Title: History of the Thirty Years' War in Germany.
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Author: Friedrich Schiller
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History of the Thirty Years' War in Germany.
Friedrich Schiller
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Table of Contents
History of the Thirty Years' War in Germany................................................................................................1
History of the Thirty Years' War in Germany.
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History of the Thirty Years' War in Germany.
Friedrich Schiller
Translated by Rev. A. J. W. Morrison, M.A.
Preface
Book I
Book II
Book III
Book IV
Book V
Index
Preface
The present is the only collected edition of the principal works of Schiller which is accessible to English
readers. Detached poems or dramas have been translated at various times, and sometimes by men of
eminence, since the first publication of the original works; and in several instances these versions have been
incorporated, after some revision or necessary correction, into the following collection; but on the other hand
a large proportion of the contents have been specially translated for this edition, in which category are the
historical works which occupy this volume and a portion of the next.
Schiller was not less efficiently qualified by nature for an historian than for a dramatist. He was formed to
excel in all departments of literature, and the admirable lucidity of style and soundness and impartiality of
judgment displayed in his historical writings will not easily by surpassed, and will always recommend them
as popular expositions of the periods of which they treat.
Since the first publication of this edition many corrections and improvements have been made, with a view to
rendering it as acceptable as possible to English readers.
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Book I.
From the beginning of the religious wars in Germany, to the peace of Munster, scarcely any thing great or
remarkable occurred in the political world of Europe in which the Reformation had not an important share.
All the events of this period, if they did not originate in, soon became mixed up with, the question of religion,
and no state was either too great or too little to feel directly or indirectly more or less of its influence.
Against the reformed doctrine and its adherents, the House of Austria directed, almost exclusively, the whole
of its immense political power. In France, the Reformation had enkindled a civil war which, under four
stormy reigns, shook the kingdom to its foundations, brought foreign armies into the heart of the country, and
for half a century rendered it the scene of the most mournful disorders. It was the Reformation, too, that
rendered the Spanish yoke intolerable to the Flemings, and awakened in them both the desire and the courage
to throw off its fetters, while it also principally furnished them with the means of their emancipation. And as
to England, all the evils with which Philip the Second threatened Elizabeth, were mainly intended in revenge
for her having taken his Protestant subjects under her protection, and placing herself at the head of a religious
party which it was his aim and endeavour to extirpate. In Germany, the schisms in the church produced also a
lasting political schism, which made that country for more than a century the theatre of confusion, but at the
same time threw up a firm barrier against political oppression. It was, too, the Reformation principally that
first drew the northern powers, Denmark and Sweden, into the political system of Europe; and while on the
one hand the Protestant League was strengthened by their adhesion, it on the other was indispensable to their
interests. States which hitherto scarcely concerned themselves with one another's existence, acquired through
the Reformation an attractive centre of interest, and began to be united by new political sympathies. And as
through its influence new relations sprang up between citizen and citizen, and between rulers and subjects, so
also entire states were forced by it into new relative positions. Thus, by a strange course of events, religious
disputes were the means of cementing a closer union among the nations of Europe.
Fearful indeed, and destructive, was the first movement in which this general political sympathy announced
itself; a desolating war of thirty years, which, from the interior of Bohemia to the mouth of the Scheldt, and
from the banks of the Po to the coasts of the Baltic, devastated whole countries, destroyed harvests, and
reduced towns and villages to ashes; which opened a grave for many thousand combatants, and for half a
century smothered the glimmering sparks of civilization in Germany, and threw back the improving manners
of the country into their pristine barbarity and wildness. Yet out of this fearful war Europe came forth free
and independent. In it she first learned to recognize herself as a community of nations; and this
intercommunion of states, which originated in the thirty years' war, may alone be sufficient to reconcile the
philosopher to its horrors. The hand of industry has slowly but gradually effaced the traces of its ravages,
while its beneficent influence still survives; and this general sympathy among the states of Europe, which
grew out of the troubles in Bohemia, is our guarantee for the continuance of that peace which was the result
of the war. As the sparks of destruction found their way from the interior of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria,
to kindle Germany, France, and the half of Europe, so also will the torch of civilization make a path for itself
from the latter to enlighten the former countries.
All this was effected by religion. Religion alone could have rendered possible all that was accomplished, but
it was far from being the SOLE motive of the war. Had not private advantages and state interests been closely
connected with it, vain and powerless would have been the arguments of theologians; and the cry of the
people would never have met with princes so willing to espouse their cause, nor the new doctrines have found
such numerous, brave, and persevering champions. The Reformation is undoubtedly owing in a great measure
to the invincible power of truth, or of opinions which were held as such. The abuses in the old church, the
absurdity of many of its dogmas, the extravagance of its requisitions, necessarily revolted the tempers of men,
already halfwon with the promise of a better light, and favourably disposed them towards the new doctrines.
The charm of independence, the rich plunder of monastic institutions, made the Reformation attractive in the
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eyes of princes, and tended not a little to strengthen their inward convictions. Nothing, however, but political
considerations could have driven them to espouse it. Had not Charles the Fifth, in the intoxication of success,
made an attempt on the independence of the German States, a Protestant league would scarcely have rushed
to arms in defence of freedom of belief; but for the ambition of the Guises, the Calvinists in France would
never have beheld a Conde or a Coligny at their head. Without the exaction of the tenth and the twentieth
penny, the See of Rome had never lost the United Netherlands. Princes fought in selfdefence or for
aggrandizement, while religious enthusiasm recruited their armies, and opened to them the treasures of their
subjects. Of the multitude who flocked to their standards, such as were not lured by the hope of plunder
imagined they were fighting for the truth, while in fact they were shedding their blood for the personal
objects of their princes.
And well was it for the people that, on this occasion, their interests coincided with those of their princes. To
this coincidence alone were they indebted for their deliverance from popery. Well was it also for the rulers,
that the subject contended too for his own cause, while he was fighting their battles. Fortunately at this date
no European sovereign was so absolute as to be able, in the pursuit of his political designs, to dispense with
the goodwill of his subjects. Yet how difficult was it to gain and to set to work this goodwill! The most
impressive arguments drawn from reasons of state fall powerless on the ear of the subject, who seldom
understands, and still more rarely is interested in them. In such circumstances, the only course open to a
prudent prince is to connect the interests of the cabinet with some one that sits nearer to the people's heart, if
such exists, or if not, to create it.
In such a position stood the greater part of those princes who embraced the cause of the Reformation. By a
strange concatenation of events, the divisions of the Church were associated with two circumstances, without
which, in all probability, they would have had a very different conclusion. These were, the increasing power
of the House of Austria, which threatened the liberties of Europe, and its active zeal for the old religion. The
first aroused the princes, while the second armed the people.
The abolition of a foreign jurisdiction within their own territories, the supremacy in ecclesiastical matters, the
stopping of the treasure which had so long flowed to Rome, the rich plunder of religious foundations, were
tempting advantages to every sovereign. Why, then, it may be asked, did they not operate with equal force
upon the princes of the House of Austria? What prevented this house, particularly in its German branch, from
yielding to the pressing demands of so many of its subjects, and, after the example of other princes, enriching
itself at the expense of a defenceless clergy? It is difficult to credit that a belief in the infallibility of the
Romish Church had any greater influence on the pious adherence of this house, than the opposite conviction
had on the revolt of the Protestant princes. In fact, several circumstances combined to make the Austrian
princes zealous supporters of popery. Spain and Italy, from which Austria derived its principal strength, were
still devoted to the See of Rome with that blind obedience which, ever since the days of the Gothic dynasty,
had been the peculiar characteristic of the Spaniard. The slightest approximation, in a Spanish prince, to the
obnoxious tenets of Luther and Calvin, would have alienated for ever the affections of his subjects, and a
defection from the Pope would have cost him the kingdom. A Spanish prince had no alternative but
orthodoxy or abdication. The same restraint was imposed upon Austria by her Italian dominions, which she
was obliged to treat, if possible, with even greater indulgence; impatient as they naturally were of a foreign
yoke, and possessing also ready means of shaking it off. In regard to the latter provinces, moreover, the rival
pretensions of France, and the neighbourhood of the Pope, were motives sufficient to prevent the Emperor
from declaring in favour of a party which strove to annihilate the papal see, and also to induce him to show
the most active zeal in behalf of the old religion. These general considerations, which must have been equally
weighty with every Spanish monarch, were, in the particular case of Charles V., still further enforced by
peculiar and personal motives. In Italy this monarch had a formidable rival in the King of France, under
whose protection that country might throw itself the instant that Charles should incur the slightest suspicion
of heresy. Distrust on the part of the Roman Catholics, and a rupture with the church, would have been fatal
also to many of his most cherished designs. Moreover, when Charles was first called upon to make his
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election between the two parties, the new doctrine had not yet attained to a full and commanding influence,
and there still subsisted a prospect of its reconciliation with the old. In his son and successor, Philip the
Second, a monastic education combined with a gloomy and despotic disposition to generate an unmitigated
hostility to all innovations in religion; a feeling which the thought that his most formidable political
opponents were also the enemies of his faith was not calculated to weaken. As his European possessions,
scattered as they were over so many countries, were on all sides exposed to the seductions of foreign
opinions, the progress of the Reformation in other quarters could not well be a matter of indifference to him.
His immediate interests, therefore, urged him to attach himself devotedly to the old church, in order to close
up the sources of the heretical contagion. Thus, circumstances naturally placed this prince at the head of the
league which the Roman Catholics formed against the Reformers. The principles which had actuated the long
and active reigns of Charles V. and Philip the Second, remained a law for their successors; and the more the
breach in the church widened, the firmer became the attachment of the Spaniards to Roman Catholicism.
The German line of the House of Austria was apparently more unfettered; but, in reality, though free from
many of these restraints, it was yet confined by others. The possession of the imperial throne a dignity it
was impossible for a Protestant to hold, (for with what consistency could an apostate from the Romish
Church wear the crown of a Roman emperor?) bound the successors of Ferdinand I. to the See of Rome.
Ferdinand himself was, from conscientious motives, heartily attached to it. Besides, the German princes of
the House of Austria were not powerful enough to dispense with the support of Spain, which, however, they
would have forfeited by the least show of leaning towards the new doctrines. The imperial dignity, also,
required them to preserve the existing political system of Germany, with which the maintenance of their own
authority was closely bound up, but which it was the aim of the Protestant League to destroy. If to these
grounds we add the indifference of the Protestants to the Emperor's necessities and to the common dangers of
the empire, their encroachments on the temporalities of the church, and their aggressive violence when they
became conscious of their own power, we can easily conceive how so many concurring motives must have
determined the emperors to the side of popery, and how their own interests came to be intimately interwoven
with those of the Roman Church. As its fate seemed to depend altogether on the part taken by Austria, the
princes of this house came to be regarded by all Europe as the pillars of popery. The hatred, therefore, which
the Protestants bore against the latter, was turned exclusively upon Austria; and the cause became gradually
confounded with its protector.
But this irreconcileable enemy of the Reformation the House of Austria by its ambitious projects and
the overwhelming force which it could bring to their support, endangered, in no small degree, the freedom of
Europe, and more especially of the German States. This circumstance could not fail to rouse the latter from
their security, and to render them vigilant in selfdefence. Their ordinary resources were quite insufficient to
resist so formidable a power. Extraordinary exertions were required from their subjects; and when even these
proved far from adequate, they had recourse to foreign assistance; and, by means of a common league, they
endeavoured to oppose a power which, singly, they were unable to withstand.
But the strong political inducements which the German princes had to resist the pretensions of the House of
Austria, naturally did not extend to their subjects. It is only immediate advantages or immediate evils that set
the people in action, and for these a sound policy cannot wait. Ill then would it have fared with these princes,
if by good fortune another effectual motive had not offered itself, which roused the passions of the people,
and kindled in them an enthusiasm which might be directed against the political danger, as having with it a
common cause of alarm.
This motive was their avowed hatred of the religion which Austria protected, and their enthusiastic
attachment to a doctrine which that House was endeavouring to extirpate by fire and sword. Their attachment
was ardent, their hatred invincible. Religious fanaticism anticipates even the remotest dangers. Enthusiasm
never calculates its sacrifices. What the most pressing danger of the state could not gain from the citizens,
was effected by religious zeal. For the state, or for the prince, few would have drawn the sword; but for
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religion, the merchant, the artist, the peasant, all cheerfully flew to arms. For the state, or for the prince, even
the smallest additional impost would have been avoided; but for religion the people readily staked at once
life, fortune, and all earthly hopes. It trebled the contributions which flowed into the exchequer of the princes,
and the armies which marched to the field; and, in the ardent excitement produced in all minds by the peril to
which their faith was exposed, the subject felt not the pressure of those burdens and privations under which,
in cooler moments, he would have sunk exhausted. The terrors of the Spanish Inquisition, and the massacre
of St. Bartholomew's, procured for the Prince of Orange, the Admiral Coligny, the British Queen Elizabeth,
and the Protestant princes of Germany, supplies of men and money from their subjects, to a degree which at
present is inconceivable.
But, with all their exertions, they would have effected little against a power which was an overmatch for any
single adversary, however powerful. At this period of imperfect policy, accidental circumstances alone could
determine distant states to afford one another a mutual support. The differences of government, of laws, of
language, of manners, and of character, which hitherto had kept whole nations and countries as it were
insulated, and raised a lasting barrier between them, rendered one state insensible to the distresses of another,
save where national jealousy could indulge a malicious joy at the reverses of a rival. This barrier the
Reformation destroyed. An interest more intense and more immediate than national aggrandizement or
patriotism, and entirely independent of private utility, began to animate whole states and individual citizens;
an interest capable of uniting numerous and distant nations, even while it frequently lost its force among the
subjects of the same government. With the inhabitants of Geneva, for instance, of England, of Germany, or of
Holland, the French Calvinist possessed a common point of union which he had not with his own
countrymen. Thus, in one important particular, he ceased to be the citizen of a single state, and to confine his
views and sympathies to his own country alone. The sphere of his views became enlarged. He began to
calculate his own fate from that of other nations of the same religious profession, and to make their cause his
own. Now for the first time did princes venture to bring the affairs of other countries before their own
councils; for the first time could they hope for a willing ear to their own necessities, and prompt assistance
from others. Foreign affairs had now become a matter of domestic policy, and that aid was readily granted to
the religious confederate which would have been denied to the mere neighbour, and still more to the distant
stranger. The inhabitant of the Palatinate leaves his native fields to fight side by side with his religious
associate of France, against the common enemy of their faith. The Huguenot draws his sword against the
country which persecutes him, and sheds his blood in defence of the liberties of Holland. Swiss is arrayed
against Swiss; German against German, to determine, on the banks of the Loire and the Seine, the succession
of the French crown. The Dane crosses the Eider, and the Swede the Baltic, to break the chains which are
forged for Germany.
It is difficult to say what would have been the fate of the Reformation, and the liberties of the Empire, had not
the formidable power of Austria declared against them. This, however, appears certain, that nothing so
completely damped the Austrian hopes of universal monarchy, as the obstinate war which they had to wage
against the new religious opinions. Under no other circumstances could the weaker princes have roused their
subjects to such extraordinary exertions against the ambition of Austria, or the States themselves have united
so closely against the common enemy.
The power of Austria never stood higher than after the victory which Charles V. gained over the Germans at
Muehlberg. With the treaty of Smalcalde the freedom of Germany lay, as it seemed, prostrate for ever; but it
revived under Maurice of Saxony, once its most formidable enemy. All the fruits of the victory of Muehlberg
were lost again in the congress of Passau, and the diet of Augsburg; and every scheme for civil and religious
oppression terminated in the concessions of an equitable peace.
The diet of Augsburg divided Germany into two religious and two political parties, by recognizing the
independent rights and existence of both. Hitherto the Protestants had been looked on as rebels; they were
henceforth to be regarded as brethren not indeed through affection, but necessity. By the Interim*, the
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Confession of Augsburg was allowed temporarily to take a sisterly place alongside of the olden religion,
though only as a tolerated neighbour. To every secular state was conceded the right of establishing the
religion it acknowledged as supreme and exclusive within its own territories, and of forbidding the open
profession of its rival. Subjects were to be free to quit a country where their own religion was not tolerated.
The doctrines of Luther for the first time received a positive sanction; and if they were trampled under foot in
Bavaria and Austria, they predominated in Saxony and Thuringia. But the sovereigns alone were to determine
what form of religion should prevail within their territories; the feelings of subjects who had no
representatives in the diet were little attended to in the pacification. In the ecclesiastical territories, indeed,
where the unreformed religion enjoyed an undisputed supremacy, the free exercise of their religion was
obtained for all who had previously embraced the Protestant doctrines; but this indulgence rested only on the
personal guarantee of Ferdinand, King of the Romans, by whose endeavours chiefly this peace was effected;
a guarantee, which, being rejected by the Roman Catholic members of the Diet, and only inserted in the treaty
under their protest, could not of course have the force of law.
* A system of Theology so called, prepared by order of the Emperor Charles V. for the use of Germany, to
reconcile the differences between the Roman Catholics and the Lutherans, which, however, was rejected by
both parties Ed.
If it had been opinions only that thus divided the minds of men, with what indifference would all have
regarded the division! But on these opinions depended riches, dignities, and rights; and it was this which so
deeply aggravated the evils of division. Of two brothers, as it were, who had hitherto enjoyed a paternal
inheritance in common, one now remained, while the other was compelled to leave his father's house, and
hence arose the necessity of dividing the patrimony. For this separation, which he could not have foreseen,
the father had made no provision. By the beneficent donations of pious ancestors the riches of the church had
been accumulating through a thousand years, and these benefactors were as much the progenitors of the
departing brother as of him who remained. Was the right of inheritance then to be limited to the paternal
house, or to be extended to blood? The gifts had been made to the church in communion with Rome, because
at that time no other existed, to the firstborn, as it were, because he was as yet the only son. Was then a
right of primogeniture to be admitted in the church, as in noble families? Were the pretensions of one party to
be favoured by a prescription from times when the claims of the other could not have come into existence?
Could the Lutherans be justly excluded from these possessions, to which the benevolence of their forefathers
had contributed, merely on the ground that, at the date of their foundation, the differences between
Lutheranism and Romanism were unknown? Both parties have disputed, and still dispute, with equal
plausibility, on these points. Both alike have found it difficult to prove their right. Law can be applied only to
conceivable cases, and perhaps spiritual foundations are not among the number of these, and still less where
the conditions of the founders generally extended to a system of doctrines; for how is it conceivable that a
permanent endowment should be made of opinions left open to change?
What law cannot decide, is usually determined by might, and such was the case here. The one party held
firmly all that could no longer be wrested from it the other defended what it still possessed. All the
bishoprics and abbeys which had been secularized BEFORE the peace, remained with the Protestants; but, by
an express clause, the unreformed Catholics provided that none should thereafter be secularized. Every
impropriator of an ecclesiastical foundation, who held immediately of the Empire, whether elector, bishop, or
abbot, forfeited his benefice and dignity the moment he embraced the Protestant belief; he was obliged in that
event instantly to resign its emoluments, and the chapter was to proceed to a new election, exactly as if his
place had been vacated by death. By this sacred anchor of the Ecclesiastical Reservation, (`Reservatum
Ecclesiasticum',) which makes the temporal existence of a spiritual prince entirely dependent on his fidelity
to the olden religion, the Roman Catholic Church in Germany is still held fast; and precarious, indeed, would
be its situation were this anchor to give way. The principle of the Ecclesiastical Reservation was strongly
opposed by the Protestants; and though it was at last adopted into the treaty of peace, its insertion was
qualified with the declaration, that parties had come to no final determination on the point. Could it then be
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more binding on the Protestants than Ferdinand's guarantee in favour of Protestant subjects of ecclesiastical
states was upon the Roman Catholics? Thus were two important subjects of dispute left unsettled in the treaty
of peace, and by them the war was rekindled.
Such was the position of things with regard to religious toleration and ecclesiastical property: it was the same
with regard to rights and dignities. The existing German system provided only for one church, because one
only was in existence when that system was framed. The church had now divided; the Diet had broken into
two religious parties; was the whole system of the Empire still exclusively to follow the one? The emperors
had hitherto been members of the Romish Church, because till now that religion had no rival. But was it his
connexion with Rome which constituted a German emperor, or was it not rather Germany which was to be
represented in its head? The Protestants were now spread over the whole Empire, and how could they justly
still be represented by an unbroken line of Roman Catholic emperors? In the Imperial Chamber the German
States judge themselves, for they elect the judges; it was the very end of its institution that they should do so,
in order that equal justice should be dispensed to all; but would this be still possible, if the representatives of
both professions were not equally admissible to a seat in the Chamber? That one religion only existed in
Germany at the time of its establishment, was accidental; that no one estate should have the means of legally
oppressing another, was the essential purpose of the institution. Now this object would be entirely frustrated
if one religious party were to have the exclusive power of deciding for the other. Must, then, the design be
sacrificed, because that which was merely accidental had changed? With great difficulty the Protestants, at
last, obtained for the representatives of their religion a place in the Supreme Council, but still there was far
from being a perfect equality of voices. To this day no Protestant prince has been raised to the imperial
throne.
Whatever may be said of the equality which the peace of Augsburg was to have established between the two
German churches, the Roman Catholic had unquestionably still the advantage. All that the Lutheran Church
gained by it was toleration; all that the Romish Church conceded, was a sacrifice to necessity, not an offering
to justice. Very far was it from being a peace between two equal powers, but a truce between a sovereign and
unconquered rebels. From this principle all the proceedings of the Roman Catholics against the Protestants
seemed to flow, and still continue to do so. To join the reformed faith was still a crime, since it was to be
visited with so severe a penalty as that which the Ecclesiastical Reservation held suspended over the apostacy
of the spiritual princes. Even to the last, the Romish Church preferred to risk to loss of every thing by force,
than voluntarily to yield the smallest matter to justice. The loss was accidental and might be repaired; but the
abandonment of its pretensions, the concession of a single point to the Protestants, would shake the
foundations of the church itself. Even in the treaty of peace this principle was not lost sight of. Whatever in
this peace was yielded to the Protestants was always under condition. It was expressly declared, that affairs
were to remain on the stipulated footing only till the next general council, which was to be called with the
view of effecting an union between the two confessions. Then only, when this last attempt should have failed,
was the religious treaty to become valid and conclusive. However little hope there might be of such a
reconciliation, however little perhaps the Romanists themselves were in earnest with it, still it was something
to have clogged the peace with these stipulations.
Thus this religious treaty, which was to extinguish for ever the flames of civil war, was, in fact, but a
temporary truce, extorted by force and necessity; not dictated by justice, nor emanating from just notions
either of religion or toleration. A religious treaty of this kind the Roman Catholics were as incapable of
granting, to be candid, as in truth the Lutherans were unqualified to receive. Far from evincing a tolerant
spirit towards the Roman Catholics, when it was in their power, they even oppressed the Calvinists; who
indeed just as little deserved toleration, since they were unwilling to practise it. For such a peace the times
were not yet ripe the minds of men not yet sufficiently enlightened. How could one party expect from
another what itself was incapable of performing? What each side saved or gained by the treaty of Augsburg,
it owed to the imposing attitude of strength which it maintained at the time of its negociation. What was won
by force was to be maintained also by force; if the peace was to be permanent, the two parties to it must
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preserve the same relative positions. The boundaries of the two churches had been marked out with the
sword; with the sword they must be preserved, or woe to that party which should be first disarmed! A sad and
fearful prospect for the tranquillity of Germany, when peace itself bore so threatening an aspect.
A momentary lull now pervaded the empire; a transitory bond of concord appeared to unite its scattered limbs
into one body, so that for a time a feeling also for the common weal returned. But the division had penetrated
its inmost being, and to restore its original harmony was impossible. Carefully as the treaty of peace appeared
to have defined the rights of both parties, its interpretation was nevertheless the subject of many disputes. In
the heat of conflict it had produced a cessation of hostilities; it covered, not extinguished, the fire, and
unsatisfied claims remained on either side. The Romanists imagined they had lost too much, the Protestants
that they had gained too little; and the treaty which neither party could venture to violate, was interpreted by
each in its own favour.
The seizure of the ecclesiastical benefices, the motive which had so strongly tempted the majority of the
Protestant princes to embrace the doctrines of Luther, was not less powerful after than before the peace; of
those whose founders had not held their fiefs immediately of the empire, such as were not already in their
possession would it was evident soon be so. The whole of Lower Germany was already secularized; and if it
were otherwise in Upper Germany, it was owing to the vehement resistance of the Catholics, who had there
the preponderance. Each party, where it was the most powerful, oppressed the adherents of the other; the
ecclesiastical princes in particular, as the most defenceless members of the empire, were incessantly
tormented by the ambition of their Protestant neighbours. Those who were too weak to repel force by force,
took refuge under the wings of justice; and the complaints of spoliation were heaped up against the
Protestants in the Imperial Chamber, which was ready enough to pursue the accused with judgments, but
found too little support to carry them into effect. The peace which stipulated for complete religious toleration
for the dignitaries of the Empire, had provided also for the subject, by enabling him, without interruption, to
leave the country in which the exercise of his religion was prohibited. But from the wrongs which the
violence of a sovereign might inflict on an obnoxious subject; from the nameless oppressions by which he
might harass and annoy the emigrant; from the artful snares in which subtilty combined with power might
enmesh him from these, the dead letter of the treaty could afford him no protection. The Catholic subject
of Protestant princes complained loudly of violations of the religious peace the Lutherans still more loudly
of the oppression they experienced under their Romanist suzerains. The rancour and animosities of
theologians infused a poison into every occurrence, however inconsiderable, and inflamed the minds of the
people. Happy would it have been had this theological hatred exhausted its zeal upon the common enemy,
instead of venting its virus on the adherents of a kindred faith!
Unanimity amongst the Protestants might, by preserving the balance between the contending parties, have
prolonged the peace; but as if to complete the confusion, all concord was quickly broken. The doctrines
which had been propagated by Zuingli in Zurich, and by Calvin in Geneva, soon spread to Germany, and
divided the Protestants among themselves, with little in unison save their common hatred to popery. The
Protestants of this date bore but slight resemblance to those who, fifty years before, drew up the Confession
of Augsburg; and the cause of the change is to be sought in that Confession itself. It had prescribed a positive
boundary to the Protestant faith, before the newly awakened spirit of inquiry had satisfied itself as to the
limits it ought to set; and the Protestants seemed unwittingly to have thrown away much of the advantage
acquired by their rejection of popery. Common complaints of the Romish hierarchy, and of ecclesiastical
abuses, and a common disapprobation of its dogmas, formed a sufficient centre of union for the Protestants;
but not content with this, they sought a rallying point in the promulgation of a new and positive creed, in
which they sought to embody the distinctions, the privileges, and the essence of the church, and to this they
referred the convention entered into with their opponents. It was as professors of this creed that they had
acceded to the treaty; and in the benefits of this peace the advocates of the confession were alone entitled to
participate. In any case, therefore, the situation of its adherents was embarrassing. If a blind obedience were
yielded to the dicta of the Confession, a lasting bound would be set to the spirit of inquiry; if, on the other
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hand, they dissented from the formulae agreed upon, the point of union would be lost. Unfortunately both
incidents occurred, and the evil results of both were quickly felt. One party rigorously adhered to the original
symbol of faith, and the other abandoned it, only to adopt another with equal exclusiveness.
Nothing could have furnished the common enemy a more plausible defence of his cause than this dissension;
no spectacle could have been more gratifying to him than the rancour with which the Protestants alternately
persecuted each other. Who could condemn the Roman Catholics, if they laughed at the audacity with which
the Reformers had presumed to announce the only true belief? if from Protestants they borrowed the
weapons against Protestants? if, in the midst of this clashing of opinions, they held fast to the authority of
their own church, for which, in part, there spoke an honourable antiquity, and a yet more honourable plurality
of voices. But this division placed the Protestants in still more serious embarrassments. As the covenants of
the treaty applied only to the partisans of the Confession, their opponents, with some reason, called upon
them to explain who were to be recognized as the adherents of that creed. The Lutherans could not, without
offending conscience, include the Calvinists in their communion, except at the risk of converting a useful
friend into a dangerous enemy, could they exclude them. This unfortunate difference opened a way for the
machinations of the Jesuits to sow distrust between both parties, and to destroy the unity of their measures.
Fettered by the double fear of their direct adversaries, and of their opponents among themselves, the
Protestants lost for ever the opportunity of placing their church on a perfect equality with the Catholic. All
these difficulties would have been avoided, and the defection of the Calvinists would not have prejudiced the
common cause, if the point of union had been placed simply in the abandonment of Romanism, instead of in
the Confession of Augsburg.
But however divided on other points, they concurred in this that the security which had resulted from
equality of power could only be maintained by the preservation of that balance. In the meanwhile, the
continual reforms of one party, and the opposing measures of the other, kept both upon the watch, while the
interpretation of the religious treaty was a neverending subject of dispute. Each party maintained that every
step taken by its opponent was an infraction of the peace, while of every movement of its own it was asserted
that it was essential to its maintenance. Yet all the measures of the Catholics did not, as their opponents
alleged, proceed from a spirit of encroachment many of them were the necessary precautions of
selfdefence. The Protestants had shown unequivocally enough what the Romanists might expect if they
were unfortunate enough to become the weaker party. The greediness of the former for the property of the
church, gave no reason to expect indulgence; their bitter hatred left no hope of magnanimity or
forbearance.
But the Protestants, likewise, were excusable if they too placed little confidence in the sincerity of the Roman
Catholics. By the treacherous and inhuman treatment which their brethren in Spain, France, and the
Netherlands, had suffered; by the disgraceful subterfuge of the Romish princes, who held that the Pope had
power to relieve them from the obligation of the most solemn oaths; and above all, by the detestable maxim,
that faith was not to be kept with heretics, the Roman Church, in the eyes of all honest men, had lost its
honour. No engagement, no oath, however sacred, from a Roman Catholic, could satisfy a Protestant. What
security then could the religious peace afford, when, throughout Germany, the Jesuits represented it as a
measure of mere temporary convenience, and in Rome itself it was solemnly repudiated.
The General Council, to which reference had been made in the treaty, had already been held in the city of
Trent; but, as might have been foreseen, without accommodating the religious differences, or taking a single
step to effect such accommodation, and even without being attended by the Protestants. The latter, indeed,
were now solemnly excommunicated by it in the name of the church, whose representative the Council gave
itself out to be. Could, then, a secular treaty, extorted moreover by force of arms, afford them adequate
protection against the ban of the church; a treaty, too, based on a condition which the decision of the Council
seemed entirely to abolish? There was then a show of right for violating the peace, if only the Romanists
possessed the power; and henceforward the Protestants were protected by nothing but the respect for their
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formidable array.
Other circumstances combined to augment this distrust. Spain, on whose support the Romanists in Germany
chiefly relied, was engaged in a bloody conflict with the Flemings. By it, the flower of the Spanish troops
were drawn to the confines of Germany. With what ease might they be introduced within the empire, if a
decisive stroke should render their presence necessary? Germany was at that time a magazine of war for
nearly all the powers of Europe. The religious war had crowded it with soldiers, whom the peace left
destitute; its many independent princes found it easy to assemble armies, and afterwards, for the sake of gain,
or the interests of party, hire them out to other powers. With German troops, Philip the Second waged war
against the Netherlands, and with German troops they defended themselves. Every such levy in Germany was
a subject of alarm to the one party or the other, since it might be intended for their oppression. The arrival of
an ambassador, an extraordinary legate of the Pope, a conference of princes, every unusual incident, must, it
was thought, be pregnant with destruction to some party. Thus, for nearly half a century, stood Germany, her
hand upon the sword; every rustle of a leaf alarmed her.
Ferdinand the First, King of Hungary, and his excellent son, Maximilian the Second, held at this memorable
epoch the reins of government. With a heart full of sincerity, with a truly heroic patience, had Ferdinand
brought about the religious peace of Augsburg, and afterwards, in the Council of Trent, laboured assiduously,
though vainly, at the ungrateful task of reconciling the two religions. Abandoned by his nephew, Philip of
Spain, and hard pressed both in Hungary and Transylvania by the victorious armies of the Turks, it was not
likely that this emperor would entertain the idea of violating the religious peace, and thereby destroying his
own painful work. The heavy expenses of the perpetually recurring war with Turkey could not be defrayed by
the meagre contributions of his exhausted hereditary dominions. He stood, therefore, in need of the assistance
of the whole empire; and the religious peace alone preserved in one body the otherwise divided empire.
Financial necessities made the Protestant as needful to him as the Romanist, and imposed upon him the
obligation of treating both parties with equal justice, which, amidst so many contradictory claims, was truly a
colossal task. Very far, however, was the result from answering his expectations. His indulgence of the
Protestants served only to bring upon his successors a war, which death saved himself the mortification of
witnessing. Scarcely more fortunate was his son Maximilian, with whom perhaps the pressure of
circumstances was the only obstacle, and a longer life perhaps the only want, to his establishing the new
religion upon the imperial throne. Necessity had taught the father forbearance towards the Protestants
necessity and justice dictated the same course to the son. The grandson had reason to repent that he neither
listened to justice, nor yielded to necessity.
Maximilian left six sons, of whom the eldest, the Archduke Rodolph, inherited his dominions, and ascended
the imperial throne. The other brothers were put off with petty appanages. A few mesne fiefs were held by a
collateral branch, which had their uncle, Charles of Styria, at its head; and even these were afterwards, under
his son, Ferdinand the Second, incorporated with the rest of the family dominions. With this exception, the
whole of the imposing power of Austria was now wielded by a single, but unfortunately weak hand.
Rodolph the Second was not devoid of those virtues which might have gained him the esteem of mankind,
had the lot of a private station fallen to him. His character was mild, he loved peace and the sciences,
particularly astronomy, natural history, chemistry, and the study of antiquities. To these he applied with a
passionate zeal, which, at the very time when the critical posture of affairs demanded all his attention, and his
exhausted finances the most rigid economy, diverted his attention from state affairs, and involved him in
pernicious expenses. His taste for astronomy soon lost itself in those astrological reveries to which timid and
melancholy temperaments like his are but too disposed. This, together with a youth passed in Spain, opened
his ears to the evil counsels of the Jesuits, and the influence of the Spanish court, by which at last he was
wholly governed. Ruled by tastes so little in accordance with the dignity of his station, and alarmed by
ridiculous prophecies, he withdrew, after the Spanish custom, from the eyes of his subjects, to bury himself
amidst his gems and antiques, or to make experiments in his laboratory, while the most fatal discords
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loosened all the bands of the empire, and the flames of rebellion began to burst out at the very footsteps of his
throne. All access to his person was denied, the most urgent matters were neglected. The prospect of the rich
inheritance of Spain was closed against him, while he was trying to make up his mind to offer his hand to the
Infanta Isabella. A fearful anarchy threatened the Empire, for though without an heir of his own body, he
could not be persuaded to allow the election of a King of the Romans. The Austrian States renounced their
allegiance, Hungary and Transylvania threw off his supremacy, and Bohemia was not slow in following their
example. The descendant of the once so formidable Charles the Fifth was in perpetual danger, either of losing
one part of his possessions to the Turks, or another to the Protestants, and of sinking, beyond redemption,
under the formidable coalition which a great monarch of Europe had formed against him. The events which
now took place in the interior of Germany were such as usually happened when either the throne was without
an emperor, or the Emperor without a sense of his imperial dignity. Outraged or abandoned by their head, the
States of the Empire were left to help themselves; and alliances among themselves must supply the defective
authority of the Emperor. Germany was divided into two leagues, which stood in arms arrayed against each
other: between both, Rodolph, the despised opponent of the one, and the impotent protector of the other,
remained irresolute and useless, equally unable to destroy the former or to command the latter. What had the
Empire to look for from a prince incapable even of defending his hereditary dominions against its domestic
enemies? To prevent the utter ruin of the House of Austria, his own family combined against him; and a
powerful party threw itself into the arms of his brother. Driven from his hereditary dominions, nothing was
now left him to lose but the imperial dignity; and he was only spared this last disgrace by a timely death.
At this critical moment, when only a supple policy, united with a vigorous arm, could have maintained the
tranquillity of the Empire, its evil genius gave it a Rodolph for Emperor. At a more peaceful period the
Germanic Union would have managed its own interests, and Rodolph, like so many others of his rank, might
have hidden his deficiencies in a mysterious obscurity. But the urgent demand for the qualities in which he
was most deficient revealed his incapacity. The position of Germany called for an emperor who, by his
known energies, could give weight to his resolves; and the hereditary dominions of Rodolph, considerable as
they were, were at present in a situation to occasion the greatest embarrassment to the governors.
The Austrian princes, it is true were Roman Catholics, and in addition to that, the supporters of Popery, but
their countries were far from being so. The reformed opinions had penetrated even these, and favoured by
Ferdinand's necessities and Maximilian's mildness, had met with a rapid success. The Austrian provinces
exhibited in miniature what Germany did on a larger scale. The great nobles and the ritter class or knights
were chiefly evangelical, and in the cities the Protestants had a decided preponderance. If they succeeded in
bringing a few of their party into the country, they contrived imperceptibly to fill all places of trust and the
magistracy with their own adherents, and to exclude the Catholics. Against the numerous order of the nobles
and knights, and the deputies from the towns, the voice of a few prelates was powerless; and the unseemly
ridicule and offensive contempt of the former soon drove them entirely from the provincial diets. Thus the
whole of the Austrian Diet had imperceptibly become Protestant, and the Reformation was making rapid
strides towards its public recognition. The prince was dependent on the Estates, who had it in their power to
grant or refuse supplies. Accordingly, they availed themselves of the financial necessities of Ferdinand and
his son to extort one religious concession after another. To the nobles and knights, Maximilian at last
conceded the free exercise of their religion, but only within their own territories and castles. The intemperate
enthusiasm of the Protestant preachers overstepped the boundaries which prudence had prescribed. In
defiance of the express prohibition, several of them ventured to preach publicly, not only in the towns, but in
Vienna itself, and the people flocked in crowds to this new doctrine, the best seasoning of which was
personality and abuse. Thus continued food was supplied to fanaticism, and the hatred of two churches, that
were such near neighbours, was farther envenomed by the sting of an impure zeal.
Among the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, Hungary and Transylvania were the most unstable,
and the most difficult to retain. The impossibility of holding these two countries against the neighbouring and
overwhelming power of the Turks, had already driven Ferdinand to the inglorious expedient of recognizing,
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by an annual tribute, the Porte's supremacy over Transylvania; a shameful confession of weakness, and a still
more dangerous temptation to the turbulent nobility, when they fancied they had any reason to complain of
their master. Not without conditions had the Hungarians submitted to the House of Austria. They asserted the
elective freedom of their crown, and boldly contended for all those prerogatives of their order which are
inseparable from this freedom of election. The near neighbourhood of Turkey, the facility of changing
masters with impunity, encouraged the magnates still more in their presumption; discontented with the
Austrian government they threw themselves into the arms of the Turks; dissatisfied with these, they returned
again to their German sovereigns. The frequency and rapidity of these transitions from one government to
another, had communicated its influences also to their mode of thinking; and as their country wavered
between the Turkish and Austrian rule, so their minds vacillated between revolt and submission. The more
unfortunate each nation felt itself in being degraded into a province of a foreign kingdom, the stronger desire
did they feel to obey a monarch chosen from amongst themselves, and thus it was always easy for an
enterprising noble to obtain their support. The nearest Turkish pasha was always ready to bestow the
Hungarian sceptre and crown on a rebel against Austria; just as ready was Austria to confirm to any
adventurer the possession of provinces which he had wrested from the Porte, satisfied with preserving
thereby the shadow of authority, and with erecting at the same time a barrier against the Turks. In this way
several of these magnates, Batbori, Boschkai, Ragoczi, and Bethlen succeeded in establishing themselves,
one after another, as tributary sovereigns in Transylvania and Hungary; and they maintained their ground by
no deeper policy than that of occasionally joining the enemy, in order to render themselves more formidable
to their own prince.
Ferdinand, Maximilian, and Rodolph, who were all sovereigns of Hungary and Transylvania, exhausted their
other territories in endeavouring to defend these from the hostile inroads of the Turks, and to put down
intestine rebellion. In this quarter destructive wars were succeeded but by brief truces, which were scarcely
less hurtful: far and wide the land lay waste, while the injured serf had to complain equally of his enemy and
his protector. Into these countries also the Reformation had penetrated; and protected by the freedom of the
States, and under the cover of the internal disorders, had made a noticeable progress. Here too it was
incautiously attacked, and party spirit thus became yet more dangerous from religious enthusiasm. Headed by
a bold rebel, Boschkai, the nobles of Hungary and Transylvania raised the standard of rebellion. The
Hungarian insurgents were upon the point of making common cause with the discontented Protestants in
Austria, Moravia, and Bohemia, and uniting all those countries in one fearful revolt. The downfall of popery
in these lands would then have been inevitable.
Long had the Austrian archdukes, the brothers of the Emperor, beheld with silent indignation the impending
ruin of their house; this last event hastened their decision. The Archduke Matthias, Maximilian's second son,
Viceroy in Hungary, and Rodolph's presumptive heir, now came forward as the stay of the falling house of
Hapsburg. In his youth, misled by a false ambition, this prince, disregarding the interests of his family, had
listened to the overtures of the Flemish insurgents, who invited him into the Netherlands to conduct the
defence of their liberties against the oppression of his own relative, Philip the Second. Mistaking the voice of
an insulated faction for that of the entire nation, Matthias obeyed the call. But the event answered the
expectations of the men of Brabant as little as his own, and from this imprudent enterprise he retired with
little credit.
Far more honourable was his second appearance in the political world. Perceiving that his repeated
remonstrances with the Emperor were unavailing, he assembled the archdukes, his brothers and cousins, at
Presburg, and consulted with them on the growing perils of their house, when they unanimously assigned to
him, as the oldest, the duty of defending that patrimony which a feeble brother was endangering. In his hands
they placed all their powers and rights, and vested him with sovereign authority, to act at his discretion for the
common good. Matthias immediately opened a communication with the Porte and the Hungarian rebels, and
through his skilful management succeeded in saving, by a peace with the Turks, the remainder of Hungary,
and by a treaty with the rebels, preserved the claims of Austria to the lost provinces. But Rodolph, as jealous
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as he had hitherto been careless of his sovereign authority, refused to ratify this treaty, which he regarded as a
criminal encroachment on his sovereign rights. He accused the Archduke of keeping up a secret
understanding with the enemy, and of cherishing treasonable designs on the crown of Hungary.
The activity of Matthias was, in truth, anything but disinterested; the conduct of the Emperor only accelerated
the execution of his ambitious views. Secure, from motives of gratitude, of the devotion of the Hungarians,
for whom he had so lately obtained the blessings of peace; assured by his agents of the favourable disposition
of the nobles, and certain of the support of a large party, even in Austria, he now ventured to assume a bolder
attitude, and, sword in hand, to discuss his grievances with the Emperor. The Protestants in Austria and
Moravia, long ripe for revolt, and now won over to the Archduke by his promises of toleration, loudly and
openly espoused his cause, and their longmenaced alliance with the Hungarian rebels was actually effected.
Almost at once a formidable conspiracy was planned and matured against the Emperor. Too late did he
resolve to amend his past errors; in vain did he attempt to break up this fatal alliance. Already the whole
empire was in arms; Hungary, Austria, and Moravia had done homage to Matthias, who was already on his
march to Bohemia to seize the Emperor in his palace, and to cut at once the sinews of his power.
Bohemia was not a more peaceable possession for Austria than Hungary; with this difference only, that, in
the latter, political considerations, in the former, religious dissensions, fomented disorders. In Bohemia, a
century before the days of Luther, the first spark of the religious war had been kindled; a century after Luther,
the first flames of the thirty years' war burst out in Bohemia. The sect which owed its rise to John Huss, still
existed in that country; it agreed with the Romish Church in ceremonies and doctrines, with the single
exception of the administration of the Communion, in which the Hussites communicated in both kinds. This
privilege had been conceded to the followers of Huss by the Council of Basle, in an express treaty, (the
Bohemian Compact); and though it was afterwards disavowed by the popes, they nevertheless continued to
profit by it under the sanction of the government. As the use of the cup formed the only important distinction
of their body, they were usually designated by the name of Utraquists; and they readily adopted an
appellation which reminded them of their dearly valued privilege. But under this title lurked also the far
stricter sects of the Bohemian and Moravian Brethren, who differed from the predominant church in more
important particulars, and bore, in fact, a great resemblance to the German Protestants. Among them both, the
German and Swiss opinions on religion made rapid progress; while the name of Utraquists, under which they
managed to disguise the change of their principles, shielded them from persecution.
In truth, they had nothing in common with the Utraquists but the name; essentially, they were altogether
Protestant. Confident in the strength of their party, and the Emperor's toleration under Maximilian, they had
openly avowed their tenets. After the example of the Germans, they drew up a Confession of their own, in
which Lutherans as well as Calvinists recognized their own doctrines, and they sought to transfer to the new
Confession the privileges of the original Utraquists. In this they were opposed by their Roman Catholic
countrymen, and forced to rest content with the Emperor's verbal assurance of protection.
As long as Maximilian lived, they enjoyed complete toleration, even under the new form they had taken.
Under his successor the scene changed. An imperial edict appeared, which deprived the Bohemian Brethren
of their religious freedom. Now these differed in nothing from the other Utraquists. The sentence, therefore,
of their condemnation, obviously included all the partisans of the Bohemian Confession. Accordingly, they
all combined to oppose the imperial mandate in the Diet, but without being able to procure its revocation. The
Emperor and the Roman Catholic Estates took their ground on the Compact and the Bohemian Constitution;
in which nothing appeared in favour of a religion which had not then obtained the voice of the country. Since
that time, how completely had affairs changed! What then formed but an inconsiderable opinion, had now
become the predominant religion of the country. And what was it then, but a subterfuge to limit a newly
spreading religion by the terms of obsolete treaties? The Bohemian Protestants appealed to the verbal
guarantee of Maximilian, and the religious freedom of the Germans, with whom they argued they ought to be
on a footing of equality. It was in vain their appeal was dismissed.
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Such was the posture of affairs in Bohemia, when Matthias, already master of Hungary, Austria, and
Moravia, appeared in Kolin, to raise the Bohemian Estates also against the Emperor. The embarrassment of
the latter was now at its height. Abandoned by all his other subjects, he placed his last hopes on the
Bohemians, who, it might be foreseen, would take advantage of his necessities to enforce their own demands.
After an interval of many years, he once more appeared publicly in the Diet at Prague; and to convince the
people that he was really still in existence, orders were given that all the windows should be opened in the
streets through which he was to pass proof enough how far things had gone with him. The event justified
his fears. The Estates, conscious of their own power, refused to take a single step until their privileges were
confirmed, and religious toleration fully assured to them. It was in vain to have recourse now to the old
system of evasion. The Emperor's fate was in their hands, and he must yield to necessity. At present,
however, he only granted their other demands religious matters he reserved for consideration at the next
Diet.
The Bohemians now took up arms in defence of the Emperor, and a bloody war between the two brothers was
on the point of breaking out. But Rodolph, who feared nothing so much as remaining in this slavish
dependence on the Estates, waited not for a warlike issue, but hastened to effect a reconciliation with his
brother by more peaceable means. By a formal act of abdication he resigned to Matthias, what indeed he had
no chance of wresting from him, Austria and the kingdom of Hungary, and acknowledged him as his
successor to the crown of Bohemia.
Dearly enough had the Emperor extricated himself from one difficulty, only to get immediately involved in
another. The settlement of the religious affairs of Bohemia had been referred to the next Diet, which was held
in 1609. The reformed Bohemians demanded the free exercise of their faith, as under the former emperors; a
Consistory of their own; the cession of the University of Prague; and the right of electing `Defenders', or
`Protectors' of `Liberty', from their own body. The answer was the same as before; for the timid Emperor was
now entirely fettered by the unreformed party. However often, and in however threatening language the
Estates renewed their remonstrances, the Emperor persisted in his first declaration of granting nothing beyond
the old compact. The Diet broke up without coming to a decision; and the Estates, exasperated against the
Emperor, arranged a general meeting at Prague, upon their own authority, to right themselves.
They appeared at Prague in great force. In defiance of the imperial prohibition, they carried on their
deliberations almost under the very eyes of the Emperor. The yielding compliance which he began to show,
only proved how much they were feared, and increased their audacity. Yet on the main point he remained
inflexible. They fulfilled their threats, and at last resolved to establish, by their own power, the free and
universal exercise of their religion, and to abandon the Emperor to his necessities until he should confirm this
resolution. They even went farther, and elected for themselves the DEFENDERS which the Emperor had
refused them. Ten were nominated by each of the three Estates; they also determined to raise, as soon as
possible, an armed force, at the head of which Count Thurn, the chief organizer of the revolt, should be
placed as general defender of the liberties of Bohemia. Their determination brought the Emperor to
submission, to which he was now counselled even by the Spaniards. Apprehensive lest the exasperated
Estates should throw themselves into the arms of the King of Hungary, he signed the memorable Letter of
Majesty for Bohemia, by which, under the successors of the Emperor, that people justified their rebellion.
The Bohemian Confession, which the States had laid before the Emperor Maximilian, was, by the Letter of
Majesty, placed on a footing of equality with the olden profession. The Utraquists, for by this title the
Bohemian Protestants continued to designate themselves, were put in possession of the University of Prague,
and allowed a Consistory of their own, entirely independent of the archiepiscopal see of that city. All the
churches in the cities, villages, and market towns, which they held at the date of the letter, were secured to
them; and if in addition they wished to erect others, it was permitted to the nobles, and knights, and the free
cities to do so. This last clause in the Letter of Majesty gave rise to the unfortunate disputes which
subsequently rekindled the flames of war in Europe.
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The Letter of Majesty erected the Protestant part of Bohemia into a kind of republic. The Estates had learned
to feel the power which they gained by perseverance, unity, and harmony in their measures. The Emperor
now retained little more than the shadow of his sovereign authority; while by the new dignity of the socalled
defenders of liberty, a dangerous stimulus was given to the spirit of revolt. The example and success of
Bohemia afforded a tempting seduction to the other hereditary dominions of Austria, and all attempted by
similar means to extort similar privileges. The spirit of liberty spread from one province to another; and as it
was chiefly the disunion among the Austrian princes that had enabled the Protestants so materially to improve
their advantages, they now hastened to effect a reconciliation between the Emperor and the King of Hungary.
But the reconciliation could not be sincere. The wrong was too great to be forgiven, and Rodolph continued
to nourish at heart an unextinguishable hatred of Matthias. With grief and indignation he brooded over the
thought, that the Bohemian sceptre was finally to descend into the hands of his enemy; and the prospect was
not more consoling, even if Matthias should die without issue. In that case, Ferdinand, Archduke of Graetz,
whom he equally disliked, was the head of the family. To exclude the latter as well as Matthias from the
succession to the throne of Bohemia, he fell upon the project of diverting that inheritance to Ferdinand's
brother, the Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau, who among all his relatives had ever been the dearest and
most deserving. The prejudices of the Bohemians in favour of the elective freedom of their crown, and their
attachment to Leopold's person, seemed to favour this scheme, in which Rodolph consulted rather his own
partiality and vindictiveness than the good of his house. But to carry out this project, a military force was
requisite, and Rodolph actually assembled an army in the bishopric of Passau. The object of this force was
hidden from all. An inroad, however, which, for want of pay it made suddenly and without the Emperor's
knowledge into Bohemia, and the outrages which it there committed, stirred up the whole kingdom against
him. In vain he asserted his innocence to the Bohemian Estates; they would not believe his protestations;
vainly did he attempt to restrain the violence of his soldiery; they disregarded his orders. Persuaded that the
Emperor's object was to annul the Letter of Majesty, the Protectors of Liberty armed the whole of Protestant
Bohemia, and invited Matthias into the country. After the dispersion of the force he had collected at Passau,
the Emperor remained helpless at Prague, where he was kept shut up like a prisoner in his palace, and
separated from all his councillors. In the meantime, Matthias entered Prague amidst universal rejoicings,
where Rodolph was soon afterwards weak enough to acknowledge him King of Bohemia. So hard a fate
befell this Emperor; he was compelled, during his life, to abdicate in favour of his enemy that very throne, of
which he had been endeavouring to deprive him after his own death. To complete his degradation, he was
obliged, by a personal act of renunciation, to release his subjects in Bohemia, Silesia, and Lusatia from their
allegiance, and he did it with a broken heart. All, even those he thought he had most attached to his person,
had abandoned him. When he had signed the instrument, he threw his hat upon the ground, and gnawed the
pen which had rendered so shameful a service.
While Rodolph thus lost one hereditary dominion after another, the imperial dignity was not much better
maintained by him. Each of the religious parties into which Germany was divided, continued its efforts to
advance itself at the expense of the other, or to guard against its attacks. The weaker the hand that held the
sceptre, and the more the Protestants and Roman Catholics felt they were left to themselves, the more vigilant
necessarily became their watchfulness, and the greater their distrust of each other. It was enough that the
Emperor was ruled by Jesuits, and was guided by Spanish counsels, to excite the apprehension of the
Protestants, and to afford a pretext for hostility. The rash zeal of the Jesuits, which in the pulpit and by the
press disputed the validity of the religious peace, increased this distrust, and caused their adversaries to see a
dangerous design in the most indifferent measures of the Roman Catholics. Every step taken in the hereditary
dominions of the Emperor, for the repression of the reformed religion, was sure to draw the attention of all
the Protestants of Germany; and this powerful support which the reformed subjects of Austria met, or
expected to meet with from their religious confederates in the rest of Germany, was no small cause of their
confidence, and of the rapid success of Matthias. It was the general belief of the Empire, that they owed the
long enjoyment of the religious peace merely to the difficulties in which the Emperor was placed by the
internal troubles in his dominions, and consequently they were in no haste to relieve him from them.
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Almost all the affairs of the Diet were neglected, either through the procrastination of the Emperor, or
through the fault of the Protestant Estates, who had determined to make no provision for the common wants
of the Empire till their own grievances were removed. These grievances related principally to the
misgovernment of the Emperor; the violation of the religious treaty, and the presumptuous usurpations of the
Aulic Council, which in the present reign had begun to extend its jurisdiction at the expense of the Imperial
Chamber. Formerly, in all disputes between the Estates, which could not be settled by club law, the Emperors
had in the last resort decided of themselves, if the case were trifling, and in conjunction with the princes, if it
were important; or they determined them by the advice of imperial judges who followed the court. This
superior jurisdiction they had, in the end of the fifteenth century, assigned to a regular and permanent
tribunal, the Imperial Chamber of Spires, in which the Estates of the Empire, that they might not be
oppressed by the arbitrary appointment of the Emperor, had reserved to themselves the right of electing the
assessors, and of periodically reviewing its decrees. By the religious peace, these rights of the Estates, (called
the rights of presentation and visitation,) were extended also to the Lutherans, so that Protestant judges had a
voice in Protestant causes, and a seeming equality obtained for both religions in this supreme tribunal.
But the enemies of the Reformation and of the freedom of the Estates, vigilant to take advantage of every
incident that favoured their views, soon found means to neutralize the beneficial effects of this institution. A
supreme jurisdiction over the Imperial States was gradually and skilfully usurped by a private imperial
tribunal, the Aulic Council in Vienna, a court at first intended merely to advise the Emperor in the exercise of
his undoubted, imperial, and personal prerogatives; a court, whose members being appointed and paid by
him, had no law but the interest of their master, and no standard of equity but the advancement of the
unreformed religion of which they were partisans. Before the Aulic Council were now brought several suits
originating between Estates differing in religion, and which, therefore, properly belonged to the Imperial
Chamber. It was not surprising if the decrees of this tribunal bore traces of their origin; if the interests of the
Roman Church and of the Emperor were preferred to justice by Roman Catholic judges, and the creatures of
the Emperor. Although all the Estates of Germany seemed to have equal cause for resisting so perilous an
abuse, the Protestants alone, who most sensibly felt it, and even these not all at once and in a body, came
forward as the defenders of German liberty, which the establishment of so arbitrary a tribunal had outraged in
its most sacred point, the administration of justice. In fact, Germany would have had little cause to
congratulate itself upon the abolition of clublaw, and in the institution of the Imperial Chamber, if an
arbitrary tribunal of the Emperor was allowed to interfere with the latter. The Estates of the German Empire
would indeed have improved little upon the days of barbarism, if the Chamber of Justice in which they sat
along with the Emperor as judges, and for which they had abandoned their original princely prerogative,
should cease to be a court of the last resort. But the strangest contradictions were at this date to be found in
the minds of men. The name of Emperor, a remnant of Roman despotism, was still associated with an idea of
autocracy, which, though it formed a ridiculous inconsistency with the privileges of the Estates, was
nevertheless argued for by jurists, diffused by the partisans of despotism, and believed by the ignorant.
To these general grievances was gradually added a chain of singular incidents, which at length converted the
anxiety of the Protestants into utter distrust. During the Spanish persecutions in the Netherlands, several
Protestant families had taken refuge in AixlaChapelle, an imperial city, and attached to the Roman
Catholic faith, where they settled and insensibly extended their adherents. Having succeeded by stratagem in
introducing some of their members into the municipal council, they demanded a church and the public
exercise of their worship, and the demand being unfavourably received, they succeeded by violence in
enforcing it, and also in usurping the entire government of the city. To see so important a city in Protestant
hands was too heavy a blow for the Emperor and the Roman Catholics. After all the Emperor's requests and
commands for the restoration of the olden government had proved ineffectual, the Aulic Council proclaimed
the city under the ban of the Empire, which, however, was not put in force till the following reign.
Of yet greater importance were two other attempts of the Protestants to extend their influence and their
power. The Elector Gebhard, of Cologne, (born Truchsess* of Waldburg,) conceived for the young Countess
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Agnes, of Mansfield, Canoness of Gerresheim, a passion which was not unreturned. As the eyes of all
Germany were directed to this intercourse, the brothers of the Countess, two zealous Calvinists, demanded
satisfaction for the injured honour of their house, which, as long as the elector remained a Roman Catholic
prelate, could not be repaired by marriage. They threatened the elector they would wash out this stain in his
blood and their sister's, unless he either abandoned all further connexion with the countess, or consented to
reestablish her reputation at the altar. The elector, indifferent to all the consequences of this step, listened to
nothing but the voice of love. Whether it was in consequence of his previous inclination to the reformed
doctrines, or that the charms of his mistress alone effected this wonder, he renounced the Roman Catholic
faith, and led the beautiful Agnes to the altar.
* Grandmaster of the kitchen.
This event was of the greatest importance. By the letter of the clause reserving the ecclesiastical states from
the general operation of the religious peace, the elector had, by his apostacy, forfeited all right to the
temporalities of his bishopric; and if, in any case, it was important for the Catholics to enforce the clause, it
was so especially in the case of electorates. On the other hand, the relinquishment of so high a dignity was a
severe sacrifice, and peculiarly so in the case of a tender husband, who had wished to enhance the value of
his heart and hand by the gift of a principality. Moreover, the Reservatum Ecclesiasticum was a disputed
article of the treaty of Augsburg; and all the German Protestants were aware of the extreme importance of
wresting this fourth* electorate from the opponents of their faith. The example had already been set in several
of the ecclesiastical benefices of Lower Germany, and attended with success. Several canons of Cologne had
also already embraced the Protestant confession, and were on the elector's side, while, in the city itself, he
could depend upon the support of a numerous Protestant party. All these considerations, greatly strengthened
by the persuasions of his friends and relations, and the promises of several German courts, determined the
elector to retain his dominions, while he changed his religion.
* Saxony, Brandenburg, and the Palatinate were already Protestant.
But it was soon apparent that he had entered upon a contest which he could not carry through. Even the free
toleration of the Protestant service within the territories of Cologne, had already occasioned a violent
opposition on the part of the canons and Roman Catholic `Estates' of that province. The intervention of the
Emperor, and a papal ban from Rome, which anathematized the elector as an apostate, and deprived him of
all his dignities, temporal and spiritual, armed his own subjects and chapter against him. The Elector
assembled a military force; the chapter did the same. To ensure also the aid of a strong arm, they proceeded
forthwith to a new election, and chose the Bishop of Liege, a prince of Bavaria.
A civil war now commenced, which, from the strong interest which both religious parties in Germany
necessarily felt in the conjuncture, was likely to terminate in a general breaking up of the religious peace.
What most made the Protestants indignant, was that the Pope should have presumed, by a pretended apostolic
power, to deprive a prince of the empire of his imperial dignities. Even in the golden days of their spiritual
domination, this prerogative of the Pope had been disputed; how much more likely was it to be questioned at
a period when his authority was entirely disowned by one party, while even with the other it rested on a
tottering foundation. All the Protestant princes took up the affair warmly against the Emperor; and Henry IV.
of France, then King of Navarre, left no means of negotiation untried to urge the German princes to the
vigorous assertion of their rights. The issue would decide for ever the liberties of Germany. Four Protestant
against three Roman Catholic voices in the Electoral College must at once have given the preponderance to
the former, and for ever excluded the House of Austria from the imperial throne.
But the Elector Gebhard had embraced the Calvinist, not the Lutheran religion; and this circumstance alone
was his ruin. The mutual rancour of these two churches would not permit the Lutheran Estates to regard the
Elector as one of their party, and as such to lend him their effectual support. All indeed had encouraged, and
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promised him assistance; but only one appanaged prince of the Palatine House, the Palsgrave John Casimir, a
zealous Calvinist, kept his word. Despite of the imperial prohibition, he hastened with his little army into the
territories of Cologne; but without being able to effect any thing, because the Elector, who was destitute even
of the first necessaries, left him totally without help. So much the more rapid was the progress of the
newlychosen elector, whom his Bavarian relations and the Spaniards from the Netherlands supported with
the utmost vigour. The troops of Gebhard, left by their master without pay, abandoned one place after another
to the enemy; by whom others were compelled to surrender. In his Westphalian territories, Gebhard held out
for some time longer, till here, too, he was at last obliged to yield to superior force. After several vain
attempts in Holland and England to obtain means for his restoration, he retired into the Chapter of Strasburg,
and died dean of that cathedral; the first sacrifice to the Ecclesiastical Reservation, or rather to the want of
harmony among the German Protestants.
To this dispute in Cologne was soon added another in Strasburg. Several Protestant canons of Cologne, who
had been included in the same papal ban with the elector, had taken refuge within this bishopric, where they
likewise held prebends. As the Roman Catholic canons of Strasburg hesitated to allow them, as being under
the ban, the enjoyment of their prebends, they took violent possession of their benefices, and the support of a
powerful Protestant party among the citizens soon gave them the preponderance in the chapter. The other
canons thereupon retired to AlsaceSaverne, where, under the protection of the bishop, they established
themselves as the only lawful chapter, and denounced that which remained in Strasburg as illegal. The latter,
in the meantime, had so strengthened themselves by the reception of several Protestant colleagues of high
rank, that they could venture, upon the death of the bishop, to nominate a new Protestant bishop in the person
of John George of Brandenburg. The Roman Catholic canons, far from allowing this election, nominated the
Bishop of Metz, a prince of Lorraine, to that dignity, who announced his promotion by immediately
commencing hostilities against the territories of Strasburg.
That city now took up arms in defence of its Protestant chapter and the Prince of Brandenburg, while the
other party, with the assistance of the troops of Lorraine, endeavoured to possess themselves of the
temporalities of the chapter. A tedious war was the consequence, which, according to the spirit of the times,
was attended with barbarous devastations. In vain did the Emperor interpose with his supreme authority to
terminate the dispute; the ecclesiastical property remained for a long time divided between the two parties, till
at last the Protestant prince, for a moderate pecuniary equivalent, renounced his claims; and thus, in this
dispute also, the Roman Church came off victorious.
An occurrence which, soon after the adjustment of this dispute, took place in Donauwerth, a free city of
Suabia, was still more critical for the whole of Protestant Germany. In this once Roman Catholic city, the
Protestants, during the reigns of Ferdinand and his son, had, in the usual way, become so completely
predominant, that the Roman Catholics were obliged to content themselves with a church in the Monastery of
the Holy Cross, and for fear of offending the Protestants, were even forced to suppress the greater part of
their religious rites. At length a fanatical abbot of this monastery ventured to defy the popular prejudices, and
to arrange a public procession, preceded by the cross and banners flying; but he was soon compelled to desist
from the attempt. When, a year afterwards, encouraged by a favourable imperial proclamation, the same
abbot attempted to renew this procession, the citizens proceeded to open violence. The inhabitants shut the
gates against the monks on their return, trampled their colours under foot, and followed them home with
clamour and abuse. An imperial citation was the consequence of this act of violence; and as the exasperated
populace even threatened to assault the imperial commissaries, and all attempts at an amicable adjustment
were frustrated by the fanaticism of the multitude, the city was at last formally placed under the ban of the
Empire, the execution of which was intrusted to Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria. The citizens, formerly so
insolent, were seized with terror at the approach of the Bavarian army; pusillanimity now possessed them,
though once so full of defiance, and they laid down their arms without striking a blow. The total abolition of
the Protestant religion within the walls of the city was the punishment of their rebellion; it was deprived of its
privileges, and, from a free city of Suabia, converted into a municipal town of Bavaria.
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Two circumstances connected with this proceeding must have strongly excited the attention of the
Protestants, even if the interests of religion had been less powerful on their minds. First of all, the sentence
had been pronounced by the Aulic Council, an arbitrary and exclusively Roman Catholic tribunal, whose
jurisdiction besides had been so warmly disputed by them; and secondly, its execution had been intrusted to
the Duke of Bavaria, the head of another circle. These unconstitutional steps seemed to be the harbingers of
further violent measures on the Roman Catholic side, the result, probably, of secret conferences and
dangerous designs, which might perhaps end in the entire subversion of their religious liberty.
In circumstances where the law of force prevails, and security depends upon power alone, the weakest party
is naturally the most busy to place itself in a posture of defence. This was now the case in Germany. If the
Roman Catholics really meditated any evil against the Protestants in Germany, the probability was that the
blow would fall on the south rather than the north, because, in Lower Germany, the Protestants were
connected together through a long unbroken tract of country, and could therefore easily combine for their
mutual support; while those in the south, detached from each other, and surrounded on all sides by Roman
Catholic states, were exposed to every inroad. If, moreover, as was to be expected, the Catholics availed
themselves of the divisions amongst the Protestants, and levelled their attack against one of the religious
parties, it was the Calvinists who, as the weaker, and as being besides excluded from the religious treaty,
were apparently in the greatest danger, and upon them would probably fall the first attack.
Both these circumstances took place in the dominions of the Elector Palatine, which possessed, in the Duke
of Bavaria, a formidable neighbour, and which, by reason of their defection to Calvinism, received no
protection from the Religious Peace, and had little hope of succour from the Lutheran states. No country in
Germany had experienced so many revolutions in religion in so short a time as the Palatinate. In the space of
sixty years this country, an unfortunate toy in the hands of its rulers, had twice adopted the doctrines of
Luther, and twice relinquished them for Calvinism. The Elector Frederick III. first abandoned the confession
of Augsburg, which his eldest son and successor, Lewis, immediately reestablished. The Calvinists
throughout the whole country were deprived of their churches, their preachers and even their teachers
banished beyond the frontiers; while the prince, in his Lutheran zeal, persecuted them even in his will, by
appointing none but strict and orthodox Lutherans as the guardians of his son, a minor. But this illegal
testament was disregarded by his brother the Count Palatine, John Casimir, who, by the regulations of the
Golden Bull, assumed the guardianship and administration of the state. Calvinistic teachers were given to the
Elector Frederick IV., then only nine years of age, who were ordered, if necessary, to drive the Lutheran
heresy out of the soul of their pupil with blows. If such was the treatment of the sovereign, that of the subjects
may be easily conceived.
It was under this Frederick that the Palatine Court exerted itself so vigorously to unite the Protestant states of
Germany in joint measures against the House of Austria, and, if possible, bring about the formation of a
general confederacy. Besides that this court had always been guided by the counsels of France, with whom
hatred of the House of Austria was the ruling principle, a regard for his own safety urged him to secure in
time the doubtful assistance of the Lutherans against a near and overwhelming enemy. Great difficulties,
however, opposed this union, because the Lutherans' dislike of the Reformed was scarcely less than the
common aversion of both to the Romanists. An attempt was first made to reconcile the two professions, in
order to facilitate a political union; but all these attempts failed, and generally ended in both parties adhering
the more strongly to their respective opinions. Nothing then remained but to increase the fear and the distrust
of the Evangelicals, and in this way to impress upon them the necessity of this alliance. The power of the
Roman Catholics and the magnitude of the danger were exaggerated, accidental incidents were ascribed to
deliberate plans, innocent actions misrepresented by invidious constructions, and the whole conduct of the
professors of the olden religion was interpreted as the result of a wellweighed and systematic plan, which, in
all probability, they were very far from having concerted.
The Diet of Ratisbon, to which the Protestants had looked forward with the hope of obtaining a renewal of
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the Religious Peace, had broken up without coming to a decision, and to the former grievances of the
Protestant party was now added the late oppression of Donauwerth. With incredible speed, the union, so long
attempted, was now brought to bear. A conference took place at Anhausen, in Franconia, at which were
present the Elector Frederick IV., from the Palatinate, the Palsgrave of Neuburg, two Margraves of
Brandenburg, the Margrave of Baden, and the Duke John Frederick of Wirtemburg, Lutherans as well as
Calvinists, who for themselves and their heirs entered into a close confederacy under the title of the
Evangelical Union. The purport of this union was, that the allied princes should, in all matters relating to
religion and their civil rights, support each other with arms and counsel against every aggressor, and should
all stand as one man; that in case any member of the alliance should be attacked, he should be assisted by the
rest with an armed force; that, if necessary, the territories, towns, and castles of the allied states should be
open to his troops; and that, whatever conquests were made, should be divided among all the confederates, in
proportion to the contingent furnished by each.
The direction of the whole confederacy in time of peace was conferred upon the Elector Palatine, but with a
limited power. To meet the necessary expenses, subsidies were demanded, and a common fund established.
Differences of religion (betwixt the Lutherans and the Calvinists) were to have no effect on this alliance,
which was to subsist for ten years, every member of the union engaged at the same time to procure new
members to it. The Electorate of Brandenburg adopted the alliance, that of Saxony rejected it. HesseCashel
could not be prevailed upon to declare itself, the Dukes of Brunswick and Luneburg also hesitated. But the
three cities of the Empire, Strasburg, Nuremburg, and Ulm, were no unimportant acquisition for the league,
which was in great want of their money, while their example, besides, might be followed by other imperial
cities.
After the formation of this alliance, the confederate states, dispirited, and singly, little feared, adopted a
bolder language. Through Prince Christian of Anhalt, they laid their common grievances and demands before
the Emperor; among which the principal were the restoration of Donauwerth, the abolition of the Imperial
Court, the reformation of the Emperor's own administration and that of his counsellors. For these
remonstrances, they chose the moment when the Emperor had scarcely recovered breath from the troubles in
his hereditary dominions, when he had lost Hungary and Austria to Matthias, and had barely preserved his
Bohemian throne by the concession of the Letter of Majesty, and finally, when through the succession of
Juliers he was already threatened with the distant prospect of a new war. No wonder, then, that this dilatory
prince was more irresolute than ever in his decision, and that the confederates took up arms before he could
bethink himself.
The Roman Catholics regarded this confederacy with a jealous eye; the Union viewed them and the Emperor
with the like distrust; the Emperor was equally suspicious of both; and thus, on all sides, alarm and animosity
had reached their climax. And, as if to crown the whole, at this critical conjuncture by the death of the Duke
John William of Juliers, a highly disputable succession became vacant in the territories of Juliers and Cleves.
Eight competitors laid claim to this territory, the indivisibility of which had been guaranteed by solemn
treaties; and the Emperor, who seemed disposed to enter upon it as a vacant fief, might be considered as the
ninth. Four of these, the Elector of Brandenburg, the Count Palatine of Neuburg, the Count Palatine of Deux
Ponts, and the Margrave of Burgau, an Austrian prince, claimed it as a female fief in name of four princesses,
sisters of the late duke. Two others, the Elector of Saxony, of the line of Albert, and the Duke of Saxony, of
the line of Ernest, laid claim to it under a prior right of reversion granted to them by the Emperor Frederick
III., and confirmed to both Saxon houses by Maximilian I. The pretensions of some foreign princes were little
regarded. The best right was perhaps on the side of Brandenburg and Neuburg, and between the claims of
these two it was not easy to decide. Both courts, as soon as the succession was vacant, proceeded to take
possession; Brandenburg beginning, and Neuburg following the example. Both commenced their dispute with
the pen, and would probably have ended it with the sword; but the interference of the Emperor, by proceeding
to bring the cause before his own cognizance, and, during the progress of the suit, sequestrating the disputed
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countries, soon brought the contending parties to an agreement, in order to avert the common danger. They
agreed to govern the duchy conjointly. In vain did the Emperor prohibit the Estates from doing homage to
their new masters; in vain did he send his own relation, the Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau and
Strasburg, into the territory of Juliers, in order, by his presence, to strengthen the imperial party. The whole
country, with the exception of Juliers itself, had submitted to the Protestant princes, and in that capital the
imperialists were besieged.
The dispute about the succession of Juliers was an important one to the whole German empire, and also
attracted the attention of several European courts. It was not so much the question, who was or was not to
possess the Duchy of Juliers; the real question was, which of the two religious parties in Germany, the
Roman Catholic or the Protestant, was to be strengthened by so important an accession for which of the
two RELIGIONS this territory was to be lost or won. The question in short was, whether Austria was to be
allowed to persevere in her usurpations, and to gratify her lust of dominion by another robbery; or whether
the liberties of Germany, and the balance of power, were to be maintained against her encroachments. The
disputed succession of Juliers, therefore, was matter which interested all who were favourable to liberty, and
hostile to Austria. The Evangelical Union, Holland, England, and particularly Henry IV. of France, were
drawn into the strife.
This monarch, the flower of whose life had been spent in opposing the House of Austria and Spain, and by
persevering heroism alone had surmounted the obstacles which this house had thrown between him and the
French throne, had been no idle spectator of the troubles in Germany. This contest of the Estates with the
Emperor was the means of giving and securing peace to France. The Protestants and the Turks were the two
salutary weights which kept down the Austrian power in the East and West; but it would rise again in all its
terrors, if once it were allowed to remove this pressure. Henry the Fourth had before his eyes for half a
lifetime, the uninterrupted spectacle of Austrian ambition and Austrian lust of dominion, which neither
adversity nor poverty of talents, though generally they check all human passions, could extinguish in a bosom
wherein flowed one drop of the blood of Ferdinand of Arragon. Austrian ambition had destroyed for a
century the peace of Europe, and effected the most violent changes in the heart of its most considerable
states. It had deprived the fields of husbandmen, the workshops of artisans, to fill the land with enormous
armies, and to cover the commercial sea with hostile fleets. It had imposed upon the princes of Europe the
necessity of fettering the industry of their subjects by unheardof imposts; and of wasting in selfdefence the
best strength of their states, which was thus lost to the prosperity of their inhabitants. For Europe there was
no peace, for its states no welfare, for the people's happiness no security or permanence, so long as this
dangerous house was permitted to disturb at pleasure the repose of the world.
Such considerations clouded the mind of Henry at the close of his glorious career. What had it not cost him to
reduce to order the troubled chaos into which France had been plunged by the tumult of civil war, fomented
and supported by this very Austria! Every great mind labours for eternity; and what security had Henry for
the endurance of that prosperity which he had gained for France, so long as Austria and Spain formed a single
power, which did indeed lie exhausted for the present, but which required only one lucky chance to be
speedily reunited, and to spring up again as formidable as ever. If he would bequeath to his successors a
firmly established throne, and a durable prosperity to his subjects, this dangerous power must be for ever
disarmed. This was the source of that irreconcileable enmity which Henry had sworn to the House of Austria,
a hatred unextinguishable, ardent, and wellfounded as that of Hannibal against the people of Romulus, but
ennobled by a purer origin.
The other European powers had the same inducements to action as Henry, but all of them had not that
enlightened policy, nor that disinterested courage to act upon the impulse. All men, without distinction, are
allured by immediate advantages; great minds alone are excited by distant good. So long as wisdom in its
projects calculates upon wisdom, or relies upon its own strength, it forms none but chimerical schemes, and
runs a risk of making itself the laughter of the world; but it is certain of success, and may reckon upon aid and
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admiration when it finds a place in its intellectual plans for barbarism, rapacity, and superstition, and can
render the selfish passions of mankind the executors of its purposes.
In the first point of view, Henry's wellknown project of expelling the House of Austria from all its
possessions, and dividing the spoil among the European powers, deserves the title of a chimera, which men
have so liberally bestowed upon it; but did it merit that appellation in the second? It had never entered into
the head of that excellent monarch, in the choice of those who must be the instruments of his designs, to
reckon on the sufficiency of such motives as animated himself and Sully to the enterprise. All the states
whose cooperation was necessary, were to be persuaded to the work by the strongest motives that can set a
political power in action. From the Protestants in Germany nothing more was required than that which, on
other grounds, had been long their object, their throwing off the Austrian yoke; from the Flemings, a
similar revolt from the Spaniards. To the Pope and all the Italian republics no inducement could be more
powerful than the hope of driving the Spaniards for ever from their peninsula; for England, nothing more
desirable than a revolution which should free it from its bitterest enemy. By this division of the Austrian
conquests, every power gained either land or freedom, new possessions or security for the old; and as all
gained, the balance of power remained undisturbed. France might magnanimously decline a share in the
spoil, because by the ruin of Austria it doubly profited, and was most powerful if it did not become more
powerful. Finally, upon condition of ridding Europe of their presence, the posterity of Hapsburg were to be
allowed the liberty of augmenting her territories in all the other known or yet undiscovered portions of the
globe. But the dagger of Ravaillac delivered Austria from her danger, to postpone for some centuries longer
the tranquillity of Europe.
With his view directed to this project, Henry felt the necessity of taking a prompt and active part in the
important events of the Evangelical Union, and the disputed succession of Juliers. His emissaries were busy
in all the courts of Germany, and the little which they published or allowed to escape of the great political
secrets of their master, was sufficient to win over minds inflamed by so ardent a hatred to Austria, and by so
strong a desire of aggrandizement. The prudent policy of Henry cemented the Union still more closely, and
the powerful aid which he bound himself to furnish, raised the courage of the confederates into the firmest
confidence. A numerous French army, led by the king in person, was to meet the troops of the Union on the
banks of the Rhine, and to assist in effecting the conquest of Juliers and Cleves; then, in conjunction with the
Germans, it was to march into Italy, (where Savoy, Venice, and the Pope were even now ready with a
powerful reinforcement,) and to overthrow the Spanish dominion in that quarter. This victorious army was
then to penetrate by Lombardy into the hereditary dominions of Hapsburg; and there, favoured by a general
insurrection of the Protestants, destroy the power of Austria in all its German territories, in Bohemia,
Hungary, and Transylvania. The Brabanters and Hollanders, supported by French auxiliaries, would in the
meantime shake off the Spanish tyranny in the Netherlands; and thus the mighty stream which, only a short
time before, had so fearfully overflowed its banks, threatening to overwhelm in its troubled waters the
liberties of Europe, would then roll silent and forgotten behind the Pyrenean mountains.
At other times, the French had boasted of their rapidity of action, but upon this occasion they were
outstripped by the Germans. An army of the confederates entered Alsace before Henry made his appearance
there, and an Austrian army, which the Bishop of Strasburg and Passau had assembled in that quarter for an
expedition against Juliers, was dispersed. Henry IV. had formed his plan as a statesman and a king, but he
had intrusted its execution to plunderers. According to his design, no Roman Catholic state was to have cause
to think this preparation aimed against itself, or to make the quarrel of Austria its own. Religion was in
nowise to be mixed up with the matter. But how could the German princes forget their own purposes in
furthering the plans of Henry? Actuated as they were by the desire of aggrandizement and by religious hatred,
was it to be supposed that they would not gratify, in every passing opportunity, their ruling passions to the
utmost? Like vultures, they stooped upon the territories of the ecclesiastical princes, and always chose those
rich countries for their quarters, though to reach them they must make ever so wide a detour from their direct
route. They levied contributions as in an enemy's country, seized upon the revenues, and exacted, by
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violence, what they could not obtain of freewill. Not to leave the Roman Catholics in doubt as to the true
objects of their expedition, they announced, openly and intelligibly enough, the fate that awaited the property
of the church. So little had Henry IV. and the German princes understood each other in their plan of
operations, so much had the excellent king been mistaken in his instruments. It is an unfailing maxim, that, if
policy enjoins an act of violence, its execution ought never to be entrusted to the violent; and that he only
ought to be trusted with the violation of order by whom order is held sacred.
Both the past conduct of the Union, which was condemned even by several of the evangelical states, and the
apprehension of even worse treatment, aroused the Roman Catholics to something beyond mere inactive
indignation. As to the Emperor, his authority had sunk too low to afford them any security against such an
enemy. It was their Union that rendered the confederates so formidable and so insolent; and another union
must now be opposed to them.
The Bishop of Wurtzburg formed the plan of the Catholic union, which was distinguished from the
evangelical by the title of the League. The objects agreed upon were nearly the same as those which
constituted the groundwork of the Union. Bishops formed its principal members, and at its head was placed
Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria. As the only influential secular member of the confederacy, he was entrusted
with far more extensive powers than the Protestants had committed to their chief. In addition to the duke's
being the sole head of the League's military power, whereby their operations acquired a speed and weight
unattainable by the Union, they had also the advantage that supplies flowed in much more regularly from the
rich prelates, than the latter could obtain them from the poor evangelical states. Without offering to the
Emperor, as the sovereign of a Roman Catholic state, any share in their confederacy, without even
communicating its existence to him as emperor, the League arose at once formidable and threatening; with
strength sufficient to crush the Protestant Union and to maintain itself under three emperors. It contended,
indeed, for Austria, in so far as it fought against the Protestant princes; but Austria herself had soon cause to
tremble before it.
The arms of the Union had, in the meantime, been tolerably successful in Juliers and in Alsace; Juliers was
closely blockaded, and the whole bishopric of Strasburg was in their power. But here their splendid
achievements came to an end. No French army appeared upon the Rhine; for he who was to be its leader, he
who was the animating soul of the whole enterprize, Henry IV., was no more! Their supplies were on the
wane; the Estates refused to grant new subsidies; and the confederate free cities were offended that their
money should be liberally, but their advice so sparingly called for. Especially were they displeased at being
put to expense for the expedition against Juliers, which had been expressly excluded from the affairs of the
Union at the united princes appropriating to themselves large pensions out of the common treasure
and, above all, at their refusing to give any account of its expenditure.
The Union was thus verging to its fall, at the moment when the League started to oppose it in the vigour of its
strength. Want of supplies disabled the confederates from any longer keeping the field. And yet it was
dangerous to lay down their weapons in the sight of an armed enemy. To secure themselves at least on one
side, they hastened to conclude a peace with their old enemy, the Archduke Leopold; and both parties agreed
to withdraw their troops from Alsace, to exchange prisoners, and to bury all that had been done in oblivion.
Thus ended in nothing all these promising preparations.
The same imperious tone with which the Union, in the confidence of its strength, had menaced the Roman
Catholics of Germany, was now retorted by the League upon themselves and their troops. The traces of their
march were pointed out to them, and plainly branded with the hard epithets they had deserved. The chapters
of Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Strasburg, Mentz, Treves, Cologne, and several others, had experienced their
destructive presence; to all these the damage done was to be made good, the free passage by land and by
water restored, (for the Protestants had even seized on the navigation of the Rhine,) and everything replaced
on its former footing. Above all, the parties to the Union were called on to declare expressly and
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unequivocally its intentions. It was now their turn to yield to superior strength. They had not calculated on so
formidable an opponent; but they themselves had taught the Roman Catholics the secret of their strength. It
was humiliating to their pride to sue for peace, but they might think themselves fortunate in obtaining it. The
one party promised restitution, the other forgiveness. All laid down their arms. The storm of war once more
rolled by, and a temporary calm succeeded. The insurrection in Bohemia then broke out, which deprived the
Emperor of the last of his hereditary dominions, but in this dispute neither the Union nor the League took any
share.
At length the Emperor died in 1612, as little regretted in his coffin as noticed on the throne. Long afterwards,
when the miseries of succeeding reigns had made the misfortunes of his reign forgotten, a halo spread about
his memory, and so fearful a night set in upon Germany, that, with tears of blood, people prayed for the
return of such an emperor.
Rodolph never could be prevailed upon to choose a successor in the empire, and all awaited with anxiety the
approaching vacancy of the throne; but, beyond all hope, Matthias at once ascended it, and without
opposition. The Roman Catholics gave him their voices, because they hoped the best from his vigour and
activity; the Protestants gave him theirs, because they hoped every thing from his weakness. It is not difficult
to reconcile this contradiction. The one relied on what he had once appeared; the other judged him by what he
seemed at present.
The moment of a new accession is always a day of hope; and the first Diet of a king in elective monarchies is
usually his severest trial. Every old grievance is brought forward, and new ones are sought out, that they may
be included in the expected reform; quite a new world is expected to commence with the new reign. The
important services which, in his insurrection, their religious confederates in Austria had rendered to Matthias,
were still fresh in the minds of the Protestant free cities, and, above all, the price which they had exacted for
their services seemed now to serve them also as a model.
It was by the favour of the Protestant Estates in Austria and Moravia that Matthias had sought and really
found the way to his brother's throne; but, hurried on by his ambitious views, he never reflected that a way
was thus opened for the States to give laws to their sovereign. This discovery soon awoke him from the
intoxication of success. Scarcely had he shown himself in triumph to his Austrian subjects, after his
victorious expedition to Bohemia, when a humble petition awaited him which was quite sufficient to poison
his whole triumph. They required, before doing homage, unlimited religious toleration in the cities and
market towns, perfect equality of rights between Roman Catholics and Protestants, and a full and equal
admissibility of the latter to all offices of state. In several places, they of themselves assumed these
privileges, and, reckoning on a change of administration, restored the Protestant religion where the late
Emperor had suppressed it. Matthias, it is true, had not scrupled to make use of the grievances of the
Protestants for his own ends against the Emperor; but it was far from being his intention to relieve them. By a
firm and resolute tone he hoped to check, at once, these presumptuous demands. He spoke of his hereditary
title to these territories, and would hear of no stipulations before the act of homage. A like unconditional
submission had been rendered by their neighbours, the inhabitants of Styria, to the Archduke Ferdinand, who,
however, had soon reason to repent of it. Warned by this example, the Austrian States persisted in their
refusal; and, to avoid being compelled by force to do homage, their deputies (after urging their Roman
Catholic colleagues to a similar resistance) immediately left the capital, and began to levy troops.
They took steps to renew their old alliance with Hungary, drew the Protestant princes into their interests, and
set themselves seriously to work to accomplish their object by force of arms.
With the more exorbitant demands of the Hungarians Matthias had not hesitated to comply. For Hungary was
an elective monarchy, and the republican constitution of the country justified to himself their demands, and to
the Roman Catholic world his concessions. In Austria, on the contrary, his predecessors had exercised far
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higher prerogatives, which he could not relinquish at the demand of the Estates without incurring the scorn of
Roman Catholic Europe, the enmity of Spain and Rome, and the contempt of his own Roman Catholic
subjects. His exclusively Romish council, among which the Bishop of Vienna, Melchio Kiesel, had the chief
influence, exhorted him to see all the churches extorted from him by the Protestants, rather than to concede
one to them as a matter of right.
But by ill luck this difficulty occurred at a time when the Emperor Rodolph was yet alive, and a spectator of
this scene, and who might easily have been tempted to employ against his brother the same weapons which
the latter had successfully directed against him namely, an understanding with his rebellious subjects. To
avoid this blow, Matthias willingly availed himself of the offer made by Moravia, to act as mediator between
him and the Estates of Austria. Representatives of both parties met in Vienna, when the Austrian deputies
held language which would have excited surprise even in the English Parliament. "The Protestants," they
said, "are determined to be not worse treated in their native country than the handful of Romanists. By the
help of his Protestant nobles had Matthias reduced the Emperor to submission; where 80 Papists were to be
found, 300 Protestant barons might be counted. The example of Rodolph should be a warning to Matthias. He
should take care that he did not lose the terrestrial, in attempting to make conquests for the celestial." As the
Moravian States, instead of using their powers as mediators for the Emperor's advantage, finally adopted the
cause of their coreligionists of Austria; as the Union in Germany came forward to afford them its most
active support, and as Matthias dreaded reprisals on the part of the Emperor, he was at length compelled to
make the desired declaration in favour of the Evangelical Church.
This behaviour of the Austrian Estates towards their Archduke was now imitated by the Protestant Estates of
the Empire towards their Emperor, and they promised themselves the same favourable results. At his first
Diet at Ratisbon in 1613, when the most pressing affairs were waiting for decision when a general
contribution was indispensable for a war against Turkey, and against Bethlem Gabor in Transylvania, who by
Turkish aid had forcibly usurped the sovereignty of that land, and even threatened Hungary they surprised
him with an entirely new demand. The Roman Catholic votes were still the most numerous in the Diet; and as
every thing was decided by a plurality of voices, the Protestant party, however closely united, were entirely
without consideration. The advantage of this majority the Roman Catholics were now called on to relinquish;
henceforward no one religious party was to be permitted to dictate to the other by means of its invariable
superiority. And in truth, if the evangelical religion was really to be represented in the Diet, it was
selfevident that it must not be shut out from the possibility of making use of that privilege, merely from the
constitution of the Diet itself. Complaints of the judicial usurpations of the Aulic Council, and of the
oppression of the Protestants, accompanied this demand, and the deputies of the Estates were instructed to
take no part in any general deliberations till a favourable answer should be given on this preliminary point.
The Diet was torn asunder by this dangerous division, which threatened to destroy for ever the unity of its
deliberations. Sincerely as the Emperor might have wished, after the example of his father Maximilian, to
preserve a prudent balance between the two religions, the present conduct of the Protestants seemed to leave
him nothing but a critical choice between the two. In his present necessities a general contribution from the
Estates was indispensable to him; and yet he could not conciliate the one party without sacrificing the support
of the other. Insecure as he felt his situation to be in his own hereditary dominions, he could not but tremble
at the idea, however remote, of an open war with the Protestants. But the eyes of the whole Roman Catholic
world, which were attentively regarding his conduct, the remonstrances of the Roman Catholic Estates, and
of the Courts of Rome and Spain, as little permitted him to favour the Protestant at the expense of the Romish
religion.
So critical a situation would have paralysed a greater mind than Matthias; and his own prudence would
scarcely have extricated him from his dilemma. But the interests of the Roman Catholics were closely
interwoven with the imperial authority; if they suffered this to fall, the ecclesiastical princes in particular
would be without a bulwark against the attacks of the Protestants. Now, then, that they saw the Emperor
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wavering, they thought it high time to reassure his sinking courage. They imparted to him the secret of their
League, and acquainted him with its whole constitution, resources and power. Little comforting as such a
revelation must have been to the Emperor, the prospect of so powerful a support gave him greater boldness to
oppose the Protestants. Their demands were rejected, and the Diet broke up without coming to a decision. But
Matthias was the victim of this dispute. The Protestants refused him their supplies, and made him alone suffer
for the inflexibility of the Roman Catholics.
The Turks, however, appeared willing to prolong the cessation of hostilities, and Bethlem Gabor was left in
peaceable possession of Transylvania. The empire was now free from foreign enemies; and even at home, in
the midst of all these fearful disputes, peace still reigned. An unexpected accident had given a singular turn to
the dispute as to the succession of Juliers. This duchy was still ruled conjointly by the Electoral House of
Brandenburg and the Palatine of Neuburg; and a marriage between the Prince of Neuburg and a Princess of
Brandenburg was to have inseparably united the interests of the two houses. But the whole scheme was upset
by a box on the ear, which, in a drunken brawl, the Elector of Brandenburg unfortunately inflicted upon his
intended soninlaw. From this moment the good understanding between the two houses was at an end. The
Prince of Neuburg embraced popery. The hand of a princess of Bavaria rewarded his apostacy, and the strong
support of Bavaria and Spain was the natural result of both. To secure to the Palatine the exclusive possession
of Juliers, the Spanish troops from the Netherlands were marched into the Palatinate. To rid himself of these
guests, the Elector of Brandenburg called the Flemings to his assistance, whom he sought to propitiate by
embracing the Calvinist religion. Both Spanish and Dutch armies appeared, but, as it seemed, only to make
conquests for themselves.
The neighbouring war of the Netherlands seemed now about to be decided on German ground; and what an
inexhaustible mine of combustibles lay here ready for it! The Protestants saw with consternation the
Spaniards establishing themselves upon the Lower Rhine; with still greater anxiety did the Roman Catholics
see the Hollanders bursting through the frontiers of the empire. It was in the west that the mine was expected
to explode which had long been dug under the whole of Germany. To the west, apprehension and anxiety
turned; but the spark which kindled the flame came unexpectedly from the east.
The tranquillity which Rodolph II.'s `Letter of Majesty' had established in Bohemia lasted for some time,
under the administration of Matthias, till the nomination of a new heir to this kingdom in the person of
Ferdinand of Gratz.
This prince, whom we shall afterwards become better acquainted with under the title of Ferdinand II.,
Emperor of Germany, had, by the violent extirpation of the Protestant religion within his hereditary
dominions, announced himself as an inexorable zealot for popery, and was consequently looked upon by the
Roman Catholic part of Bohemia as the future pillar of their church. The declining health of the Emperor
brought on this hour rapidly; and, relying on so powerful a supporter, the Bohemian Papists began to treat the
Protestants with little moderation. The Protestant vassals of Roman Catholic nobles, in particular,
experienced the harshest treatment. At length several of the former were incautious enough to speak
somewhat loudly of their hopes, and by threatening hints to awaken among the Protestants a suspicion of
their future sovereign. But this mistrust would never have broken out into actual violence, had the Roman
Catholics confined themselves to general expressions, and not by attacks on individuals furnished the
discontent of the people with enterprising leaders.
Henry Matthias, Count Thurn, not a native of Bohemia, but proprietor of some estates in that kingdom, had,
by his zeal for the Protestant cause, and an enthusiastic attachment to his newly adopted country, gained the
entire confidence of the Utraquists, which opened him the way to the most important posts. He had fought
with great glory against the Turks, and won by a flattering address the hearts of the multitude. Of a hot and
impetuous disposition, which loved tumult because his talents shone in it rash and thoughtless enough to
undertake things which cold prudence and a calmer temper would not have ventured upon unscrupulous
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enough, where the gratification of his passions was concerned, to sport with the fate of thousands, and at the
same time politic enough to hold in leadingstrings such a people as the Bohemians then were. He had
already taken an active part in the troubles under Rodolph's administration; and the Letter of Majesty which
the States had extorted from that Emperor, was chiefly to be laid to his merit. The court had intrusted to him,
as burgrave or castellan of Calstein, the custody of the Bohemian crown, and of the national charter. But the
nation had placed in his hands something far more important ITSELF with the office of defender or
protector of the faith. The aristocracy by which the Emperor was ruled, imprudently deprived him of this
harmless guardianship of the dead, to leave him his full influence over the living. They took from him his
office of burgrave, or constable of the castle, which had rendered him dependent on the court, thereby
opening his eyes to the importance of the other which remained, and wounded his vanity, which yet was the
thing that made his ambition harmless. From this moment he was actuated solely by a desire of revenge; and
the opportunity of gratifying it was not long wanting.
In the Royal Letter which the Bohemians had extorted from Rodolph II., as well as in the German religious
treaty, one material article remained undetermined. All the privileges granted by the latter to the Protestants,
were conceived in favour of the Estates or governing bodies, not of the subjects; for only to those of the
ecclesiastical states had a toleration, and that precarious, been conceded. The Bohemian Letter of Majesty, in
the same manner, spoke only of the Estates and imperial towns, the magistrates of which had contrived to
obtain equal privileges with the former. These alone were free to erect churches and schools, and openly to
celebrate their Protestant worship; in all other towns, it was left entirely to the government to which they
belonged, to determine the religion of the inhabitants. The Estates of the Empire had availed themselves of
this privilege in its fullest extent; the secular indeed without opposition; while the ecclesiastical, in whose
case the declaration of Ferdinand had limited this privilege, disputed, not without reason, the validity of that
limitation. What was a disputed point in the religious treaty, was left still more doubtful in the Letter of
Majesty; in the former, the construction was not doubtful, but it was a question how far obedience might be
compulsory; in the latter, the interpretation was left to the states. The subjects of the ecclesiastical Estates in
Bohemia thought themselves entitled to the same rights which the declaration of Ferdinand secured to the
subjects of German bishops, they considered themselves on an equality with the subjects of imperial towns,
because they looked upon the ecclesiastical property as part of the royal demesnes. In the little town of
Klostergrab, subject to the Archbishop of Prague; and in Braunau, which belonged to the abbot of that
monastery, churches were founded by the Protestants, and completed notwithstanding the opposition of their
superiors, and the disapprobation of the Emperor.
In the meantime, the vigilance of the defenders had somewhat relaxed, and the court thought it might venture
on a decisive step. By the Emperor's orders, the church at Klostergrab was pulled down; that at Braunau
forcibly shut up, and the most turbulent of the citizens thrown into prison. A general commotion among the
Protestants was the consequence of this measure; a loud outcry was everywhere raised at this violation of the
Letter of Majesty; and Count Thurn, animated by revenge, and particularly called upon by his office of
defender, showed himself not a little busy in inflaming the minds of the people. At his instigation deputies
were summoned to Prague from every circle in the empire, to concert the necessary measures against the
common danger. It was resolved to petition the Emperor to press for the liberation of the prisoners. The
answer of the Emperor, already offensive to the states, from its being addressed, not to them, but to his
viceroy, denounced their conduct as illegal and rebellious, justified what had been done at Klostergrab and
Braunau as the result of an imperial mandate, and contained some passages that might be construed into
threats.
Count Thurn did not fail to augment the unfavourable impression which this imperial edict made upon the
assembled Estates. He pointed out to them the danger in which all who had signed the petition were involved,
and sought by working on their resentment and fears to hurry them into violent resolutions. To have caused
their immediate revolt against the Emperor, would have been, as yet, too bold a measure. It was only step by
step that he would lead them on to this unavoidable result. He held it, therefore, advisable first to direct their
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indignation against the Emperor's counsellors; and for that purpose circulated a report, that the imperial
proclamation had been drawn up by the government at Prague, and only signed in Vienna. Among the
imperial delegates, the chief objects of the popular hatred, were the President of the Chamber, Slawata, and
Baron Martinitz, who had been elected in place of Count Thurn, Burgrave of Calstein. Both had long before
evinced pretty openly their hostile feelings towards the Protestants, by alone refusing to be present at the
sitting at which the Letter of Majesty had been inserted in the Bohemian constitution. A threat was made at
the time to make them responsible for every violation of the Letter of Majesty; and from this moment,
whatever evil befell the Protestants was set down, and not without reason, to their account. Of all the Roman
Catholic nobles, these two had treated their Protestant vassals with the greatest harshness. They were accused
of hunting them with dogs to the mass, and of endeavouring to drive them to popery by a denial of the rites of
baptism, marriage, and burial. Against two characters so unpopular the public indignation was easily excited,
and they were marked out for a sacrifice to the general indignation.
On the 23rd of May, 1618, the deputies appeared armed, and in great numbers, at the royal palace, and forced
their way into the hall where the Commissioners Sternberg, Martinitz, Lobkowitz, and Slawata were
assembled. In a threatening tone they demanded to know from each of them, whether he had taken any part,
or had consented to, the imperial proclamation. Sternberg received them with composure, Martinitz and
Slawata with defiance. This decided their fate; Sternberg and Lobkowitz, less hated, and more feared, were
led by the arm out of the room; Martinitz and Slawata were seized, dragged to a window, and precipitated
from a height of eighty feet, into the castle trench. Their creature, the secretary Fabricius, was thrown after
them. This singular mode of execution naturally excited the surprise of civilized nations. The Bohemians
justified it as a national custom, and saw nothing remarkable in the whole affair, excepting that any one
should have got up again safe and sound after such a fall. A dunghill, on which the imperial commissioners
chanced to be deposited, had saved them from injury.
It was not to be expected that this summary mode of proceeding would much increase the favour of the
parties with the Emperor, but this was the very position to which Count Thurn wished to bring them. If, from
the fear of uncertain danger, they had permitted themselves such an act of violence, the certain expectation of
punishment, and the now urgent necessity of making themselves secure, would plunge them still deeper into
guilt. By this brutal act of selfredress, no room was left for irresolution or repentance, and it seemed as if a
single crime could be absolved only by a series of violences. As the deed itself could not be undone, nothing
was left but to disarm the hand of punishment. Thirty directors were appointed to organise a regular
insurrection. They seized upon all the offices of state, and all the imperial revenues, took into their own
service the royal functionaries and the soldiers, and summoned the whole Bohemian nation to avenge the
common cause. The Jesuits, whom the common hatred accused as the instigators of every previous
oppression, were banished the kingdom, and this harsh measure the Estates found it necessary to justify in a
formal manifesto. These various steps were taken for the preservation of the royal authority and the laws
the language of all rebels till fortune has decided in their favour.
The emotion which the news of the Bohemian insurrection excited at the imperial court, was much less lively
than such intelligence deserved. The Emperor Matthias was no longer the resolute spirit that formerly sought
out his king and master in the very bosom of his people, and hurled him from three thrones. The confidence
and courage which had animated him in an usurpation, deserted him in a legitimate selfdefence. The
Bohemian rebels had first taken up arms, and the nature of circumstances drove him to join them. But he
could not hope to confine such a war to Bohemia. In all the territories under his dominion, the Protestants
were united by a dangerous sympathy the common danger of their religion might suddenly combine them
all into a formidable republic. What could he oppose to such an enemy, if the Protestant portion of his
subjects deserted him? And would not both parties exhaust themselves in so ruinous a civil war? How much
was at stake if he lost; and if he won, whom else would he destroy but his own subjects?
Considerations such as these inclined the Emperor and his council to concessions and pacific measures, but it
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was in this very spirit of concession that, as others would have it, lay the origin of the evil. The Archduke
Ferdinand of Gratz congratulated the Emperor upon an event, which would justify in the eyes of all Europe
the severest measures against the Bohemian Protestants. "Disobedience, lawlessness, and insurrection," he
said, "went always handinhand with Protestantism. Every privilege which had been conceded to the
Estates by himself and his predecessor, had had no other effect than to raise their demands. All the measures
of the heretics were aimed against the imperial authority. Step by step had they advanced from defiance to
defiance up to this last aggression; in a short time they would assail all that remained to be assailed, in the
person of the Emperor. In arms alone was there any safety against such an enemy peace and subordination
could be only established upon the ruins of their dangerous privileges; security for the Catholic belief was to
be found only in the total destruction of this sect. Uncertain, it was true, might be the event of the war, but
inevitable was the ruin if it were pretermitted. The confiscation of the lands of the rebels would richly
indemnify them for its expenses, while the terror of punishment would teach the other states the wisdom of a
prompt obedience in future." Were the Bohemian Protestants to blame, if they armed themselves in time
against the enforcement of such maxims? The insurrection in Bohemia, besides, was directed only against the
successor of the Emperor, not against himself, who had done nothing to justify the alarm of the Protestants.
To exclude this prince from the Bohemian throne, arms had before been taken up under Matthias, though as
long as this Emperor lived, his subjects had kept within the bounds of an apparent submission.
But Bohemia was in arms, and unarmed, the Emperor dared not even offer them peace. For this purpose,
Spain supplied gold, and promised to send troops from Italy and the Netherlands. Count Bucquoi, a native of
the Netherlands, was named generalissimo, because no native could be trusted, and Count Dampierre, another
foreigner, commanded under him. Before the army took the field, the Emperor endeavoured to bring about an
amicable arrangement, by the publication of a manifesto. In this he assured the Bohemians, "that he held
sacred the Letter of Majesty that he had not formed any resolutions inimical to their religion or their
privileges, and that his present preparations were forced upon him by their own. As soon as the nation laid
down their arms, he also would disband his army." But this gracious letter failed of its effect, because the
leaders of the insurrection contrived to hide from the people the Emperor's good intentions. Instead of this,
they circulated the most alarming reports from the pulpit, and by pamphlets, and terrified the deluded
populace with threatened horrors of another Saint Bartholomew's that existed only in their own imagination.
All Bohemia, with the exception of three towns, Budweiss, Krummau, and Pilsen, took part in this
insurrection. These three towns, inhabited principally by Roman Catholics, alone had the courage, in this
general revolt, to hold out for the Emperor, who promised them assistance. But it could not escape Count
Thurn, how dangerous it was to leave in hostile hands three places of such importance, which would at all
times keep open for the imperial troops an entrance into the kingdom. With prompt determination he
appeared before Budweiss and Krummau, in the hope of terrifying them into a surrender. Krummau
surrendered, but all his attacks were steadfastly repulsed by Budweiss.
And now, too, the Emperor began to show more earnestness and energy. Bucquoi and Dampierre, with two
armies, fell upon the Bohemian territories, which they treated as a hostile country. But the imperial generals
found the march to Prague more difficult than they had expected. Every pass, every position that was the least
tenable, must be opened by the sword, and resistance increased at each fresh step they took, for the outrages
of their troops, chiefly consisting of Hungarians and Walloons, drove their friends to revolt and their enemies
to despair. But even now that his troops had penetrated into Bohemia, the Emperor continued to offer the
Estates peace, and to show himself ready for an amicable adjustment. But the new prospects which opened
upon them, raised the courage of the revolters. Moravia espoused their party; and from Germany appeared to
them a defender equally intrepid and unexpected, in the person of Count Mansfeld.
The heads of the Evangelic Union had been silent but not inactive spectators of the movements in Bohemia.
Both were contending for the same cause, and against the same enemy. In the fate of the Bohemians, their
confederates in the faith might read their own; and the cause of this people was represented as of solemn
concern to the whole German union. True to these principles, the Unionists supported the courage of the
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insurgents by promises of assistance; and a fortunate accident now enabled them, beyond their hopes, to fulfil
them.
The instrument by which the House of Austria was humbled in Germany, was Peter Ernest, Count Mansfeld,
the son of a distinguished Austrian officer, Ernest von Mansfeld, who for some time had commanded with
repute the Spanish army in the Netherlands. His first campaigns in Juliers and Alsace had been made in the
service of this house, and under the banner of the Archduke Leopold, against the Protestant religion and the
liberties of Germany. But insensibly won by the principles of this religion, he abandoned a leader whose
selfishness denied him the reimbursement of the monies expended in his cause, and he transferred his zeal
and a victorious sword to the Evangelic Union. It happened just then that the Duke of Savoy, an ally of the
Union, demanded assistance in a war against Spain. They assigned to him their newly acquired servant, and
Mansfeld received instructions to raise an army of 4000 men in Germany, in the cause and in the pay of the
duke. The army was ready to march at the very moment when the flames of war burst out in Bohemia, and
the duke, who at the time did not stand in need of its services, placed it at the disposal of the Union. Nothing
could be more welcome to these troops than the prospect of aiding their confederates in Bohemia, at the cost
of a third party. Mansfeld received orders forthwith to march with these 4000 men into that kingdom; and a
pretended Bohemian commission was given to blind the public as to the true author of this levy.
This Mansfeld now appeared in Bohemia, and, by the occupation of Pilsen, strongly fortified and favourable
to the Emperor, obtained a firm footing in the country. The courage of the rebels was farther increased by
succours which the Silesian States despatched to their assistance. Between these and the Imperialists, several
battles were fought, far indeed from decisive, but only on that account the more destructive, which served as
the prelude to a more serious war. To check the vigour of his military operations, a negotiation was entered
into with the Emperor, and a disposition was shown to accept the proffered mediation of Saxony. But before
the event could prove how little sincerity there was in these proposals, the Emperor was removed from the
scene by death.
What now had Matthias done to justify the expectations which he had excited by the overthrow of his
predecessor? Was it worth while to ascend a brother's throne through guilt, and then maintain it with so little
dignity, and leave it with so little renown? As long as Matthias sat on the throne, he had to atone for the
imprudence by which he had gained it. To enjoy the regal dignity a few years sooner, he had shackled the
free exercise of its prerogatives. The slender portion of independence left him by the growing power of the
Estates, was still farther lessened by the encroachments of his relations. Sickly and childless he saw the
attention of the world turned to an ambitious heir who was impatiently anticipating his fate; and who, by his
interference with the closing administration, was already opening his own.
With Matthias, the reigning line of the German House of Austria was in a manner extinct; for of all the sons
of Maximilian, one only was now alive, the weak and childless Archduke Albert, in the Netherlands, who had
already renounced his claims to the inheritance in favour of the line of Gratz. The Spanish House had also, in
a secret bond, resigned its pretensions to the Austrian possessions in behalf of the Archduke Ferdinand of
Styria, in whom the branch of Hapsburg was about to put forth new shoots, and the former greatness of
Austria to experience a revival.
The father of Ferdinand was the Archduke Charles of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria, the youngest brother of
the Emperor Maximilian II.; his mother a princess of Bavaria. Having lost his father at twelve years of age,
he was intrusted by the archduchess to the guardianship of her brother William, Duke of Bavaria, under
whose eyes he was instructed and educated by Jesuits at the Academy of Ingolstadt. What principles he was
likely to imbibe by his intercourse with a prince, who from motives of devotion had abdicated his
government, may be easily conceived. Care was taken to point out to him, on the one hand, the weak
indulgence of Maximilian's house towards the adherents of the new doctrines, and the consequent troubles of
their dominions; on the other, the blessings of Bavaria, and the inflexible religious zeal of its rulers; between
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these two examples he was left to choose for himself.
Formed in this school to be a stout champion of the faith, and a prompt instrument of the church, he left
Bavaria, after a residence of five years, to assume the government of his hereditary dominions. The Estates of
Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria, who, before doing homage, demanded a guarantee for freedom of religion,
were told that religious liberty has nothing to do with their allegiance. The oath was put to them without
conditions, and unconditionally taken. Many years, however, elapsed, ere the designs which had been
planned at Ingolstadt were ripe for execution. Before attempting to carry them into effect, he sought in person
at Loretto the favour of the Virgin, and received the apostolic benediction in Rome at the feet of Clement
VIII.
These designs were nothing less than the expulsion of Protestantism from a country where it had the
advantage of numbers, and had been legally recognized by a formal act of toleration, granted by his father to
the noble and knightly estates of the land. A grant so formally ratified could not be revoked without danger;
but no difficulties could deter the pious pupil of the Jesuits. The example of other states, both Roman
Catholic and Protestant, which within their own territories had exercised unquestioned a right of reformation,
and the abuse which the Estates of Styria made of their religious liberties, would serve as a justification of
this violent procedure. Under the shelter of an absurd positive law, those of equity and prudence might, it was
thought, be safely despised. In the execution of these unrighteous designs, Ferdinand did, it must be owned,
display no common courage and perseverance. Without tumult, and we may add, without cruelty, he
suppressed the Protestant service in one town after another, and in a few years, to the astonishment of
Germany, this dangerous work was brought to a successful end.
But, while the Roman Catholics admired him as a hero, and the champion of the church, the Protestants
began to combine against him as against their most dangerous enemy. And yet Matthias's intention to
bequeath to him the succession, met with little or no opposition in the elective states of Austria. Even the
Bohemians agreed to receive him as their future king, on very favourable conditions. It was not until
afterwards, when they had experienced the pernicious influence of his councils on the administration of the
Emperor, that their anxiety was first excited; and then several projects, in his handwriting, which an unlucky
chance threw into their hands, as they plainly evinced his disposition towards them, carried their
apprehension to the utmost pitch. In particular, they were alarmed by a secret family compact with Spain, by
which, in default of heirsmale of his own body, Ferdinand bequeathed to that crown the kingdom of
Bohemia, without first consulting the wishes of that nation, and without regard to its right of free election.
The many enemies, too, which by his reforms in Styria that prince had provoked among the Protestants, were
very prejudicial to his interests in Bohemia; and some Styrian emigrants, who had taken refuge there,
bringing with them into their adopted country hearts overflowing with a desire of revenge, were particularly
active in exciting the flame of revolt. Thus illaffected did Ferdinand find the Bohemians, when he
succeeded Matthias.
So bad an understanding between the nation and the candidate for the throne, would have raised a storm even
in the most peaceable succession; how much more so at the present moment, before the ardour of insurrection
had cooled; when the nation had just recovered its dignity, and reasserted its rights; when they still held arms
in their hands, and the consciousness of unity had awakened an enthusiastic reliance on their own strength;
when by past success, by the promises of foreign assistance, and by visionary expectations of the future, their
courage had been raised to an undoubting confidence. Disregarding the rights already conferred on
Ferdinand, the Estates declared the throne vacant, and their right of election entirely unfettered. All hopes of
their peaceful submission were at an end, and if Ferdinand wished still to wear the crown of Bohemia, he
must choose between purchasing it at the sacrifice of all that would make a crown desirable, or winning it
sword in hand.
But with what means was it to be won? Turn his eyes where he would, the fire of revolt was burning. Silesia
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had already joined the insurgents in Bohemia; Moravia was on the point of following its example. In Upper
and Lower Austria the spirit of liberty was awake, as it had been under Rodolph, and the Estates refused to do
homage. Hungary was menaced with an inroad by Prince Bethlen Gabor, on the side of Transylvania; a secret
arming among the Turks spread consternation among the provinces to the eastward; and, to complete his
perplexities, the Protestants also, in his hereditary dominions, stimulated by the general example, were again
raising their heads. In that quarter, their numbers were overwhelming; in most places they had possession of
the revenues which Ferdinand would need for the maintenance of the war. The neutral began to waver, the
faithful to be discouraged, the turbulent alone to be animated and confident. One half of Germany encouraged
the rebels, the other inactively awaited the issue; Spanish assistance was still very remote. The moment which
had brought him every thing, threatened also to deprive him of all.
And when he now, yielding to the stern law of necessity, made overtures to the Bohemian rebels, all his
proposals for peace were insolently rejected. Count Thurn, at the head of an army, entered Moravia to bring
this province, which alone continued to waver, to a decision. The appearance of their friends is the signal of
revolt for the Moravian Protestants. Bruenn is taken, the remainder of the country yields with free will,
throughout the province government and religion are changed. Swelling as it flows, the torrent of rebellion
pours down upon Austria, where a party, holding similar sentiments, receives it with a joyful concurrence.
Henceforth, there should be no more distinctions of religion; equality of rights should be guaranteed to all
Christian churches. They hear that a foreign force has been invited into the country to oppress the Bohemians.
Let them be sought out, and the enemies of liberty pursued to the ends of the earth. Not an arm is raised in
defence of the Archduke, and the rebels, at length, encamp before Vienna to besiege their sovereign.
Ferdinand had sent his children from Gratz, where they were no longer safe, to the Tyrol; he himself awaited
the insurgents in his capital. A handful of soldiers was all he could oppose to the enraged multitude; these
few were without pay or provisions, and therefore little to be depended on. Vienna was unprepared for a long
siege. The party of the Protestants, ready at any moment to join the Bohemians, had the preponderance in the
city; those in the country had already begun to levy troops against him. Already, in imagination, the
Protestant populace saw the Emperor shut up in a monastery, his territories divided, and his children educated
as Protestants. Confiding in secret, and surrounded by public enemies, he saw the chasm every moment
widening to engulf his hopes and even himself. The Bohemian bullets were already falling upon the imperial
palace, when sixteen Austrian barons forcibly entered his chamber, and inveighing against him with loud and
bitter reproaches, endeavoured to force him into a confederation with the Bohemians. One of them, seizing
him by the button of his doublet, demanded, in a tone of menace, "Ferdinand, wilt thou sign it?"
Who would not be pardoned had he wavered in this frightful situation? Yet Ferdinand still remembered the
dignity of a Roman emperor. No alternative seemed left to him but an immediate flight or submission;
laymen urged him to the one, priests to the other. If he abandoned the city, it would fall into the enemy's
hands; with Vienna, Austria was lost; with Austria, the imperial throne. Ferdinand abandoned not his capital,
and as little would he hear of conditions.
The Archduke is still engaged in altercation with the deputed barons, when all at once a sound of trumpets is
heard in the palace square. Terror and astonishment take possession of all present; a fearful report pervades
the palace; one deputy after another disappears. Many of the nobility and the citizens hastily take refuge in
the camp of Thurn. This sudden change is effected by a regiment of Dampierre's cuirassiers, who at that
moment marched into the city to defend the Archduke. A body of infantry soon followed; reassured by their
appearance, several of the Roman Catholic citizens, and even the students themselves, take up arms. A report
which arrived just at the same time from Bohemia made his deliverance complete. The Flemish general,
Bucquoi, had totally defeated Count Mansfeld at Budweiss, and was marching upon Prague. The Bohemians
hastily broke up their camp before Vienna to protect their own capital.
And now also the passes were free which the enemy had taken possession of, in order to obstruct Ferdinand's
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progress to his coronation at Frankfort. If the accession to the imperial throne was important for the plans of
the King of Hungary, it was of still greater consequence at the present moment, when his nomination as
Emperor would afford the most unsuspicious and decisive proof of the dignity of his person, and of the
justice of his cause, while, at the same time, it would give him a hope of support from the Empire. But the
same cabal which opposed him in his hereditary dominions, laboured also to counteract him in his canvass
for the imperial dignity. No Austrian prince, they maintained, ought to ascend the throne; least of all
Ferdinand, the bigoted persecutor of their religion, the slave of Spain and of the Jesuits. To prevent this, the
crown had been offered, even during the lifetime of Matthias, to the Duke of Bavaria, and on his refusal, to
the Duke of Savoy. As some difficulty was experienced in settling with the latter the conditions of
acceptance, it was sought, at all events, to delay the election till some decisive blow in Austria or Bohemia
should annihilate all the hopes of Ferdinand, and incapacitate him from any competition for this dignity. The
members of the Union left no stone unturned to gain over from Ferdinand the Electorate of Saxony, which
was bound to Austrian interests; they represented to this court the dangers with which the Protestant religion,
and even the constitution of the empire, were threatened by the principles of this prince and his Spanish
alliance. By the elevation of Ferdinand to the imperial throne, Germany, they further asserted, would be
involved in the private quarrels of this prince, and bring upon itself the arms of Bohemia. But in spite of all
opposing influences, the day of election was fixed, Ferdinand summoned to it as lawful king of Bohemia, and
his electoral vote, after a fruitless resistance on the part of the Bohemian Estates, acknowledged to be good.
The votes of the three ecclesiastical electorates were for him, Saxony was favourable to him, Brandenburg
made no opposition, and a decided majority declared him Emperor in 1619. Thus he saw the most doubtful of
his crowns placed first of all on his head; but a few days after he lost that which he had reckoned among the
most certain of his possessions. While he was thus elected Emperor in Frankfort, he was in Prague deprived
of the Bohemian throne.
Almost all of his German hereditary dominions had in the meantime entered into a formidable league with the
Bohemians, whose insolence now exceeded all bounds. In a general Diet, the latter, on the 17th of August,
1619, proclaimed the Emperor an enemy to the Bohemian religion and liberties, who by his pernicious
counsels had alienated from them the affections of the late Emperor, had furnished troops to oppress them,
had given their country as a prey to foreigners, and finally, in contravention of the national rights, had
bequeathed the crown, by a secret compact, to Spain: they therefore declared that he had forfeited whatever
title he might otherwise have had to the crown, and immediately proceeded to a new election. As this
sentence was pronounced by Protestants, their choice could not well fall upon a Roman Catholic prince,
though, to save appearances, some voices were raised for Bavaria and Savoy. But the violent religious
animosities which divided the evangelical and the reformed parties among the Protestants, impeded for some
time the election even of a Protestant king; till at last the address and activity of the Calvinists carried the day
from the numerical superiority of the Lutherans.
Among all the princes who were competitors for this dignity, the Elector Palatine Frederick V. had the best
grounded claims on the confidence and gratitude of the Bohemians; and among them all, there was no one in
whose case the private interests of particular Estates, and the attachment of the people, seemed to be justified
by so many considerations of state. Frederick V. was of a free and lively spirit, of great goodness of heart,
and regal liberality. He was the head of the Calvinistic party in Germany, the leader of the Union, whose
resources were at his disposal, a near relation of the Duke of Bavaria, and a soninlaw of the King of Great
Britain, who might lend him his powerful support. All these considerations were prominently and
successfully brought forward by the Calvinists, and Frederick V. was chosen king by the Assembly at Prague,
amidst prayers and tears of joy.
The whole proceedings of the Diet at Prague had been premeditated, and Frederick himself had taken too
active a share in the matter to feel at all surprised at the offer made to him by the Bohemians. But now the
immediate glitter of this throne dazzled him, and the magnitude both of his elevation and his delinquency
made his weak mind to tremble. After the usual manner of pusillanimous spirits, he sought to confirm himself
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in his purpose by the opinions of others; but these opinions had no weight with him when they ran counter to
his own cherished wishes. Saxony and Bavaria, of whom he sought advice, all his brother electors, all who
compared the magnitude of the design with his capacities and resources, warned him of the danger into which
he was about to rush. Even King James of England preferred to see his soninlaw deprived of this crown,
than that the sacred majesty of kings should be outraged by so dangerous a precedent. But of what avail was
the voice of prudence against the seductive glitter of a crown? In the moment of boldest determination, when
they are indignantly rejecting the consecrated branch of a race which had governed them for two centuries, a
free people throws itself into his arms. Confiding in his courage, they choose him as their leader in the
dangerous career of glory and liberty. To him, as to its born champion, an oppressed religion looks for shelter
and support against its persecutors. Could he have the weakness to listen to his fears, and to betray the cause
of religion and liberty? This religion proclaims to him its own preponderance, and the weakness of its rival,
twothirds of the power of Austria are now in arms against Austria itself, while a formidable confederacy,
already formed in Transylvania, would, by a hostile attack, further distract even the weak remnant of its
power. Could inducements such as these fail to awaken his ambition, or such hopes to animate and inflame
his resolution?
A few moments of calm consideration would have sufficed to show the danger of the undertaking, and the
comparative worthlessness of the prize. But the temptation spoke to his feelings; the warning only to his
reason. It was his misfortune that his nearest and most influential counsellors espoused the side of his
passions. The aggrandizement of their master's power opened to the ambition and avarice of his Palatine
servants an unlimited field for their gratification; this anticipated triumph of their church kindled the ardour
of the Calvinistic fanatic. Could a mind so weak as that of Ferdinand resist the delusions of his counsellors,
who exaggerated his resources and his strength, as much as they underrated those of his enemies; or the
exhortations of his preachers, who announced the effusions of their fanatical zeal as the immediate inspiration
of heaven? The dreams of astrology filled his mind with visionary hopes; even love conspired, with its
irresistible fascination, to complete the seduction. "Had you," demanded the Electress, "confidence enough in
yourself to accept the hand of a king's daughter, and have you misgivings about taking a crown which is
voluntarily offered you? I would rather eat bread at thy kingly table, than feast at thy electoral board."
Frederick accepted the Bohemian crown. The coronation was celebrated with unexampled pomp at Prague,
for the nation displayed all its riches in honour of its own work. Silesia and Moravia, the adjoining provinces
to Bohemia, followed their example, and did homage to Frederick. The reformed faith was enthroned in all
the churches of the kingdom; the rejoicings were unbounded, their attachment to their new king bordered on
adoration. Denmark and Sweden, Holland and Venice, and several of the Dutch states, acknowledged him as
lawful sovereign, and Frederick now prepared to maintain his new acquisition.
His principal hopes rested on Prince Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania. This formidable enemy of Austria, and
of the Roman Catholic church, not content with the principality which, with the assistance of the Turks, he
had wrested from his legitimate prince, Gabriel Bathori, gladly seized this opportunity of aggrandizing
himself at the expense of Austria, which had hesitated to acknowledge him as sovereign of Transylvania. An
attack upon Hungary and Austria was concerted with the Bohemian rebels, and both armies were to unite
before the capital. Meantime, Bethlen Gabor, under the mask of friendship, disguised the true object of his
warlike preparations, artfully promising the Emperor to lure the Bohemians into the toils, by a pretended
offer of assistance, and to deliver up to him alive the leaders of the insurrection. All at once, however, he
appeared in a hostile attitude in Upper Hungary. Before him went terror, and devastation behind; all
opposition yielded, and at Presburg he received the Hungarian crown. The Emperor's brother, who governed
in Vienna, trembled for the capital. He hastily summoned General Bucquoi to his assistance, and the retreat
of the Imperialists drew the Bohemians, a second time, before the walls of Vienna. Reinforced by twelve
thousand Transylvanians, and soon after joined by the victorious army of Bethlen Gabor, they again menaced
the capital with assault; all the country round Vienna was laid waste, the navigation of the Danube closed, all
supplies cut off, and the horrors of famine were threatened. Ferdinand, hastily recalled to his capital by this
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urgent danger, saw himself a second time on the brink of ruin. But want of provisions, and the inclement
weather, finally compelled the Bohemians to go into quarters, a defeat in Hungary recalled Bethlen Gabor,
and thus once more had fortune rescued the Emperor.
In a few weeks the scene was changed, and by his prudence and activity Ferdinand improved his position as
rapidly as Frederick, by indolence and impolicy, ruined his. The Estates of Lower Austria were regained to
their allegiance by a confirmation of their privileges; and the few who still held out were declared guilty of
`lesemajeste' and high treason. During the election of Frankfort, he had contrived, by personal
representations, to win over to his cause the ecclesiastical electors, and also Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, at
Munich. The whole issue of the war, the fate of Frederick and the Emperor, were now dependent on the part
which the Union and the League should take in the troubles of Bohemia. It was evidently of importance to all
the Protestants of Germany that the King of Bohemia should be supported, while it was equally the interest of
the Roman Catholics to prevent the ruin of the Emperor. If the Protestants succeeded in Bohemia, all the
Roman Catholic princes in Germany might tremble for their possessions; if they failed, the Emperor would
give laws to Protestant Germany. Thus Ferdinand put the League, Frederick the Union, in motion. The ties of
relationship and a personal attachment to the Emperor, his brotherinlaw, with whom he had been educated
at Ingolstadt, zeal for the Roman Catholic religion, which seemed to be in the most imminent peril, and the
suggestions of the Jesuits, combined with the suspicious movements of the Union, moved the Duke of
Bavaria, and all the princes of the League, to make the cause of Ferdinand their own.
According to the terms of a treaty with the Emperor, which assured to the Duke of Bavaria compensation for
all the expenses of the war, or the losses he might sustain, Maximilian took, with full powers, the command
of the troops of the League, which were ordered to march to the assistance of the Emperor against the
Bohemian rebels. The leaders of the Union, instead of delaying by every means this dangerous coalition of
the League with the Emperor, did every thing in their power to accelerate it. Could they, they thought, but
once drive the Roman Catholic League to take an open part in the Bohemian war, they might reckon on
similar measures from all the members and allies of the Union. Without some open step taken by the Roman
Catholics against the Union, no effectual confederacy of the Protestant powers was to be looked for. They
seized, therefore, the present emergency of the troubles in Bohemia to demand from the Roman Catholics the
abolition of their past grievances, and full security for the future exercise of their religion. They addressed
this demand, which was moreover couched in threatening language, to the Duke of Bavaria, as the head of the
Roman Catholics, and they insisted on an immediate and categorical answer. Maximilian might decide for or
against them, still their point was gained; his concession, if he yielded, would deprive the Roman Catholic
party of its most powerful protector; his refusal would arm the whole Protestant party, and render inevitable a
war in which they hoped to be the conquerors. Maximilian, firmly attached to the opposite party from so
many other considerations, took the demands of the Union as a formal declaration of hostilities, and
quickened his preparations. While Bavaria and the League were thus arming in the Emperor's cause,
negotiations for a subsidy were opened with the Spanish court. All the difficulties with which the indolent
policy of that ministry met this demand were happily surmounted by the imperial ambassador at Madrid,
Count Khevenhuller. In addition to a subsidy of a million of florins, which from time to time were doled out
by this court, an attack upon the Lower Palatinate, from the side of the Spanish Netherlands, was at the same
time agreed upon.
During these attempts to draw all the Roman Catholic powers into the League, every exertion was made
against the counterleague of the Protestants. To this end, it was important to alarm the Elector of Saxony
and the other Evangelical powers, and accordingly the Union were diligent in propagating a rumour that the
preparations of the League had for their object to deprive them of the ecclesiastical foundations they had
secularized. A written assurance to the contrary calmed the fears of the Duke of Saxony, whom moreover
private jealousy of the Palatine, and the insinuations of his chaplain, who was in the pay of Austria, and
mortification at having been passed over by the Bohemians in the election to the throne, strongly inclined to
the side of Austria. The fanaticism of the Lutherans could never forgive the reformed party for having drawn,
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as they expressed it, so many fair provinces into the gulf of Calvinism, and rejecting the Roman Antichrist
only to make way for an Helvetian one.
While Ferdinand used every effort to improve the unfavourable situation of his affairs, Frederick was daily
injuring his good cause. By his close and questionable connexion with the Prince of Transylvania, the open
ally of the Porte, he gave offence to weak minds; and a general rumour accused him of furthering his own
ambition at the expense of Christendom, and arming the Turks against Germany. His inconsiderate zeal for
the Calvinistic scheme irritated the Lutherans of Bohemia, his attacks on imageworship incensed the Papists
of this kingdom against him. New and oppressive imposts alienated the affections of all his subjects. The
disappointed hopes of the Bohemian nobles cooled their zeal; the absence of foreign succours abated their
confidence. Instead of devoting himself with untiring energies to the affairs of his kingdom, Frederick wasted
his time in amusements; instead of filling his treasury by a wise economy, he squandered his revenues by a
needless theatrical pomp, and a misplaced munificence. With a lightminded carelessness, he did but gaze at
himself in his new dignity, and in the illtimed desire to enjoy his crown, he forgot the more pressing duty of
securing it on his head.
But greatly as men had erred in their opinion of him, Frederick himself had not less miscalculated his foreign
resources. Most of the members of the Union considered the affairs of Bohemia as foreign to the real object
of their confederacy; others, who were devoted to him, were overawed by fear of the Emperor. Saxony and
Hesse Darmstadt had already been gained over by Ferdinand; Lower Austria, on which side a powerful
diversion had been looked for, had made its submission to the Emperor; and Bethlen Gabor had concluded a
truce with him. By its embassies, the court of Vienna had induced Denmark to remain inactive, and to occupy
Sweden in a war with the Poles. The republic of Holland had enough to do to defend itself against the arms of
the Spaniards; Venice and Saxony remained inactive; King James of England was overreached by the artifice
of Spain. One friend after another withdrew; one hope vanished after another so rapidly in a few months
was every thing changed.
In the mean time, the leaders of the Union assembled an army; the Emperor and the League did the same.
The troops of the latter were assembled under the banners of Maximilian at Donauwerth, those of the Union
at Ulm, under the Margrave of Anspach. The decisive moment seemed at length to have arrived which was to
end these long dissensions by a vigorous blow, and irrevocably to settle the relation of the two churches in
Germany. Anxiously on the stretch was the expectation of both parties. How great then was their
astonishment when suddenly the intelligence of peace arrived, and both armies separated without striking a
blow!
The intervention of France effected this peace, which was equally acceptable to both parties. The French
cabinet, no longer swayed by the counsels of Henry the Great, and whose maxims of state were perhaps not
applicable to the present condition of that kingdom, was now far less alarmed at the preponderance of
Austria, than of the increase which would accrue to the strength of the Calvinists, if the Palatine house should
be able to retain the throne of Bohemia. Involved at the time in a dangerous conflict with its own Calvinistic
subjects, it was of the utmost importance to France that the Protestant faction in Bohemia should be
suppressed before the Huguenots could copy their dangerous example. In order therefore to facilitate the
Emperor's operations against the Bohemians, she offered her mediation to the Union and the League, and
effected this unexpected treaty, of which the main article was, "That the Union should abandon all
interference in the affairs of Bohemia, and confine the aid which they might afford to Frederick the Fifth, to
his Palatine territories." To this disgraceful treaty, the Union were moved by the firmness of Maximilian, and
the fear of being pressed at once by the troops of the League, and a new Imperial army which was on its
march from the Netherlands.
The whole force of Bavaria and the League was now at the disposal of the Emperor to be employed against
the Bohemians, who by the pacification of Ulm were abandoned to their fate. With a rapid movement, and
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before a rumour of the proceedings at Ulm could reach there, Maximilian appeared in Upper Austria, when
the Estates, surprised and unprepared for an enemy, purchased the Emperor's pardon by an immediate and
unconditional submission. In Lower Austria, the duke formed a junction with the troops from the Low
Countries under Bucquoi, and without loss of time the united Imperial and Bavarian forces, amounting to
50,000 men, entered Bohemia. All the Bohemian troops, which were dispersed over Lower Austria and
Moravia, were driven before them; every town which attempted resistance was quickly taken by storm;
others, terrified by the report of the punishment inflicted on these, voluntarily opened their gates; nothing in
short interrupted the impetuous career of Maximilian. The Bohemian army, commanded by the brave Prince
Christian of Anhalt, retreated to the neighbourhood of Prague; where, under the walls of the city, Maximilian
offered him battle.
The wretched condition in which he hoped to surprise the insurgents, justified the rapidity of the duke's
movements, and secured him the victory. Frederick's army did not amount to 30,000 men. Eight thousand of
these were furnished by the Prince of Anhalt; 10,000 were Hungarians, whom Bethlen Gabor had despatched
to his assistance. An inroad of the Elector of Saxony upon Lusatia, had cut off all succours from that country,
and from Silesia; the pacification of Austria put an end to all his expectations from that quarter; Bethlen
Gabor, his most powerful ally, remained inactive in Transylvania; the Union had betrayed his cause to the
Emperor. Nothing remained to him but his Bohemians; and they were without goodwill to his cause, and
without unity and courage. The Bohemian magnates were indignant that German generals should be put over
their heads; Count Mansfeld remained in Pilsen, at a distance from the camp, to avoid the mortification of
serving under Anhalt and Hohenlohe. The soldiers, in want of necessaries, became dispirited; and the little
discipline that was observed, gave occasion to bitter complaints from the peasantry. It was in vain that
Frederick made his appearance in the camp, in the hope of reviving the courage of the soldiers by his
presence, and of kindling the emulation of the nobles by his example.
The Bohemians had begun to entrench themselves on the White Mountain near Prague, when they were
attacked by the Imperial and Bavarian armies, on the 8th November, 1620. In the beginning of the action,
some advantages were gained by the cavalry of the Prince of Anhalt; but the superior numbers of the enemy
soon neutralized them. The charge of the Bavarians and Walloons was irresistible. The Hungarian cavalry
was the first to retreat. The Bohemian infantry soon followed their example; and the Germans were at last
carried along with them in the general flight. Ten cannons, composing the whole of Frederick's artillery, were
taken by the enemy; four thousand Bohemians fell in the flight and on the field; while of the Imperialists and
soldiers of the League only a few hundred were killed. In less than an hour this decisive action was over.
Frederick was seated at table in Prague, while his army was thus cut to pieces. It is probable that he had not
expected the attack on this day, since he had ordered an entertainment for it. A messenger summoned him
from table, to show him from the walls the whole frightful scene. He requested a cessation of hostilities for
twentyfour hours for deliberation; but eight was all the Duke of Bavaria would allow him. Frederick availed
himself of these to fly by night from the capital, with his wife, and the chief officers of his army. This flight
was so hurried, that the Prince of Anhalt left behind him his most private papers, and Frederick his crown. "I
know now what I am," said this unfortunate prince to those who endeavoured to comfort him; "there are
virtues which misfortune only can teach us, and it is in adversity alone that princes learn to know
themselves."
Prague was not irretrievably lost when Frederick's pusillanimity abandoned it. The light troops of Mansfeld
were still in Pilsen, and were not engaged in the action. Bethlen Gabor might at any moment have assumed an
offensive attitude, and drawn off the Emperor's army to the Hungarian frontier. The defeated Bohemians
might rally. Sickness, famine, and the inclement weather, might wear out the enemy; but all these hopes
disappeared before the immediate alarm. Frederick dreaded the fickleness of the Bohemians, who might
probably yield to the temptation to purchase, by the surrender of his person, the pardon of the Emperor.
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Thurn, and those of this party who were in the same condemnation with him, found it equally inexpedient to
await their destiny within the walls of Prague. They retired towards Moravia, with a view of seeking refuge in
Transylvania. Frederick fled to Breslau, where, however, he only remained a short time. He removed from
thence to the court of the Elector of Brandenburg, and finally took shelter in Holland.
The battle of Prague had decided the fate of Bohemia. Prague surrendered the next day to the victors; the
other towns followed the example of the capital. The Estates did homage without conditions, and the same
was done by those of Silesia and Moravia. The Emperor allowed three months to elapse, before instituting
any inquiry into the past. Reassured by this apparent clemency, many who, at first, had fled in terror appeared
again in the capital. All at once, however, the storm burst forth; fortyeight of the most active among the
insurgents were arrested on the same day and hour, and tried by an extraordinary commission, composed of
native Bohemians and Austrians. Of these, twentyseven, and of the common people an immense number,
expired on the scaffold. The absenting offenders were summoned to appear to their trial, and failing to do so,
condemned to death, as traitors and offenders against his Catholic Majesty, their estates confiscated, and their
names affixed to the gallows. The property also of the rebels who had fallen in the field was seized. This
tyranny might have been borne, as it affected individuals only, and while the ruin of one enriched another;
but more intolerable was the oppression which extended to the whole kingdom, without exception. All the
Protestant preachers were banished from the country; the Bohemians first, and afterwards those of Germany.
The `Letter of Majesty', Ferdinand tore with his own hand, and burnt the seal. Seven years after the battle of
Prague, the toleration of the Protestant religion within the kingdom was entirely revoked. But whatever
violence the Emperor allowed himself against the religious privileges of his subjects, he carefully abstained
from interfering with their political constitution; and while he deprived them of the liberty of thought, he
magnanimously left them the prerogative of taxing themselves.
The victory of the White Mountain put Ferdinand in possession of all his dominions. It even invested him
with greater authority over them than his predecessors enjoyed, since their allegiance had been
unconditionally pledged to him, and no Letter of Majesty now existed to limit his sovereignty. All his wishes
were now gratified, to a degree surpassing his most sanguine expectations.
It was now in his power to dismiss his allies, and disband his army. If he was just, there was an end of the war
if he was both magnanimous and just, punishment was also at an end. The fate of Germany was in his
hands; the happiness and misery of millions depended on the resolution he should take. Never was so great a
decision resting on a single mind; never did the blindness of one man produce so much ruin.
Book II.
The resolution which Ferdinand now adopted, gave to the war a new direction, a new scene, and new actors.
From a rebellion in Bohemia, and the chastisement of rebels, a war extended first to Germany, and afterwards
to Europe. It is, therefore, necessary to take a general survey of the state of affairs both in Germany and the
rest of Europe.
Unequally as the territory of Germany and the privileges of its members were divided among the Roman
Catholics and the Protestants, neither party could hope to maintain itself against the encroachments of its
adversary otherwise than by a prudent use of its peculiar advantages, and by a politic union among
themselves. If the Roman Catholics were the more numerous party, and more favoured by the constitution of
the empire, the Protestants, on the other hand, had the advantage of possessing a more compact and populous
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line of territories, valiant princes, a warlike nobility, numerous armies, flourishing free towns, the command
of the sea, and even at the worst, certainty of support from Roman Catholic states. If the Catholics could arm
Spain and Italy in their favour, the republics of Venice, Holland, and England, opened their treasures to the
Protestants, while the states of the North and the formidable power of Turkey, stood ready to afford them
prompt assistance. Brandenburg, Saxony, and the Palatinate, opposed three Protestant to three Ecclesiastical
votes in the Electoral College; while to the Elector of Bohemia, as to the Archduke of Austria, the possession
of the Imperial dignity was an important check, if the Protestants properly availed themselves of it. The
sword of the Union might keep within its sheath the sword of the League; or if matters actually came to a
war, might make the issue of it doubtful. But, unfortunately, private interests dissolved the band of union
which should have held together the Protestant members of the empire. This critical conjuncture found none
but secondrate actors on the political stage, and the decisive moment was neglected because the courageous
were deficient in power, and the powerful in sagacity, courage, and resolution.
The Elector of Saxony was placed at the head of the German Protestants, by the services of his ancestor
Maurice, by the extent of his territories, and by the influence of his electoral vote. Upon the resolution he
might adopt, the fate of the contending parties seemed to depend; and John George was not insensible to the
advantages which this important situation procured him. Equally valuable as an ally, both to the Emperor and
to the Protestant Union, he cautiously avoided committing himself to either party; neither trusting himself by
any irrevocable declaration entirely to the gratitude of the Emperor, nor renouncing the advantages which
were to be gained from his fears. Uninfected by the contagion of religious and romantic enthusiasm which
hurried sovereign after sovereign to risk both crown and life on the hazard of war, John George aspired to the
more solid renown of improving and advancing the interests of his territories. His cotemporaries accused him
of forsaking the Protestant cause in the very midst of the storm; of preferring the aggrandizement of his house
to the emancipation of his country; of exposing the whole Evangelical or Lutheran church of Germany to
ruin, rather than raise an arm in defence of the Reformed or Calvinists; of injuring the common cause by his
suspicious friendship more seriously than the open enmity of its avowed opponents. But it would have been
well if his accusers had imitated the wise policy of the Elector. If, despite of the prudent policy, the Saxons,
like all others, groaned at the cruelties which marked the Emperor's progress; if all Germany was a witness
how Ferdinand deceived his confederates and trifled with his engagements; if even the Elector himself at last
perceived this the more shame to the Emperor who could so basely betray such implicit confidence.
If an excessive reliance on the Emperor, and the hope of enlarging his territories, tied the hands of the Elector
of Saxony, the weak George William, Elector of Brandenburg, was still more shamefully fettered by fear of
Austria, and of the loss of his dominions. What was made a reproach against these princes would have
preserved to the Elector Palatine his fame and his kingdom. A rash confidence in his untried strength, the
influence of French counsels, and the temptation of a crown, had seduced that unfortunate prince into an
enterprise for which he had neither adequate genius nor political capacity. The partition of his territories
among discordant princes, enfeebled the Palatinate, which, united, might have made a longer resistance.
This partition of territory was equally injurious to the House of Hesse, in which, between Darmstadt and
Cassel, religious dissensions had occasioned a fatal division. The line of Darmstadt, adhering to the
Confession of Augsburg, had placed itself under the Emperor's protection, who favoured it at the expense of
the Calvinists of Cassel. While his religious confederates were shedding their blood for their faith and their
liberties, the Landgrave of Darmstadt was won over by the Emperor's gold. But William of Cassel, every way
worthy of his ancestor who, a century before, had defended the freedom of Germany against the formidable
Charles V., espoused the cause of danger and of honour. Superior to that pusillanimity which made far more
powerful princes bow before Ferdinand's might, the Landgrave William was the first to join the hero of
Sweden, and to set an example to the princes of Germany which all had hesitated to begin. The boldness of
his resolve was equalled by the steadfastness of his perseverance and the valour of his exploits. He placed
himself with unshrinking resolution before his bleeding country, and boldly confronted the fearful enemy,
whose hands were still reeking from the carnage of Magdeburg.
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The Landgrave William deserves to descend to immortality with the heroic race of Ernest. Thy day of
vengeance was long delayed, unfortunate John Frederick! Noble! nevertobeforgotten prince! Slowly but
brightly it broke. Thy times returned, and thy heroic spirit descended on thy grandson. An intrepid race of
princes issues from the Thuringian forests, to shame, by immortal deeds, the unjust sentence which robbed
thee of the electoral crown to avenge thy offended shade by heaps of bloody sacrifice. The sentence of the
conqueror could deprive thee of thy territories, but not that spirit of patriotism which staked them, nor that
chivalrous courage which, a century afterwards, was destined to shake the throne of his descendant. Thy
vengeance and that of Germany whetted the sacred sword, and one heroic hand after the other wielded the
irresistible steel. As men, they achieved what as sovereigns they dared not undertake; they met in a glorious
cause as the valiant soldiers of liberty. Too weak in territory to attack the enemy with their own forces, they
directed foreign artillery against them, and led foreign banners to victory.
The liberties of Germany, abandoned by the more powerful states, who, however, enjoyed most of the
prosperity accruing from them, were defended by a few princes for whom they were almost without value.
The possession of territories and dignities deadened courage; the want of both made heroes. While Saxony,
Brandenburg, and the rest drew back in terror, Anhalt, Mansfeld, the Prince of Weimar and others were
shedding their blood in the field. The Dukes of Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Luneburg, and Wirtemberg, and the
free cities of Upper Germany, to whom the name of EMPEROR was of course a formidable one, anxiously
avoided a contest with such an opponent, and crouched murmuring beneath his mighty arm.
Austria and Roman Catholic Germany possessed in Maximilian of Bavaria a champion as prudent as he was
powerful. Adhering throughout the war to one fixed plan, never divided between his religion and his political
interests; not the slavish dependent of Austria, who was labouring for HIS advancement, and trembled before
her powerful protector, Maximilian earned the territories and dignities that rewarded his exertions. The other
Roman Catholic states, which were chiefly Ecclesiastical, too unwarlike to resist the multitudes whom the
prosperity of their territories allured, became the victims of the war one after another, and were contented to
persecute in the cabinet and in the pulpit, the enemy whom they could not openly oppose in the field. All of
them, slaves either to Austria or Bavaria, sunk into insignificance by the side of Maximilian; in his hand
alone their united power could be rendered available.
The formidable monarchy which Charles V. and his son had unnaturally constructed of the Netherlands,
Milan, and the two Sicilies, and their distant possessions in the East and West Indies, was under Philip III.
and Philip IV. fast verging to decay. Swollen to a sudden greatness by unfruitful gold, this power was now
sinking under a visible decline, neglecting, as it did, agriculture, the natural support of states. The conquests
in the West Indies had reduced Spain itself to poverty, while they enriched the markets of Europe; the
bankers of Antwerp, Venice, and Genoa, were making profit on the gold which was still buried in the mines
of Peru. For the sake of India, Spain had been depopulated, while the treasures drawn from thence were
wasted in the reconquest of Holland, in the chimerical project of changing the succession to the crown of
France, and in an unfortunate attack upon England. But the pride of this court had survived its greatness, as
the hate of its enemies had outlived its power. Distrust of the Protestants suggested to the ministry of Philip
III. the dangerous policy of his father; and the reliance of the Roman Catholics in Germany on Spanish
assistance, was as firm as their belief in the wonderworking bones of the martyrs. External splendour
concealed the inward wounds at which the lifeblood of this monarchy was oozing; and the belief of its
strength survived, because it still maintained the lofty tone of its golden days. Slaves in their palaces, and
strangers even upon their own thrones, the Spanish nominal kings still gave laws to their German relations;
though it is very doubtful if the support they afforded was worth the dependence by which the emperors
purchased it. The fate of Europe was decided behind the Pyrenees by ignorant monks or vindictive favourites.
Yet, even in its debasement, a power must always be formidable, which yields to none in extent; which, from
custom, if not from the steadfastness of its views, adhered faithfully to one system of policy; which possessed
welldisciplined armies and consummate generals; which, where the sword failed, did not scruple to employ
the dagger; and converted even its ambassadors into incendiaries and assassins. What it had lost in three
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quarters of the globe, it now sought to regain to the eastward, and all Europe was at its mercy, if it could
succeed in its long cherished design of uniting with the hereditary dominions of Austria all that lay between
the Alps and the Adriatic.
To the great alarm of the native states, this formidable power had gained a footing in Italy, where its
continual encroachments made the neighbouring sovereigns to tremble for their own possessions. The Pope
himself was in the most dangerous situation; hemmed in on both sides by the Spanish Viceroys of Naples on
the one side, and that of Milan upon the other. Venice was confined between the Austrian Tyrol and the
Spanish territories in Milan. Savoy was surrounded by the latter and France. Hence the wavering and
equivocal policy, which from the time of Charles V. had been pursued by the Italian States. The double
character which pertained to the Popes made them perpetually vacillate between two contradictory systems of
policy. If the successors of St. Peter found in the Spanish princes their most obedient disciples, and the most
steadfast supporters of the Papal See, yet the princes of the States of the Church had in these monarchs their
most dangerous neighbours, and most formidable opponents. If, in the one capacity, their dearest wish was
the destruction of the Protestants, and the triumph of Austria, in the other, they had reason to bless the arms
of the Protestants, which disabled a dangerous enemy. The one or the other sentiment prevailed, according as
the love of temporal dominion, or zeal for spiritual supremacy, predominated in the mind of the Pope. But the
policy of Rome was, on the whole, directed to immediate dangers; and it is well known how far more
powerful is the apprehension of losing a present good, than anxiety to recover a long lost possession. And
thus it becomes intelligible how the Pope should first combine with Austria for the destruction of heresy, and
then conspire with these very heretics for the destruction of Austria. Strangely blended are the threads of
human affairs! What would have become of the Reformation, and of the liberties of Germany, if the Bishop
of Rome and the Prince of Rome had had but one interest?
France had lost with its great Henry all its importance and all its weight in the political balance of Europe. A
turbulent minority had destroyed all the benefits of the able administration of Henry. Incapable ministers, the
creatures of court intrigue, squandered in a few years the treasures which Sully's economy and Henry's
frugality had amassed. Scarce able to maintain their ground against internal factions, they were compelled to
resign to other hands the helm of European affairs. The same civil war which armed Germany against itself,
excited a similar commotion in France; and Louis XIII. attained majority only to wage a war with his own
mother and his Protestant subjects. This party, which had been kept quiet by Henry's enlightened policy, now
seized the opportunity to take up arms, and, under the command of some adventurous leaders, began to form
themselves into a party within the state, and to fix on the strong and powerful town of Rochelle as the capital
of their intended kingdom. Too little of a statesman to suppress, by a prudent toleration, this civil commotion
in its birth, and too little master of the resources of his kingdom to direct them with energy, Louis XIII. was
reduced to the degradation of purchasing the submission of the rebels by large sums of money. Though policy
might incline him, in one point of view, to assist the Bohemian insurgents against Austria, the son of Henry
the Fourth was now compelled to be an inactive spectator of their destruction, happy enough if the Calvinists
in his own dominions did not unseasonably bethink them of their confederates beyond the Rhine. A great
mind at the helm of state would have reduced the Protestants in France to obedience, while it employed them
to fight for the independence of their German brethren. But Henry IV. was no more, and Richelieu had not
yet revived his system of policy.
While the glory of France was thus upon the wane, the emancipated republic of Holland was completing the
fabric of its greatness. The enthusiastic courage had not yet died away which, enkindled by the House of
Orange, had converted this mercantile people into a nation of heroes, and had enabled them to maintain their
independence in a bloody war against the Spanish monarchy. Aware how much they owed their own liberty
to foreign support, these republicans were ready to assist their German brethren in a similar cause, and the
more so, as both were opposed to the same enemy, and the liberty of Germany was the best warrant for that
of Holland. But a republic which had still to battle for its very existence, which, with all its wonderful
exertions, was scarce a match for the formidable enemy within its own territories, could not be expected to
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withdraw its troops from the necessary work of selfdefence to employ them with a magnanimous policy in
protecting foreign states.
England too, though now united with Scotland, no longer possessed, under the weak James, that influence in
the affairs of Europe which the governing mind of Elizabeth had procured for it. Convinced that the welfare
of her dominions depended on the security of the Protestants, this politic princess had never swerved from the
principle of promoting every enterprise which had for its object the diminution of the Austrian power. Her
successor was no less devoid of capacity to comprehend, than of vigour to execute, her views. While the
economical Elizabeth spared not her treasures to support the Flemings against Spain, and Henry IV. against
the League, James abandoned his daughter, his soninlaw, and his grandchild, to the fury of their enemies.
While he exhausted his learning to establish the divine right of kings, he allowed his own dignity to sink into
the dust; while he exerted his rhetoric to prove the absolute authority of kings, he reminded the people of
theirs; and by a useless profusion, sacrificed the chief of his sovereign rights that of dispensing with his
parliament, and thus depriving liberty of its organ. An innate horror at the sight of a naked sword averted him
from the most just of wars; while his favourite Buckingham practised on his weakness, and his own
complacent vanity rendered him an easy dupe of Spanish artifice. While his soninlaw was ruined, and the
inheritance of his grandson given to others, this weak prince was imbibing, with satisfaction, the incense
which was offered to him by Austria and Spain. To divert his attention from the German war, he was amused
with the proposal of a Spanish marriage for his son, and the ridiculous parent encouraged the romantic youth
in the foolish project of paying his addresses in person to the Spanish princess. But his son lost his bride, as
his soninlaw lost the crown of Bohemia and the Palatine Electorate; and death alone saved him from the
danger of closing his pacific reign by a war at home, which he never had courage to maintain, even at a
distance.
The domestic disturbances which his misgovernment had gradually excited burst forth under his unfortunate
son, and forced him, after some unimportant attempts, to renounce all further participation in the German
war, in order to stem within his own kingdom the rage of faction.
Two illustrious monarchs, far unequal in personal reputation, but equal in power and desire of fame, made the
North at this time to be respected. Under the long and active reign of Christian IV., Denmark had risen into
importance. The personal qualifications of this prince, an excellent navy, a formidable army, wellordered
finances, and prudent alliances, had combined to give her prosperity at home and influence abroad. Gustavus
Vasa had rescued Sweden from vassalage, reformed it by wise laws, and had introduced, for the first time,
this newlyorganized state into the field of European politics. What this great prince had merely sketched in
rude outline, was filled up by Gustavus Adolphus, his still greater grandson.
These two kingdoms, once unnaturally united and enfeebled by their union, had been violently separated at
the time of the Reformation, and this separation was the epoch of their prosperity. Injurious as this
compulsory union had proved to both kingdoms, equally necessary to each apart were neighbourly friendship
and harmony. On both the evangelical church leaned; both had the same seas to protect; a common interest
ought to unite them against the same enemy. But the hatred which had dissolved the union of these
monarchies continued long after their separation to divide the two nations. The Danish kings could not
abandon their pretensions to the Swedish crown, nor the Swedes banish the remembrance of Danish
oppression. The contiguous boundaries of the two kingdoms constantly furnished materials for international
quarrels, while the watchful jealousy of both kings, and the unavoidable collision of their commercial
interests in the North Seas, were inexhaustible sources of dispute.
Among the means of which Gustavus Vasa, the founder of the Swedish monarchy, availed himself to
strengthen his new edifice, the Reformation had been one of the principal. A fundamental law of the kingdom
excluded the adherents of popery from all offices of the state, and prohibited every future sovereign of
Sweden from altering the religious constitution of the kingdom. But the second son and second successor of
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Gustavus had relapsed into popery, and his son Sigismund, also king of Poland, had been guilty of measures
which menaced both the constitution and the established church. Headed by Charles, Duke of Sudermania,
the third son of Gustavus, the Estates made a courageous resistance, which terminated, at last, in an open civil
war between the uncle and nephew, and between the King and the people. Duke Charles, administrator of the
kingdom during the absence of the king, had availed himself of Sigismund's long residence in Poland, and the
just displeasure of the states, to ingratiate himself with the nation, and gradually to prepare his way to the
throne. His views were not a little forwarded by Sigismund's imprudence. A general Diet ventured to abolish,
in favour of the Protector, the rule of primogeniture which Gustavus had established in the succession, and
placed the Duke of Sudermania on the throne, from which Sigismund, with his whole posterity, were
solemnly excluded. The son of the new king (who reigned under the name of Charles IX.) was Gustavus
Adolphus, whom, as the son of a usurper, the adherents of Sigismund refused to recognize. But if the
obligations between monarchy and subjects are reciprocal, and states are not to be transmitted, like a lifeless
heirloom, from hand to hand, a nation acting with unanimity must have the power of renouncing their
allegiance to a sovereign who has violated his obligations to them, and of filling his place by a worthier
object.
Gustavus Adolphus had not completed his seventeenth year, when the Swedish throne became vacant by the
death of his father. But the early maturity of his genius enabled the Estates to abridge in his favour the legal
period of minority. With a glorious conquest over himself he commenced a reign which was to have victory
for its constant attendant, a career which was to begin and end in success. The young Countess of Brahe, the
daughter of a subject, had gained his early affections, and he had resolved to share with her the Swedish
throne. But, constrained by time and circumstances, he made his attachment yield to the higher duties of a
king, and heroism again took exclusive possession of a heart which was not destined by nature to confine
itself within the limits of quiet domestic happiness.
Christian IV. of Denmark, who had ascended the throne before the birth of Gustavus, in an inroad upon
Sweden, had gained some considerable advantages over the father of that hero. Gustavus Adolphus hastened
to put an end to this destructive war, and by prudent sacrifices obtained a peace, in order to turn his arms
against the Czar of Muscovy. The questionable fame of a conqueror never tempted him to spend the blood of
his subjects in unjust wars; but he never shrunk from a just one. His arms were successful against Russia, and
Sweden was augmented by several important provinces on the east.
In the meantime, Sigismund of Poland retained against the son the same sentiments of hostility which the
father had provoked, and left no artifice untried to shake the allegiance of his subjects, to cool the ardour of
his friends, and to embitter his enemies. Neither the great qualities of his rival, nor the repeated proofs of
devotion which Sweden gave to her loved monarch, could extinguish in this infatuated prince the foolish
hope of regaining his lost throne. All Gustavus's overtures were haughtily rejected. Unwillingly was this
really peaceful king involved in a tedious war with Poland, in which the whole of Livonia and Polish Prussia
were successively conquered. Though constantly victorious, Gustavus Adolphus was always the first to hold
out the hand of peace.
This contest between Sweden and Poland falls somewhere about the beginning of the Thirty Years' War in
Germany, with which it is in some measure connected. It was enough that Sigismund, himself a Roman
Catholic, was disputing the Swedish crown with a Protestant prince, to assure him the active support of Spain
and Austria; while a double relationship to the Emperor gave him a still stronger claim to his protection. It
was his reliance on this powerful assistance that chiefly encouraged the King of Poland to continue the war,
which had hitherto turned out so unfavourably for him, and the courts of Madrid and Vienna failed not to
encourage him by highsounding promises. While Sigismund lost one place after another in Livonia,
Courland, and Prussia, he saw his ally in Germany advancing from conquest after conquest to unlimited
power. No wonder then if his aversion to peace kept pace with his losses. The vehemence with which he
nourished his chimerical hopes blinded him to the artful policy of his confederates, who at his expense were
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keeping the Swedish hero employed, in order to overturn, without opposition, the liberties of Germany, and
then to seize on the exhausted North as an easy conquest. One circumstance which had not been calculated on
the magnanimity of Gustavus overthrew this deceitful policy. An eight years' war in Poland, so far
from exhausting the power of Sweden, had only served to mature the military genius of Gustavus, to inure the
Swedish army to warfare, and insensibly to perfect that system of tactics by which they were afterwards to
perform such wonders in Germany.
After this necessary digression on the existing circumstances of Europe, I now resume the thread of my
history.
Ferdinand had regained his dominions, but had not indemnified himself for the expenses of recovering them.
A sum of forty millions of florins, which the confiscations in Bohemia and Moravia had produced, would
have sufficed to reimburse both himself and his allies; but the Jesuits and his favourites soon squandered this
sum, large as it was. Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, to whose victorious arm, principally, the Emperor owed
the recovery of his dominions; who, in the service of religion and the Emperor, had sacrificed his near
relation, had the strongest claims on his gratitude; and moreover, in a treaty which, before the war, the duke
had concluded with the Emperor, he had expressly stipulated for the reimbursement of all expenses.
Ferdinand felt the full weight of the obligation imposed upon him by this treaty and by these services, but he
was not disposed to discharge it at his own cost. His purpose was to bestow a brilliant reward upon the duke,
but without detriment to himself. How could this be done better than at the expense of the unfortunate prince
who, by his revolt, had given the Emperor a right to punish him, and whose offences might be painted in
colours strong enough to justify the most violent measures under the appearance of law. That, then,
Maximilian may be rewarded, Frederick must be further persecuted and totally ruined; and to defray the
expenses of the old war, a new one must be commenced.
But a still stronger motive combined to enforce the first. Hitherto Ferdinand had been contending for
existence alone; he had been fulfilling no other duty than that of selfdefence. But now, when victory gave
him freedom to act, a higher duty occurred to him, and he remembered the vow which he had made at Loretto
and at Rome, to his generalissima, the Holy Virgin, to extend her worship even at the risk of his crown and
life. With this object, the oppression of the Protestants was inseparably connected. More favourable
circumstances for its accomplishment could not offer than those which presented themselves at the close of
the Bohemian war. Neither the power, nor a pretext of right, were now wanting to enable him to place the
Palatinate in the hands of the Catholics, and the importance of this change to the Catholic interests in
Germany would be incalculable. Thus, in rewarding the Duke of Bavaria with the spoils of his relation, he at
once gratified his meanest passions and fulfilled his most exalted duties; he crushed an enemy whom he
hated, and spared his avarice a painful sacrifice, while he believed he was winning a heavenly crown.
In the Emperor's cabinet, the ruin of Frederick had been resolved upon long before fortune had decided
against him; but it was only after this event that they ventured to direct against him the thunders of arbitrary
power. A decree of the Emperor, destitute of all the formalities required on such occasions by the laws of the
Empire, pronounced the Elector, and three other princes who had borne arms for him at Silesia and Bohemia,
as offenders against the imperial majesty, and disturbers of the public peace, under the ban of the empire, and
deprived them of their titles and territories. The execution of this sentence against Frederick, namely the
seizure of his lands, was, in further contempt of law, committed to Spain as Sovereign of the circle of
Burgundy, to the Duke of Bavaria, and the League. Had the Evangelic Union been worthy of the name it
bore, and of the cause which it pretended to defend, insuperable obstacles might have prevented the execution
of the sentence; but it was hopeless for a power which was far from a match even for the Spanish troops in
the Lower Palatinate, to contend against the united strength of the Emperor, Bavaria, and the League. The
sentence of proscription pronounced upon the Elector soon detached the free cities from the Union; and the
princes quickly followed their example. Fortunate in preserving their own dominions, they abandoned the
Elector, their former chief, to the Emperor's mercy, renounced the Union, and vowed never to revive it again.
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But while thus ingloriously the German princes deserted the unfortunate Frederick, and while Bohemia,
Silesia, and Moravia submitted to the Emperor, a single man, a soldier of fortune, whose only treasure was
his sword, Ernest Count Mansfeld, dared, in the Bohemian town of Pilsen, to defy the whole power of
Austria. Left without assistance after the battle of Prague by the Elector, to whose service he had devoted
himself, and even uncertain whether Frederick would thank him for his perseverance, he alone for some time
held out against the imperialists, till the garrison, mutinying for want of pay, sold the town to the Emperor.
Undismayed by this reverse, he immediately commenced new levies in the Upper Palatinate, and enlisted the
disbanded troops of the Union. A new army of 20,000 men was soon assembled under his banners, the more
formidable to the provinces which might be the object of its attack, because it must subsist by plunder.
Uncertain where this swarm might light, the neighbouring bishops trembled for their rich possessions, which
offered a tempting prey to its ravages. But, pressed by the Duke of Bavaria, who now entered the Upper
Palatinate, Mansfeld was compelled to retire. Eluding, by a successful stratagem, the Bavarian general, Tilly,
who was in pursuit of him, he suddenly appeared in the Lower Palatinate, and there wreaked upon the
bishoprics of the Rhine the severities he had designed for those of Franconia. While the imperial and
Bavarian allies thus overran Bohemia, the Spanish general, Spinola, had penetrated with a numerous army
from the Netherlands into the Lower Palatinate, which, however, the pacification of Ulm permitted the Union
to defend. But their measures were so badly concerted, that one place after another fell into the hands of the
Spaniards; and at last, when the Union broke up, the greater part of the country was in the possession of
Spain. The Spanish general, Corduba, who commanded these troops after the recall of Spinola, hastily raised
the siege of Frankenthal, when Mansfeld entered the Lower Palatinate. But instead of driving the Spaniards
out of this province, he hastened across the Rhine to secure for his needy troops shelter and subsistence in
Alsace. The open countries on which this swarm of maurauders threw themselves were converted into
frightful deserts, and only by enormous contributions could the cities purchase an exemption from plunder.
Reinforced by this expedition, Mansfeld again appeared on the Rhine to cover the Lower Palatinate.
So long as such an arm fought for him, the cause of the Elector Frederick was not irretrievably lost. New
prospects began to open, and misfortune raised up friends who had been silent during his prosperity. King
James of England, who had looked on with indifference while his soninlaw lost the Bohemian crown, was
aroused from his insensibility when the very existence of his daughter and grandson was at stake, and the
victorious enemy ventured an attack upon the Electorate. Late enough, he at last opened his treasures, and
hastened to afford supplies of money and troops, first to the Union, which at that time was defending the
Lower Palatinate, and afterwards, when they retired, to Count Mansfeld. By his means his near relation,
Christian, King of Denmark, was induced to afford his active support. At the same time, the approaching
expiration of the truce between Spain and Holland deprived the Emperor of all the supplies which otherwise
he might expect from the side of the Netherlands. More important still was the assistance which the Palatinate
received from Transylvania and Hungary. The cessation of hostilities between Gabor and the Emperor was
scarcely at an end, when this old and formidable enemy of Austria overran Hungary anew, and caused
himself to be crowned king in Presburg. So rapid was his progress that, to protect Austria and Hungary,
Boucquoi was obliged to evacuate Bohemia. This brave general met his death at the siege of Neuhausel, as,
shortly before, the no less valiant Dampierre had fallen before Presburg. Gabor's march into the Austrian
territory was irresistible; the old Count Thurn, and several other distinguished Bohemians, had united their
hatred and their strength with this irreconcileable enemy of Austria. A vigorous attack on the side of
Germany, while Gabor pressed the Emperor on that of Hungary, might have retrieved the fortunes of
Frederick; but, unfortunately, the Bohemians and Germans had always laid down their arms when Gabor took
the field; and the latter was always exhausted at the very moment that the former began to recover their
vigour.
Meanwhile Frederick had not delayed to join his protector Mansfeld. In disguise he entered the Lower
Palatinate, of which the possession was at that time disputed between Mansfeld and the Bavarian general,
Tilly, the Upper Palatinate having been long conquered. A ray of hope shone upon him as, from the wreck of
the Union, new friends came forward. A former member of the Union, George Frederick, Margrave of Baden,
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had for some time been engaged in assembling a military force, which soon amounted to a considerable army.
Its destination was kept a secret till he suddenly took the field and joined Mansfeld. Before commencing the
war, he resigned his Margraviate to his son, in the hope of eluding, by this precaution, the Emperor's revenge,
if his enterprize should be unsuccessful. His neighbour, the Duke of Wirtemberg, likewise began to augment
his military force. The courage of the Palatine revived, and he laboured assiduously to renew the Protestant
Union. It was now time for Tilly to consult for his own safety, and he hastily summoned the Spanish troops,
under Corduba, to his assistance. But while the enemy was uniting his strength, Mansfeld and the Margrave
separated, and the latter was defeated by the Bavarian general near Wimpfen (1622).
To defend a king whom his nearest relation persecuted, and who was deserted even by his own
fatherinlaw, there had come forward an adventurer without money, and whose very legitimacy was
questioned. A sovereign had resigned possessions over which he reigned in peace, to hazard the uncertain
fortune of war in behalf of a stranger. And now another soldier of fortune, poor in territorial possessions, but
rich in illustrious ancestry, undertook the defence of a cause which the former despaired of. Christian, Duke
of Brunswick, administrator of Halberstadt, seemed to have learnt from Count Mansfeld the secret of keeping
in the field an army of 20,000 men without money. Impelled by youthful presumption, and influenced partly
by the wish of establishing his reputation at the expense of the Roman Catholic priesthood, whom he
cordially detested, and partly by a thirst for plunder, he assembled a considerable army in Lower Saxony,
under the pretext of espousing the defence of Frederick, and of the liberties of Germany. "God's Friend,
Priest's Foe", was the motto he chose for his coinage, which was struck out of church plate; and his conduct
belied one half at least of the device.
The progress of these banditti was, as usual, marked by the most frightful devastation. Enriched by the spoils
of the chapters of Lower Saxony and Westphalia, they gathered strength to plunder the bishoprics upon the
Upper Rhine. Driven from thence, both by friends and foes, the Administrator approached the town of
Hoechst on the Maine, which he crossed after a murderous action with Tilly, who disputed with him the
passage of the river. With the loss of half his army he reached the opposite bank, where he quickly collected
his shattered troops, and formed a junction with Mansfeld. Pursued by Tilly, this united host threw itself
again into Alsace, to repeat their former ravages. While the Elector Frederick followed, almost like a fugitive
mendicant, this swarm of plunderers which acknowledged him as its lord, and dignified itself with his name,
his friends were busily endeavouring to effect a reconciliation between him and the Emperor. Ferdinand took
care not to deprive them of all hope of seeing the Palatine restored to his dominion. Full of artifice and
dissimulation, he pretended to be willing to enter into a negotiation, hoping thereby to cool their ardour in the
field, and to prevent them from driving matters to extremity. James I., ever the dupe of Spanish cunning,
contributed not a little, by his foolish intermeddling, to promote the Emperor's schemes. Ferdinand insisted
that Frederick, if he would appeal to his clemency, should, first of all, lay down his arms, and James
considered this demand extremely reasonable. At his instigation, the Elector dismissed his only real
defenders, Count Mansfeld and the Administrator, and in Holland awaited his own fate from the mercy of the
Emperor.
Mansfeld and Duke Christian were now at a loss for some new name; the cause of the Elector had not set
them in motion, so his dismissal could not disarm them. War was their object; it was all the same to them in
whose cause or name it was waged. After some vain attempts on the part of Mansfeld to be received into the
Emperor's service, both marched into Lorraine, where the excesses of their troops spread terror even to the
heart of France. Here they long waited in vain for a master willing to purchase their services; till the Dutch,
pressed by the Spanish General Spinola, offered to take them into pay. After a bloody fight at Fleurus with
the Spaniards, who attempted to intercept them, they reached Holland, where their appearance compelled the
Spanish general forthwith to raise the siege of BergenopZoom. But even Holland was soon weary of these
dangerous guests, and availed herself of the first moment to get rid of their unwelcome assistance. Mansfeld
allowed his troops to recruit themselves for new enterprises in the fertile province of East Friezeland. Duke
Christian, passionately enamoured of the Electress Palatine, with whom he had become acquainted in
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Holland, and more disposed for war than ever, led back his army into Lower Saxony, bearing that princess's
glove in his hat, and on his standards the motto "All for God and Her". Neither of these adventurers had as
yet run their career in this war.
All the imperial territories were now free from the enemy; the Union was dissolved; the Margrave of Baden,
Duke Christian, and Mansfeld, driven from the field, and the Palatinate overrun by the executive troops of the
empire. Manheim and Heidelberg were in possession of Bavaria, and Frankenthal was shortly afterwards
ceded to the Spaniards. The Palatine, in a distant corner of Holland, awaited the disgraceful permission to
appease, by abject submission, the vengeance of the Emperor; and an Electoral Diet was at last summoned to
decide his fate. That fate, however, had been long before decided at the court of the Emperor; though now,
for the first time, were circumstances favourable for giving publicity to the decision. After his past measures
towards the Elector, Ferdinand believed that a sincere reconciliation was not to be hoped for. The violent
course he had once begun, must be completed successfully, or recoil upon himself. What was already lost
was irrecoverable; Frederick could never hope to regain his dominions; and a prince without territory and
without subjects had little chance of retaining the electoral crown. Deeply as the Palatine had offended
against the House of Austria, the services of the Duke of Bavaria were no less meritorious. If the House of
Austria and the Roman Catholic church had much to dread from the resentment and religious rancour of the
Palatine family, they had as much to hope from the gratitude and religious zeal of the Bavarian. Lastly, by the
cession of the Palatine Electorate to Bavaria, the Roman Catholic religion would obtain a decisive
preponderance in the Electoral College, and secure a permanent triumph in Germany.
The last circumstance was sufficient to win the support of the three Ecclesiastical Electors to this innovation;
and among the Protestants the vote of Saxony was alone of any importance. But could John George be
expected to dispute with the Emperor a right, without which he would expose to question his own title to the
electoral dignity? To a prince whom descent, dignity, and political power placed at the head of the Protestant
church in Germany, nothing, it is true, ought to be more sacred than the defence of the rights of that church
against all the encroachments of the Roman Catholics. But the question here was not whether the interests of
the Protestants were to be supported against the Roman Catholics, but which of two religions equally
detested, the Calvinistic and the Popish, was to triumph over the other; to which of the two enemies, equally
dangerous, the Palatinate was to be assigned; and in this clashing of opposite duties, it was natural that
private hate and private gain should determine the event. The born protector of the liberties of Germany, and
of the Protestant religion, encouraged the Emperor to dispose of the Palatinate by his imperial prerogative;
and to apprehend no resistance on the part of Saxony to his measures on the mere ground of form. If the
Elector was afterwards disposed to retract this consent, Ferdinand himself, by driving the Evangelical
preachers from Bohemia, was the cause of this change of opinion; and, in the eyes of the Elector, the
transference of the Palatine Electorate to Bavaria ceased to be illegal, as soon as Ferdinand was prevailed
upon to cede Lusatia to Saxony, in consideration of six millions of dollars, as the expenses of the war.
Thus, in defiance of all Protestant Germany, and in mockery of the fundamental laws of the empire, which, as
his election, he had sworn to maintain, Ferdinand at Ratisbon solemnly invested the Duke of Bavaria with the
Palatinate, without prejudice, as the form ran, to the rights which the relations or descendants of Frederick
might afterwards establish. That unfortunate prince thus saw himself irrevocably driven from his possessions,
without having been even heard before the tribunal which condemned him a privilege which the law
allows to the meanest subject, and even to the most atrocious criminal.
This violent step at last opened the eyes of the King of England; and as the negociations for the marriage of
his son with the Infanta of Spain were now broken off, James began seriously to espouse the cause of his
soninlaw. A change in the French ministry had placed Cardinal Richelieu at the head of affairs, and this
fallen kingdom soon began to feel that a great mind was at the helm of state. The attempts of the Spanish
Viceroy in Milan to gain possession of the Valtelline, and thus to form a junction with the Austrian hereditary
dominions, revived the olden dread of this power, and with it the policy of Henry the Great. The marriage of
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the Prince of Wales with Henrietta of France, established a close union between the two crowns; and to this
alliance, Holland, Denmark, and some of the Italian states presently acceded. Its object was to expel, by force
of arms, Spain from the Valtelline, and to compel Austria to reinstate Frederick; but only the first of these
designs was prosecuted with vigour. James I. died, and Charles I., involved in disputes with his Parliament,
could not bestow attention on the affairs of Germany. Savoy and Venice withheld their assistance; and the
French minister thought it necessary to subdue the Huguenots at home, before he supported the German
Protestants against the Emperor. Great as were the hopes which had been formed from this alliance, they
were yet equalled by the disappointment of the event.
Mansfeld, deprived of all support, remained inactive on the Lower Rhine; and Duke Christian of Brunswick,
after an unsuccessful campaign, was a second time driven out of Germany. A fresh irruption of Bethlen
Gabor into Moravia, frustrated by the want of support from the Germans, terminated, like all the rest, in a
formal peace with the Emperor. The Union was no more; no Protestant prince was in arms; and on the
frontiers of Lower Germany, the Bavarian General Tilly, at the head of a victorious army, encamped in the
Protestant territory. The movements of the Duke of Brunswick had drawn him into this quarter, and even into
the circle of Lower Saxony, when he made himself master of the Administrator's magazines at Lippstadt. The
necessity of observing this enemy, and preventing him from new inroads, was the pretext assigned for
continuing Tilly's stay in the country. But, in truth, both Mansfeld and Duke Christian had, from want of
money, disbanded their armies, and Count Tilly had no enemy to dread. Why, then, still burden the country
with his presence?
It is difficult, amidst the uproar of contending parties, to distinguish the voice of truth; but certainly it was
matter for alarm that the League did not lay down its arms. The premature rejoicings of the Roman Catholics,
too, were calculated to increase apprehension. The Emperor and the League stood armed and victorious in
Germany without a power to oppose them, should they venture to attack the Protestant states and to annul the
religious treaty. Had Ferdinand been in reality far from disposed to abuse his conquests, still the defenceless
position of the Protestants was most likely to suggest the temptation. Obsolete conventions could not bind a
prince who thought that he owed all to religion, and believed that a religious creed would sanctify any deed,
however violent. Upper Germany was already overpowered. Lower Germany alone could check his despotic
authority. Here the Protestants still predominated; the church had been forcibly deprived of most of its
endowments; and the present appeared a favourable moment for recovering these lost possessions. A great
part of the strength of the Lower German princes consisted in these Chapters, and the plea of restoring its
own to the church, afforded an excellent pretext for weakening these princes.
Unpardonable would have been their negligence, had they remained inactive in this danger. The
remembrance of the ravages which Tilly's army had committed in Lower Saxony was too recent not to arouse
the Estates to measures of defence. With all haste, the circle of Lower Saxony began to arm itself.
Extraordinary contributions were levied, troops collected, and magazines filled. Negociations for subsidies
were set on foot with Venice, Holland, and England. They deliberated, too, what power should be placed at
the head of the confederacy. The kings of the Sound and the Baltic, the natural allies of this circle, would not
see with indifference the Emperor treating it as a conqueror, and establishing himself as their neighbour on
the shores of the North Sea. The twofold interests of religion and policy urged them to put a stop to his
progress in Lower Germany. Christian IV. of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein, was himself a prince of this
circle, and by considerations equally powerful, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden was induced to join the
confederacy.
These two kings vied with each other for the honour of defending Lower Saxony, and of opposing the
formidable power of Austria. Each offered to raise a welldisciplined army, and to lead it in person. His
victorious campaigns against Moscow and Poland gave weight to the promises of the King of Sweden. The
shores of the Baltic were full of the name of Gustavus. But the fame of his rival excited the envy of the
Danish monarch; and the more success he promised himself in this campaign, the less disposed was he to
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show any favour to his envied neighbour. Both laid their conditions and plans before the English ministry,
and Christian IV. finally succeeded in outbidding his rival. Gustavus Adolphus, for his own security, had
demanded the cession of some places of strength in Germany, where he himself had no territories, to afford,
in case of need, a place of refuge for his troops. Christian IV. possessed Holstein and Jutland, through which,
in the event of a defeat, he could always secure a retreat.
Eager to get the start of his competitor, the King of Denmark hastened to take the field. Appointed
generalissimo of the circle of Lower Saxony, he soon had an army of 60,000 men in motion; the
administrator of Magdeburg, and the Dukes of Brunswick and Mecklenburgh, entered into an alliance with
him. Encouraged by the hope of assistance from England, and the possession of so large a force, he flattered
himself he should be able to terminate the war in a single campaign.
At Vienna, it was officially notified that the only object of these preparations was the protection of the circle,
and the maintenance of peace. But the negociations with Holland, England, and even France, the
extraordinary exertions of the circle, and the raising of so formidable an army, seemed to have something
more in view than defensive operations, and to contemplate nothing less than the complete restoration of the
Elector Palatine, and the humiliation of the dreaded power of Austria.
After negociations, exhortations, commands, and threats had in vain been employed by the Emperor in order
to induce the King of Denmark and the circle of Lower Saxony to lay down their arms, hostilities
commenced, and Lower Germany became the theatre of war. Count Tilly, marching along the left bank of the
Weser, made himself master of all the passes as far as Minden. After an unsuccessful attack on Nieuburg, he
crossed the river and overran the principality of Calemberg, in which he quartered his troops. The king
conducted his operations on the right bank of the river, and spread his forces over the territories of
Brunswick, but having weakened his main body by too powerful detachments, he could not engage in any
enterprise of importance. Aware of his opponent's superiority, he avoided a decisive action as anxiously as
the general of the League sought it.
With the exception of the troops from the Spanish Netherlands, which had poured into the Lower Palatinate,
the Emperor had hitherto made use only of the arms of Bavaria and the League in Germany. Maximilian
conducted the war as executor of the ban of the empire, and Tilly, who commanded the army of execution,
was in the Bavarian service. The Emperor owed superiority in the field to Bavaria and the League, and his
fortunes were in their hands. This dependence on their goodwill, but ill accorded with the grand schemes,
which the brilliant commencement of the war had led the imperial cabinet to form.
However active the League had shown itself in the Emperor's defence, while thereby it secured its own
welfare, it could not be expected that it would enter as readily into his views of conquest. Or, if they still
continued to lend their armies for that purpose, it was too much to be feared that they would share with the
Emperor nothing but general odium, while they appropriated to themselves all advantages. A strong army
under his own orders could alone free him from this debasing dependence upon Bavaria, and restore to him
his former preeminence in Germany. But the war had already exhausted the imperial dominions, and they
were unequal to the expense of such an armament. In these circumstances, nothing could be more welcome to
the Emperor than the proposal with which one of his officers surprised him.
This was Count Wallenstein, an experienced officer, and the richest nobleman in Bohemia. From his earliest
youth he had been in the service of the House of Austria, and several campaigns against the Turks, Venetians,
Bohemians, Hungarians, and Transylvanians had established his reputation. He was present as colonel at the
battle of Prague, and afterwards, as majorgeneral, had defeated a Hungarian force in Moravia. The
Emperor's gratitude was equal to his services, and a large share of the confiscated estates of the Bohemian
insurgents was their reward. Possessed of immense property, excited by ambitious views, confident in his
own good fortune, and still more encouraged by the existing state of circumstances, he offered, at his own
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expense and that of his friends, to raise and clothe an army for the Emperor, and even undertook the cost of
maintaining it, if he were allowed to augment it to 50,000 men. The project was universally ridiculed as the
chimerical offspring of a visionary brain; but the offer was highly valuable, if its promises should be but
partially fulfilled. Certain circles in Bohemia were assigned to him as depots, with authority to appoint his
own officers. In a few months he had 20,000 men under arms, with which, quitting the Austrian territories, he
soon afterwards appeared on the frontiers of Lower Saxony with 30,000. The Emperor had lent this armament
nothing but his name. The reputation of the general, the prospect of rapid promotion, and the hope of plunder,
attracted to his standard adventurers from all quarters of Germany; and even sovereign princes, stimulated by
the desire of glory or of gain, offered to raise regiments for the service of Austria.
Now, therefore, for the first time in this war, an imperial army appeared in Germany; an event which if it
was menacing to the Protestants, was scarcely more acceptable to the Catholics. Wallenstein had orders to
unite his army with the troops of the League, and in conjunction with the Bavarian general to attack the King
of Denmark. But long jealous of Tilly's fame, he showed no disposition to share with him the laurels of the
campaign, or in the splendour of his rival's achievements to dim the lustre of his own. His plan of operations
was to support the latter, but to act entirely independent of him. As he had not resources, like Tilly, for
supplying the wants of his army, he was obliged to march his troops into fertile countries which had not as
yet suffered from war. Disobeying, therefore, the order to form a junction with the general of the League, he
marched into the territories of Halberstadt and Magdeburg, and at Dessau made himself master of the Elbe.
All the lands on either bank of this river were at his command, and from them he could either attack the King
of Denmark in the rear, or, if prudent, enter the territories of that prince.
Christian IV. was fully aware of the danger of his situation between two such powerful armies. He had
already been joined by the administrator of Halberstadt, who had lately returned from Holland; he now also
acknowledged Mansfeld, whom previously he had refused to recognise, and supported him to the best of his
ability. Mansfeld amply requited this service. He alone kept at bay the army of Wallenstein upon the Elbe,
and prevented its junction with that of Tilly, and a combined attack on the King of Denmark.
Notwithstanding the enemy's superiority, this intrepid general even approached the bridge of Dessau, and
ventured to entrench himself in presence of the imperial lines. But attacked in the rear by the whole force of
the Imperialists, he was obliged to yield to superior numbers, and to abandon his post with the loss of 3,000
killed. After this defeat, Mansfeld withdrew into Brandenburg, where he soon recruited and reinforced his
army; and suddenly turned into Silesia, with the view of marching from thence into Hungary; and, in
conjunction with Bethlen Gabor, carrying the war into the heart of Austria. As the Austrian dominions in that
quarter were entirely defenceless, Wallenstein received immediate orders to leave the King of Denmark, and
if possible to intercept Mansfeld's progress through Silesia.
The diversion which this movement of Mansfeld had made in the plans of Wallenstein, enabled the king to
detach a part of his force into Westphalia, to seize the bishoprics of Munster and Osnaburg. To check this
movement, Tilly suddenly moved from the Weser; but the operations of Duke Christian, who threatened the
territories of the League with an inroad in the direction of Hesse, and to remove thither the seat of war,
recalled him as rapidly from Westphalia. In order to keep open his communication with these provinces, and
to prevent the junction of the enemy with the Landgrave of Hesse, Tilly hastily seized all the tenable posts on
the Werha and Fulda, and took up a strong position in Minden, at the foot of the Hessian Mountains, and at
the confluence of these rivers with the Weser. He soon made himself master of Goettingen, the key of
Brunswick and Hesse, and was meditating a similar attack upon Nordheim, when the king advanced upon
him with his whole army. After throwing into this place the necessary supplies for a long siege, the latter
attempted to open a new passage through Eichsfeld and Thuringia, into the territories of the League. He had
already reached Duderstadt, when Tilly, by forced marches, came up with him. As the army of Tilly, which
had been reinforced by some of Wallenstein's regiments, was superior in numbers to his own, the king, to
avoid a battle, retreated towards Brunswick. But Tilly incessantly harassed his retreat, and after three days'
skirmishing, he was at length obliged to await the enemy near the village of Lutter in Barenberg. The Danes
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began the attack with great bravery, and thrice did their intrepid monarch lead them in person against the
enemy; but at length the superior numbers and discipline of the Imperialists prevailed, and the general of the
League obtained a complete victory. The Danes lost sixty standards, and their whole artillery, baggage, and
ammunition. Several officers of distinction and about 4,000 men were killed in the field of battle; and several
companies of foot, in the flight, who had thrown themselves into the townhouse of Lutter, laid down their
arms and surrendered to the conqueror.
The king fled with his cavalry, and soon collected the wreck of his army which had survived this serious
defeat. Tilly pursued his victory, made himself master of the Weser and Brunswick, and forced the king to
retire into Bremen. Rendered more cautious by defeat, the latter now stood upon the defensive; and
determined at all events to prevent the enemy from crossing the Elbe. But while he threw garrisons into every
tenable place, he reduced his own diminished army to inactivity; and one after another his scattered troops
were either defeated or dispersed. The forces of the League, in command of the Weser, spread themselves
along the Elbe and Havel, and everywhere drove the Danes before them. Tilly himself crossing the Elbe
penetrated with his victorious army into Brandenburg, while Wallenstein entered Holstein to remove the seat
of war to the king's own dominions.
This general had just returned from Hungary whither he had pursued Mansfeld, without being able to obstruct
his march, or prevent his junction with Bethlen Gabor. Constantly persecuted by fortune, but always superior
to his fate, Mansfeld had made his way against countless difficulties, through Silesia and Hungary to
Transylvania, where, after all, he was not very welcome. Relying upon the assistance of England, and a
powerful diversion in Lower Saxony, Gabor had again broken the truce with the Emperor. But in place of the
expected diversion in his favour, Mansfeld had drawn upon himself the whole strength of Wallenstein, and
instead of bringing, required, pecuniary assistance. The want of concert in the Protestant counsels cooled
Gabor's ardour; and he hastened, as usual, to avert the coming storm by a speedy peace. Firmly determined,
however, to break it, with the first ray of hope, he directed Mansfeld in the mean time to apply for assistance
to Venice.
Cut off from Germany, and unable to support the weak remnant of his troops in Hungary, Mansfeld sold his
artillery and baggage train, and disbanded his soldiers. With a few followers, he proceeded through Bosnia
and Dalmatia, towards Venice. New schemes swelled his bosom; but his career was ended. Fate, which had
so restlessly sported with him throughout, now prepared for him a peaceful grave in Dalmatia. Death
overtook him in the vicinity of Zara in 1626, and a short time before him died the faithful companion of his
fortunes, Christian, Duke of Brunswick two men worthy of immortality, had they but been as superior to
their times as they were to their adversities.
The King of Denmark, with his whole army, was unable to cope with Tilly alone; much less, therefore, with a
shattered force could he hold his ground against the two imperial generals. The Danes retired from all their
posts on the Weser, the Elbe, and the Havel, and the army of Wallenstein poured like a torrent into
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Holstein and Sleswick. That general, too proud to act in conjunction with
another, had dispatched Tilly across the Elbe, to watch, as he gave out, the motions of the Dutch in that
quarter; but in reality that he might terminate the war against the king, and reap for himself the fruits of
Tilly's conquests. Christian had now lost all his fortresses in the German States, with the exception of
Gluckstadt; his armies were defeated or dispersed; no assistance came from Germany; from England, little
consolation; while his confederates in Lower Saxony were at the mercy of the conqueror. The Landgrave of
Hesse Cassel had been forced by Tilly, soon after the battle of Lutter, to renounce the Danish alliance.
Wallenstein's formidable appearance before Berlin reduced the Elector of Brandenburgh to submission, and
compelled him to recognise, as legitimate, Maximilian's title to the Palatine Electorate. The greater part of
Mecklenburgh was now overrun by imperial troops; and both dukes, as adherents of the King of Denmark,
placed under the ban of the empire, and driven from their dominions. The defence of the German liberties
against illegal encroachments, was punished as a crime deserving the loss of all dignities and territories; and
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yet this was but the prelude to the still more crying enormities which shortly followed.
The secret how Wallenstein had purposed to fulfil his extravagant designs was now manifest. He had learned
the lesson from Count Mansfeld; but the scholar surpassed his master. On the principle that war must support
war, Mansfeld and the Duke of Brunswick had subsisted their troops by contributions levied indiscriminately
on friend and enemy; but this predatory life was attended with all the inconvenience and insecurity which
accompany robbery. Like a fugitive banditti, they were obliged to steal through exasperated and vigilant
enemies; to roam from one end of Germany to another; to watch their opportunity with anxiety; and to
abandon the most fertile territories whenever they were defended by a superior army. If Mansfeld and Duke
Christian had done such great things in the face of these difficulties, what might not be expected if the
obstacles were removed; when the army raised was numerous enough to overawe in itself the most powerful
states of the empire; when the name of the Emperor insured impunity to every outrage; and when, under the
highest authority, and at the head of an overwhelming force, the same system of warfare was pursued, which
these two adventurers had hitherto adopted at their own risk, and with only an untrained multitude?
Wallenstein had all this in view when he made his bold offer to the Emperor, which now seemed extravagant
to no one. The more his army was augmented, the less cause was there to fear for its subsistence, because it
could irresistibly bear down upon the refractory states; the more violent its outrages, the more probable was
impunity. Towards hostile states it had the plea of right; towards the favourably disposed it could allege
necessity. The inequality, too, with which it dealt out its oppressions, prevented any dangerous union among
the states; while the exhaustion of their territories deprived them of the power of vengeance. Thus the whole
of Germany became a kind of magazine for the imperial army, and the Emperor was enabled to deal with the
other states as absolutely as with his own hereditary dominions. Universal was the clamour for redress before
the imperial throne; but there was nothing to fear from the revenge of the injured princes, so long as they
appealed for justice. The general discontent was directed equally against the Emperor, who had lent his name
to these barbarities, and the general who exceeded his power, and openly abused the authority of his master.
They applied to the Emperor for protection against the outrages of his general; but Wallenstein had no sooner
felt himself absolute in the army, than he threw off his obedience to his sovereign.
The exhaustion of the enemy made a speedy peace probable; yet Wallenstein continued to augment the
imperial armies until they were at least 100,000 men strong. Numberless commissions to colonelcies and
inferior commands, the regal pomp of the commanderinchief, immoderate largesses to his favourites, (for
he never gave less than a thousand florins,) enormous sums lavished in corrupting the court at Vienna all
this had been effected without burdening the Emperor. These immense sums were raised by the contributions
levied from the lower German provinces, where no distinction was made between friend and foe; and the
territories of all princes were subjected to the same system of marching and quartering, of extortion and
outrage. If credit is to be given to an extravagant contemporary statement, Wallenstein, during his seven years
command, had exacted not less than sixty thousand millions of dollars from one half of Germany. The greater
his extortions, the greater the rewards of his soldiers, and the greater the concourse to his standard, for the
world always follows fortune. His armies flourished while all the states through which they passed withered.
What cared he for the detestation of the people, and the complaints of princes? His army adored him, and the
very enormity of his guilt enabled him to bid defiance to its consequences.
It would be unjust to Ferdinand, were we to lay all these irregularities to his charge. Had he foreseen that he
was abandoning the German States to the mercy of his officer, he would have been sensible how dangerous to
himself so absolute a general would prove. The closer the connexion became between the army, and the
leader from whom flowed favour and fortune, the more the ties which united both to the Emperor were
relaxed. Every thing, it is true, was done in the name of the latter; but Wallenstein only availed himself of the
supreme majesty of the Emperor to crush the authority of other states. His object was to depress the princes
of the empire, to destroy all gradation of rank between them and the Emperor, and to elevate the power of the
latter above all competition. If the Emperor were absolute in Germany, who then would be equal to the man
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intrusted with the execution of his will? The height to which Wallenstein had raised the imperial authority
astonished even the Emperor himself; but as the greatness of the master was entirely the work of the servant,
the creation of Wallenstein would necessarily sink again into nothing upon the withdrawal of its creative
hand. Not without an object, therefore, did Wallenstein labour to poison the minds of the German princes
against the Emperor. The more violent their hatred of Ferdinand, the more indispensable to the Emperor
would become the man who alone could render their illwill powerless. His design unquestionably was, that
his sovereign should stand in fear of no one in all Germany besides himself, the source and engine of this
despotic power.
As a step towards this end, Wallenstein now demanded the cession of Mecklenburg, to be held in pledge till
the repayment of his advances for the war. Ferdinand had already created him Duke of Friedland, apparently
with the view of exalting his own general over Bavaria; but an ordinary recompense would not satisfy
Wallenstein's ambition. In vain was this new demand, which could be granted only at the expense of two
princes of the empire, actively resisted in the Imperial Council; in vain did the Spaniards, who had long been
offended by his pride, oppose his elevation. The powerful support which Wallenstein had purchased from the
imperial councillors prevailed, and Ferdinand was determined, at whatever cost, to secure the devotion of so
indispensable a minister. For a slight offence, one of the oldest German houses was expelled from their
hereditary dominions, that a creature of the Emperor might be enriched by their spoils (1628).
Wallenstein now began to assume the title of generalissimo of the Emperor by sea and land. Wismar was
taken, and a firm footing gained on the Baltic. Ships were required from Poland and the Hanse towns to carry
the war to the other side of the Baltic; to pursue the Danes into the heart of their own country, and to compel
them to a peace which might prepare the way to more important conquests. The communication between the
Lower German States and the Northern powers would be broken, could the Emperor place himself between
them, and encompass Germany, from the Adriatic to the Sound, (the intervening kingdom of Poland being
already dependent on him,) with an unbroken line of territory. If such was the Emperor's plan, Wallenstein
had a peculiar interest in its execution. These possessions on the Baltic should, he intended, form the first
foundation of a power, which had long been the object of his ambition, and which should enable him to throw
off his dependence on the Emperor.
To effect this object, it was of extreme importance to gain possession of Stralsund, a town on the Baltic. Its
excellent harbour, and the short passage from it to the Swedish and Danish coasts, peculiarly fitted it for a
naval station in a war with these powers. This town, the sixth of the Hanseatic League, enjoyed great
privileges under the Duke of Pomerania, and totally independent of Denmark, had taken no share in the war.
But neither its neutrality, nor its privileges, could protect it against the encroachments of Wallenstein, when
he had once cast a longing look upon it.
The request he made, that Stralsund should receive an imperial garrison, had been firmly and honourably
rejected by the magistracy, who also refused his cunningly demanded permission to march his troops through
the town, Wallenstein, therefore, now proposed to besiege it.
The independence of Stralsund, as securing the free navigation of the Baltic, was equally important to the two
Northern kings. A common danger overcame at last the private jealousies which had long divided these
princes. In a treaty concluded at Copenhagen in 1628, they bound themselves to assist Stralsund with their
combined force, and to oppose in common every foreign power which should appear in the Baltic with
hostile views. Christian IV. also threw a sufficient garrison into Stralsund, and by his personal presence
animated the courage of the citizens. Some ships of war which Sigismund, King of Poland, had sent to the
assistance of the imperial general, were sunk by the Danish fleet; and as Lubeck refused him the use of its
shipping, this imperial generalissimo of the sea had not even ships enough to blockade this single harbour.
Nothing could appear more adventurous than to attempt the conquest of a strongly fortified seaport without
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first blockading its harbour. Wallenstein, however, who as yet had never experienced a check, wished to
conquer nature itself, and to perform impossibilities. Stralsund, open to the sea, continued to be supplied with
provisions and reinforcements; yet Wallenstein maintained his blockade on the land side, and endeavoured,
by boasting menaces, to supply his want of real strength. "I will take this town," said he, "though it were
fastened by a chain to the heavens." The Emperor himself, who might have cause to regret an enterprise
which promised no very glorious result, joyfully availed himself of the apparent submission and acceptable
propositions of the inhabitants, to order the general to retire from the town. Wallenstein despised the
command, and continued to harass the besieged by incessant assaults. As the Danish garrison, already much
reduced, was unequal to the fatigues of this prolonged defence, and the king was unable to detach any further
troops to their support, Stralsund, with Christian's consent, threw itself under the protection of the King of
Sweden. The Danish commander left the town to make way for a Swedish governor, who gloriously defended
it. Here Wallenstein's good fortune forsook him; and, for the first time, his pride experienced the humiliation
of relinquishing his prey, after the loss of many months and of 12,000 men. The necessity to which he
reduced the town of applying for protection to Sweden, laid the foundation of a close alliance between
Gustavus Adolphus and Stralsund, which greatly facilitated the entrance of the Swedes into Germany.
Hitherto invariable success had attended the arms of the Emperor and the League, and Christian IV., defeated
in Germany, had sought refuge in his own islands; but the Baltic checked the further progress of the
conquerors. The want of ships not only stopped the pursuit of the king, but endangered their previous
acquisitions. The union of the two northern monarchs was most to be dreaded, because, so long as it lasted, it
effectually prevented the Emperor and his general from acquiring a footing on the Baltic, or effecting a
landing in Sweden. But if they could succeed in dissolving this union, and especially securing the friendship
of the Danish king, they might hope to overpower the insulated force of Sweden. The dread of the
interference of foreign powers, the insubordination of the Protestants in his own states, and still more the
storm which was gradually darkening along the whole of Protestant Germany, inclined the Emperor to peace,
which his general, from opposite motives, was equally desirous to effect. Far from wishing for a state of
things which would reduce him from the meridian of greatness and glory to the obscurity of private life, he
only wished to change the theatre of war, and by a partial peace to prolong the general confusion. The
friendship of Denmark, whose neighbour he had become as Duke of Mecklenburgh, was most important for
the success of his ambitious views; and he resolved, even at the sacrifice of his sovereign's interests, to secure
its alliance.
By the treaty of Copenhagen, Christian IV. had expressly engaged not to conclude a separate peace with the
Emperor, without the consent of Sweden. Notwithstanding, Wallenstein's proposition was readily received by
him. In a conference at Lubeck in 1629, from which Wallenstein, with studied contempt, excluded the
Swedish ambassadors who came to intercede for Mecklenburgh, all the conquests taken by the imperialists
were restored to the Danes. The conditions imposed upon the king were, that he should interfere no farther
with the affairs of Germany than was called for by his character of Duke of Holstein; that he should on no
pretext harass the Chapters of Lower Germany, and should leave the Dukes of Mecklenburgh to their fate. By
Christian himself had these princes been involved in the war with the Emperor; he now sacrificed them, to
gain the favour of the usurper of their territories. Among the motives which had engaged him in a war with
the Emperor, not the least was the restoration of his relation, the Elector Palatine yet the name of that
unfortunate prince was not even mentioned in the treaty; while in one of its articles the legitimacy of the
Bavarian election was expressly recognised. Thus meanly and ingloriously did Christian IV. retire from the
field.
Ferdinand had it now in his power, for the second time, to secure the tranquillity of Germany; and it
depended solely on his will whether the treaty with Denmark should or should not be the basis of a general
peace. From every quarter arose the cry of the unfortunate, petitioning for an end of their sufferings; the
cruelties of his soldiers, and the rapacity of his generals, had exceeded all bounds. Germany, laid waste by the
desolating bands of Mansfeld and the Duke of Brunswick, and by the still more terrible hordes of Tilly and
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Wallenstein, lay exhausted, bleeding, wasted, and sighing for repose. An anxious desire for peace was felt by
all conditions, and by the Emperor himself; involved as he was in a war with France in Upper Italy, exhausted
by his past warfare in Germany, and apprehensive of the day of reckoning which was approaching. But,
unfortunately, the conditions on which alone the two religious parties were willing respectively to sheath the
sword, were irreconcileable. The Roman Catholics wished to terminate the war to their own advantage; the
Protestants advanced equal pretensions. The Emperor, instead of uniting both parties by a prudent
moderation, sided with one; and thus Germany was again plunged in the horrors of a bloody war.
From the very close of the Bohemian troubles, Ferdinand had carried on a counter reformation in his
hereditary dominions, in which, however, from regard to some of the Protestant Estates, he proceeded, at
first, with moderation. But the victories of his generals in Lower Germany encouraged him to throw off all
reserve. Accordingly he had it intimated to all the Protestants in these dominions, that they must either
abandon their religion, or their native country, a bitter and dreadful alternative, which excited the most
violent commotions among his Austrian subjects. In the Palatinate, immediately after the expulsion of
Frederick, the Protestant religion had been suppressed, and its professors expelled from the University of
Heidelberg.
All this was but the prelude to greater changes. In the Electoral Congress held at Muehlhausen, the Roman
Catholics had demanded of the Emperor that all the archbishoprics, bishoprics, mediate and immediate,
abbacies and monasteries, which, since the Diet of Augsburg, had been secularized by the Protestants, should
be restored to the church, in order to indemnify them for the losses and sufferings in the war. To a Roman
Catholic prince so zealous as Ferdinand was, such a hint was not likely to be neglected; but he still thought it
would be premature to arouse the whole Protestants of Germany by so decisive a step. Not a single Protestant
prince but would be deprived, by this revocation of the religious foundations, of a part of his lands; for where
these revenues had not actually been diverted to secular purposes they had been made over to the Protestant
church. To this source, many princes owed the chief part of their revenues and importance. All, without
exception, would be irritated by this demand for restoration. The religious treaty did not expressly deny their
right to these chapters, although it did not allow it. But a possession which had now been held for nearly a
century, the silence of four preceding emperors, and the law of equity, which gave them an equal right with
the Roman Catholics to the foundations of their common ancestors, might be strongly pleaded by them as a
valid title. Besides the actual loss of power and authority, which the surrender of these foundations would
occasion, besides the inevitable confusion which would necessarily attend it, one important disadvantage to
which it would lead, was, that the restoration of the Roman Catholic bishops would increase the strength of
that party in the Diet by so many additional votes. Such grievous sacrifices likely to fall on the Protestants,
made the Emperor apprehensive of a formidable opposition; and until the military ardour should have cooled
in Germany, he had no wish to provoke a party formidable by its union, and which in the Elector of Saxony
had a powerful leader. He resolved, therefore, to try the experiment at first on a small scale, in order to
ascertain how it was likely to succeed on a larger one. Accordingly, some of the free cities in Upper
Germany, and the Duke of Wirtemberg, received orders to surrender to the Roman Catholics several of the
confiscated chapters.
The state of affairs in Saxony enabled the Emperor to make some bolder experiments in that quarter. In the
bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, the Protestant canons had not hesitated to elect bishops of their
own religion. Both bishoprics, with the exception of the town of Magdeburg itself, were overrun by the
troops of Wallenstein. It happened, moreover, that by the death of the Administrator Duke Christian of
Brunswick, Halberstadt was vacant, as was also the Archbishopric of Magdeburg by the deposition of
Christian William, a prince of the House of Brandenburgh. Ferdinand took advantage of the circumstance to
restore the see of Halberstadt to a Roman Catholic bishop, and a prince of his own house. To avoid a similar
coercion, the Chapter of Magdeburg hastened to elect a son of the Elector of Saxony as archbishop. But the
pope, who with his arrogated authority interfered in this matter, conferred the Archbishopric of Magdeburg
also on the Austrian prince. Thus, with all his pious zeal for religion, Ferdinand never lost sight of the
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interests of his family.
At length, when the peace of Lubeck had delivered the Emperor from all apprehensions on the side of
Denmark, and the German Protestants seemed entirely powerless, the League becoming louder and more
urgent in its demands, Ferdinand, in 1629, signed the Edict of Restitution, (so famous by its disastrous
consequences,) which he had previously laid before the four Roman Catholic electors for their approbation.
In the preamble, he claimed the prerogative, in right of his imperial authority, to interpret the meaning of the
religious treaty, the ambiguities of which had already caused so many disputes, and to decide as supreme
arbiter and judge between the contending parties. This prerogative he founded upon the practice of his
ancestors, and its previous recognition even by Protestant states. Saxony had actually acknowledged this right
of the Emperor; and it now became evident how deeply this court had injured the Protestant cause by its
dependence on the House of Austria. But though the meaning of the religious treaty was really ambiguous, as
a century of religious disputes sufficiently proved, yet for the Emperor, who must be either a Protestant or a
Roman Catholic, and therefore an interested party, to assume the right of deciding between the disputants,
was clearly a violation of an essential article of the pacification. He could not be judge in his own cause,
without reducing the liberties of the empire to an empty sound.
And now, in virtue of this usurpation, Ferdinand decided, "That every secularization of a religious
foundation, mediate or immediate, by the Protestants, subsequent to the date of the treaty, was contrary to its
spirit, and must be revoked as a breach of it." He further decided, "That, by the religious peace, Catholic
proprietors of estates were no further bound to their Protestant subjects than to allow them full liberty to quit
their territories." In obedience to this decision, all unlawful possessors of benefices the Protestant states in
short without exception were ordered, under pain of the ban of the empire, immediately to surrender their
usurped possessions to the imperial commissioners.
This sentence applied to no less than two archbishoprics and twelve bishoprics, besides innumerable
abbacies. The edict came like a thunderbolt on the whole of Protestant Germany; dreadful even in its
immediate consequences; but yet more so from the further calamities it seemed to threaten. The Protestants
were now convinced that the suppression of their religion had been resolved on by the Emperor and the
League, and that the overthrow of German liberty would soon follow. Their remonstrances were unheeded;
the commissioners were named, and an army assembled to enforce obedience. The edict was first put in force
in Augsburg, where the treaty was concluded; the city was again placed under the government of its bishop,
and six Protestant churches in the town were closed. The Duke of Wirtemberg was, in like manner,
compelled to surrender his abbacies. These severe measures, though they alarmed the Protestant states, were
yet insufficient to rouse them to an active resistance. Their fear of the Emperor was too strong, and many
were disposed to quiet submission. The hope of attaining their end by gentle measures, induced the Roman
Catholics likewise to delay for a year the execution of the edict, and this saved the Protestants; before the end
of that period, the success of the Swedish arms had totally changed the state of affairs.
In a Diet held at Ratisbon, at which Ferdinand was present in person (in 1630), the necessity of taking some
measures for the immediate restoration of a general peace to Germany, and for the removal of all grievances,
was debated. The complaints of the Roman Catholics were scarcely less numerous than those of the
Protestants, although Ferdinand had flattered himself that by the Edict of Restitution he had secured the
members of the League, and its leader by the gift of the electoral dignity, and the cession of great part of the
Palatinate. But the good understanding between the Emperor and the princes of the League had rapidly
declined since the employment of Wallenstein. Accustomed to give law to Germany, and even to sway the
Emperor's own destiny, the haughty Elector of Bavaria now at once saw himself supplanted by the imperial
general, and with that of the League, his own importance completely undermined. Another had now stepped
in to reap the fruits of his victories, and to bury his past services in oblivion. Wallenstein's imperious
character, whose dearest triumph was in degrading the authority of the princes, and giving an odious latitude
to that of the Emperor, tended not a little to augment the irritation of the Elector. Discontented with the
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Emperor, and distrustful of his intentions, he had entered into an alliance with France, which the other
members of the League were suspected of favouring. A fear of the Emperor's plans of aggrandizement, and
discontent with existing evils, had extinguished among them all feelings of gratitude. Wallenstein's exactions
had become altogether intolerable. Brandenburg estimated its losses at twenty, Pomerania at ten, Hesse
Cassel at seven millions of dollars, and the rest in proportion. The cry for redress was loud, urgent, and
universal; all prejudices were hushed; Roman Catholics and Protestants were united on this point. The
terrified Emperor was assailed on all sides by petitions against Wallenstein, and his ear filled with the most
fearful descriptions of his outrages. Ferdinand was not naturally cruel. If not totally innocent of the atrocities
which were practised in Germany under the shelter of his name, he was ignorant of their extent; and he was
not long in yielding to the representation of the princes, and reduced his standing army by eighteen thousand
cavalry. While this reduction took place, the Swedes were actively preparing an expedition into Germany,
and the greater part of the disbanded Imperialists enlisted under their banners.
The Emperor's concessions only encouraged the Elector of Bavaria to bolder demands. So long as the Duke
of Friedland retained the supreme command, his triumph over the Emperor was incomplete. The princes of
the League were meditating a severe revenge on Wallenstein for that haughtiness with which he had treated
them all alike. His dismissal was demanded by the whole college of electors, and even by Spain, with a
degree of unanimity and urgency which astonished the Emperor. The anxiety with which Wallenstein's
enemies pressed for his dismissal, ought to have convinced the Emperor of the importance of his services.
Wallenstein, informed of the cabals which were forming against him in Ratisbon, lost no time in opening the
eyes of the Emperor to the real views of the Elector of Bavaria. He himself appeared in Ratisbon, with a
pomp which threw his master into the shade, and increased the hatred of his opponents.
Long was the Emperor undecided. The sacrifice demanded was a painful one. To the Duke of Friedland alone
he owed his preponderance; he felt how much he would lose in yielding him to the indignation of the princes.
But at this moment, unfortunately, he was under the necessity of conciliating the Electors. His son Ferdinand
had already been chosen King of Hungary, and he was endeavouring to procure his election as his successor
in the empire. For this purpose, the support of Maximilian was indispensable. This consideration was the
weightiest, and to oblige the Elector of Bavaria he scrupled not to sacrifice his most valuable servant.
At the Diet at Ratisbon, there were present ambassadors from France, empowered to adjust the differences
which seemed to menace a war in Italy between the Emperor and their sovereign. Vincent, Duke of Mantua
and Montferrat, dying without issue, his next relation, Charles, Duke of Nevers, had taken possession of this
inheritance, without doing homage to the Emperor as liege lord of the principality. Encouraged by the support
of France and Venice, he refused to surrender these territories into the hands of the imperial commissioners,
until his title to them should be decided. On the other hand, Ferdinand had taken up arms at the instigation of
the Spaniards, to whom, as possessors of Milan, the near neighbourhood of a vassal of France was peculiarly
alarming, and who welcomed this prospect of making, with the assistance of the Emperor, additional
conquests in Italy. In spite of all the exertions of Pope Urban VIII. to avert a war in that country, Ferdinand
marched a German army across the Alps, and threw the Italian states into a general consternation. His arms
had been successful throughout Germany, and exaggerated fears revived the olden apprehension of Austria's
projects of universal monarchy. All the horrors of the German war now spread like a deluge over those
favoured countries which the Po waters; Mantua was taken by storm, and the surrounding districts given up
to the ravages of a lawless soldiery. The curse of Italy was thus added to the maledictions upon the Emperor
which resounded through Germany; and even in the Roman Conclave, silent prayers were offered for the
success of the Protestant arms.
Alarmed by the universal hatred which this Italian campaign had drawn upon him, and wearied out by the
urgent remonstrances of the Electors, who zealously supported the application of the French ambassador, the
Emperor promised the investiture to the new Duke of Mantua.
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This important service on the part of Bavaria, of course, required an equivalent from France. The adjustment
of the treaty gave the envoys of Richelieu, during their residence in Ratisbon, the desired opportunity of
entangling the Emperor in dangerous intrigues, of inflaming the discontented princes of the League still more
strongly against him, and of turning to his disadvantage all the transactions of the Diet. For this purpose
Richelieu had chosen an admirable instrument in Father Joseph, a Capuchin friar, who accompanied the
ambassadors without exciting the least suspicion. One of his principal instructions was assiduously to bring
about the dismissal of Wallenstein. With the general who had led it to victory, the army of Austria would lose
its principal strength; many armies could not compensate for the loss of this individual. It would therefore be
a masterstroke of policy, at the very moment when a victorious monarch, the absolute master of his
operations, was arming against the Emperor, to remove from the head of the imperial armies the only general
who, by ability and military experience, was able to cope with the French king. Father Joseph, in the interests
of Bavaria, undertook to overcome the irresolution of the Emperor, who was now in a manner besieged by
the Spaniards and the Electoral Council. "It would be expedient," he thought, "to gratify the Electors on this
occasion, and thereby facilitate his son's election to the Roman Crown. This object once gained, Wallenstein
could at any time resume his former station." The artful Capuchin was too sure of his man to touch upon this
ground of consolation.
The voice of a monk was to Ferdinand II. the voice of God. "Nothing on earth," writes his own confessor,
"was more sacred in his eyes than a priest. If it could happen, he used to say, that an angel and a Regular were
to meet him at the same time and place, the Regular should receive his first, and the angel his second
obeisance." Wallenstein's dismissal was determined upon.
In return for this pious concession, the Capuchin dexterously counteracted the Emperor's scheme to procure
for the King of Hungary the further dignity of King of the Romans. In an express clause of the treaty just
concluded, the French ministers engaged in the name of their sovereign to observe a complete neutrality
between the Emperor and his enemies; while, at the same time, Richelieu was actually negociating with the
King of Sweden to declare war, and pressing upon him the alliance of his master. The latter, indeed,
disavowed the lie as soon as it had served its purpose, and Father Joseph, confined to a convent, must atone
for the alleged offence of exceeding his instructions. Ferdinand perceived, when too late, that he had been
imposed upon. "A wicked Capuchin," he was heard to say, "has disarmed me with his rosary, and thrust
nothing less than six electoral crowns into his cowl."
Artifice and trickery thus triumphed over the Emperor, at the moment when he was believed to be omnipotent
in Germany, and actually was so in the field. With the loss of 18,000 men, and of a general who alone was
worth whole armies, he left Ratisbon without gaining the end for which he had made such sacrifices. Before
the Swedes had vanquished him in the field, Maximilian of Bavaria and Father Joseph had given him a
mortal blow. At this memorable Diet at Ratisbon the war with Sweden was resolved upon, and that of Mantua
terminated. Vainly had the princes present at it interceded for the Dukes of Mecklenburgh; and equally
fruitless had been an application by the English ambassadors for a pension to the Palatine Frederick.
Wallenstein was at the head of an army of nearly a hundred thousand men who adored him, when the
sentence of his dismissal arrived. Most of the officers were his creatures: with the common soldiers his
hint was law. His ambition was boundless, his pride indomitable, his imperious spirit could not brook an
injury unavenged. One moment would now precipitate him from the height of grandeur into the obscurity of a
private station. To execute such a sentence upon such a delinquent seemed to require more address than it
cost to obtain it from the judge. Accordingly, two of Wallenstein's most intimate friends were selected as
heralds of these evil tidings, and instructed to soften them as much as possible, by flattering assurances of the
continuance of the Emperor's favour.
Wallenstein had ascertained the purport of their message before the imperial ambassadors arrived. He had
time to collect himself, and his countenance exhibited an external calmness, while grief and rage were
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storming in his bosom. He had made up his mind to obey. The Emperor's decision had taken him by surprise
before circumstances were ripe, or his preparations complete, for the bold measures he had contemplated. His
extensive estates were scattered over Bohemia and Moravia; and by their confiscation, the Emperor might at
once destroy the sinews of his power. He looked, therefore, to the future for revenge; and in this hope he was
encouraged by the predictions of an Italian astrologer, who led his imperious spirit like a child in leading
strings. Seni had read in the stars, that his master's brilliant career was not yet ended; and that bright and
glorious prospects still awaited him. It was, indeed, unnecessary to consult the stars to foretell that an enemy,
Gustavus Adolphus, would ere long render indispensable the services of such a general as Wallenstein.
"The Emperor is betrayed," said Wallenstein to the messengers; "I pity but forgive him. It is plain that the
grasping spirit of the Bavarian dictates to him. I grieve that, with so much weakness, he has sacrificed me, but
I will obey." He dismissed the emissaries with princely presents; and in a humble letter besought the
continuance of the Emperor's favour, and of the dignities he had bestowed upon him.
The murmurs of the army were universal, on hearing of the dismissal of their general; and the greater part of
his officers immediately quitted the imperial service. Many followed him to his estates in Bohemia and
Moravia; others he attached to his interests by pensions, in order to command their services when the
opportunity should offer.
But repose was the last thing that Wallenstein contemplated when he returned to private life. In his retreat, he
surrounded himself with a regal pomp, which seemed to mock the sentence of degradation. Six gates led to
the palace he inhabited in Prague, and a hundred houses were pulled down to make way for his courtyard.
Similar palaces were built on his other numerous estates. Gentlemen of the noblest houses contended for the
honour of serving him, and even imperial chamberlains resigned the golden key to the Emperor, to fill a
similar office under Wallenstein. He maintained sixty pages, who were instructed by the ablest masters. His
antichamber was protected by fifty life guards. His table never consisted of less than 100 covers, and his
seneschal was a person of distinction. When he travelled, his baggage and suite accompanied him in a
hundred wagons, drawn by six or four horses; his court followed in sixty carriages, attended by fifty led
horses. The pomp of his liveries, the splendour of his equipages, and the decorations of his apartments, were
in keeping with all the rest. Six barons and as many knights, were in constant attendance about his person,
and ready to execute his slightest order. Twelve patrols went their rounds about his palace, to prevent any
disturbance. His busy genius required silence. The noise of coaches was to be kept away from his residence,
and the streets leading to it were frequently blocked up with chains. His own circle was as silent as the
approaches to his palace; dark, reserved, and impenetrable, he was more sparing of his words than of his
gifts; while the little that he spoke was harsh and imperious. He never smiled, and the coldness of his
temperament was proof against sensual seductions. Ever occupied with grand schemes, he despised all those
idle amusements in which so many waste their lives. The correspondence he kept up with the whole of
Europe was chiefly managed by himself, and, that as little as possible might be trusted to the silence of
others, most of the letters were written by his own hand. He was a man of large stature, thin, of a sallow
complexion, with short red hair, and small sparkling eyes. A gloomy and forbidding seriousness sat upon his
brow; and his magnificent presents alone retained the trembling crowd of his dependents.
In this stately obscurity did Wallenstein silently, but not inactively, await the hour of revenge. The victorious
career of Gustavus Adolphus soon gave him a presentiment of its approach. Not one of his lofty schemes had
been abandoned; and the Emperor's ingratitude had loosened the curb of his ambition. The dazzling splendour
of his private life bespoke high soaring projects; and, lavish as a king, he seemed already to reckon among his
certain possessions those which he contemplated with hope.
After Wallenstein's dismissal, and the invasion of Gustavus Adolphus, a new generalissimo was to be
appointed; and it now appeared advisable to unite both the imperial army and that of the League under one
general. Maximilian of Bavaria sought this appointment, which would have enabled him to dictate to the
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Emperor, who, from a conviction of this, wished to procure the command for his eldest son, the King of
Hungary. At last, in order to avoid offence to either of the competitors, the appointment was given to Tilly,
who now exchanged the Bavarian for the Austrian service. The imperial army in Germany, after the
retirement of Wallenstein, amounted to about 40,000 men; that of the League to nearly the same number,
both commanded by excellent officers, trained by the experience of several campaigns, and proud of a long
series of victories. With such a force, little apprehension was felt at the invasion of the King of Sweden, and
the less so as it commanded both Pomerania and Mecklenburg, the only countries through which he could
enter Germany.
After the unsuccessful attempt of the King of Denmark to check the Emperor's progress, Gustavus Adolphus
was the only prince in Europe from whom oppressed liberty could look for protection the only one who,
while he was personally qualified to conduct such an enterprise, had both political motives to recommend and
wrongs to justify it. Before the commencement of the war in Lower Saxony, important political interests
induced him, as well as the King of Denmark, to offer his services and his army for the defence of Germany;
but the offer of the latter had, to his own misfortune, been preferred. Since that time, Wallenstein and the
Emperor had adopted measures which must have been equally offensive to him as a man and as a king.
Imperial troops had been despatched to the aid of the Polish king, Sigismund, to defend Prussia against the
Swedes. When the king complained to Wallenstein of this act of hostility, he received for answer, "The
Emperor has more soldiers than he wants for himself, he must help his friends." The Swedish ambassadors
had been insolently ordered by Wallenstein to withdraw from the conference at Lubeck; and when, unawed
by this command, they were courageous enough to remain, contrary to the law of nations, he had threatened
them with violence. Ferdinand had also insulted the Swedish flag, and intercepted the king's despatches to
Transylvania. He also threw every obstacle in the way of a peace betwixt Poland and Sweden, supported the
pretensions of Sigismund to the Swedish throne, and denied the right of Gustavus to the title of king.
Deigning no regard to the repeated remonstrances of Gustavus, he rather aggravated the offence by new
grievances, than acceded the required satisfaction.
So many personal motives, supported by important considerations, both of policy and religion, and seconded
by pressing invitations from Germany, had their full weight with a prince, who was naturally the more jealous
of his royal prerogative the more it was questioned, who was flattered by the glory he hoped to gain as
Protector of the Oppressed, and passionately loved war as the element of his genius. But, until a truce or
peace with Poland should set his hands free, a new and dangerous war was not to be thought of.
Cardinal Richelieu had the merit of effecting this truce with Poland. This great statesman, who guided the
helm of Europe, while in France he repressed the rage of faction and the insolence of the nobles, pursued
steadily, amidst the cares of a stormy administration, his plan of lowering the ascendancy of the House of
Austria. But circumstances opposed considerable obstacles to the execution of his designs; and even the
greatest minds cannot, with impunity, defy the prejudices of the age. The minister of a Roman Catholic king,
and a Cardinal, he was prevented by the purple he bore from joining the enemies of that church in an open
attack on a power which had the address to sanctify its ambitious encroachments under the name of religion.
The external deference which Richelieu was obliged to pay to the narrow views of his contemporaries limited
his exertions to secret negociations, by which he endeavoured to gain the hand of others to accomplish the
enlightened projects of his own mind. After a fruitless attempt to prevent the peace between Denmark and the
Emperor, he had recourse to Gustavus Adolphus, the hero of his age. No exertion was spared to bring this
monarch to a favourable decision, and at the same time to facilitate the execution of it. Charnasse, an
unsuspected agent of the Cardinal, proceeded to Polish Prussia, where Gustavus Adolphus was conducting
the war against Sigismund, and alternately visited these princes, in order to persuade them to a truce or peace.
Gustavus had been long inclined to it, and the French minister succeeded at last in opening the eyes of
Sigismund to his true interests, and to the deceitful policy of the Emperor. A truce for six years was agreed
on, Gustavus being allowed to retain all his conquests. This treaty gave him also what he had so long desired,
the liberty of directing his arms against the Emperor. For this the French ambassador offered him the alliance
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of his sovereign and considerable subsidies. But Gustavus Adolphus was justly apprehensive lest the
acceptance of the assistance should make him dependent upon France, and fetter him in his career of
conquest, while an alliance with a Roman Catholic power might excite distrust among the Protestants.
If the war was just and necessary, the circumstances under which it was undertaken were not less promising.
The name of the Emperor, it is true, was formidable, his resources inexhaustible, his power hitherto
invincible. So dangerous a contest would have dismayed any other than Gustavus. He saw all the obstacles
and dangers which opposed his undertaking, but he knew also the means by which, as he hoped, they might
be conquered. His army, though not numerous, was well disciplined, inured to hardship by a severe climate
and campaigns, and trained to victory in the war with Poland. Sweden, though poor in men and money, and
overtaxed by an eight years' war, was devoted to its monarch with an enthusiasm which assured him of the
ready support of his subjects. In Germany, the name of the Emperor was at least as much hated as feared. The
Protestant princes only awaited the arrival of a deliverer to throw off his intolerable yoke, and openly declare
for the Swedes. Even the Roman Catholic states would welcome an antagonist to the Emperor, whose
opposition might control his overwhelming influence. The first victory gained on German ground would be
decisive. It would encourage those princes who still hesitated to declare themselves, strengthen the cause of
his adherents, augment his troops, and open resources for the maintenance of the campaign. If the greater part
of the German states were impoverished by oppression, the flourishing Hanse towns had escaped, and they
could not hesitate, by a small voluntary sacrifice, to avert the general ruin. As the imperialists should be
driven from the different provinces, their armies would diminish, since they were subsisting on the countries
in which they were encamped. The strength, too, of the Emperor had been lessened by illtimed detachments
to Italy and the Netherlands; while Spain, weakened by the loss of the Manilla galleons, and engaged in a
serious war in the Netherlands, could afford him little support. Great Britain, on the other hand, gave the
King of Sweden hope of considerable subsidies; and France, now at peace with itself, came forward with the
most favourable offers.
But the strongest pledge for the success of his undertaking Gustavus found in himself. Prudence
demanded that he should embrace all the foreign assistance he could, in order to guard his enterprise from the
imputation of rashness; but all his confidence and courage were entirely derived from himself. He was
indisputably the greatest general of his age, and the bravest soldier in the army which he had formed.
Familiar with the tactics of Greece and Rome, he had discovered a more effective system of warfare, which
was adopted as a model by the most eminent commanders of subsequent times. He reduced the unwieldy
squadrons of cavalry, and rendered their movements more light and rapid; and, with the same view, he
widened the intervals between his battalions. Instead of the usual array in a single line, he disposed his forces
in two lines, that the second might advance in the event of the first giving way.
He made up for his want of cavalry, by placing infantry among the horse; a practice which frequently decided
the victory. Europe first learned from him the importance of infantry. All Germany was astonished at the
strict discipline which, at the first, so creditably distinguished the Swedish army within their territories; all
disorders were punished with the utmost severity, particularly impiety, theft, gambling, and duelling. The
Swedish articles of war enforced frugality. In the camp, the King's tent not excepted, neither silver nor gold
was to be seen. The general's eye looked as vigilantly to the morals as to the martial bravery of his soldiers;
every regiment was ordered to form round its chaplain for morning and evening prayers. In all these points
the lawgiver was also an example. A sincere and ardent piety exalted his courage. Equally free from the
coarse infidelity which leaves the passions of the barbarian without a control, and from the grovelling
superstition of Ferdinand, who humbled himself to the dust before the Supreme Being, while he haughtily
trampled on his fellowcreature in the height of his success he was ever a man and a Christian in the
height of his devotion, a king and a hero. The hardships of war he shared with the meanest soldier in his
army; maintained a calm serenity amidst the hottest fury of battle; his glance was omnipresent, and he
intrepidly forgot the danger while he exposed himself to the greatest peril. His natural courage, indeed, too
often made him forget the duty of a general; and the life of a king ended in the death of a common soldier.
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But such a leader was followed to victory alike by the coward and the brave, and his eagle glance marked
every heroic deed which his example had inspired. The fame of their sovereign excited in the nation an
enthusiastic sense of their own importance; proud of their king, the peasant in Finland and Gothland joyfully
contributed his pittance; the soldier willingly shed his blood; and the lofty energy which his single mind had
imparted to the nation long survived its creator.
The necessity of the war was acknowledged, but the best plan of conducting it was a matter of much question.
Even to the bold Chancellor Oxenstiern, an offensive war appeared too daring a measure; the resources of his
poor and conscientious master, appeared to him too slender to compete with those of a despotic sovereign,
who held all Germany at his command. But the minister's timid scruples were overruled by the hero's
penetrating prudence. "If we await the enemy in Sweden," said Gustavus, "in the event of a defeat every thing
would be lost, by a fortunate commencement in Germany everything would be gained. The sea is wide, and
we have a long line of coast in Sweden to defend. If the enemy's fleet should escape us, or our own be
defeated, it would, in either case, be impossible to prevent the enemy's landing. Every thing depends on the
retention of Stralsund. So long as this harbour is open to us, we shall both command the Baltic, and secure a
retreat from Germany. But to protect this port, we must not remain in Sweden, but advance at once into
Pomerania. Let us talk no more, then, of a defensive war, by which we should sacrifice our greatest
advantages. Sweden must not be doomed to behold a hostile banner; if we are vanquished in Germany, it will
be time enough to follow your plan."
Gustavus resolved to cross the Baltic and attack the Emperor. His preparations were made with the utmost
expedition, and his precautionary measures were not less prudent than the resolution itself was bold and
magnanimous. Before engaging in so distant a war, it was necessary to secure Sweden against its neighbours.
At a personal interview with the King of Denmark at Markaroed, Gustavus assured himself of the friendship
of that monarch; his frontier on the side of Moscow was well guarded; Poland might be held in check from
Germany, if it betrayed any design of infringing the truce. Falkenberg, a Swedish ambassador, who visited
the courts of Holland and Germany, obtained the most flattering promises from several Protestant princes,
though none of them yet possessed courage or selfdevotion enough to enter into a formal alliance with him.
Lubeck and Hamburg engaged to advance him money, and to accept Swedish copper in return. Emissaries
were also despatched to the Prince of Transylvania, to excite that implacable enemy of Austria to arms.
In the mean time, Swedish levies were made in Germany and the Netherlands, the regiments increased to
their full complement, new ones raised, transports provided, a fleet fitted out, provisions, military stores, and
money collected. Thirty ships of war were in a short time prepared, 15,000 men equipped, and 200 transports
were ready to convey them across the Baltic. A greater force Gustavus Adolphus was unwilling to carry into
Germany, and even the maintenance of this exceeded the revenues of his kingdom. But however small his
army, it was admirable in all points of discipline, courage, and experience, and might serve as the nucleus of
a more powerful armament, if it once gained the German frontier, and its first attempts were attended with
success. Oxenstiern, at once general and chancellor, was posted with 10,000 men in Prussia, to protect that
province against Poland. Some regular troops, and a considerable body of militia, which served as a nursery
for the main body, remained in Sweden, as a defence against a sudden invasion by any treacherous
neighbour.
These were the measures taken for the external defence of the kingdom. Its internal administration was
provided for with equal care. The government was intrusted to the Council of State, and the finances to the
Palatine John Casimir, the brotherinlaw of the King, while his wife, tenderly as he was attached to her, was
excluded from all share in the government, for which her limited talents incapacitated her. He set his house in
order like a dying man. On the 20th May, 1630, when all his measures were arranged, and all was ready for
his departure, the King appeared in the Diet at Stockholm, to bid the States a solemn farewell. Taking in his
arms his daughter Christina, then only four years old, who, in the cradle, had been acknowledged as his
successor, he presented her to the States as the future sovereign, exacted from them a renewal of the oath of
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allegiance to her, in case he should never more return; and then read the ordinances for the government of the
kingdom during his absence, or the minority of his daughter. The whole assembly was dissolved in tears, and
the King himself was some time before he could attain sufficient composure to deliver his farewell address to
the States.
"Not lightly or wantonly," said he, "am I about to involve myself and you in this new and dangerous war;
God is my witness that _I_ do not fight to gratify my own ambition. But the Emperor has wronged me most
shamefully in the person of my ambassadors. He has supported my enemies, persecuted my friends and
brethren, trampled my religion in the dust, and even stretched his revengeful arm against my crown. The
oppressed states of Germany call loudly for aid, which, by God's help, we will give them.
"I am fully sensible of the dangers to which my life will be exposed. I have never yet shrunk from them, nor
is it likely that I shall escape them all. Hitherto, Providence has wonderfully protected me, but I shall at last
fall in defence of my country. I commend you to the protection of Heaven. Be just, be conscientious, act
uprightly, and we shall meet again in eternity.
"To you, my Counsellors of State, I address myself first. May God enlighten you, and fill you with wisdom,
to promote the welfare of my people. You, too, my brave nobles, I commend to the divine protection.
Continue to prove yourselves the worthy successors of those Gothic heroes, whose bravery humbled to the
dust the pride of ancient Rome. To you, ministers of religion, I recommend moderation and unity; be
yourselves examples of the virtues which you preach, and abuse not your influence over the minds of my
people. On you, deputies of the burgesses, and the peasantry, I entreat the blessing of heaven; may your
industry be rewarded by a prosperous harvest; your stores plenteously filled, and may you be crowned
abundantly with all the blessings of this life. For the prosperity of all my subjects, absent and present, I offer
my warmest prayers to Heaven. I bid you all a sincere it may be an eternal farewell."
The embarkation of the troops took place at Elfsknaben, where the fleet lay at anchor. An immense concourse
flocked thither to witness this magnificent spectacle. The hearts of the spectators were agitated by varied
emotions, as they alternately considered the vastness of the enterprise, and the greatness of the leader. Among
the superior officers who commanded in this army were Gustavus Horn, the Rhinegrave Otto Lewis, Henry
Matthias, Count Thurn, Ottenberg, Baudissen, Banner, Teufel, Tott, Mutsenfahl, Falkenberg, Kniphausen,
and other distinguished names. Detained by contrary winds, the fleet did not sail till June, and on the 24th of
that month reached the Island of Rugen in Pomerania.
Gustavus Adolphus was the first who landed. In the presence of his suite, he knelt on the shore of Germany to
return thanks to the Almighty for the safe arrival of his fleet and his army. He landed his troops on the Islands
of Wollin and Usedom; upon his approach, the imperial garrisons abandoned their entrenchments and fled.
He advanced rapidly on Stettin, to secure this important place before the appearance of the Imperialists.
Bogislaus XIV., Duke of Pomerania, a feeble and superannuated prince, had been long tired out by the
outrages committed by the latter within his territories; but too weak to resist, he had contented himself with
murmurs. The appearance of his deliverer, instead of animating his courage, increased his fear and anxiety.
Severely as his country had suffered from the Imperialists, the risk of incurring the Emperor's vengeance
prevented him from declaring openly for the Swedes. Gustavus Adolphus, who was encamped under the
walls of the town, summoned the city to receive a Swedish garrison. Bogislaus appeared in person in the
camp of Gustavus, to deprecate this condition. "I come to you," said Gustavus, "not as an enemy but a friend.
I wage no war against Pomerania, nor against the German empire, but against the enemies of both. In my
hands this duchy shall be sacred; and it shall be restored to you at the conclusion of the campaign, by me,
with more certainty, than by any other. Look to the traces of the imperial force within your territories, and to
mine in Usedom; and decide whether you will have the Emperor or me as your friend. What have you to
expect, if the Emperor should make himself master of your capital? Will he deal with you more leniently than
I? Or is it your intention to stop my progress? The case is pressing: decide at once, and do not compel me to
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have recourse to more violent measures."
The alternative was a painful one. On the one side, the King of Sweden was before his gates with a
formidable army; on the other, he saw the inevitable vengeance of the Emperor, and the fearful example of so
many German princes, who were now wandering in misery, the victims of that revenge. The more immediate
danger decided his resolution. The gates of Stettin were opened to the king; the Swedish troops entered; and
the Austrians, who were advancing by rapid marches, anticipated. The capture of this place procured for the
king a firm footing in Pomerania, the command of the Oder, and a magazine for his troops. To prevent a
charge of treachery, Bogislaus was careful to excuse this step to the Emperor on the plea of necessity; but
aware of Ferdinand's implacable disposition, he entered into a close alliance with his new protector. By this
league with Pomerania, Gustavus secured a powerful friend in Germany, who covered his rear, and
maintained his communication with Sweden.
As Ferdinand was already the aggressor in Prussia, Gustavus Adolphus thought himself absolved from the
usual formalities, and commenced hostilities without any declaration of war. To the other European powers,
he justified his conduct in a manifesto, in which he detailed the grounds which had led him to take up arms.
Meanwhile he continued his progress in Pomerania, while he saw his army daily increasing. The troops
which had fought under Mansfeld, Duke Christian of Brunswick, the King of Denmark, and Wallenstein,
came in crowds, both officers and soldiers, to join his victorious standard.
At the Imperial court, the invasion of the king of Sweden at first excited far less attention than it merited. The
pride of Austria, extravagantly elated by its unheardof successes, looked down with contempt upon a prince,
who, with a handful of men, came from an obscure corner of Europe, and who owed his past successes, as
they imagined, entirely to the incapacity of a weak opponent. The depreciatory representation which
Wallenstein had artfully given of the Swedish power, increased the Emperor's security; for what had he to
fear from an enemy, whom his general undertook to drive with such ease from Germany? Even the rapid
progress of Gustavus Adolphus in Pomerania, could not entirely dispel this prejudice, which the mockeries of
the courtiers continued to feed. He was called in Vienna the Snow King, whom the cold of the north kept
together, but who would infallibly melt as he advanced southward. Even the electors, assembled in Ratisbon,
disregarded his representations; and, influenced by an abject complaisance to Ferdinand, refused him even
the title of king. But while they mocked him in Ratisbon and Vienna, in Mecklenburg and Pomerania, one
strong town after another fell into his hands.
Notwithstanding this contempt, the Emperor thought it proper to offer to adjust his differences with Sweden
by negociation, and for that purpose sent plenipotentiaries to Denmark. But their instructions showed how
little he was in earnest in these proposals, for he still continued to refuse to Gustavus the title of king. He
hoped by this means to throw on the king of Sweden the odium of being the aggressor, and thereby to ensure
the support of the States of the empire. The conference at Dantzic proved, as might be expected, fruitless, and
the animosity of both parties was increased to its utmost by an intemperate correspondence.
An imperial general, Torquato Conti, who commanded in Pomerania, had, in the mean time, made a vain
attempt to wrest Stettin from the Swedes. The Imperialists were driven out from one place after another;
Damm, Stargard, Camin, and Wolgast, soon fell into the hands of Gustavus. To revenge himself upon the
Duke of Pomerania, the imperial general permitted his troops, upon his retreat, to exercise every barbarity on
the unfortunate inhabitants of Pomerania, who had already suffered but too severely from his avarice. On
pretence of cutting off the resources of the Swedes, the whole country was laid waste and plundered; and
often when the Imperialists were unable any longer to maintain a place, it was laid in ashes, in order to leave
the enemy nothing but ruins. But these barbarities only served to place in a more favourable light the opposite
conduct of the Swedes, and to win all hearts to their humane monarch. The Swedish soldier paid for all he
required; no private property was injured on his march. The Swedes consequently were received with open
arms both in town and country, whilst every Imperialist that fell into the hands of the Pomeranian peasantry
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was ruthlessly murdered. Many Pomeranians entered into the service of Sweden, and the estates of this
exhausted country willingly voted the king a contribution of 100,000 florins.
Torquato Conti, who, with all his severity of character, was a consummate general, endeavoured to render
Stettin useless to the king of Sweden, as he could not deprive him of it. He entrenched himself upon the Oder,
at Gartz, above Stettin, in order, by commanding that river, to cut off the water communication of the town
with the rest of Germany. Nothing could induce him to attack the King of Sweden, who was his superior in
numbers, while the latter was equally cautious not to storm the strong entrenchments of the Imperialists.
Torquato, too deficient in troops and money to act upon the offensive against the king, hoped by this plan of
operations to give time for Tilly to hasten to the defence of Pomerania, and then, in conjunction with that
general, to attack the Swedes. Seizing the opportunity of the temporary absence of Gustavus, he made a
sudden attempt upon Stettin, but the Swedes were not unprepared for him. A vigorous attack of the
Imperialists was firmly repulsed, and Torquato was forced to retire with great loss. For this auspicious
commencement of the war, however, Gustavus was, it must be owned, as much indebted to his good fortune
as to his military talents. The imperial troops in Pomerania had been greatly reduced since Wallenstein's
dismissal; moreover, the outrages they had committed were now severely revenged upon them; wasted and
exhausted, the country no longer afforded them a subsistence. All discipline was at an end; the orders of the
officers were disregarded, while their numbers daily decreased by desertion, and by a general mortality,
which the piercing cold of a strange climate had produced among them.
Under these circumstances, the imperial general was anxious to allow his troops the repose of winter quarters,
but he had to do with an enemy to whom the climate of Germany had no winter. Gustavus had taken the
precaution of providing his soldiers with dresses of sheepskin, to enable them to keep the field even in the
most inclement season. The imperial plenipotentiaries, who came to treat with him for a cessation of
hostilities, received this discouraging answer: "The Swedes are soldiers in winter as well as in summer, and
not disposed to oppress the unfortunate peasantry. The Imperialists may act as they think proper, but they
need not expect to remain undisturbed." Torquato Conti soon after resigned a command, in which neither
riches nor reputation were to be gained.
In this inequality of the two armies, the advantage was necessarily on the side of the Swedes. The Imperialists
were incessantly harassed in their winter quarters; Greifenhagan, an important place upon the Oder, taken by
storm, and the towns of Gartz and Piritz were at last abandoned by the enemy. In the whole of Pomerania,
Greifswald, Demmin, and Colberg alone remained in their hands, and these the king made great preparations
to besiege. The enemy directed their retreat towards Brandenburg, in which much of their artillery and
baggage, and many prisoners fell into the hands of the pursuers.
By seizing the passes of Riebnitz and Damgarden, Gustavus had opened a passage into Mecklenburg, whose
inhabitants were invited to return to their allegiance under their legitimate sovereigns, and to expel the
adherents of Wallenstein. The Imperialists, however, gained the important town of Rostock by stratagem, and
thus prevented the farther advance of the king, who was unwilling to divide his forces. The exiled dukes of
Mecklenburg had ineffectually employed the princes assembled at Ratisbon to intercede with the Emperor: in
vain they had endeavoured to soften Ferdinand, by renouncing the alliance of the king, and every idea of
resistance. But, driven to despair by the Emperor's inflexibility, they openly espoused the side of Sweden, and
raising troops, gave the command of them to Francis Charles Duke of SaxeLauenburg. That general made
himself master of several strong places on the Elbe, but lost them afterwards to the Imperial General
Pappenheim, who was despatched to oppose him. Soon afterwards, besieged by the latter in the town of
Ratzeburg, he was compelled to surrender with all his troops. Thus ended the attempt which these unfortunate
princes made to recover their territories; and it was reserved for the victorious arm of Gustavus Adolphus to
render them that brilliant service.
The Imperialists had thrown themselves into Brandenburg, which now became the theatre of the most
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barbarous atrocities. These outrages were inflicted upon the subjects of a prince who had never injured the
Emperor, and whom, moreover, he was at the very time inciting to take up arms against the King of Sweden.
The sight of the disorders of their soldiers, which want of money compelled them to wink at, and of authority
over their troops, excited the disgust even of the imperial generals; and, from very shame, their
commanderinchief, Count Schaumburg, wished to resign.
Without a sufficient force to protect his territories, and left by the Emperor, in spite of the most pressing
remonstrances, without assistance, the Elector of Brandenburg at last issued an edict, ordering his subjects to
repel force by force, and to put to death without mercy every Imperial soldier who should henceforth be
detected in plundering. To such a height had the violence of outrage and the misery of the government risen,
that nothing was left to the sovereign, but the desperate extremity of sanctioning private vengeance by a
formal law.
The Swedes had pursued the Imperialists into Brandenburg; and only the Elector's refusal to open to him the
fortress of Custrin for his march, obliged the king to lay aside his design of besieging Frankfort on the Oder.
He therefore returned to complete the conquest of Pomerania, by the capture of Demmin and Colberg. In the
mean time, FieldMarshal Tilly was advancing to the defence of Brandenburg.
This general, who could boast as yet of never having suffered a defeat, the conqueror of Mansfeld, of Duke
Christian of Brunswick, of the Margrave of Baden, and the King of Denmark, was now in the Swedish
monarch to meet an opponent worthy of his fame. Descended of a noble family in Liege, Tilly had formed his
military talents in the wars of the Netherlands, which was then the great school for generals. He soon found
an opportunity of distinguishing himself under Rodolph II. in Hungary, where he rapidly rose from one step
to another. After the peace, he entered into the service of Maximilian of Bavaria, who made him
commanderinchief with absolute powers. Here, by his excellent regulations, he was the founder of the
Bavarian army; and to him, chiefly, Maximilian was indebted for his superiority in the field. Upon the
termination of the Bohemian war, he was appointed commander of the troops of the League; and, after
Wallenstein's dismissal, generalissimo of the imperial armies. Equally stern towards his soldiers and
implacable towards his enemies, and as gloomy and impenetrable as Wallenstein, he was greatly his superior
in probity and disinterestedness. A bigoted zeal for religion, and a bloody spirit of persecution, cooperated,
with the natural ferocity of his character, to make him the terror of the Protestants. A strange and terrific
aspect bespoke his character: of low stature, thin, with hollow cheeks, a long nose, a broad and wrinkled
forehead, large whiskers, and a pointed chin; he was generally attired in a Spanish doublet of green satin,
with slashed sleeves, with a small high peaked hat upon his head, surmounted by a red feather which hung
down to his back. His whole aspect recalled to recollection the Duke of Alva, the scourge of the Flemings,
and his actions were far from effacing the impression. Such was the general who was now to be opposed to
the hero of the north.
Tilly was far from undervaluing his antagonist, "The King of Sweden," said he in the Diet at Ratisbon, "is an
enemy both prudent and brave, inured to war, and in the flower of his age. His plans are excellent, his
resources considerable; his subjects enthusiastically attached to him. His army, composed of Swedes,
Germans, Livonians, Finlanders, Scots and English, by its devoted obedience to their leader, is blended into
one nation: he is a gamester in playing with whom not to have lost is to have won a great deal."
The progress of the King of Sweden in Brandenburg and Pomerania, left the new generalissimo no time to
lose; and his presence was now urgently called for by those who commanded in that quarter. With all
expedition, he collected the imperial troops which were dispersed over the empire; but it required time to
obtain from the exhausted and impoverished provinces the necessary supplies. At last, about the middle of
winter, he appeared at the head of 20,000 men, before Frankfort on the Oder, where he was joined by
Schaumburg. Leaving to this general the defence of Frankfort, with a sufficient garrison, he hastened to
Pomerania, with a view of saving Demmin, and relieving Colberg, which was already hard pressed by the
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Swedes. But even before he had left Brandenburg, Demmin, which was but poorly defended by the Duke of
Savelli, had surrendered to the king, and Colberg, after a five months' siege, was starved into a capitulation.
As the passes in Upper Pomerania were well guarded, and the king's camp near Schwedt defied attack, Tilly
abandoned his offensive plan of operations, and retreated towards the Elbe to besiege Magdeburg.
The capture of Demmin opened to the king a free passage into Mecklenburg; but a more important enterprise
drew his arms into another quarter. Scarcely had Tilly commenced his retrograde movement, when suddenly
breaking up his camp at Schwedt, the king marched his whole force against Frankfort on the Oder. This town,
badly fortified, was defended by a garrison of 8,000 men, mostly composed of those ferocious bands who had
so cruelly ravaged Pomerania and Brandenburg. It was now attacked with such impetuosity, that on the third
day it was taken by storm. The Swedes, assured of victory, rejected every offer of capitulation, as they were
resolved to exercise the dreadful right of retaliation. For Tilly, soon after his arrival, had surrounded a
Swedish detachment, and, irritated by their obstinate resistance, had cut them in pieces to a man. This cruelty
was not forgotten by the Swedes. "New Brandenburg Quarter", they replied to the Imperialists who begged
their lives, and slaughtered them without mercy. Several thousands were either killed or taken, and many
were drowned in the Oder, the rest fled to Silesia. All their artillery fell into the hands of the Swedes. To
satisfy the rage of his troops, Gustavus Adolphus was under the necessity of giving up the town for three
hours to plunder.
While the king was thus advancing from one conquest to another, and, by his success, encouraging the
Protestants to active resistance, the Emperor proceeded to enforce the Edict of Restitution, and, by his
exorbitant pretensions, to exhaust the patience of the states. Compelled by necessity, he continued the violent
course which he had begun with such arrogant confidence; the difficulties into which his arbitrary conduct
had plunged him, he could only extricate himself from by measures still more arbitrary. But in so
complicated a body as the German empire, despotism must always create the most dangerous convulsions.
With astonishment, the princes beheld the constitution of the empire overthrown, and the state of nature to
which matters were again verging, suggested to them the idea of selfdefence, the only means of protection
in such a state of things. The steps openly taken by the Emperor against the Lutheran church, had at last
removed the veil from the eyes of John George, who had been so long the dupe of his artful policy.
Ferdinand, too, had personally offended him by the exclusion of his son from the archbishopric of
Magdeburg; and fieldmarshal Arnheim, his new favourite and minister, spared no pains to increase the
resentment of his master. Arnheim had formerly been an imperial general under Wallenstein, and being still
zealously attached to him, he was eager to avenge his old benefactor and himself on the Emperor, by
detaching Saxony from the Austrian interests. Gustavus Adolphus, supported by the Protestant states, would
be invincible; a consideration which already filled the Emperor with alarm. The example of Saxony would
probably influence others, and the Emperor's fate seemed now in a manner to depend upon the Elector's
decision. The artful favourite impressed upon his master this idea of his own importance, and advised him to
terrify the Emperor, by threatening an alliance with Sweden, and thus to extort from his fears, what he had
sought in vain from his gratitude. The favourite, however, was far from wishing him actually to enter into the
Swedish alliance, but, by holding aloof from both parties, to maintain his own importance and independence.
Accordingly, he laid before him a plan, which only wanted a more able hand to carry it into execution, and
recommended him, by heading the Protestant party, to erect a third power in Germany, and thereby maintain
the balance between Sweden and Austria.
This project was peculiarly flattering to the Saxon Elector, to whom the idea of being dependent upon
Sweden, or of longer submitting to the tyranny of the Emperor, was equally hateful. He could not, with
indifference, see the control of German affairs wrested from him by a foreign prince; and incapable as he was
of taking a principal part, his vanity would not condescend to act a subordinate one. He resolved, therefore, to
draw every possible advantage from the progress of Gustavus, but to pursue, independently, his own separate
plans. With this view, he consulted with the Elector of Brandenburg, who, from similar causes, was ready to
act against the Emperor, but, at the same time, was jealous of Sweden. In a Diet at Torgau, having assured
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himself of the support of his Estates, he invited the Protestant States of the empire to a general convention,
which took place at Leipzig, on the 6th February 1631. Brandenburg, Hesse Cassel, with several princes,
counts, estates of the empire, and Protestant bishops were present, either personally or by deputy, at this
assembly, which the chaplain to the Saxon Court, Dr. Hoe von Hohenegg, opened with a vehement discourse
from the pulpit. The Emperor had, in vain, endeavoured to prevent this selfappointed convention, whose
object was evidently to provide for its own defence, and which the presence of the Swedes in the empire,
rendered more than usually alarming. Emboldened by the progress of Gustavus Adolphus, the assembled
princes asserted their rights, and after a session of two months broke up, with adopting a resolution which
placed the Emperor in no slight embarrassment. Its import was to demand of the Emperor, in a general
address, the revocation of the Edict of Restitution, the withdrawal of his troops from their capitals and
fortresses, the suspension of all existing proceedings, and the abolition of abuses; and, in the mean time, to
raise an army of 40,000 men, to enable them to redress their own grievances, if the Emperor should still
refuse satisfaction.
A further incident contributed not a little to increase the firmness of the Protestant princes. The King of
Sweden had, at last, overcome the scruples which had deterred him from a closer alliance with France, and,
on the 13th January 1631, concluded a formal treaty with this crown. After a serious dispute respecting the
treatment of the Roman Catholic princes of the empire, whom France took under her protection, and against
whom Gustavus claimed the right of retaliation, and after some less important differences with regard to the
title of majesty, which the pride of France was loth to concede to the King of Sweden, Richelieu yielded the
second, and Gustavus Adolphus the first point, and the treaty was signed at Beerwald in Neumark. The
contracting parties mutually covenanted to defend each other with a military force, to protect their common
friends, to restore to their dominions the deposed princes of the empire, and to replace every thing, both on
the frontier and in the interior of Germany, on the same footing on which it stood before the commencement
of the war. For this end, Sweden engaged to maintain an army of 30,000 men in Germany, and France agreed
to furnish the Swedes with an annual subsidy of 400,000 dollars. If the arms of Gustavus were successful, he
was to respect the Roman Catholic religion and the constitution of the empire in all the conquered places, and
to make no attempt against either. All Estates and princes whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, either in
Germany or in other countries, were to be invited to become parties to the treaty; neither France nor Sweden
was to conclude a separate peace without the knowledge and consent of the other; and the treaty itself was to
continue in force for five years.
Great as was the struggle to the King of Sweden to receive subsidies from France, and sacrifice his
independence in the conduct of the war, this alliance with France decided his cause in Germany. Protected, as
he now was, by the greatest power in Europe, the German states began to feel confidence in his undertaking,
for the issue of which they had hitherto good reason to tremble. He became truly formidable to the Emperor.
The Roman Catholic princes too, who, though they were anxious to humble Austria, had witnessed his
progress with distrust, were less alarmed now that an alliance with a Roman Catholic power ensured his
respect for their religion. And thus, while Gustavus Adolphus protected the Protestant religion and the
liberties of Germany against the aggression of Ferdinand, France secured those liberties, and the Roman
Catholic religion, against Gustavus himself, if the intoxication of success should hurry him beyond the
bounds of moderation.
The King of Sweden lost no time in apprizing the members of the confederacy of Leipzig of the treaty
concluded with France, and inviting them to a closer union with himself. The application was seconded by
France, who spared no pains to win over the Elector of Saxony. Gustavus was willing to be content with
secret support, if the princes should deem it too bold a step as yet to declare openly in his favour. Several
princes gave him hopes of his proposals being accepted on the first favourable opportunity; but the Saxon
Elector, full of jealousy and distrust towards the King of Sweden, and true to the selfish policy he had
pursued, could not be prevailed upon to give a decisive answer.
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The resolution of the confederacy of Leipzig, and the alliance betwixt France and Sweden, were news equally
disagreeable to the Emperor. Against them he employed the thunder of imperial ordinances, and the want of
an army saved France from the full weight of his displeasure. Remonstrances were addressed to all the
members of the confederacy, strongly prohibiting them from enlisting troops. They retorted with explanations
equally vehement, justified their conduct upon the principles of natural right, and continued their
preparations.
Meantime, the imperial generals, deficient both in troops and money, found themselves reduced to the
disagreeable alternative of losing sight either of the King of Sweden, or of the Estates of the empire, since
with a divided force they were not a match for either. The movements of the Protestants called their attention
to the interior of the empire, while the progress of the king in Brandenburg, by threatening the hereditary
possessions of Austria, required them to turn their arms to that quarter. After the conquest of Frankfort, the
king had advanced upon Landsberg on the Warta, and Tilly, after a fruitless attempt to relieve it, had again
returned to Magdeburg, to prosecute with vigour the siege of that town.
The rich archbishopric, of which Magdeburg was the capital, had long been in the possession of princes of
the house of Brandenburg, who introduced the Protestant religion into the province. Christian William, the
last administrator, had, by his alliance with Denmark, incurred the ban of the empire, on which account the
chapter, to avoid the Emperor's displeasure, had formally deposed him. In his place they had elected Prince
John Augustus, the second son of the Elector of Saxony, whom the Emperor rejected, in order to confer the
archbishopric on his son Leopold. The Elector of Saxony complained ineffectually to the imperial court; but
Christian William of Brandenburg took more active measures. Relying on the attachment of the magistracy
and inhabitants of Brandenburg, and excited by chimerical hopes, he thought himself able to surmount all the
obstacles which the vote of the chapter, the competition of two powerful rivals, and the Edict of Restitution
opposed to his restoration. He went to Sweden, and, by the promise of a diversion in Germany, sought to
obtain assistance from Gustavus. He was dismissed by that monarch not without hopes of effectual
protection, but with the advice to act with caution.
Scarcely had Christian William been informed of the landing of his protector in Pomerania, than he entered
Magdeburg in disguise. Appearing suddenly in the town council, he reminded the magistrates of the ravages
which both town and country had suffered from the imperial troops, of the pernicious designs of Ferdinand,
and the danger of the Protestant church. He then informed them that the moment of deliverance was at hand,
and that Gustavus Adolphus offered them his alliance and assistance. Magdeburg, one of the most flourishing
towns in Germany, enjoyed under the government of its magistrates a republican freedom, which inspired its
citizens with a brave heroism. Of this they had already given proofs, in the bold defence of their rights against
Wallenstein, who, tempted by their wealth, made on them the most extravagant demands. Their territory had
been given up to the fury of his troops, though Magdeburg itself had escaped his vengeance. It was not
difficult, therefore, for the Administrator to gain the concurrence of men in whose minds the rememberance
of these outrages was still recent. An alliance was formed between the city and the Swedish king, by which
Magdeburg granted to the king a free passage through its gates and territories, with liberty of enlisting
soldiers within its boundaries, and on the other hand, obtained promises of effectual protection for its religion
and its privileges.
The Administrator immediately collected troops and commenced hostilities, before Gustavus Adolphus was
near enough to cooperate with him. He defeated some imperial detachments in the neighbourhood, made a
few conquests, and even surprised Halle. But the approach of an imperial army obliged him to retreat hastily,
and not without loss, to Magdeburg. Gustavus Adolphus, though displeased with his premature measures,
sent Dietrich Falkenberg, an experienced officer, to direct the Administrator's military operations, and to
assist him with his counsel. Falkenberg was named by the magistrates governor of the town during the war.
The Prince's army was daily augmented by recruits from the neighbouring towns; and he was able for some
months to maintain a petty warfare with success.
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At length Count Pappenheim, having brought his expedition against the Duke of SaxeLauenburg to a close,
approached the town. Driving the troops of the Administrator from their entrenchments, he cut off his
communication with Saxony, and closely invested the place. He was soon followed by Tilly, who haughtily
summoned the Elector forthwith to comply with the Edict of Restitution, to submit to the Emperor's orders,
and surrender Magdeburg. The Prince's answer was spirited and resolute, and obliged Tilly at once to have
recourse to arms.
In the meanwhile, the siege was prolonged, by the progress of the King of Sweden, which called the Austrian
general from before the place; and the jealousy of the officers, who conducted the operations in his absence,
delayed, for some months, the fall of Magdeburg. On the 30th March 1631, Tilly returned, to push the siege
with vigour.
The outworks were soon carried, and Falkenberg, after withdrawing the garrisons from the points which he
could no longer hold, destroyed the bridge over the Elbe. As his troops were barely sufficient to defend the
extensive fortifications, the suburbs of Sudenburg and Neustadt were abandoned to the enemy, who
immediately laid them in ashes. Pappenheim, now separated from Tilly, crossed the Elbe at Schonenbeck,
and attacked the town from the opposite side.
The garrison, reduced by the defence of the outworks, scarcely exceeded 2000 infantry and a few hundred
horse; a small number for so extensive and irregular a fortress. To supply this deficiency, the citizens were
armed a desperate expedient, which produced more evils than those it prevented. The citizens, at best but
indifferent soldiers, by their disunion threw the town into confusion. The poor complained that they were
exposed to every hardship and danger, while the rich, by hiring substitutes, remained at home in safety. These
rumours broke out at last in an open mutiny; indifference succeeded to zeal; weariness and negligence took
the place of vigilance and foresight. Dissension, combined with growing scarcity, gradually produced a
feeling of despondence, many began to tremble at the desperate nature of their undertaking, and the
magnitude of the power to which they were opposed. But religious zeal, an ardent love of liberty, an
invincible hatred to the Austrian yoke, and the expectation of speedy relief, banished as yet the idea of a
surrender; and divided as they were in every thing else, they were united in the resolve to defend themselves
to the last extremity.
Their hopes of succour were apparently well founded. They knew that the confederacy of Leipzig was
arming; they were aware of the near approach of Gustavus Adolphus. Both were alike interested in the
preservation of Magdeburg; and a few days might bring the King of Sweden before its walls. All this was
also known to Tilly, who, therefore, was anxious to make himself speedily master of the place. With this
view, he had despatched a trumpeter with letters to the Administrator, the commandant, and the magistrates,
offering terms of capitulation; but he received for answer, that they would rather die than surrender. A
spirited sally of the citizens, also convinced him that their courage was as earnest as their words, while the
king's arrival at Potsdam, with the incursions of the Swedes as far as Zerbst, filled him with uneasiness, but
raised the hopes of the garrison. A second trumpeter was now despatched; but the more moderate tone of his
demands increased the confidence of the besieged, and unfortunately their negligence also.
The besiegers had now pushed their approaches as far as the ditch, and vigorously cannonaded the
fortifications from the abandoned batteries. One tower was entirely overthrown, but this did not facilitate an
assault, as it fell sidewise upon the wall, and not into the ditch. Notwithstanding the continual bombardment,
the walls had not suffered much; and the fire balls, which were intended to set the town in flames, were
deprived of their effect by the excellent precautions adopted against them. But the ammunition of the
besieged was nearly expended, and the cannon of the town gradually ceased to answer the fire of the
Imperialists. Before a new supply could be obtained, Magdeburg would be either relieved, or taken. The
hopes of the besieged were on the stretch, and all eyes anxiously directed towards the quarter in which the
Swedish banners were expected to appear. Gustavus Adolphus was near enough to reach Magdeburg within
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three days; security grew with hope, which all things contributed to augment. On the 9th of May, the fire of
the Imperialists was suddenly stopped, and the cannon withdrawn from several of the batteries. A deathlike
stillness reigned in the Imperial camp. The besieged were convinced that deliverance was at hand. Both
citizens and soldiers left their posts upon the ramparts early in the morning, to indulge themselves, after their
long toils, with the refreshment of sleep, but it was indeed a dear sleep, and a frightful awakening.
Tilly had abandoned the hope of taking the town, before the arrival of the Swedes, by the means which he
had hitherto adopted; he therefore determined to raise the siege, but first to hazard a general assault. This
plan, however, was attended with great difficulties, as no breach had been effected, and the works were
scarcely injured. But the council of war assembled on this occasion, declared for an assault, citing the
example of Maestricht, which had been taken early in the morning, while the citizens and soldiers were
reposing themselves. The attack was to be made simultaneously on four points; the night betwixt the 9th and
10th of May, was employed in the necessary preparations. Every thing was ready and awaiting the signal,
which was to be given by cannon at five o'clock in the morning. The signal, however, was not given for two
hours later, during which Tilly, who was still doubtful of success, again consulted the council of war.
Pappenheim was ordered to attack the works of the new town, where the attempt was favoured by a sloping
rampart, and a dry ditch of moderate depth. The citizens and soldiers had mostly left the walls, and the few
who remained were overcome with sleep. This general, therefore, found little difficulty in mounting the wall
at the head of his troops.
Falkenberg, roused by the report of musketry, hastened from the townhouse, where he was employed in
despatching Tilly's second trumpeter, and hurried with all the force he could hastily assemble towards the
gate of the new town, which was already in the possession of the enemy. Beaten back, this intrepid general
flew to another quarter, where a second party of the enemy were preparing to scale the walls. After an
ineffectual resistance he fell in the commencement of the action. The roaring of musketry, the pealing of the
alarmbells, and the growing tumult apprised the awakening citizens of their danger. Hastily arming
themselves, they rushed in blind confusion against the enemy. Still some hope of repulsing the besiegers
remained; but the governor being killed, their efforts were without plan and cooperation, and at last their
ammunition began to fail them. In the meanwhile, two other gates, hitherto unattacked, were stripped of their
defenders, to meet the urgent danger within the town. The enemy quickly availed themselves of this
confusion to attack these posts. The resistance was nevertheless spirited and obstinate, until four imperial
regiments, at length, masters of the ramparts, fell upon the garrison in the rear, and completed their rout.
Amidst the general tumult, a brave captain, named Schmidt, who still headed a few of the more resolute
against the enemy, succeeded in driving them to the gates; here he fell mortally wounded, and with him
expired the hopes of Magdeburg. Before noon, all the works were carried, and the town was in the enemy's
hands.
Two gates were now opened by the storming party for the main body, and Tilly marched in with part of his
infantry. Immediately occupying the principal streets, he drove the citizens with pointed cannon into their
dwellings, there to await their destiny. They were not long held in suspense; a word from Tilly decided the
fate of Magdeburg.
Even a more humane general would in vain have recommended mercy to such soldiers; but Tilly never made
the attempt. Left by their general's silence masters of the lives of all the citizens, the soldiery broke into the
houses to satiate their most brutal appetites. The prayers of innocence excited some compassion in the hearts
of the Germans, but none in the rude breasts of Pappenheim's Walloons. Scarcely had the savage cruelty
commenced, when the other gates were thrown open, and the cavalry, with the fearful hordes of the Croats,
poured in upon the devoted inhabitants.
Here commenced a scene of horrors for which history has no language poetry no pencil. Neither innocent
childhood, nor helpless old age; neither youth, sex, rank, nor beauty, could disarm the fury of the conquerors.
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Wives were abused in the arms of their husbands, daughters at the feet of their parents; and the defenceless
sex exposed to the double sacrifice of virtue and life. No situation, however obscure, or however sacred,
escaped the rapacity of the enemy. In a single church fiftythree women were found beheaded. The Croats
amused themselves with throwing children into the flames; Pappenheim's Walloons with stabbing infants at
the mother's breast. Some officers of the League, horrorstruck at this dreadful scene, ventured to remind
Tilly that he had it in his power to stop the carnage. "Return in an hour," was his answer; "I will see what I
can do; the soldier must have some reward for his danger and toils." These horrors lasted with unabated fury,
till at last the smoke and flames proved a check to the plunderers. To augment the confusion and to divert the
resistance of the inhabitants, the Imperialists had, in the commencement of the assault, fired the town in
several places. The wind rising rapidly, spread the flames, till the blaze became universal. Fearful, indeed,
was the tumult amid clouds of smoke, heaps of dead bodies, the clash of swords, the crash of falling ruins,
and streams of blood. The atmosphere glowed; and the intolerable heat forced at last even the murderers to
take refuge in their camp. In less than twelve hours, this strong, populous, and flourishing city, one of the
finest in Germany, was reduced to ashes, with the exception of two churches and a few houses. The
Administrator, Christian William, after receiving several wounds, was taken prisoner, with three of the
burgomasters; most of the officers and magistrates had already met an enviable death. The avarice of the
officers had saved 400 of the richest citizens, in the hope of extorting from them an exorbitant ransom. But
this humanity was confined to the officers of the League, whom the ruthless barbarity of the Imperialists
caused to be regarded as guardian angels.
Scarcely had the fury of the flames abated, when the Imperialists returned to renew the pillage amid the ruins
and ashes of the town. Many were suffocated by the smoke; many found rich booty in the cellars, where the
citizens had concealed their more valuable effects. On the 13th of May, Tilly himself appeared in the town,
after the streets had been cleared of ashes and dead bodies. Horrible and revolting to humanity was the scene
that presented itself. The living crawling from under the dead, children wandering about with heartrending
cries, calling for their parents; and infants still sucking the breasts of their lifeless mothers. More than 6,000
bodies were thrown into the Elbe to clear the streets; a much greater number had been consumed by the
flames. The whole number of the slain was reckoned at not less than 30,000.
The entrance of the general, which took place on the 14th, put a stop to the plunder, and saved the few who
had hitherto contrived to escape. About a thousand people were taken out of the cathedral, where they had
remained three days and two nights, without food, and in momentary fear of death. Tilly promised them
quarter, and commanded bread to be distributed among them. The next day, a solemn mass was performed in
the cathedral, and `Te Deum' sung amidst the discharge of artillery. The imperial general rode through the
streets, that he might be able, as an eyewitness, to inform his master that no such conquest had been made
since the destruction of Troy and Jerusalem. Nor was this an exaggeration, whether we consider the
greatness, importance, and prosperity of the city razed, or the fury of its ravagers.
In Germany, the tidings of the dreadful fate of Magdeburg caused triumphant joy to the Roman Catholics,
while it spread terror and consternation among the Protestants. Loudly and generally they complained against
the king of Sweden, who, with so strong a force, and in the very neighbourhood, had left an allied city to its
fate. Even the most reasonable deemed his inaction inexplicable; and lest he should lose irretrievably the
good will of the people, for whose deliverance he had engaged in this war, Gustavus was under the necessity
of publishing to the world a justification of his own conduct.
He had attacked, and on the 16th April, carried Landsberg, when he was apprised of the danger of
Magdeburg. He resolved immediately to march to the relief of that town; and he moved with all his cavalry,
and ten regiments of infantry towards the Spree. But the position which he held in Germany, made it
necessary that he should not move forward without securing his rear. In traversing a country where he was
surrounded by suspicious friends and dangerous enemies, and where a single premature movement might cut
off his communication with his own kingdom, the utmost vigilance and caution were necessary. The Elector
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of Brandenburg had already opened the fortress of Custrin to the flying Imperialists, and closed the gates
against their pursuers. If now Gustavus should fail in his attack upon Tilly, the Elector might again open his
fortresses to the Imperialists, and the king, with an enemy both in front and rear, would be irrecoverably lost.
In order to prevent this contingency, he demanded that the Elector should allow him to hold the fortresses of
Custrin and Spandau, till the siege of Magdeburg should be raised.
Nothing could be more reasonable than this demand. The services which Gustavus had lately rendered the
Elector, by expelling the Imperialists from Brandenburg, claimed his gratitude, while the past conduct of the
Swedes in Germany entitled them to confidence. But by the surrender of his fortresses, the Elector would in
some measure make the King of Sweden master of his country; besides that, by such a step, he must at once
break with the Emperor, and expose his States to his future vengeance. The Elector's struggle with himself
was long and violent, but pusillanimity and selfinterest for awhile prevailed. Unmoved by the fate of
Magdeburg, cold in the cause of religion and the liberties of Germany, he saw nothing but his own danger;
and this anxiety was greatly stimulated by his minister Von Schwartzenburgh, who was secretly in the pay of
Austria. In the mean time, the Swedish troops approached Berlin, and the king took up his residence with the
Elector. When he witnessed the timorous hesitation of that prince, he could not restrain his indignation: "My
road is to Magdeburg," said he; "not for my own advantage, but for that of the Protestant religion. If no one
will stand by me, I shall immediately retreat, conclude a peace with the Emperor, and return to Stockholm. I
am convinced that Ferdinand will readily grant me whatever conditions I may require. But if Magdeburg is
once lost, and the Emperor relieved from all fear of me, then it is for you to look to yourselves and the
consequences." This timely threat, and perhaps, too, the aspect of the Swedish army, which was strong
enough to obtain by force what was refused to entreaty, brought at last the Elector to his senses, and Spandau
was delivered into the hands of the Swedes.
The king had now two routes to Magdeburg; one westward led through an exhausted country, and filled with
the enemy's troops, who might dispute with him the passage of the Elbe; the other more to the southward, by
Dessau and Wittenberg, where bridges were to be found for crossing the Elbe, and where supplies could
easily be drawn from Saxony. But he could not avail himself of the latter without the consent of the Elector,
whom Gustavus had good reason to distrust. Before setting out on his march, therefore, he demanded from
that prince a free passage and liberty for purchasing provisions for his troops. His application was refused,
and no remonstrances could prevail on the Elector to abandon his system of neutrality. While the point was
still in dispute, the news of the dreadful fate of Magdeburg arrived.
Tilly announced its fall to the Protestant princes in the tone of a conqueror, and lost no time in making the
most of the general consternation. The influence of the Emperor, which had sensibly declined during the
rapid progress of Gustavus, after this decisive blow rose higher than ever; and the change was speedily
visible in the imperious tone he adopted towards the Protestant states. The decrees of the Confederation of
Leipzig were annulled by a proclamation, the Convention itself suppressed by an imperial decree, and all the
refractory states threatened with the fate of Magdeburg. As the executor of this imperial mandate, Tilly
immediately ordered troops to march against the Bishop of Bremen, who was a member of the Confederacy,
and had himself enlisted soldiers. The terrified bishop immediately gave up his forces to Tilly, and signed the
revocation of the acts of the Confederation. An imperial army, which had lately returned from Italy, under the
command of Count Furstenberg, acted in the same manner towards the Administrator of Wirtemberg. The
duke was compelled to submit to the Edict of Restitution, and all the decrees of the Emperor, and even to pay
a monthly subsidy of 100,000 dollars, for the maintenance of the imperial troops. Similar burdens were
inflicted upon Ulm and Nuremberg, and the entire circles of Franconia and Swabia. The hand of the Emperor
was stretched in terror over all Germany. The sudden preponderance, more in appearance, perhaps, than in
reality, which he had obtained by this blow, carried him beyond the bounds even of the moderation which he
had hitherto observed, and misled him into hasty and violent measures, which at last turned the wavering
resolution of the German princes in favour of Gustavus Adolphus. Injurious as the immediate consequences
of the fall of Magdeburg were to the Protestant cause, its remoter effects were most advantageous. The past
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surprise made way for active resentment, despair inspired courage, and the German freedom rose, like a
phoenix, from the ashes of Magdeburg.
Among the princes of the Leipzig Confederation, the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse were the
most powerful; and, until they were disarmed, the universal authority of the Emperor was unconfirmed.
Against the Landgrave, therefore, Tilly first directed his attack, and marched straight from Magdeburg into
Thuringia. During this march, the territories of Saxe Ernest and Schwartzburg were laid waste, and
Frankenhausen plundered before the very eyes of Tilly, and laid in ashes with impunity. The unfortunate
peasant paid dear for his master's attachment to the interests of Sweden. Erfurt, the key of Saxony and
Franconia, was threatened with a siege, but redeemed itself by a voluntary contribution of money and
provisions. From thence, Tilly despatched his emissaries to the Landgrave, demanding of him the immediate
disbanding of his army, a renunciation of the league of Leipzig, the reception of imperial garrisons into his
territories and fortresses, with the necessary contributions, and the declaration of friendship or hostility. Such
was the treatment which a prince of the Empire was compelled to submit to from a servant of the Emperor.
But these extravagant demands acquired a formidable weight from the power which supported them; and the
dreadful fate of Magdeburg, still fresh in the memory of the Landgrave, tended still farther to enforce them.
Admirable, therefore, was the intrepidity of the Landgrave's answer: "To admit foreign troops into his capital
and fortresses, the Landgrave is not disposed; his troops he requires for his own purposes; as for an attack, he
can defend himself. If General Tilly wants money or provisions, let him go to Munich, where there is plenty
of both." The irruption of two bodies of imperial troops into Hesse Cassel was the immediate result of this
spirited reply, but the Landgrave gave them so warm a reception that they could effect nothing; and just as
Tilly was preparing to follow with his whole army, to punish the unfortunate country for the firmness of its
sovereign, the movements of the King of Sweden recalled him to another quarter.
Gustavus Adolphus had learned the fall of Magdeburg with deep regret; and the demand now made by the
Elector, George William, in terms of their agreement, for the restoration of Spandau, greatly increased this
feeling. The loss of Magdeburg had rather augmented than lessened the reasons which made the possession of
this fortress so desirable; and the nearer became the necessity of a decisive battle between himself and Tilly,
the more unwilling he felt to abandon the only place which, in the event of a defeat, could ensure him a
refuge. After a vain endeavour, by entreaties and representations, to bring over the Elector to his views,
whose coldness and lukewarmness daily increased, he gave orders to his general to evacuate Spandau, but at
the same time declared to the Elector that he would henceforth regard him as an enemy.
To give weight to this declaration, he appeared with his whole force before Berlin. "I will not be worse
treated than the imperial generals," was his reply to the ambassadors whom the bewildered Elector
despatched to his camp. "Your master has received them into his territories, furnished them with all necessary
supplies, ceded to them every place which they required, and yet, by all these concessions, he could not
prevail upon them to treat his subjects with common humanity. All that I require of him is security, a
moderate sum of money, and provisions for my troops; in return, I promise to protect his country, and to keep
the war at a distance from him. On these points, however, I must insist; and my brother, the Elector, must
instantly determine to have me as a friend, or to see his capital plundered." This decisive tone produced a due
impression; and the cannon pointed against the town put an end to the doubts of George William. In a few
days, a treaty was signed, by which the Elector engaged to furnish a monthly subsidy of 30,000 dollars, to
leave Spandau in the king's hands, and to open Custrin at all times to the Swedish troops. This now open
alliance of the Elector of Brandenburg with the Swedes, excited no less displeasure at Vienna, than did
formerly the similar procedure of the Duke of Pomerania; but the changed fortune which now attended his
arms, obliged the Emperor to confine his resentment to words.
The king's satisfaction, on this favourable event, was increased by the agreeable intelligence that Griefswald,
the only fortress which the Imperialists still held in Pomerania, had surrendered, and that the whole country
was now free of the enemy. He appeared once more in this duchy, and was gratified at the sight of the general
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joy which he had caused to the people. A year had elapsed since Gustavus first entered Germany, and this
event was now celebrated by all Pomerania as a national festival. Shortly before, the Czar of Moscow had
sent ambassadors to congratulate him, to renew his alliance, and even to offer him troops. He had great
reason to rejoice at the friendly disposition of Russia, as it was indispensable to his interests that Sweden
itself should remain undisturbed by any dangerous neighbour during the war in which he himself was
engaged. Soon after, his queen, Maria Eleonora, landed in Pomerania, with a reinforcement of 8000 Swedes;
and the arrival of 6000 English, under the Marquis of Hamilton, requires more particular notice because this
is all that history mentions of the English during the Thirty Years' War.
During Tilly's expedition into Thuringia, Pappenheim commanded in Magdeburg; but was unable to prevent
the Swedes from crossing the Elbe at various points, routing some imperial detachments, and seizing several
posts. He himself, alarmed at the approach of the King of Sweden, anxiously recalled Tilly, and prevailed
upon him to return by rapid marches to Magdeburg. Tilly encamped on this side of the river at Wolmerstadt;
Gustavus on the same side, near Werben, not far from the confluence of the Havel and the Elbe. His very
arrival portended no good to Tilly. The Swedes routed three of his regiments, which were posted in villages
at some distance from the main body, carried off half their baggage, and burned the remainder. Tilly in vain
advanced within cannon shot of the king's camp, and offered him battle. Gustavus, weaker by onehalf than
his adversary, prudently declined it; and his position was too strong for an attack. Nothing more ensued but a
distant cannonade, and a few skirmishes, in which the Swedes had invariably the advantage. In his retreat to
Wolmerstadt, Tilly's army was weakened by numerous desertions. Fortune seemed to have forsaken him
since the carnage of Magdeburg.
The King of Sweden, on the contrary, was followed by uninterrupted success. While he himself was
encamped in Werben, the whole of Mecklenburg, with the exception of a few towns, was conquered by his
General Tott and the Duke Adolphus Frederick; and he enjoyed the satisfaction of reinstating both dukes in
their dominions. He proceeded in person to Gustrow, where the reinstatement was solemnly to take place, to
give additional dignity to the ceremony by his presence. The two dukes, with their deliverer between them,
and attended by a splendid train of princes, made a public entry into the city, which the joy of their subjects
converted into an affecting solemnity. Soon after his return to Werben, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel
appeared in his camp, to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance; the first sovereign prince in Germany,
who voluntarily and openly declared against the Emperor, though not wholly uninfluenced by strong motives.
The Landgrave bound himself to act against the king's enemies as his own, to open to him his towns and
territory, and to furnish his army with provisions and necessaries. The king, on the other hand, declared
himself his ally and protector; and engaged to conclude no peace with the Emperor without first obtaining for
the Landgrave a full redress of grievances. Both parties honourably performed their agreement. Hesse Cassel
adhered to the Swedish alliance during the whole of this tedious war; and at the peace of Westphalia had no
reason to regret the friendship of Sweden.
Tilly, from whom this bold step on the part of the Landgrave was not long concealed, despatched Count
Fugger with several regiments against him; and at the same time endeavoured to excite his subjects to
rebellion by inflammatory letters. But these made as little impression as his troops, which subsequently failed
him so decidedly at the battle of Breitenfield. The Estates of Hesse could not for a moment hesitate between
their oppressor and their protector.
But the imperial general was far more disturbed by the equivocal conduct of the Elector of Saxony, who, in
defiance of the imperial prohibition, continued his preparations, and adhered to the confederation of Leipzig.
At this conjuncture, when the proximity of the King of Sweden made a decisive battle ere long inevitable, it
appeared extremely dangerous to leave Saxony in arms, and ready in a moment to declare for the enemy.
Tilly had just received a reinforcement of 25,000 veteran troops under Furstenberg, and, confident in his
strength, he hoped either to disarm the Elector by the mere terror of his arrival, or at least to conquer him with
little difficulty. Before quitting his camp at Wolmerstadt, he commanded the Elector, by a special messenger,
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to open his territories to the imperial troops; either to disband his own, or to join them to the imperial army;
and to assist, in conjunction with himself, in driving the King of Sweden out of Germany. While he reminded
him that, of all the German states, Saxony had hitherto been most respected, he threatened it, in case of
refusal, with the most destructive ravages.
But Tilly had chosen an unfavourable moment for so imperious a requisition. The illtreatment of his
religious and political confederates, the destruction of Magdeburg, the excesses of the Imperialists in Lusatia,
all combined to incense the Elector against the Emperor. The approach, too, of Gustavus Adolphus, (however
slender his claims were to the protection of that prince,) tended to fortify his resolution. He accordingly
forbade the quartering of the imperial soldiers in his territories, and announced his firm determination to
persist in his warlike preparations. However surprised he should be, he added, "to see an imperial army on its
march against his territories, when that army had enough to do in watching the operations of the King of
Sweden, nevertheless he did not expect, instead of the promised and well merited rewards, to be repaid with
ingratitude and the ruin of his country." To Tilly's deputies, who were entertained in a princely style, he gave
a still plainer answer on the occasion. "Gentlemen," said he, "I perceive that the Saxon confectionery, which
has been so long kept back, is at length to be set upon the table. But as it is usual to mix with it nuts and
garnish of all kinds, take care of your teeth."
Tilly instantly broke up his camp, and, with the most frightful devastation, advanced upon Halle; from this
place he renewed his demands on the Elector, in a tone still more urgent and threatening. The previous policy
of this prince, both from his own inclination, and the persuasions of his corrupt ministers had been to promote
the interests of the Emperor, even at the expense of his own sacred obligations, and but very little tact had
hitherto kept him inactive. All this but renders more astonishing the infatuation of the Emperor or his
ministers in abandoning, at so critical a moment, the policy they had hitherto adopted, and by extreme
measures, incensing a prince so easily led. Was this the very object which Tilly had in view? Was it his
purpose to convert an equivocal friend into an open enemy, and thus to relieve himself from the necessity of
that indulgence in the treatment of this prince, which the secret instructions of the Emperor had hitherto
imposed upon him? Or was it the Emperor's wish, by driving the Elector to open hostilities, to get quit of his
obligations to him, and so cleverly to break off at once the difficulty of a reckoning? In either case, we must
be equally surprised at the daring presumption of Tilly, who hesitated not, in presence of one formidable
enemy, to provoke another; and at his negligence in permitting, without opposition, the union of the two.
The Saxon Elector, rendered desperate by the entrance of Tilly into his territories, threw himself, though not
without a violent struggle, under the protection of Sweden.
Immediately after dismissing Tilly's first embassy, he had despatched his fieldmarshal Arnheim in all haste
to the camp of Gustavus, to solicit the prompt assistance of that monarch whom he had so long neglected.
The king concealed the inward satisfaction he felt at this long wished for result. "I am sorry for the Elector,"
said he, with dissembled coldness, to the ambassador; "had he heeded my repeated remonstrances, his
country would never have seen the face of an enemy, and Magdeburg would not have fallen. Now, when
necessity leaves him no alternative, he has recourse to my assistance. But tell him, that I cannot, for the sake
of the Elector of Saxony, ruin my own cause, and that of my confederates. What pledge have I for the
sincerity of a prince whose minister is in the pay of Austria, and who will abandon me as soon as the
Emperor flatters him, and withdraws his troops from his frontiers? Tilly, it is true, has received a strong
reinforcement; but this shall not prevent me from meeting him with confidence, as soon as I have covered my
rear."
The Saxon minister could make no other reply to these reproaches, than that it was best to bury the past in
oblivion.
He pressed the king to name the conditions, on which he would afford assistance to Saxony, and offered to
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guarantee their acceptance. "I require," said Gustavus, "that the Elector shall cede to me the fortress of
Wittenberg, deliver to me his eldest sons as hostages, furnish my troops with three months' pay, and deliver
up to me the traitors among his ministry."
"Not Wittenberg alone," said the Elector, when he received this answer, and hurried back his minister to the
Swedish camp, "not Wittenberg alone, but Torgau, and all Saxony, shall be open to him; my whole family
shall be his hostages, and if that is insufficient, I will place myself in his hands. Return and inform him I am
ready to deliver to him any traitors he shall name, to furnish his army with the money he requires, and to
venture my life and fortune in the good cause.
The king had only desired to test the sincerity of the Elector's new sentiments. Convinced of it, he now
retracted these harsh demands. "The distrust," said he, "which was shown to myself when advancing to the
relief of Magdeburg, had naturally excited mine; the Elector's present confidence demands a return. I am
satisfied, provided he grants my army one month's pay, and even for this advance I hope to indemnify him."
Immediately upon the conclusion of the treaty, the king crossed the Elbe, and next day joined the Saxons.
Instead of preventing this junction, Tilly had advanced against Leipzig, which he summoned to receive an
imperial garrison. In hopes of speedy relief, Hans Von der Pforta, the commandant, made preparations for his
defence, and laid the suburb towards Halle in ashes. But the ill condition of the fortifications made resistance
vain, and on the second day the gates were opened. Tilly had fixed his head quarters in the house of a
gravedigger, the only one still standing in the suburb of Halle: here he signed the capitulation, and here, too,
he arranged his attack on the King of Sweden. Tilly grew pale at the representation of the death's head and
cross bones, with which the proprietor had decorated his house; and, contrary to all expectation, Leipzig
experienced moderate treatment.
Meanwhile, a council of war was held at Torgau, between the King of Sweden and the Elector of Saxony, at
which the Elector of Brandenburg was also present. The resolution which should now be adopted, was to
decide irrevocably the fate of Germany and the Protestant religion, the happiness of nations and the destiny of
their princes. The anxiety of suspense which, before every decisive resolve, oppresses even the hearts of
heroes, appeared now for a moment to overshadow the great mind of Gustavus Adolphus. "If we decide upon
battle," said he, "the stake will be nothing less than a crown and two electorates. Fortune is changeable, and
the inscrutable decrees of Heaven may, for our sins, give the victory to our enemies. My kingdom, it is true,
even after the loss of my life and my army, would still have a hope left. Far removed from the scene of
action, defended by a powerful fleet, a wellguarded frontier, and a warlike population, it would at least be
safe from the worst consequences of a defeat. But what chances of escape are there for you, with an enemy so
close at hand?" Gustavus Adolphus displayed the modest diffidence of a hero, whom an overweening belief
of his own strength did not blind to the greatness of his danger; John George, the confidence of a weak man,
who knows that he has a hero by his side. Impatient to rid his territories as soon as possible of the oppressive
presence of two armies, he burned for a battle, in which he had no former laurels to lose. He was ready to
march with his Saxons alone against Leipzig, and attack Tilly. At last Gustavus acceded to his opinion; and it
was resolved that the attack should be made without delay, before the arrival of the reinforcements, which
were on their way, under Altringer and Tiefenbach. The united Swedish and Saxon armies now crossed the
Mulda, while the Elector returned homeward.
Early on the morning of the 7th September, 1631, the hostile armies came in sight of each other. Tilly, who,
since he had neglected the opportunity of overpowering the Saxons before their union with the Swedes, was
disposed to await the arrival of the reinforcements, had taken up a strong and advantageous position not far
from Leipzig, where he expected he should be able to avoid the battle. But the impetuosity of Pappenheim
obliged him, as soon as the enemy were in motion, to alter his plans, and to move to the left, in the direction
of the hills which run from the village of Wahren towards Lindenthal. At the foot of these heights, his army
was drawn up in a single line, and his artillery placed upon the heights behind, from which it could sweep the
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whole extensive plain of Breitenfeld. The Swedish and Saxon army advanced in two columns, having to pass
the Lober near Podelwitz, in Tilly's front.
To defend the passage of this rivulet, Pappenheim advanced at the head of 2000 cuirassiers, though after great
reluctance on the part of Tilly, and with express orders not to commence a battle. But, in disobedience to this
command, Pappenheim attacked the vanguard of the Swedes, and after a brief struggle was driven to retreat.
To check the progress of the enemy, he set fire to Podelwitz, which, however, did not prevent the two
columns from advancing and forming in order of battle.
On the right, the Swedes drew up in a double line, the infantry in the centre, divided into such small
battalions as could be easily and rapidly manoeuvred without breaking their order; the cavalry upon their
wings, divided in the same manner into small squadrons, interspersed with bodies of musqueteers, so as both
to give an appearance of greater numerical force, and to annoy the enemy's horse. Colonel Teufel
commanded the centre, Gustavus Horn the left, while the right was led by the king in person, opposed to
Count Pappenheim.
On the left, the Saxons formed at a considerable distance from the Swedes, by the advice of Gustavus,
which was justified by the event. The order of battle had been arranged between the Elector and his
fieldmarshal, and the king was content with merely signifying his approval. He was anxious apparently to
separate the Swedish prowess from that of the Saxons, and fortune did not confound them.
The enemy was drawn up under the heights towards the west, in one immense line, long enough to outflank
the Swedish army, the infantry being divided in large battalions, the cavalry in equally unwieldy
squadrons. The artillery being on the heights behind, the range of its fire was over the heads of his men. From
this position of his artillery, it was evident that Tilly's purpose was to await rather than to attack the enemy;
since this arrangement rendered it impossible for him to do so without exposing his men to the fire of his own
cannons. Tilly himself commanded the centre, Count Furstenberg the right wing, and Pappenheim the left.
The united troops of the Emperor and the League on this day did not amount to 34,000 or 35,000 men; the
Swedes and Saxons were about the same number. But had a million been confronted with a million it could
only have rendered the action more bloody, certainly not more important and decisive. For this day Gustavus
had crossed the Baltic, to court danger in a distant country, and expose his crown and life to the caprice of
fortune. The two greatest generals of the time, both hitherto invincible, were now to be matched against each
other in a contest which both had long avoided; and on this field of battle the hitherto untarnished laurels of
one leader must droop for ever. The two parties in Germany had beheld the approach of this day with fear and
trembling; and the whole age awaited with deep anxiety its issue, and posterity was either to bless or deplore
it for ever.
Tilly's usual intrepidity and resolution seemed to forsake him on this eventful day. He had formed no regular
plan for giving battle to the King, and he displayed as little firmness in avoiding it. Contrary to his own
judgment, Pappenheim had forced him to action. Doubts which he had never before felt, struggled in his
bosom; gloomy forebodings clouded his everopen brow; the shade of Magdeburg seemed to hover over him.
A cannonade of two hours commenced the battle; the wind, which was from the west, blew thick clouds of
smoke and dust from the newlyploughed and parched fields into the faces of the Swedes. This compelled
the king insensibly to wheel northwards, and the rapidity with which this movement was executed left no
time to the enemy to prevent it.
Tilly at last left his heights, and began the first attack upon the Swedes; but to avoid their hot fire, he filed off
towards the right, and fell upon the Saxons with such impetuosity that their line was broken, and the whole
army thrown into confusion. The Elector himself retired to Eilenburg, though a few regiments still
maintained their ground upon the field, and by a bold stand saved the honour of Saxony. Scarcely had the
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confusion began ere the Croats commenced plundering, and messengers were despatched to Munich and
Vienna with the news of the victory.
Pappenheim had thrown himself with the whole force of his cavalry upon the right wing of the Swedes, but
without being able to make it waver. The king commanded here in person, and under him General Banner.
Seven times did Pappenheim renew the attack, and seven times was he repulsed. He fled at last with great
loss, and abandoned the field to his conqueror.
In the mean time, Tilly, having routed the remainder of the Saxons, attacked with his victorious troops the
left wing of the Swedes. To this wing the king, as soon as he perceived that the Saxons were thrown into
disorder, had, with a ready foresight, detached a reinforcement of three regiments to cover its flank, which the
flight of the Saxons had left exposed. Gustavus Horn, who commanded here, showed the enemy's cuirassiers
a spirited resistance, which the infantry, interspersed among the squadrons of horse, materially assisted. The
enemy were already beginning to relax the vigour of their attack, when Gustavus Adolphus appeared to
terminate the contest. The left wing of the Imperialists had been routed; and the king's division, having no
longer any enemy to oppose, could now turn their arms wherever it would be to the most advantage.
Wheeling, therefore, with his right wing and main body to the left, he attacked the heights on which the
enemy's artillery was planted. Gaining possession of them in a short time, he turned upon the enemy the full
fire of their own cannon.
The play of artillery upon their flank, and the terrible onslaught of the Swedes in front, threw this hitherto
invincible army into confusion. A sudden retreat was the only course left to Tilly, but even this was to be
made through the midst of the enemy. The whole army was in disorder, with the exception of four regiments
of veteran soldiers, who never as yet had fled from the field, and were resolved not to do so now. Closing
their ranks, they broke through the thickest of the victorious army, and gained a small thicket, where they
opposed a new front to the Swedes, and maintained their resistance till night, when their number was reduced
to six hundred men. With them fled the wreck of Tilly's army, and the battle was decided.
Amid the dead and the wounded, Gustavus Adolphus threw himself on his knees; and the first joy of his
victory gushed forth in fervent prayer. He ordered his cavalry to pursue the enemy as long as the darkness of
the night would permit. The pealing of the alarmbells set the inhabitants of all the neighbouring villages in
motion, and utterly lost was the unhappy fugitive who fell into their hands. The king encamped with the rest
of his army between the field of battle and Leipzig, as it was impossible to attack the town the same night.
Seven thousand of the enemy were killed in the field, and more than 5,000 either wounded or taken prisoners.
Their whole artillery and camp fell into the hands of the Swedes, and more than a hundred standards and
colours were taken. Of the Saxons about 2,000 had fallen, while the loss of the Swedes did not exceed 700.
The rout of the Imperialists was so complete, that Tilly, on his retreat to Halle and Halberstadt, could not
rally above 600 men, or Pappenheim more than 1,400 so rapidly was this formidable army dispersed,
which so lately was the terror of Italy and Germany.
Tilly himself owed his escape merely to chance. Exhausted by his wounds, he still refused to surrender to a
Swedish captain of horse, who summoned him to yield; but who, when he was on the point of putting him to
death, was himself stretched on the ground by a timely pistolshot. But more grievous than danger or wounds
was the pain of surviving his reputation, and of losing in a single day the fruits of a long life. All former
victories were as nothing, since he had failed in gaining the one that should have crowned them all. Nothing
remained of all his past exploits, but the general execration which had followed them. From this period, he
never recovered his cheerfulness or his good fortune. Even his last consolation, the hope of revenge, was
denied to him, by the express command of the Emperor not to risk a decisive battle.
The disgrace of this day is to be ascribed principally to three mistakes; his planting the cannon on the hills
behind him, his afterwards abandoning these heights, and his allowing the enemy, without opposition, to
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form in order of battle. But how easily might those mistakes have been rectified, had it not been for the cool
presence of mind and superior genius of his adversary!
Tilly fled from Halle to Halberstadt, where he scarcely allowed time for the cure of his wounds, before he
hurried towards the Weser to recruit his force by the imperial garrisons in Lower Saxony.
The Elector of Saxony had not failed, after the danger was over, to appear in Gustavus's camp. The king
thanked him for having advised a battle; and the Elector, charmed at his friendly reception, promised him, in
the first transports of joy, the Roman crown. Gustavus set out next day for Merseburg, leaving the Elector to
recover Leipzig. Five thousand Imperialists, who had collected together after the defeat, and whom he met on
his march, were either cut in pieces or taken prisoners, of whom again the greater part entered into his
service. Merseburg quickly surrendered; Halle was soon after taken, whither the Elector of Saxony, after
making himself master of Leipzig, repaired to meet the king, and to concert their future plan of operations.
The victory was gained, but only a prudent use of it could render it decisive. The imperial armies were totally
routed, Saxony free from the enemy, and Tilly had retired into Brunswick. To have followed him thither
would have been to renew the war in Lower Saxony, which had scarcely recovered from the ravages of the
last. It was therefore determined to carry the war into the enemy's country, which, open and defenceless as far
as Vienna, invited attack. On their right, they might fall upon the territories of the Roman Catholic princes, or
penetrate, on the left, into the hereditary dominions of Austria, and make the Emperor tremble in his palace.
Both plans were resolved on; and the question that now remained was to assign its respective parts. Gustavus
Adolphus, at the head of a victorious army, had little resistance to apprehend in his progress from Leipzig to
Prague, Vienna, and Presburg. As to Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, they had been stripped of
their defenders, while the oppressed Protestants in these countries were ripe for a revolt. Ferdinand was no
longer secure in his capital: Vienna, on the first terror of surprise, would at once open its gates. The loss of
his territories would deprive the enemy of the resources by which alone the war could be maintained; and
Ferdinand would, in all probability, gladly accede, on the hardest conditions, to a peace which would remove
a formidable enemy from the heart of his dominions. This bold plan of operations was flattering to a
conqueror, and success perhaps might have justified it. But Gustavus Adolphus, as prudent as he was brave,
and more a statesman than a conqueror, rejected it, because he had a higher end in view, and would not trust
the issue either to bravery or good fortune alone.
By marching towards Bohemia, Franconia and the Upper Rhine would be left to the Elector of Saxony. But
Tilly had already begun to recruit his shattered army from the garrisons in Lower Saxony, and was likely to
be at the head of a formidable force upon the Weser, and to lose no time in marching against the enemy. To
so experienced a general, it would not do to oppose an Arnheim, of whose military skill the battle of Leipzig
had afforded but equivocal proof; and of what avail would be the rapid and brilliant career of the king in
Bohemia and Austria, if Tilly should recover his superiority in the Empire, animating the courage of the
Roman Catholics, and disarming, by a new series of victories, the allies and confederates of the king? What
would he gain by expelling the Emperor from his hereditary dominions, if Tilly succeeded in conquering for
that Emperor the rest of Germany? Could he hope to reduce the Emperor more than had been done, twelve
years before, by the insurrection of Bohemia, which had failed to shake the firmness or exhaust the resources
of that prince, and from which he had risen more formidable than ever?
Less brilliant, but more solid, were the advantages which he had to expect from an incursion into the
territories of the League. In this quarter, his appearance in arms would be decisive. At this very conjuncture,
the princes were assembled in a Diet at Frankfort, to deliberate upon the Edict of Restitution, where
Ferdinand employed all his artful policy to persuade the intimidated Protestants to accede to a speedy and
disadvantageous arrangement. The advance of their protector could alone encourage them to a bold
resistance, and disappoint the Emperor's designs. Gustavus Adolphus hoped, by his presence, to unite the
discontented princes, or by the terror of his arms to detach them from the Emperor's party. Here, in the centre
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of Germany, he could paralyse the nerves of the imperial power, which, without the aid of the League, must
soon fall here, in the neighbourhood of France, he could watch the movements of a suspicious ally; and
however important to his secret views it was to cultivate the friendship of the Roman Catholic electors, he
saw the necessity of making himself first of all master of their fate, in order to establish, by his magnanimous
forbearance, a claim to their gratitude.
He accordingly chose the route to Franconia and the Rhine; and left the conquest of Bohemia to the Elector of
Saxony.
Book III.
The glorious battle of Leipzig effected a great change in the conduct of Gustavus Adolphus, as well as in the
opinion which both friends and foes entertained of him. Successfully had he confronted the greatest general
of the age, and had matched the strength of his tactics and the courage of his Swedes against the elite of the
imperial army, the most experienced troops in Europe. From this moment he felt a firm confidence in his own
powers selfconfidence has always been the parent of great actions. In all his subsequent operations more
boldness and decision are observable; greater determination, even amidst the most unfavourable
circumstances, a more lofty tone towards his adversaries, a more dignified bearing towards his allies, and
even in his clemency, something of the forbearance of a conqueror. His natural courage was farther
heightened by the pious ardour of his imagination. He saw in his own cause that of heaven, and in the defeat
of Tilly beheld the decisive interference of Providence against his enemies, and in himself the instrument of
divine vengeance. Leaving his crown and his country far behind, he advanced on the wings of victory into the
heart of Germany, which for centuries had seen no foreign conqueror within its bosom. The warlike spirit of
its inhabitants, the vigilance of its numerous princes, the artful confederation of its states, the number of its
strong castles, its many and broad rivers, had long restrained the ambition of its neighbours; and frequently as
its extensive frontier had been attacked, its interior had been free from hostile invasion. The Empire had
hitherto enjoyed the equivocal privilege of being its own enemy, though invincible from without. Even now,
it was merely the disunion of its members, and the intolerance of religious zeal, that paved the way for the
Swedish invader. The bond of union between the states, which alone had rendered the Empire invincible, was
now dissolved; and Gustavus derived from Germany itself the power by which he subdued it. With as much
courage as prudence, he availed himself of all that the favourable moment afforded; and equally at home in
the cabinet and the field, he tore asunder the web of the artful policy, with as much ease, as he shattered walls
with the thunder of his cannon. Uninterruptedly he pursued his conquests from one end of Germany to the
other, without breaking the line of posts which commanded a secure retreat at any moment; and whether on
the banks of the Rhine, or at the mouth of the Lech, alike maintaining his communication with his hereditary
dominions.
The consternation of the Emperor and the League at Tilly's defeat at Leipzig, was scarcely greater than the
surprise and embarrassment of the allies of the King of Sweden at his unexpected success. It was beyond both
their expectations and their wishes. Annihilated in a moment was that formidable army which, while it
checked his progress and set bounds to his ambition, rendered him in some measure dependent on
themselves. He now stood in the heart of Germany, alone, without a rival or without an adversary who was a
match for him. Nothing could stop his progress, or check his pretensions, if the intoxication of success should
tempt him to abuse his victory. If formerly they had dreaded the Emperor's irresistible power, there was no
less cause now to fear every thing for the Empire, from the violence of a foreign conqueror, and for the
Catholic Church, from the religious zeal of a Protestant king. The distrust and jealousy of some of the
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combined powers, which a stronger fear of the Emperor had for a time repressed, now revived; and scarcely
had Gustavus Adolphus merited, by his courage and success, their confidence, when they began covertly to
circumvent all his plans. Through a continual struggle with the arts of enemies, and the distrust of his own
allies, must his victories henceforth be won; yet resolution, penetration, and prudence made their way through
all impediments. But while his success excited the jealousy of his more powerful allies, France and Saxony, it
gave courage to the weaker, and emboldened them openly to declare their sentiments and join his party.
Those who could neither vie with Gustavus Adolphus in importance, nor suffer from his ambition, expected
the more from the magnanimity of their powerful ally, who enriched them with the spoils of their enemies,
and protected them against the oppression of their stronger neighbours. His strength covered their weakness,
and, inconsiderable in themselves, they acquired weight and influence from their union with the Swedish
hero. This was the case with most of the free cities, and particularly with the weaker Protestant states. It was
these that introduced the king into the heart of Germany; these covered his rear, supplied his troops with
necessaries, received them into their fortresses, while they exposed their own lives in his battles. His prudent
regard to their national pride, his popular deportment, some brilliant acts of justice, and his respect for the
laws, were so many ties by which he bound the German Protestants to his cause; while the crying atrocities of
the Imperialists, the Spaniards, and the troops of Lorraine, powerfully contributed to set his own conduct and
that of his army in a favourable light.
If Gustavus Adolphus owed his success chiefly to his own genius, at the same time, it must be owned, he was
greatly favoured by fortune and by circumstances. Two great advantages gave him a decided superiority over
the enemy. While he removed the scene of war into the lands of the League, drew their youth as recruits,
enriched himself with booty, and used the revenues of their fugitive princes as his own, he at once took from
the enemy the means of effectual resistance, and maintained an expensive war with little cost to himself. And,
moreover, while his opponents, the princes of the League, divided among themselves, and governed by
different and often conflicting interests, acted without unanimity, and therefore without energy; while their
generals were deficient in authority, their troops in obedience, the operations of their scattered armies without
concert; while the general was separated from the lawgiver and the statesman; these several functions were
united in Gustavus Adolphus, the only source from which authority flowed, the sole object to which the eye
of the warrior turned; the soul of his party, the inventor as well as the executor of his plans. In him, therefore,
the Protestants had a centre of unity and harmony, which was altogether wanting to their opponents. No
wonder, then, if favoured by such advantages, at the head of such an army, with such a genius to direct it, and
guided by such political prudence, Gustavus Adolphus was irresistible.
With the sword in one hand, and mercy in the other, he traversed Germany as a conqueror, a lawgiver, and a
judge, in as short a time almost as the tourist of pleasure. The keys of towns and fortresses were delivered to
him, as if to the native sovereign. No fortress was inaccessible; no river checked his victorious career. He
conquered by the very terror of his name. The Swedish standards were planted along the whole stream of the
Maine: the Lower Palatinate was free, the troops of Spain and Lorraine had fled across the Rhine and the
Moselle. The Swedes and Hessians poured like a torrent into the territories of Mentz, of Wurtzburg, and
Bamberg, and three fugitive bishops, at a distance from their sees, suffered dearly for their unfortunate
attachment to the Emperor. It was now the turn for Maximilian, the leader of the League, to feel in his own
dominions the miseries he had inflicted upon others. Neither the terrible fate of his allies, nor the peaceful
overtures of Gustavus, who, in the midst of conquest, ever held out the hand of friendship, could conquer the
obstinacy of this prince. The torrent of war now poured into Bavaria. Like the banks of the Rhine, those of
the Lecke and the Donau were crowded with Swedish troops. Creeping into his fortresses, the defeated
Elector abandoned to the ravages of the foe his dominions, hitherto unscathed by war, and on which the
bigoted violence of the Bavarians seemed to invite retaliation. Munich itself opened its gates to the invincible
monarch, and the fugitive Palatine, Frederick V., in the forsaken residence of his rival, consoled himself for a
time for the loss of his dominions.
While Gustavus Adolphus was extending his conquests in the south, his generals and allies were gaining
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similar triumphs in the other provinces. Lower Saxony shook off the yoke of Austria, the enemy abandoned
Mecklenburg, and the imperial garrisons retired from the banks of the Weser and the Elbe. In Westphalia and
the Upper Rhine, William, Landgrave of Hesse, rendered himself formidable; the Duke of Weimar in
Thuringia, and the French in the Electorate of Treves; while to the eastward the whole kingdom of Bohemia
was conquered by the Saxons. The Turks were preparing to attack Hungary, and in the heart of Austria a
dangerous insurrection was threatened. In vain did the Emperor look around to the courts of Europe for
support; in vain did he summon the Spaniards to his assistance, for the bravery of the Flemings afforded them
ample employment beyond the Rhine; in vain did he call upon the Roman court and the whole church to
come to his rescue. The offended Pope sported, in pompous processions and idle anathemas, with the
embarrassments of Ferdinand, and instead of the desired subsidy he was shown the devastation of Mantua.
On all sides of his extensive monarchy hostile arms surrounded him. With the states of the League, now
overrun by the enemy, those ramparts were thrown down, behind which Austria had so long defended herself,
and the embers of war were now smouldering upon her unguarded frontiers. His most zealous allies were
disarmed; Maximilian of Bavaria, his firmest support, was scarce able to defend himself. His armies,
weakened by desertion and repeated defeat, and dispirited by continued misfortunes had unlearnt, under
beaten generals, that warlike impetuosity which, as it is the consequence, so it is the guarantee of success.
The danger was extreme, and extraordinary means alone could raise the imperial power from the degradation
into which it was fallen.
The most urgent want was that of a general; and the only one from whom he could hope for the revival of his
former splendour, had been removed from his command by an envious cabal. So low had the Emperor now
fallen, that he was forced to make the most humiliating proposals to his injured subject and servant, and
meanly to press upon the imperious Duke of Friedland the acceptance of the powers which no less meanly
had been taken from him. A new spirit began from this moment to animate the expiring body of Austria; and
a sudden change in the aspect of affairs bespoke the firm hand which guided them. To the absolute King of
Sweden, a general equally absolute was now opposed; and one victorious hero was confronted with another.
Both armies were again to engage in the doubtful struggle; and the prize of victory, already almost secured in
the hands of Gustavus Adolphus, was to be the object of another and a severer trial. The storm of war
gathered around Nuremberg; before its walls the hostile armies encamped; gazing on each other with dread
and respect, longing for, and yet shrinking from, the moment that was to close them together in the shock of
battle. The eyes of Europe turned to the scene in curiosity and alarm, while Nuremberg, in dismay, expected
soon to lend its name to a more decisive battle than that of Leipzig. Suddenly the clouds broke, and the storm
rolled away from Franconia, to burst upon the plains of Saxony. Near Lutzen fell the thunder that had
menaced Nuremberg; the victory, half lost, was purchased by the death of the king. Fortune, which had never
forsaken him in his lifetime, favoured the King of Sweden even in his death, with the rare privilege of falling
in the fulness of his glory and an untarnished fame. By a timely death, his protecting genius rescued him from
the inevitable fate of man that of forgetting moderation in the intoxication of success, and justice in the
plenitude of power. It may be doubted whether, had he lived longer, he would still have deserved the tears
which Germany shed over his grave, or maintained his title to the admiration with which posterity regards
him, as the first and only JUST conqueror that the world has produced. The untimely fall of their great leader
seemed to threaten the ruin of his party; but to the Power which rules the world, no loss of a single man is
irreparable. As the helm of war dropped from the hand of the falling hero, it was seized by two great
statesmen, Oxenstiern and Richelieu. Destiny still pursued its relentless course, and for full sixteen years
longer the flames of war blazed over the ashes of the longforgotten king and soldier.
I may now be permitted to take a cursory retrospect of Gustavus Adolphus in his victorious career; glance at
the scene in which he alone was the great actor; and then, when Austria becomes reduced to extremity by the
successes of the Swedes, and by a series of disasters is driven to the most humiliating and desperate
expedients, to return to the history of the Emperor.
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As soon as the plan of operations had been concerted at Halle, between the King of Sweden and the Elector
of Saxony; as soon as the alliance had been concluded with the neighbouring princes of Weimar and Anhalt,
and preparations made for the recovery of the bishopric of Magdeburg, the king began his march into the
empire. He had here no despicable foe to contend with. Within the empire, the Emperor was still powerful;
throughout Franconia, Swabia, and the Palatinate, imperial garrisons were posted, with whom the possession
of every place of importance must be disputed sword in hand. On the Rhine he was opposed by the Spaniards,
who had overrun the territory of the banished Elector Palatine, seized all its strong places, and would
everywhere dispute with him the passage over that river. On his rear was Tilly, who was fast recruiting his
force, and would soon be joined by the auxiliaries from Lorraine. Every Papist presented an inveterate foe,
while his connexion with France did not leave him at liberty to act with freedom against the Roman
Catholics. Gustavus had foreseen all these obstacles, but at the same time the means by which they were to be
overcome. The strength of the Imperialists was broken and divided among different garrisons, while he would
bring against them one by one his whole united force. If he was to be opposed by the fanaticism of the
Roman Catholics, and the awe in which the lesser states regarded the Emperor's power, he might depend on
the active support of the Protestants, and their hatred to Austrian oppression. The ravages of the Imperialist
and Spanish troops also powerfully aided him in these quarters; where the illtreated husbandman and citizen
sighed alike for a deliverer, and where the mere change of yoke seemed to promise a relief. Emissaries were
despatched to gain over to the Swedish side the principal free cities, particularly Nuremberg and Frankfort.
The first that lay in the king's march, and which he could not leave unoccupied in his rear, was Erfurt. Here
the Protestant party among the citizens opened to him, without a blow, the gates of the town and the citadel.
From the inhabitants of this, as of every important place which afterwards submitted, he exacted an oath of
allegiance, while he secured its possession by a sufficient garrison. To his ally, Duke William of Weimar, he
intrusted the command of an army to be raised in Thuringia. He also left his queen in Erfurt, and promised to
increase its privileges. The Swedish army now crossed the Thuringian forest in two columns, by Gotha and
Arnstadt, and having delivered, in its march, the county of Henneberg from the Imperialists, formed a
junction on the third day near Koenigshofen, on the frontiers of Franconia.
Francis, Bishop of Wurtzburg, the bitter enemy of the Protestants, and the most zealous member of the
League, was the first to feel the indignation of Gustavus Adolphus. A few threats gained for the Swedes
possession of his fortress of Koenigshofen, and with it the key of the whole province. At the news of this
rapid conquest, dismay seized all the Roman Catholic towns of the circle. The Bishops of Wurtzburg and
Bamberg trembled in their castles; they already saw their sees tottering, their churches profaned, and their
religion degraded. The malice of his enemies had circulated the most frightful representations of the
persecuting spirit and the mode of warfare pursued by the Swedish king and his soldiers, which neither the
repeated assurances of the king, nor the most splendid examples of humanity and toleration, ever entirely
effaced. Many feared to suffer at the hands of another what in similar circumstances they were conscious of
inflicting themselves. Many of the richest Roman Catholics hastened to secure by flight their property, their
religion, and their persons, from the sanguinary fanaticism of the Swedes. The bishop himself set the
example. In the midst of the alarm, which his bigoted zeal had caused, he abandoned his dominions, and fled
to Paris, to excite, if possible, the French ministry against the common enemy of religion.
The further progress of Gustavus Adolphus in the ecclesiastical territories agreed with this brilliant
commencement. Schweinfurt, and soon afterwards Wurtzburg, abandoned by their Imperial garrisons,
surrendered; but Marienberg he was obliged to carry by storm. In this place, which was believed to be
impregnable, the enemy had collected a large store of provisions and ammunition, all of which fell into the
hands of the Swedes. The king found a valuable prize in the library of the Jesuits, which he sent to Upsal,
while his soldiers found a still more agreeable one in the prelate's wellfilled cellars; his treasures the bishop
had in good time removed. The whole bishopric followed the example of the capital, and submitted to the
Swedes. The king compelled all the bishop's subjects to swear allegiance to himself; and, in the absence of
the lawful sovereign, appointed a regency, one half of whose members were Protestants. In every Roman
Catholic town which Gustavus took, he opened the churches to the Protestant people, but without retaliating
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on the Papists the cruelties which they had practised on the former. On such only as sword in hand refused to
submit, were the fearful rights of war enforced; and for the occasional acts of violence committed by a few of
the more lawless soldiers, in the blind rage of the first attack, their humane leader is not justly responsible.
Those who were peaceably disposed, or defenceless, were treated with mildness. It was a sacred principle of
Gustavus to spare the blood of his enemies, as well as that of his own troops.
On the first news of the Swedish irruption, the Bishop of Wurtzburg, without regarding the treaty which he
had entered into with the King of Sweden, had earnestly pressed the general of the League to hasten to the
assistance of the bishopric. That defeated commander had, in the mean time, collected on the Weser the
shattered remnant of his army, reinforced himself from the garrisons of Lower Saxony, and effected a
junction in Hesse with Altringer and Fugger, who commanded under him. Again at the head of a considerable
force, Tilly burned with impatience to wipe out the stain of his first defeat by a splendid victory. From his
camp at Fulda, whither he had marched with his army, he earnestly requested permission from the Duke of
Bavaria to give battle to Gustavus Adolphus. But, in the event of Tilly's defeat, the League had no second
army to fall back upon, and Maximilian was too cautious to risk again the fate of his party on a single battle.
With tears in his eyes, Tilly read the commands of his superior, which compelled him to inactivity. Thus his
march to Franconia was delayed, and Gustavus Adolphus gained time to overrun the whole bishopric. It was
in vain that Tilly, reinforced at Aschaffenburg by a body of 12,000 men from Lorraine, marched with an
overwhelming force to the relief of Wurtzburg. The town and citadel were already in the hands of the
Swedes, and Maximilian of Bavaria was generally blamed (and not without cause, perhaps) for having, by his
scruples, occasioned the loss of the bishopric. Commanded to avoid a battle, Tilly contented himself with
checking the farther advance of the enemy; but he could save only a few of the towns from the impetuosity of
the Swedes. Baffled in an attempt to reinforce the weak garrison of Hanau, which it was highly important to
the Swedes to gain, he crossed the Maine, near Seligenstadt, and took the direction of the Bergstrasse, to
protect the Palatinate from the conqueror.
Tilly, however, was not the sole enemy whom Gustavus Adolphus met in Franconia, and drove before him.
Charles, Duke of Lorraine, celebrated in the annals of the time for his unsteadiness of character, his vain
projects, and his misfortunes, ventured to raise a weak arm against the Swedish hero, in the hope of obtaining
from the Emperor the electoral dignity. Deaf to the suggestions of a rational policy, he listened only to the
dictates of heated ambition; by supporting the Emperor, he exasperated France, his formidable neighbour;
and in the pursuit of a visionary phantom in another country, left undefended his own dominions, which were
instantly overrun by a French army. Austria willingly conceded to him, as well as to the other princes of the
League, the honour of being ruined in her cause. Intoxicated with vain hopes, this prince collected a force of
17,000 men, which he proposed to lead in person against the Swedes. If these troops were deficient in
discipline and courage, they were at least attractive by the splendour of their accoutrements; and however
sparing they were of their prowess against the foe, they were liberal enough with it against the defenceless
citizens and peasantry, whom they were summoned to defend. Against the bravery, and the formidable
discipline of the Swedes this splendidly attired army, however, made no long stand. On the first advance of
the Swedish cavalry a panic seized them, and they were driven without difficulty from their cantonments in
Wurtzburg; the defeat of a few regiments occasioned a general rout, and the scattered remnant sought a
covert from the Swedish valour in the towns beyond the Rhine. Loaded with shame and ridicule, the duke
hurried home by Strasburg, too fortunate in escaping, by a submissive written apology, the indignation of his
conqueror, who had first beaten him out of the field, and then called upon him to account for his hostilities. It
is related upon this occasion that, in a village on the Rhine a peasant struck the horse of the duke as he rode
past, exclaiming, "Haste, Sir, you must go quicker to escape the great King of Sweden!"
The example of his neighbours' misfortunes had taught the Bishop of Bamberg prudence. To avert the
plundering of his territories, he made offers of peace, though these were intended only to delay the king's
course till the arrival of assistance. Gustavus Adolphus, too honourable himself to suspect dishonesty in
another, readily accepted the bishop's proposals, and named the conditions on which he was willing to save
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his territories from hostile treatment. He was the more inclined to peace, as he had no time to lose in the
conquest of Bamberg, and his other designs called him to the Rhine. The rapidity with which he followed up
these plans, cost him the loss of those pecuniary supplies which, by a longer residence in Franconia, he might
easily have extorted from the weak and terrified bishop. This artful prelate broke off the negotiation the
instant the storm of war passed away from his own territories. No sooner had Gustavus marched onwards
than he threw himself under the protection of Tilly, and received the troops of the Emperor into the very
towns and fortresses, which shortly before he had shown himself ready to open to the Swedes. By this
stratagem, however, he only delayed for a brief interval the ruin of his bishopric. A Swedish general who had
been left in Franconia, undertook to punish the perfidy of the bishop; and the ecclesiastical territory became
the seat of war, and was ravaged alike by friends and foes.
The formidable presence of the Imperialists had hitherto been a check upon the Franconian States; but their
retreat, and the humane conduct of the Swedish king, emboldened the nobility and other inhabitants of this
circle to declare in his favour. Nuremberg joyfully committed itself to his protection; and the Franconian
nobles were won to his cause by flattering proclamations, in which he condescended to apologize for his
hostile appearance in the dominions. The fertility of Franconia, and the rigorous honesty of the Swedish
soldiers in their dealings with the inhabitants, brought abundance to the camp of the king. The high esteem
which the nobility of the circle felt for Gustavus, the respect and admiration with which they regarded his
brilliant exploits, the promises of rich booty which the service of this monarch held out, greatly facilitated the
recruiting of his troops; a step which was made necessary by detaching so many garrisons from the main
body. At the sound of his drums, recruits flocked to his standard from all quarters.
The king had scarcely spent more time in conquering Franconia, than he would have required to cross it. He
now left behind him Gustavus Horn, one of his best generals, with a force of 8,000 men, to complete and
retain his conquest. He himself with his main army, reinforced by the late recruits, hastened towards the
Rhine in order to secure this frontier of the empire from the Spaniards; to disarm the ecclesiastical electors,
and to obtain from their fertile territories new resources for the prosecution of the war. Following the course
of the Maine, he subjected, in the course of his march, Seligenstadt, Aschaffenburg, Steinheim, the whole
territory on both sides of the river. The imperial garrisons seldom awaited his approach, and never attempted
resistance. In the meanwhile one of his colonels had been fortunate enough to take by surprise the town and
citadel of Hanau, for whose preservation Tilly had shown such anxiety. Eager to be free of the oppressive
burden of the Imperialists, the Count of Hanau gladly placed himself under the milder yoke of the King of
Sweden.
Gustavus Adolphus now turned his whole attention to Frankfort, for it was his constant maxim to cover his
rear by the friendship and possession of the more important towns. Frankfort was among the free cities
which, even from Saxony, he had endeavoured to prepare for his reception; and he now called upon it, by a
summons from Offenbach, to allow him a free passage, and to admit a Swedish garrison. Willingly would
this city have dispensed with the necessity of choosing between the King of Sweden and the Emperor; for,
whatever party they might embrace, the inhabitants had a like reason to fear for their privileges and trade.
The Emperor's vengeance would certainly fall heavily upon them, if they were in a hurry to submit to the
King of Sweden, and afterwards he should prove unable to protect his adherents in Germany. But still more
ruinous for them would be the displeasure of an irresistible conqueror, who, with a formidable army, was
already before their gates, and who might punish their opposition by the ruin of their commerce and
prosperity. In vain did their deputies plead the danger which menaced their fairs, their privileges, perhaps
their constitution itself, if, by espousing the party of the Swedes, they were to incur the Emperor's
displeasure. Gustavus Adolphus expressed to them his astonishment that, when the liberties of Germany and
the Protestant religion were at stake, the citizens of Frankfort should talk of their annual fairs, and postpone
for temporal interests the great cause of their country and their conscience. He had, he continued, in a
menacing tone, found the keys of every town and fortress, from the Isle of Rugen to the Maine, and knew
also where to find a key to Frankfort; the safety of Germany, and the freedom of the Protestant Church, were,
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he assured them, the sole objects of his invasion; conscious of the justice of his cause, he was determined not
to allow any obstacle to impede his progress. "The inhabitants of Frankfort, he was well aware, wished to
stretch out only a finger to him, but he must have the whole hand in order to have something to grasp." At the
head of the army, he closely followed the deputies as they carried back his answer, and in order of battle
awaited, near Saxenhausen, the decision of the council.
If Frankfort hesitated to submit to the Swedes, it was solely from fear of the Emperor; their own inclinations
did not allow them a moment to doubt between the oppressor of Germany and its protector. The menacing
preparations amidst which Gustavus Adolphus now compelled them to decide, would lessen the guilt of their
revolt in the eyes of the Emperor, and by an appearance of compulsion justify the step which they willingly
took. The gates were therefore opened to the King of Sweden, who marched his army through this imperial
town in magnificent procession, and in admirable order. A garrison of 600 men was left in Saxenhausen;
while the king himself advanced the same evening, with the rest of his army, against the town of Hoechst in
Mentz, which surrendered to him before night.
While Gustavus was thus extending his conquests along the Maine, fortune crowned also the efforts of his
generals and allies in the north of Germany. Rostock, Wismar, and Doemitz, the only strong places in the
Duchy of Mecklenburg which still sighed under the yoke of the Imperialists, were recovered by their
legitimate sovereign, the Duke John Albert, under the Swedish general, Achatius Tott. In vain did the
imperial general, Wolf Count von Mansfeld, endeavour to recover from the Swedes the territories of
Halberstadt, of which they had taken possession immediately upon the victory of Leipzig; he was even
compelled to leave Magdeburg itself in their hands. The Swedish general, Banner, who with 8,000 men
remained upon the Elbe, closely blockaded that city, and had defeated several imperial regiments which had
been sent to its relief. Count Mansfeld defended it in person with great resolution; but his garrison being too
weak to oppose for any length of time the numerous force of the besiegers, he was already about to surrender
on conditions, when Pappenheim advanced to his assistance, and gave employment elsewhere to the Swedish
arms. Magdeburg, however, or rather the wretched huts that peeped out miserably from among the ruins of
that once great town, was afterwards voluntarily abandoned by the Imperialists, and immediately taken
possession of by the Swedes.
Even Lower Saxony, encouraged by the progress of the king, ventured to raise its head from the disasters of
the unfortunate Danish war. They held a congress at Hamburg, and resolved upon raising three regiments,
which they hoped would be sufficient to free them from the oppressive garrisons of the Imperialists. The
Bishop of Bremen, a relation of Gustavus Adolphus, was not content even with this; but assembled troops of
his own, and terrified the unfortunate monks and priests of the neighbourhood, but was quickly compelled by
the imperial general, Count Gronsfeld, to lay down his arms. Even George, Duke of Lunenburg, formerly a
colonel in the Emperor's service, embraced the party of Gustavus, for whom he raised several regiments, and
by occupying the attention of the Imperialists in Lower Saxony, materially assisted him.
But more important service was rendered to the king by the Landgrave William of Hesse Cassel, whose
victorious arms struck with terror the greater part of Westphalia and Lower Saxony, the bishopric of Fulda,
and even the Electorate of Cologne. It has been already stated that immediately after the conclusion of the
alliance between the Landgrave and Gustavus Adolphus at Werben, two imperial generals, Fugger and
Altringer, were ordered by Tilly to march into Hesse, to punish the Landgrave for his revolt from the
Emperor. But this prince had as firmly withstood the arms of his enemies, as his subjects had the
proclamations of Tilly inciting them to rebellion, and the battle of Leipzig presently relieved him of their
presence. He availed himself of their absence with courage and resolution; in a short time, Vach, Muenden
and Hoexter surrendered to him, while his rapid advance alarmed the bishoprics of Fulda, Paderborn, and the
ecclesiastical territories which bordered on Hesse. The terrified states hastened by a speedy submission to set
limits to his progress, and by considerable contributions to purchase exemption from plunder. After these
successful enterprises, the Landgrave united his victorious army with that of Gustavus Adolphus, and
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concerted with him at Frankfort their future plan of operations.
In this city, a number of princes and ambassadors were assembled to congratulate Gustavus on his success,
and either to conciliate his favour or to appease his indignation. Among them was the fugitive King of
Bohemia, the Palatine Frederick V., who had hastened from Holland to throw himself into the arms of his
avenger and protector. Gustavus gave him the unprofitable honour of greeting him as a crowned head, and
endeavoured, by a respectful sympathy, to soften his sense of his misfortunes. But great as the advantages
were, which Frederick had promised himself from the power and good fortune of his protector; and high as
were the expectations he had built on his justice and magnanimity, the chance of this unfortunate prince's
reinstatement in his kingdom was as distant as ever. The inactivity and contradictory politics of the English
court had abated the zeal of Gustavus Adolphus, and an irritability which he could not always repress, made
him on this occasion forget the glorious vocation of protector of the oppressed, in which, on his invasion of
Germany, he had so loudly announced himself.
The terrors of the king's irresistible strength, and the near prospect of his vengeance, had also compelled
George, Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, to a timely submission. His connection with the Emperor, and his
indifference to the Protestant cause, were no secret to the king, but he was satisfied with laughing at so
impotent an enemy. As the Landgrave knew his own strength and the political situation of Germany so little,
as to offer himself as mediator between the contending parties, Gustavus used jestingly to call him the
peacemaker. He was frequently heard to say, when at play he was winning from the Landgrave, "that the
money afforded double satisfaction, as it was Imperial coin." To his affinity with the Elector of Saxony,
whom Gustavus had cause to treat with forbearance, the Landgrave was indebted for the favourable terms he
obtained from the king, who contented himself with the surrender of his fortress of Russelheim, and his
promise of observing a strict neutrality during the war. The Counts of Westerwald and Wetteran also visited
the King in Frankfort, to offer him their assistance against the Spaniards, and to conclude an alliance, which
was afterwards of great service to him. The town of Frankfort itself had reason to rejoice at the presence of
this monarch, who took their commerce under his protection, and by the most effectual measures restored the
fairs, which had been greatly interrupted by the war.
The Swedish army was now reinforced by ten thousand Hessians, which the Landgrave of Casse commanded.
Gustavus Adolphus had already invested Koenigstein; Kostheim and Floersheim surrendered after a short
siege; he was in command of the Maine; and transports were preparing with all speed at Hoechst to carry his
troops across the Rhine. These preparations filled the Elector of Mentz, Anselm Casimir, with consternation;
and he no longer doubted but that the storm of war would next fall upon him. As a partisan of the Emperor,
and one of the most active members of the League, he could expect no better treatment than his confederates,
the Bishops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, had already experienced. The situation of his territories upon the
Rhine made it necessary for the enemy to secure them, while the fertility afforded an irresistible temptation to
a necessitous army. Miscalculating his own strength and that of his adversaries, the Elector flattered himself
that he was able to repel force by force, and weary out the valour of the Swedes by the strength of his
fortresses. He ordered the fortifications of his capital to be repaired with all diligence, provided it with every
necessary for sustaining a long siege, and received into the town a garrison of 2,000 Spaniards, under Don
Philip de Sylva. To prevent the approach of the Swedish transports, he endeavoured to close the mouth of the
Maine by driving piles, and sinking large heaps of stones and vessels. He himself, however, accompanied by
the Bishop of Worms, and carrying with him his most precious effects, took refuge in Cologne, and
abandoned his capital and territories to the rapacity of a tyrannical garrison. But these preparations, which
bespoke less of true courage than of weak and overweening confidence, did not prevent the Swedes from
marching against Mentz, and making serious preparations for an attack upon the city. While one body of their
troops poured into the Rheingau, routed the Spaniards who remained there, and levied contributions on the
inhabitants, another laid the Roman Catholic towns in Westerwald and Wetterau under similar contributions.
The main army had encamped at Cassel, opposite Mentz; and Bernhard, Duke of Weimar, made himself
master of the Maeusethurm and the Castle of Ehrenfels, on the other side of the Rhine. Gustavus was now
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actively preparing to cross the river, and to blockade the town on the land side, when the movements of Tilly
in Franconia suddenly called him from the siege, and obtained for the Elector a short repose.
The danger of Nuremberg, which, during the absence of Gustavus Adolphus on the Rhine, Tilly had made a
show of besieging, and, in the event of resistance, threatened with the cruel fate of Magdeburg, occasioned
the king suddenly to retire from before Mentz. Lest he should expose himself a second time to the reproaches
of Germany, and the disgrace of abandoning a confederate city to a ferocious enemy, he hastened to its relief
by forced marches. On his arrival at Frankfort, however, he heard of its spirited resistance, and of the retreat
of Tilly, and lost not a moment in prosecuting his designs against Mentz. Failing in an attempt to cross the
Rhine at Cassel, under the cannon of the besieged, he directed his march towards the Bergstrasse, with a view
of approaching the town from an opposite quarter. Here he quickly made himself master of all the places of
importance, and at Stockstadt, between Gernsheim and Oppenheim, appeared a second time upon the banks
of the Rhine. The whole of the Bergstrasse was abandoned by the Spaniards, who endeavoured obstinately to
defend the other bank of the river. For this purpose, they had burned or sunk all the vessels in the
neighbourhood, and arranged a formidable force on the banks, in case the king should attempt the passage at
that place.
On this occasion, the king's impetuosity exposed him to great danger of falling into the hands of the enemy.
In order to reconnoitre the opposite bank, he crossed the river in a small boat; he had scarcely landed when he
was attacked by a party of Spanish horse, from whose hands he only saved himself by a precipitate retreat.
Having at last, with the assistance of the neighbouring fishermen, succeeded in procuring a few transports, he
despatched two of them across the river, bearing Count Brahe and 300 Swedes. Scarcely had this officer time
to entrench himself on the opposite bank, when he was attacked by 14 squadrons of Spanish dragoons and
cuirassiers. Superior as the enemy was in number, Count Brahe, with his small force, bravely defended
himself, and gained time for the king to support him with fresh troops. The Spaniards at last retired with the
loss of 600 men, some taking refuge in Oppenheim, and others in Mentz. A lion of marble on a high pillar,
holding a naked sword in his paw, and a helmet on his head, was erected seventy years after the event, to
point out to the traveller the spot where the immortal monarch crossed the great river of Germany.
Gustavus Adolphus now conveyed his artillery and the greater part of his troops over the river, and laid siege
to Oppenheim, which, after a brave resistance, was, on the 8th December, 1631, carried by storm. Five
hundred Spaniards, who had so courageously defended the place, fell indiscriminately a sacrifice to the fury
of the Swedes. The crossing of the Rhine by Gustavus struck terror into the Spaniards and Lorrainers, who
had thought themselves protected by the river from the vengeance of the Swedes. Rapid flight was now their
only security; every place incapable of an effectual defence was immediately abandoned. After a long train of
outrages on the defenceless citizens, the troops of Lorraine evacuated Worms, which, before their departure,
they treated with wanton cruelty. The Spaniards hastened to shut themselves up in Frankenthal, where they
hoped to defy the victorious arms of Gustavus Adolphus.
The king lost no time in prosecuting his designs against Mentz, into which the flower of the Spanish troops
had thrown themselves. While he advanced on the left bank of the Rhine, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel
moved forward on the other, reducing several strong places on his march. The besieged Spaniards, though
hemmed in on both sides, displayed at first a bold determination, and threw, for several days, a shower of
bombs into the Swedish camp, which cost the king many of his bravest soldiers. But notwithstanding, the
Swedes continually gained ground, and had at last advanced so close to the ditch that they prepared seriously
for storming the place. The courage of the besieged now began to droop. They trembled before the furious
impetuosity of the Swedish soldiers, of which Marienberg, in Wurtzburg, had afforded so fearful an example.
The same dreadful fate awaited Mentz, if taken by storm; and the enemy might even be easily tempted to
revenge the carnage of Magdeburg on this rich and magnificent residence of a Roman Catholic prince. To
save the town, rather than their own lives, the Spanish garrison capitulated on the fourth day, and obtained
from the magnanimity of Gustavus a safe conduct to Luxembourg; the greater part of them, however,
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following the example of many others, enlisted in the service of Sweden.
On the 13th December, 1631, the king made his entry into the conquered town, and fixed his quarters in the
palace of the Elector. Eighty pieces of cannon fell into his hands, and the citizens were obliged to redeem
their property from pillage, by a payment of 80,000 florins. The benefits of this redemption did not extend to
the Jews and the clergy, who were obliged to make large and separate contributions for themselves. The
library of the Elector was seized by the king as his share, and presented by him to his chancellor, Oxenstiern,
who intended it for the Academy of Westerrah, but the vessel in which it was shipped to Sweden foundered at
sea.
After the loss of Mentz, misfortune still pursued the Spaniards on the Rhine. Shortly before the capture of
that city, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel had taken Falkenstein and Reifenberg, and the fortress of
Koningstein surrendered to the Hessians. The Rhinegrave, Otto Louis, one of the king's generals, defeated
nine Spanish squadrons who were on their march for Frankenthal, and made himself master of the most
important towns upon the Rhine, from Boppart to Bacharach. After the capture of the fortress of Braunfels,
which was effected by the Count of Wetterau, with the cooperation of the Swedes, the Spaniards quickly
lost every place in Wetterau, while in the Palatinate they retained few places besides Frankenthal. Landau and
Kronweisenberg openly declared for the Swedes; Spires offered troops for the king's service; Manheim was
gained through the prudence of the Duke Bernard of Weimar, and the negligence of its governor, who, for
this misconduct, was tried before the council of war, at Heidelberg, and beheaded.
The king had protracted the campaign into the depth of winter, and the severity of the season was perhaps one
cause of the advantage his soldiers gained over those of the enemy. But the exhausted troops now stood in
need of the repose of winter quarters, which, after the surrender of Mentz, Gustavus assigned to them, in its
neighbourhood. He himself employed the interval of inactivity in the field, which the season of the year
enjoined, in arranging, with his chancellor, the affairs of his cabinet, in treating for a neutrality with some of
his enemies, and adjusting some political disputes which had sprung up with a neighbouring ally. He chose
the city of Mentz for his winter quarters, and the settlement of these state affairs, and showed a greater
partiality for this town, than seemed consistent with the interests of the German princes, or the shortness of
his visit to the Empire. Not content with strongly fortifying it, he erected at the opposite angle which the
Maine forms with the Rhine, a new citadel, which was named Gustavusburg from its founder, but which is
better known under the title of Pfaffenraub or Pfaffenzwang*.
* Priests' plunder; alluding to the means by which the expense of its erection had been defrayed.
While Gustavus Adolphus made himself master of the Rhine, and threatened the three neighbouring
electorates with his victorious arms, his vigilant enemies in Paris and St. Germain's made use of every artifice
to deprive him of the support of France, and, if possible, to involve him in a war with that power. By his
sudden and equivocal march to the Rhine, he had surprised his friends, and furnished his enemies with the
means of exciting a distrust of his intentions. After the conquest of Wurtzburg, and of the greater part of
Franconia, the road into Bavaria and Austria lay open to him through Bamberg and the Upper Palatinate; and
the expectation was as general, as it was natural, that he would not delay to attack the Emperor and the Duke
of Bavaria in the very centre of their power, and, by the reduction of his two principal enemies, bring the war
immediately to an end. But to the surprise of both parties, Gustavus left the path which general expectation
had thus marked out for him; and instead of advancing to the right, turned to the left, to make the less
important and more innocent princes of the Rhine feel his power, while he gave time to his more formidable
opponents to recruit their strength. Nothing but the paramount design of reinstating the unfortunate Palatine,
Frederick V., in the possession of his territories, by the expulsion of the Spaniards, could seem to account for
this strange step; and the belief that Gustavus was about to effect that restoration, silenced for a while the
suspicions of his friends and the calumnies of his enemies. But the Lower Palatinate was now almost entirely
cleared of the enemy; and yet Gustavus continued to form new schemes of conquest on the Rhine, and to
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withhold the reconquered country from the Palatine, its rightful owner. In vain did the English ambassador
remind him of what justice demanded, and what his own solemn engagement made a duty of honour;
Gustavus replied to these demands with bitter complaints of the inactivity of the English court, and prepared
to carry his victorious standard into Alsace, and even into Lorraine.
A distrust of the Swedish monarch was now loud and open, while the malice of his enemies busily circulated
the most injurious reports as to his intentions. Richelieu, the minister of Louis XIII., had long witnessed with
anxiety the king's progress towards the French frontier, and the suspicious temper of Louis rendered him but
too accessible to the evil surmises which the occasion gave rise to. France was at this time involved in a civil
war with her Protestant subjects, and the fear was not altogether groundless, that the approach of a victorious
monarch of their party might revive their drooping spirit, and encourage them to a more desperate resistance.
This might be the case, even if Gustavus Adolphus was far from showing a disposition to encourage them, or
to act unfaithfully towards his ally, the King of France. But the vindictive Bishop of Wurtzburg, who was
anxious to avenge the loss of his dominions, the envenomed rhetoric of the Jesuits and the active zeal of the
Bavarian minister, represented this dreaded alliance between the Huguenots and the Swedes as an undoubted
fact, and filled the timid mind of Louis with the most alarming fears. Not merely chimerical politicians, but
many of the best informed Roman Catholics, fully believed that the king was on the point of breaking into the
heart of France, to make common cause with the Huguenots, and to overturn the Catholic religion within the
kingdom. Fanatical zealots already saw him, with his army, crossing the Alps, and dethroning the Viceregent
of Christ in Italy. Such reports no doubt soon refute themselves; yet it cannot be denied that Gustavus, by his
manoeuvres on the Rhine, gave a dangerous handle to the malice of his enemies, and in some measure
justified the suspicion that he directed his arms, not so much against the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria, as
against the Roman Catholic religion itself.
The general clamour of discontent which the Jesuits raised in all the Catholic courts, against the alliance
between France and the enemy of the church, at last compelled Cardinal Richelieu to take a decisive step for
the security of his religion, and at once to convince the Roman Catholic world of the zeal of France, and of
the selfish policy of the ecclesiastical states of Germany. Convinced that the views of the King of Sweden,
like his own, aimed solely at the humiliation of the power of Austria, he hesitated not to promise to the
princes of the League, on the part of Sweden, a complete neutrality, immediately they abandoned their
alliance with the Emperor and withdrew their troops. Whatever the resolution these princes should adopt,
Richelieu would equally attain his object. By their separation from the Austrian interest, Ferdinand would be
exposed to the combined attack of France and Sweden; and Gustavus Adolphus, freed from his other enemies
in Germany, would be able to direct his undivided force against the hereditary dominions of Austria. In that
event, the fall of Austria was inevitable, and this great object of Richelieu's policy would be gained without
injury to the church. If, on the other hand, the princes of the League persisted in their opposition, and adhered
to the Austrian alliance, the result would indeed be more doubtful, but still France would have sufficiently
proved to all Europe the sincerity of her attachment to the Catholic cause, and performed her duty as a
member of the Roman Church. The princes of the League would then appear the sole authors of those evils,
which the continuance of the war would unavoidably bring upon the Roman Catholics of Germany; they
alone, by their wilful and obstinate adherence to the Emperor, would frustrate the measures employed for
their protection, involve the church in danger, and themselves in ruin.
Richelieu pursued this plan with greater zeal, the more he was embarrassed by the repeated demands of the
Elector of Bavaria for assistance from France; for this prince, as already stated, when he first began to
entertain suspicions of the Emperor, entered immediately into a secret alliance with France, by which, in the
event of any change in the Emperor's sentiments, he hoped to secure the possession of the Palatinate. But
though the origin of the treaty clearly showed against what enemy it was directed, Maximilian now thought
proper to make use of it against the King of Sweden, and did not hesitate to demand from France that
assistance against her ally, which she had simply promised against Austria. Richelieu, embarrassed by this
conflicting alliance with two hostile powers, had no resource left but to endeavour to put a speedy
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termination to their hostilities; and as little inclined to sacrifice Bavaria, as he was disabled, by his treaty with
Sweden, from assisting it, he set himself, with all diligence, to bring about a neutrality, as the only means of
fulfilling his obligations to both. For this purpose, the Marquis of Breze was sent, as his plenipotentiary, to
the King of Sweden at Mentz, to learn his sentiments on this point, and to procure from him favourable
conditions for the allied princes. But if Louis XIII. had powerful motives for wishing for this neutrality,
Gustavus Adolphus had as grave reasons for desiring the contrary. Convinced by numerous proofs that the
hatred of the princes of the League to the Protestant religion was invincible, their aversion to the foreign
power of the Swedes inextinguishable, and their attachment to the House of Austria irrevocable, he
apprehended less danger from their open hostility, than from a neutrality which was so little in unison with
their real inclinations; and, moreover, as he was constrained to carry on the war in Germany at the expense of
the enemy, he manifestly sustained great loss if he diminished their number without increasing that of his
friends. It was not surprising, therefore, if Gustavus evinced little inclination to purchase the neutrality of the
League, by which he was likely to gain so little, at the expense of the advantages he had already obtained.
The conditions, accordingly, upon which he offered to adopt the neutrality towards Bavaria were severe, and
suited to these views. He required of the whole League a full and entire cessation from all hostilities; the
recall of their troops from the imperial army, from the conquered towns, and from all the Protestant countries;
the reduction of their military force; the exclusion of the imperial armies from their territories, and from
supplies either of men, provisions, or ammunition. Hard as the conditions were, which the victor thus
imposed upon the vanquished, the French mediator flattered himself he should be able to induce the Elector
of Bavaria to accept them. In order to give time for an accommodation, Gustavus had agreed to a cessation of
hostilities for a fortnight. But at the very time when this monarch was receiving from the French agents
repeated assurances of the favourable progress of the negociation, an intercepted letter from the Elector to
Pappenheim, the imperial general in Westphalia, revealed the perfidy of that prince, as having no other object
in view by the whole negociation, than to gain time for his measures of defence. Far from intending to fetter
his military operations by a truce with Sweden, the artful prince hastened his preparations, and employed the
leisure which his enemy afforded him, in making the most active dispositions for resistance. The negociation
accordingly failed, and served only to increase the animosity of the Bavarians and the Swedes.
Tilly's augmented force, with which he threatened to overrun Franconia, urgently required the king's presence
in that circle; but it was necessary to expel previously the Spaniards from the Rhine, and to cut off their
means of invading Germany from the Netherlands. With this view, Gustavus Adolphus had made an offer of
neutrality to the Elector of Treves, Philip von Zeltern, on condition that the fortress of Hermanstein should be
delivered up to him, and a free passage granted to his troops through Coblentz. But unwillingly as the Elector
had beheld the Spaniards within his territories, he was still less disposed to commit his estates to the
suspicious protection of a heretic, and to make the Swedish conqueror master of his destinies. Too weak to
maintain his independence between two such powerful competitors, he took refuge in the protection of
France. With his usual prudence, Richelieu profited by the embarrassments of this prince to augment the
power of France, and to gain for her an important ally on the German frontier. A numerous French army was
despatched to protect the territory of Treves, and a French garrison was received into Ehrenbreitstein. But the
object which had moved the Elector to this bold step was not completely gained, for the offended pride of
Gustavus Adolphus was not appeased till he had obtained a free passage for his troops through Treves.
Pending these negociations with Treves and France, the king's generals had entirely cleared the territory of
Mentz of the Spanish garrisons, and Gustavus himself completed the conquest of this district by the capture
of Kreutznach. To protect these conquests, the chancellor Oxenstiern was left with a division of the army
upon the Middle Rhine, while the main body, under the king himself, began its march against the enemy in
Franconia.
The possession of this circle had, in the mean time, been disputed with variable success, between Count Tilly
and the Swedish General Horn, whom Gustavus had left there with 8,000 men; and the Bishopric of
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Bamberg, in particular, was at once the prize and the scene of their struggle. Called away to the Rhine by his
other projects, the king had left to his general the chastisement of the bishop, whose perfidy had excited his
indignation, and the activity of Horn justified the choice. In a short time, he subdued the greater part of the
bishopric; and the capital itself, abandoned by its imperial garrison, was carried by storm. The banished
bishop urgently demanded assistance from the Elector of Bavaria, who was at length persuaded to put an end
to Tilly's inactivity. Fully empowered by his master's order to restore the bishop to his possessions, this
general collected his troops, who were scattered over the Upper Palatinate, and with an army of 20,000 men
advanced upon Bamberg. Firmly resolved to maintain his conquest even against this overwhelming force,
Horn awaited the enemy within the walls of Bamberg; but was obliged to yield to the vanguard of Tilly what
he had thought to be able to dispute with his whole army. A panic which suddenly seized his troops, and
which no presence of mind of their general could check, opened the gates to the enemy, and it was with
difficulty that the troops, baggage, and artillery, were saved. The reconquest of Bamberg was the fruit of this
victory; but Tilly, with all his activity, was unable to overtake the Swedish general, who retired in good order
behind the Maine. The king's appearance in Franconia, and his junction with Gustavus Horn at Kitzingen, put
a stop to Tilly's conquests, and compelled him to provide for his own safety by a rapid retreat.
The king made a general review of his troops at Aschaffenburg. After his junction with Gustavus Horn,
Banner, and Duke William of Weimar, they amounted to nearly 40,000 men. His progress through Franconia
was uninterrupted; for Tilly, far too weak to encounter an enemy so superior in numbers, had retreated, by
rapid marches, towards the Danube. Bohemia and Bavaria were now equally near to the king, and, uncertain
whither his victorious course might be directed, Maximilian could form no immediate resolution. The choice
of the king, and the fate of both provinces, now depended on the road that should be left open to Count Tilly.
It was dangerous, during the approach of so formidable an enemy, to leave Bavaria undefended, in order to
protect Austria; still more dangerous, by receiving Tilly into Bavaria, to draw thither the enemy also, and to
render it the seat of a destructive war. The cares of the sovereign finally overcame the scruples of the
statesman, and Tilly received orders, at all hazards, to cover the frontiers of Bavaria with his army.
Nuremberg received with triumphant joy the protector of the Protestant religion and German freedom, and
the enthusiasm of the citizens expressed itself on his arrival in loud transports of admiration and joy. Even
Gustavus could not contain his astonishment, to see himself in this city, which was the very centre of
Germany, where he had never expected to be able to penetrate. The noble appearance of his person,
completed the impression produced by his glorious exploits, and the condescension with which he received
the congratulations of this free city won all hearts. He now confirmed the alliance he had concluded with it on
the shores of the Baltic, and excited the citizens to zealous activity and fraternal unity against the common
enemy. After a short stay in Nuremberg, he followed his army to the Danube, and appeared unexpectedly
before the frontier town of Donauwerth. A numerous Bavarian garrison defended the place; and their
commander, Rodolph Maximilian, Duke of Saxe Lauenburg, showed at first a resolute determination to
defend it till the arrival of Tilly. But the vigour with which Gustavus Adolphus prosecuted the siege, soon
compelled him to take measures for a speedy and secure retreat, which amidst a tremendous fire from the
Swedish artillery he successfully executed.
The conquest of Donauwerth opened to the king the further side of the Danube, and now the small river Lech
alone separated him from Bavaria. The immediate danger of his dominions aroused all Maximilian's activity;
and however little he had hitherto disturbed the enemy's progress to his frontier, he now determined to
dispute as resolutely the remainder of their course. On the opposite bank of the Lech, near the small town of
Rain, Tilly occupied a strongly fortified camp, which, surrounded by three rivers, bade defiance to all attack.
All the bridges over the Lech were destroyed; the whole course of the stream protected by strong garrisons as
far as Augsburg; and that town itself, which had long betrayed its impatience to follow the example of
Nuremberg and Frankfort, secured by a Bavarian garrison, and the disarming of its inhabitants. The Elector
himself, with all the troops he could collect, threw himself into Tilly's camp, as if all his hopes centred on this
single point, and here the good fortune of the Swedes was to suffer shipwreck for ever.
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Gustavus Adolphus, after subduing the whole territory of Augsburg, on his own side of the river, and opening
to his troops a rich supply of necessaries from that quarter, soon appeared on the bank opposite the Bavarian
entrenchments. It was now the month of March, when the river, swollen by frequent rains, and the melting of
the snow from the mountains of the Tyrol, flowed full and rapid between its steep banks. Its boiling current
threatened the rash assailants with certain destruction, while from the opposite side the enemy's cannon
showed their murderous mouths. If, in despite of the fury both of fire and water, they should accomplish this
almost impossible passage, a fresh and vigorous enemy awaited the exhausted troops in an impregnable
camp; and when they needed repose and refreshment they must prepare for battle. With exhausted powers
they must ascend the hostile entrenchments, whose strength seemed to bid defiance to every assault. A defeat
sustained upon this shore would be attended with inevitable destruction, since the same stream which
impeded their advance would also cut off their retreat, if fortune should abandon them.
The Swedish council of war, which the king now assembled, strongly urged upon him all these
considerations, in order to deter him from this dangerous undertaking. The most intrepid were appalled, and a
troop of honourable warriors, who had grown gray in the field, did not hesitate to express their alarm. But the
king's resolution was fixed. "What!" said he to Gustavus Horn, who spoke for the rest, "have we crossed the
Baltic, and so many great rivers of Germany, and shall we now be checked by a brook like the Lech?"
Gustavus had already, at great personal risk, reconnoitred the whole country, and discovered that his own side
of the river was higher than the other, and consequently gave a considerable advantage to the fire of the
Swedish artillery over that of the enemy. With great presence of mind he determined to profit by this
circumstance. At the point where the left bank of the Lech forms an angle with the right, he immediately
caused three batteries to be erected, from which 72 fieldpieces maintained a cross fire upon the enemy.
While this tremendous cannonade drove the Bavarians from the opposite bank, he caused to be erected a
bridge over the river with all possible rapidity. A thick smoke, kept up by burning wood and wet straw,
concealed for some time the progress of the work from the enemy, while the continued thunder of the cannon
overpowered the noise of the axes. He kept alive by his own example the courage of his troops, and
discharged more than 60 cannon with his own hand. The cannonade was returned by the Bavarians with equal
vivacity for two hours, though with less effect, as the Swedish batteries swept the lower opposite bank, while
their height served as a breastwork to their own troops. In vain, therefore, did the Bavarians attempt to
destroy these works; the superior fire of the Swedes threw them into disorder, and the bridge was completed
under their very eyes. On this dreadful day, Tilly did every thing in his power to encourage his troops; and no
danger could drive him from the bank. At length he found the death which he sought, a cannon ball shattered
his leg; and Altringer, his brave companioninarms, was, soon after, dangerously wounded in the head.
Deprived of the animating presence of their two generals, the Bavarians gave way at last, and Maximilian, in
spite of his own judgment, was driven to adopt a pusillanimous resolve. Overcome by the persuasions of the
dying Tilly, whose wonted firmness was overpowered by the near approach of death, he gave up his
impregnable position for lost; and the discovery by the Swedes of a ford, by which their cavalry were on the
point of passing, accelerated his inglorious retreat. The same night, before a single soldier of the enemy had
crossed the Lech, he broke up his camp, and, without giving time for the King to harass him in his march,
retreated in good order to Neuburgh and Ingolstadt. With astonishment did Gustavus Adolphus, who
completed the passage of the river on the following day behold the hostile camp abandoned; and the Elector's
flight surprised him still more, when he saw the strength of the position he had quitted. "Had I been the
Bavarian," said he, "though a cannon ball had carried away my beard and chin, never would I have
abandoned a position like this, and laid open my territory to my enemies."
Bavaria now lay exposed to the conqueror; and, for the first time, the tide of war, which had hitherto only
beat against its frontier, now flowed over its long spared and fertile fields. Before, however, the King
proceeded to the conquest of these provinces, he delivered the town of Augsburg from the yoke of Bavaria;
exacted an oath of allegiance from the citizens; and to secure its observance, left a garrison in the town. He
then advanced, by rapid marches, against Ingolstadt, in order, by the capture of this important fortress, which
the Elector covered with the greater part of his army, to secure his conquests in Bavaria, and obtain a firm
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footing on the Danube.
Shortly after the appearance of the Swedish King before Ingolstadt, the wounded Tilly, after experiencing the
caprice of unstable fortune, terminated his career within the walls of that town. Conquered by the superior
generalship of Gustavus Adolphus, he lost, at the close of his days, all the laurels of his earlier victories, and
appeased, by a series of misfortunes, the demands of justice, and the avenging manes of Magdeburg. In his
death, the Imperial army and that of the League sustained an irreparable loss; the Roman Catholic religion
was deprived of its most zealous defender, and Maximilian of Bavaria of the most faithful of his servants,
who sealed his fidelity by his death, and even in his dying moments fulfilled the duties of a general. His last
message to the Elector was an urgent advice to take possession of Ratisbon, in order to maintain the
command of the Danube, and to keep open the communication with Bohemia.
With the confidence which was the natural fruit of so many victories, Gustavus Adolphus commenced the
siege of Ingolstadt, hoping to gain the town by the fury of his first assault. But the strength of its
fortifications, and the bravery of its garrison, presented obstacles greater than any he had had to encounter
since the battle of Breitenfeld, and the walls of Ingolstadt were near putting an end to his career. While
reconnoitring the works, a 24pounder killed his horse under him, and he fell to the ground, while almost
immediately afterwards another ball struck his favourite, the young Margrave of Baden, by his side. With
perfect selfpossession the king rose, and quieted the fears of his troops by immediately mounting another
horse.
The occupation of Ratisbon by the Bavarians, who, by the advice of Tilly, had surprised this town by
stratagem, and placed in it a strong garrison, quickly changed the king's plan of operations. He had flattered
himself with the hope of gaining this town, which favoured the Protestant cause, and to find in it an ally as
devoted to him as Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Frankfort. Its seizure by the Bavarians seemed to postpone for
a long time the fulfilment of his favourite project of making himself master of the Danube, and cutting off his
adversaries' supplies from Bohemia. He suddenly raised the siege of Ingolstadt, before which he had wasted
both his time and his troops, and penetrated into the interior of Bavaria, in order to draw the Elector into that
quarter for the defence of his territories, and thus to strip the Danube of its defenders.
The whole country, as far as Munich, now lay open to the conqueror. Mosburg, Landshut, and the whole
territory of Freysingen, submitted; nothing could resist his arms. But if he met with no regular force to
oppose his progress, he had to contend against a still more implacable enemy in the heart of every Bavarian
religious fanaticism. Soldiers who did not believe in the Pope were, in this country, a new and unheardof
phenomenon; the blind zeal of the priests represented them to the peasantry as monsters, the children of hell,
and their leader as Antichrist. No wonder, then, if they thought themselves released from all the ties of nature
and humanity towards this brood of Satan, and justified in committing the most savage atrocities upon them.
Woe to the Swedish soldier who fell into their hands! All the torments which inventive malice could devise
were exercised upon these unhappy victims; and the sight of their mangled bodies exasperated the army to a
fearful retaliation. Gustavus Adolphus, alone, sullied the lustre of his heroic character by no act of revenge;
and the aversion which the Bavarians felt towards his religion, far from making him depart from the
obligations of humanity towards that unfortunate people, seemed to impose upon him the stricter duty to
honour his religion by a more constant clemency.
The approach of the king spread terror and consternation in the capital, which, stripped of its defenders, and
abandoned by its principal inhabitants, placed all its hopes in the magnanimity of the conqueror. By an
unconditional and voluntary surrender, it hoped to disarm his vengeance; and sent deputies even to
Freysingen to lay at his feet the keys of the city. Strongly as the king might have been tempted by the
inhumanity of the Bavarians, and the hostility of their sovereign, to make a dreadful use of the rights of
victory; pressed as he was by Germans to avenge the fate of Magdeburg on the capital of its destroyer, this
great prince scorned this mean revenge; and the very helplessness of his enemies disarmed his severity.
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Contented with the more noble triumph of conducting the Palatine Frederick with the pomp of a victor into
the very palace of the prince who had been the chief instrument of his ruin, and the usurper of his territories,
he heightened the brilliancy of his triumphal entry by the brighter splendour of moderation and clemency.
The King found in Munich only a forsaken palace, for the Elector's treasures had been transported to Werfen.
The magnificence of the building astonished him; and he asked the guide who showed the apartments who
was the architect. "No other," replied he, "than the Elector himself." "I wish," said the King, "I had this
architect to send to Stockholm." "That," he was answered, "the architect will take care to prevent." When the
arsenal was examined, they found nothing but carriages, stripped of their cannon. The latter had been so
artfully concealed under the floor, that no traces of them remained; and but for the treachery of a workman,
the deceit would not have been detected. "Rise up from the dead," said the King, "and come to judgment."
The floor was pulled up, and 140 pieces of cannon discovered, some of extraordinary calibre, which had been
principally taken in the Palatinate and Bohemia. A treasure of 30,000 gold ducats, concealed in one of the
largest, completed the pleasure which the King received from this valuable acquisition.
A far more welcome spectacle still would have been the Bavarian army itself; for his march into the heart of
Bavaria had been undertaken chiefly with the view of luring them from their entrenchments. In this
expectation he was disappointed. No enemy appeared; no entreaties, however urgent, on the part of his
subjects, could induce the Elector to risk the remainder of his army to the chances of a battle. Shut up in
Ratisbon, he awaited the reinforcements which Wallenstein was bringing from Bohemia; and endeavoured, in
the mean time, to amuse his enemy and keep him inactive, by reviving the negociation for a neutrality. But
the King's distrust, too often and too justly excited by his previous conduct, frustrated this design; and the
intentional delay of Wallenstein abandoned Bavaria to the Swedes.
Thus far had Gustavus advanced from victory to victory, without meeting with an enemy able to cope with
him. A part of Bavaria and Swabia, the Bishoprics of Franconia, the Lower Palatinate, and the Archbishopric
of Mentz, lay conquered in his rear. An uninterrupted career of conquest had conducted him to the threshold
of Austria; and the most brilliant success had fully justified the plan of operations which he had formed after
the battle of Breitenfeld. If he had not succeeded to his wish in promoting a confederacy among the Protestant
States, he had at least disarmed or weakened the League, carried on the war chiefly at its expense, lessened
the Emperor's resources, emboldened the weaker States, and while he laid under contribution the allies of the
Emperor, forced a way through their territories into Austria itself. Where arms were unavailing, the greatest
service was rendered by the friendship of the free cities, whose affections he had gained, by the double ties of
policy and religion; and, as long as he should maintain his superiority in the field, he might reckon on every
thing from their zeal. By his conquests on the Rhine, the Spaniards were cut off from the Lower Palatinate,
even if the state of the war in the Netherlands left them at liberty to interfere in the affairs of Germany. The
Duke of Lorraine, too, after his unfortunate campaign, had been glad to adopt a neutrality. Even the numerous
garrisons he had left behind him, in his progress through Germany, had not diminished his army; and, fresh
and vigorous as when he first began his march, he now stood in the centre of Bavaria, determined and
prepared to carry the war into the heart of Austria.
While Gustavus Adolphus thus maintained his superiority within the empire, fortune, in another quarter, had
been no less favourable to his ally, the Elector of Saxony. By the arrangement concerted between these
princes at Halle, after the battle of Leipzig, the conquest of Bohemia was intrusted to the Elector of Saxony,
while the King reserved for himself the attack upon the territories of the League. The first fruits which the
Elector reaped from the battle of Breitenfeld, was the reconquest of Leipzig, which was shortly followed by
the expulsion of the Austrian garrisons from the entire circle. Reinforced by the troops who deserted to him
from the hostile garrisons, the Saxon General, Arnheim, marched towards Lusatia, which had been overrun
by an Imperial General, Rudolph von Tiefenbach, in order to chastise the Elector for embracing the cause of
the enemy. He had already commenced in this weakly defended province the usual course of devastation,
taken several towns, and terrified Dresden itself by his approach, when his destructive progress was suddenly
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stopped, by an express mandate from the Emperor to spare the possessions of the King of Saxony.
Ferdinand had perceived too late the errors of that policy, which reduced the Elector of Saxony to extremities,
and forcibly driven this powerful monarch into an alliance with Sweden. By moderation, equally illtimed,
he now wished to repair if possible the consequences of his haughtiness; and thus committed a second error
in endeavouring to repair the first. To deprive his enemy of so powerful an ally, he had opened, through the
intervention of Spain, a negociation with the Elector; and in order to facilitate an accommodation, Tiefenbach
was ordered immediately to retire from Saxony. But these concessions of the Emperor, far from producing
the desired effect, only revealed to the Elector the embarrassment of his adversary and his own importance,
and emboldened him the more to prosecute the advantages he had already obtained. How could he, moreover,
without becoming chargeable with the most shameful ingratitude, abandon an ally to whom he had given the
most solemn assurances of fidelity, and to whom he was indebted for the preservation of his dominions, and
even of his Electoral dignity?
The Saxon army, now relieved from the necessity of marching into Lusatia, advanced towards Bohemia,
where a combination of favourable circumstances seemed to ensure them an easy victory. In this kingdom,
the first scene of this fatal war, the flames of dissension still smouldered beneath the ashes, while the
discontent of the inhabitants was fomented by daily acts of oppression and tyranny. On every side, this
unfortunate country showed signs of a mournful change. Whole districts had changed their proprietors, and
groaned under the hated yoke of Roman Catholic masters, whom the favour of the Emperor and the Jesuits
had enriched with the plunder and possessions of the exiled Protestants. Others, taking advantage themselves
of the general distress, had purchased, at a low rate, the confiscated estates. The blood of the most eminent
champions of liberty had been shed upon the scaffold; and such as by a timely flight avoided that fate, were
wandering in misery far from their native land, while the obsequious slaves of despotism enjoyed their
patrimony. Still more insupportable than the oppression of these petty tyrants, was the restraint of conscience
which was imposed without distinction on all the Protestants of that kingdom. No external danger, no
opposition on the part of the nation, however steadfast, not even the fearful lessons of past experience could
check in the Jesuits the rage of proselytism; where fair means were ineffectual, recourse was had to military
force to bring the deluded wanderers within the pale of the church. The inhabitants of Joachimsthal, on the
frontiers between Bohemia and Meissen, were the chief sufferers from this violence. Two imperial
commissaries, accompanied by as many Jesuits, and supported by fifteen musketeers, made their appearance
in this peaceful valley to preach the gospel to the heretics. Where the rhetoric of the former was ineffectual,
the forcibly quartering the latter upon the houses, and threats of banishment and fines were tried. But on this
occasion, the good cause prevailed, and the bold resistance of this small district compelled the Emperor
disgracefully to recall his mandate of conversion. The example of the court had, however, afforded a
precedent to the Roman Catholics of the empire, and seemed to justify every act of oppression which their
insolence tempted them to wreak upon the Protestants. It is not surprising, then, if this persecuted party was
favourable to a revolution, and saw with pleasure their deliverers on the frontiers.
The Saxon army was already on its march towards Prague, the imperial garrisons everywhere retired before
them. Schloeckenau, Tetschen, Aussig, Leutmeritz, soon fell into the enemy's hands, and every Roman
Catholic place was abandoned to plunder. Consternation seized all the Papists of the Empire; and conscious
of the outrages which they themselves had committed on the Protestants, they did not venture to abide the
vengeful arrival of a Protestant army. All the Roman Catholics, who had anything to lose, fled hastily from
the country to the capital, which again they presently abandoned. Prague was unprepared for an attack, and
was too weakly garrisoned to sustain a long siege. Too late had the Emperor resolved to despatch
FieldMarshal Tiefenbach to the defence of this capital. Before the imperial orders could reach the
headquarters of that general, in Silesia, the Saxons were already close to Prague, the Protestant inhabitants
of which showed little zeal, while the weakness of the garrison left no room to hope a long resistance. In this
fearful state of embarrassment, the Roman Catholics of Prague looked for security to Wallenstein, who now
lived in that city as a private individual. But far from lending his military experience, and the weight of his
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name, towards its defence, he seized the favourable opportunity to satiate his thirst for revenge. If he did not
actually invite the Saxons to Prague, at least his conduct facilitated its capture. Though unprepared, the town
might still hold out until succours could arrive; and an imperial colonel, Count Maradas, showed serious
intentions of undertaking its defence. But without command and authority, and having no support but his own
zeal and courage, he did not dare to venture upon such a step without the advice of a superior. He therefore
consulted the Duke of Friedland, whose approbation might supply the want of authority from the Emperor,
and to whom the Bohemian generals were referred by an express edict of the court in the last extremity. He,
however, artfully excused himself, on the plea of holding no official appointment, and his long retirement
from the political world; while he weakened the resolution of the subalterns by the scruples which he
suggested, and painted in the strongest colours. At last, to render the consternation general and complete, he
quitted the capital with his whole court, however little he had to fear from its capture; and the city was lost,
because, by his departure, he showed that he despaired of its safety. His example was followed by all the
Roman Catholic nobility, the generals with their troops, the clergy, and all the officers of the crown. All night
the people were employed in saving their persons and effects. The roads to Vienna were crowded with
fugitives, who scarcely recovered from their consternation till they reached the imperial city. Maradas
himself, despairing of the safety of Prague, followed the rest, and led his small detachment to Tabor, where
he awaited the event.
Profound silence reigned in Prague, when the Saxons next morning appeared before it; no preparations were
made for defence; not a single shot from the walls announced an intention of resistance. On the contrary, a
crowd of spectators from the town, allured by curiosity, came flocking round, to behold the foreign army; and
the peaceful confidence with which they advanced, resembled a friendly salutation, more than a hostile
reception. From the concurrent reports of these people, the Saxons learned that the town had been deserted by
the troops, and that the government had fled to Budweiss. This unexpected and inexplicable absence of
resistance excited Arnheim's distrust the more, as the speedy approach of the Silesian succours was no secret
to him, and as he knew that the Saxon army was too indifferently provided with materials for undertaking a
siege, and by far too weak in numbers to attempt to take the place by storm. Apprehensive of stratagem, he
redoubled his vigilance; and he continued in this conviction until Wallenstein's housesteward, whom he
discovered among the crowd, confirmed to him this intelligence. "The town is ours without a blow!"
exclaimed he in astonishment to his officers, and immediately summoned it by a trumpeter.
The citizens of Prague, thus shamefully abandoned by their defenders, had long taken their resolution; all that
they had to do was to secure their properties and liberties by an advantageous capitulation. No sooner was the
treaty signed by the Saxon general, in his master's name, than the gates were opened, without farther
opposition; and upon the 11th of November, 1631, the army made their triumphal entry. The Elector soon
after followed in person, to receive the homage of those whom he had newly taken under his protection; for it
was only in the character of protector that the three towns of Prague had surrendered to him. Their allegiance
to the Austrian monarchy was not to be dissolved by the step they had taken. In proportion as the Papists'
apprehensions of reprisals on the part of the Protestants had been exaggerated, so was their surprise great at
the moderation of the Elector, and the discipline of his troops. FieldMarshal Arnheim plainly evinced, on
this occasion, his respect for Wallenstein. Not content with sparing his estates on his march, he now placed
guards over his palace, in Prague, to prevent the plunder of any of his effects. The Roman Catholics of the
town were allowed the fullest liberty of conscience; and of all the churches they had wrested from the
Protestants, four only were now taken back from them. From this general indulgence, none were excluded but
the Jesuits, who were generally considered as the authors of all past grievances, and thus banished the
kingdom.
John George belied not the submission and dependence with which the terror of the imperial name inspired
him; nor did he indulge at Prague, in a course of conduct which would assuredly have been pursued against
himself in Dresden, by imperial generals, such as Tilly or Wallenstein. He carefully distinguished between
the enemy with whom he was at war, and the head of the Empire, to whom he owed obedience. He did not
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venture to touch the household furniture of the latter, while, without scruple, he appropriated and transported
to Dresden the cannon of the former. He did not take up his residence in the imperial palace, but the house of
Lichtenstein; too modest to use the apartments of one whom he had deprived of a kingdom. Had this trait
been related of a great man and a hero, it would irresistibly excite our admiration; but the character of this
prince leaves us in doubt whether this moderation ought to be ascribed to a noble selfcommand, or to the
littleness of a weak mind, which even good fortune could not embolden, and liberty itself could not strip of
its habituated fetters.
The surrender of Prague, which was quickly followed by that of most of the other towns, effected a great and
sudden change in Bohemia. Many of the Protestant nobility, who had hitherto been wandering about in
misery, now returned to their native country; and Count Thurn, the famous author of the Bohemian
insurrection, enjoyed the triumph of returning as a conqueror to the scene of his crime and his condemnation.
Over the very bridge where the heads of his adherents, exposed to view, held out a fearful picture of the fate
which had threatened himself, he now made his triumphal entry; and to remove these ghastly objects was his
first care. The exiles again took possession of their properties, without thinking of recompensing for the
purchase money the present possessors, who had mostly taken to flight. Even though they had received a
price for their estates, they seized on every thing which had once been their own; and many had reason to
rejoice at the economy of the late possessors. The lands and cattle had greatly improved in their hands; the
apartments were now decorated with the most costly furniture; the cellars, which had been left empty, were
richly filled; the stables supplied; the magazines stored with provisions. But distrusting the constancy of that
good fortune, which had so unexpectedly smiled upon them, they hastened to get quit of these insecure
possessions, and to convert their immoveable into transferable property.
The presence of the Saxons inspired all the Protestants of the kingdom with courage; and, both in the country
and the capital, crowds flocked to the newly opened Protestant churches. Many, whom fear alone had
retained in their adherence to Popery, now openly professed the new doctrine; and many of the late converts
to Roman Catholicism gladly renounced a compulsory persuasion, to follow the earlier conviction of their
conscience. All the moderation of the new regency, could not restrain the manifestation of that just
displeasure, which this persecuted people felt against their oppressors. They made a fearful and cruel use of
their newly recovered rights; and, in many parts of the kingdom, their hatred of the religion which they had
been compelled to profess, could be satiated only by the blood of its adherents.
Meantime the succours which the imperial generals, Goetz and Tiefenbach, were conducting from Silesia,
had entered Bohemia, where they were joined by some of Tilly's regiments, from the Upper Palatinate. In
order to disperse them before they should receive any further reinforcement, Arnheim advanced with part of
his army from Prague, and made a vigorous attack on their entrenchments near Limburg, on the Elbe. After a
severe action, not without great loss, he drove the enemy from their fortified camp, and forced them, by his
heavy fire, to recross the Elbe, and to destroy the bridge which they had built over that river. Nevertheless,
the Imperialists obtained the advantage in several skirmishes, and the Croats pushed their incursions to the
very gates of Prague. Brilliant and promising as the opening of the Bohemian campaign had been, the issue
by no means satisfied the expectations of Gustavus Adolphus. Instead of vigorously following up their
advantages, by forcing a passage to the Swedish army through the conquered country, and then, with it,
attacking the imperial power in its centre, the Saxons weakened themselves in a war of skirmishes, in which
they were not always successful, while they lost the time which should have been devoted to greater
undertakings. But the Elector's subsequent conduct betrayed the motives which had prevented him from
pushing his advantage over the Emperor, and by consistent measures promoting the plans of the King of
Sweden.
The Emperor had now lost the greater part of Bohemia, and the Saxons were advancing against Austria, while
the Swedish monarch was rapidly moving to the same point through Franconia, Swabia, and Bavaria. A long
war had exhausted the strength of the Austrian monarchy, wasted the country, and diminished its armies. The
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renown of its victories was no more, as well as the confidence inspired by constant success; its troops had lost
the obedience and discipline to which those of the Swedish monarch owed all their superiority in the field.
The confederates of the Emperor were disarmed, or their fidelity shaken by the danger which threatened
themselves. Even Maximilian of Bavaria, Austria's most powerful ally, seemed disposed to yield to the
seductive proposition of neutrality; while his suspicious alliance with France had long been a subject of
apprehension to the Emperor. The bishops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, the Elector of Mentz, and the Duke of
Lorraine, were either expelled from their territories, or threatened with immediate attack; Treves had placed
itself under the protection of France. The bravery of the Hollanders gave full employment to the Spanish
arms in the Netherlands; while Gustavus had driven them from the Rhine. Poland was still fettered by the
truce which subsisted between that country and Sweden. The Hungarian frontier was threatened by the
Transylvanian Prince, Ragotsky, a successor of Bethlen Gabor, and the inheritor of his restless mind; while
the Porte was making great preparation to profit by the favourable conjuncture for aggression. Most of the
Protestant states, encouraged by their protector's success, were openly and actively declaring against the
Emperor. All the resources which had been obtained by the violent and oppressive extortions of Tilly and
Wallenstein were exhausted; all these depots, magazines, and rallyingpoints, were now lost to the Emperor;
and the war could no longer be carried on as before at the cost of others. To complete his embarrassment, a
dangerous insurrection broke out in the territory of the Ens, where the illtimed religious zeal of the
government had provoked the Protestants to resistance; and thus fanaticism lit its torch within the empire,
while a foreign enemy was already on its frontier. After so long a continuance of good fortune, such brilliant
victories and extensive conquests, such fruitless effusion of blood, the Emperor saw himself a second time on
the brink of that abyss, into which he was so near falling at the commencement of his reign. If Bavaria should
embrace the neutrality; if Saxony should resist the tempting offers he had held out; and France resolve to
attack the Spanish power at the same time in the Netherlands, in Italy and in Catalonia, the ruin of Austria
would be complete; the allied powers would divide its spoils, and the political system of Germany would
undergo a total change.
The chain of these disasters began with the battle of Breitenfeld, the unfortunate issue of which plainly
revealed the long decided decline of the Austrian power, whose weakness had hitherto been concealed under
the dazzling glitter of a grand name. The chief cause of the Swedes' superiority in the field, was evidently to
be ascribed to the unlimited power of their leader, who concentrated in himself the whole strength of his
party; and, unfettered in his enterprises by any higher authority, was complete master of every favourable
opportunity, could control all his means to the accomplishment of his ends, and was responsible to none but
himself. But since Wallenstein's dismissal, and Tilly's defeat, the very reverse of this course was pursued by
the Emperor and the League. The generals wanted authority over their troops, and liberty of acting at their
discretion; the soldiers were deficient in discipline and obedience; the scattered corps in combined operation;
the states in attachment to the cause; the leaders in harmony among themselves, in quickness to resolve, and
firmness to execute. What gave the Emperor's enemy so decided an advantage over him, was not so much
their superior power, as their manner of using it. The League and the Emperor did not want means, but a
mind capable of directing them with energy and effect. Even had Count Tilly not lost his old renown, distrust
of Bavaria would not allow the Emperor to place the fate of Austria in the hands of one who had never
concealed his attachment to the Bavarian Elector. The urgent want which Ferdinand felt, was for a general
possessed of sufficient experience to form and to command an army, and willing at the same time to dedicate
his services, with blind devotion, to the Austrian monarchy.
This choice now occupied the attention of the Emperor's privy council, and divided the opinions of its
members. In order to oppose one monarch to another, and by the presence of their sovereign to animate the
courage of the troops, Ferdinand, in the ardour of the moment, had offered himself to be the leader of his
army; but little trouble was required to overturn a resolution which was the offspring of despair alone, and
which yielded at once to calm reflection. But the situation which his dignity, and the duties of administration,
prevented the Emperor from holding, might be filled by his son, a youth of talents and bravery, and of whom
the subjects of Austria had already formed great expectations. Called by his birth to the defence of a
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monarchy, of whose crowns he wore two already, Ferdinand III., King of Hungary and Bohemia, united, with
the natural dignity of heir to the throne, the respect of the army, and the attachment of the people, whose
cooperation was indispensable to him in the conduct of the war. None but the beloved heir to the crown
could venture to impose new burdens on a people already severely oppressed; his personal presence with the
army could alone suppress the pernicious jealousies of the several leaders, and by the influence of his name,
restore the neglected discipline of the troops to its former rigour. If so young a leader was devoid of the
maturity of judgment, prudence, and military experience which practice alone could impart, this deficiency
might be supplied by a judicious choice of counsellors and assistants, who, under the cover of his name,
might be vested with supreme authority.
But plausible as were the arguments with which a part of the ministry supported this plan, it was met by
difficulties not less serious, arising from the distrust, perhaps even the jealousy, of the Emperor, and also
from the desperate state of affairs. How dangerous was it to entrust the fate of the monarchy to a youth, who
was himself in need of counsel and support! How hazardous to oppose to the greatest general of his age, a
tyro, whose fitness for so important a post had never yet been tested by experience; whose name, as yet
unknown to fame, was far too powerless to inspire a dispirited army with the assurance of future victory!
What a new burden on the country, to support the state a royal leader was required to maintain, and which the
prejudices of the age considered as inseparable from his presence with the army! How serious a consideration
for the prince himself, to commence his political career, with an office which must make him the scourge of
his people, and the oppressor of the territories which he was hereafter to rule.
But not only was a general to be found for the army; an army must also be found for the general. Since the
compulsory resignation of Wallenstein, the Emperor had defended himself more by the assistance of Bavaria
and the League, than by his own armies; and it was this dependence on equivocal allies, which he was
endeavouring to escape, by the appointment of a general of his own. But what possibility was there of raising
an army out of nothing, without the allpowerful aid of gold, and the inspiriting name of a victorious
commander; above all, an army which, by its discipline, warlike spirit, and activity, should be fit to cope with
the experienced troops of the northern conqueror? In all Europe, there was but one man equal to this, and that
one had been mortally affronted.
The moment had at last arrived, when more than ordinary satisfaction was to be done to the wounded pride of
the Duke of Friedland. Fate itself had been his avenger, and an unbroken chain of disasters, which had
assailed Austria from the day of his dismissal, had wrung from the Emperor the humiliating confession, that
with this general he had lost his right arm. Every defeat of his troops opened afresh this wound; every town
which he lost, revived in the mind of the deceived monarch the memory of his own weakness and ingratitude.
It would have been well for him, if, in the offended general, he had only lost a leader of his troops, and a
defender of his dominions; but he was destined to find in him an enemy, and the most dangerous of all, since
he was least armed against the stroke of treason.
Removed from the theatre of war, and condemned to irksome inaction, while his rivals gathered laurels on the
field of glory, the haughty duke had beheld these changes of fortune with affected composure, and concealed,
under a glittering and theatrical pomp, the dark designs of his restless genius. Torn by burning passions
within, while all without bespoke calmness and indifference, he brooded over projects of ambition and
revenge, and slowly, but surely, advanced towards his end. All that he owed to the Emperor was effaced from
his mind; what he himself had done for the Emperor was imprinted in burning characters on his memory. To
his insatiable thirst for power, the Emperor's ingratitude was welcome, as it seemed to tear in pieces the
record of past favours, to absolve him from every obligation towards his former benefactor. In the disguise of
a righteous retaliation, the projects dictated by his ambition now appeared to him just and pure. In proportion
as the external circle of his operations was narrowed, the world of hope expanded before him, and his dreamy
imagination revelled in boundless projects, which, in any mind but such as his, madness alone could have
given birth to. His services had raised him to the proudest height which it was possible for a man, by his own
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efforts, to attain. Fortune had denied him nothing which the subject and the citizen could lawfully enjoy. Till
the moment of his dismissal, his demands had met with no refusal, his ambition had met with no check; but
the blow which, at the diet of Ratisbon, humbled him, showed him the difference between ORIGINAL and
DEPUTED power, the distance between the subject and his sovereign. Roused from the intoxication of his
own greatness by this sudden reverse of fortune, he compared the authority which he had possessed, with that
which had deprived him of it; and his ambition marked the steps which it had yet to surmount upon the ladder
of fortune. From the moment he had so bitterly experienced the weight of sovereign power, his efforts were
directed to attain it for himself; the wrong which he himself had suffered made him a robber. Had he not been
outraged by injustice, he might have obediently moved in his orbit round the majesty of the throne, satisfied
with the glory of being the brightest of its satellites. It was only when violently forced from its sphere, that
his wandering star threw in disorder the system to which it belonged, and came in destructive collision with
its sun.
Gustavus Adolphus had overrun the north of Germany; one place after another was lost; and at Leipzig, the
flower of the Austrian army had fallen. The intelligence of this defeat soon reached the ears of Wallenstein,
who, in the retired obscurity of a private station in Prague, contemplated from a calm distance the tumult of
war. The news, which filled the breasts of the Roman Catholics with dismay, announced to him the return of
greatness and good fortune. For him was Gustavus Adolphus labouring. Scarce had the king begun to gain
reputation by his exploits, when Wallenstein lost not a moment to court his friendship, and to make common
cause with this successful enemy of Austria. The banished Count Thurn, who had long entered the service of
Sweden, undertook to convey Wallenstein's congratulations to the king, and to invite him to a close alliance
with the duke. Wallenstein required 15,000 men from the king; and with these, and the troops he himself
engaged to raise, he undertook to conquer Bohemia and Moravia, to surprise Vienna, and drive his master,
the Emperor, before him into Italy. Welcome as was this unexpected proposition, its extravagant promises
were naturally calculated to excite suspicion. Gustavus Adolphus was too good a judge of merit to reject with
coldness the offers of one who might be so important a friend. But when Wallenstein, encouraged by the
favourable reception of his first message, renewed it after the battle of Breitenfeld, and pressed for a decisive
answer, the prudent monarch hesitated to trust his reputation to the chimerical projects of so daring an
adventurer, and to commit so large a force to the honesty of a man who felt no shame in openly avowing
himself a traitor. He excused himself, therefore, on the plea of the weakness of his army which, if diminished
by so large a detachment, would certainly suffer in its march through the empire; and thus, perhaps, by excess
of caution, lost an opportunity of putting an immediate end to the war. He afterwards endeavoured to renew
the negociation; but the favourable moment was past, and Wallenstein's offended pride never forgave the first
neglect.
But the king's hesitation, perhaps, only accelerated the breach, which their characters made inevitable sooner
or later. Both framed by nature to give laws, not to receive them, they could not long have cooperated in an
enterprise, which eminently demanded mutual submission and sacrifices. Wallenstein was NOTHING where
he was not EVERYTHING; he must either act with unlimited power, or not at all. So cordially, too, did
Gustavus dislike control, that he had almost renounced his advantageous alliance with France, because it
threatened to fetter his own independent judgment. Wallenstein was lost to a party, if he could not lead; the
latter was, if possible, still less disposed to obey the instructions of another. If the pretensions of a rival would
be so irksome to the Duke of Friedland, in the conduct of combined operations, in the division of the spoil
they would be insupportable. The proud monarch might condescend to accept the assistance of a rebellious
subject against the Emperor, and to reward his valuable services with regal munificence; but he never could
so far lose sight of his own dignity, and the majesty of royalty, as to bestow the recompense which the
extravagant ambition of Wallenstein demanded; and requite an act of treason, however useful, with a crown.
In him, therefore, even if all Europe should tacitly acquiesce, Wallenstein had reason to expect the most
decided and formidable opponent to his views on the Bohemian crown; and in all Europe he was the only one
who could enforce his opposition. Constituted Dictator in Germany by Wallenstein himself, he might turn his
arms against him, and consider himself bound by no obligations to one who was himself a traitor. There was
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no room for a Wallenstein under such an ally; and it was, apparently, this conviction, and not any supposed
designs upon the imperial throne, that he alluded to, when, after the death of the King of Sweden, he
exclaimed, "It is well for him and me that he is gone. The German Empire does not require two such leaders."
His first scheme of revenge on the house of Austria had indeed failed; but the purpose itself remained
unalterable; the choice of means alone was changed. What he had failed in effecting with the King of
Sweden, he hoped to obtain with less difficulty and more advantage from the Elector of Saxony. Him he was
as certain of being able to bend to his views, as he had always been doubtful of Gustavus Adolphus. Having
always maintained a good understanding with his old friend Arnheim, he now made use of him to bring about
an alliance with Saxony, by which he hoped to render himself equally formidable to the Emperor and the
King of Sweden. He had reason to expect that a scheme, which, if successful, would deprive the Swedish
monarch of his influence in Germany, would be welcomed by the Elector of Saxony, who he knew was
jealous of the power and offended at the lofty pretensions of Gustavus Adolphus. If he succeeded in
separating Saxony from the Swedish alliance, and in establishing, conjointly with that power, a third party in
the Empire, the fate of the war would be placed in his hand; and by this single step he would succeed in
gratifying his revenge against the Emperor, revenging the neglect of the Swedish monarch, and on the ruin of
both, raising the edifice of his own greatness.
But whatever course he might follow in the prosecution of his designs, he could not carry them into effect
without an army entirely devoted to him. Such a force could not be secretly raised without its coming to the
knowledge of the imperial court, where it would naturally excite suspicion, and thus frustrate his design in the
very outset. From the army, too, the rebellious purposes for which it was destined, must be concealed till the
very moment of execution, since it could scarcely be expected that they would at once be prepared to listen to
the voice of a traitor, and serve against their legitimate sovereign. Wallenstein, therefore, must raise it
publicly and in name of the Emperor, and be placed at its head, with unlimited authority, by the Emperor
himself. But how could this be accomplished, otherwise than by his being appointed to the command of the
army, and entrusted with full powers to conduct the war. Yet neither his pride, nor his interest, permitted him
to sue in person for this post, and as a suppliant to accept from the favour of the Emperor a limited power,
when an unlimited authority might be extorted from his fears. In order to make himself the master of the
terms on which he would resume the command of the army, his course was to wait until the post should be
forced upon him. This was the advice he received from Arnheim, and this the end for which he laboured with
profound policy and restless activity.
Convinced that extreme necessity would alone conquer the Emperor's irresolution, and render powerless the
opposition of his bitter enemies, Bavaria and Spain, he henceforth occupied himself in promoting the success
of the enemy, and in increasing the embarrassments of his master. It was apparently by his instigation and
advice, that the Saxons, when on the route to Lusatia and Silesia, had turned their march towards Bohemia,
and overrun that defenceless kingdom, where their rapid conquests was partly the result of his measures. By
the fears which he affected to entertain, he paralyzed every effort at resistance; and his precipitate retreat
caused the delivery of the capital to the enemy. At a conference with the Saxon general, which was held at
Kaunitz under the pretext of negociating for a peace, the seal was put to the conspiracy, and the conquest of
Bohemia was the first fruits of this mutual understanding. While Wallenstein was thus personally
endeavouring to heighten the perplexities of Austria, and while the rapid movements of the Swedes upon the
Rhine effectually promoted his designs, his friends and bribed adherents in Vienna uttered loud complaints of
the public calamities, and represented the dismissal of the general as the sole cause of all these misfortunes.
"Had Wallenstein commanded, matters would never have come to this," exclaimed a thousand voices; while
their opinions found supporters, even in the Emperor's privy council.
Their repeated remonstrances were not needed to convince the embarrassed Emperor of his general's merits,
and of his own error. His dependence on Bavaria and the League had soon become insupportable; but hitherto
this dependence permitted him not to show his distrust, or irritate the Elector by the recall of Wallenstein. But
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now when his necessities grew every day more pressing, and the weakness of Bavaria more apparent, he
could no longer hesitate to listen to the friends of the duke, and to consider their overtures for his restoration
to command. The immense riches Wallenstein possessed, the universal reputation he enjoyed, the rapidity
with which six years before he had assembled an army of 40,000 men, the little expense at which he had
maintained this formidable force, the actions he had performed at its head, and lastly, the zeal and fidelity he
had displayed for his master's honour, still lived in the Emperor's recollection, and made Wallenstein seem to
him the ablest instrument to restore the balance between the belligerent powers, to save Austria, and preserve
the Catholic religion. However sensibly the imperial pride might feel the humiliation, in being forced to make
so unequivocal an admission of past errors and present necessity; however painful it was to descend to
humble entreaties, from the height of imperial command; however doubtful the fidelity of so deeply injured
and implacable a character; however loudly and urgently the Spanish minister and the Elector of Bavaria
protested against this step, the immediate pressure of necessity finally overcame every other consideration,
and the friends of the duke were empowered to consult him on the subject, and to hold out the prospect of his
restoration.
Informed of all that was transacted in the Emperor's cabinet to his advantage, Wallenstein possessed
sufficient selfcommand to conceal his inward triumph and to assume the mask of indifference. The moment
of vengeance was at last come, and his proud heart exulted in the prospect of repaying with interest the
injuries of the Emperor. With artful eloquence, he expatiated upon the happy tranquillity of a private station,
which had blessed him since his retirement from a political stage. Too long, he said, had he tasted the
pleasures of ease and independence, to sacrifice to the vain phantom of glory, the uncertain favour of princes.
All his desire of power and distinction were extinct: tranquillity and repose were now the sole object of his
wishes. The better to conceal his real impatience, he declined the Emperor's invitation to the court, but at the
same time, to facilitate the negociations, came to Znaim in Moravia.
At first, it was proposed to limit the authority to be intrusted to him, by the presence of a superior, in order,
by this expedient, to silence the objections of the Elector of Bavaria. The imperial deputies, Questenberg and
Werdenberg, who, as old friends of the duke, had been employed in this delicate mission, were instructed to
propose that the King of Hungary should remain with the army, and learn the art of war under Wallenstein.
But the very mention of his name threatened to put a period to the whole negociation. "No! never," exclaimed
Wallenstein, "will I submit to a colleague in my office. No not even if it were God himself, with whom I
should have to share my command." But even when this obnoxious point was given up, Prince Eggenberg,
the Emperor's minister and favourite, who had always been the steady friend and zealous champion of
Wallenstein, and was therefore expressly sent to him, exhausted his eloquence in vain to overcome the
pretended reluctance of the duke. "The Emperor," he admitted, "had, in Wallenstein, thrown away the most
costly jewel in his crown: but unwillingly and compulsorily only had he taken this step, which he had since
deeply repented of; while his esteem for the duke had remained unaltered, his favour for him undiminished.
Of these sentiments he now gave the most decisive proof, by reposing unlimited confidence in his fidelity and
capacity to repair the mistakes of his predecessors, and to change the whole aspect of affairs. It would be
great and noble to sacrifice his just indignation to the good of his country; dignified and worthy of him to
refute the evil calumny of his enemies by the double warmth of his zeal. This victory over himself,"
concluded the prince, "would crown his other unparalleled services to the empire, and render him the greatest
man of his age."
These humiliating confessions, and flattering assurances, seemed at last to disarm the anger of the duke; but
not before he had disburdened his heart of his reproaches against the Emperor, pompously dwelt upon his
own services, and humbled to the utmost the monarch who solicited his assistance, did he condescend to
listen to the attractive proposals of the minister. As if he yielded entirely to the force of their arguments, he
condescended with a haughty reluctance to that which was the most ardent wish of his heart; and deigned to
favour the ambassadors with a ray of hope. But far from putting an end to the Emperor's embarrassments, by
giving at once a full and unconditional consent, he only acceded to a part of his demands, that he might exalt
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the value of that which still remained, and was of most importance. He accepted the command, but only for
three months; merely for the purpose of raising, but not of leading, an army. He wished only to show his
power and ability in its organization, and to display before the eyes of the Emperor, the greatness of that
assistance, which he still retained in his hands. Convinced that an army raised by his name alone, would, if
deprived of its creator, soon sink again into nothing, he intended it to serve only as a decoy to draw more
important concessions from his master. And yet Ferdinand congratulated himself, even in having gained so
much as he had.
Wallenstein did not long delay to fulfil those promises which all Germany regarded as chimerical, and which
Gustavus Adolphus had considered as extravagant. But the foundation for the present enterprise had been
long laid, and he now only put in motion the machinery, which many years had been prepared for the
purpose. Scarcely had the news spread of Wallenstein's levies, when, from every quarter of the Austrian
monarchy, crowds of soldiers repaired to try their fortunes under this experienced general. Many, who had
before fought under his standards, had been admiring eyewitnesses of his great actions, and experienced his
magnanimity, came forward from their retirement, to share with him a second time both booty and glory. The
greatness of the pay he promised attracted thousands, and the plentiful supplies the soldier was likely to enjoy
at the cost of the peasant, was to the latter an irresistible inducement to embrace the military life at once,
rather than be the victim of its oppression. All the Austrian provinces were compelled to assist in the
equipment. No class was exempt from taxation no dignity or privilege from capitation. The Spanish court,
as well as the King of Hungary, agreed to contribute a considerable sum. The ministers made large presents,
while Wallenstein himself advanced 200,000 dollars from his own income to hasten the armament. The
poorer officers he supported out of his own revenues; and, by his own example, by brilliant promotions, and
still more brilliant promises, he induced all, who were able, to raise troops at their own expense. Whoever
raised a corps at his own cost was to be its commander. In the appointment of officers, religion made no
difference. Riches, bravery and experience were more regarded than creed. By this uniform treatment of
different religious sects, and still more by his express declaration, that his present levy had nothing to do with
religion, the Protestant subjects of the empire were tranquillized, and reconciled to bear their share of the
public burdens. The duke, at the same time, did not omit to treat, in his own name, with foreign states for men
and money. He prevailed on the Duke of Lorraine, a second time, to espouse the cause of the Emperor.
Poland was urged to supply him with Cossacks, and Italy with warlike necessaries. Before the three months
were expired, the army which was assembled in Moravia, amounted to no less than 40,000 men, chiefly
drawn from the unconquered parts of Bohemia, from Moravia, Silesia, and the German provinces of the
House of Austria. What to every one had appeared impracticable, Wallenstein, to the astonishment of all
Europe, had in a short time effected. The charm of his name, his treasures, and his genius, had assembled
thousands in arms, where before Austria had only looked for hundreds. Furnished, even to superfluity, with
all necessaries, commanded by experienced officers, and inflamed by enthusiasm which assured itself of
victory, this newly created army only awaited the signal of their leader to show themselves, by the bravery of
their deeds, worthy of his choice.
The duke had fulfilled his promise, and the troops were ready to take the field; he then retired, and left to the
Emperor to choose a commander. But it would have been as easy to raise a second army like the first, as to
find any other commander for it than Wallenstein. This promising army, the last hope of the Emperor, was
nothing but an illusion, as soon as the charm was dissolved which had called it into existence; by Wallenstein
it had been raised, and, without him, it sank like a creation of magic into its original nothingness. Its officers
were either bound to him as his debtors, or, as his creditors, closely connected with his interests, and the
preservation of his power. The regiments he had entrusted to his own relations, creatures, and favourites. He,
and he alone, could discharge to the troops the extravagant promises by which they had been lured into his
service. His pledged word was the only security on which their bold expectations rested; a blind reliance on
his omnipotence, the only tie which linked together in one common life and soul the various impulses of their
zeal. There was an end of the good fortune of each individual, if he retired, who alone was the voucher of its
fulfilment.
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However little Wallenstein was serious in his refusal, he successfully employed this means to terrify the
Emperor into consenting to his extravagant conditions. The progress of the enemy every day increased the
pressure of the Emperor's difficulties, while the remedy was also close at hand; a word from him might
terminate the general embarrassment. Prince Eggenberg at length received orders, for the third and last time,
at any cost and sacrifice, to induce his friend, Wallenstein, to accept the command.
He found him at Znaim in Moravia, pompously surrounded by the troops, the possession of which he made
the Emperor so earnestly to long for. As a suppliant did the haughty subject receive the deputy of his
sovereign. "He never could trust," he said, "to a restoration to command, which he owed to the Emperor's
necessities, and not to his sense of justice. He was now courted, because the danger had reached its height,
and safety was hoped for from his arm only; but his successful services would soon cause the servant to be
forgotten, and the return of security would bring back renewed ingratitude. If he deceived the expectations
formed of him, his long earned renown would be forfeited; even if he fulfilled them, his repose and happiness
must be sacrificed. Soon would envy be excited anew, and the dependent monarch would not hesitate, a
second time, to make an offering of convenience to a servant whom he could now dispense with. Better for
him at once, and voluntarily, to resign a post from which sooner or later the intrigues of his enemies would
expel him. Security and content were to be found in the bosom of private life; and nothing but the wish to
oblige the Emperor had induced him, reluctantly enough, to relinquish for a time his blissful repose."
Tired of this long farce, the minister at last assumed a serious tone, and threatened the obstinate duke with the
Emperor's resentment, if he persisted in his refusal. "Low enough had the imperial dignity," he added,
"stooped already; and yet, instead of exciting his magnanimity by its condescension, had only flattered his
pride and increased his obstinacy. If this sacrifice had been made in vain, he would not answer, but that the
suppliant might be converted into the sovereign, and that the monarch might not avenge his injured dignity on
his rebellious subject. However greatly Ferdinand may have erred, the Emperor at least had a claim to
obedience; the man might be mistaken, but the monarch could not confess his error. If the Duke of Friedland
had suffered by an unjust decree, he might yet be recompensed for all his losses; the wound which it had
itself inflicted, the hand of Majesty might heal. If he asked security for his person and his dignities, the
Emperor's equity would refuse him no reasonable demand. Majesty contemned, admitted not of any
atonement; disobedience to its commands cancelled the most brilliant services. The Emperor required his
services, and as emperor he demanded them. Whatever price Wallenstein might set upon them, the Emperor
would readily agree to; but he demanded obedience, or the weight of his indignation should crush the
refractory servant."
Wallenstein, whose extensive possessions within the Austrian monarchy were momentarily exposed to the
power of the Emperor, was keenly sensible that this was no idle threat; yet it was not fear that at last
overcame his affected reluctance. This imperious tone of itself, was to his mind a plain proof of the weakness
and despair which dictated it, while the Emperor's readiness to yield all his demands, convinced him that he
had attained the summit of his wishes. He now made a show of yielding to the persuasions of Eggenberg; and
left him, in order to write down the conditions on which he accepted the command.
Not without apprehension, did the minister receive the writing, in which the proudest of subjects had
prescribed laws to the proudest of sovereigns. But however little confidence he had in the moderation of his
friend, the extravagant contents of his writing surpassed even his worst expectations. Wallenstein required the
uncontrolled command over all the German armies of Austria and Spain, with unlimited powers to reward
and punish. Neither the King of Hungary, nor the Emperor himself, were to appear in the army, still less to
exercise any act of authority over it. No commission in the army, no pension or letter of grace, was to be
granted by the Emperor without Wallenstein's approval. All the conquests and confiscations that should take
place, were to be placed entirely at Wallenstein's disposal, to the exclusion of every other tribunal. For his
ordinary pay, an imperial hereditary estate was to be assigned him, with another of the conquered estates
within the empire for his extraordinary expenses. Every Austrian province was to be opened to him if he
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required it in case of retreat. He farther demanded the assurance of the possession of the Duchy of
Mecklenburg, in the event of a future peace; and a formal and timely intimation, if it should be deemed
necessary a second time to deprive him of the command.
In vain the minister entreated him to moderate his demands, which, if granted, would deprive the Emperor of
all authority over his own troops, and make him absolutely dependent on his general. The value placed on his
services had been too plainly manifested to prevent him dictating the price at which they were to be
purchased. If the pressure of circumstances compelled the Emperor to grant these demands, it was more than
a mere feeling of haughtiness and desire of revenge which induced the duke to make them. His plans of
rebellion were formed, to their success, every one of the conditions for which Wallenstein stipulated in this
treaty with the court, was indispensable. Those plans required that the Emperor should be deprived of all
authority in Germany, and be placed at the mercy of his general; and this object would be attained, the
moment Ferdinand subscribed the required conditions. The use which Wallenstein intended to make of his
army, (widely different indeed from that for which it was entrusted to him,) brooked not of a divided power,
and still less of an authority superior to his own. To be the sole master of the will of his troops, he must also
be the sole master of their destinies; insensibly to supplant his sovereign, and to transfer permanently to his
own person the rights of sovereignty, which were only lent to him for a time by a higher authority, he must
cautiously keep the latter out of the view of the army. Hence his obstinate refusal to allow any prince of the
house of Austria to be present with the army. The liberty of free disposal of all the conquered and confiscated
estates in the empire, would also afford him fearful means of purchasing dependents and instruments of his
plans, and of acting the dictator in Germany more absolutely than ever any Emperor did in time of peace. By
the right to use any of the Austrian provinces as a place of refuge, in case of need, he had full power to hold
the Emperor a prisoner by means of his own forces, and within his own dominions; to exhaust the strength
and resources of these countries, and to undermine the power of Austria in its very foundation.
Whatever might be the issue, he had equally secured his own advantage, by the conditions he had extorted
from the Emperor. If circumstances proved favourable to his daring project, this treaty with the Emperor
facilitated its execution; if on the contrary, the course of things ran counter to it, it would at least afford him a
brilliant compensation for the failure of his plans. But how could he consider an agreement valid, which was
extorted from his sovereign, and based upon treason? How could he hope to bind the Emperor by a written
agreement, in the face of a law which condemned to death every one who should have the presumption to
impose conditions upon him? But this criminal was the most indispensable man in the empire, and Ferdinand,
well practised in dissimulation, granted him for the present all he required.
At last, then, the imperial army had found a commanderinchief worthy of the name. Every other authority
in the army, even that of the Emperor himself, ceased from the moment Wallenstein assumed the
commander's baton, and every act was invalid which did not proceed from him. From the banks of the
Danube, to those of the Weser and the Oder, was felt the lifegiving dawning of this new star; a new spirit
seemed to inspire the troops of the emperor, a new epoch of the war began. The Papists form fresh hopes, the
Protestant beholds with anxiety the changed course of affairs.
The greater the price at which the services of the new general had been purchased, the greater justly were the
expectations from those which the court of the Emperor entertained. But the duke was in no hurry to fulfil
these expectations. Already in the vicinity of Bohemia, and at the head of a formidable force, he had but to
show himself there, in order to overpower the exhausted force of the Saxons, and brilliantly to commence his
new career by the reconquest of that kingdom. But, contented with harassing the enemy with indecisive
skirmishes of his Croats, he abandoned the best part of that kingdom to be plundered, and moved calmly
forward in pursuit of his own selfish plans. His design was, not to conquer the Saxons, but to unite with them.
Exclusively occupied with this important object, he remained inactive in the hope of conquering more surely
by means of negociation. He left no expedient untried, to detach this prince from the Swedish alliance; and
Ferdinand himself, ever inclined to an accommodation with this prince, approved of this proceeding. But the
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great debt which Saxony owed to Sweden, was as yet too freshly remembered to allow of such an act of
perfidy; and even had the Elector been disposed to yield to the temptation, the equivocal character of
Wallenstein, and the bad character of Austrian policy, precluded any reliance in the integrity of its promises.
Notorious already as a treacherous statesman, he met not with faith upon the very occasion when perhaps he
intended to act honestly; and, moreover, was denied, by circumstances, the opportunity of proving the
sincerity of his intentions, by the disclosure of his real motives.
He, therefore, unwillingly resolved to extort, by force of arms, what he could not obtain by negociation.
Suddenly assembling his troops, he appeared before Prague ere the Saxons had time to advance to its relief.
After a short resistance, the treachery of some Capuchins opens the gates to one of his regiments; and the
garrison, who had taken refuge in the citadel, soon laid down their arms upon disgraceful conditions. Master
of the capital, he hoped to carry on more successfully his negociations at the Saxon court; but even while he
was renewing his proposals to Arnheim, he did not hesitate to give them weight by striking a decisive blow.
He hastened to seize the narrow passes between Aussig and Pirna, with a view of cutting off the retreat of the
Saxons into their own country; but the rapidity of Arnheim's operations fortunately extricated them from the
danger. After the retreat of this general, Egra and Leutmeritz, the last strongholds of the Saxons, surrendered
to the conqueror: and the whole kingdom was restored to its legitimate sovereign, in less time than it had
been lost.
Wallenstein, less occupied with the interests of his master, than with the furtherance of his own plans, now
purposed to carry the war into Saxony, and by ravaging his territories, compel the Elector to enter into a
private treaty with the Emperor, or rather with himself. But, however little accustomed he was to make his
will bend to circumstances, he now perceived the necessity of postponing his favourite scheme for a time, to
a more pressing emergency. While he was driving the Saxons from Bohemia, Gustavus Adolphus had been
gaining the victories, already detailed, on the Rhine and the Danube, and carried the war through Franconia
and Swabia, to the frontiers of Bavaria. Maximilian, defeated on the Lech, and deprived by death of Count
Tilly, his best support, urgently solicited the Emperor to send with all speed the Duke of Friedland to his
assistance, from Bohemia, and by the defence of Bavaria, to avert the danger from Austria itself. He also
made the same request to Wallenstein, and entreated him, till he could himself come with the main force, to
despatch in the mean time a few regiments to his aid. Ferdinand seconded the request with all his influence,
and one messenger after another was sent to Wallenstein, urging him to move towards the Danube.
It now appeared how completely the Emperor had sacrificed his authority, in surrendering to another the
supreme command of his troops. Indifferent to Maximilian's entreaties, and deaf to the Emperor's repeated
commands, Wallenstein remained inactive in Bohemia, and abandoned the Elector to his fate. The
remembrance of the evil service which Maximilian had rendered him with the Emperor, at the Diet at
Ratisbon, was deeply engraved on the implacable mind of the duke, and the Elector's late attempts to prevent
his reinstatement, were no secret to him. The moment of revenging this affront had now arrived, and
Maximilian was doomed to pay dearly for his folly, in provoking the most revengeful of men. Wallenstein
maintained, that Bohemia ought not to be left exposed, and that Austria could not be better protected, than by
allowing the Swedish army to waste its strength before the Bavarian fortress. Thus, by the arm of the Swedes,
he chastised his enemy; and while one place after another fell into their hands, he allowed the Elector vainly
to await his arrival in Ratisbon. It was only when the complete subjugation of Bohemia left him without
excuse, and the conquests of Gustavus Adolphus in Bavaria threatened Austria itself, that he yielded to the
pressing entreaties of the Elector and the Emperor, and determined to effect the longexpected union with the
former; an event, which, according to the general anticipation of the Roman Catholics, would decide the fate
of the campaign.
Gustavus Adolphus, too weak in numbers to cope even with Wallenstein's force alone, naturally dreaded the
junction of such powerful armies, and the little energy he used to prevent it, was the occasion of great
surprise. Apparently he reckoned too much on the hatred which alienated the leaders, and seemed to render
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their effectual cooperation improbable; when the event contradicted his views, it was too late to repair his
error. On the first certain intelligence he received of their designs, he hastened to the Upper Palatinate, for the
purpose of intercepting the Elector: but the latter had already arrived there, and the junction had been effected
at Egra.
This frontier town had been chosen by Wallenstein, for the scene of his triumph over his proud rival. Not
content with having seen him, as it were, a suppliant at his feet, he imposed upon him the hard condition of
leaving his territories in his rear exposed to the enemy, and declaring by this long march to meet him, the
necessity and distress to which he was reduced. Even to this humiliation, the haughty prince patiently
submitted. It had cost him a severe struggle to ask for protection of the man who, if his own wishes had been
consulted, would never have had the power of granting it: but having once made up his mind to it, he was
ready to bear all the annoyances which were inseparable from that resolve, and sufficiently master of himself
to put up with petty grievances, when an important end was in view.
But whatever pains it had cost to effect this junction, it was equally difficult to settle the conditions on which
it was to be maintained. The united army must be placed under the command of one individual, if any object
was to be gained by the union, and each general was equally averse to yield to the superior authority of the
other. If Maximilian rested his claim on his electoral dignity, the nobleness of his descent, and his influence
in the empire, Wallenstein's military renown, and the unlimited command conferred on him by the Emperor,
gave an equally strong title to it. If it was deeply humiliating to the pride of the former to serve under an
imperial subject, the idea of imposing laws on so imperious a spirit, flattered in the same degree the
haughtiness of Wallenstein. An obstinate dispute ensued, which, however, terminated in a mutual
compromise to Wallenstein's advantage. To him was assigned the unlimited command of both armies,
particularly in battle, while the Elector was deprived of all power of altering the order of battle, or even the
route of the army. He retained only the bare right of punishing and rewarding his own troops, and the free use
of these, when not acting in conjunction with the Imperialists.
After these preliminaries were settled, the two generals at last ventured upon an interview; but not until they
had mutually promised to bury the past in oblivion, and all the outward formalities of a reconciliation had
been settled. According to agreement, they publicly embraced in the sight of their troops, and made mutual
professions of friendship, while in reality the hearts of both were overflowing with malice. Maximilian, well
versed in dissimulation, had sufficient command over himself, not to betray in a single feature his real
feelings; but a malicious triumph sparkled in the eyes of Wallenstein, and the constraint which was visible in
all his movements, betrayed the violence of the emotion which overpowered his proud soul.
The combined Imperial and Bavarian armies amounted to nearly 60,000 men, chiefly veterans. Before this
force, the King of Sweden was not in a condition to keep the field. As his attempt to prevent their junction
had failed, he commenced a rapid retreat into Franconia, and awaited there for some decisive movement on
the part of the enemy, in order to form his own plans. The position of the combined armies between the
frontiers of Saxony and Bavaria, left it for some time doubtful whether they would remove the war into the
former, or endeavour to drive the Swedes from the Danube, and deliver Bavaria. Saxony had been stripped of
troops by Arnheim, who was pursuing his conquests in Silesia; not without a secret design, it was generally
supposed, of favouring the entrance of the Duke of Friedland into that electorate, and of thus driving the
irresolute John George into peace with the Emperor. Gustavus Adolphus himself, fully persuaded that
Wallenstein's views were directed against Saxony, hastily despatched a strong reinforcement to the assistance
of his confederate, with the intention, as soon as circumstances would allow, of following with the main
body. But the movements of Wallenstein's army soon led him to suspect that he himself was the object of
attack; and the Duke's march through the Upper Palatinate, placed the matter beyond a doubt. The question
now was, how to provide for his own security, and the prize was no longer his supremacy, but his very
existence. His fertile genius must now supply the means, not of conquest, but of preservation. The approach
of the enemy had surprised him before he had time to concentrate his troops, which were scattered all over
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Germany, or to summon his allies to his aid. Too weak to meet the enemy in the field, he had no choice left,
but either to throw himself into Nuremberg, and run the risk of being shut up in its walls, or to sacrifice that
city, and await a reinforcement under the cannon of Donauwerth. Indifferent to danger or difficulty, while he
obeyed the call of humanity or honour, he chose the first without hesitation, firmly resolved to bury himself
with his whole army under the ruins of Nuremberg, rather than to purchase his own safety by the sacrifice of
his confederates.
Measures were immediately taken to surround the city and suburbs with redoubts, and to form an entrenched
camp. Several thousand workmen immediately commenced this extensive work, and an heroic determination
to hazard life and property in the common cause, animated the inhabitants of Nuremberg. A trench, eight feet
deep and twelve broad, surrounded the whole fortification; the lines were defended by redoubts and batteries,
the gates by half moons. The river Pegnitz, which flows through Nuremberg, divided the whole camp into
two semicircles, whose communication was secured by several bridges. About three hundred pieces of
cannon defended the townwalls and the intrenchments. The peasantry from the neighbouring villages, and
the inhabitants of Nuremberg, assisted the Swedish soldiers so zealously, that on the seventh day the army
was able to enter the camp, and, in a fortnight, this great work was completed.
While these operations were carried on without the walls, the magistrates of Nuremberg were busily occupied
in filling the magazines with provisions and ammunition for a long siege. Measures were taken, at the same
time, to secure the health of the inhabitants, which was likely to be endangered by the conflux of so many
people; cleanliness was enforced by the strictest regulations. In order, if necessary, to support the King, the
youth of the city were embodied and trained to arms, the militia of the town considerably reinforced, and a
new regiment raised, consisting of fourandtwenty names, according to the letters of the alphabet. Gustavus
had, in the mean time, called to his assistance his allies, Duke William of Weimar, and the Landgrave of
Hesse Cassel; and ordered his generals on the Rhine, in Thuringia and Lower Saxony, to commence their
march immediately, and join him with their troops in Nuremberg. His army, which was encamped within the
lines, did not amount to more than 16,000 men, scarcely a third of the enemy.
The Imperialists had, in the mean time, by slow marches, advanced to Neumark, where Wallenstein made a
general review. At the sight of this formidable force, he could not refrain from indulging in a childish boast:
"In four days," said he, "it will be shown whether I or the King of Sweden is to be master of the world." Yet,
notwithstanding his superiority, he did nothing to fulfil his promise; and even let slip the opportunity of
crushing his enemy, when the latter had the hardihood to leave his lines to meet him. "Battles enough have
been fought," was his answer to those who advised him to attack the King, "it is now time to try another
method." Wallenstein's wellfounded reputation required not any of those rash enterprises on which younger
soldiers rush, in the hope of gaining a name. Satisfied that the enemy's despair would dearly sell a victory,
while a defeat would irretrievably ruin the Emperor's affairs, he resolved to wear out the ardour of his
opponent by a tedious blockade, and by thus depriving him of every opportunity of availing himself of his
impetuous bravery, take from him the very advantage which had hitherto rendered him invincible. Without
making any attack, therefore, he erected a strong fortified camp on the other side of the Pegnitz, and opposite
Nuremberg; and, by this well chosen position, cut off from the city and the camp of Gustavus all supplies
from Franconia, Swabia, and Thuringia. Thus he held in siege at once the city and the King, and flattered
himself with the hope of slowly, but surely, wearing out by famine and pestilence the courage of his opponent
whom he had no wish to encounter in the field.
Little aware, however, of the resources and the strength of his adversary, Wallenstein had not taken sufficient
precautions to avert from himself the fate he was designing for others. From the whole of the neighbouring
country, the peasantry had fled with their property; and what little provision remained, must be obstinately
contested with the Swedes. The King spared the magazines within the town, as long as it was possible to
provision his army from without; and these forays produced constant skirmishes between the Croats and the
Swedish cavalry, of which the surrounding country exhibited the most melancholy traces. The necessaries of
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life must be obtained sword in hand; and the foraging parties could not venture out without a numerous
escort. And when this supply failed, the town opened its magazines to the King, but Wallenstein had to
support his troops from a distance. A large convoy from Bavaria was on its way to him, with an escort of a
thousand men. Gustavus Adolphus having received intelligence of its approach, immediately sent out a
regiment of cavalry to intercept it; and the darkness of the night favoured the enterprise. The whole convoy,
with the town in which it was, fell into the hands of the Swedes; the Imperial escort was cut to pieces; about
1,200 cattle carried off; and a thousand waggons, loaded with bread, which could not be brought away, were
set on fire. Seven regiments, which Wallenstein had sent forward to Altdorp to cover the entrance of the long
and anxiously expected convoy, were attacked by the King, who had, in like manner, advanced to cover the
retreat of his cavalry, and routed after an obstinate action, being driven back into the Imperial camp, with the
loss of 400 men. So many checks and difficulties, and so firm and unexpected a resistance on the part of the
King, made the Duke of Friedland repent that he had declined to hazard a battle. The strength of the Swedish
camp rendered an attack impracticable; and the armed youth of Nuremberg served the King as a nursery from
which he could supply his loss of troops. The want of provisions, which began to be felt in the Imperial camp
as strongly as in the Swedish, rendered it uncertain which party would be first compelled to give way.
Fifteen days had the two armies now remained in view of each other, equally defended by inaccessible
entrenchments, without attempting anything more than slight attacks and unimportant skirmishes. On both
sides, infectious diseases, the natural consequence of bad food, and a crowded population, had occasioned a
greater loss than the sword. And this evil daily increased. But at length, the long expected succours arrived in
the Swedish camp; and by this strong reinforcement, the King was now enabled to obey the dictates of his
native courage, and to break the chains which had hitherto fettered him.
In obedience to his requisitions, the Duke of Weimar had hastily drawn together a corps from the garrisons in
Lower Saxony and Thuringia, which, at Schweinfurt in Franconia, was joined by four Saxon regiments, and
at Kitzingen by the corps of the Rhine, which the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Palatine of Birkenfeld,
despatched to the relief of the King. The Chancellor, Oxenstiern, undertook to lead this force to its
destination. After being joined at Windsheim by the Duke of Weimar himself, and the Swedish General
Banner, he advanced by rapid marches to Bruck and Eltersdorf, where he passed the Rednitz, and reached the
Swedish camp in safety. This reinforcement amounted to nearly 50,000 men, and was attended by a train of
60 pieces of cannon, and 4,000 baggage waggons. Gustavus now saw himself at the head of an army of
nearly 70,000 strong, without reckoning the militia of Nuremberg, which, in case of necessity, could bring
into the field about 30,000 fighting men; a formidable force, opposed to another not less formidable. The war
seemed at length compressed to the point of a single battle, which was to decide its fearful issue. With
divided sympathies, Europe looked with anxiety to this scene, where the whole strength of the two
contending parties was fearfully drawn, as it were, to a focus.
If, before the arrival of the Swedish succours, a want of provisions had been felt, the evil was now fearfully
increased to a dreadful height in both camps, for Wallenstein had also received reinforcements from Bavaria.
Besides the 120,000 men confronted to each other, and more than 50,000 horses, in the two armies, and
besides the inhabitants of Nuremberg, whose number far exceeded the Swedish army, there were in the camp
of Wallenstein about 15,000 women, with as many drivers, and nearly the same number in that of the
Swedes. The custom of the time permitted the soldier to carry his family with him to the field. A number of
prostitutes followed the Imperialists; while, with the view of preventing such excesses, Gustavus's care for
the morals of his soldiers promoted marriages. For the rising generation, who had this camp for their home
and country, regular military schools were established, which educated a race of excellent warriors, by which
means the army might in a manner recruit itself in the course of a long campaign. No wonder, then, if these
wandering nations exhausted every territory in which they encamped, and by their immense consumption
raised the necessaries of life to an exorbitant price. All the mills of Nuremberg were insufficient to grind the
corn required for each day; and 15,000 pounds of bread, which were daily delivered, by the town into the
Swedish camp, excited, without allaying, the hunger of the soldiers. The laudable exertions of the magistrates
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of Nuremberg could not prevent the greater part of the horses from dying for want of forage, while the
increasing mortality in the camp consigned more than a hundred men daily to the grave.
To put an end to these distresses, Gustavus Adolphus, relying on his numerical superiority, left his lines on
the 25th day, forming before the enemy in order of battle, while he cannonaded the duke's camp from three
batteries erected on the side of the Rednitz. But the duke remained immoveable in his entrenchments, and
contented himself with answering this challenge by a distant fire of cannon and musketry. His plan was to
wear out the king by his inactivity, and by the force of famine to overcome his resolute determination; and
neither the remonstrances of Maximilian, and the impatience of his army, nor the ridicule of his opponent,
could shake his purpose. Gustavus, deceived in his hope of forcing a battle, and compelled by his increasing
necessities, now attempted impossibilities, and resolved to storm a position which art and nature had
combined to render impregnable.
Intrusting his own camp to the militia of Nuremberg, on the fiftyeighth day of his encampment, (the festival
of St. Bartholomew,) he advanced in full order of battle, and passing the Rednitz at Furth, easily drove the
enemy's outposts before him. The main army of the Imperialists was posted on the steep heights between the
Biber and the Rednitz, called the Old Fortress and Altenberg; while the camp itself, commanded by these
eminences, spread out immeasurably along the plain. On these heights, the whole of the artillery was placed.
Deep trenches surrounded inaccessible redoubts, while thick barricadoes, with pointed palisades, defended
the approaches to the heights, from the summits of which, Wallenstein calmly and securely discharged the
lightnings of his artillery from amid the dark thunderclouds of smoke. A destructive fire of musketry was
maintained behind the breastworks, and a hundred pieces of cannon threatened the desperate assailant with
certain destruction. Against this dangerous post Gustavus now directed his attack; five hundred musketeers,
supported by a few infantry, (for a greater number could not act in the narrow space,) enjoyed the unenvied
privilege of first throwing themselves into the open jaws of death. The assault was furious, the resistance
obstinate. Exposed to the whole fire of the enemy's artillery, and infuriate by the prospect of inevitable death,
these determined warriors rushed forward to storm the heights; which, in an instant, converted into a flaming
volcano, discharged on them a shower of shot. At the same moment, the heavy cavalry rushed forward into
the openings which the artillery had made in the close ranks of the assailants, and divided them; till the
intrepid band, conquered by the strength of nature and of man, took to flight, leaving a hundred dead upon the
field. To Germans had Gustavus yielded this post of honour. Exasperated at their retreat, he now led on his
Finlanders to the attack, thinking, by their northern courage, to shame the cowardice of the Germans. But
they, also, after a similar hot reception, yielded to the superiority of the enemy; and a third regiment
succeeded them to experience the same fate. This was replaced by a fourth, a fifth, and a sixth; so that, during
a ten hours' action, every regiment was brought to the attack to retire with bloody loss from the contest. A
thousand mangled bodies covered the field; yet Gustavus undauntedly maintained the attack, and Wallenstein
held his position unshaken.
In the mean time, a sharp contest had taken place between the imperial cavalry and the left wing of the
Swedes, which was posted in a thicket on the Rednitz, with varying success, but with equal intrepidity and
loss on both sides. The Duke of Friedland and Prince Bernard of Weimar had each a horse shot under them;
the king himself had the sole of his boot carried off by a cannon ball. The combat was maintained with
undiminished obstinacy, till the approach of night separated the combatants. But the Swedes had advanced
too far to retreat without hazard. While the king was seeking an officer to convey to the regiments the order
to retreat, he met Colonel Hepburn, a brave Scotchman, whose native courage alone had drawn him from the
camp to share in the dangers of the day. Offended with the king for having not long before preferred a
younger officer for some post of danger, he had rashly vowed never again to draw his sword for the king. To
him Gustavus now addressed himself, praising his courage, and requesting him to order the regiments to
retreat. "Sire," replied the brave soldier, "it is the only service I cannot refuse to your Majesty; for it is a
hazardous one," and immediately hastened to carry the command. One of the heights above the old
fortress had, in the heat of the action, been carried by the Duke of Weimar. It commanded the hills and the
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whole camp. But the heavy rain which fell during the night, rendered it impossible to draw up the cannon;
and this post, which had been gained with so much bloodshed, was also voluntarily abandoned. Diffident of
fortune, which forsook him on this decisive day, the king did not venture the following morning to renew the
attack with his exhausted troops; and vanquished for the first time, even because he was not victor, he led
back his troops over the Rednitz. Two thousand dead which he left behind him on the field, testified to the
extent of his loss; and the Duke of Friedland remained unconquered within his lines.
For fourteen days after this action, the two armies still continued in front of each other, each in the hope that
the other would be the first to give way. Every day reduced their provisions, and as scarcity became greater,
the excesses of the soldiers rendered furious, exercised the wildest outrages on the peasantry. The increasing
distress broke up all discipline and order in the Swedish camp; and the German regiments, in particular,
distinguished themselves for the ravages they practised indiscriminately on friend and foe. The weak hand of
a single individual could not check excesses, encouraged by the silence, if not the actual example, of the
inferior officers. These shameful breaches of discipline, on the maintenance of which he had hitherto justly
prided himself, severely pained the king; and the vehemence with which he reproached the German officers
for their negligence, bespoke the liveliness of his emotion. "It is you yourselves, Germans," said he, "that rob
your native country, and ruin your own confederates in the faith. As God is my judge, I abhor you, I loathe
you; my heart sinks within me whenever I look upon you. Ye break my orders; ye are the cause that the world
curses me, that the tears of poverty follow me, that complaints ring in my ear `The king, our friend, does
us more harm than even our worst enemies.' On your account I have stripped my own kingdom of its
treasures, and spent upon you more than 40 tons of gold*; while from your German empire I have not
received the least aid. I gave you a share of all that God had given to me; and had ye regarded my orders, I
would have gladly shared with you all my future acquisitions. Your want of discipline convinces me of your
evil intentions, whatever cause I might otherwise have to applaud your bravery."
* A ton of gold in Sweden amounts to 100,000 rix dollars.
Nuremberg had exerted itself, almost beyond its power, to subsist for eleven weeks the vast crowd which was
compressed within its boundaries; but its means were at length exhausted, and the king's more numerous
party was obliged to determine on a retreat. By the casualties of war and sickness, Nuremberg had lost more
than 10,000 of its inhabitants, and Gustavus Adolphus nearly 20,000 of his soldiers. The fields around the
city were trampled down, the villages lay in ashes, the plundered peasantry lay faint and dying on the
highways; foul odours infected the air, and bad food, the exhalations from so dense a population, and so
many putrifying carcasses, together with the heat of the dogdays, produced a desolating pestilence which
raged among men and beasts, and long after the retreat of both armies, continued to load the country with
misery and distress. Affected by the general distress, and despairing of conquering the steady determination
of the Duke of Friedland, the king broke up his camp on the 8th September, leaving in Nuremberg a sufficient
garrison. He advanced in full order of battle before the enemy, who remained motionless, and did not attempt
in the least to harass his retreat. His route lay by the Aisch and Windsheim towards Neustadt, where he halted
five days to refresh his troops, and also to be near to Nuremberg, in case the enemy should make an attempt
upon the town. But Wallenstein, as exhausted as himself, had only awaited the retreat of the Swedes to
commence his own. Five days afterwards, he broke up his camp at Zirndorf, and set it on fire. A hundred
columns of smoke, rising from all the burning villages in the neighbourhood, announced his retreat, and
showed the city the fate it had escaped. His march, which was directed on Forchheim, was marked by the
most frightful ravages; but he was too far advanced to be overtaken by the king. The latter now divided his
army, which the exhausted country was unable to support, and leaving one division to protect Franconia, with
the other he prosecuted in person his conquests in Bavaria.
In the mean time, the imperial Bavarian army had marched into the Bishopric of Bamberg, where the Duke of
Friedland a second time mustered his troops. He found this force, which so lately had amounted to 60,000
men, diminished by the sword, desertion, and disease, to about 24,000, and of these a fourth were Bavarians.
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Thus had the encampments before Nuremberg weakened both parties more than two great battles would have
done, apparently without advancing the termination of the war, or satisfying, by any decisive result, the
expectations of Europe. The king's conquests in Bavaria, were, it is true, checked for a time by this diversion
before Nuremberg, and Austria itself secured against the danger of immediate invasion; but by the retreat of
the king from that city, he was again left at full liberty to make Bavaria the seat of war. Indifferent towards
the fate of that country, and weary of the restraint which his union with the Elector imposed upon him, the
Duke of Friedland eagerly seized the opportunity of separating from this burdensome associate, and
prosecuting, with renewed earnestness, his favourite plans. Still adhering to his purpose of detaching Saxony
from its Swedish alliance, he selected that country for his winter quarters, hoping by his destructive presence
to force the Elector the more readily into his views.
No conjuncture could be more favourable for his designs. The Saxons had invaded Silesia, where, reinforced
by troops from Brandenburgh and Sweden, they had gained several advantages over the Emperor's troops.
Silesia would be saved by a diversion against the Elector in his own territories, and the attempt was the more
easy, as Saxony, left undefended during the war in Silesia, lay open on every side to attack. The pretext of
rescuing from the enemy an hereditary dominion of Austria, would silence the remonstrances of the Elector
of Bavaria, and, under the mask of a patriotic zeal for the Emperor's interests, Maximilian might be sacrificed
without much difficulty. By giving up the rich country of Bavaria to the Swedes, he hoped to be left
unmolested by them in his enterprise against Saxony, while the increasing coldness between Gustavus and
the Saxon Court, gave him little reason to apprehend any extraordinary zeal for the deliverance of John
George. Thus a second time abandoned by his artful protector, the Elector separated from Wallenstein at
Bamberg, to protect his defenceless territory with the small remains of his troops, while the imperial army,
under Wallenstein, directed its march through Bayreuth and Coburg towards the Thuringian Forest.
An imperial general, Holk, had previously been sent into Vogtland with 6,000 men, to waste this defenceless
province with fire and sword, he was soon followed by Gallas, another of the Duke's generals, and an equally
faithful instrument of his inhuman orders. Finally, Pappenheim, too, was recalled from Lower Saxony, to
reinforce the diminished army of the duke, and to complete the miseries of the devoted country. Ruined
churches, villages in ashes, harvests wilfully destroyed, families plundered, and murdered peasants, marked
the progress of these barbarians, under whose scourge the whole of Thuringia, Vogtland, and Meissen, lay
defenceless. Yet this was but the prelude to greater sufferings, with which Wallenstein himself, at the head of
the main army, threatened Saxony. After having left behind him fearful monuments of his fury, in his march
through Franconia and Thuringia, he arrived with his whole army in the Circle of Leipzig, and compelled the
city, after a short resistance, to surrender. His design was to push on to Dresden, and by the conquest of the
whole country, to prescribe laws to the Elector. He had already approached the Mulda, threatening to
overpower the Saxon army which had advanced as far as Torgau to meet him, when the King of Sweden's
arrival at Erfurt gave an unexpected check to his operations. Placed between the Saxon and Swedish armies,
which were likely to be farther reinforced by the troops of George, Duke of Luneburg, from Lower Saxony,
he hastily retired upon Meresberg, to form a junction there with Count Pappenheim, and to repel the further
advance of the Swedes.
Gustavus Adolphus had witnessed, with great uneasiness, the arts employed by Spain and Austria to detach
his allies from him. The more important his alliance with Saxony, the more anxiety the inconstant temper of
John George caused him. Between himself and the Elector, a sincere friendship could never subsist. A prince,
proud of his political importance, and accustomed to consider himself as the head of his party, could not see
without annoyance the interference of a foreign power in the affairs of the Empire; and nothing, but the
extreme danger of his dominions, could overcome the aversion with which he had long witnessed the
progress of this unwelcome intruder. The increasing influence of the king in Germany, his authority with the
Protestant states, the unambiguous proofs which he gave of his ambitious views, which were of a character
calculated to excite the jealousies of all the states of the Empire, awakened in the Elector's breast a thousand
anxieties, which the imperial emissaries did not fail skilfully to keep alive and cherish. Every arbitrary step
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on the part of the King, every demand, however reasonable, which he addressed to the princes of the Empire,
was followed by bitter complaints from the Elector, which seemed to announce an approaching rupture. Even
the generals of the two powers, whenever they were called upon to act in common, manifested the same
jealousy as divided their leaders. John George's natural aversion to war, and a lingering attachment to
Austria, favoured the efforts of Arnheim; who, maintaining a constant correspondence with Wallenstein,
laboured incessantly to effect a private treaty between his master and the Emperor; and if his representations
were long disregarded, still the event proved that they were not altogether without effect.
Gustavus Adolphus, naturally apprehensive of the consequences which the defection of so powerful an ally
would produce on his future prospects in Germany, spared no pains to avert so pernicious an event; and his
remonstrances had hitherto had some effect upon the Elector. But the formidable power with which the
Emperor seconded his seductive proposals, and the miseries which, in the case of hesitation, he threatened to
accumulate upon Saxony, might at length overcome the resolution of the Elector, should he be left exposed to
the vengeance of his enemies; while an indifference to the fate of so powerful a confederate, would
irreparably destroy the confidence of the other allies in their protector. This consideration induced the king a
second time to yield to the pressing entreaties of the Elector, and to sacrifice his own brilliant prospects to the
safety of this ally. He had already resolved upon a second attack on Ingoldstadt; and the weakness of the
Elector of Bavaria gave him hopes of soon forcing this exhausted enemy to accede to a neutrality. An
insurrection of the peasantry in Upper Austria, opened to him a passage into that country, and the capital
might be in his possession, before Wallenstein could have time to advance to its defence. All these views he
now gave up for the sake of an ally, who, neither by his services nor his fidelity, was worthy of the sacrifice;
who, on the pressing occasions of common good, had steadily adhered to his own selfish projects; and who
was important, not for the services he was expected to render, but merely for the injuries he had it in his
power to inflict. Is it possible, then, to refrain from indignation, when we know that, in this expedition,
undertaken for the benefit of such an ally, the great king was destined to terminate his career?
Rapidly assembling his troops in Franconia, he followed the route of Wallenstein through Thuringia. Duke
Bernard of Weimar, who had been despatched to act against Pappenheim, joined the king at Armstadt, who
now saw himself at the head of 20,000 veterans. At Erfurt he took leave of his queen, who was not to behold
him, save in his coffin, at Weissenfels. Their anxious adieus seemed to forbode an eternal separation.
He reached Naumburg on the 1st November, 1632, before the corps, which the Duke of Friedland had
despatched for that purpose, could make itself master of that place. The inhabitants of the surrounding
country flocked in crowds to look upon the hero, the avenger, the great king, who, a year before, had first
appeared in that quarter, like a guardian angel. Shouts of joy everywhere attended his progress; the people
knelt before him, and struggled for the honour of touching the sheath of his sword, or the hem of his garment.
The modest hero disliked this innocent tribute which a sincerely grateful and admiring multitude paid him.
"Is it not," said he, "as if this people would make a God of me? Our affairs prosper, indeed; but I fear the
vengeance of Heaven will punish me for this presumption, and soon enough reveal to this deluded multitude
my human weakness and mortality!" How amiable does Gustavus appear before us at this moment, when
about to leave us for ever! Even in the plenitude of success, he honours an avenging Nemesis, declines that
homage which is due only to the Immortal, and strengthens his title to our tears, the nearer the moment
approaches that is to call them forth!
In the mean time, the Duke of Friedland had determined to advance to meet the king, as far as Weissenfels,
and even at the hazard of a battle, to secure his winterquarters in Saxony. His inactivity before Nuremberg
had occasioned a suspicion that he was unwilling to measure his powers with those of the Hero of the North,
and his hardearned reputation would be at stake, if, a second time, he should decline a battle. His present
superiority in numbers, though much less than what it was at the beginning of the siege of Nuremberg, was
still enough to give him hopes of victory, if he could compel the king to give battle before his junction with
the Saxons. But his present reliance was not so much in his numerical superiority, as in the predictions of his
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astrologer Seni, who had read in the stars that the good fortune of the Swedish monarch would decline in the
month of November. Besides, between Naumburg and Weissenfels there was also a range of narrow defiles,
formed by a long mountainous ridge, and the river Saal, which ran at their foot, along which the Swedes
could not advance without difficulty, and which might, with the assistance of a few troops, be rendered
almost impassable. If attacked there, the king would have no choice but either to penetrate with great danger
through the defiles, or commence a laborious retreat through Thuringia, and to expose the greater part of his
army to a march through a desert country, deficient in every necessary for their support. But the rapidity with
which Gustavus Adolphus had taken possession of Naumburg, disappointed this plan, and it was now
Wallenstein himself who awaited the attack.
But in this expectation he was disappointed; for the king, instead of advancing to meet him at Weissenfels,
made preparations for entrenching himself near Naumburg, with the intention of awaiting there the
reinforcements which the Duke of Lunenburg was bringing up. Undecided whether to advance against the
king through the narrow passes between Weissenfels and Naumburg, or to remain inactive in his camp, he
called a council of war, in order to have the opinion of his most experienced generals. None of these thought
it prudent to attack the king in his advantageous position. On the other hand, the preparations which the latter
made to fortify his camp, plainly showed that it was not his intention soon to abandon it. But the approach of
winter rendered it impossible to prolong the campaign, and by a continued encampment to exhaust the
strength of the army, already so much in need of repose. All voices were in favour of immediately
terminating the campaign: and, the more so, as the important city of Cologne upon the Rhine was threatened
by the Dutch, while the progress of the enemy in Westphalia and the Lower Rhine called for effective
reinforcements in that quarter. Wallenstein yielded to the weight of these arguments, and almost convinced
that, at this season, he had no reason to apprehend an attack from the King, he put his troops into
winterquarters, but so that, if necessary, they might be rapidly assembled. Count Pappenheim was
despatched, with great part of the army, to the assistance of Cologne, with orders to take possession, on his
march, of the fortress of Moritzburg, in the territory of Halle. Different corps took up their winterquarters in
the neighbouring towns, to watch, on all sides, the motions of the enemy. Count Colloredo guarded the castle
of Weissenfels, and Wallenstein himself encamped with the remainder not far from Merseburg, between
Flotzgaben and the Saal, from whence he purposed to march to Leipzig, and to cut off the communication
between the Saxons and the Swedish army.
Scarcely had Gustavus Adolphus been informed of Pappenheim's departure, when suddenly breaking up his
camp at Naumburg, he hastened with his whole force to attack the enemy, now weakened to one half. He
advanced, by rapid marches, towards Weissenfels, from whence the news of his arrival quickly reached the
enemy, and greatly astonished the Duke of Friedland. But a speedy resolution was now necessary; and the
measures of Wallenstein were soon taken. Though he had little more than 12,000 men to oppose to the 20,000
of the enemy, he might hope to maintain his ground until the return of Pappenheim, who could not have
advanced farther than Halle, five miles distant. Messengers were hastily despatched to recall him, while
Wallenstein moved forward into the wide plain between the Canal and Lutzen, where he awaited the King in
full order of battle, and, by this position, cut off his communication with Leipzig and the Saxon auxiliaries.
Three cannon shots, fired by Count Colloredo from the castle of Weissenfels, announced the king's approach;
and at this concerted signal, the light troops of the Duke of Friedland, under the command of the Croatian
General Isolani, moved forward to possess themselves of the villages lying upon the Rippach. Their weak
resistance did not impede the advance of the enemy, who crossed the Rippach, near the village of that name,
and formed in line below Lutzen, opposite the Imperialists. The high road which goes from Weissenfels to
Leipzig, is intersected between Lutzen and Markranstadt by the canal which extends from Zeitz to
Merseburg, and unites the Elster with the Saal. On this canal, rested the left wing of the Imperialists, and the
right of the King of Sweden; but so that the cavalry of both extended themselves along the opposite side. To
the northward, behind Lutzen, was Wallenstein's right wing, and to the south of that town was posted the left
wing of the Swedes; both armies fronted the high road, which ran between them, and divided their order of
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battle; but the evening before the battle, Wallenstein, to the great disadvantage of his opponent, had possessed
himself of this highway, deepened the trenches which ran along its sides, and planted them with musketeers,
so as to make the crossing of it both difficult and dangerous. Behind these, again, was erected a battery of
seven large pieces of cannon, to support the fire from the trenches; and at the windmills, close behind Lutzen,
fourteen smaller field pieces were ranged on an eminence, from which they could sweep the greater part of
the plain. The infantry, divided into no more than five unwieldy brigades, was drawn up at the distance of
300 paces from the road, and the cavalry covered the flanks. All the baggage was sent to Leipzig, that it
might not impede the movements of the army; and the ammunitionwaggons alone remained, which were
placed in rear of the line. To conceal the weakness of the Imperialists, all the campfollowers and sutlers
were mounted, and posted on the left wing, but only until Pappenheim's troops arrived. These arrangements
were made during the darkness of the night; and when the morning dawned, all was ready for the reception of
the enemy.
On the evening of the same day, Gustavus Adolphus appeared on the opposite plain, and formed his troops in
the order of attack. His disposition was the same as that which had been so successful the year before at
Leipzig. Small squadrons of horse were interspersed among the divisions of the infantry, and troops of
musketeers placed here and there among the cavalry. The army was arranged in two lines, the canal on the
right and in its rear, the high road in front, and the town on the left. In the centre, the infantry was formed,
under the command of Count Brahe; the cavalry on the wings; the artillery in front. To the German hero,
Bernard, Duke of Weimar, was intrusted the command of the German cavalry of the left wing; while, on the
right, the king led on the Swedes in person, in order to excite the emulation of the two nations to a noble
competition. The second line was formed in the same manner; and behind these was placed the reserve,
commanded by Henderson, a Scotchman.
In this position, they awaited the eventful dawn of morning, to begin a contest, which long delay, rather than
the probability of decisive consequences, and the picked body, rather than the number of the combatants, was
to render so terrible and remarkable. The strained expectation of Europe, so disappointed before Nuremberg,
was now to be gratified on the plains of Lutzen. During the whole course of the war, two such generals, so
equally matched in renown and ability, had not before been pitted against each other. Never, as yet, had
daring been cooled by so awful a hazard, or hope animated by so glorious a prize. Europe was next day to
learn who was her greatest general: tomorrow, the leader, who had hitherto been invincible, must
acknowledge a victor. This morning was to place it beyond a doubt, whether the victories of Gustavus at
Leipzig and on the Lech, were owing to his own military genius, or to the incompetency of his opponent;
whether the services of Wallenstein were to vindicate the Emperor's choice, and justify the high price at
which they had been purchased. The victory was as yet doubtful, but certain were the labour and the
bloodshed by which it must be earned. Every private in both armies, felt a jealous share in their leader's
reputation, and under every corslet beat the same emotions that inflamed the bosoms of the generals. Each
army knew the enemy to which it was to be opposed: and the anxiety which each in vain attempted to repress,
was a convincing proof of their opponent's strength.
At last the fateful morning dawned; but an impenetrable fog, which spread over the plain, delayed the attack
till noon. Kneeling in front of his lines, the king offered up his devotions; and the whole army, at the same
moment dropping on their knees, burst into a moving hymn, accompanied by the military music. The king
then mounted his horse, and clad only in a leathern doublet and surtout, (for a wound he had formerly
received prevented his wearing armour,) rode along the ranks, to animate the courage of his troops with a
joyful confidence, which, however, the forboding presentiment of his own bosom contradicted. "God with
us!" was the warcry of the Swedes; "Jesus Maria!" that of the Imperialists. About eleven the fog began to
disperse, and the enemy became visible. At the same moment Lutzen was seen in flames, having been set on
fire by command of the duke, to prevent his being outflanked on that side. The charge was now sounded; the
cavalry rushed upon the enemy, and the infantry advanced against the trenches.
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Received by a tremendous fire of musketry and heavy artillery, these intrepid battalions maintained the attack
with undaunted courage, till the enemy's musketeers abandoned their posts, the trenches were passed, the
battery carried and turned against the enemy. They pressed forward with irresistible impetuosity; the first of
the five imperial brigades was immediately routed, the second soon after, and the third put to flight. But here
the genius of Wallenstein opposed itself to their progress. With the rapidity of lightning he was on the spot to
rally his discomfited troops; and his powerful word was itself sufficient to stop the flight of the fugitives.
Supported by three regiments of cavalry, the vanquished brigades, forming anew, faced the enemy, and
pressed vigorously into the broken ranks of the Swedes. A murderous conflict ensued. The nearness of the
enemy left no room for firearms, the fury of the attack no time for loading; man was matched to man, the
useless musket exchanged for the sword and pike, and science gave way to desperation. Overpowered by
numbers, the wearied Swedes at last retire beyond the trenches; and the captured battery is again lost by the
retreat. A thousand mangled bodies already strewed the plain, and as yet not a single step of ground had been
won.
In the mean time, the king's right wing, led by himself, had fallen upon the enemy's left. The first impetuous
shock of the heavy Finland cuirassiers dispersed the lightlymounted Poles and Croats, who were posted
here, and their disorderly flight spread terror and confusion among the rest of the cavalry. At this moment
notice was brought the king, that his infantry were retreating over the trenches, and also that his left wing,
exposed to a severe fire from the enemy's cannon posted at the windmills was beginning to give way. With
rapid decision he committed to General Horn the pursuit of the enemy's left, while he flew, at the head of the
regiment of Steinbock, to repair the disorder of his right wing. His noble charger bore him with the velocity
of lightning across the trenches, but the squadrons that followed could not come on with the same speed, and
only a few horsemen, among whom was Francis Albert, Duke of Saxe Lauenburg, were able to keep up with
the king. He rode directly to the place where his infantry were most closely pressed, and while he was
reconnoitring the enemy's line for an exposed point of attack, the shortness of his sight unfortunately led him
too close to their ranks. An imperial Gefreyter*, remarking that every one respectfully made way for him as
he rode along, immediately ordered a musketeer to take aim at him. "Fire at him yonder," said he, "that must
be a man of consequence." The soldier fired, and the king's left arm was shattered. At that moment his
squadron came hurrying up, and a confused cry of "the king bleeds! the king is shot!" spread terror and
consternation through all the ranks. "It is nothing follow me," cried the king, collecting his whole
strength; but overcome by pain, and nearly fainting, he requested the Duke of Lauenburg, in French, to lead
him unobserved out of the tumult. While the duke proceeded towards the right wing with the king, making a
long circuit to keep this discouraging sight from the disordered infantry, his majesty received a second shot
through the back, which deprived him of his remaining strength. "Brother," said he, with a dying voice, "I
have enough! look only to your own life." At the same moment he fell from his horse pierced by several more
shots; and abandoned by all his attendants, he breathed his last amidst the plundering hands of the Croats. His
charger, flying without its rider, and covered with blood, soon made known to the Swedish cavalry the fall of
their king. They rushed madly forward to rescue his sacred remains from the hands of the enemy. A
murderous conflict ensued over the body, till his mangled remains were buried beneath a heap of slain.
* Gefreyter, a person exempt from watching duty, nearly corresponding to the corporal.
The mournful tidings soon ran through the Swedish army; but instead of destroying the courage of these
brave troops, it but excited it into a new, a wild, and consuming flame. Life had lessened in value, now that
the most sacred life of all was gone; death had no terrors for the lowly since the anointed head was not
spared. With the fury of lions the Upland, Smaeland, Finland, East and West Gothland regiments rushed a
second time upon the left wing of the enemy, which, already making but feeble resistance to General Horn,
was now entirely beaten from the field. Bernard, Duke of SaxeWeimar, gave to the bereaved Swedes a
noble leader in his own person; and the spirit of Gustavus led his victorious squadrons anew. The left wing
quickly formed again, and vigorously pressed the right of the Imperialists. The artillery at the windmills,
which had maintained so murderous a fire upon the Swedes, was captured and turned against the enemy. The
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centre, also, of the Swedish infantry, commanded by the duke and Knyphausen, advanced a second time
against the trenches, which they successfully passed, and retook the battery of seven cannons. The attack was
now renewed with redoubled fury upon the heavy battalions of the enemy's centre; their resistance became
gradually less, and chance conspired with Swedish valour to complete the defeat. The imperial
powderwaggons took fire, and, with a tremendous explosion, grenades and bombs filled the air. The enemy,
now in confusion, thought they were attacked in the rear, while the Swedish brigades pressed them in front.
Their courage began to fail them. Their left wing was already beaten, their right wavering, and their artillery
in the enemy's hands. The battle seemed to be almost decided; another moment would decide the fate of the
day, when Pappenheim appeared on the field, with his cuirassiers and dragoons; all the advantages already
gained were lost, and the battle was to be fought anew.
The order which recalled that general to Lutzen had reached him in Halle, while his troops were still
plundering the town. It was impossible to collect the scattered infantry with that rapidity, which the urgency
of the order, and Pappenheim's impatience required. Without waiting for it, therefore, he ordered eight
regiments of cavalry to mount; and at their head he galloped at full speed for Lutzen, to share in the battle. He
arrived in time to witness the flight of the imperial right wing, which Gustavus Horn was driving from the
field, and to be at first involved in their rout. But with rapid presence of mind he rallied the flying troops, and
led them once more against the enemy. Carried away by his wild bravery, and impatient to encounter the
king, who he supposed was at the head of this wing, he burst furiously upon the Swedish ranks, which,
exhausted by victory, and inferior in numbers, were, after a noble resistance, overpowered by this fresh body
of enemies. Pappenheim's unexpected appearance revived the drooping courage of the Imperialists, and the
Duke of Friedland quickly availed himself of the favourable moment to reform his line. The closely serried
battalions of the Swedes were, after a tremendous conflict, again driven across the trenches; and the battery,
which had been twice lost, again rescued from their hands. The whole yellow regiment, the finest of all that
distinguished themselves in this dreadful day, lay dead on the field, covering the ground almost in the same
excellent order which, when alive, they maintained with such unyielding courage. The same fate befel
another regiment of Blues, which Count Piccolomini attacked with the imperial cavalry, and cut down after a
desperate contest. Seven times did this intrepid general renew the attack; seven horses were shot under him,
and he himself was pierced with six musket balls; yet he would not leave the field, until he was carried along
in the general rout of the whole army. Wallenstein himself was seen riding through his ranks with cool
intrepidity, amidst a shower of balls, assisting the distressed, encouraging the valiant with praise, and the
wavering by his fearful glance. Around and close by him his men were falling thick, and his own mantle was
perforated by several shots. But avenging destiny this day protected that breast, for which another weapon
was reserved; on the same field where the noble Gustavus expired, Wallenstein was not allowed to terminate
his guilty career.
Less fortunate was Pappenheim, the Telamon of the army, the bravest soldier of Austria and the church. An
ardent desire to encounter the king in person, carried this daring leader into the thickest of the fight, where he
thought his noble opponent was most surely to be met. Gustavus had also expressed a wish to meet his brave
antagonist, but these hostile wishes remained ungratified; death first brought together these two great heroes.
Two musketballs pierced the breast of Pappenheim; and his men forcibly carried him from the field. While
they were conveying him to the rear, a murmur reached him, that he whom he had sought, lay dead upon the
plain. When the truth of the report was confirmed to him, his look became brighter, his dying eye sparkled
with a last gleam of joy. "Tell the Duke of Friedland," said he, "that I lie without hope of life, but that I die
happy, since I know that the implacable enemy of my religion has fallen on the same day."
With Pappenheim, the good fortune of the Imperialists departed. The cavalry of the left wing, already beaten,
and only rallied by his exertions, no sooner missed their victorious leader, than they gave up everything for
lost, and abandoned the field of battle in spiritless despair. The right wing fell into the same confusion, with
the exception of a few regiments, which the bravery of their colonels Gotz, Terzky, Colloredo, and
Piccolomini, compelled to keep their ground. The Swedish infantry, with prompt determination, profited by
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the enemy's confusion. To fill up the gaps which death had made in the front line, they formed both lines into
one, and with it made the final and decisive charge. A third time they crossed the trenches, and a third time
they captured the battery. The sun was setting when the two lines closed. The strife grew hotter as it drew to
an end; the last efforts of strength were mutually exerted, and skill and courage did their utmost to repair in
these precious moments the fortune of the day. It was in vain; despair endows every one with superhuman
strength; no one can conquer, no one will give way. The art of war seemed to exhaust its powers on one side,
only to unfold some new and untried masterpiece of skill on the other. Night and darkness at last put an end
to the fight, before the fury of the combatants was exhausted; and the contest only ceased, when no one could
any longer find an antagonist. Both armies separated, as if by tacit agreement; the trumpets sounded, and each
party claiming the victory, quitted the field.
The artillery on both sides, as the horses could not be found, remained all night upon the field, at once the
reward and the evidence of victory to him who should hold it. Wallenstein, in his haste to leave Leipzig and
Saxony, forgot to remove his part. Not long after the battle was ended, Pappenheim's infantry, who had been
unable to follow the rapid movements of their general, and who amounted to six regiments, marched on the
field, but the work was done. A few hours earlier, so considerable a reinforcement would perhaps have
decided the day in favour of the Imperialists; and, even now, by remaining on the field, they might have
saved the duke's artillery, and made a prize of that of the Swedes. But they had received no orders to act; and,
uncertain as to the issue of the battle, they retired to Leipzig, where they hoped to join the main body.
The Duke of Friedland had retreated thither, and was followed on the morrow by the scattered remains of his
army, without artillery, without colours, and almost without arms. The Duke of Weimar, it appears, after the
toils of this bloody day, allowed the Swedish army some repose, between Lutzen and Weissenfels, near
enough to the field of battle to oppose any attempt the enemy might make to recover it. Of the two armies,
more than 9,000 men lay dead; a still greater number were wounded, and among the Imperialists, scarcely a
man escaped from the field uninjured. The entire plain from Lutzen to the Canal was strewed with the
wounded, the dying, and the dead. Many of the principal nobility had fallen on both sides. Even the Abbot of
Fulda, who had mingled in the combat as a spectator, paid for his curiosity and his illtimed zeal with his
life. History says nothing of prisoners; a further proof of the animosity of the combatants, who neither gave
nor took quarter.
Pappenheim died the next day of his wounds at Leipzig; an irreparable loss to the imperial army, which this
brave warrior had so often led on to victory. The battle of Prague, where, together with Wallenstein, he was
present as colonel, was the beginning of his heroic career. Dangerously wounded, with a few troops, he made
an impetuous attack on a regiment of the enemy, and lay for several hours mixed with the dead upon the
field, beneath the weight of his horse, till he was discovered by some of his own men in plundering. With a
small force he defeated, in three different engagements, the rebels in Upper Austria, though 40,000 strong. At
the battle of Leipzig, he for a long time delayed the defeat of Tilly by his bravery, and led the arms of the
Emperor on the Elbe and the Weser to victory. The wild impetuous fire of his temperament, which no danger,
however apparent, could cool, or impossibilities check, made him the most powerful arm of the imperial
force, but unfitted him for acting at its head. The battle of Leipzig, if Tilly may be believed, was lost through
his rash ardour. At the destruction of Magdeburg, his hands were deeply steeped in blood; war rendered
savage and ferocious his disposition, which had been cultivated by youthful studies and various travels. On
his forehead, two red streaks, like swords, were perceptible, with which nature had marked him at his very
birth. Even in his later years, these became visible, as often as his blood was stirred by passion; and
superstition easily persuaded itself, that the future destiny of the man was thus impressed upon the forehead
of the child. As a faithful servant of the House of Austria, he had the strongest claims on the gratitude of both
its lines, but he did not survive to enjoy the most brilliant proof of their regard. A messenger was already on
his way from Madrid, bearing to him the order of the Golden Fleece, when death overtook him at Leipzig.
Though Te Deum, in all Spanish and Austrian lands, was sung in honour of a victory, Wallenstein himself, by
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the haste with which he quitted Leipzig, and soon after all Saxony, and by renouncing his original design of
fixing there his winter quarters, openly confessed his defeat. It is true he made one more feeble attempt to
dispute, even in his flight, the honour of victory, by sending out his Croats next morning to the field; but the
sight of the Swedish army drawn up in order of battle, immediately dispersed these flying bands, and Duke
Bernard, by keeping possession of the field, and soon after by the capture of Leipzig, maintained indisputably
his claim to the title of victor.
But it was a dear conquest, a dearer triumph! It was not till the fury of the contest was over, that the full
weight of the loss sustained was felt, and the shout of triumph died away into a silent gloom of despair. He,
who had led them to the charge, returned not with them; there he lay upon the field which he had won,
mingled with the dead bodies of the common crowd. After a long and almost fruitless search, the corpse of
the king was discovered, not far from the great stone, which, for a hundred years before, had stood between
Lutzen and the Canal, and which, from the memorable disaster of that day, still bears the name of the Stone
of the Swede. Covered with blood and wounds, so as scarcely to be recognised, trampled beneath the horses'
hoofs, stripped by the rude hands of plunderers of its ornaments and clothes, his body was drawn from
beneath a heap of dead, conveyed to Weissenfels, and there delivered up to the lamentations of his soldiers,
and the last embraces of his queen. The first tribute had been paid to revenge, and blood had atoned for the
blood of the monarch; but now affection assumes its rights, and tears of grief must flow for the man. The
universal sorrow absorbs all individual woes. The generals, still stupefied by the unexpected blow, stood
speechless and motionless around his bier, and no one trusted himself enough to contemplate the full extent
of their loss.
The Emperor, we are told by Khevenhuller, showed symptoms of deep, and apparently sincere feeling, at the
sight of the king's doublet stained with blood, which had been stripped from him during the battle, and carried
to Vienna. "Willingly," said he, "would I have granted to the unfortunate prince a longer life, and a safe
return to his kingdom, had Germany been at peace." But when a trait, which is nothing more than a proof of a
yet lingering humanity, and which a mere regard to appearances and even selflove, would have extorted
from the most insensible, and the absence of which could exist only in the most inhuman heart, has, by a
Roman Catholic writer of modern times and acknowledged merit, been made the subject of the highest
eulogium, and compared with the magnanimous tears of Alexander, for the fall of Darius, our distrust is
excited of the other virtues of the writer's hero, and what is still worse, of his own ideas of moral dignity. But
even such praise, whatever its amount, is much for one, whose memory his biographer has to clear from the
suspicion of being privy to the assassination of a king.
It was scarcely to be expected, that the strong leaning of mankind to the marvellous, would leave to the
common course of nature the glory of ending the career of Gustavus Adolphus. The death of so formidable a
rival was too important an event for the Emperor, not to excite in his bitter opponent a ready suspicion, that
what was so much to his interests, was also the result of his instigation. For the execution, however, of this
dark deed, the Emperor would require the aid of a foreign arm, and this it was generally believed he had
found in Francis Albert, Duke of Saxe Lauenburg. The rank of the latter permitted him a free access to the
king's person, while it at the same time seemed to place him above the suspicion of so foul a deed. This
prince, however, was in fact not incapable of this atrocity, and he had moreover sufficient motives for its
commission.
Francis Albert, the youngest of four sons of Francis II, Duke of Lauenburg, and related by the mother's side
to the race of Vasa, had, in his early years, found a most friendly reception at the Swedish court. Some
offence which he had committed against Gustavus Adolphus, in the queen's chamber, was, it is said, repaid
by this fiery youth with a box on the ear; which, though immediately repented of, and amply apologized for,
laid the foundation of an irreconcileable hate in the vindictive heart of the duke. Francis Albert subsequently
entered the imperial service, where he rose to the command of a regiment, and formed a close intimacy with
Wallenstein, and condescended to be the instrument of a secret negociation with the Saxon court, which did
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little honour to his rank. Without any sufficient cause being assigned, he suddenly quitted the Austrian
service, and appeared in the king's camp at Nuremberg, to offer his services as a volunteer. By his show of
zeal for the Protestant cause, and prepossessing and flattering deportment, he gained the heart of the king,
who, warned in vain by Oxenstiern, continued to lavish his favour and friendship on this suspicious new
comer. The battle of Lutzen soon followed, in which Francis Albert, like an evil genius, kept close to the
king's side and did not leave him till he fell. He owed, it was thought, his own safety amidst the fire of the
enemy, to a green sash which he wore, the colour of the Imperialists. He was at any rate the first to convey to
his friend Wallenstein the intelligence of the king's death. After the battle, he exchanged the Swedish service
for the Saxon; and, after the murder of Wallenstein, being charged with being an accomplice of that general,
he only escaped the sword of justice by abjuring his faith. His last appearance in life was as commander of an
imperial army in Silesia, where he died of the wounds he had received before Schweidnitz. It requires some
effort to believe in the innocence of a man, who had run through a career like this, of the act charged against
him; but, however great may be the moral and physical possibility of his committing such a crime, it must
still be allowed that there are no certain grounds for imputing it to him. Gustavus Adolphus, it is well known,
exposed himself to danger, like the meanest soldier in his army, and where thousands fell, he, too, might
naturally meet his death. How it reached him, remains indeed buried in mystery; but here, more than
anywhere, does the maxim apply, that where the ordinary course of things is fully sufficient to account for the
fact, the honour of human nature ought not to be stained by any suspicion of moral atrocity.
But by whatever hand he fell, his extraordinary destiny must appear a great interposition of Providence.
History, too often confined to the ungrateful task of analyzing the uniform play of human passions, is
occasionally rewarded by the appearance of events, which strike like a hand from heaven, into the nicely
adjusted machinery of human plans, and carry the contemplative mind to a higher order of things. Of this
kind, is the sudden retirement of Gustavus Adolphus from the scene; stopping for a time the whole
movement of the political machine, and disappointing all the calculations of human prudence. Yesterday, the
very soul, the great and animating principle of his own creation; today, struck unpitiably to the ground in the
very midst of his eagle flight; untimely torn from a whole world of great designs, and from the ripening
harvest of his expectations, he left his bereaved party disconsolate; and the proud edifice of his past greatness
sunk into ruins. The Protestant party had identified its hopes with its invincible leader, and scarcely can it
now separate them from him; with him, they now fear all good fortune is buried. But it was no longer the
benefactor of Germany who fell at Lutzen: the beneficent part of his career, Gustavus Adolphus had already
terminated; and now the greatest service which he could render to the liberties of Germany was to die.
The allengrossing power of an individual was at an end, but many came forward to essay their strength; the
equivocal assistance of an overpowerful protector, gave place to a more noble selfexertion on the part of
the Estates; and those who were formerly the mere instruments of his aggrandizement, now began to work for
themselves. They now looked to their own exertions for the emancipation, which could not be received
without danger from the hand of the mighty; and the Swedish power, now incapable of sinking into the
oppressor, was henceforth restricted to the more modest part of an ally.
The ambition of the Swedish monarch aspired unquestionably to establish a power within Germany, and to
attain a firm footing in the centre of the empire, which was inconsistent with the liberties of the Estates. His
aim was the imperial crown; and this dignity, supported by his power, and maintained by his energy and
activity, would in his hands be liable to more abuse than had ever been feared from the House of Austria.
Born in a foreign country, educated in the maxims of arbitrary power, and by principles and enthusiasm a
determined enemy to Popery, he was ill qualified to maintain inviolate the constitution of the German States,
or to respect their liberties. The coercive homage which Augsburg, with many other cities, was forced to pay
to the Swedish crown, bespoke the conqueror, rather than the protector of the empire; and this town, prouder
of the title of a royal city, than of the higher dignity of the freedom of the empire, flattered itself with the
anticipation of becoming the capital of his future kingdom. His illdisguised attempts upon the Electorate of
Mentz, which he first intended to bestow upon the Elector of Brandenburg, as the dower of his daughter
Christina, and afterwards destined for his chancellor and friend Oxenstiern, evinced plainly what liberties he
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was disposed to take with the constitution of the empire. His allies, the Protestant princes, had claims on his
gratitude, which could be satisfied only at the expense of their Roman Catholic neighbours, and particularly
of the immediate Ecclesiastical Chapters; and it seems probable a plan was early formed for dividing the
conquered provinces, (after the precedent of the barbarian hordes who overran the German empire,) as a
common spoil, among the German and Swedish confederates. In his treatment of the Elector Palatine, he
entirely belied the magnanimity of the hero, and forgot the sacred character of a protector. The Palatinate was
in his hands, and the obligations both of justice and honour demanded its full and immediate restoration to
the legitimate sovereign. But, by a subtlety unworthy of a great mind, and disgraceful to the honourable title
of protector of the oppressed, he eluded that obligation. He treated the Palatinate as a conquest wrested from
the enemy, and thought that this circumstance gave him a right to deal with it as he pleased. He surrendered it
to the Elector as a favour, not as a debt; and that, too, as a Swedish fief, fettered by conditions which
diminished half its value, and degraded this unfortunate prince into a humble vassal of Sweden. One of these
conditions obliged the Elector, after the conclusion of the war, to furnish, along with the other princes, his
contribution towards the maintenance of the Swedish army, a condition which plainly indicates the fate
which, in the event of the ultimate success of the king, awaited Germany. His sudden disappearance secured
the liberties of Germany, and saved his reputation, while it probably spared him the mortification of seeing
his own allies in arms against him, and all the fruits of his victories torn from him by a disadvantageous
peace. Saxony was already disposed to abandon him, Denmark viewed his success with alarm and jealousy;
and even France, the firmest and most potent of his allies, terrified at the rapid growth of his power and the
imperious tone which he assumed, looked around at the very moment he past the Lech, for foreign alliances,
in order to check the progress of the Goths, and restore to Europe the balance of power.
Book IV.
The weak bond of union, by which Gustavus Adolphus contrived to hold together the Protestant members of
the empire, was dissolved by his death: the allies were now again at liberty, and their alliance, to last, must be
formed anew. By the former event, if unremedied, they would lose all the advantages they had gained at the
cost of so much bloodshed, and expose themselves to the inevitable danger of becoming one after the other
the prey of an enemy, whom, by their union alone, they had been able to oppose and to master. Neither
Sweden, nor any of the states of the empire, was singly a match with the Emperor and the League; and, by
seeking a peace under the present state of things, they would necessarily be obliged to receive laws from the
enemy. Union was, therefore, equally indispensable, either for concluding a peace or continuing the war. But
a peace, sought under the present circumstances, could not fail to be disadvantageous to the allied powers.
With the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the enemy had formed new hopes; and however gloomy might be the
situation of his affairs after the battle of Lutzen, still the death of his dreaded rival was an event too disastrous
to the allies, and too favourable for the Emperor, not to justify him in entertaining the most brilliant
expectations, and not to encourage him to the prosecution of the war. Its inevitable consequence, for the
moment at least, must be want of union among the allies, and what might not the Emperor and the League
gain from such a division of their enemies? He was not likely to sacrifice such prospects, as the present turn
of affairs held out to him, for any peace, not highly beneficial to himself; and such a peace the allies would
not be disposed to accept. They naturally determined, therefore, to continue the war, and for this purpose, the
maintenance of the existing union was acknowledged to be indispensable.
But how was this union to be renewed? and whence were to be derived the necessary means for continuing
the war? It was not the power of Sweden, but the talents and personal influence of its late king, which had
given him so overwhelming an influence in Germany, so great a command over the minds of men; and even
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he had innumerable difficulties to overcome, before he could establish among the states even a weak and
wavering alliance. With his death vanished all, which his personal qualities alone had rendered practicable;
and the mutual obligation of the states seemed to cease with the hopes on which it had been founded. Several
impatiently threw off the yoke which had always been irksome; others hastened to seize the helm which they
had unwillingly seen in the hands of Gustavus, but which, during his lifetime, they did not dare to dispute
with him. Some were tempted, by the seductive promises of the Emperor, to abandon the alliance; others,
oppressed by the heavy burdens of a fourteen years' war, longed for the repose of peace, upon any conditions,
however ruinous. The generals of the army, partly German princes, acknowledged no common head, and no
one would stoop to receive orders from another. Unanimity vanished alike from the cabinet and the field, and
their common weal was threatened with ruin, by the spirit of disunion.
Gustavus had left no male heir to the crown of Sweden: his daughter Christina, then six years old, was the
natural heir. The unavoidable weakness of a regency, suited ill with that energy and resolution, which
Sweden would be called upon to display in this trying conjuncture. The wide reaching mind of Gustavus
Adolphus had raised this unimportant, and hitherto unknown kingdom, to a rank among the powers of
Europe, which it could not retain without the fortune and genius of its author, and from which it could not
recede, without a humiliating confession of weakness. Though the German war had been conducted chiefly
on the resources of Germany, yet even the small contribution of men and money, which Sweden furnished,
had sufficed to exhaust the finances of that poor kingdom, and the peasantry groaned beneath the imposts
necessarily laid upon them. The plunder gained in Germany enriched only a few individuals, among the
nobles and the soldiers, while Sweden itself remained poor as before. For a time, it is true, the national glory
reconciled the subject to these burdens, and the sums exacted, seemed but as a loan placed at interest, in the
fortunate hand of Gustavus Adolphus, to be richly repaid by the grateful monarch at the conclusion of a
glorious peace. But with the king's death this hope vanished, and the deluded people now loudly demanded
relief from their burdens.
But the spirit of Gustavus Adolphus still lived in the men to whom he had confided the administration of the
kingdom. However dreadful to them, and unexpected, was the intelligence of his death, it did not deprive
them of their manly courage; and the spirit of ancient Rome, under the invasion of Brennus and Hannibal,
animated this noble assembly. The greater the price, at which these hardgained advantages had been
purchased, the less readily could they reconcile themselves to renounce them: not unrevenged was a king to
be sacrificed. Called on to choose between a doubtful and exhausting war, and a profitable but disgraceful
peace, the Swedish council of state boldly espoused the side of danger and honour; and with agreeable
surprise, men beheld this venerable senate acting with all the energy and enthusiasm of youth. Surrounded
with watchful enemies, both within and without, and threatened on every side with danger, they armed
themselves against them all, with equal prudence and heroism, and laboured to extend their kingdom, even at
the moment when they had to struggle for its existence.
The decease of the king, and the minority of his daughter Christina, renewed the claims of Poland to the
Swedish throne; and King Ladislaus, the son of Sigismund, spared no intrigues to gain a party in Sweden. On
this ground, the regency lost no time in proclaiming the young queen, and arranging the administration of the
regency. All the officers of the kingdom were summoned to do homage to their new princess; all
correspondence with Poland prohibited, and the edicts of previous monarchs against the heirs of Sigismund,
confirmed by a solemn act of the nation. The alliance with the Czar of Muscovy was carefully renewed, in
order, by the arms of this prince, to keep the hostile Poles in check. The death of Gustavus Adolphus had put
an end to the jealousy of Denmark, and removed the grounds of alarm which had stood in the way of a good
understanding between the two states. The representations by which the enemy sought to stir up Christian IV.
against Sweden were no longer listened to; and the strong wish the Danish monarch entertained for the
marriage of his son Ulrick with the young princess, combined, with the dictates of a sounder policy, to incline
him to a neutrality. At the same time, England, Holland, and France came forward with the gratifying
assurances to the regency of continued friendship and support, and encouraged them, with one voice, to
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prosecute with activity the war, which hitherto had been conducted with so much glory. Whatever reason
France might have to congratulate itself on the death of the Swedish conqueror, it was as fully sensible of the
expediency of maintaining the alliance with Sweden. Without exposing itself to great danger, it could not
allow the power of Sweden to sink in Germany. Want of resources of its own, would either drive Sweden to
conclude a hasty and disadvantageous peace with Austria, and then all the past efforts to lower the
ascendancy of this dangerous power would be thrown away; or necessity and despair would drive the armies
to extort from the Roman Catholic states the means of support, and France would then be regarded as the
betrayer of those very states, who had placed themselves under her powerful protection. The death of
Gustavus, far from breaking up the alliance between France and Sweden, had only rendered it more necessary
for both, and more profitable for France. Now, for the first time, since he was dead who had stretched his
protecting arm over Germany, and guarded its frontiers against the encroaching designs of France, could the
latter safely pursue its designs upon Alsace, and thus be enabled to sell its aid to the German Protestants at a
dearer rate.
Strengthened by these alliances, secured in its interior, and defended from without by strong frontier
garrisons and fleets, the regency did not delay an instant to continue a war, by which Sweden had little of its
own to lose, while, if success attended its arms, one or more of the German provinces might be won, either as
a conquest, or indemnification of its expenses. Secure amidst its seas, Sweden, even if driven out of
Germany, would scarcely be exposed to greater peril, than if it voluntarily retired from the contest, while the
former measure was as honourable, as the latter was disgraceful. The more boldness the regency displayed,
the more confidence would they inspire among their confederates, the more respect among their enemies, and
the more favourable conditions might they anticipate in the event of peace. If they found themselves too weak
to execute the wideranging projects of Gustavus, they at least owed it to this lofty model to do their utmost,
and to yield to no difficulty short of absolute necessity. Alas, that motives of selfinterest had too great a
share in this noble determination, to demand our unqualified admiration! For those who had nothing
themselves to suffer from the calamities of war, but were rather to be enriched by it, it was an easy matter to
resolve upon its continuation; for the German empire was, in the end, to defray the expenses; and the
provinces on which they reckoned, would be cheaply purchased with the few troops they sacrificed to them,
and with the generals who were placed at the head of armies, composed for the most part of Germans, and
with the honourable superintendence of all the operations, both military and political.
But this superintendence was irreconcileable with the distance of the Swedish regency from the scene of
action, and with the slowness which necessarily accompanies all the movements of a council.
To one comprehensive mind must be intrusted the management of Swedish interests in Germany, and with
full powers to determine at discretion all questions of war and peace, the necessary alliances, or the
acquisitions made. With dictatorial power, and with the whole influence of the crown which he was to
represent, must this important magistrate be invested, in order to maintain its dignity, to enforce united and
combined operations, to give effect to his orders, and to supply the place of the monarch whom he succeeded.
Such a man was found in the Chancellor Oxenstiern, the first minister, and what is more, the friend of the
deceased king, who, acquainted with all the secrets of his master, versed in the politics of Germany, and in
the relations of all the states of Europe, was unquestionably the fittest instrument to carry out the plans of
Gustavus Adolphus in their full extent.
Oxenstiern was on his way to Upper Germany, in order to assemble the four Upper Circles, when the news of
the king's death reached him at Hanau. This was a heavy blow, both to the friend and the statesman. Sweden,
indeed, had lost but a king, Germany a protector; but Oxenstiern, the author of his fortunes, the friend of his
soul, and the object of his admiration. Though the greatest sufferer in the general loss, he was the first who by
his energy rose from the blow, and the only one qualified to repair it. His penetrating glance foresaw all the
obstacles which would oppose the execution of his plans, the discouragement of the estates, the intrigues of
hostile courts, the breaking up of the confederacy, the jealousy of the leaders, and the dislike of princes of the
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empire to submit to foreign authority. But even this deep insight into the existing state of things, which
revealed the whole extent of the evil, showed him also the means by which it might be overcome. It was
essential to revive the drooping courage of the weaker states, to meet the secret machinations of the enemy, to
allay the jealousy of the more powerful allies, to rouse the friendly powers, and France in particular, to active
assistance; but above all, to repair the ruined edifice of the German alliance, and to reunite the scattered
strength of the party by a close and permanent bond of union. The dismay which the loss of their leader
occasioned the German Protestants, might as readily dispose them to a closer alliance with Sweden, as to a
hasty peace with the Emperor; and it depended entirely upon the course pursued, which of these alternatives
they would adopt. Every thing might be lost by the slightest sign of despondency; nothing, but the confidence
which Sweden showed in herself, could kindle among the Germans a noble feeling of selfconfidence. All
the attempts of Austria, to detach these princes from the Swedish alliance, would be unavailing, the moment
their eyes became opened to their true interests, and they were instigated to a public and formal breach with
the Emperor.
Before these measures could be taken, and the necessary points settled between the regency and their
minister, a precious opportunity of action would, it is true, be lost to the Swedish army, of which the enemy
would be sure to take the utmost advantage. It was, in short, in the power of the Emperor totally to ruin the
Swedish interest in Germany, and to this he was actually invited by the prudent councils of the Duke of
Friedland. Wallenstein advised him to proclaim a universal amnesty, and to meet the Protestant states with
favourable conditions. In the first consternation produced by the fall of Gustavus Adolphus, such a
declaration would have had the most powerful effects, and probably would have brought the wavering states
back to their allegiance. But blinded by this unexpected turn of fortune, and infatuated by Spanish counsels,
he anticipated a more brilliant issue from war, and, instead of listening to these propositions of an
accommodation, he hastened to augment his forces. Spain, enriched by the grant of the tenth of the
ecclesiastical possessions, which the pope confirmed, sent him considerable supplies, negociated for him at
the Saxon court, and hastily levied troops for him in Italy to be employed in Germany. The Elector of Bavaria
also considerably increased his military force; and the restless disposition of the Duke of Lorraine did not
permit him to remain inactive in this favourable change of fortune. But while the enemy were thus busy to
profit by the disaster of Sweden, Oxenstiern was diligent to avert its most fatal consequences.
Less apprehensive of open enemies, than of the jealousy of the friendly powers, he left Upper Germany,
which he had secured by conquests and alliances, and set out in person to prevent a total defection of the
Lower German states, or, what would have been almost equally ruinous to Sweden, a private alliance among
themselves. Offended at the boldness with which the chancellor assumed the direction of affairs, and
inwardly exasperated at the thought of being dictated to by a Swedish nobleman, the Elector of Saxony again
meditated a dangerous separation from Sweden; and the only question in his mind was, whether he should
make full terms with the Emperor, or place himself at the head of the Protestants and form a third party in
Germany. Similar ideas were cherished by Duke Ulric of Brunswick, who, indeed, showed them openly
enough by forbidding the Swedes from recruiting within his dominions, and inviting the Lower Saxon states
to Luneburg, for the purpose of forming a confederacy among themselves. The Elector of Brandenburg,
jealous of the influence which Saxony was likely to attain in Lower Germany, alone manifested any zeal for
the interests of the Swedish throne, which, in thought, he already destined for his son. At the court of Saxony,
Oxenstiern was no doubt honourably received; but, notwithstanding the personal efforts of the Elector of
Brandenburg, empty promises of continued friendship were all which he could obtain. With the Duke of
Brunswick he was more successful, for with him he ventured to assume a bolder tone. Sweden was at the
time in possession of the See of Magdeburg, the bishop of which had the power of assembling the Lower
Saxon circle. The chancellor now asserted the rights of the crown, and by this spirited proceeding, put a stop
for the present to this dangerous assembly designed by the duke. The main object, however, of his present
journey and of his future endeavours, a general confederacy of the Protestants, miscarried entirely, and he
was obliged to content himself with some unsteady alliances in the Saxon circles, and with the weaker
assistance of Upper Germany.
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As the Bavarians were too powerful on the Danube, the assembly of the four Upper Circles, which should
have been held at Ulm, was removed to Heilbronn, where deputies of more than twelve cities of the empire,
with a brilliant crowd of doctors, counts, and princes, attended. The ambassadors of foreign powers likewise,
France, England, and Holland, attended this Congress, at which Oxenstiern appeared in person, with all the
splendour of the crown whose representative he was. He himself opened the proceedings, and conducted the
deliberations. After receiving from all the assembled estates assurances of unshaken fidelity, perseverance,
and unity, he required of them solemnly and formally to declare the Emperor and the league as enemies. But
desirable as it was for Sweden to exasperate the illfeeling between the emperor and the estates into a formal
rupture, the latter, on the other hand, were equally indisposed to shut out the possibility of reconciliation, by
so decided a step, and to place themselves entirely in the hands of the Swedes. They maintained, that any
formal declaration of war was useless and superfluous, where the act would speak for itself, and their
firmness on this point silenced at last the chancellor. Warmer disputes arose on the third and principal article
of the treaty, concerning the means of prosecuting the war, and the quota which the several states ought to
furnish for the support of the army. Oxenstiern's maxim, to throw as much as possible of the common burden
on the states, did not suit very well with their determination to give as little as possible. The Swedish
chancellor now experienced, what had been felt by thirty emperors before him, to their cost, that of all
difficult undertakings, the most difficult was to extort money from the Germans. Instead of granting the
necessary sums for the new armies to be raised, they eloquently dwelt upon the calamities occasioned by the
former, and demanded relief from the old burdens, when they were required to submit to new. The irritation
which the chancellor's demand for money raised among the states, gave rise to a thousand complaints; and the
outrages committed by the troops, in their marches and quarters, were dwelt upon with a startling minuteness
and truth.
In the service of two absolute monarchs, Oxenstiern had but little opportunity to become accustomed to the
formalities and cautious proceedings of republican deliberations, or to bear opposition with patience. Ready
to act, the instant the necessity of action was apparent, and inflexible in his resolution, when he had once
taken it, he was at a loss to comprehend the inconsistency of most men, who, while they desire the end, are
yet averse to the means. Prompt and impetuous by nature, he was so on this occasion from principle; for
every thing depended on concealing the weakness of Sweden, under a firm and confident speech, and by
assuming the tone of a lawgiver, really to become so. It was nothing wonderful, therefore, if, amidst these
interminable discussions with German doctors and deputies, he was entirely out of his sphere, and if the
deliberateness which distinguishes the character of the Germans in their public deliberations, had driven him
almost to despair. Without respecting a custom, to which even the most powerful of the emperors had been
obliged to conform, he rejected all written deliberations which suited so well with the national slowness of
resolve. He could not conceive how ten days could be spent in debating a measure, which with himself was
decided upon its bare suggestion. Harshly, however, as he treated the States, he found them ready enough to
assent to his fourth motion, which concerned himself. When he pointed out the necessity of giving a head and
a director to the new confederation, that honour was unanimously assigned to Sweden, and he himself was
humbly requested to give to the common cause the benefit of his enlightened experience, and to take upon
himself the burden of the supreme command. But in order to prevent his abusing the great powers thus
conferred upon him, it was proposed, not without French influence, to appoint a number of overseers, in fact,
under the name of assistants, to control the expenditure of the common treasure, and to consult with him as to
the levies, marches, and quarterings of the troops. Oxenstiern long and strenuously resisted this limitation of
his authority, which could not fail to trammel him in the execution of every enterprise requiring promptitude
or secrecy, and at last succeeded, with difficulty, in obtaining so far a modification of it, that his management
in affairs of war was to be uncontrolled. The chancellor finally approached the delicate point of the
indemnification which Sweden was to expect at the conclusion of the war, from the gratitude of the allies,
and flattered himself with the hope that Pomerania, the main object of Sweden, would be assigned to her, and
that he would obtain from the provinces, assurances of effectual cooperation in its acquisition. But he could
obtain nothing more than a vague assurance, that in a general peace the interests of all parties would be
attended to. That on this point, the caution of the estates was not owing to any regard for the constitution of
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the empire, became manifest from the liberality they evinced towards the chancellor, at the expense of the
most sacred laws of the empire. They were ready to grant him the archbishopric of Mentz, (which he already
held as a conquest,) and only with difficulty did the French ambassador succeed in preventing a step, which
was as impolitic as it was disgraceful. Though on the whole, the result of the congress had fallen far short of
Oxenstiern's expectations, he had at least gained for himself and his crown his main object, namely, the
direction of the whole confederacy; he had also succeeded in strengthening the bond of union between the
four upper circles, and obtained from the states a yearly contribution of two millions and a half of dollars, for
the maintenance of the army.
These concessions on the part of the States, demanded some return from Sweden. A few weeks after the
death of Gustavus Adolphus, sorrow ended the days of the unfortunate Elector Palatine. For eight months he
had swelled the pomp of his protector's court, and expended on it the small remainder of his patrimony. He
was, at last, approaching the goal of his wishes, and the prospect of a brighter future was opening, when death
deprived him of his protector. But what he regarded as the greatest calamity, was highly favourable to his
heirs. Gustavus might venture to delay the restoration of his dominions, or to load the gift with hard
conditions; but Oxenstiern, to whom the friendship of England, Holland, and Brandenburg, and the good
opinion of the Reformed States were indispensable, felt the necessity of immediately fulfilling the obligations
of justice. At this assembly, at Heilbronn, therefore, he engaged to surrender to Frederick's heirs the whole
Palatinate, both the part already conquered, and that which remained to be conquered, with the exception of
Manheim, which the Swedes were to hold, until they should be indemnified for their expenses. The
Chancellor did not confine his liberality to the family of the Palatine alone; the other allied princes received
proofs, though at a later period, of the gratitude of Sweden, which, however, she dispensed at little cost to
herself.
Impartiality, the most sacred obligation of the historian, here compels us to an admission, not much to the
honour of the champions of German liberty. However the Protestant Princes might boast of the justice of their
cause, and the sincerity of their conviction, still the motives from which they acted were selfish enough; and
the desire of stripping others of their possessions, had at least as great a share in the commencement of
hostilities, as the fear of being deprived of their own. Gustavus soon found that he might reckon much more
on these selfish motives, than on their patriotic zeal, and did not fail to avail himself of them. Each of his
confederates received from him the promise of some possession, either already wrested, or to be afterwards
taken from the enemy; and death alone prevented him from fulfilling these engagements. What prudence had
suggested to the king, necessity now prescribed to his successor. If it was his object to continue the war, he
must be ready to divide the spoil among the allies, and promise them advantages from the confusion which it
was his object to continue. Thus he promised to the Landgrave of Hesse, the abbacies of Paderborn, Corvey,
Munster, and Fulda; to Duke Bernard of Weimar, the Franconian Bishoprics; to the Duke of Wirtemberg, the
Ecclesiastical domains, and the Austrian counties lying within his territories, all under the title of fiefs of
Sweden. This spectacle, so strange and so dishonourable to the German character, surprised the Chancellor,
who found it difficult to repress his contempt, and on one occasion exclaimed, "Let it be writ in our records,
for an everlasting memorial, that a German prince made such a request of a Swedish nobleman, and that the
Swedish nobleman granted it to the German upon German ground!"
After these successful measures, he was in a condition to take the field, and prosecute the war with fresh
vigour. Soon after the victory at Lutzen, the troops of Saxony and Lunenburg united with the Swedish main
body; and the Imperialists were, in a short time, totally driven from Saxony. The united army again divided:
the Saxons marched towards Lusatia and Silesia, to act in conjunction with Count Thurn against the
Austrians in that quarter; a part of the Swedish army was led by the Duke of Weimar into Franconia, and the
other by George, Duke of Brunswick, into Westphalia and Lower Saxony.
The conquests on the Lech and the Danube, during Gustavus's expedition into Saxony, had been maintained
by the Palatine of Birkenfeld, and the Swedish General Banner, against the Bavarians; but unable to hold
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their ground against the victorious progress of the latter, supported as they were by the bravery and military
experience of the Imperial General Altringer, they were under the necessity of summoning the Swedish
General Horn to their assistance, from Alsace. This experienced general having captured the towns of
Benfeld, Schlettstadt, Colmar, and Hagenau, committed the defence of them to the Rhinegrave Otto Louis,
and hastily crossed the Rhine to form a junction with Banner's army. But although the combined force
amounted to more than 16,000, they could not prevent the enemy from obtaining a strong position on the
Swabian frontier, taking Kempten, and being joined by seven regiments from Bohemia. In order to retain the
command of the important banks of the Lech and the Danube, they were under the necessity of recalling the
Rhinegrave Otto Louis from Alsace, where he had, after the departure of Horn, found it difficult to defend
himself against the exasperated peasantry. With his army, he was now summoned to strengthen the army on
the Danube; and as even this reinforcement was insufficient, Duke Bernard of Weimar was earnestly pressed
to turn his arms into this quarter.
Duke Bernard, soon after the opening of the campaign of 1633, had made himself master of the town and
territory of Bamberg, and was now threatening Wurtzburg. But on receiving the summons of General Horn,
without delay he began his march towards the Danube, defeated on his way a Bavarian army under John de
Werth, and joined the Swedes near Donauwerth. This numerous force, commanded by excellent generals,
now threatened Bavaria with a fearful inroad. The bishopric of Eichstadt was completely overrun, and
Ingoldstadt was on the point of being delivered up by treachery to the Swedes. Altringer, fettered in his
movements by the express order of the Duke of Friedland, and left without assistance from Bohemia, was
unable to check the progress of the enemy. The most favourable circumstances combined to further the
progress of the Swedish arms in this quarter, when the operations of the army were at once stopped by a
mutiny among the officers.
All the previous successes in Germany were owing altogether to arms; the greatness of Gustavus himself was
the work of the army, the fruit of their discipline, their bravery, and their persevering courage under
numberless dangers and privations. However wisely his plans were laid in the cabinet, it was to the army
ultimately that he was indebted for their execution; and the expanding designs of the general did but
continually impose new burdens on the soldiers. All the decisive advantages of the war, had been violently
gained by a barbarous sacrifice of the soldiers' lives in winter campaigns, forced marches, stormings, and
pitched battles; for it was Gustavus's maxim never to decline a battle, so long as it cost him nothing but men.
The soldiers could not long be kept ignorant of their own importance, and they justly demanded a share in the
spoil which had been won by their own blood. Yet, frequently, they hardly received their pay; and the
rapacity of individual generals, or the wants of the state, generally swallowed up the greater part of the sums
raised by contributions, or levied upon the conquered provinces. For all the privations he endured, the soldier
had no other recompense than the doubtful chance either of plunder or promotion, in both of which he was
often disappointed. During the lifetime of Gustavus Adolphus, the combined influence of fear and hope had
suppressed any open complaint, but after his death, the murmurs were loud and universal; and the soldiery
seized the most dangerous moment to impress their superiors with a sense of their importance. Two officers,
Pfuhl and Mitschefal, notorious as restless characters, even during the King's life, set the example in the camp
on the Danube, which in a few days was imitated by almost all the officers of the army. They solemnly bound
themselves to obey no orders, till these arrears, now outstanding for months, and even years, should be paid
up, and a gratuity, either in money or lands, made to each man, according to his services. "Immense sums,"
they said, "were daily raised by contributions, and all dissipated by a few. They were called out to serve
amidst frost and snow, and no reward requited their incessant labours. The soldiers' excesses at Heilbronn had
been blamed, but no one ever talked of their services. The world rung with the tidings of conquests and
victories, but it was by their hands that they had been fought and won."
The number of the malcontents daily increased; and they even attempted by letters, (which were fortunately
intercepted,) to seduce the armies on the Rhine and in Saxony. Neither the representations of Bernard of
Weimar, nor the stern reproaches of his harsher associate in command, could suppress this mutiny, while the
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vehemence of Horn seemed only to increase the insolence of the insurgents. The conditions they insisted on,
were that certain towns should be assigned to each regiment for the payment of arrears. Four weeks were
allowed to the Swedish Chancellor to comply with these demands; and in case of refusal, they announced that
they would pay themselves, and never more draw a sword for Sweden.
These pressing demands, made at the very time when the military chest was exhausted, and credit at a low
ebb, greatly embarrassed the chancellor. The remedy, he saw, must be found quickly, before the contagion
should spread to the other troops, and he should be deserted by all his armies at once. Among all the Swedish
generals, there was only one of sufficient authority and influence with the soldiers to put an end to this
dispute. The Duke of Weimar was the favourite of the army, and his prudent moderation had won the
goodwill of the soldiers, while his military experience had excited their admiration. He now undertook the
task of appeasing the discontented troops; but, aware of his importance, he embraced the opportunity to make
advantageous stipulations for himself, and to make the embarrassment of the chancellor subservient to his
own views.
Gustavus Adolphus had flattered him with the promise of the Duchy of Franconia, to be formed out of the
Bishoprics of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, and he now insisted on the performance of this pledge. He at the
same time demanded the chief command, as generalissimo of Sweden. The abuse which the Duke of Weimar
thus made of his influence, so irritated Oxenstiern, that, in the first moment of his displeasure, he gave him
his dismissal from the Swedish service. But he soon thought better of it, and determined, instead of
sacrificing so important a leader, to attach him to the Swedish interests at any cost. He therefore granted to
him the Franconian bishoprics, as a fief of the Swedish crown, reserving, however, the two fortresses of
Wurtzburg and Koenigshofen, which were to be garrisoned by the Swedes; and also engaged, in name of the
Swedish crown, to secure these territories to the duke. His demand of the supreme authority was evaded on
some specious pretext. The duke did not delay to display his gratitude for this valuable grant, and by his
influence and activity soon restored tranquillity to the army. Large sums of money, and still more extensive
estates, were divided among the officers, amounting in value to about five millions of dollars, and to which
they had no other right but that of conquest. In the mean time, however, the opportunity for a great
undertaking had been lost, and the united generals divided their forces to oppose the enemy in other quarters.
Gustavus Horn, after a short inroad into the Upper Palatinate, and the capture of Neumark, directed his march
towards the Swabian frontier, where the Imperialists, strongly reinforced, threatened Wuertemberg. At his
approach, the enemy retired to the Lake of Constance, but only to show the Swedes the road into a district
hitherto unvisited by war. A post on the entrance to Switzerland, would be highly serviceable to the Swedes,
and the town of Kostnitz seemed peculiarly well fitted to be a point of communication between him and the
confederated cantons. Accordingly, Gustavus Horn immediately commenced the siege of it; but destitute of
artillery, for which he was obliged to send to Wirtemberg, he could not press the attack with sufficient vigour,
to prevent the enemy from throwing supplies into the town, which the lake afforded them convenient
opportunity of doing. He, therefore, after an ineffectual attempt, quitted the place and its neighbourhood, and
hastened to meet a more threatening danger upon the Danube.
At the Emperor's instigation, the Cardinal Infante, the brother of Philip IV. of Spain, and the Viceroy of
Milan, had raised an army of 14,000 men, intended to act upon the Rhine, independently of Wallenstein, and
to protect Alsace. This force now appeared in Bavaria, under the command of the Duke of Feria, a Spaniard;
and, that they might be directly employed against the Swedes, Altringer was ordered to join them with his
corps. Upon the first intelligence of their approach, Horn had summoned to his assistance the Palsgrave of
Birkenfeld, from the Rhine; and being joined by him at Stockach, boldly advanced to meet the enemy's army
of 30,000 men.
The latter had taken the route across the Danube into Swabia, where Gustavus Horn came so close upon
them, that the two armies were only separated from each other by half a German mile. But, instead of
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accepting the offer of battle, the Imperialists moved by the Forest towns towards Briesgau and Alsace, where
they arrived in time to relieve Breysack, and to arrest the victorious progress of the Rhinegrave, Otto Louis.
The latter had, shortly before, taken the Forest towns, and, supported by the Palatine of Birkenfeld, who had
liberated the Lower Palatinate and beaten the Duke of Lorraine out of the field, had once more given the
superiority to the Swedish arms in that quarter. He was now forced to retire before the superior numbers of
the enemy; but Horn and Birkenfeld quickly advanced to his support, and the Imperialists, after a brief
triumph, were again expelled from Alsace. The severity of the autumn, in which this hapless retreat had to be
conducted, proved fatal to most of the Italians; and their leader, the Duke of Feria, died of grief at the failure
of his enterprise.
In the mean time, Duke Bernard of Weimar had taken up his position on the Danube, with eighteen regiments
of infantry and 140 squadrons of horse, to cover Franconia, and to watch the movements of the
ImperialBavarian army upon that river. No sooner had Altringer departed, to join the Italians under Feria,
than Bernard, profiting by his absence, hastened across the Danube, and with the rapidity of lightning
appeared before Ratisbon. The possession of this town would ensure the success of the Swedish designs upon
Bavaria and Austria; it would establish them firmly on the Danube, and provide a safe refuge in case of
defeat, while it alone could give permanence to their conquests in that quarter. To defend Ratisbon, was the
urgent advice which the dying Tilly left to the Elector; and Gustavus Adolphus had lamented it as an
irreparable loss, that the Bavarians had anticipated him in taking possession of this place. Indescribable,
therefore, was the consternation of Maximilian, when Duke Bernard suddenly appeared before the town, and
prepared in earnest to besiege it.
The garrison consisted of not more than fifteen companies, mostly newlyraised soldiers; although that
number was more than sufficient to weary out an enemy of far superior force, if supported by welldisposed
and warlike inhabitants. But this was not the greatest danger which the Bavarian garrison had to contend
against. The Protestant inhabitants of Ratisbon, equally jealous of their civil and religious freedom, had
unwillingly submitted to the yoke of Bavaria, and had long looked with impatience for the appearance of a
deliverer. Bernard's arrival before the walls filled them with lively joy; and there was much reason to fear that
they would support the attempts of the besiegers without, by exciting a tumult within. In this perplexity, the
Elector addressed the most pressing entreaties to the Emperor and the Duke of Friedland to assist him, were it
only with 5,000 men. Seven messengers in succession were despatched by Ferdinand to Wallenstein, who
promised immediate succours, and even announced to the Elector the near advance of 12,000 men under
Gallas; but at the same time forbade that general, under pain of death, to march. Meanwhile the Bavarian
commandant of Ratisbon, in the hope of speedy assistance, made the best preparations for defence, armed the
Roman Catholic peasants, disarmed and carefully watched the Protestant citizens, lest they should attempt
any hostile design against the garrison. But as no relief arrived, and the enemy's artillery incessantly battered
the walls, he consulted his own safety, and that of the garrison, by an honourable capitulation, and abandoned
the Bavarian officials and ecclesiastics to the conqueror's mercy.
The possession of Ratisbon, enlarged the projects of the duke, and Bavaria itself now appeared too narrow a
field for his bold designs. He determined to penetrate to the frontiers of Austria, to arm the Protestant
peasantry against the Emperor, and restore to them their religious liberty. He had already taken Straubingen,
while another Swedish army was advancing successfully along the northern bank of the Danube. At the head
of his Swedes, bidding defiance to the severity of the weather, he reached the mouth of the Iser, which he
passed in the presence of the Bavarian General Werth, who was encamped on that river. Passau and Lintz
trembled for their fate; the terrified Emperor redoubled his entreaties and commands to Wallenstein, to hasten
with all speed to the relief of the hardpressed Bavarians. But here the victorious Bernard, of his own accord,
checked his career of conquest. Having in front of him the river Inn, guarded by a number of strong
fortresses, and behind him two hostile armies, a disaffected country, and the river Iser, while his rear was
covered by no tenable position, and no entrenchment could be made in the frozen ground, and threatened by
the whole force of Wallenstein, who had at last resolved to march to the Danube, by a timely retreat he
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escaped the danger of being cut off from Ratisbon, and surrounded by the enemy. He hastened across the Iser
to the Danube, to defend the conquests he had made in the Upper Palatinate against Wallenstein, and fully
resolved not to decline a battle, if necessary, with that general. But Wallenstein, who was not disposed for
any great exploits on the Danube, did not wait for his approach; and before the Bavarians could congratulate
themselves on his arrival, he suddenly withdrew again into Bohemia. The duke thus ended his victorious
campaign, and allowed his troops their wellearned repose in winter quarters upon an enemy's country.
While in Swabia the war was thus successfully conducted by Gustavus Horn, and on the Upper and Lower
Rhine by the Palatine of Birkenfeld, General Baudissen, and the Rhinegrave Otto Louis, and by Duke
Bernard on the Danube; the reputation of the Swedish arms was as gloriously sustained in Lower Saxony and
Westphalia by the Duke of Lunenburg and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel. The fortress of Hamel was taken
by Duke George, after a brave defence, and a brilliant victory obtained over the imperial General Gronsfeld,
by the united Swedish and Hessian armies, near Oldendorf. Count Wasaburg, a natural son of Gustavus
Adolphus, showed himself in this battle worthy of his descent. Sixteen pieces of cannon, the whole baggage
of the Imperialists, together with 74 colours, fell into the hands of the Swedes; 3,000 of the enemy perished
on the field, and nearly the same number were taken prisoners. The town of Osnaburg surrendered to the
Swedish Colonel Knyphausen, and Paderborn to the Landgrave of Hesse; while, on the other hand,
Bueckeburg, a very important place for the Swedes, fell into the hands of the Imperialists. The Swedish
banners were victorious in almost every quarter of Germany; and the year after the death of Gustavus, left no
trace of the loss which had been sustained in the person of that great leader.
In a review of the important events which signalized the campaign of 1633, the inactivity of a man, of whom
the highest expectations had been formed, justly excites astonishment. Among all the generals who
distinguished themselves in this campaign, none could be compared with Wallenstein, in experience, talents,
and reputation; and yet, after the battle of Lutzen, we lose sight of him entirely. The fall of his great rival had
left the whole theatre of glory open to him; all Europe was now attentively awaiting those exploits, which
should efface the remembrance of his defeat, and still prove to the world his military superiority.
Nevertheless, he continued inactive in Bohemia, while the Emperor's losses in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and
the Rhine, pressingly called for his presence a conduct equally unintelligible to friend and foe the
terror, and, at the same time, the last hope of the Emperor. After the defeat of Lutzen he had hastened into
Bohemia, where he instituted the strictest inquiry into the conduct of his officers in that battle. Those whom
the council of war declared guilty of misconduct, were put to death without mercy, those who had behaved
with bravery, rewarded with princely munificence, and the memory of the dead honoured by splendid
monuments. During the winter, he oppressed the imperial provinces by enormous contributions, and
exhausted the Austrian territories by his winter quarters, which he purposely avoided taking up in an enemy's
country. And in the spring of 1633, instead of being the first to open the campaign, with this wellchosen and
wellappointed army, and to make a worthy display of his great abilities, he was the last who appeared in the
field; and even then, it was an hereditary province of Austria, which he selected as the seat of war.
Of all the Austrian provinces, Silesia was most exposed to danger. Three different armies, a Swedish under
Count Thurn, a Saxon under Arnheim and the Duke of Lauenburg, and one of Brandenburg under Borgsdorf,
had at the same time carried the war into this country; they had already taken possession of the most
important places, and even Breslau had embraced the cause of the allies. But this crowd of commanders and
armies was the very means of saving this province to the Emperor; for the jealousy of the generals, and the
mutual hatred of the Saxons and the Swedes, never allowed them to act with unanimity. Arnheim and Thurn
contended for the chief command; the troops of Brandenburg and Saxony combined against the Swedes,
whom they looked upon as troublesome strangers who ought to be got rid of as soon as possible. The Saxons,
on the contrary, lived on a very intimate footing with the Imperialists, and the officers of both these hostile
armies often visited and entertained each other. The Imperialists were allowed to remove their property
without hindrance, and many did not affect to conceal that they had received large sums from Vienna. Among
such equivocal allies, the Swedes saw themselves sold and betrayed; and any great enterprise was out of the
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question, while so bad an understanding prevailed between the troops. General Arnheim, too, was absent the
greater part of the time; and when he at last returned, Wallenstein was fast approaching the frontiers with a
formidable force.
His army amounted to 40,000 men, while to oppose him the allies had only 24,000. They nevertheless
resolved to give him battle, and marched to Munsterberg, where he had formed an intrenched camp. But
Wallenstein remained inactive for eight days; he then left his intrenchments, and marched slowly and with
composure to the enemy's camp. But even after quitting his position, and when the enemy, emboldened by his
past delay, manfully prepared to receive him, he declined the opportunity of fighting. The caution with which
he avoided a battle was imputed to fear; but the wellestablished reputation of Wallenstein enabled him to
despise this suspicion. The vanity of the allies allowed them not to see that he purposely saved them a defeat,
because a victory at that time would not have served his own ends. To convince them of his superior power,
and that his inactivity proceeded not from any fear of them, he put to death the commander of a castle that
fell into his hands, because he had refused at once to surrender an untenable place.
For nine days, did the two armies remain within musketshot of each other, when Count Terzky, from the
camp of the Imperialists, appeared with a trumpeter in that of the allies, inviting General Arnheim to a
conference. The purport was, that Wallenstein, notwithstanding his superiority, was willing to agree to a
cessation of arms for six weeks. "He was come," he said, "to conclude a lasting peace with the Swedes, and
with the princes of the empire, to pay the soldiers, and to satisfy every one. All this was in his power; and if
the Austrian court hesitated to confirm his agreement, he would unite with the allies, and (as he privately
whispered to Arnheim) hunt the Emperor to the devil." At the second conference, he expressed himself still
more plainly to Count Thurn. "All the privileges of the Bohemians," he engaged, "should be confirmed anew,
the exiles recalled and restored to their estates, and he himself would be the first to resign his share of them.
The Jesuits, as the authors of all past grievances, should be banished, the Swedish crown indemnified by
stated payments, and all the superfluous troops on both sides employed against the Turks." The last article
explained the whole mystery. "If," he continued, "HE should obtain the crown of Bohemia, all the exiles
would have reason to applaud his generosity; perfect toleration of religions should be established within the
kingdom, the Palatine family be reinstated in its rights, and he would accept the Margraviate of Moravia as a
compensation for Mecklenburg. The allied armies would then, under his command, advance upon Vienna,
and sword in hand, compel the Emperor to ratify the treaty."
Thus was the veil at last removed from the schemes, over which he had brooded for years in mysterious
silence. Every circumstance now convinced him that not a moment was to be lost in its execution. Nothing
but a blind confidence in the good fortune and military genius of the Duke of Friedland, had induced the
Emperor, in the face of the remonstrances of Bavaria and Spain, and at the expense of his own reputation, to
confer upon this imperious leader such an unlimited command. But this belief in Wallenstein's being
invincible, had been much weakened by his inaction, and almost entirely overthrown by the defeat at Lutzen.
His enemies at the imperial court now renewed their intrigues; and the Emperor's disappointment at the
failure of his hopes, procured for their remonstrances a favourable reception. Wallenstein's whole conduct
was now reviewed with the most malicious criticism; his ambitious haughtiness, his disobedience to the
Emperor's orders, were recalled to the recollection of that jealous prince, as well as the complaints of the
Austrian subjects against his boundless oppression; his fidelity was questioned, and alarming hints thrown
out as to his secret views. These insinuations, which the conduct of the duke seemed but too well to justify,
failed not to make a deep impression on Ferdinand; but the step had been taken, and the great power with
which Wallenstein had been invested, could not be taken from him without danger. Insensibly to diminish
that power, was the only course that now remained, and, to effect this, it must in the first place be divided;
but, above all, the Emperor's present dependence on the good will of his general put an end to. But even this
right had been resigned in his engagement with Wallenstein, and the Emperor's own handwriting secured him
against every attempt to unite another general with him in the command, or to exercise any immediate act of
authority over the troops. As this disadvantageous contract could neither be kept nor broken, recourse was
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had to artifice. Wallenstein was Imperial Generalissimo in Germany, but his command extended no further,
and he could not presume to exercise any authority over a foreign army. A Spanish army was accordingly
raised in Milan, and marched into Germany under a Spanish general. Wallenstein now ceased to be
indispensable because he was no longer supreme, and in case of necessity, the Emperor was now provided
with the means of support even against him.
The duke quickly and deeply felt whence this blow came, and whither it was aimed. In vain did he protest
against this violation of the compact, to the Cardinal Infante; the Italian army continued its march, and he was
forced to detach General Altringer to join it with a reinforcement. He took care, indeed, so closely to fetter
the latter, as to prevent the Italian army from acquiring any great reputation in Alsace and Swabia; but this
bold step of the court awakened him from his security, and warned him of the approach of danger. That he
might not a second time be deprived of his command, and lose the fruit of all his labours, he must accelerate
the accomplishment of his long meditated designs. He secured the attachment of his troops by removing the
doubtful officers, and by his liberality to the rest. He had sacrificed to the welfare of the army every other
order in the state, every consideration of justice and humanity, and therefore he reckoned upon their gratitude.
At the very moment when he meditated an unparalleled act of ingratitude against the author of his own good
fortune, he founded all his hopes upon the gratitude which was due to himself.
The leaders of the Silesian armies had no authority from their principals to consent, on their own discretion,
to such important proposals as those of Wallenstein, and they did not even feel themselves warranted in
granting, for more than a fortnight, the cessation of hostilities which he demanded. Before the duke disclosed
his designs to Sweden and Saxony, he had deemed it advisable to secure the sanction of France to his bold
undertaking. For this purpose, a secret negociation had been carried on with the greatest possible caution and
distrust, by Count Kinsky with Feuquieres, the French ambassador at Dresden, and had terminated according
to his wishes. Feuquieres received orders from his court to promise every assistance on the part of France,
and to offer the duke a considerable pecuniary aid in case of need.
But it was this excessive caution to secure himself on all sides, that led to his ruin. The French ambassador
with astonishment discovered that a plan, which, more than any other, required secrecy, had been
communicated to the Swedes and the Saxons. And yet it was generally known that the Saxon ministry was in
the interests of the Emperor, and on the other hand, the conditions offered to the Swedes fell too far short of
their expectations to be likely to be accepted. Feuquieres, therefore, could not believe that the duke could be
serious in calculating upon the aid of the latter, and the silence of the former. He communicated accordingly
his doubts and anxieties to the Swedish chancellor, who equally distrusted the views of Wallenstein, and
disliked his plans. Although it was no secret to Oxenstiern, that the duke had formerly entered into a similar
negociation with Gustavus Adolphus, he could not credit the possibility of inducing a whole army to revolt,
and of his extravagant promises. So daring a design, and such imprudent conduct, seemed not to be consistent
with the duke's reserved and suspicious temper, and he was the more inclined to consider the whole as the
result of dissimulation and treachery, because he had less reason to doubt his prudence than his honesty.
Oxenstiern's doubts at last affected Arnheim himself, who, in full confidence in Wallenstein's sincerity, had
repaired to the chancellor at Gelnhausen, to persuade him to lend some of his best regiments to the duke, to
aid him in the execution of the plan. They began to suspect that the whole proposal was only a snare to
disarm the allies, and to betray the flower of their troops into the hands of the Emperor. Wallenstein's
wellknown character did not contradict the suspicion, and the inconsistencies in which he afterwards
involved himself, entirely destroyed all confidence in his sincerity. While he was endeavouring to draw the
Swedes into this alliance, and requiring the help of their best troops, he declared to Arnheim that they must
begin with expelling the Swedes from the empire; and while the Saxon officers, relying upon the security of
the truce, repaired in great numbers to his camp, he made an unsuccessful attempt to seize them. He was the
first to break the truce, which some months afterwards he renewed, though not without great difficulty. All
confidence in his sincerity was lost; his whole conduct was regarded as a tissue of deceit and low cunning,
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devised to weaken the allies and repair his own strength. This indeed he actually did effect, as his own army
daily augmented, while that of the allies was reduced nearly one half by desertion and bad provisions. But he
did not make that use of his superiority which Vienna expected. When all men were looking for a decisive
blow to be struck, he suddenly renewed the negociations; and when the truce lulled the allies into security, he
as suddenly recommenced hostilities. All these contradictions arose out of the double and irreconcileable
designs to ruin at once the Emperor and the Swedes, and to conclude a separate peace with the Saxons.
Impatient at the ill success of his negociations, he at last determined to display his strength; the more so, as
the pressing distress within the empire, and the growing dissatisfaction of the Imperial court, admitted not of
his making any longer delay. Before the last cessation of hostilities, General Holk, from Bohemia, had
attacked the circle of Meissen, laid waste every thing on his route with fire and sword, driven the Elector into
his fortresses, and taken the town of Leipzig. But the truce in Silesia put a period to his ravages, and the
consequences of his excesses brought him to the grave at Adorf. As soon as hostilities were recommenced,
Wallenstein made a movement, as if he designed to penetrate through Lusatia into Saxony, and circulated the
report that Piccolomini had already invaded that country. Arnheim immediately broke up his camp in Silesia,
to follow him, and hastened to the assistance of the Electorate. By this means the Swedes were left exposed,
who were encamped in small force under Count Thurn, at Steinau, on the Oder, and this was exactly what
Wallenstein desired. He allowed the Saxon general to advance sixteen miles towards Meissen, and then
suddenly turning towards the Oder, surprised the Swedish army in the most complete security. Their cavalry
were first beaten by General Schafgotsch, who was sent against them, and the infantry completely surrounded
at Steinau by the duke's army which followed. Wallenstein gave Count Thurn half an hour to deliberate
whether he would defend himself with 2,500 men, against more than 20,000, or surrender at discretion. But
there was no room for deliberation. The army surrendered, and the most complete victory was obtained
without bloodshed. Colours, baggage, and artillery all fell into the hands of the victors, the officers were
taken into custody, the privates drafted into the army of Wallenstein. And now at last, after a banishment of
fourteen years, after numberless changes of fortune, the author of the Bohemian insurrection, and the remote
origin of this destructive war, the notorious Count Thurn, was in the power of his enemies. With
bloodthirsty impatience, the arrival of this great criminal was looked for in Vienna, where they already
anticipated the malicious triumph of sacrificing so distinguished a victim to public justice. But to deprive the
Jesuits of this pleasure, was a still sweeter triumph to Wallenstein, and Thurn was set at liberty. Fortunately
for him, he knew more than it was prudent to have divulged in Vienna, and his enemies were also those of
Wallenstein. A defeat might have been forgiven in Vienna, but this disappointment of their hopes they could
not pardon. "What should I have done with this madman?" he writes, with a malicious sneer, to the minister
who called him to account for this unseasonable magnanimity. "Would to Heaven the enemy had no generals
but such as he. At the head of the Swedish army, he will render us much better service than in prison."
The victory of Steinau was followed by the capture of Liegnitz, Grossglogau, and even of Frankfort on the
Oder. Schafgotsch, who remained in Silesia to complete the subjugation of that province, blockaded Brieg,
and threatened Breslau, though in vain, as that free town was jealous of its privileges, and devoted to the
Swedes. Colonels Illo and Goetz were ordered by Wallenstein to the Warta, to push forwards into Pomerania,
and to the coasts of the Baltic, and actually obtained possession of Landsberg, the key of Pomerania. While
thus the Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Pomerania were made to tremble for their dominions,
Wallenstein himself, with the remainder of his army, burst suddenly into Lusatia, where he took Goerlitz by
storm, and forced Bautzen to surrender. But his object was merely to alarm the Elector of Saxony, not to
follow up the advantages already obtained; and therefore, even with the sword in his hand, he continued his
negociations for peace with Brandenburg and Saxony, but with no better success than before, as the
inconsistencies of his conduct had destroyed all confidence in his sincerity. He was therefore on the point of
turning his whole force in earnest against the unfortunate Saxons, and effecting his object by force of arms,
when circumstances compelled him to leave these territories. The conquests of Duke Bernard upon the
Danube, which threatened Austria itself with immediate danger, urgently demanded his presence in Bavaria;
and the expulsion of the Saxons and Swedes from Silesia, deprived him of every pretext for longer resisting
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the Imperial orders, and leaving the Elector of Bavaria without assistance. With his main body, therefore, he
immediately set out for the Upper Palatinate, and his retreat freed Upper Saxony for ever of this formidable
enemy.
So long as was possible, he had delayed to move to the rescue of Bavaria, and on every pretext evaded the
commands of the Emperor. He had, indeed, after reiterated remonstrances, despatched from Bohemia a
reinforcement of some regiments to Count Altringer, who was defending the Lech and the Danube against
Horn and Bernard, but under the express condition of his acting merely on the defensive. He referred the
Emperor and the Elector, whenever they applied to him for aid, to Altringer, who, as he publicly gave out,
had received unlimited powers; secretly, however, he tied up his hands by the strictest injunctions, and even
threatened him with death, if he exceeded his orders. When Duke Bernard had appeared before Ratisbon, and
the Emperor as well as the Elector repeated still more urgently their demand for succour, he pretended he was
about to despatch General Gallas with a considerable army to the Danube; but this movement also was
delayed, and Ratisbon, Straubing, and Cham, as well as the bishopric of Eichstaedt, fell into the hands of the
Swedes. When at last he could no longer neglect the orders of the Court, he marched slowly toward the
Bavarian frontier, where he invested the town of Cham, which had been taken by the Swedes. But no sooner
did he learn that on the Swedish side a diversion was contemplated, by an inroad of the Saxons into Bohemia,
than he availed himself of the report, as a pretext for immediately retreating into that kingdom. Every
consideration, he urged, must be postponed to the defence and preservation of the hereditary dominions of the
Emperor; and on this plea, he remained firmly fixed in Bohemia, which he guarded as if it had been his own
property. And when the Emperor laid upon him his commands to move towards the Danube, and prevent the
Duke of Weimar from establishing himself in so dangerous a position on the frontiers of Austria, Wallenstein
thought proper to conclude the campaign a second time, and quartered his troops for the winter in this
exhausted kingdom.
Such continued insolence and unexampled contempt of the Imperial orders, as well as obvious neglect of the
common cause, joined to his equivocal behaviour towards the enemy, tended at last to convince the Emperor
of the truth of those unfavourable reports with regard to the Duke, which were current through Germany. The
latter had, for a long time, succeeded in glozing over his criminal correspondence with the enemy, and
persuading the Emperor, still prepossessed in his favour, that the sole object of his secret conferences was to
obtain peace for Germany. But impenetrable as he himself believed his proceedings to be, in the course of his
conduct, enough transpired to justify the insinuations with which his rivals incessantly loaded the ear of the
Emperor. In order to satisfy himself of the truth or falsehood of these rumours, Ferdinand had already, at
different times, sent spies into Wallenstein's camp; but as the Duke took the precaution never to commit
anything to writing, they returned with nothing but conjectures. But when, at last, those ministers who
formerly had been his champions at the court, in consequence of their estates not being exempted by
Wallenstein from the general exactions, joined his enemies; when the Elector of Bavaria threatened, in case
of Wallenstein being any longer retained in the supreme command, to unite with the Swedes; when the
Spanish ambassador insisted on his dismissal, and threatened, in case of refusal, to withdraw the subsidies
furnished by his Crown, the Emperor found himself a second time compelled to deprive him of the command.
The Emperor's authoritative and direct interference with the army, soon convinced the Duke that the compact
with himself was regarded as at an end, and that his dismissal was inevitable. One of his inferior generals in
Austria, whom he had forbidden, under pain of death, to obey the orders of the court, received the positive
commands of the Emperor to join the Elector of Bavaria; and Wallenstein himself was imperiously ordered to
send some regiments to reinforce the army of the Cardinal Infante, who was on his march from Italy. All
these measures convinced him that the plan was finally arranged to disarm him by degrees, and at once, when
he was weak and defenceless, to complete his ruin.
In selfdefence, must he now hasten to carry into execution the plans which he had originally formed only
with the view to aggrandizement. He had delayed too long, either because the favourable configuration of the
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stars had not yet presented itself, or, as he used to say, to check the impatience of his friends, because THE
TIME WAS NOT YET COME. The time, even now, was not come: but the pressure of circumstances no
longer allowed him to await the favour of the stars. The first step was to assure himself of the sentiments of
his principal officers, and then to try the attachment of the army, which he had so long confidently reckoned
on. Three of them, Colonels Kinsky, Terzky, and Illo, had long been in his secrets, and the two first were
further united to his interests by the ties of relationship. The same wild ambition, the same bitter hatred of the
government, and the hope of enormous rewards, bound them in the closest manner to Wallenstein, who, to
increase the number of his adherents, could stoop to the lowest means. He had once advised Colonel Illo to
solicit, in Vienna, the title of Count, and had promised to back his application with his powerful mediation.
But he secretly wrote to the ministry, advising them to refuse his request, as to grant it would give rise to
similar demands from others, whose services and claims were equal to his. On Illo's return to the camp,
Wallenstein immediately demanded to know the success of his mission; and when informed by Illo of its
failure, he broke out into the bitterest complaints against the court. "Thus," said he, "are our faithful services
rewarded. My recommendation is disregarded, and your merit denied so trifling a reward! Who would any
longer devote his services to so ungrateful a master? No, for my part, I am henceforth the determined foe of
Austria." Illo agreed with him, and a close alliance was cemented between them.
But what was known to these three confidants of the duke, was long an impenetrable secret to the rest; and
the confidence with which Wallenstein spoke of the devotion of his officers, was founded merely on the
favours he had lavished on them, and on their known dissatisfaction with the Court. But this vague
presumption must be converted into certainty, before he could venture to lay aside the mask, or take any open
step against the Emperor. Count Piccolomini, who had distinguished himself by his unparalleled bravery at
Lutzen, was the first whose fidelity he put to the proof. He had, he thought, gained the attachment of this
general by large presents, and preferred him to all others, because born under the same constellations with
himself. He disclosed to him, that, in consequence of the Emperor's ingratitude, and the near approach of his
own danger, he had irrevocably determined entirely to abandon the party of Austria, to join the enemy with
the best part of his army, and to make war upon the House of Austria, on all sides of its dominions, till he had
wholly extirpated it. In the execution of this plan, he principally reckoned on the services of Piccolomini, and
had beforehand promised him the greatest rewards. When the latter, to conceal his amazement at this
extraordinary communication, spoke of the dangers and obstacles which would oppose so hazardous an
enterprise, Wallenstein ridiculed his fears. "In such enterprises," he maintained, "nothing was difficult but the
commencement. The stars were propitious to him, the opportunity the best that could be wished for, and
something must always be trusted to fortune. His resolution was taken, and if it could not be otherwise, he
would encounter the hazard at the head of a thousand horse." Piccolomini was careful not to excite
Wallenstein's suspicions by longer opposition, and yielded apparently to the force of his reasoning. Such was
the infatuation of the Duke, that notwithstanding the warnings of Count Terzky, he never doubted the
sincerity of this man, who lost not a moment in communicating to the court at Vienna this important
conversation.
Preparatory to taking the last decisive step, he, in January 1634, called a meeting of all the commanders of
the army at Pilsen, whither he had marched after his retreat from Bavaria. The Emperor's recent orders to
spare his hereditary dominions from winter quarterings, to recover Ratisbon in the middle of winter, and to
reduce the army by a detachment of six thousand horse to the Cardinal Infante, were matters sufficiently
grave to be laid before a council of war; and this plausible pretext served to conceal from the curious the real
object of the meeting. Sweden and Saxony received invitations to be present, in order to treat with the Duke
of Friedland for a peace; to the leaders of more distant armies, written communications were made. Of the
commanders thus summoned, twenty appeared; but three most influential, Gallas, Colloredo, and Altringer,
were absent. The Duke reiterated his summons to them, and in the mean time, in expectation of their speedy
arrival, proceeded to execute his designs.
It was no light task that he had to perform: a nobleman, proud, brave, and jealous of his honour, was to
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declare himself capable of the basest treachery, in the very presence of those who had been accustomed to
regard him as the representative of majesty, the judge of their actions, and the supporter of their laws, and to
show himself suddenly as a traitor, a cheat, and a rebel. It was no easy task, either, to shake to its foundations
a legitimate sovereignty, strengthened by time and consecrated by laws and religion; to dissolve all the
charms of the senses and the imagination, those formidable guardians of an established throne, and to attempt
forcibly to uproot those invincible feelings of duty, which plead so loudly and so powerfully in the breast of
the subject, in favour of his sovereign. But, blinded by the splendour of a crown, Wallenstein observed not
the precipice that yawned beneath his feet; and in full reliance on his own strength, the common case with
energetic and daring minds, he stopped not to consider the magnitude and the number of the difficulties that
opposed him. Wallenstein saw nothing but an army, partly indifferent and partly exasperated against the
court, accustomed, with a blind submission, to do homage to his great name, to bow to him as their legislator
and judge, and with trembling reverence to follow his orders as the decrees of fate. In the extravagant
flatteries which were paid to his omnipotence, in the bold abuse of the court government, in which a lawless
soldiery indulged, and which the wild licence of the camp excused, he thought he read the sentiments of the
army; and the boldness with which they were ready to censure the monarch's measures, passed with him for a
readiness to renounce their allegiance to a sovereign so little respected. But that which he had regarded as the
lightest matter, proved the most formidable obstacle with which he had to contend; the soldiers' feelings of
allegiance were the rock on which his hopes were wrecked. Deceived by the profound respect in which he
was held by these lawless bands, he ascribed the whole to his own personal greatness, without distinguishing
how much he owed to himself, and how much to the dignity with which he was invested. All trembled before
him, while he exercised a legitimate authority, while obedience to him was a duty, and while his consequence
was supported by the majesty of the sovereign. Greatness, in and of itself, may excite terror and admiration;
but legitimate greatness alone can inspire reverence and submission; and of this decisive advantage he
deprived himself, the instant he avowed himself a traitor.
FieldMarshal Illo undertook to learn the sentiments of the officers, and to prepare them for the step which
was expected of them. He began by laying before them the new orders of the court to the general and the
army; and by the obnoxious turn he skilfully gave to them, he found it easy to excite the indignation of the
assembly. After this well chosen introduction, he expatiated with much eloquence upon the merits of the
army and the general, and the ingratitude with which the Emperor was accustomed to requite them. "Spanish
influence," he maintained, "governed the court; the ministry were in the pay of Spain; the Duke of Friedland
alone had hitherto opposed this tyranny, and had thus drawn down upon himself the deadly enmity of the
Spaniards. To remove him from the command, or to make away with him entirely," he continued, "had long
been the end of their desires; and, until they could succeed in one or other, they endeavoured to abridge his
power in the field. The command was to be placed in the hands of the King of Hungary, for no other reason
than the better to promote the Spanish power in Germany; because this prince, as the ready instrument of
foreign counsels, might be led at pleasure. It was merely with the view of weakening the army, that the six
thousand troops were required for the Cardinal Infante; it was solely for the purpose of harassing it by a
winter campaign, that they were now called on, in this inhospitable season, to undertake the recovery of
Ratisbon. The means of subsistence were everywhere rendered difficult, while the Jesuits and the ministry
enriched themselves with the sweat of the provinces, and squandered the money intended for the pay of the
troops. The general, abandoned by the court, acknowledges his inability to keep his engagements to the army.
For all the services which, for two and twenty years, he had rendered the House of Austria; for all the
difficulties with which he had struggled; for all the treasures of his own, which he had expended in the
imperial service, a second disgraceful dismissal awaited him. But he was resolved the matter should not come
to this; he was determined voluntarily to resign the command, before it should be wrested from his hands;
and this," continued the orator, "is what, through me, he now makes known to his officers. It was now for
them to say whether it would be advisable to lose such a general. Let each consider who was to refund him
the sums he had expended in the Emperor's service, and where he was now to reap the reward of their
bravery, when he who was their evidence removed from the scene."
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A universal cry, that they would not allow their general to be taken from them, interrupted the speaker. Four
of the principal officers were deputed to lay before him the wish of the assembly, and earnestly to request that
he would not leave the army. The duke made a show of resistance, and only yielded after the second
deputation. This concession on his side, seemed to demand a return on theirs; as he engaged not to quit the
service without the knowledge and consent of the generals, he required of them, on the other hand, a written
promise to truly and firmly adhere to him, neither to separate nor to allow themselves to be separated from
him, and to shed their last drop of blood in his defence. Whoever should break this covenant, was to be
regarded as a perfidious traitor, and treated by the rest as a common enemy. The express condition which was
added, "AS LONG AS WALLENSTEIN SHALL EMPLOY THE ARMY IN THE EMPEROR'S SERVICE,"
seemed to exclude all misconception, and none of the assembled generals hesitated at once to accede to a
demand, apparently so innocent and so reasonable.
This document was publicly read before an entertainment, which FieldMarshal Illo had expressly prepared
for the purpose; it was to be signed, after they rose from table. The host did his utmost to stupify his guests by
strong potations; and it was not until he saw them affected with the wine, that he produced the paper for
signature. Most of them wrote their names, without knowing what they were subscribing; a few only, more
curious or more distrustful, read the paper over again, and discovered with astonishment that the clause "as
long as Wallenstein shall employ the army for the Emperor's service" was omitted. Illo had, in fact, artfully
contrived to substitute for the first another copy, in which these words were wanting. The trick was manifest,
and many refused now to sign. Piccolomini, who had seen through the whole cheat, and had been present at
this scene merely with the view of giving information of the whole to the court, forgot himself so far in his
cups as to drink the Emperor's health. But Count Terzky now rose, and declared that all were perjured villains
who should recede from their engagement. His menaces, the idea of the inevitable danger to which they who
resisted any longer would be exposed, the example of the rest, and Illo's rhetoric, at last overcame their
scruples; and the paper was signed by all without exception.
Wallenstein had now effected his purpose; but the unexpected resistance he had met with from the
commanders roused him at last from the fond illusions in which he had hitherto indulged. Besides, most of
the names were scrawled so illegibly, that some deceit was evidently intended. But instead of being recalled
to his discretion by this warning, he gave vent to his injured pride in undignified complaints and reproaches.
He assembled the generals the next day, and undertook personally to confirm the whole tenor of the
agreement which Illo had submitted to them the day before. After pouring out the bitterest reproaches and
abuse against the court, he reminded them of their opposition to the proposition of the previous day, and
declared that this circumstance had induced him to retract his own promise. The generals withdrew in silence
and confusion; but after a short consultation in the antichamber, they returned to apologize for their late
conduct, and offered to sign the paper anew.
Nothing now remained, but to obtain a similar assurance from the absent generals, or, on their refusal, to
seize their persons. Wallenstein renewed his invitation to them, and earnestly urged them to hasten their
arrival. But a rumour of the doings at Pilsen reached them on their journey, and suddenly stopped their
further progress. Altringer, on pretence of sickness, remained in the strong fortress of Frauenberg. Gallas
made his appearance, but merely with the design of better qualifying himself as an eyewitness, to keep the
Emperor informed of all Wallenstein's proceedings. The intelligence which he and Piccolomini gave, at once
converted the suspicions of the court into an alarming certainty. Similar disclosures, which were at the same
time made from other quarters, left no room for farther doubt; and the sudden change of the commanders in
Austria and Silesia, appeared to be the prelude to some important enterprise. The danger was pressing, and
the remedy must be speedy, but the court was unwilling to proceed at once to the execution of the sentence,
till the regular forms of justice were complied with. Secret instructions were therefore issued to the principal
officers, on whose fidelity reliance could be placed, to seize the persons of the Duke of Friedland and of his
two associates, Illo and Terzky, and keep them in close confinement, till they should have an opportunity of
being heard, and of answering for their conduct; but if this could not be accomplished quietly, the public
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danger required that they should be taken dead or live. At the same time, General Gallas received a patent
commission, by which these orders of the Emperor were made known to the colonels and officers, and the
army was released from its obedience to the traitor, and placed under LieutenantGeneral Gallas, till a new
generalissimo could be appointed. In order to bring back the seduced and deluded to their duty, and not to
drive the guilty to despair, a general amnesty was proclaimed, in regard to all offences against the imperial
majesty committed at Pilsen.
General Gallas was not pleased with the honour which was done him. He was at Pilsen, under the eye of the
person whose fate he was to dispose of; in the power of an enemy, who had a hundred eyes to watch his
motions. If Wallenstein once discovered the secret of his commission, nothing could save him from the
effects of his vengeance and despair. But if it was thus dangerous to be the secret depositary of such a
commission, how much more so to execute it? The sentiments of the generals were uncertain; and it was at
least doubtful whether, after the step they had taken, they would be ready to trust the Emperor's promises, and
at once to abandon the brilliant expectations they had built upon Wallenstein's enterprise. It was also
hazardous to attempt to lay hands on the person of a man who, till now, had been considered inviolable; who
from long exercise of supreme power, and from habitual obedience, had become the object of deepest
respect; who was invested with every attribute of outward majesty and inward greatness; whose very aspect
inspired terror, and who by a nod disposed of life and death! To seize such a man, like a common criminal, in
the midst of the guards by whom he was surrounded, and in a city apparently devoted to him; to convert the
object of this deep and habitual veneration into a subject of compassion, or of contempt, was a commission
calculated to make even the boldest hesitate. So deeply was fear and veneration for their general engraven in
the breasts of the soldiers, that even the atrocious crime of high treason could not wholly eradicate these
sentiments.
Gallas perceived the impossibility of executing his commission under the eyes of the duke; and his most
anxious wish was, before venturing on any steps, to have an interview with Altringer. As the long absence of
the latter had already begun to excite the duke's suspicions, Gallas offered to repair in person to Frauenberg,
and to prevail on Altringer, his relation, to return with him. Wallenstein was so pleased with this proof of his
zeal, that he even lent him his own equipage for the journey. Rejoicing at the success of his stratagem, he left
Pilsen without delay, leaving to Count Piccolomini the task of watching Wallenstein's further movements. He
did not fail, as he went along, to make use of the imperial patent, and the sentiments of the troops proved
more favourable than he had expected. Instead of taking back his friend to Pilsen, he despatched him to
Vienna, to warn the Emperor against the intended attack, while he himself repaired to Upper Austria, of
which the safety was threatened by the near approach of Duke Bernard. In Bohemia, the towns of Budweiss
and Tabor were again garrisoned for the Emperor, and every precaution taken to oppose with energy the
designs of the traitor.
As Gallas did not appear disposed to return, Piccolomini determined to put Wallenstein's credulity once more
to the test. He begged to be sent to bring back Gallas, and Wallenstein suffered himself a second time to be
overreached. This inconceivable blindness can only be accounted for as the result of his pride, which never
retracted the opinion it had once formed of any person, and would not acknowledge, even to itself, the
possibility of being deceived. He conveyed Count Piccolomini in his own carriage to Lintz, where the latter
immediately followed the example of Gallas, and even went a step farther. He had promised the duke to
return. He did so, but it was at the head of an army, intending to surprise the duke in Pilsen. Another army
under General Suys hastened to Prague, to secure that capital in its allegiance, and to defend it against the
rebels. Gallas, at the same time, announced himself to the different imperial armies as the
commanderinchief, from whom they were henceforth to receive orders. Placards were circulated through
all the imperial camps, denouncing the duke and his four confidants, and absolving the soldiers from all
obedience to him.
The example which had been set at Lintz, was universally followed; imprecations were showered on the
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traitor, and he was forsaken by all the armies. At last, when even Piccolomini returned no more, the mist fell
from Wallenstein's eyes, and in consternation he awoke from his dream. Yet his faith in the truth of astrology,
and in the fidelity of the army was unshaken. Immediately after the intelligence of Piccolomini's defection, he
issued orders, that in future no commands were to be obeyed, which did not proceed directly from himself, or
from Terzky, or Illo. He prepared, in all haste, to advance upon Prague, where he intended to throw off the
mask, and openly to declare against the Emperor. All the troops were to assemble before that city, and from
thence to pour down with rapidity upon Austria. Duke Bernard, who had joined the conspiracy, was to
support the operations of the duke, with the Swedish troops, and to effect a diversion upon the Danube.
Terzky was already upon his march towards Prague; and nothing, but the want of horses, prevented the duke
from following him with the regiments who still adhered faithfully to him. But when, with the most anxious
expectation, he awaited the intelligence from Prague, he suddenly received information of the loss of that
town, the defection of his generals, the desertion of his troops, the discovery of his whole plot, and the rapid
advance of Piccolomini, who was sworn to his destruction. Suddenly and fearfully had all his projects been
ruined all his hopes annihilated. He stood alone, abandoned by all to whom he had been a benefactor,
betrayed by all on whom he had depended. But it is under such circumstances that great minds reveal
themselves. Though deceived in all his expectations, he refused to abandon one of his designs; he despaired
of nothing, so long as life remained. The time was now come, when he absolutely required that assistance,
which he had so often solicited from the Swedes and the Saxons, and when all doubts of the sincerity of his
purposes must be dispelled. And now, when Oxenstiern and Arnheim were convinced of the sincerity of his
intentions, and were aware of his necessities, they no longer hesitated to embrace the favourable opportunity,
and to offer him their protection. On the part of Saxony, the Duke Francis Albert of Saxe Lauenberg was to
join him with 4,000 men; and Duke Bernard, and the Palatine Christian of Birkenfeld, with 6,000 from
Sweden, all chosen troops.
Wallenstein left Pilsen, with Terzky's regiment, and the few who either were, or pretended to be, faithful to
him, and hastened to Egra, on the frontiers of the kingdom, in order to be near the Upper Palatinate, and to
facilitate his junction with Duke Bernard. He was not yet informed of the decree by which he was proclaimed
a public enemy and traitor; this thunderstroke awaited him at Egra. He still reckoned on the army, which
General Schafgotsch was preparing for him in Silesia, and flattered himself with the hope that many even of
those who had forsaken him, would return with the first dawning of success. Even during his flight to Egra
(so little humility had he learned from melancholy experience) he was still occupied with the colossal scheme
of dethroning the Emperor. It was under these circumstances, that one of his suite asked leave to offer him his
advice. "Under the Emperor," said he, "your highness is certain of being a great and respected noble; with the
enemy, you are at best but a precarious king. It is unwise to risk certainty for uncertainty. The enemy will
avail themselves of your personal influence, while the opportunity lasts; but you will ever be regarded with
suspicion, and they will always be fearful lest you should treat them as you have done the Emperor. Return,
then, to your allegiance, while there is yet time. "And how is that to be done?" said Wallenstein,
interrupting him: "You have 40,000 menatarms," rejoined he, (meaning ducats, which were stamped with
the figure of an armed man,) "take them with you, and go straight to the Imperial Court; then declare that the
steps you have hitherto taken were merely designed to test the fidelity of the Emperor's servants, and of
distinguishing the loyal from the doubtful; and since most have shown a disposition to revolt, say you are
come to warn his Imperial Majesty against those dangerous men. Thus you will make those appear as traitors,
who are labouring to represent you as a false villain. At the Imperial Court, a man is sure to be welcome with
40,000 ducats, and Friedland will be again as he was at the first." "The advice is good," said Wallenstein,
after a pause, "but let the devil trust to it."
While the duke, in his retirement in Egra, was energetically pushing his negociations with the enemy,
consulting the stars, and indulging in new hopes, the dagger which was to put an end to his existence was
unsheathed almost under his very eyes. The imperial decree which proclaimed him an outlaw, had not failed
of its effect; and an avenging Nemesis ordained that the ungrateful should fall beneath the blow of
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ingratitude. Among his officers, Wallenstein had particularly distinguished one Leslie*, an Irishman, and had
made his fortune. This was the man who now felt himself called on to execute the sentence against him, and
to earn the price of blood. No sooner had he reached Egra, in the suite of the duke, than he disclosed to the
commandant of the town, Colonel Buttler, and to LieutenantColonel Gordon, two Protestant Scotchmen, the
treasonable designs of the duke, which the latter had imprudently enough communicated to him during the
journey. In these two individuals, he had found men capable of a determined resolution. They were now
called on to choose between treason and duty, between their legitimate sovereign and a fugitive abandoned
rebel; and though the latter was their common benefactor, the choice could not remain for a moment doubtful.
They were solemnly pledged to the allegiance of the Emperor, and this duty required them to take the most
rapid measures against the public enemy. The opportunity was favourable; his evil genius seemed to have
delivered him into the hands of vengeance. But not to encroach on the province of justice, they resolved to
deliver up their victim alive; and they parted with the bold resolve to take their general prisoner. This dark
plot was buried in the deepest silence; and Wallenstein, far from suspecting his impending ruin, flattered
himself that in the garrison of Egra he possessed his bravest and most faithful champions.
* Schiller is mistaken as to this point. Leslie was a Scotchman, and Buttler an Irishman and a papist. He
died a general in the Emperor's service, and founded, at Prague, a convent of Irish Franciscans which still
exists.
At this time, he became acquainted with the Imperial proclamations containing his sentence, and which had
been published in all the camps. He now became aware of the full extent of the danger which encompassed
him, the utter impossibility of retracing his steps, his fearfully forlorn condition, and the absolute necessity of
at once trusting himself to the faith and honour of the Emperor's enemies. To Leslie he poured forth all the
anguish of his wounded spirit, and the vehemence of his agitation extracted from him his last remaining
secret. He disclosed to this officer his intention to deliver up Egra and Ellenbogen, the passes of the kingdom,
to the Palatine of Birkenfeld, and at the same time, informed him of the near approach of Duke Bernard, of
whose arrival he hoped to receive tidings that very night. These disclosures, which Leslie immediately
communicated to the conspirators, made them change their original plan. The urgency of the danger admitted
not of half measures. Egra might in a moment be in the enemy's hands, and a sudden revolution set their
prisoner at liberty. To anticipate this mischance, they resolved to assassinate him and his associates the
following night.
In order to execute this design with less noise, it was arranged that the fearful deed should be perpetrated at
an entertainment which Colonel Buttler should give in the Castle of Egra. All the guests, except Wallenstein,
made their appearance, who being in too great anxiety of mind to enjoy company excused himself. With
regard to him, therefore, their plan must be again changed; but they resolved to execute their design against
the others. The three Colonels, Illo, Terzky, and William Kinsky, came in with careless confidence, and with
them Captain Neumann, an officer of ability, whose advice Terzky sought in every intricate affair. Previous
to their arrival, trusty soldiers of the garrison, to whom the plot had been communicated, were admitted into
the Castle, all the avenues leading from it guarded, and six of Buttler's dragoons concealed in an apartment
close to the banquetingroom, who, on a concerted signal, were to rush in and kill the traitors. Without
suspecting the danger that hung over them, the guests gaily abandoned themselves to the pleasures of the
table, and Wallenstein's health was drunk in full bumpers, not as a servant of the Emperor, but as a sovereign
prince. The wine opened their hearts, and Illo, with exultation, boasted that in three days an army would
arrive, such as Wallenstein had never before been at the head of. "Yes," cried Neumann, "and then he hopes
to bathe his hands in Austrian blood." During this conversation, the dessert was brought in, and Leslie gave
the concerted signal to raise the drawbridges, while he himself received the keys of the gates. In an instant,
the hall was filled with armed men, who, with the unexpected greeting of "Long live Ferdinand!" placed
themselves behind the chairs of the marked guests. Surprised, and with a presentiment of their fate, they
sprang from the table. Kinsky and Terzky were killed upon the spot, and before they could put themselves
upon their guard. Neumann, during the confusion in the hall, escaped into the court, where, however, he was
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instantly recognised and cut down. Illo alone had the presence of mind to defend himself. He placed his back
against a window, from whence he poured the bitterest reproaches upon Gordon, and challenged him to fight
him fairly and honourably. After a gallant resistance, in which he slew two of his assailants, he fell to the
ground overpowered by numbers, and pierced with ten wounds. The deed was no sooner accomplished, than
Leslie hastened into the town to prevent a tumult. The sentinels at the castle gate, seeing him running and out
of breath, and believing he belonged to the rebels, fired their muskets after him, but without effect. The firing,
however, aroused the townguard, and all Leslie's presence of mind was requisite to allay the tumult. He
hastily detailed to them all the circumstances of Wallenstein's conspiracy, the measures which had been
already taken to counteract it, the fate of the four rebels, as well as that which awaited their chief. Finding the
troops well disposed, he exacted from them a new oath of fidelity to the Emperor, and to live and die for the
good cause. A hundred of Buttler's dragoons were sent from the Castle into the town to patrol the streets, to
overawe the partisans of the Duke, and to prevent tumult. All the gates of Egra were at the same time seized,
and every avenue to Wallenstein's residence, which adjoined the marketplace, guarded by a numerous and
trusty body of troops, sufficient to prevent either his escape or his receiving any assistance from without.
But before they proceeded finally to execute the deed, a long conference was held among the conspirators in
the Castle, whether they should kill him, or content themselves with making him prisoner. Besprinkled as
they were with the blood, and deliberating almost over the very corpses of his murdered associates, even
these furious men yet shuddered at the horror of taking away so illustrious a life. They saw before their
mind's eye him their leader in battle, in the days of his good fortune, surrounded by his victorious army,
clothed with all the pomp of military greatness, and longaccustomed awe again seized their minds. But this
transitory emotion was soon effaced by the thought of the immediate danger. They remembered the hints
which Neumann and Illo had thrown out at table, the near approach of a formidable army of Swedes and
Saxons, and they clearly saw that the death of the traitor was their only chance of safety. They adhered,
therefore, to their first resolution, and Captain Deveroux, an Irishman, who had already been retained for the
murderous purpose, received decisive orders to act.
While these three officers were thus deciding upon his fate in the castle of Egra, Wallenstein was occupied in
reading the stars with Seni. "The danger is not yet over," said the astrologer with prophetic spirit. "IT IS,"
replied the Duke, who would give the law even to heaven. "But," he continued with equally prophetic spirit,
"that thou friend Seni thyself shall soon be thrown into prison, that also is written in the stars." The astrologer
had taken his leave, and Wallenstein had retired to bed, when Captain Deveroux appeared before his
residence with six halberdiers, and was immediately admitted by the guard, who were accustomed to see him
visit the general at all hours. A page who met him upon the stairs, and attempted to raise an alarm, was run
through the body with a pike. In the antichamber, the assassins met a servant, who had just come out of the
sleepingroom of his master, and had taken with him the key. Putting his finger upon his mouth, the terrified
domestic made a sign to them to make no noise, as the Duke was asleep. "Friend," cried Deveroux, "it is time
to awake him;" and with these words he rushed against the door, which was also bolted from within, and
burst it open.
Wallenstein had been roused from his first sleep, by the report of a musket which had accidentally gone off,
and had sprung to the window to call the guard. At the same moment, he heard, from the adjoining building,
the shrieks of the Countesses Terzky and Kinsky, who had just learnt the violent fate of their husbands. Ere
he had time to reflect on these terrible events, Deveroux, with the other murderers, was in his chamber. The
Duke was in his shirt, as he had leaped out of bed, and leaning on a table near the window. "Art thou the
villain," cried Deveroux to him, "who intends to deliver up the Emperor's troops to the enemy, and to tear the
crown from the head of his Majesty? Now thou must die!" He paused for a few moments, as if expecting an
answer; but scorn and astonishment kept Wallenstein silent. Throwing his arms wide open, he received in his
breast, the deadly blow of the halberds, and without uttering a groan, fell weltering in his blood.
The next day, an express arrived from the Duke of Lauenburg, announcing his approach. The messenger was
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secured, and another in Wallenstein's livery despatched to the Duke, to decoy him into Egra. The stratagem
succeeded, and Francis Albert fell into the hands of the enemy. Duke Bernard of Weimar, who was on his
march towards Egra, was nearly sharing the same fate. Fortunately, he heard of Wallenstein's death in time to
save himself by a retreat. Ferdinand shed a tear over the fate of his general, and ordered three thousand
masses to be said for his soul at Vienna; but, at the same time, he did not forget to reward his assassins with
gold chains, chamberlains' keys, dignities, and estates.
Thus did Wallenstein, at the age of fifty, terminate his active and extraordinary life. To ambition, he owed
both his greatness and his ruin; with all his failings, he possessed great and admirable qualities, and had he
kept himself within due bounds, he would have lived and died without an equal. The virtues of the ruler and
of the hero, prudence, justice, firmness, and courage, are strikingly prominent features in his character; but he
wanted the gentler virtues of the man, which adorn the hero, and make the ruler beloved. Terror was the
talisman with which he worked; extreme in his punishments as in his rewards, he knew how to keep alive the
zeal of his followers, while no general of ancient or modern times could boast of being obeyed with equal
alacrity. Submission to his will was more prized by him than bravery; for, if the soldiers work by the latter, it
is on the former that the general depends. He continually kept up the obedience of his troops by capricious
orders, and profusely rewarded the readiness to obey even in trifles; because he looked rather to the act itself,
than its object. He once issued a decree, with the penalty of death on disobedience, that none but red sashes
should be worn in the army. A captain of horse no sooner heard the order, than pulling off his
goldembroidered sash, he trampled it under foot; Wallenstein, on being informed of the circumstance,
promoted him on the spot to the rank of Colonel. His comprehensive glance was always directed to the
whole, and in all his apparent caprice, he steadily kept in view some general scope or bearing. The robberies
committed by the soldiers in a friendly country, had led to the severest orders against marauders; and all who
should be caught thieving, were threatened with the halter. Wallenstein himself having met a straggler in the
open country upon the field, commanded him to be seized without trial, as a transgressor of the law, and in
his usual voice of thunder, exclaimed, "Hang the fellow," against which no opposition ever availed. The
soldier pleaded and proved his innocence, but the irrevocable sentence had gone forth. "Hang then innocent,"
cried the inexorable Wallenstein, "the guilty will have then more reason to tremble." Preparations were
already making to execute the sentence, when the soldier, who gave himself up for lost, formed the desperate
resolution of not dying without revenge. He fell furiously upon his judge, but was overpowered by numbers,
and disarmed before he could fulfil his design. "Now let him go," said the Duke, "it will excite sufficient
terror."
His munificence was supported by an immense income, which was estimated at three millions of florins
yearly, without reckoning the enormous sums which he raised under the name of contributions. His liberality
and clearness of understanding, raised him above the religious prejudices of his age; and the Jesuits never
forgave him for having seen through their system, and for regarding the pope as nothing more than a bishop
of Rome.
But as no one ever yet came to a fortunate end who quarrelled with the Church, Wallenstein also must
augment the number of its victims. Through the intrigues of monks, he lost at Ratisbon the command of the
army, and at Egra his life; by the same arts, perhaps, he lost what was of more consequence, his honourable
name and good repute with posterity.
For in justice it must be admitted, that the pens which have traced the history of this extraordinary man are
not untinged with partiality, and that the treachery of the duke, and his designs upon the throne of Bohemia,
rest not so much upon proven facts, as upon probable conjecture. No documents have yet been brought to
light, which disclose with historical certainty the secret motives of his conduct; and among all his public and
well attested actions, there is, perhaps, not one which could not have had an innocent end. Many of his most
obnoxious measures proved nothing but the earnest wish he entertained for peace; most of the others are
explained and justified by the wellfounded distrust he entertained of the Emperor, and the excusable wish of
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maintaining his own importance. It is true, that his conduct towards the Elector of Bavaria looks too like an
unworthy revenge, and the dictates of an implacable spirit; but still, none of his actions perhaps warrant us in
holding his treason to be proved. If necessity and despair at last forced him to deserve the sentence which had
been pronounced against him while innocent, still this, if true, will not justify that sentence. Thus Wallenstein
fell, not because he was a rebel, but he became a rebel because he fell. Unfortunate in life that he made a
victorious party his enemy, and still more unfortunate in death, that the same party survived him and wrote
his history.
Book V.
Wallenstein's death rendered necessary the appointment of a new generalissimo; and the Emperor yielded at
last to the advice of the Spaniards, to raise his son Ferdinand, King of Hungary, to that dignity. Under him,
Count Gallas commanded, who performed the functions of commanderinchief, while the prince brought to
this post nothing but his name and dignity. A considerable force was soon assembled under Ferdinand; the
Duke of Lorraine brought up a considerable body of auxiliaries in person, and the Cardinal Infante joined him
from Italy with 10,000 men. In order to drive the enemy from the Danube, the new general undertook the
enterprise in which his predecessor had failed, the siege of Ratisbon. In vain did Duke Bernard of Weimar
penetrate into the interior of Bavaria, with a view to draw the enemy from the town; Ferdinand continued to
press the siege with vigour, and the city, after a most obstinate resistance, was obliged to open its gates to
him. Donauwerth soon shared the same fate, and Nordlingen in Swabia was now invested. The loss of so
many of the imperial cities was severely felt by the Swedish party; as the friendship of these towns had so
largely contributed to the success of their arms, indifference to their fate would have been inexcusable. It
would have been an indelible disgrace, had they deserted their confederates in their need, and abandoned
them to the revenge of an implacable conqueror. Moved by these considerations, the Swedish army, under the
command of Horn, and Bernard of Weimar, advanced upon Nordlingen, determined to relieve it even at the
expense of a battle.
The undertaking was a dangerous one, for in numbers the enemy was greatly superior to that of the Swedes.
There was also a further reason for avoiding a battle at present; the enemy's force was likely soon to divide,
the Italian troops being destined for the Netherlands. In the mean time, such a position might be taken up, as
to cover Nordlingen, and cut off their supplies. All these grounds were strongly urged by Gustavus Horn, in
the Swedish council of war; but his remonstrances were disregarded by men who, intoxicated by a long
career of success, mistook the suggestions of prudence for the voice of timidity. Overborne by the superior
influence of Duke Bernard, Gustavus Horn was compelled to risk a contest, whose unfavourable issue, a dark
foreboding seemed already to announce. The fate of the battle depended upon the possession of a height
which commanded the imperial camp. An attempt to occupy it during the night failed, as the tedious transport
of the artillery through woods and hollow ways delayed the arrival of the troops. When the Swedes arrived
about midnight, they found the heights in possession of the enemy, strongly entrenched. They waited,
therefore, for daybreak, to carry them by storm. Their impetuous courage surmounted every obstacle; the
entrenchments, which were in the form of a crescent, were successfully scaled by each of the two brigades
appointed to the service; but as they entered at the same moment from opposite sides, they met and threw
each other into confusion. At this unfortunate moment, a barrel of powder blew up, and created the greatest
disorder among the Swedes. The imperial cavalry charged upon their broken ranks, and the flight became
universal. No persuasion on the part of their general could induce the fugitives to renew the assault.
He resolved, therefore, in order to carry this important post, to lead fresh troops to the attack. But in the
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interim, some Spanish regiments had marched in, and every attempt to gain it was repulsed by their heroic
intrepidity. One of the duke's own regiments advanced seven times, and was as often driven back. The
disadvantage of not occupying this post in time, was quickly and sensibly felt. The fire of the enemy's
artillery from the heights, caused such slaughter in the adjacent wing of the Swedes, that Horn, who
commanded there, was forced to give orders to retire. Instead of being able to cover the retreat of his
colleague, and to check the pursuit of the enemy, Duke Bernard, overpowered by numbers, was himself
driven into the plain, where his routed cavalry spread confusion among Horn's brigade, and rendered the
defeat complete. Almost the entire infantry were killed or taken prisoners. More than 12,000 men remained
dead upon the field of battle; 80 field pieces, about 4,000 waggons, and 300 standards and colours fell into
the hands of the Imperialists. Horn himself, with three other generals, were taken prisoners. Duke Bernard
with difficulty saved a feeble remnant of his army, which joined him at Frankfort.
The defeat at Nordlingen, cost the Swedish Chancellor the second sleepless night he had passed in
Germany*. The consequences of this disaster were terrible. The Swedes had lost by it at once their superiority
in the field, and with it the confidence of their confederates, which they had gained solely by their previous
military success. A dangerous division threatened the Protestant Confederation with ruin. Consternation and
terror seized upon the whole party; while the Papists arose with exulting triumph from the deep humiliation
into which they had sunk. Swabia and the adjacent circles first felt the consequences of the defeat of
Nordlingen; and Wirtemberg, in particular, was overrun by the conquering army. All the members of the
League of Heilbronn trembled at the prospect of the Emperor's revenge; those who could, fled to Strasburg,
while the helpless free cities awaited their fate with alarm. A little more of moderation towards the
conquered, would have quickly reduced all the weaker states under the Emperor's authority; but the severity
which was practised, even against those who voluntarily surrendered, drove the rest to despair, and roused
them to a vigorous resistance.
* The first was occasioned by the death of Gustavus Adolphus.
In this perplexity, all looked to Oxenstiern for counsel and assistance; Oxenstiern applied for both to the
German States. Troops were wanted; money likewise, to raise new levies, and to pay to the old the arrears
which the men were clamorously demanding. Oxenstiern addressed himself to the Elector of Saxony; but he
shamefully abandoned the Swedish cause, to negociate for a separate peace with the Emperor at Pirna. He
solicited aid from the Lower Saxon States; but they, long wearied of the Swedish pretensions and demands
for money, now thought only of themselves; and George, Duke of Lunenburg, in place of flying to the
assistance of Upper Germany, laid siege to Minden, with the intention of keeping possession of it for himself.
Abandoned by his German allies, the chancellor exerted himself to obtain the assistance of foreign powers.
England, Holland, and Venice were applied to for troops and money; and, driven to the last extremity, the
chancellor reluctantly resolved to take the disagreeable step which he had so long avoided, and to throw
himself under the protection of France.
The moment had at last arrived which Richelieu had long waited for with impatience. Nothing, he was aware,
but the impossibility of saving themselves by any other means, could induce the Protestant States in Germany
to support the pretensions of France upon Alsace. This extreme necessity had now arrived; the assistance of
that power was indispensable, and she was resolved to be well paid for the active part which she was about to
take in the German war. Full of lustre and dignity, it now came upon the political stage. Oxenstiern, who felt
little reluctance in bestowing the rights and possessions of the empire, had already ceded the fortress of
Philipsburg, and the other long coveted places. The Protestants of Upper Germany now, in their own names,
sent a special embassy to Richelieu, requesting him to take Alsace, the fortress of Breyssach, which was still
to be recovered from the enemy, and all the places upon the Upper Rhine, which were the keys of Germany,
under the protection of France. What was implied by French protection had been seen in the conduct of
France towards the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which it had held for centuries against the rightful
owners. Treves was already in the possession of French garrisons; Lorraine was in a manner conquered, as it
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might at any time be overrun by an army, and could not, alone, and with its own strength, withstand its
formidable neighbour. France now entertained the hope of adding Alsace to its large and numerous
possessions, and, since a treaty was soon to be concluded with the Dutch for the partition of the Spanish
Netherlands the prospect of making the Rhine its natural boundary towards Germany. Thus shamefully
were the rights of Germany sacrificed by the German States to this treacherous and grasping power, which,
under the mask of a disinterested friendship, aimed only at its own aggrandizement; and while it boldly
claimed the honourable title of a Protectress, was solely occupied with promoting its own schemes, and
advancing its own interests amid the general confusion.
In return for these important cessions, France engaged to effect a diversion in favour of the Swedes, by
commencing hostilities against the Spaniards; and if this should lead to an open breach with the Emperor, to
maintain an army upon the German side of the Rhine, which was to act in conjunction with the Swedes and
Germans against Austria. For a war with Spain, the Spaniards themselves soon afforded the desired pretext.
Making an inroad from the Netherlands, upon the city of Treves, they cut in pieces the French garrison; and,
in open violation of the law of nations, made prisoner the Elector, who had placed himself under the
protection of France, and carried him into Flanders. When the Cardinal Infante, as Viceroy of the Spanish
Netherlands, refused satisfaction for these injuries, and delayed to restore the prince to liberty, Richelieu,
after the old custom, formally proclaimed war at Brussels by a herald, and the war was at once opened by
three different armies in Milan, in the Valteline, and in Flanders. The French minister was less anxious to
commence hostilities with the Emperor, which promised fewer advantages, and threatened greater
difficulties. A fourth army, however, was detached across the Rhine into Germany, under the command of
Cardinal Lavalette, which was to act in conjunction with Duke Bernard, against the Emperor, without a
previous declaration of war.
A heavier blow for the Swedes, than even the defeat of Nordlingen, was the reconciliation of the Elector of
Saxony with the Emperor. After many fruitless attempts both to bring about and to prevent it, it was at last
effected in 1634, at Pirna, and, the following year, reduced into a formal treaty of peace, at Prague. The
Elector of Saxony had always viewed with jealousy the pretensions of the Swedes in Germany; and his
aversion to this foreign power, which now gave laws within the Empire, had grown with every fresh
requisition that Oxenstiern was obliged to make upon the German states. This ill feeling was kept alive by the
Spanish court, who laboured earnestly to effect a peace between Saxony and the Emperor. Wearied with the
calamities of a long and destructive contest, which had selected Saxony above all others for its theatre;
grieved by the miseries which both friend and foe inflicted upon his subjects, and seduced by the tempting
propositions of the House of Austria, the Elector at last abandoned the common cause, and, caring little for
the fate of his confederates, or the liberties of Germany, thought only of securing his own advantages, even at
the expense of the whole body.
In fact, the misery of Germany had risen to such a height, that all clamorously vociferated for peace; and even
the most disadvantageous pacification would have been hailed as a blessing from heaven. The plains, which
formerly had been thronged with a happy and industrious population, where nature had lavished her choicest
gifts, and plenty and prosperity had reigned, were now a wild and desolate wilderness. The fields, abandoned
by the industrious husbandman, lay waste and uncultivated; and no sooner had the young crops given the
promise of a smiling harvest, than a single march destroyed the labours of a year, and blasted the last hope of
an afflicted peasantry. Burnt castles, wasted fields, villages in ashes, were to be seen extending far and wide
on all sides, while the ruined peasantry had no resource left but to swell the horde of incendiaries, and
fearfully to retaliate upon their fellows, who had hitherto been spared the miseries which they themselves had
suffered. The only safeguard against oppression was to become an oppressor. The towns groaned under the
licentiousness of undisciplined and plundering garrisons, who seized and wasted the property of the citizens,
and, under the license of their position, committed the most remorseless devastation and cruelty. If the march
of an army converted whole provinces into deserts, if others were impoverished by winter quarters, or
exhausted by contributions, these still were but passing evils, and the industry of a year might efface the
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miseries of a few months. But there was no relief for those who had a garrison within their walls, or in the
neighbourhood; even the change of fortune could not improve their unfortunate fate, since the victor trod in
the steps of the vanquished, and friends were not more merciful than enemies. The neglected farms, the
destruction of the crops, and the numerous armies which overran the exhausted country, were inevitably
followed by scarcity and the high price of provisions, which in the later years was still further increased by a
general failure in the crops. The crowding together of men in camps and quarters want upon one side, and
excess on the other, occasioned contagious distempers, which were more fatal than even the sword. In this
long and general confusion, all the bonds of social life were broken up; respect for the rights of their
fellow men, the fear of the laws, purity of morals, honour, and religion, were laid aside, where might ruled
supreme with iron sceptre. Under the shelter of anarchy and impunity, every vice flourished, and men became
as wild as the country. No station was too dignified for outrage, no property too holy for rapine and avarice.
In a word, the soldier reigned supreme; and that most brutal of despots often made his own officer feel his
power. The leader of an army was a far more important person within any country where he appeared, than its
lawful governor, who was frequently obliged to fly before him into his own castles for safety. Germany
swarmed with these petty tyrants, and the country suffered equally from its enemies and its protectors. These
wounds rankled the deeper, when the unhappy victims recollected that Germany was sacrificed to the
ambition of foreign powers, who, for their own ends, prolonged the miseries of war. Germany bled under the
scourge, to extend the conquests and influence of Sweden; and the torch of discord was kept alive within the
Empire, that the services of Richelieu might be rendered indispensable in France.
But, in truth, it was not merely interested voices which opposed a peace; and if both Sweden and the German
states were anxious, from corrupt motives, to prolong the conflict, they were seconded in their views by
sound policy. After the defeat of Nordlingen, an equitable peace was not to be expected from the Emperor;
and, this being the case, was it not too great a sacrifice, after seventeen years of war, with all its miseries, to
abandon the contest, not only without advantage, but even with loss? What would avail so much bloodshed, if
all was to remain as it had been; if their rights and pretensions were neither larger nor safer; if all that had
been won with so much difficulty was to be surrendered for a peace at any cost? Would it not be better to
endure, for two or three years more, the burdens they had borne so long, and to reap at last some recompense
for twenty years of suffering? Neither was it doubtful, that peace might at last be obtained on favourable
terms, if only the Swedes and the German Protestants should continue united in the cabinet and in the field,
and pursued their common interests with a reciprocal sympathy and zeal. Their divisions alone, had rendered
the enemy formidable, and protracted the acquisition of a lasting and general peace. And this great evil the
Elector of Saxony had brought upon the Protestant cause by concluding a separate treaty with Austria.
He, indeed, had commenced his negociations with the Emperor, even before the battle of Nordlingen; and the
unfortunate issue of that battle only accelerated their conclusion. By it, all his confidence in the Swedes was
lost; and it was even doubted whether they would ever recover from the blow. The jealousies among their
generals, the insubordination of the army, and the exhaustion of the Swedish kingdom, shut out any
reasonable prospect of effective assistance on their part. The Elector hastened, therefore, to profit by the
Emperor's magnanimity, who, even after the battle of Nordlingen, did not recall the conditions previously
offered. While Oxenstiern, who had assembled the estates in Frankfort, made further demands upon them and
him, the Emperor, on the contrary, made concessions; and therefore it required no long consideration to
decide between them.
In the mean time, however, he was anxious to escape the charge of sacrificing the common cause and
attending only to his own interests. All the German states, and even the Swedes, were publicly invited to
become parties to this peace, although Saxony and the Emperor were the only powers who deliberated upon
it, and who assumed the right to give law to Germany. By this selfappointed tribunal, the grievances of the
Protestants were discussed, their rights and privileges decided, and even the fate of religions determined,
without the presence of those who were most deeply interested in it. Between them, a general peace was
resolved on, and it was to be enforced by an imperial army of execution, as a formal decree of the Empire.
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Whoever opposed it, was to be treated as a public enemy; and thus, contrary to their rights, the states were to
be compelled to acknowledge a law, in the passing of which they had no share. Thus, even in form, the
pacification at Prague was an arbitrary measure; nor was it less so in its contents. The Edict of Restitution had
been the chief cause of dispute between the Elector and the Emperor; and therefore it was first considered in
their deliberations. Without formally annulling it, it was determined by the treaty of Prague, that all the
ecclesiastical domains holding immediately of the Empire, and, among the mediate ones, those which had
been seized by the Protestants subsequently to the treaty at Passau, should, for forty years, remain in the same
position as they had been in before the Edict of Restitution, but without any formal decision of the diet to that
effect. Before the expiration of this term a commission, composed of equal numbers of both religions, should
proceed to settle the matter peaceably and according to law; and if this commission should be unable to come
to a decision, each party should remain in possession of the rights which it had exercised before the Edict of
Restitution. This arrangement, therefore, far from removing the grounds of dissension, only suspended the
dispute for a time; and this article of the treaty of Prague only covered the embers of a future war.
The archbishopric of Magdeburg remained in possession of Prince Augustus of Saxony, and Halberstadt in
that of the Archduke Leopold William. Four estates were taken from the territory of Magdeburg, and given to
Saxony, for which the Administrator of Magdeburg, Christian William of Brandenburg, was otherwise to be
indemnified. The Dukes of Mecklenburg, upon acceding to this treaty, were to be acknowledged as rightful
possessors of their territories, in which the magnanimity of Gustavus Adolphus had long ago reinstated them.
Donauwerth recovered its liberties. The important claims of the heirs of the Palatine, however important it
might be for the Protestant cause not to lose this electorate vote in the diet, were passed over in consequence
of the animosity subsisting between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. All the conquests which, in the course
of the war, had been made by the German states, or by the League and the Emperor, were to be mutually
restored; all which had been appropriated by the foreign powers of France and Sweden, was to be forcibly
wrested from them by the united powers. The troops of the contracting parties were to be formed into one
imperial army, which, supported and paid by the Empire, was, by force of arms, to carry into execution the
covenants of the treaty.
As the peace of Prague was intended to serve as a general law of the Empire, those points, which did not
immediately affect the latter, formed the subject of a separate treaty. By it, Lusatia was ceded to the Elector
of Saxony as a fief of Bohemia, and special articles guaranteed the freedom of religion of this country and of
Silesia.
All the Protestant states were invited to accede to the treaty of Prague, and on that condition were to benefit
by the amnesty. The princes of Wurtemberg and Baden, whose territories the Emperor was already in
possession of, and which he was not disposed to restore unconditionally; and such vassals of Austria as had
borne arms against their sovereign; and those states which, under the direction of Oxenstiern, composed the
council of the Upper German Circle, were excluded from the treaty, not so much with the view of
continuing the war against them, as of compelling them to purchase peace at a dearer rate. Their territories
were to be retained in pledge, till every thing should be restored to its former footing. Such was the treaty of
Prague. Equal justice, however, towards all, might perhaps have restored confidence between the head of the
Empire and its members between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics between the Reformed and
the Lutheran party; and the Swedes, abandoned by all their allies, would in all probability have been driven
from Germany with disgrace. But this inequality strengthened, in those who were more severely treated, the
spirit of mistrust and opposition, and made it an easier task for the Swedes to keep alive the flame of war, and
to maintain a party in Germany.
The peace of Prague, as might have been expected, was received with very various feelings throughout
Germany. The attempt to conciliate both parties, had rendered it obnoxious to both. The Protestants
complained of the restraints imposed upon them; the Roman Catholics thought that these hated sectaries had
been favoured at the expense of the true church. In the opinion of the latter, the church had been deprived of
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its inalienable rights, by the concession to the Protestants of forty years' undisturbed possession of the
ecclesiastical benefices; while the former murmured that the interests of the Protestant church had been
betrayed, because toleration had not been granted to their coreligionists in the Austrian dominions. But no
one was so bitterly reproached as the Elector of Saxony, who was publicly denounced as a deserter, a traitor
to religion and the liberties of the Empire, and a confederate of the Emperor.
In the mean time, he consoled himself with the triumph of seeing most of the Protestant states compelled by
necessity to embrace this peace. The Elector of Brandenburg, Duke William of Weimar, the princes of
Anhalt, the dukes of Mecklenburg, the dukes of Brunswick Lunenburg, the Hanse towns, and most of the
imperial cities, acceded to it. The Landgrave William of Hesse long wavered, or affected to do so, in order to
gain time, and to regulate his measures by the course of events. He had conquered several fertile provinces of
Westphalia, and derived from them principally the means of continuing the war; these, by the terms of the
treaty, he was bound to restore. Bernard, Duke of Weimar, whose states, as yet, existed only on paper, as a
belligerent power was not affected by the treaty, but as a general was so materially; and, in either view, he
must equally be disposed to reject it. His whole riches consisted in his bravery, his possessions in his sword.
War alone gave him greatness and importance, and war alone could realize the projects which his ambition
suggested.
But of all who declaimed against the treaty of Prague, none were so loud in their clamours as the Swedes, and
none had so much reason for their opposition. Invited to Germany by the Germans themselves, the champions
of the Protestant Church, and the freedom of the States, which they had defended with so much bloodshed,
and with the sacred life of their king, they now saw themselves suddenly and shamefully abandoned,
disappointed in all their hopes, without reward and without gratitude driven from the empire for which they
had toiled and bled, and exposed to the ridicule of the enemy by the very princes who owed every thing to
them. No satisfaction, no indemnification for the expenses which they had incurred, no equivalent for the
conquests which they were to leave behind them, was provided by the treaty of Prague. They were to be
dismissed poorer than they came, or, if they resisted, to be expelled by the very powers who had invited them.
The Elector of Saxony at last spoke of a pecuniary indemnification, and mentioned the small sum of two
millions five hundred thousand florins; but the Swedes had already expended considerably more, and this
disgraceful equivalent in money was both contrary to their true interests, and injurious to their pride. "The
Electors of Bavaria and Saxony," replied Oxenstiern, "have been paid for their services, which, as vassals,
they were bound to render the Emperor, with the possession of important provinces; and shall we, who have
sacrificed our king for Germany, be dismissed with the miserable sum of 2,500,000 florins?" The
disappointment of their expectations was the more severe, because the Swedes had calculated upon being
recompensed with the Duchy of Pomerania, the present possessor of which was old and without heirs. But the
succession of this territory was confirmed by the treaty of Prague to the Elector of Brandenburg; and all the
neighbouring powers declared against allowing the Swedes to obtain a footing within the empire.
Never, in the whole course of the war, had the prospects of the Swedes looked more gloomy, than in the year
1635, immediately after the conclusion of the treaty of Prague. Many of their allies, particularly among the
free cities, abandoned them to benefit by the peace; others were compelled to accede to it by the victorious
arms of the Emperor. Augsburg, subdued by famine, surrendered under the severest conditions; Wurtzburg
and Coburg were lost to the Austrians. The League of Heilbronn was formally dissolved. Nearly the whole of
Upper Germany, the chief seat of the Swedish power, was reduced under the Emperor. Saxony, on the
strength of the treaty of Prague, demanded the evacuation of Thuringia, Halberstadt, and Magdeburg.
Philipsburg, the military depot of France, was surprised by the Austrians, with all the stores it contained; and
this severe loss checked the activity of France. To complete the embarrassments of Sweden, the truce with
Poland was drawing to a close. To support a war at the same time with Poland and in Germany, was far
beyond the power of Sweden; and all that remained was to choose between them. Pride and ambition
declared in favour of continuing the German war, at whatever sacrifice on the side of Poland. An army,
however, was necessary to command the respect of Poland, and to give weight to Sweden in any negotiations
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for a truce or a peace.
The mind of Oxenstiern, firm, and inexhaustible in expedients, set itself manfully to meet these calamities,
which all combined to overwhelm Sweden; and his shrewd understanding taught him how to turn even
misfortunes to his advantage. The defection of so many German cities of the empire deprived him, it is true,
of a great part of his former allies, but at the same time it freed him from the necessity of paying any regard
to their interests. The more the number of his enemies increased, the more provinces and magazines were
opened to his troops. The gross ingratitude of the States, and the haughty contempt with which the Emperor
behaved, (who did not even condescend to treat directly with him about a peace,) excited in him the courage
of despair, and a noble determination to maintain the struggle to the last. The continuance of war, however
unfortunate it might prove, could not render the situation of Sweden worse than it now was; and if Germany
was to be evacuated, it was at least better and nobler to do so sword in hand, and to yield to force rather than
to fear.
In the extremity in which the Swedes were now placed by the desertion of their allies, they addressed
themselves to France, who met them with the greatest encouragement. The interests of the two crowns were
closely united, and France would have injured herself by allowing the Swedish power in Germany to decline.
The helpless situation of the Swedes, was rather an additional motive with France to cement more closely
their alliance, and to take a more active part in the German war. Since the alliance with Sweden, at Beerwald,
in 1632, France had maintained the war against the Emperor, by the arms of Gustavus Adolphus, without any
open or formal breach, by furnishing subsidies and increasing the number of his enemies. But alarmed at the
unexpected rapidity and success of the Swedish arms, France, in anxiety to restore the balance of power,
which was disturbed by the preponderance of the Swedes, seemed, for a time, to have lost sight of her
original designs. She endeavoured to protect the Roman Catholic princes of the empire against the Swedish
conqueror, by the treaties of neutrality, and when this plan failed, she even meditated herself to declare war
against him. But no sooner had the death of Gustavus Adolphus, and the desperate situation of the Swedish
affairs, dispelled this apprehension, than she returned with fresh zeal to her first design, and readily afforded
in this misfortune the aid which in the hour of success she had refused. Freed from the checks which the
ambition and vigilance of Gustavus Adolphus placed upon her plans of aggrandizement, France availed
herself of the favourable opportunity afforded by the defeat of Nordlingen, to obtain the entire direction of
the war, and to prescribe laws to those who sued for her powerful protection. The moment seemed to smile
upon her boldest plans, and those which had formerly seemed chimerical, now appeared to be justified by
circumstances. She now turned her whole attention to the war in Germany; and, as soon as she had secured
her own private ends by a treaty with the Germans, she suddenly entered the political arena as an active and a
commanding power. While the other belligerent states had been exhausting themselves in a tedious contest,
France had been reserving her strength, and maintained the contest by money alone; but now, when the state
of things called for more active measures, she seized the sword, and astonished Europe by the boldness and
magnitude of her undertakings. At the same moment, she fitted out two fleets, and sent six different armies
into the field, while she subsidized a foreign crown and several of the German princes. Animated by this
powerful cooperation, the Swedes and Germans awoke from the consternation, and hoped, sword in hand, to
obtain a more honourable peace than that of Prague. Abandoned by their confederates, who had been
reconciled to the Emperor, they formed a still closer alliance with France, which increased her support with
their growing necessities, at the same time taking a more active, although secret share in the German war,
until at last, she threw off the mask altogether, and in her own name made an unequivocal declaration of war
against the Emperor.
To leave Sweden at full liberty to act against Austria, France commenced her operations by liberating it from
all fear of a Polish war. By means of the Count d'Avaux, its minister, an agreement was concluded between
the two powers at Stummsdorf in Prussia, by which the truce was prolonged for twentysix years, though not
without a great sacrifice on the part of the Swedes, who ceded by a single stroke of the pen almost the whole
of Polish Prussia, the dearbought conquest of Gustavus Adolphus. The treaty of Beerwald was, with certain
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modifications, which circumstances rendered necessary, renewed at different times at Compiegne, and
afterwards at Wismar and Hamburg. France had already come to a rupture with Spain, in May, 1635, and the
vigorous attack which it made upon that power, deprived the Emperor of his most valuable auxiliaries from
the Netherlands. By supporting the Landgrave William of Cassel, and Duke Bernard of Weimar, the Swedes
were enabled to act with more vigour upon the Elbe and the Danube, and a diversion upon the Rhine
compelled the Emperor to divide his force.
The war was now prosecuted with increasing activity. By the treaty of Prague, the Emperor had lessened the
number of his adversaries within the Empire; though, at the same time, the zeal and activity of his foreign
enemies had been augmented by it. In Germany, his influence was almost unlimited, for, with the exception
of a few states, he had rendered himself absolute master of the German body and its resources, and was again
enabled to act in the character of emperor and sovereign. The first fruit of his power was the elevation of his
son, Ferdinand III., to the dignity of King of the Romans, to which he was elected by a decided majority of
votes, notwithstanding the opposition of Treves, and of the heirs of the Elector Palatine. But, on the other
hand, he had exasperated the Swedes to desperation, had armed the power of France against him, and drawn
its troops into the heart of the kingdom. France and Sweden, with their German allies, formed, from this
moment, one firm and compactly united power; the Emperor, with the German states which adhered to him,
were equally firm and united. The Swedes, who no longer fought for Germany, but for their own lives,
showed no more indulgence; relieved from the necessity of consulting their German allies, or accounting to
them for the plans which they adopted, they acted with more precipitation, rapidity, and boldness. Battles,
though less decisive, became more obstinate and bloody; greater achievements, both in bravery and military
skill, were performed; but they were but insulated efforts; and being neither dictated by any consistent plan,
nor improved by any commanding spirit, had comparatively little influence upon the course of the war.
Saxony had bound herself, by the treaty of Prague, to expel the Swedes from Germany. From this moment,
the banners of the Saxons and Imperialists were united: the former confederates were converted into
implacable enemies. The archbishopric of Magdeburg which, by the treaty, was ceded to the prince of
Saxony, was still held by the Swedes, and every attempt to acquire it by negociation had proved ineffectual.
Hostilities commenced, by the Elector of Saxony recalling all his subjects from the army of Banner, which
was encamped upon the Elbe. The officers, long irritated by the accumulation of their arrears, obeyed the
summons, and evacuated one quarter after another. As the Saxons, at the same time, made a movement
towards Mecklenburg, to take Doemitz, and to drive the Swedes from Pomerania and the Baltic, Banner
suddenly marched thither, relieved Doemitz, and totally defeated the Saxon General Baudissin, with 7000
men, of whom 1000 were slain, and about the same number taken prisoners. Reinforced by the troops and
artillery, which had hitherto been employed in Polish Prussia, but which the treaty of Stummsdorf rendered
unnecessary, this brave and impetuous general made, the following year (1636), a sudden inroad into the
Electorate of Saxony, where he gratified his inveterate hatred of the Saxons by the most destructive ravages.
Irritated by the memory of old grievances which, during their common campaigns, he and the Swedes had
suffered from the haughtiness of the Saxons, and now exasperated to the utmost by the late defection of the
Elector, they wreaked upon the unfortunate inhabitants all their rancour. Against Austria and Bavaria, the
Swedish soldier had fought from a sense, as it were, of duty; but against the Saxons, they contended with all
the energy of private animosity and personal revenge, detesting them as deserters and traitors; for the hatred
of former friends is of all the most fierce and irreconcileable. The powerful diversion made by the Duke of
Weimar, and the Landgrave of Hesse, upon the Rhine and in Westphalia, prevented the Emperor from
affording the necessary assistance to Saxony, and left the whole Electorate exposed to the destructive ravages
of Banner's army.
At length, the Elector, having formed a junction with the Imperial General Hatzfeld, advanced against
Magdeburg, which Banner in vain hastened to relieve. The united army of the Imperialists and the Saxons
now spread itself over Brandenburg, wrested several places from the Swedes, and almost drove them to the
Baltic. But, contrary to all expectation, Banner, who had been given up as lost, attacked the allies, on the 24th
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of September, 1636, at Wittstock, where a bloody battle took place. The onset was terrific; and the whole
force of the enemy was directed against the right wing of the Swedes, which was led by Banner in person.
The contest was long maintained with equal animosity and obstinacy on both sides. There was not a squadron
among the Swedes, which did not return ten times to the charge, to be as often repulsed; when at last, Banner
was obliged to retire before the superior numbers of the enemy. His left wing sustained the combat until
night, and the second line of the Swedes, which had not as yet been engaged, was prepared to renew it the
next morning. But the Elector did not wait for a second attack. His army was exhausted by the efforts of the
preceding day; and, as the drivers had fled with the horses, his artillery was unserviceable. He accordingly
retreated in the night, with Count Hatzfeld, and relinquished the ground to the Swedes. About 5000 of the
allies fell upon the field, exclusive of those who were killed in the pursuit, or who fell into the hands of the
exasperated peasantry. One hundred and fifty standards and colours, twentythree pieces of cannon, the
whole baggage and silver plate of the Elector, were captured, and more than 2000 men taken prisoners. This
brilliant victory, achieved over an enemy far superior in numbers, and in a very advantageous position,
restored the Swedes at once to their former reputation; their enemies were discouraged, and their friends
inspired with new hopes. Banner instantly followed up this decisive success, and hastily crossing the Elbe,
drove the Imperialists before him, through Thuringia and Hesse, into Westphalia. He then returned, and took
up his winter quarters in Saxony.
But, without the material aid furnished by the diversion upon the Rhine, and the activity there of Duke
Bernard and the French, these important successes would have been unattainable. Duke Bernard, after the
defeat of Nordlingen, reorganized his broken army at Wetterau; but, abandoned by the confederates of the
League of Heilbronn, which had been dissolved by the peace of Prague, and receiving little support from the
Swedes, he found himself unable to maintain an army, or to perform any enterprise of importance. The defeat
at Nordlingen had terminated all his hopes on the Duchy of Franconia, while the weakness of the Swedes,
destroyed the chance of retrieving his fortunes through their assistance. Tired, too, of the constraint imposed
upon him by the imperious chancellor, he turned his attention to France, who could easily supply him with
money, the only aid which he required, and France readily acceded to his proposals. Richelieu desired
nothing so much as to diminish the influence of the Swedes in the German war, and to obtain the direction of
it for himself. To secure this end, nothing appeared more effectual than to detach from the Swedes their
bravest general, to win him to the interests of France, and to secure for the execution of its projects the
services of his arm. From a prince like Bernard, who could not maintain himself without foreign support,
France had nothing to fear, since no success, however brilliant, could render him independent of that crown.
Bernard himself came into France, and in October, 1635, concluded a treaty at St. Germaine en Laye, not as a
Swedish general, but in his own name, by which it was stipulated that he should receive for himself a yearly
pension of one million five hundred thousand livres, and four millions for the support of his army, which he
was to command under the orders of the French king. To inflame his zeal, and to accelerate the conquest of
Alsace, France did not hesitate, by a secret article, to promise him that province for his services; a promise
which Richelieu had little intention of performing, and which the duke also estimated at its real worth. But
Bernard confided in his good fortune, and in his arms, and met artifice with dissimulation. If he could once
succeed in wresting Alsace from the enemy, he did not despair of being able, in case of need, to maintain it
also against a friend. He now raised an army at the expense of France, which he commanded nominally under
the orders of that power, but in reality without any limitation whatever, and without having wholly
abandoned his engagements with Sweden. He began his operations upon the Rhine, where another French
army, under Cardinal Lavalette, had already, in 1635, commenced hostilities against the Emperor.
Against this force, the main body of the Imperialists, after the great victory of Nordlingen, and the reduction
of Swabia and Franconia had advanced under the command of Gallas, had driven them as far as Metz, cleared
the Rhine, and took from the Swedes the towns of Metz and Frankenthal, of which they were in possession.
But frustrated by the vigorous resistance of the French, in his main object, of taking up his winter quarters in
France, he led back his exhausted troops into Alsace and Swabia. At the opening of the next campaign, he
passed the Rhine at Breysach, and prepared to carry the war into the interior of France. He actually entered
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Burgundy, while the Spaniards from the Netherlands made progress in Picardy; and John De Werth, a
formidable general of the League, and a celebrated partisan, pushed his march into Champagne, and spread
consternation even to the gates of Paris. But an insignificant fortress in Franche Comte completely checked
the Imperialists, and they were obliged, a second time, to abandon their enterprise.
The activity of Duke Bernard had hitherto been impeded by his dependence on a French general, more suited
to the priestly robe, than to the baton of command; and although, in conjunction with him, he conquered
Alsace Saverne, he found himself unable, in the years 1636 and 1637, to maintain his position upon the
Rhine. The ill success of the French arms in the Netherlands had cheated the activity of operations in Alsace
and Breisgau; but in 1638, the war in that quarter took a more brilliant turn. Relieved from his former
restraint, and with unlimited command of his troops, Duke Bernard, in the beginning of February, left his
winter quarters in the bishopric of Basle, and unexpectedly appeared upon the Rhine, where, at this rude
season of the year, an attack was little anticipated. The forest towns of Laufenburg, Waldshut, and Seckingen,
were surprised, and Rhinefeldt besieged. The Duke of Savelli, the Imperial general who commanded in that
quarter, hastened by forced marches to the relief of this important place, succeeded in raising the siege, and
compelled the Duke of Weimar, with great loss to retire. But, contrary to all human expectation, he appeared
on the third day after, (21st February, 1638,) before the Imperialists, in order of battle, and defeated them in a
bloody engagement, in which the four Imperial generals, Savelli, John De Werth, Enkeford, and Sperreuter,
with 2000 men, were taken prisoners. Two of these, De Werth and Enkeford, were afterwards sent by
Richelieu's orders into France, in order to flatter the vanity of the French by the sight of such distinguished
prisoners, and by the pomp of military trophies, to withdraw the attention of the populace from the public
distress. The captured standards and colours were, with the same view, carried in solemn procession to the
church of Notre Dame, thrice exhibited before the altar, and committed to sacred custody.
The taking of Rhinefeldt, Roeteln, and Fribourg, was the immediate consequence of the duke's victory. His
army now increased by considerable recruits, and his projects expanded in proportion as fortune favoured
him. The fortress of Breysach upon the Rhine was looked upon as holding the command of that river, and as
the key of Alsace. No place in this quarter was of more importance to the Emperor, and upon none had more
care been bestowed. To protect Breysach, was the principal destination of the Italian army, under the Duke of
Feria; the strength of its works, and its natural defences, bade defiance to assault, while the Imperial generals
who commanded in that quarter had orders to retain it at any cost. But the duke, trusting to his good fortune,
resolved to attempt the siege. Its strength rendered it impregnable; it could, therefore, only be starved into a
surrender; and this was facilitated by the carelessness of the commandant, who, expecting no attack, had been
selling off his stores. As under these circumstances the town could not long hold out, it must be immediately
relieved or victualled. Accordingly, the Imperial General Goetz rapidly advanced at the head of 12,000 men,
accompanied by 3000 waggons loaded with provisions, which he intended to throw into the place. But he was
attacked with such vigour by Duke Bernard at Witteweyer, that he lost his whole force, except 3000 men,
together with the entire transport. A similar fate at Ochsenfeld, near Thann, overtook the Duke of Lorraine,
who, with 5000 or 6000 men, advanced to relieve the fortress. After a third attempt of general Goetz for the
relief of Breysach had proved ineffectual, the fortress, reduced to the greatest extremity by famine,
surrendered, after a blockade of four months, on the 17th December 1638, to its equally persevering and
humane conqueror.
The capture of Breysach opened a boundless field to the ambition of the Duke of Weimar, and the romance of
his hopes was fast approaching to reality. Far from intending to surrender his conquests to France, he destined
Breysach for himself, and revealed this intention, by exacting allegiance from the vanquished, in his own
name, and not in that of any other power. Intoxicated by his past success, and excited by the boldest hopes, he
believed that he should be able to maintain his conquests, even against France herself. At a time when
everything depended upon bravery, when even personal strength was of importance, when troops and
generals were of more value than territories, it was natural for a hero like Bernard to place confidence in his
own powers, and, at the head of an excellent army, who under his command had proved invincible, to believe
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himself capable of accomplishing the boldest and largest designs. In order to secure himself one friend among
the crowd of enemies whom he was about to provoke, he turned his eyes upon the Landgravine Amelia of
Hesse, the widow of the lately deceased Landgrave William, a princess whose talents were equal to her
courage, and who, along with her hand, would bestow valuable conquests, an extensive principality, and a
well disciplined army. By the union of the conquests of Hesse, with his own upon the Rhine, and the junction
of their forces, a power of some importance, and perhaps a third party, might be formed in Germany, which
might decide the fate of the war. But a premature death put a period to these extensive schemes.
"Courage, Father Joseph, Breysach is ours!" whispered Richelieu in the ear of the Capuchin, who had long
held himself in readiness to be despatched into that quarter; so delighted was he with this joyful intelligence.
Already in imagination he held Alsace, Breisgau, and all the frontiers of Austria in that quarter, without
regard to his promise to Duke Bernard. But the firm determination which the latter had unequivocally shown,
to keep Breysach for himself, greatly embarrassed the cardinal, and no efforts were spared to retain the
victorious Bernard in the interests of France. He was invited to court, to witness the honours by which his
triumph was to be commemorated; but he perceived and shunned the seductive snare. The cardinal even went
so far as to offer him the hand of his niece in marriage; but the proud German prince declined the offer, and
refused to sully the blood of Saxony by a misalliance. He was now considered as a dangerous enemy, and
treated as such. His subsidies were withdrawn; and the Governor of Breysach and his principal officers were
bribed, at least upon the event of the duke's death, to take possession of his conquests, and to secure his
troops. These intrigues were no secret to the duke, and the precautions he took in the conquered places,
clearly bespoke the distrust of France. But this misunderstanding with the French court had the most
prejudicial influence upon his future operations. The preparations he was obliged to make, in order to secure
his conquests against an attack on the side of France, compelled him to divide his military strength, while the
stoppage of his subsidies delayed his appearance in the field. It had been his intention to cross the Rhine, to
support the Swedes, and to act against the Emperor and Bavaria on the banks of the Danube. He had already
communicated his plan of operations to Banner, who was about to carry the war into the Austrian territories,
and had promised to relieve him so, when a sudden death cut short his heroic career, in the 36th year of his
age, at Neuburgh upon the Rhine (in July, 1639).
He died of a pestilential disorder, which, in the course of two days, had carried off nearly 400 men in his
camp. The black spots which appeared upon his body, his own dying expressions, and the advantages which
France was likely to reap from his sudden decease, gave rise to a suspicion that he had been removed by
poison a suspicion sufficiently refuted by the symptoms of his disorder. In him, the allies lost their
greatest general after Gustavus Adolphus, France a formidable competitor for Alsace, and the Emperor his
most dangerous enemy. Trained to the duties of a soldier and a general in the school of Gustavus Adolphus,
he successfully imitated his eminent model, and wanted only a longer life to equal, if not to surpass it. With
the bravery of the soldier, he united the calm and cool penetration of the general and the persevering fortitude
of the man, with the daring resolution of youth; with the wild ardour of the warrior, the sober dignity of the
prince, the moderation of the sage, and the conscientiousness of the man of honour. Discouraged by no
misfortune, he quickly rose again in full vigour from the severest defeats; no obstacles could check his
enterprise, no disappointments conquer his indomitable perseverance. His genius, perhaps, soared after
unattainable objects; but the prudence of such men, is to be measured by a different standard from that of
ordinary people. Capable of accomplishing more, he might venture to form more daring plans. Bernard
affords, in modern history, a splendid example of those days of chivalry, when personal greatness had its full
weight and influence, when individual bravery could conquer provinces, and the heroic exploits of a German
knight raised him even to the Imperial throne.
The best part of the duke's possessions were his army, which, together with Alsace, he bequeathed to his
brother William. But to this army, both France and Sweden thought that they had wellgrounded claims; the
latter, because it had been raised in name of that crown, and had done homage to it; the former, because it had
been supported by its subsidies. The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate also negociated for its services, and
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attempted, first by his agents, and latterly in his own person, to win it over to his interests, with the view of
employing it in the reconquest of his territories. Even the Emperor endeavoured to secure it, a circumstance
the less surprising, when we reflect that at this time the justice of the cause was comparatively unimportant,
and the extent of the recompense the main object to which the soldier looked; and when bravery, like every
other commodity, was disposed of to the highest bidder. But France, richer and more determined, outbade all
competitors: it bought over General Erlach, the commander of Breysach, and the other officers, who soon
placed that fortress, with the whole army, in their hands.
The young Palatine, Prince Charles Louis, who had already made an unsuccessful campaign against the
Emperor, saw his hopes again deceived. Although intending to do France so ill a service, as to compete with
her for Bernard's army, he had the imprudence to travel through that kingdom. The cardinal, who dreaded the
justice of the Palatine's cause, was glad to seize any opportunity to frustrate his views. He accordingly caused
him to be seized at Moulin, in violation of the law of nations, and did not set him at liberty, until he learned
that the army of the Duke of Weimar had been secured. France was now in possession of a numerous and
well disciplined army in Germany, and from this moment began to make open war upon the Emperor.
But it was no longer against Ferdinand II. that its hostilities were to be conducted; for that prince had died in
February, 1637, in the 59th year of his age. The war which his ambition had kindled, however, survived him.
During a reign of eighteen years he had never once laid aside the sword, nor tasted the blessings of peace as
long as his hand swayed the imperial sceptre. Endowed with the qualities of a good sovereign, adorned with
many of those virtues which ensure the happiness of a people, and by nature gentle and humane, we see him,
from erroneous ideas of the monarch's duty, become at once the instrument and the victim of the evil passions
of others; his benevolent intentions frustrated, and the friend of justice converted into the oppressor of
mankind, the enemy of peace, and the scourge of his people. Amiable in domestic life, and respectable as a
sovereign, but in his policy ill advised, while he gained the love of his Roman Catholic subjects, he incurred
the execration of the Protestants. History exhibits many and greater despots than Ferdinand II., yet he alone
has had the unfortunate celebrity of kindling a thirty years' war; but to produce its lamentable consequences,
his ambition must have been seconded by a kindred spirit of the age, a congenial state of previous
circumstances, and existing seeds of discord. At a less turbulent period, the spark would have found no fuel;
and the peacefulness of the age would have choked the voice of individual ambition; but now the flash fell
upon a pile of accumulated combustibles, and Europe was in flames.
His son, Ferdinand III., who, a few months before his father's death, had been raised to the dignity of King of
the Romans, inherited his throne, his principles, and the war which he had caused. But Ferdinand III. had
been a closer witness of the sufferings of the people, and the devastation of the country, and felt more keenly
and ardently the necessity of peace. Less influenced by the Jesuits and the Spaniards, and more moderate
towards the religious views of others, he was more likely than his father to listen to the voice of reason. He
did so, and ultimately restored to Europe the blessing of peace, but not till after a contest of eleven years
waged with sword and pen; not till after he had experienced the impossibility of resistance, and necessity had
laid upon him its stern laws.
Fortune favoured him at the commencement of his reign, and his arms were victorious against the Swedes.
The latter, under the command of the victorious Banner, had, after their success at Wittstock, taken up their
winter quarters in Saxony; and the campaign of 1637 opened with the siege of Leipzig. The vigorous
resistance of the garrison, and the approach of the Electoral and Imperial armies, saved the town, and Banner,
to prevent his communication with the Elbe being cut off, was compelled to retreat into Torgau. But the
superior number of the Imperialists drove him even from that quarter; and, surrounded by the enemy,
hemmed in by rivers, and suffering from famine, he had no course open to him but to attempt a highly
dangerous retreat into Pomerania, of which, the boldness and successful issue border upon romance. The
whole army crossed the Oder, at a ford near Furstenberg; and the soldiers, wading up to the neck in water,
dragged the artillery across, when the horses refused to draw. Banner had expected to be joined by General
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Wrangel, on the farther side of the Oder in Pomerania; and, in conjunction with him, to be able to make head
against the enemy. But Wrangel did not appear; and in his stead, he found an Imperial army posted at
Landsberg, with a view to cut off the retreat of the Swedes. Banner now saw that he had fallen into a
dangerous snare, from which escape appeared impossible. In his rear lay an exhausted country, the
Imperialists, and the Oder on his left; the Oder, too, guarded by the Imperial General Bucheim, offered no
retreat; in front, Landsberg, Custrin, the Warta, and a hostile army; and on the right, Poland, in which,
notwithstanding the truce, little confidence could be placed. In these circumstances, his position seemed
hopeless, and the Imperialists were already triumphing in the certainty of his fall. Banner, with just
indignation, accused the French as the authors of this misfortune. They had neglected to make, according to
their promise, a diversion upon the Rhine; and, by their inaction, allowed the Emperor to combine his whole
force upon the Swedes. "When the day comes," cried the incensed General to the French Commissioner, who
followed the camp, "that the Swedes and Germans join their arms against France, we shall cross the Rhine
with less ceremony." But reproaches were now useless; what the emergency demanded was energy and
resolution. In the hope of drawing the enemy by stratagem from the Oder, Banner pretended to march
towards Poland, and despatched the greater part of his baggage in this direction, with his own wife, and those
of the other officers. The Imperialists immediately broke up their camp, and hurried towards the Polish
frontier to block up the route; Bucheim left his station, and the Oder was stripped of its defenders. On a
sudden, and under cloud of night, Banner turned towards that river, and crossed it about a mile above Custrin,
with his troops, baggage, and artillery, without bridges or vessels, as he had done before at Furstenberg. He
reached Pomerania without loss, and prepared to share with Wrangel the defence of that province.
But the Imperialists, under the command of Gallas, entered that duchy at Ribses, and overran it by their
superior strength. Usedom and Wolgast were taken by storm, Demmin capitulated, and the Swedes were
driven far into Lower Pomerania. It was, too, more important for them at this moment than ever, to maintain a
footing in that country, for Bogislaus XIV. had died that year, and Sweden must prepare to establish its title
to Pomerania. To prevent the Elector of Brandenburg from making good the title to that duchy, which the
treaty of Prague had given him, Sweden exerted her utmost energies, and supported its generals to the extent
of her ability, both with troops and money. In other quarters of the kingdom, the affairs of the Swedes began
to wear a more favourable aspect, and to recover from the humiliation into which they had been thrown by
the inaction of France, and the desertion of their allies. For, after their hasty retreat into Pomerania, they had
lost one place after another in Upper Saxony; the princes of Mecklenburg, closely pressed by the troops of the
Emperor, began to lean to the side of Austria, and even George, Duke of Lunenburg, declared against them.
Ehrenbreitstein was starved into a surrender by the Bavarian General de Werth, and the Austrians possessed
themselves of all the works which had been thrown up on the Rhine. France had been the sufferer in the
contest with Spain; and the event had by no means justified the pompous expectations which had
accompanied the opening of the campaign. Every place which the Swedes had held in the interior of
Germany was lost; and only the principal towns in Pomerania still remained in their hands. But a single
campaign raised them from this state of humiliation; and the vigorous diversion, which the victorious Bernard
had effected upon the Rhine, gave quite a new turn to affairs.
The misunderstandings between France and Sweden were now at last adjusted, and the old treaty between
these powers confirmed at Hamburg, with fresh advantages for Sweden. In Hesse, the politic Landgravine
Amelia had, with the approbation of the Estates, assumed the government after the death of her husband, and
resolutely maintained her rights against the Emperor and the House of Darmstadt. Already zealously attached
to the Swedish Protestant party, on religious grounds, she only awaited a favourable opportunity openly to
declare herself. By artful delays, and by prolonging the negociations with the Emperor, she had succeeded in
keeping him inactive, till she had concluded a secret compact with France, and the victories of Duke Bernard
had given a favourable turn to the affairs of the Protestants. She now at once threw off the mask, and renewed
her former alliance with the Swedish crown. The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate was also stimulated, by the
success of Bernard, to try his fortune against the common enemy. Raising troops in Holland with English
money, he formed a magazine at Meppen, and joined the Swedes in Westphalia. His magazine was, however,
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quickly lost; his army defeated near Flotha, by Count Hatzfeld; but his attempt served to occupy for some
time the attention of the enemy, and thereby facilitated the operations of the Swedes in other quarters. Other
friends began to appear, as fortune declared in their favour, and the circumstance, that the States of Lower
Saxony embraced a neutrality, was of itself no inconsiderable advantage.
Under these advantages, and reinforced by 14,000 fresh troops from Sweden and Livonia. Banner opened,
with the most favourable prospects, the campaign of 1638. The Imperialists who were in possession of Upper
Pomerania and Mecklenburg, either abandoned their positions, or deserted in crowds to the Swedes, to avoid
the horrors of famine, the most formidable enemy in this exhausted country. The whole country betwixt the
Elbe and the Oder was so desolated by the past marchings and quarterings of the troops, that, in order to
support his army on its march into Saxony and Bohemia, Banner was obliged to take a circuitous route from
Lower Pomerania into Lower Saxony, and then into the Electorate of Saxony through the territory of
Halberstadt. The impatience of the Lower Saxon States to get rid of such troublesome guests, procured him
so plentiful a supply of provisions, that he was provided with bread in Magdeburg itself, where famine had
even overcome the natural antipathy of men to human flesh. His approach spread consternation among the
Saxons; but his views were directed not against this exhausted country, but against the hereditary dominions
of the Emperor. The victories of Bernard encouraged him, while the prosperity of the Austrian provinces
excited his hopes of booty. After defeating the Imperial General Salis, at Elsterberg, totally routing the Saxon
army at Chemnitz, and taking Pirna, he penetrated with irresistible impetuosity into Bohemia, crossed the
Elbe, threatened Prague, took Brandeis and Leutmeritz, defeated General Hofkirchen with ten regiments, and
spread terror and devastation through that defenceless kingdom. Booty was his sole object, and whatever he
could not carry off he destroyed. In order to remove more of the corn, the ears were cut from the stalks, and
the latter burnt. Above a thousand castles, hamlets, and villages were laid in ashes; sometimes more than a
hundred were seen burning in one night. From Bohemia he crossed into Silesia, and it was his intention to
carry his ravages even into Moravia and Austria. But to prevent this, Count Hatzfeld was summoned from
Westphalia, and Piccolomini from the Netherlands, to hasten with all speed to this quarter. The Archduke
Leopold, brother to the Emperor, assumed the command, in order to repair the errors of his predecessor
Gallas, and to raise the army from the low ebb to which it had fallen.
The result justified the change, and the campaign of 1640 appeared to take a most unfortunate turn for the
Swedes. They were successively driven out of all their posts in Bohemia, and anxious only to secure their
plunder, they precipitately crossed the heights of Meissen. But being followed into Saxony by the pursuing
enemy, and defeated at Plauen, they were obliged to take refuge in Thuringia. Made masters of the field in a
single summer, they were as rapidly dispossessed; but only to acquire it a second time, and to hurry from one
extreme to another. The army of Banner, weakened and on the brink of destruction in its camp at Erfurt,
suddenly recovered itself. The Duke of Lunenburg abandoned the treaty of Prague, and joined Banner with
the very troops which, the year before, had fought against him. Hesse Cassel sent reinforcements, and the
Duke of Longueville came to his support with the army of the late Duke Bernard. Once more numerically
superior to the Imperialists, Banner offered them battle near Saalfeld; but their leader, Piccolomini, prudently
declined an engagement, having chosen too strong a position to be forced. When the Bavarians at length
separated from the Imperialists, and marched towards Franconia, Banner attempted an attack upon this
divided corps, but the attempt was frustrated by the skill of the Bavarian General Von Mercy, and the near
approach of the main body of the Imperialists. Both armies now moved into the exhausted territory of Hesse,
where they formed intrenched camps near each other, till at last famine and the severity of the winter
compelled them both to retire. Piccolomini chose the fertile banks of the Weser for his winter quarters; but
being outflanked by Banner, he was obliged to give way to the Swedes, and to impose on the Franconian sees
the burden of maintaining his army.
At this period, a diet was held in Ratisbon, where the complaints of the States were to be heard, measures
taken for securing the repose of the Empire, and the question of peace or war finally settled. The presence of
the Emperor, the majority of the Roman Catholic voices in the Electoral College, the great number of
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bishops, and the withdrawal of several of the Protestant votes, gave the Emperor a complete command of the
deliberations of the assembly, and rendered this diet any thing but a fair representative of the opinions of the
German Empire. The Protestants, with reason, considered it as a mere combination of Austria and its
creatures against their party; and it seemed to them a laudable effort to interrupt its deliberations, and to
dissolve the diet itself.
Banner undertook this bold enterprise. His military reputation had suffered by his last retreat from Bohemia,
and it stood in need of some great exploit to restore its former lustre. Without communicating his designs to
any one, in the depth of the winter of 1641, as soon as the roads and rivers were frozen, he broke up from his
quarters in Lunenburg. Accompanied by Marshal Guebriant, who commanded the armies of France and
Weimar, he took the route towards the Danube, through Thuringia and Vogtland, and appeared before
Ratisbon, ere the Diet could be apprised of his approach. The consternation of the assembly was
indescribable; and, in the first alarm, the deputies prepared for flight. The Emperor alone declared that he
would not leave the town, and encouraged the rest by his example. Unfortunately for the Swedes, a thaw
came on, which broke up the ice upon the Danube, so that it was no longer passable on foot, while no boats
could cross it, on account of the quantities of ice which were swept down by the current. In order to perform
something, and to humble the pride of the Emperor, Banner discourteously fired 500 cannon shots into the
town, which, however, did little mischief. Baffled in his designs, he resolved to penetrate farther into Bavaria,
and the defenceless province of Moravia, where a rich booty and comfortable quarters awaited his troops.
Guebriant, however, began to fear that the purpose of the Swedes was to draw the army of Bernard away
from the Rhine, and to cut off its communication with France, till it should be either entirely won over, or
incapacitated from acting independently. He therefore separated from Banner to return to the Maine; and the
latter was exposed to the whole force of the Imperialists, which had been secretly drawn together between
Ratisbon and Ingoldstadt, and was on its march against him. It was now time to think of a rapid retreat,
which, having to be effected in the face of an army superior in cavalry, and betwixt woods and rivers, through
a country entirely hostile, appeared almost impracticable. He hastily retired towards the Forest, intending to
penetrate through Bohemia into Saxony; but he was obliged to sacrifice three regiments at Neuburg. These
with a truly Spartan courage, defended themselves for four days behind an old wall, and gained time for
Banner to escape. He retreated by Egra to Annaberg; Piccolomini took a shorter route in pursuit, by
Schlakenwald; and Banner succeeded, only by a single half hour, in clearing the Pass of Prisnitz, and saving
his whole army from the Imperialists. At Zwickau he was again joined by Guebriant; and both generals
directed their march towards Halberstadt, after in vain attempting to defend the Saal, and to prevent the
passage of the Imperialists.
Banner, at length, terminated his career at Halberstadt, in May 1641, a victim to vexation and disappointment.
He sustained with great renown, though with varying success, the reputation of the Swedish arms in
Germany, and by a train of victories showed himself worthy of his great master in the art of war. He was
fertile in expedients, which he planned with secrecy, and executed with boldness; cautious in the midst of
dangers, greater in adversity than in prosperity, and never more formidable than when upon the brink of
destruction. But the virtues of the hero were united with all the railings and vices which a military life creates,
or at least fosters. As imperious in private life as he was at the head of his army, rude as his profession, and
proud as a conqueror; he oppressed the German princes no less by his haughtiness, than their country by his
contributions. He consoled himself for the toils of war in voluptuousness and the pleasures of the table, in
which he indulged to excess, and was thus brought to an early grave. But though as much addicted to pleasure
as Alexander or Mahomet the Second, he hurried from the arms of luxury into the hardest fatigues, and
placed himself in all his vigour at the head of his army, at the very moment his soldiers were murmuring at
his luxurious excesses. Nearly 80,000 men fell in the numerous battles which he fought, and about 600
hostile standards and colours, which he sent to Stockholm, were the trophies of his victories. The want of this
great general was soon severely felt by the Swedes, who feared, with justice, that the loss would not readily
be replaced. The spirit of rebellion and insubordination, which had been overawed by the imperious
demeanour of this dreaded commander, awoke upon his death. The officers, with an alarming unanimity,
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demanded payment of their arrears; and none of the four generals who shared the command, possessed
influence enough to satisfy these demands, or to silence the malcontents. All discipline was at an end,
increasing want, and the imperial citations were daily diminishing the number of the army; the troops of
France and Weimar showed little zeal; those of Lunenburg forsook the Swedish colours; the Princes also of
the House of Brunswick, after the death of Duke George, had formed a separate treaty with the Emperor; and
at last even those of Hesse quitted them, to seek better quarters in Westphalia. The enemy profited by these
calamitous divisions; and although defeated with loss in two pitched battles, succeeded in making
considerable progress in Lower Saxony.
At length appeared the new Swedish generalissimo, with fresh troops and money. This was Bernard
Torstensohn, a pupil of Gustavus Adolphus, and his most successful imitator, who had been his page during
the Polish war. Though a martyr to the gout, and confined to a litter, he surpassed all his opponents in
activity; and his enterprises had wings, while his body was held by the most frightful of fetters. Under him,
the scene of war was changed, and new maxims adopted, which necessity dictated, and the issue justified. All
the countries in which the contest had hitherto raged were exhausted; while the House of Austria, safe in its
more distant territories, felt not the miseries of the war under which the rest of Germany groaned.
Torstensohn first furnished them with this bitter experience, glutted his Swedes on the fertile produce of
Austria, and carried the torch of war to the very footsteps of the imperial throne.
In Silesia, the enemy had gained considerable advantages over the Swedish general Stalhantsch, and driven
him as far as Neumark. Torstensohn, who had joined the main body of the Swedes in Lunenburg, summoned
him to unite with his force, and in the year 1642 hastily marched into Silesia through Brandenburg, which,
under its great Elector, had begun to maintain an armed neutrality. Glogau was carried, sword in hand,
without a breach, or formal approaches; the Duke Francis Albert of Lauenburg defeated and killed at
Schweidnitz; and Schweidnitz itself with almost all the towns on that side of the Oder, taken. He now
penetrated with irresistible violence into the interior of Moravia, where no enemy of Austria had hitherto
appeared, took Olmutz, and threw Vienna itself into consternation.
But, in the mean time, Piccolomini and the Archduke Leopold had collected a superior force, which speedily
drove the Swedish conquerors from Moravia, and after a fruitless attempt upon Brieg, from Silesia.
Reinforced by Wrangel, the Swedes again attempted to make head against the enemy, and relieved
Grossglogau; but could neither bring the Imperialists to an engagement, nor carry into effect their own views
upon Bohemia. Overrunning Lusatia, they took Zittau, in presence of the enemy, and after a short stay in that
country, directed their march towards the Elbe, which they passed at Torgau. Torstensohn now threatened
Leipzig with a siege, and hoped to raise a large supply of provisions and contributions from that prosperous
town, which for ten years had been unvisited with the scourge of war.
The Imperialists, under Leopold and Piccolomini, immediately hastened by Dresden to its relief, and
Torstensohn, to avoid being inclosed between this army and the town, boldly advanced to meet them in order
of battle. By a strange coincidence, the two armies met upon the very spot which, eleven years before,
Gustavus Adolphus had rendered remarkable by a decisive victory; and the heroism of their predecessors,
now kindled in the Swedes a noble emulation on this consecrated ground. The Swedish generals,
Stahlhantsch and Wellenberg, led their divisions with such impetuosity upon the left wing of the Imperialists,
before it was completely formed, that the whole cavalry that covered it were dispersed and rendered
unserviceable. But the left of the Swedes was threatened with a similar fate, when the victorious right
advanced to its assistance, took the enemy in flank and rear, and divided the Austrian line. The infantry on
both sides stood firm as a wall, and when their ammunition was exhausted, maintained the combat with the
buttends of their muskets, till at last the Imperialists, completely surrounded, after a contest of three hours,
were compelled to abandon the field. The generals on both sides had more than once to rally their flying
troops; and the Archduke Leopold, with his regiment, was the first in the attack and last in flight. But this
bloody victory cost the Swedes more than 3000 men, and two of their best generals, Schlangen and
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Lilienhoeck. More than 5000 of the Imperialists were left upon the field, and nearly as many taken prisoners.
Their whole artillery, consisting of 46 fieldpieces, the silver plate and portfolio of the archduke, with the
whole baggage of the army, fell into the hands of the victors. Torstensohn, too greatly disabled by his victory
to pursue the enemy, moved upon Leipzig. The defeated army retired into Bohemia, where its shattered
regiments reassembled. The Archduke Leopold could not recover from the vexation caused by this defeat;
and the regiment of cavalry which, by its premature flight, had occasioned the disaster, experienced the
effects of his indignation. At Raconitz in Bohemia, in presence of the whole army, he publicly declared it
infamous, deprived it of its horses, arms, and ensigns, ordered its standards to be torn, condemned to death
several of the officers, and decimated the privates.
The surrender of Leipzig, three weeks after the battle, was its brilliant result. The city was obliged to clothe
the Swedish troops anew, and to purchase an exemption from plunder, by a contribution of 300,000
rixdollars, to which all the foreign merchants, who had warehouses in the city, were to furnish their quota.
In the middle of winter, Torstensohn advanced against Freyberg, and for several weeks defied the inclemency
of the season, hoping by his perseverance to weary out the obstinacy of the besieged. But he found that he
was merely sacrificing the lives of his soldiers; and at last, the approach of the imperial general, Piccolomini,
compelled him, with his weakened army, to retire. He considered it, however, as equivalent to a victory, to
have disturbed the repose of the enemy in their winter quarters, who, by the severity of the weather, sustained
a loss of 3000 horses. He now made a movement towards the Oder, as if with the view of reinforcing himself
with the garrisons of Pomerania and Silesia; but, with the rapidity of lightning, he again appeared upon the
Bohemian frontier, penetrated through that kingdom, and relieved Olmutz in Moravia, which was hard
pressed by the Imperialists. His camp at Dobitschau, two miles from Olmutz, commanded the whole of
Moravia, on which he levied heavy contributions, and carried his ravages almost to the gates of Vienna. In
vain did the Emperor attempt to arm the Hungarian nobility in defence of this province; they appealed to their
privileges, and refused to serve beyond the limits of their own country. Thus, the time that should have been
spent in active resistance, was lost in fruitless negociation, and the entire province was abandoned to the
ravages of the Swedes.
While Torstensohn, by his marches and his victories, astonished friend and foe, the armies of the allies had
not been inactive in other parts of the empire. The troops of Hesse, under Count Eberstein, and those of
Weimar, under Mareschal de Guebriant, had fallen into the Electorate of Cologne, in order to take up their
winter quarters there. To get rid of these troublesome guests, the Elector called to his assistance the imperial
general Hatzfeldt, and assembled his own troops under General Lamboy. The latter was attacked by the allies
in January, 1642, and in a decisive action near Kempen, defeated, with the loss of about 2000 men killed, and
about twice as many prisoners. This important victory opened to them the whole Electorate and neighbouring
territories, so that the allies were not only enabled to maintain their winter quarters there, but drew from the
country large supplies of men and horses.
Guebriant left the Hessians to defend their conquests on the Lower Rhine against Hatzfeldt, and advanced
towards Thuringia, as if to second the operations of Torstensohn in Saxony. But instead of joining the
Swedes, he soon hurried back to the Rhine and the Maine, from which he seemed to think he had removed
farther than was expedient. But being anticipated in the Margraviate of Baden, by the Bavarians under Mercy
and John de Werth, he was obliged to wander about for several weeks, exposed, without shelter, to the
inclemency of the winter, and generally encamping upon the snow, till he found a miserable refuge in
Breisgau. He at last took the field; and, in the next summer, by keeping the Bavarian army employed in
Suabia, prevented it from relieving Thionville, which was besieged by Conde. But the superiority of the
enemy soon drove him back to Alsace, where he awaited a reinforcement.
The death of Cardinal Richelieu took place in November, 1642, and the subsequent change in the throne and
in the ministry, occasioned by the death of Louis XIII., had for some time withdrawn the attention of France
from the German war, and was the cause of the inaction of its troops in the field. But Mazarin, the inheritor,
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not only of Richelieu's power, but also of his principles and his projects, followed out with renewed zeal the
plans of his predecessor, though the French subject was destined to pay dearly enough for the political
greatness of his country. The main strength of its armies, which Richelieu had employed against the
Spaniards, was by Mazarin directed against the Emperor; and the anxiety with which he carried on the war in
Germany, proved the sincerity of his opinion, that the German army was the right arm of his king, and a wall
of safety around France. Immediately upon the surrender of Thionville, he sent a considerable reinforcement
to FieldMarshal Guebriant in Alsace; and to encourage the troops to bear the fatigues of the German war,
the celebrated victor of Rocroi, the Duke of Enghien, afterwards Prince of Conde, was placed at their head.
Guebriant now felt himself strong enough to appear again in Germany with repute. He hastened across the
Rhine with the view of procuring better winter quarters in Suabia, and actually made himself master of
Rothweil, where a Bavarian magazine fell into his hands. But the place was too dearly purchased for its
worth, and was again lost even more speedily than it had been taken. Guebriant received a wound in the arm,
which the surgeon's unskilfulness rendered mortal, and the extent of his loss was felt on the very day of his
death.
The French army, sensibly weakened by an expedition undertaken at so severe a season of the year, had, after
the taking of Rothweil, withdrawn into the neighbourhood of Duttlingen, where it lay in complete security,
without expectation of a hostile attack. In the mean time, the enemy collected a considerable force, with a
view to prevent the French from establishing themselves beyond the Rhine and so near to Bavaria, and to
protect that quarter from their ravages. The Imperialists, under Hatzfeldt, had formed a junction with the
Bavarians under Mercy; and the Duke of Lorraine, who, during the whole course of the war, was generally
found everywhere except in his own duchy, joined their united forces. It was resolved to force the quarters of
the French in Duttlingen, and the neighbouring villages, by surprise; a favourite mode of proceeding in this
war, and which, being commonly accompanied by confusion, occasioned more bloodshed than a regular
battle. On the present occasion, there was the more to justify it, as the French soldiers, unaccustomed to such
enterprises, conceived themselves protected by the severity of the winter against any surprise. John de Werth,
a master in this species of warfare, which he had often put in practice against Gustavus Horn, conducted the
enterprise, and succeeded, contrary to all expectation.
The attack was made on a side where it was least looked for, on account of the woods and narrow passes, and
a heavy snow storm which fell upon the same day, (the 24th November, 1643,) concealed the approach of the
vanguard till it halted before Duttlingen. The whole of the artillery without the place, as well as the
neighbouring Castle of Honberg, were taken without resistance, Duttlingen itself was gradually surrounded
by the enemy, and all connexion with the other quarters in the adjacent villages silently and suddenly cut off.
The French were vanquished without firing a cannon. The cavalry owed their escape to the swiftness of their
horses, and the few minutes in advance, which they had gained upon their pursuers. The infantry were cut to
pieces, or voluntarily laid down their arms. About 2,000 men were killed, and 7,000, with 25 staffofficers
and 90 captains, taken prisoners. This was, perhaps, the only battle, in the whole course of the war, which
produced nearly the same effect upon the party which gained, and that which lost; both these parties were
Germans; the French disgraced themselves. The memory of this unfortunate day, which was renewed 100
years after at Rosbach, was indeed erased by the subsequent heroism of a Turenne and Conde; but the
Germans may be pardoned, if they indemnified themselves for the miseries which the policy of France had
heaped upon them, by these severe reflections upon her intrepidity.
Meantime, this defeat of the French was calculated to prove highly disastrous to Sweden, as the whole power
of the Emperor might now act against them, while the number of their enemies was increased by a formidable
accession. Torstensohn had, in September, 1643, suddenly left Moravia, and moved into Silesia. The cause of
this step was a secret, and the frequent changes which took place in the direction of his march, contributed to
increase this perplexity. From Silesia, after numberless circuits, he advanced towards the Elbe, while the
Imperialists followed him into Lusatia. Throwing a bridge across the Elbe at Torgau, he gave out that he
intended to penetrate through Meissen into the Upper Palatinate in Bavaria; at Barby he also made a
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movement, as if to pass that river, but continued to move down the Elbe as far as Havelburg, where he
astonished his troops by informing them that he was leading them against the Danes in Holstein.
The partiality which Christian IV. had displayed against the Swedes in his office of mediator, the jealousy
which led him to do all in his power to hinder the progress of their arms, the restraints which he laid upon
their navigation of the Sound, and the burdens which he imposed upon their commerce, had long roused the
indignation of Sweden; and, at last, when these grievances increased daily, had determined the Regency to
measures of retaliation. Dangerous as it seemed, to involve the nation in a new war, when, even amidst its
conquests, it was almost exhausted by the old, the desire of revenge, and the deeprooted hatred which
subsisted between Danes and Swedes, prevailed over all other considerations; and even the embarrassment in
which hostilities with Germany had plunged it, only served as an additional motive to try its fortune against
Denmark.
Matters were, in fact, arrived at last to that extremity, that the war was prosecuted merely for the purpose of
furnishing food and employment to the troops; that good winter quarters formed the chief subject of
contention; and that success, in this point, was more valued than a decisive victory. But now the provinces of
Germany were almost all exhausted and laid waste. They were wholly destitute of provisions, horses, and
men, which in Holstein were to be found in profusion. If by this movement, Torstensohn should succeed
merely in recruiting his army, providing subsistence for his horses and soldiers, and remounting his cavalry,
all the danger and difficulty would be well repaid. Besides, it was highly important, on the eve of
negotiations for peace, to diminish the injurious influence which Denmark might exercise upon these
deliberations, to delay the treaty itself, which threatened to be prejudicial to the Swedish interests, by sowing
confusion among the parties interested, and with a view to the amount of indemnification, to increase the
number of her conquests, in order to be the more sure of securing those which alone she was anxious to
retain. Moreover, the present state of Denmark justified even greater hopes, if only the attempt were executed
with rapidity and silence. The secret was in fact so well kept in Stockholm, that the Danish minister had not
the slightest suspicion of it; and neither France nor Holland were let into the scheme. Actual hostilities
commenced with the declaration of war; and Torstensohn was in Holstein, before even an attack was
expected. The Swedish troops, meeting with no resistance, quickly overran this duchy, and made themselves
masters of all its strong places, except Rensburg and Gluckstadt. Another army penetrated into Schonen,
which made as little opposition; and nothing but the severity of the season prevented the enemy from passing
the Lesser Baltic, and carrying the war into Funen and Zealand. The Danish fleet was unsuccessful at
Femern; and Christian himself, who was on board, lost his right eye by a splinter. Cut off from all
communication with the distant force of the Emperor, his ally, this king was on the point of seeing his whole
kingdom overrun by the Swedes; and all things threatened the speedy fulfilment of the old prophecy of the
famous Tycho Brahe, that in the year 1644, Christian IV. should wander in the greatest misery from his
dominions.
But the Emperor could not look on with indifference, while Denmark was sacrificed to Sweden, and the latter
strengthened by so great an acquisition. Notwithstanding great difficulties lay in the way of so long a march
through desolated provinces, he did not hesitate to despatch an army into Holstein under Count Gallas, who,
after Piccolomini's retirement, had resumed the supreme command of the troops. Gallas accordingly appeared
in the duchy, took Keil, and hoped, by forming a junction with the Danes, to be able to shut up the Swedish
army in Jutland. Meantime, the Hessians, and the Swedish General Koenigsmark, were kept in check by
Hatzfeldt, and the Archbishop of Bremen, the son of Christian IV.; and afterwards the Swedes drawn into
Saxony by an attack upon Meissen. But Torstensohn, with his augmented army, penetrated through the
unoccupied pass betwixt Schleswig and Stapelholm, met Gallas, and drove him along the whole course of the
Elbe, as far as Bernburg, where the Imperialists took up an entrenched position. Torstensohn passed the Saal,
and by posting himself in the rear of the enemy, cut off their communication with Saxony and Bohemia.
Scarcity and famine began now to destroy them in great numbers, and forced them to retreat to Magdeburg,
where, however, they were not much better off. The cavalry, which endeavoured to escape into Silesia, was
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overtaken and routed by Torstensohn, near Juterbock; the rest of the army, after a vain attempt to fight its
way through the Swedish lines, was almost wholly destroyed near Magdeburg. From this expedition, Gallas
brought back only a few thousand men of all his formidable force, and the reputation of being a consummate
master in the art of ruining an army. The King of Denmark, after this unsuccessful effort to relieve him, sued
for peace, which he obtained at Bremsebor in the year 1645, under very unfavourable conditions.
Torstensohn rapidly followed up his victory; and while Axel Lilienstern, one of the generals who commanded
under him, overawed Saxony, and Koenigsmark subdued the whole of Bremen, he himself penetrated into
Bohemia with 16,000 men and 80 pieces of artillery, and endeavoured a second time to remove the seat of
war into the hereditary dominions of Austria. Ferdinand, upon this intelligence, hastened in person to Prague,
in order to animate the courage of the people by his presence; and as a skilful general was much required, and
so little unanimity prevailed among the numerous leaders, he hoped in the immediate neighbourhood of the
war to be able to give more energy and activity. In obedience to his orders, Hatzfeldt assembled the whole
Austrian and Bavarian force, and contrary to his own inclination and advice, formed the Emperor's last army,
and the last bulwark of his states, in order of battle, to meet the enemy, who were approaching, at Jankowitz,
on the 24th of February, 1645. Ferdinand depended upon his cavalry, which outnumbered that of the enemy
by 3000, and upon the promise of the Virgin Mary, who had appeared to him in a dream, and given him the
strongest assurances of a complete victory.
The superiority of the Imperialists did not intimidate Torstensohn, who was not accustomed to number his
antagonists. On the very first onset, the left wing, which Goetz, the general of the League, had entangled in a
disadvantageous position among marshes and thickets, was totally routed; the general, with the greater part of
his men, killed, and almost the whole ammunition of the army taken. This unfortunate commencement
decided the fate of the day. The Swedes, constantly advancing, successively carried all the most commanding
heights. After a bloody engagement of eight hours, a desperate attack on the part of the Imperial cavalry, and
a vigorous resistance by the Swedish infantry, the latter remained in possession of the field. 2,000 Austrians
were killed upon the spot, and Hatzfeldt himself, with 3,000 men, taken prisoners. Thus, on the same day, did
the Emperor lose his best general and his last army.
This decisive victory at Jancowitz, at once exposed all the Austrian territory to the enemy. Ferdinand hastily
fled to Vienna, to provide for its defence, and to save his family and his treasures. In a very short time, the
victorious Swedes poured, like an inundation, upon Moravia and Austria. After they had subdued nearly the
whole of Moravia, invested Brunn, and taken all the strongholds as far as the Danube, and carried the
intrenchments at the Wolf's Bridge, near Vienna, they at last appeared in sight of that capital, while the care
which they had taken to fortify their conquests, showed that their visit was not likely to be a short one. After a
long and destructive circuit through every province of Germany, the stream of war had at last rolled
backwards to its source, and the roar of the Swedish artillery now reminded the terrified inhabitants of those
balls which, twentyseven years before, the Bohemian rebels had fired into Vienna. The same theatre of war
brought again similar actors on the scene. Torstensohn invited Ragotsky, the successor of Bethlen Gabor, to
his assistance, as the Bohemian rebels had solicited that of his predecessor; Upper Hungary was already
inundated by his troops, and his union with the Swedes was daily apprehended. The Elector of Saxony,
driven to despair by the Swedes taking up their quarters within his territories, and abandoned by the Emperor,
who, after the defeat at Jankowitz, was unable to defend himself, at length adopted the last and only
expedient which remained, and concluded a truce with Sweden, which was renewed from year to year, till the
general peace. The Emperor thus lost a friend, while a new enemy was appearing at his very gates, his armies
dispersed, and his allies in other quarters of Germany defeated. The French army had effaced the disgrace of
their defeat at Deutlingen by a brilliant campaign, and had kept the whole force of Bavaria employed upon
the Rhine and in Suabia. Reinforced with fresh troops from France, which the great Turenne, already
distinguished by his victories in Italy, brought to the assistance of the Duke of Enghien, they appeared on the
3rd of August, 1644, before Friburg, which Mercy had lately taken, and now covered, with his whole army
strongly intrenched. But against the steady firmness of the Bavarians, all the impetuous valour of the French
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was exerted in vain, and after a fruitless sacrifice of 6,000 men, the Duke of Enghien was compelled to
retreat. Mazarin shed tears over this great loss, which Conde, who had no feeling for anything but glory,
disregarded. "A single night in Paris," said he, "gives birth to more men than this action has destroyed." The
Bavarians, however, were so disabled by this murderous battle, that, far from being in a condition to relieve
Austria from the menaced dangers, they were too weak even to defend the banks of the Rhine. Spires,
Worms, and Manheim capitulated; the strong fortress of Philipsburg was forced to surrender by famine; and,
by a timely submission, Mentz hastened to disarm the conquerors.
Austria and Moravia, however, were now freed from Torstensohn, by a similar means of deliverance, as in
the beginning of the war had saved them from the Bohemians. Ragotzky, at the head of 25,000 men, had
advanced into the neighbourhood of the Swedish quarters upon the Danube. But these wild undisciplined
hordes, instead of seconding the operations of Torstensohn by any vigorous enterprise, only ravaged the
country, and increased the distress which, even before their arrival, had begun to be felt in the Swedish camp.
To extort tribute from the Emperor, and money and plunder from his subjects, was the sole object that had
allured Ragotzky, or his predecessor, Bethlen Gabor, into the field; and both departed as soon as they had
gained their end. To get rid of him, Ferdinand granted the barbarian whatever he asked, and, by a small
sacrifice, freed his states of this formidable enemy.
In the mean time, the main body of the Swedes had been greatly weakened by a tedious encampment before
Brunn. Torstensohn, who commanded in person, for four entire months employed in vain all his knowledge
of military tactics; the obstinacy of the resistance was equal to that of the assault; while despair roused the
courage of Souches, the commandant, a Swedish deserter, who had no hope of pardon. The ravages caused by
pestilence, arising from famine, want of cleanliness, and the use of unripe fruit, during their tedious and
unhealthy encampment, with the sudden retreat of the Prince of Transylvania, at last compelled the Swedish
leader to raise the siege. As all the passes upon the Danube were occupied, and his army greatly weakened by
famine and sickness, he at last relinquished his intended plan of operations against Austria and Moravia, and
contented himself with securing a key to these provinces, by leaving behind him Swedish garrisons in the
conquered fortresses. He then directed his march into Bohemia, whither he was followed by the Imperialists,
under the Archduke Leopold. Such of the lost places as had not been retaken by the latter, were recovered,
after his departure, by the Austrian General Bucheim; so that, in the course of the following year, the
Austrian frontier was again cleared of the enemy, and Vienna escaped with mere alarm. In Bohemia and
Silesia too, the Swedes maintained themselves only with a very variable fortune; they traversed both
countries, without being able to hold their ground in either. But if the designs of Torstensohn were not
crowned with all the success which they were promised at the commencement, they were, nevertheless,
productive of the most important consequences to the Swedish party. Denmark had been compelled to a
peace, Saxony to a truce. The Emperor, in the deliberations for a peace, offered greater concessions; France
became more manageable; and Sweden itself bolder and more confident in its bearing towards these two
crowns. Having thus nobly performed his duty, the author of these advantages retired, adorned with laurels,
into the tranquillity of private life, and endeavoured to restore his shattered health.
By the retreat of Torstensohn, the Emperor was relieved from all fears of an irruption on the side of Bohemia.
But a new danger soon threatened the Austrian frontier from Suabia and Bavaria. Turenne, who had separated
from Conde, and taken the direction of Suabia, had, in the year 1645, been totally defeated by Mercy, near
Mergentheim; and the victorious Bavarians, under their brave leader, poured into Hesse. But the Duke of
Enghien hastened with considerable succours from Alsace, Koenigsmark from Moravia, and the Hessians
from the Rhine, to recruit the defeated army, and the Bavarians were in turn compelled to retire to the
extreme limits of Suabia. Here they posted themselves at the village of Allersheim, near Nordlingen, in order
to cover the Bavarian frontier. But no obstacle could check the impetuosity of the Duke of Enghien. In
person, he led on his troops against the enemy's entrenchments, and a battle took place, which the heroic
resistance of the Bavarians rendered most obstinate and bloody; till at last the death of the great Mercy, the
skill of Turenne, and the iron firmness of the Hessians, decided the day in favour of the allies. But even this
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second barbarous sacrifice of life had little effect either on the course of the war, or on the negociations for
peace. The French army, exhausted by this bloody engagement, was still farther weakened by the departure of
the Hessians, and the Bavarians being reinforced by the Archduke Leopold, Turenne was again obliged
hastily to recross the Rhine.
The retreat of the French, enabled the enemy to turn his whole force upon the Swedes in Bohemia. Gustavus
Wrangel, no unworthy successor of Banner and Torstensohn, had, in 1646, been appointed
Commanderinchief of the Swedish army, which, besides Koenigsmark's flying corps and the numerous
garrisons disposed throughout the empire, amounted to about 8,000 horse, and 15,000 foot. The Archduke,
after reinforcing his army, which already amounted to 24,000 men, with twelve Bavarian regiments of
cavalry, and eighteen regiments of infantry, moved against Wrangel, in the hope of being able to overwhelm
him by his superior force before Koenigsmark could join him, or the French effect a diversion in his favour.
Wrangel, however, did not await him, but hastened through Upper Saxony to the Weser, where he took
Hoester and Paderborn. From thence he marched into Hesse, in order to join Turenne, and at his camp at
Wetzlar, was joined by the flying corps of Koenigsmark. But Turenne, fettered by the instructions of
Mazarin, who had seen with jealousy the warlike prowess and increasing power of the Swedes, excused
himself on the plea of a pressing necessity to defend the frontier of France on the side of the Netherlands, in
consequence of the Flemings having failed to make the promised diversion. But as Wrangel continued to
press his just demand, and a longer opposition might have excited distrust on the part of the Swedes, or
induce them to conclude a private treaty with Austria, Turenne at last obtained the wished for permission to
join the Swedish army.
The junction took place at Giessen, and they now felt themselves strong enough to meet the enemy. The latter
had followed the Swedes into Hesse, in order to intercept their commissariat, and to prevent their union with
Turenne. In both designs they had been unsuccessful; and the Imperialists now saw themselves cut off from
the Maine, and exposed to great scarcity and want from the loss of their magazines. Wrangel took advantage
of their weakness, to execute a plan by which he hoped to give a new turn to the war. He, too, had adopted
the maxim of his predecessor, to carry the war into the Austrian States. But discouraged by the ill success of
Torstensohn's enterprise, he hoped to gain his end with more certainty by another way. He determined to
follow the course of the Danube, and to break into the Austrian territories through the midst of Bavaria. A
similar design had been formerly conceived by Gustavus Adolphus, which he had been prevented carrying
into effect by the approach of Wallenstein's army, and the danger of Saxony. Duke Bernard moving in his
footsteps, and more fortunate than Gustavus, had spread his victorious banners between the Iser and the Inn;
but the near approach of the enemy, vastly superior in force, obliged him to halt in his victorious career, and
lead back his troops. Wrangel now hoped to accomplish the object in which his predecessors had failed, the
more so, as the Imperial and Bavarian army was far in his rear upon the Lahn, and could only reach Bavaria
by a long march through Franconia and the Upper Palatinate. He moved hastily upon the Danube, defeated a
Bavarian corps near Donauwerth, and passed that river, as well as the Lech, unopposed. But by wasting his
time in the unsuccessful siege of Augsburg, he gave opportunity to the Imperialists, not only to relieve that
city, but also to repulse him as far as Lauingen. No sooner, however, had they turned towards Suabia, with a
view to remove the war from Bavaria, than, seizing the opportunity, he repassed the Lech, and guarded the
passage of it against the Imperialists themselves. Bavaria now lay open and defenceless before him; the
French and Swedes quickly overran it; and the soldiery indemnified themselves for all dangers by frightful
outrages, robberies, and extortions. The arrival of the Imperial troops, who at last succeeded in passing the
Lech at Thierhaupten, only increased the misery of this country, which friend and foe indiscriminately
plundered.
And now, for the first time during the whole course of this war, the courage of Maximilian, which for
eightandtwenty years had stood unshaken amidst fearful dangers, began to waver. Ferdinand II., his
schoolcompanion at Ingoldstadt, and the friend of his youth, was no more; and with the death of his friend
and benefactor, the strong tie was dissolved which had linked the Elector to the House of Austria. To the
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father, habit, inclination, and gratitude had attached him; the son was a stranger to his heart, and political
interests alone could preserve his fidelity to the latter prince.
Accordingly, the motives which the artifices of France now put in operation, in order to detach him from the
Austrian alliance, and to induce him to lay down his arms, were drawn entirely from political considerations.
It was not without a selfish object that Mazarin had so far overcome his jealousy of the growing power of the
Swedes, as to allow the French to accompany them into Bavaria. His intention was to expose Bavaria to all
the horrors of war, in the hope that the persevering fortitude of Maximilian might be subdued by necessity
and despair, and the Emperor deprived of his first and last ally. Brandenburg had, under its great sovereign,
embraced the neutrality; Saxony had been forced to accede to it; the war with France prevented the Spaniards
from taking any part in that of Germany; the peace with Sweden had removed Denmark from the theatre of
war; and Poland had been disarmed by a long truce. If they could succeed in detaching the Elector of Bavaria
also from the Austrian alliance, the Emperor would be without a friend in Germany and left to the mercy of
the allied powers.
Ferdinand III. saw his danger, and left no means untried to avert it. But the Elector of Bavaria was
unfortunately led to believe that the Spaniards alone were disinclined to peace, and that nothing, but Spanish
influence, had induced the Emperor so long to resist a cessation of hostilities. Maximilian detested the
Spaniards, and could never forgive their having opposed his application for the Palatine Electorate. Could it
then be supposed that, in order to gratify this hated power, he would see his people sacrificed, his country laid
waste, and himself ruined, when, by a cessation of hostilities, he could at once emancipate himself from all
these distresses, procure for his people the repose of which they stood so much in need, and perhaps
accelerate the arrival of a general peace? All doubts disappeared; and, convinced of the necessity of this step,
he thought he should sufficiently discharge his obligations to the Emperor, if he invited him also to share in
the benefit of the truce.
The deputies of the three crowns, and of Bavaria, met at Ulm, to adjust the conditions. But it was soon
evident, from the instructions of the Austrian ambassadors that it was not the intention of the Emperor to
second the conclusion of a truce, but if possible to prevent it. It was obviously necessary to make the terms
acceptable to the Swedes, who had the advantage, and had more to hope than to fear from the continuance of
the war. They were the conquerors; and yet the Emperor presumed to dictate to them. In the first transports of
their indignation, the Swedish ambassadors were on the point of leaving the congress, and the French were
obliged to have recourse to threats in order to detain them.
The good intentions of the Elector of Bavaria, to include the Emperor in the benefit of the truce, having been
thus rendered unavailing, he felt himself justified in providing for his own safety. However hard were the
conditions on which the truce was to be purchased, he did not hesitate to accept it on any terms. He agreed to
the Swedes extending their quarters in Suabia and Franconia, and to his own being restricted to Bavaria and
the Palatinate. The conquests which he had made in Suabia were ceded to the allies, who, on their part,
restored to him what they had taken from Bavaria. Cologne and Hesse Cassel were also included in the truce.
After the conclusion of this treaty, upon the 14th March, 1647, the French and Swedes left Bavaria, and in
order not to interfere with each other, took up different quarters; the former in Wuertemberg, the latter in
Upper Suabia, in the neighbourhood of the Lake of Constance. On the extreme north of this lake, and on the
most southern frontier of Suabia, the Austrian town of Bregentz, by its steep and narrow passes, seemed to
defy attack; and in this persuasion, the whole peasantry of the surrounding villages had with their property
taken refuge in this natural fortress. The rich booty, which the store of provisions it contained, gave reason to
expect, and the advantage of possessing a pass into the Tyrol, Switzerland and Italy, induced the Swedish
general to venture an attack upon this supposed impregnable post and town, in which he succeeded.
Meantime, Turenne, according to agreement, marched into Wuertemberg, where he forced the Landgrave of
Darmstadt and the Elector of Mentz to imitate the example of Bavaria, and to embrace the neutrality.
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And now, at last, France seemed to have attained the great object of its policy, that of depriving the Emperor
of the support of the League, and of his Protestant allies, and of dictating to him, sword in hand, the
conditions of peace. Of all his once formidable power, an army, not exceeding 12,000, was all that remained
to him; and this force he was driven to the necessity of entrusting to the command of a Calvinist, the Hessian
deserter Melander, as the casualties of war had stripped him of his best generals. But as this war had been
remarkable for the sudden changes of fortune it displayed; and as every calculation of state policy had been
frequently baffled by some unforeseen event, in this case also the issue disappointed expectation; and after a
brief crisis, the fallen power of Austria rose again to a formidable strength. The jealousy which France
entertained of Sweden, prevented it from permitting the total ruin of the Emperor, or allowing the Swedes to
obtain such a preponderance in Germany, as might have been destructive to France herself. Accordingly, the
French minister declined to take advantage of the distresses of Austria; and the army of Turenne, separating
from that of Wrangel, retired to the frontiers of the Netherlands. Wrangel, indeed, after moving from Suabia
into Franconia, taking Schweinfurt, and incorporating the imperial garrison of that place with his own army,
attempted to make his way into Bohemia, and laid siege to Egra, the key of that kingdom. To relieve this
fortress, the Emperor put his last army in motion, and placed himself at its head. But obliged to take a long
circuit, in order to spare the lands of Von Schlick, the president of the council of war, he protracted his
march; and on his arrival, Egra was already taken. Both armies were now in sight of each other; and a
decisive battle was momentarily expected, as both were suffering from want, and the two camps were only
separated from each other by the space of the entrenchments. But the Imperialists, although superior in
numbers, contented themselves with keeping close to the enemy, and harassing them by skirmishes, by
fatiguing marches and famine, until the negociations which had been opened with Bavaria were brought to a
bearing.
The neutrality of Bavaria, was a wound under which the Imperial court writhed impatiently; and after in vain
attempting to prevent it, Austria now determined, if possible, to turn it to advantage. Several officers of the
Bavarian army had been offended by this step of their master, which at once reduced them to inaction, and
imposed a burdensome restraint on their restless disposition. Even the brave John de Werth was at the head of
the malcontents, and encouraged by the Emperor, he formed a plot to seduce the whole army from their
allegiance to the Elector, and lead it over to the Emperor. Ferdinand did not blush to patronize this act of
treachery against his father's most trusty ally. He formally issued a proclamation to the Bavarian troops, in
which he recalled them to himself, reminded them that they were the troops of the empire, which the Elector
had merely commanded in name of the Emperor. Fortunately for Maximilian, he detected the conspiracy in
time enough to anticipate and prevent it by the most rapid and effective measures.
This disgraceful conduct of the Emperor might have justified a reprisal, but Maximilian was too old a
statesman to listen to the voice of passion, where policy alone ought to be heard. He had not derived from the
truce the advantages he expected. Far from tending to accelerate a general peace, it had a pernicious influence
upon the negociations at Munster and Osnaburg, and had made the allies bolder in their demands. The French
and Swedes had indeed removed from Bavaria; but, by the loss of his quarters in the Suabian circle, he found
himself compelled either to exhaust his own territories by the subsistence of his troops, or at once to disband
them, and to throw aside the shield and spear, at the very moment when the sword alone seemed to be the
arbiter of right. Before embracing either of these certain evils, he determined to try a third step, the
unfavourable issue of which was at least not so certain, viz., to renounce the truce and resume the war.
This resolution, and the assistance which he immediately despatched to the Emperor in Bohemia, threatened
materially to injure the Swedes, and Wrangel was compelled in haste to evacuate that kingdom. He retired
through Thuringia into Westphalia and Lunenburg, in the hope of forming a junction with the French army
under Turenne, while the Imperial and Bavarian army followed him to the Weser, under Melander and
Gronsfeld. His ruin was inevitable, if the enemy should overtake him before his junction with Turenne; but
the same consideration which had just saved the Emperor, now proved the salvation of the Swedes. Even
amidst all the fury of the conquest, cold calculations of prudence guided the course of the war, and the
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vigilance of the different courts increased, as the prospect of peace approached. The Elector of Bavaria could
not allow the Emperor to obtain so decisive a preponderance as, by the sudden alteration of affairs, might
delay the chances of a general peace. Every change of fortune was important now, when a pacification was so
ardently desired by all, and when the disturbance of the balance of power among the contracting parties might
at once annihilate the work of years, destroy the fruit of long and tedious negociations, and indefinitely
protract the repose of Europe. If France sought to restrain the Swedish crown within due bounds, and
measured out her assistance according to her successes and defeats, the Elector of Bavaria silently undertook
the same task with the Emperor his ally, and determined, by prudently dealing out his aid, to hold the fate of
Austria in his own hands. And now that the power of the Emperor threatened once more to attain a dangerous
superiority, Maximilian at once ceased to pursue the Swedes. He was also afraid of reprisals from France,
who had threatened to direct Turenne's whole force against him if he allowed his troops to cross the Weser.
Melander, prevented by the Bavarians from further pursuing Wrangel, crossed by Jena and Erfurt into Hesse,
and now appeared as a dangerous enemy in the country which he had formerly defended. If it was the desire
of revenge upon his former sovereign, which led him to choose Hesse for the scene of his ravage, he certainly
had his full gratification. Under this scourge, the miseries of that unfortunate state reached their height. But
he had soon reason to regret that, in the choice of his quarters, he had listened to the dictates of revenge rather
than of prudence. In this exhausted country, his army was oppressed by want, while Wrangel was recruiting
his strength, and remounting his cavalry in Lunenburg. Too weak to maintain his wretched quarters against
the Swedish general, when he opened the campaign in the winter of 1648, and marched against Hesse, he was
obliged to retire with disgrace, and take refuge on the banks of the Danube.
France had once more disappointed the expectations of Sweden; and the army of Turenne, disregarding the
remonstrances of Wrangel, had remained upon the Rhine. The Swedish leader revenged himself, by drawing
into his service the cavalry of Weimar, which had abandoned the standard of France, though, by this step, he
farther increased the jealousy of that power. Turenne received permission to join the Swedes; and the last
campaign of this eventful war was now opened by the united armies. Driving Melander before them along the
Danube, they threw supplies into Egra, which was besieged by the Imperialists, and defeated the Imperial and
Bavarian armies on the Danube, which ventured to oppose them at Susmarshausen, where Melander was
mortally wounded. After this overthrow, the Bavarian general, Gronsfeld, placed himself on the farther side
of the Lech, in order to guard Bavaria from the enemy.
But Gronsfeld was not more fortunate than Tilly, who, in this same position, had sacrificed his life for
Bavaria. Wrangel and Turenne chose the same spot for passing the river, which was so gloriously marked by
the victory of Gustavus Adolphus, and accomplished it by the same means, too, which had favoured their
predecessor. Bavaria was now a second time overrun, and the breach of the truce punished by the severest
treatment of its inhabitants. Maximilian sought shelter in Salzburgh, while the Swedes crossed the Iser, and
forced their way as far as the Inn. A violent and continued rain, which in a few days swelled this
inconsiderable stream into a broad river, saved Austria once more from the threatened danger. The enemy ten
times attempted to form a bridge of boats over the Inn, and as often it was destroyed by the current. Never,
during the whole course of the war, had the Imperialists been in so great consternation as at present, when the
enemy were in the centre of Bavaria, and when they had no longer a general left who could be matched
against a Turenne, a Wrangel, and a Koenigsmark. At last the brave Piccolomini arrived from the
Netherlands, to assume the command of the feeble wreck of the Imperialists. By their own ravages in
Bohemia, the allies had rendered their subsistence in that country impracticable, and were at last driven by
scarcity to retreat into the Upper Palatinate, where the news of the peace put a period to their activity.
Koenigsmark, with his flying corps, advanced towards Bohemia, where Ernest Odowalsky, a disbanded
captain, who, after being disabled in the imperial service, had been dismissed without a pension, laid before
him a plan for surprising the lesser side of the city of Prague. Koenigsmark successfully accomplished the
bold enterprise, and acquired the reputation of closing the thirty years' war by the last brilliant achievement.
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This decisive stroke, which vanquished the Emperor's irresolution, cost the Swedes only the loss of a single
man. But the old town, the larger half of Prague, which is divided into two parts by the Moldau, by its
vigorous resistance wearied out the efforts of the Palatine, Charles Gustavus, the successor of Christina on
the throne, who had arrived from Sweden with fresh troops, and had assembled the whole Swedish force in
Bohemia and Silesia before its walls. The approach of winter at last drove the besiegers into their quarters,
and in the mean time, the intelligence arrived that a peace had been signed at Munster, on the 24th October.
The colossal labour of concluding this solemn, and ever memorable and sacred treaty, which is known by the
name of the peace of Westphalia; the endless obstacles which were to be surmounted; the contending
interests which it was necessary to reconcile; the concatenation of circumstances which must have
cooperated to bring to a favourable termination this tedious, but precious and permanent work of policy; the
difficulties which beset the very opening of the negociations, and maintaining them, when opened, during the
everfluctuating vicissitudes of the war; finally, arranging the conditions of peace, and still more, the
carrying them into effect; what were the conditions of this peace; what each contending power gained or lost,
by the toils and sufferings of a thirty years' war; what modification it wrought upon the general system of
European policy; these are matters which must be relinquished to another pen. The history of the peace of
Westphalia constitutes a whole, as important as the history of the war itself. A mere abridgment of it, would
reduce to a mere skeleton one of the most interesting and characteristic monuments of human policy and
passions, and deprive it of every feature calculated to fix the attention of the public, for which I write, and of
which I now respectfully take my leave.
[End of The History of the Thirty Years' War.]
Notes: Separate sources indicate that at the beginning of this war there were about 15 million people in
Germany, and at the end of the war there were about 4 million. If this is not surprising enough, war broke out
again only 10 years after the conclusion of this war.
Please note that the original translation changed many foreign names, both of places and persons, into
English forms. These have NOT been revised. Thus Ko"ln is still Cologne, Friedrich is still Frederick, etc.
Some foreign names were NOT translated, and due to the limits of ASCII, vowels with umlauts have,
according to custom, had an E added after them, i.e. Koeln. Also, in some cases variant spellings of names
were used, and though an attempt was made, not all have been revised.
The following index is included as an aid to searching although electronic texts can be easily searched for
any word, it may prove helpful to know what some of the most important subjects are. Therefore, the index is
included, minus the page numbers.
Index.
AixlaChapelle, placed under the Ban.
Arnheim, FieldMarshal: communicates with Wallenstein;
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marches into Saxon territory; offers alliance to Wallenstein.
Augsburg, Diet of.
Augsburg, Peace of.
Aulic Council.
Austria, House of: religious and political position; power under Charles V.
Avaux, D', Count. [See letter D.]
Baden, Margrave of, joins Frederick V.
Bamberg, Bishop of.
Banner, Swedish general: at Leipzig; enters Magdeburg; joins Oxenstiern;
relieves Domitz; attacks Imperialists at Wittstock; returns into Pomerania;
opens the campaign in 1638; retreats through Egra, and dies.
Bavaria, Duke of: makes cause with the Emperor; attends the Diet at Ratisbon.
Bavaria, Elector of: he demands Wallenstein's dismissal. [See Maximilian.]
Bavaria, invasion of, by the Swedes.
Bethlen Gabor, Prince: menaces Hungary; invades Hungary; marches to Vienna;
crowned King of Hungary; makes peace with the Emperor;
breaks truce with the Emperor.
Bohemia: condition of, and history; invasion of; peace proclaimed.
Bohemian Brethren, edict against.
Bohemian Compact.
Bohemian Diet: 1609; 1619.
Bohemian Insurrection.
Bohemian Letter of Majesty.
Bohemian Reformers at the Diet, 1609.
Brahe, Count, Swedish general.
Brandenburg: atrocities in; George William Elector of.
Bremen, Bishop of: assembles troops for Gustavus.
Breze, Marquis of.
Brunn, siege of.
Brunswick, Ulric, Duke of: forbids Swedes to recruit;
threatened by Oxenstiern.
Bucquoi: defeats Mansfeld; death of.
Buttler, Colonel.
Calvinists in the Palatinate and Empire.
Catholic League: formation of; impart their secrets to the Emperor.
Charles V., Emperor.
Charles Louis, Count Palatine.
Charnasse, agent of Richelieu.
Christian IV. of Denmark: appointed generalissimo.
Christian, Duke of Brunswick: serves in Holland; defeated by Tilly; death of.
Christian William, Administrator of Brandenburg:
enters Magdeburg in disguise.
Conde, Prince de.
Conti Torquati, Imperialist.
Darmstadt: William, Landgrave of; George, Landgrave of.
D'Avaux negotiates treaty between Sweden and Poland.
"Defenders of Liberty", the.
Denmark, King of, sues for peace 1645.
Dettingen, Battle of.
Devereux, Captain.
Donauwerth: banned by the Aulic Council; Swedish officers at.
"Edict of Restitution" signed 1629.
Egra, Castle of, great banquet held at.
Enghien, Duke of, heroic conduct of.
England, political position of.
Evangelical Union: declaration in favour of, by Matthias;
moves in support of Bohemian Protestants.
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Falkenberg, Dietrich, sent to Magdeburg.
Ferdinand I., Emperor: character of; position after Augsburg.
Ferdinand II.: his Popish announcement; as Archduke of Gratz;
as Archduke of Styria, becomes Emperor; Protestantism in Styria;
besieged in Vienna; chosen Emperor 1619; rewards Maximilian with Bohemia;
confiscates estates of Frederick; invests Maximilian with Palatinate;
attends Diet of Ratisbon; at Mantua; character of, by his confessor;
negotiations with Sweden; selects Wallenstein as general; gives orders
to spare Saxony; state of his dominions after the fall of Prague;
receives news of Lutzen; deprives Wallenstein of command;
issues orders for his seizure; orders masses for Wallenstein; death.
Ferdinand III.: King of Hungary and Bohemia; appointed generalissimo;
elected King of the Romans; becomes Emperor; defeat at Jancowitz;
conspires against Bavaria.
Feria, Duke of, Spanish general.
Feuquieres, French Ambassador at Dresden.
France: political position after Henry IV.; ambassadors at Ratisbon;
interests and claims of; triumph of her policy; declaration of war
against the Emperor; retreat of the army under Turenne from Bavaria.
FrankfortontheOder: sacked by the Swedes; Diet of.
Frederick V., Elector Palatine and King of Bohemia:
alienates his Bohemian subjects; defeated at Prague; joins Mansfeld;
deprived of the Palatinate; at Munich with Gustavus;
meets Gustavus after Leipzig; death.
Friburg, Battle of.
Friedland, Duke of. [See Wallenstein.]
Gabor, Bethlen. [See letter B.]
Gallas, Imperialist general: made generalissimo; Commanderinchief;
in command under King of Hungary; overruns Ribses; defeated by Torstensohn.
Gebhard, Elector of Cologne.
German people, principles and religious zeal of.
Germany: its condition after Augsburg; at the accession of Rodolph;
after Wallenstein's death.
"God's friend, priests' foe", motto of Duke of Brunswick.
"God with us", warcry of the Swedes.
Gordon, Colonel.
Gratz, Archduke of. [See Ferdinand II.]
Guebriant, FieldMarshal.
Gustavus Adolphus, of Sweden: ascends the throne; early life, incident of;
position of; resources; concludes a treaty with France; with Magdeburg;
complaints against; appears before Berlin; treaty with Hesse Cassel;
with Saxony; meeting at Forgue; Battle of Leipzig; marches to the Rhine;
seats the Palatine in Munich; retrospect of his career from Halle to Lutzen
(all of Book III.); storms Marienburg; takes possession of Frankfort;
besieges Mentz; carries Oppenheim by storm; exposed to the malice
of the Jesuits; enters Nuremberg; besieges Ingoldstadt, narrow escape;
enters Munich; receives congratulations from Wallenstein;
hastens to the Upper Palatinate; seizes Nuremberg;
attacks Wallenstein's camp; marches to Neustadt; enters Naumberg;
death of, at the Battle of Lutzen; his body discovered;
review of his policy.
Gustavus Vasa.
Henderson, Colonel, Scotch officer, commands reserve at Leipzig.
Henry IV. of France, "Henry of Arragon", projects and views of.
Hepburn, Colonel, Scotch officer, anecdote of.
Hesse, Landgrave of: reply to Tilly's demands; concludes a treaty
with Gustavus; does important service for Gustavus.
Holland, political position of.
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Holk, General, death of.
Horn, Gustavus: drives Imperialists from Alsace; conduct at Leipzig;
left to subdue Franconia; successes in Franconia; services at Lutzen;
marches to the Swedish frontier.
Hungary, its relations to Austria.
Hussites, account of the.
Illo, Count: confederate of Wallenstein; acts as Wallenstein's agent;
death of.
Imperialists: delegates of, at Prague; army reduced to distress;
overrun Bavaria.
Interim, the, system of theology.
James I., King of England, assists the Elector.
Jancowitz, Battle of.
Jesuits, the: banishment of; they work against Gustavus;
their oppression of the Protestants; in Vienna, mention of;
reference to, in Wallenstein's career.
"Jesus Maria", warcry of the Imperialists.
Joseph, Father, agent of Richelieu.
Juliers, Duchy of: disputes succession to; "singular turn in the disruption".
Kinsky, Count.
Kinsky, Countess.
Klostergrab.
Koenigsmark, Swedish general.
Ladislaus, son of Segismund of Poland.
Lauenburg, Duke of.
Lavelette, Cardinal.
Leipzig: general convention of, 1631; Battle of.
Leslie, an officer of Wallenstein.
Letter of Majesty: issue of; explanation of; torn by Ferdinand.
Lorraine, Charles, Duke of, defeated by Gustavus.
Lubeck, Peace of.
Lutherans, the: their position stated; their oppression of the Calvinists.
Lutter, battle at.
Lutzen: mention of; Battle of; death of Gustavus.
Magdeburg: besieged by Tilly; assaulted; taken by the Swedes.
Mansfeld, Count Ernst: defeated at Budweiss; ravages the Palatinates;
enters the Dutch service; defeated at Dessau.
Mansfeld, Wolf, Count von, leaves Magdeburg to the Swedes.
Matthias, Emperor and Archduke: chosen as Austrian leader;
heads a revolt against the Emperor; acknowledged King of Bohemia;
ascends the throne; death of.
Maximilian II., Emperor and King of Hungary, government and position of.
Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria: Head of Catholic League; marches into Bohemia;
character and position of; makes secret treaty with France; perfidy of;
anxious for peace; tactics for supremacy; takes shelter in Salzburg.
Mazarin, Cardinal: and the Battle of Friburg; his diplomatic tactics
in the war.
Melander, a Calvinist: commands the Imperial forces;
mortally wounded at Egra.
Mentz, besieged and taken.
Moravian Brethren, doctrines of.
Munich surrenders to Gustavus.
Mutiny amongst Swedish officers near Donauwerth.
Neumann, Captain.
Nevers, Duke of.
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Nordlingen, Battle of.
Nuremberg: battleground; exertions of the magistrates.
Odowalsky, disbanded officer.
Oppenheim carried by storm.
Oxenstiern, Chancellor of Sweden: receives Mentz Library;
position; assembles Estates at Heilbronn; suspects Wallenstein;
alliance with Wallenstein; solicits French assistance; applies to France.
Palatinate, the, religious history of.
Palatine, Elector, position and character of.
Pappenheim, Imperialist general: assaults Magdeburg; recalls Tilly;
attacks Swedish vanguard; at Leipzig; marches to Cologne; at Lutzen;
death of.
Peace negotiations and conclusion, 1647.
Peace negotiations of Prague: terms of; results of to France and Sweden.
Philip II., of Spain, character and political views of.
Piccolomini: Wallenstein's reference to; becomes confidant of Wallenstein;
gives warning of Wallenstein to the Court; in command at Saalfield;
in pursuit of Banner; defeated by Torstensohn; commands Imperialists.
Prague: meeting of the "Defenders"; insurrection at; Battle of,
and savage treatment of the vanquished; entered by the Saxon Army;
the taking of. [See also Bohemian Diet.]
Protestant Union: design and aim of; divisions and changes; points of union;
formation of Evangelical Union; demands on accession of Matthias;
alliance with Hungary; preachers banished; dissolved; suppression of;
oppressions in Germany; reprisals in Prague.
Ragotsky, Prince: successor to Bethlen Gabor; in Austria and Moravia,
ravages the country.
Ratisbon: Diet held at, 1630; results of Diet, taken by Duke Bernard;
besieged by King of Hungary; Diet held at, 1641.
Rednitz, desperate fight at.
Reformation: history of the (most of Book I.); influence throughout Europe;
progress in Hungary; outbreaks at Strasburg.
Reservatum Ecclesiasticum, explanation of.
Richelieu, Minister of France: negotiates with Sweden;
effects a truce; treaty with Sweden; labours in favour of Gustavus;
assists German Protestants; terms with Duke Bernard; fall of Breysach;
death of.
Rodolph, Archduke and Emperor: ascends Imperial throne as Rodolph II.;
his political position; abdicates in favour of his brother; death of.
Rostock, taken by Imperialists.
SaxeLauenberg, Francis Albert, Duke of.
SaxeWeimar, Bernard, Duke of: succeeds Gustavus at Lutzen;
remains on the field; captures Leipzig; takes Ratisbon; removal of;
escapes capture; visits France; defeats the Imperialists;
lays siege to Breysach; death of.
Saxony, Elector of, John George: refuses Tilly's demands;
alliance with Gustavus; at Leipzig; meditates a separation from Sweden;
leaves the Swedes; treats with the Emperor; recalls his officers
from Banner's army; treaty with Sweden.
Schafgotsch, Imperialist general.
Seni, Wallenstein's astrologer.
"Snow King", nickname for Gustavus.
Spain: influence in Germany; policy of, under Charles V.
Spanish prisoners.
Stralsund, siege of.
Strasbourg, religious divisions.
Styria, Archduke of. [See Ferdinand II.]
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Suys, Imperialist general.
Sweden: political and religious condition of; historical summary
of Polish connection; origin of her intervention in the Thirty Years' War;
truce with Poland; alliance with France 1631; condition after death
of Gustavus.
Swedes: offer battle to Wallenstein; overrun Bavaria;
successes throughout Germany; capture Bregentz; advance to Nordlingen.
Terzky, Count.
Terzky, Countess.
Thurn, Count, "Defender": seizes Krummau; invades Moravia;
encamps before Vienna; takes flight to Holland; returns to Prague;
conveys Wallenstein's message to Gustavus.
Thurn, Count, Swedish general: at Steinau; surrender to Wallenstein;
demanded by the Jesuits.
Tilly, Count: commands the "army of execution"; defeats the Danish army
at Lutter; appointed generalissimo; character and appearance;
returns to Magdeburg; takes Magdeburg; encamped on the Elbe;
demands assistance from Saxony; ravages Saxony; at Leipzig;
flies to Lower Saxony; defeats Charles, Duke of Lorraine;
punishes the Bishop of Bamberg; awaits Gustavus at Rain; death.
Torgua: Diet of; council at.
Torstensohn, Bernard, Swedish general: enters Silesia; defeats Piccolomini;
overruns Holstein; enters Bohemia; routs the Austrians at Jancowitz;
retires from command.
Turenne, French general: at Friburg; recrosses the Rhine;
joins the Swedes at Giessen; retires to the Netherlands.
Turks: the hostile inroads of; reference to.
Trent, Council of.
Union, the Protestant, first success and failures.
Urban VIII., Pope.
Wallenstein, Count: invades Holstein; created Duke of Friedland;
besieges Stralsund; makes a treaty with the Danes; his exactions;
appears at Ratisbon Diet; his dismissal; mode of life;
reply to the King of Denmark; pressed by the Emperor to take command;
quits Prague; his position and personal feelings; makes use of Arnheim;
advises the Saxons; assumes command; avenges himself on Maximilian;
meets the Elector at Egra, Wallenstein's triumph; review at Neumark;
besieges Nuremberg; marches to Zirndorf; takes winter quarters in Saxony;
joins Pappenheim; belief in astrology; at Lutzen; advises an amnesty;
duplicity with Elector of Bavaria; offers terms to the Swedes;
suspicions aroused; secret negotiations with France;
defeats Swedes on the Oder; releases Count Thurn; storms Goerlitz;
marches to the Upper Palatinate; deprived of command;
calls a meeting of generals at Pilsen; his duplicity;
calls for absent generals; secret orders for his apprehension issued;
publicly denounced; retires to Egra; assassination.
Weimar. [See SaxeWeimar.]
Werth, John de, Imperialist general: heads Bavarian malcontents.
Westphalia, Treaty of (Treaty of Peace).
Wimpfen.
Wrangel, Gustavus, Swedish general: marches to the Danube; ravages Bavaria;
marches to Bohemia; driven from Bohemia.
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