Title: Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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Author: Franklin Hichborn
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Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Franklin Hichborn
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Table of Contents
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909..............................................................................1
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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Story of the Session of the California Legislature of
1909
Franklin Hichborn
I. Breaking Ground
II. Organization of the Senate
III. Organization of the Assembly
IV. The Machine in Control
V. Election of United States Senator
VI. The AntiRacetrack Gambling Bill
VII. Passage of the AntiRacetrack Gambling Bill
VIII. The Direct Primary Bill
IX. The Machine Defeated in the Senate
X. Fight Over the Assembly Amendments
XI. Machine Amends Direct Primary Bill
XII. The Railroad Regulation Issue
XIII. Machine Defeats the Stetson Bill
XIV. Railroad Measures
XV. Defeat of the Commonwealth Club Bills
XVI. How the Change of Venue Bill Was Passed
XVII. Passage of the Wheelan Bills
XVIII. Defeat of the Local Option Bill
XIX. Defeat of the Initiative Amendment
XX. Defeat of the AntiJapanese Bills
XXI. The Rule Against Lobbying
XXII. The Machine Lobbyist at Work
XXIII Influence of the San Francisco Delegation
XXIV. Attacks on and Defense of the Fish Commission
XXV. The Rewarding of the Faithful
XXVI. The Holdover Senators
XXVII. The Retiring Senators
XXVIII. Conclusion
Appendix
Tables of Votes
Postal Direct Primary
Dr. Montgomery's Report
The AntiJapanese Resolution
The wellbeing of the State requires that the opponents to the machine
in Senate and Assembly, regardless of party label, organize the
Legislature. But back of this is the even more important requirement
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that there be elected to the Legislature American citizens, with the
responsibility of their citizenship upon them, rather than partisans,
burdened, until their good purposes are made negative, by the
responsibility of their partisanship.
San Francisco
Press of The James H. Barry Company
1909
PREFACE.
In writing the Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909, the purpose has been, not only to
show what was done at Sacramento last Winter, but, what is by far more important, how it was done. To this
end, the several measures are divided under three heads, namely, those dealing with moral, with political and
with industrial issues. Instead of scattering on all the measures introduced, or even a considerable part of
them, the principal issue of each group, that which meant the most to The People, and upon which the
machine centered its efforts, has been selected for detailed consideration. On the score of the moral issues,
the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill has been taken as the most important; while the Direct Primary bill is dealt
with as the chief political issue, and the railroad regulation measures as involving the chief industrial issue.
The story of the fight over these bills is the story of the session of 1909. The events attending the passage of
the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill, the amendment of the Direct Primary bill, and the defeat of the Stetson
Railroad Regulation bill, with the attending incident of the passage of the Wright Railroad bill, show, as
nothing else can, how the machine controls and manipulates a Legislature and such is the purpose of this
little volume.
The efforts of justiceloving men to simplify the criminal codes, to the end that rich and poor alike may have
equal opportunity in the trial courts not in theory alone but in fact and the successful efforts of the
machine to block this reform, have made detailed consideration of the defeat of the Commonwealth Club bills
and the passage of the Wheelan bills, and the socalled Change of Venue bill timely. And the story of these
measures illustrates again how the machine element defeats the purpose of The People, and overrides what
are the constitutional rights and should be rights in fact of every American citizen.
Measures which involved no particular contest between the good government and the machine forces
measures patched up by interested parties and slipped through the Legislature without opposition and
generally without comment although many of them of great importance, are not touched upon. The
histories of those selected for consideration show the machine, or if you like, the system, at its work of
passing undesirable measures, and of blocking the passage of good measures. If the Story of the Session of
the California Legislature of 1909 assist the citizens of California to understand how this is done; if it give
them that knowledge of the weakness, the strength, the purposes, and the affiliations of the Senators and
Assemblymen who sat in the Legislature of 1909, a knowledge of which the machine managers have had
heretofore a monopoly; if it point the way for a new method of publicity to crush corruption and to promote
reform a way which others better prepared for the work than I, may, in California and even in other States,
follow the labor of preparing this volume for the press will have been justified.
Franklin Hichborn.
Santa Clara, Cal., July 4, 1909.
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Chapter I. Breaking Ground.
Although the Reform Element had a Majority in Both Senate and Assembly, Good Bills Were Defeated, and
Vicious Measures Passed Three Reasons for This: (1) Reform Element Was Without Plan of Action, (2)
Was Without Organization; (3) The Machine Was Permitted to Organize Both Senate and Assembly.
The personnel of the California Legislature of 1909, was, all things considered, better than that of any other
Legislature that has assembled in California in a decade or more. There were, to be sure, in both Senate and
Assembly men who were constantly on the wrong side of every question affecting the moral, political or
industrial wellbeing of the State, but a majority of each House labored for the passage of good laws, laws
which would not only silence and satisfy constituents, but prove effective and accomplish the purpose for
which they had been drawn. Just as earnestly as they worked for the passage of good laws, a majority of the
members of the Senate as well as a majority of the members of the Assembly opposed the passage of vicious
measures, and of measures ostensibly introduced to work needed reform but drawn in such a manner as to be,
from a practical standpoint, ineffective.
And yet, regardless of the purpose of this majority, the socalled "Change of Venue" [1] bill was passed, and
the "Judicial Column" bill, intended to take the Judiciary out of politics, was denied passage. The infamous
"Wheelan bills," aimed at the complication of the Grand jury system, went through both Houses, while the
Commonwealth Club bills, drawn to simplify the methods of criminal procedure, were held up and eventually
defeated. The ineffective Wright Railroad Regulation bill became a law, while the Stetson Railroad measure
effective as finally amended was rejected. The provision in the Direct Primary bill for the selection of
United States Senators by Statewide vote was stricken out, and the meaningless advisory, district vote plan
substituted.
Certainly, the accomplishment of the Legislature does not line with the purpose of a majority of its members.
The voter is naturally asking why the majority in both Houses standing for good legislation and opposing
bad, accomplished so little; how it was that a minority, at practically every turn, defeated a majority.
There were three principal reasons for this outcome.
(1) The machine, as its name indicates, is a definite organization, with recognized leaders. The antimachine
element was without organization or recognized leaders.
(2) The reformadvocating majority, except in the antiracetrack gambling fight, was without definite plan of
action. The majority was, for example, for the passage of a direct primary law that would, first, take the
control of politics out of the hands of political bosses big and little, and, second, give the people of California
the privilege of naming their United States Senators, a privilege already enjoyed by the people of the more
progressive States of the Union. But the reform element knew little or nothing of the details of direct primary
legislation.
They were equally unprepared on other reform issues. They recognized the necessity of passing an effective
railroad regulation law, for example, but had little or no conception of what the provisions of the measure
should be. They recognized that the criminal laws cannot be impartially enforced against rich and poor alike
until the methods of criminal procedure be simplified, put on a common sense basis. But even here they had
no definite policy and when told by machine claquers that the proposed reforms were revolutionary, even the
most insistent of the reform element were content to let the simplifying amendments to the codes die in
committees or on the files.
On the other hand, the machine element, even before a member had reached Sacramento, had their work for
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the session carefully outlined. This session the bulk of the machine's work was negative; that is to say, with a
majority in both houses opposed to machine policies, the machine recognized the difficulties of passing bad
laws except by trick and spent the session in amending good measures into ineffectiveness, or, where they
could, in preventing their passage. Down to a comma the machine leaders knew what they wanted for a direct
primary law, for an antiracetrack gambling law, for a railroad regulation law. From the hour the Legislature
opened until the gavels fell at the moment of adjournment the machine element labored intelligently and
constantly, and as an organized working unit, to carry its ends. There were no false plays; no waste of time or
energy; every move was calculated. By persistent hammering the organized machine minority was able to
wear its unorganized opponents out.[2]
(3) The third reason for the failure of the reform majority is found in the fact that the minority was permitted
to organize both Senate and Assembly. In the Assembly the machine element named the Speaker without
serious opposition. The Speaker named the Assembly committees. It developed at the test that the important
committees of the Assembly were, generally speaking, controlled by the machine.
The LieutenantGovernor is, under the State Constitution, presiding officer of the Senate, under the title of
President of the Senate. But the Senators elect the President pro tem., who, in the absence of the President,
has the same power as the President. The reform element, although in the majority, permitted the election of
Senator Edward I. Wolfe as President pro tem. Wolfe was admittedly leader of the machine element in the
Senate. At critical times during the session, the fact that both the President and President pro tem. of the
Senate were friendly to machine interests gave the machine great advantage over its antimachine
opponents.[3]
The reform majority in the Senate made the further mistake of leaving the appointment of the Senate
committees in the hands of LieutenantGovernor Warren Porter. Governor Porter flaunts his machine
affiliations; is evidently proud of his political connections; indeed, in an address delivered before the students
of the University of California, Porter advised his hearers to be "performers" in politics rather than
"reformers." It was not at all surprising, then, that the Senate committees were appointed, not in the interest
of the reform element, but of the machine. And yet, the reform element, being in the majority, could have
taken the appointment of the committees out of Porter's hands. In the concluding chapter it will be shown
there is ample precedent for such a course. But the reform element let the opportunity pass, and Warren
Porter named the committees. Thus in both Senate and Assembly the strategic committee positions were
permitted to fall into machine hands.
The importance of this on legislation can scarcely be overestimated. Under the system in vogue in
California, the real work of a legislative session is done in committee. When a bill is introduced in either
House, it is at once referred to a committee. Until the committee reports on the measure no further action can
be taken. Thus a committee can prevent the passage of a bill by deliberately neglecting to report it back to the
main body.
When a measure passes either Senate or Assembly, it goes to the other House, and is once again referred to a
committee. Again does the fate of the bill hang on committee action. Thus, every measure before it can pass
the Legislature must, in the ordinary course of legislation, pass the scrutiny of two legislative committees,
either one of which may delay its passage or even deny Senate or Assembly, or both, opportunity to act upon
it.
To be sure, one of the rules of the Assembly of 1909 required that all bills referred to committees should be
reported back within ten days, while the Senate rules provided that committees must act on bills referred to
them as soon as "practicable," with the further provision that a majority vote of the Senate could compel a
report on a bill at any time. But these rules were employed to little advantage. In the Assembly, for example,
the Commonwealth Club bills, referred to the Judiciary Committee on January 15, were not acted upon by the
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committee at all. These bills, in spite of the ten days' rule, remained in the committee sixtyseven days. The
Direct primary bill was held up in the Senate Committee on Election Laws from January 8 until February 16,
and at that late day came out of the committee with practically unfavorable recommendation. It was
noticeable that few, if any, important reform measures were given favorable recommendation by a Senate
committee. Thus the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill, the Direct Primary bill, the Local Option bill, received
the stamp of Senate committee disapproval. They were returned to the Senate with the recommendation that
they do not pass. The same is largely true of the action of the Assembly Committees.[4]
If machinecontrolled committees could delay action on reform measures, they could at the same time
expedite the passage of bills which the machine element favored, or which had been amended to the
machine's liking. Thus the Change of Venue bill, which reached the Senate on March 15, was returned from
the Senate Judiciary Committee the day following, March 16, with the recommendation that it "do pass." The
Wheelan bills reached the Senate on March 17, and were at once referred to the Judiciary Committee. The
Judiciary Committee that very day reported them back with favorable recommendation. Had they been
delayed in the committee even 48 hours, their final passage would have been improbable.
Curiously enough, the Judiciary Committee was the one Senate committee whose members President Porter
did not name. Following a timehonored custom, every attorney at law in the Senate was made a member of
the committee. It so happened that ten of the nineteen lawyers in the Senate were on the side of reform as
against machine policies, eight generally voted with the machine, while the nineteenth gave evidence of being
in a state of chronic doubt. This gave the reform element a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee. But
President Porter had the naming of the chairman of the committee, and the order of the rank of its members.
The LieutenantGovernor's fine discrimination is shown by the fact that the Chairman of the Committee and
the four ranking members were counted on the side of the machine.
The Assembly committees acted quite as expeditiously on measures which had passed the Senate in a form
satisfactory to machine interests. Thus, the Wright Railroad Regulation bill, which reached the Assembly on
March 12, was reported back to the Assembly by the Assembly Committee on Common Carriers the day
following, March 13.
It will be seen that the reform majority unquestionably weakened its position by permitting the machine
minority to organize the Legislature. This phase of the problem which confronts the State will be dealt with
in the concluding chapter.
[1] One of the best witnesses to the viciousness of this measure is Governor Gillett, surely an unprejudiced
observer. In giving his reasons for vetoing the bill, Governor Gillett said:
"I have several reasons for saying that I will veto the bill. One reason is that I have always been opposed to it.
When I was in the Senate in 1897 I was against it and again in 1899 I fought it in the Judiciary Committee.
Two years ago I ignored another such measure that had passed through the Legislature, so that I would not be
living up to my policy of the past if I should sign this bill."
"But even if I had never had the opportunity to record my opposition on these different occasions, I should
have vetoed the bill anyway, because it is a vicious bill. The bill is not a change of venue bill in the strict
sense of the word. It simply gives the man on trial the right to disqualify the Judge on the ground of bias on
the slightest pretext."
"The worst feature about the bill is that it grants this right to the accused after the jury has been secured.
Why, if the defendant didn't like the adverse rulings of the Judge he could easily claim bias and the law
would upheld his demand for another Judge. Think of how that would operate in the Calhoun trial in San
Francisco. Such a law would cost the State thousands of dollars. It's vicious and I will not sign it."
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[2] Most suggestively shown in the amendment of the Direct Primary bill.
[3] The seriousness of the mistake made by the reform element in acquiescing in Wolfe's election, was
emphasized at the time of the deadlock in the Senate over the Direct Primary bill. The President of the
Senate, LieutenantGovernor Porter and in his absence the President pro tem., Wolfe, was charged with
the duty of calling the Senate to order. Inasmuch as it did not suit the machine's interests that the Senate
should be called to order, the Senators were obliged to sit in idleness for hours at a time, while the machine
leaders and lobbyists were working openly on the floor of the Senate to force certain of the proprimary
Senators to join the machine forces. Had the President pro tem. been one of the group of Senators who were
opposing the machine he would have called the Senate to order, thus permitting the regular work of the
session to proceed. See Chapter 10, "Fight on Assembly Amendments."
[4] The action of the Assembly Committee on Public Morals on the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill was a
notable exception to this. See chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter II. Organization of the Senate.
AntiMachine Republicans, Led Into a Caucus Trap, Surrendered the Appointment of President Pro Tem.,
Secretary and SergeantatArms to the Machine Machine Given the Selection of the Standing Committees.
In the light of the events of the session, the division between the machine or "organization" and antimachine
forces in the Senate for purposes of organization may be regarded as follows:
Antimachine Anthony[5], Bell, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Burnett[5], Cutten, Estudillo, Hurd[5],
Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker (labeled Republicans), Caminetti, Campbell,
Cartwright, Holohan, Miller, Sanford (labeled Democrats) 21.
Machine Hare, Kennedy (labeled Democrats), Bates, Bills, Finn, Hartman, Leavitt, Lewis, Martinelli,
McCartney, Reily, Savage, Weed, Willis, Wolfe, Wright (labeled Republicans) 16.
Doubtful Curtin (Democrat).
Seekers of the winning side Price and Welch (labeled Republicans).
Curtin is put down as doubtful because, justly or unjustly, he was at the opening of the session so regarded.
But Curtin's record shows that generally speaking from the beginning to the end of the session he voted with
the antimachine element. Had the antimachine forces made a determined effort to organize the Senate and
demonstrated a strength of twentyone votes, which would have been enough to organize,. Curtin would
certainly have been with them. The same is true of Welch, and it is probably true of Price. This would have
given the antimachine forces from twentytwo to twentyfour votes, a safe margin to have permitted them
to organize the Senate to carry out antimachine policies.
The machine claquers will no doubt point gleefully to the fact that when the test on the Railroad Regulation
bills came, Anthony, Burnett, Estudillo, Hurd and Walker strayed from the antimachine fold. This objection
would have more weight had there ever been an antimachine fold. As a matter of fact, the antimachine
element in the Senate from the day the session opened until it closed was unorganized, and without leaders or
detailed plan of action.
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Admittedly Estudillo and Burnett strayed on the railroad regulation question, but they did so believing the
absolute rate provided in the Stetson bill to be unconstitutional. All this will be brought out in the chapters on
railroad regulation measures, but in passing, it may be said that Burnett, in the closing hours of the session,
stated on the floor of the Senate that he had voted against the Stetson bill and for the Wright bill on the
understanding that a constitutional amendment would be passed setting at rest all question of the
constitutionality of the absolute rate. The machine leaders misled Senator Burnett. Machine votes defeated
the amendment.
Anthony, Estudillo and Walker stood out against the machine in the direct primary fight which followed the
defeat of the Stetson bill, and before the fight was over, Burnett had returned to the antimachine forces.
The case of Senator Hurd is not at all creditable to the machine. But Hurd's instincts and sympathies are not
those of Gus Hartman, Hare, Wolfe and Leavitt. Had the antimachine forces had even semblance of
organization there would have been no straying, and the accomplishment of the legislative session of 1909
would have been more satisfactory to the best citizenship of the State.
The fact that the antimachine forces, without leaders and without organization, stuck together so well as
they did is one of the most extraordinary and at the same time encouraging features of the session.
Although the antimachine forces numbered a majority of the Senate, nevertheless a bare majority of the
regular Republican Senators those who were eligible to admittance to the Republican caucus were with
the machine. The division in the Republican caucus, counting Welch and Price with the machine element,
was on machine and antimachine lines as follows:
Antimachine Anthony, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Burnett, Cutten, Estudillo, Hurd, Roseberry, Rush,
Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker 14.
Machine Bates, Pills, Finn, Hartman, Leavitt, Lewis, Martinelli, McCartney, Price, Reily, Savage, Weed,
Welch, Willis, Wolfe, Wright 16.
By timehonored custom it has become a rule for the majority[5a] in the Senate and the same holds in the
Assembly to meet in caucus to decide upon the details of organization. This is done on the theory that the
House should be so organized as to permit the majority to carry out its policies as expeditiously and with as
little friction as possible. By the unwritten rule of the caucus, the majority governs and each member who
attends the caucus is bound in honor to vote regardless of his individual views or wishes on the floor of
the Senate or Assembly, as the majority of the caucus decides. Thus, by going into caucus with the sixteen
machine Senators, the fourteen antimachine Senators were placed in a position where they were, under
caucus rule, compelled to vote on the floor of the Senate as the sixteen machine Senators dictated. This gave
the machine on the floor of the Senate thirty votes out of forty on questions affecting organization, and
permitted it to name the President pro tem., the Secretary of the Senate, the SergeantatArms, and gave it
filial voice in the appointment of the various attaches.
Had the line of division in the Senate been Republican and Democratic, the Republicans in the Senate might
very properly have caucused. But inasmuch as the machine Republicans stood during the entire session for
one set of policies, and the antimachine Republicans for another, the caucus was at best an incongruous
affair. Especially is this true when it is considered that the antimachine Republicans immediately after they
had left the caucus united with the antimachine Democrats in a threemonths contest with the united
machine Democrats and machine Republicans. But having surrendered the organization of the Senate to the
machine, the antimachine Senators, although in the majority, fought under a handicap, finally lost the
weaker of their supporters[6], and in the end went down in defeat. Had the real majority, rather than the
artificial majority, of the Senate caucused on organization, that is to say, had the antimachine Republicans
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and the antimachine Democrats caucused, and organized to carry out the policies for which they stood and
for which they fought together during the entire session, the RepublicanDemocraticmachine element
would have been defeated at every turn. But no such policy governed, and the antimachine Republicans
waddled after precedent into the caucus trap that had been set for them. Later on in the session the
antimachine Republicans and antimachine Democrats did go into caucus together, and by doing so won the
hardest fought fight of the session.[7]
In the Republican Senate caucus on organization, the machine Senators, under the crafty leadership of Wolfe
and Leavitt, worked their unhappy antimachine associates much as a playful cat, with a sense of humor, toys
with a mouse. As the cat lets the mouse think that it has escaped, the machine let the antimachine forces
think they were organizing the caucus. Leavitt had been leader of the Republican caucus at previous sessions
but he suffered "overwhelming defeat" at the hands of a "reformer." The "reformer" in question was Senator
Wright, who had been well advertised as the father of the reform Direct Primary law. Before the session
closed, the antimachine element was to learn just the sort of "reformer" Wright is. Wright, however, in the
interest of "harmony," was nominated for caucus leadership by Senator Wolfe. Leavitt's name was not even
mentioned. The unanimous vote went to Senator Wright, who was duly declared elected Chairman of the
Senate Republican caucus for the Thirtyeighth Session of the California Legislature.
The reformers were also permitted to name the Secretary of the caucus. This time a genuine antimachine
Senator was selected, A. E. Boynton.
And then came a question which brought out the gleam of the machine's teeth. Senator Boynton moved that
Senator Bell, of Pasadena, be admitted to the caucus. Somewhat to the discomfiture of the reformers, Bell
was not admitted.
Senator Bell's case is a suggestive one. He is a Republican, having been elected from one of the strongest
Republican districts of the State, the Thirtysixth Senatorial District, which takes in Pasadena. But Senator
Bell was not named by the machine; in fact, he was elected as protest against machine methods. The
Pasadena Republicans tolerated machine domination as long as they could. Then, in 1906, they induced Bell
to run against the "regular" machine nominee for the State Senate. Bell ran as an independent Republican. He
overwhelmingly defeated his machine opponent. Arrived at Sacramento at the session of 1907, he applied for
admittance to the Republican caucus.
There was ample precedent for his admittance, but curiously enough no antimachine Republican who had
defeated a machine Republican had ever been admitted to caucus privileges. In 1902, however, Charles M.
Shortridge, having failed to receive the nomination for the state Senate from Santa Clara County, ran as an
independent candidate against the regular Republican nominee. The machine supported Shortridge's
candidacy, and by most questionable methods succeeded in defeating the regular Republican. But Shortridge
was admitted to the Senate caucus of 1903 without question. Senator Bell, however, was denied admittance to
the Republican Senate caucus of 1907, on the grounds that he had defeated a regularly nominated
Republican. Shortridge had defeated a regularly nominated Republican. But Shortridge stood for machine
policies; Bell stands opposed to machine policies. The machine's policy is to keep the caucuses of the
dominant party in the Legislature as much a close corporation as possible. So in 1907, Bell's application was
rejected. Bell, throughout the session, opposed machine policies. Both for the session of 1907 and of 1909,
Senator Bell's record is absolutely clean. The machine does not approve such men, nor want them to
participate in party caucuses.
Senator Bell, who had, although refused admittance to his party caucus, done very well in 1907, did not
propose to apply for admission to the caucus of 1909. But the reform element in the Senate insisted upon
presenting his name. From machine sources it was intimated to Senator Bell that if he would make his peace
with Walter Parker, the Southern Pacific lobbyist who acts as machine leader south of the Tehachepi, no
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opposition would be offered his admission to the caucus. Bell rejected the offer with characteristic
promptness. So the antimachine Senators, since they had "organized the caucus," proceeded to admit Bell in
the face of machine opposition.
But the inexperienced political mouse discovered that it was not out of the reach of the claws of the
experienced political cat. Boynton's motion to admit Bell to the caucus was lost by a vote of 16 to 14.
Had the reform element been organized, however, Bell would have been admitted to the caucus. Three
Senators, Reily, Savage and Welch, who ordinarily voted with the machine, because of personal friendship
voted to admit Bell to the caucus. But their votes were offset by those of Burnett, Estudillo and Hurd.[8] The
vote was as follows:
To admit Bell to the caucus Anthony, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Cutten, Reily, Roseberry, Rush, Savage,
Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker, Welch 14.
Against admitting Bell to the caucus Bates, Bills, Burnett, Estudillo, Finn, Hartman, Hurd, Leavitt, Lewis,
Martinelli, McCartney, Price, Weed, Willis, Wolfe, Wright 16.
The Bell matter out of the way, the real work of organizing the Senate was taken up. Curiously enough, the
only contest came over the election of the Chaplain of the Senate; the naming of the President pro tem., of the
Secretary of the Senate and of the SergeantatArms was not opposed. Senator Price moved that Lewis A.
Hilborn be the caucus nominee for Secretary of the Senate, and J. Louis Martin for SergeantatArms. His
motion carried unanimously. Price also nominated Senator Wolfe for President pro tem. Not an antimachine
Senator protested. Wolfe was accordingly declared the caucus nominee, with the thirty Senators present,
machine and antimachine, obligated to vote for him on the floor of the Senate.
The election of a Chaplain was then taken up and several candidates nominated for the office. Rev. Father H.
H. Wyman being finally selected, which, of course, was equivalent to election.
The caucus was held at 9 o'clock of the morning of January 4. At noon of the same day a second caucus was
held at which it was decided that the division of patronage[8a] should be on the following basis: That $18 a
day should be set aside for the Secretary, SergeantatArms and Chaplain; that the LieutenantGovernor
should be allowed $22 a day, and each of the thirty caucus Senators $15 a day. This practically concluded
Republican caucusing for the session. At previous sessions the Republicans caucused practically every day.
But before the session of 1909 had advanced far, the real line that divided the Senators, the line that separated
the machine from the antimachine members, had become so pronounced that caucuses of machine and
antimachine Republicans became impracticable. Senator Wright, toward the end of the session, made frantic
efforts to get the caucus together; but he failed. The caucus on organization was about all that the
antimachine Republicans could stand.
As they had left the election of the officers of the Senate to the machine, the antimachine element left the
appointing of the Senate committees to the machine LieutenantGovernor.[9]
How well the machine, given the appointment of the committees, fortified itself is shown by consideration of
practically any one of the committees. A few examples will suffice.
There were, for example, three great issues before the Legislature; namely, the AntiRacetrack Gambling
bill, a moral issue; the Direct Primary bill, a political issue; and the Railroad Regulation bills, a commercial
issue.
The AntiGambling bill was to come before the Public Morals Committee, and the machine took good care
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that not an antimachine Senator should be given a place on that committee. The committee consisted of
Weed, Wolfe, Leavitt, Savage (labeled Republicans), Kennedy (labeled Democrat), all machine men. The
committee reported back the AntiGambling bill under pressure, with the recommendation that it "do not
pass." Public opinion was such at the time that Savage and Kennedy did not vote for the unfavorable
recommendation. But Weed, Wolfe and Leavitt, a majority of the committee, stood out against the bill until
the last.
The Direct Primary bill was to be considered by the Election Laws Committee and the machine took good
care to keep hand upon that committee. The committee was made up of seven machine and two antimachine
Senators, as follows:
Machine Senators Leavitt, Hartman, Wolfe, Savage, Wright (labeled Republicans), Kennedy and Hare
(labeled Democrats).
Every one of the seven opposed the Statewide plan for the selection of United States Senators.
The antimachine Senators on the committee were Estudillo and Stetson.
It is an open secret that the machine expected to control Estudillo through Walter Parker, the Southern Pacific
political agent. Its failure brought some confusion upon machine circles. Thus, the machine really thought
when it picked the Committee on Election Laws that it controlled eight of the nine members.
The Railroad Regulation measures were to be passed upon by the Committee on Corporations. The machine
took care to be in control of that committee. It consisted of eleven members. Seven of the eleven, if Burnett
who voted with the machine on this issue be counted with them, were machine, one was "band wagon[10],
which is a trifle worse than machine, and three antimachine, as follows:
Machine Bates, Wright, McCartney, Burnett, Bills, Finn (labeled Republicans), Kennedy (labeled
Democrat).
Band wagon Welch.
Antimachine Walker, Roseberry (labeled Republicans), and Miller (labeled Democrat).
But here again the machine was more generous than it intended to be. It figured on controlling Walker. But in
the committee Walker stood out manfully for the Stetson bill and against the Wright bill. On the floor of the
Senate, however, Walker made his one slip of the session, by voting for the Wright bill and against the
Stetson bill.
It is not necessary to continue consideration of the committees. Enough has been said to show how
thoroughly the machine minority, given the appointment of the committees, strengthened itself in the Senate
by seizing every strategic position. Indeed, the machine fortified itself with such farseeing intelligence, that
one marvels that the antimachine majority was able to offer even temporarily effective opposition.
[5] Anthony's vote was in the majority of cases cast on the side of the machine. But the determined stand that
he took on the Direct Primary bill issue, demonstrated that Anthony, had the antimachine forces maintained
any sort of organization, or had they had definite plan of action, would have been found consistently on the
side of good government. Burnett was unquestionably misled by the machine leaders. Neither Burnett nor
Anthony can be justly classed with Hartman, Wolfe, Leavitt, Bills, etc., etc. Hurd, who toward the end of the
session voted constantly with the machine, and is considered hopeless by many observers, nevertheless took
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active part in the antimachine caucus on the Direct Primary bill, and, had the organization of the Senate
been in the hands of the antimachine element, the writer firmly believes, would have continued with the
reform forces. At any rate, he was available for any antimachine movement that might have been started to
organize the Senate. Hurd, like Burnett, will have his opportunity in 1911. Both Senators hold over.
[5a] In this instance, the Republican Senators. The Senate minority was made up of the Democratic Senators,
if we make the division on party lines. But as a matter of fact, when it came to the real business of the
session, the Senate did not divide on party lines. The actual division was between the machine and the
antimachine Senators. Thus the real majority consisted of antimachine Senators, and the minority of the
Senators controlled by the machine.
[6] Hurd's case illustrates this very well.
[7] See chapter nine Machine defeated in the Senate.
[8] Burnett of San Francisco, voted against Bell on partisan grounds, and inability to grasp the situation.
Estudillo's vote was inconsistent with the majority which he cast during the session, while Hurd's was
inconsistent with those which he cast up to the time of his vote with the machine forces against the Stetson
bill.
[8a] Up to the session of 1909, the members of the Legislature fixed the amount of patronage. At the session
of 1907, the payroll of the officers and attaches of the Assembly alone ran up to nearly $10,000 a week, or
more than $1300 a day. But in 1908, the People adopted a constitutional amendment limiting the amount of
patronage, the money to be expended for legislative officers and attaches, to $500 a day for each House. This
cut the Patronage down something more than onehalf, which gave the Senators and Assemblymen who
divided it great concern.
The development of the patronage scandal during the last decade is interesting. At the session of 1901 the
Assembly patronage ran about $580 a day the Senate patronage about $610. This was only $80 a day more in
the Assembly, and $110 more in the Senate than the limit now fixed by the Constitution.
In 1903, the patronage in the Assembly totaled $6312.50 a week, more than $900 a day. In the Senate it was
$5612.50, or $800 a day.
The increase continued in 1905. in that year Assembly Patronage totaled $7956.50 a week, or $1135 a day,
while the Senate patronage was $6002.50 a week, or $857 a day.
The climax came in 1907, when the Assembly patronage went to $9660.50 a week, or $1350 a day, and the
Senate patronage to to $6893.50 a week, or $985 a day. What it would have been in 1909 had there been no
Constitutional restriction placed upon it, is a matter for speculation.
[9] See concluding chapter as to how this could have been avoided.
[10] The term "band wagon" was applied during the session to those members who were in the habit of
joining the winning side at the last moment.
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Chapter III. Organization of the Assembly.
Independent Movement to Resist the Machine's Program Failed Reform Element Rallied and Rejected
Rules Prepared by Committee Appointed by Stanton, Which Would Have Placed Majority at Mercy of the
MachineControlled Minority.
The machinefree members of the Lower House at least did better than the reformers in the Senate; they
made an attempt to organize the Assembly independent of the machine. The effort was, however, as uncertain
as that of a nestling taking its first lesson in flying. Nothing came of the venture; but it indicates what may be
done in future.
The organization of the Assembly hinges on the election of the Speaker. The machine ordinarily picks the
Speaker before the November elections, so his election need not stir up any particular enthusiasm. But there
is always something of a contest started for the sake of appearances, probably.
This year the machine had picked Phil Stanton, of Los Angeles, for the job, but Bob Beardslee, of Stockton,
was permitted to give Stanton "a run."
The San Francisco newspapers along in November and December recorded the political ripple of the contest,
but the fight was a dead affair, and nobody enthused. The play came to a tame ending when Beardslee
nominated Stanton for the Speaker's job and got the Chairmanship of the important Committee on Ways and
Means for being good, or taking program, however one may view it.
But at one time a real fight for the Speakership threatened. Assemblyman Drew, of Fresno, and other stanch
antimachine men, conceived the radical notion that it was idiotic for them to sit around like lambs waiting to
have their throats cut, while the machine organized the House. They accordingly decided to take a hand in the
organization of the Assembly themselves by refusing to vote for any man for Speaker who was known to be
under the influence of the machine.
Fortyone votes are required to elect the Speaker. The reformers figured on the nineteen Democratic
members as with them. The LincolnRoosevelt League had elected Assemblymen from several counties,
including Alameda. These were naturally counted on. Other reputable Republican members were expected to
join the movement in numbers sufficient to secure the necessary fortyone votes.
The purpose of the leaders of this departure from the regular rules of the political game should have
commended itself to every good citizen. Their idea was to organize the Assembly, not for selfadvancement,
or the promotion of special privileges as the machine leaders do year after year, but that good bills might be
passed and bad bills defeated; that the waste of the public funds might be stopped; that worthy citizenship
might be placed above predatory partisanship. And yet, they were compelled to proceed with the utmost
caution; were discouraged at every turn, and abused like pickpockets, even by those upon whom they
depended for support. Gradually it dawned upon them that not a few of the Democratic members were not in
sympathy with reform legislation. But more discouraging still was the fact that certain Republicans elected to
the Assembly by the LincolnRoosevelt faction of the party were as little to be depended upon. By consulting
the tables "B" and "C" of Assembly votes in the appendix, it will be seen that Democrats like Baxter, Collum,
Hopkins, O'Neil and Wheelan, and LincolnRoosevelt Republicans like Mott, Pulcifer and Feeley, as a
general thing voted with the machine Republicans. There were, to be sure, Democrats like Gillis, Johnson of
Placer, Juilliard, Maher, Mendenhall, Polsley, Preston, Wilson, Odom and Stuckenbruck, who were against
the machine on every issue, but the record shows the utter foolishness of regarding either party free of
machine influences. Without being able to understand just how it was, Mr. Drew and his associates failed to
secure the encouragement for their independent movement which they expected. The stealthy move upon the
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Speaker's chair was found in some unaccountable way to be blocked. Then some cautious soul suggested that
if they should fail the machine would hold up the appropriation bills of those identified with the movement.
That settled it. The attempt to elect as Speaker some member free of machine influence ended right there. The
reformers skurried for cover.
The part which the appropriation bills play in the enactment of bad laws is one of the least understood of a
legislative session. Each session money must be appropriated by legislative enactment for the maintenance
and enlargement, where necessary, of the various State institutions, such as hospitals for the insane, reform
schools, normal schools, and the like. These institutions are not local at all, but State. But the Senators and
Assemblymen from the counties in which they are situated are, by custom, charged with the responsibility of
securing the appropriations necessary for their support. The San Jose Normal School, for example, and the
Agnew Asylum for the Insane, are situated in Santa Clara County. They are no more Santa Clara County
institutions than they are Del Norte or San Diego institutions, but the Senators and Assemblymen from Santa
Clara County are held responsible for the passage of the appropriation bills affecting them. Too often, the
ability of the Assemblyman or Senator is measured, not by his real work in the Legislature, but by the size of
the appropriations which he manages to secure for his district. Under the present system by which the
machine organizes the Legislature, it is in a position to defeat or materially reduce practically any
appropriation bill. The member of the Legislature who would oppose the machine thus finds himself between
the constituents at home, who demand that he secure generous appropriations for his district, and the
machine, which he understands very well requires support of its policies as one of the prices of the
constituentdemanded appropriations. Thus those who would have opposed the machine in the organization
of the Assembly realized that failure would probably mean a hammering of their appropriation bills, which
would result in their political undoing at home. So the independent movement to organize the Assembly
came to a sorry ending.
Stanton was elected Speaker without opposition. The "defeated" Beardslee placed him in nomination.
Complete harmony prevailed. Stanton started proceedings by appointing the Committee on Rules. This
committee was charged with drafting rules for the government of the Assembly during the session. It was
made up of Assemblymen Johnston of Contra Costa, Transue, Johnson of Sacramento, Beardslee and
Stanton.
Without the people knowing much about what is going on, the rules governing legislative bodies are being
amended from time to time, so that the power of influencing legislation is being taken out of the hands of the
duly elected representatives of the people and placed with presiding officers and important committees. The
"system," or the machine, call it what you may, finds it easier to control presiding officers and committees
appointed by presiding officers, than to control Legislatures. This stealthy advance upon the liberties of the
people, seems to have reached its climax at Washington, where the independent members of both parties are
in open revolt against "Cannonism." But "Cannonism" is not confined to the National Congress alone; in a
small way it has its hold on the California Legislature. The rules prepared by Speaker Stanton's committee
were well calculated to give "Cannonism" a stronger hold in California, which would have influenced not
only the session of 1909 but, as a precedent, many sessions to come.[11] The proposed rules in saddling
"Cannonism" upon the Assembly were well calculated to strengthen the machine's grip upon the Legislature.
The departure from the rules of 1907 was most radical. Under the rules that governed the Assembly in 1907,
committees were required to report on each bill referred to them within ten days after the measure had been
submitted.
The rules proposed by the committee provided that the report should be made as soon as "practicable."
The rules of 1907 provided that a mere majority could recall a bill from committee.
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Under the proposed rules a twothirds vote would have been necessary.
Under the rules of 1907 a measure could be advanced on the files at the request of its author.
Under the committee's rules unanimous consent of the Assembly was made necessary for such advancement.
The proposed rules would have enabled the machine forces to smother in committee any measure the
machine wished to defeat. A twothirds vote would have been necessary to suspend the rules to have a bill
recalled from committee, that is to say, the votes of fiftyfour Assemblymen. Twentyseven Assemblymen
could then have held the measure in committee until the session closed.
Had the committeeprepared rules been adopted, the probabilities are that the battleground of the session
would have been transferred from the Senate Chamber to the Assembly.
But the proposed rules were not adopted. A fight against adopting the committee's report was started by Drew
of Fresno. Mr. Drew introduced a resolution rejecting the rules submitted by the committee, and substituting
the rules of 1907, to govern the session of 1909. Johnson of Sacramento led the defense that rallied to the
committee's report. But Johnson's wit failed against the argument which Drew, Callan, Preston, Young and
Cattell offered. The gentlemen denounced the rules which the committee had offered as "vicious, despotic
and gagging." Drew's resolution was adopted by a vote of 41 to 32, the committee's report rejected and the
rules of 1907 accepted for the session of 1909[12]. It was a decided victory for the antimachine forces, and
brought gloom to the scheming machine leaders. But it developed later that not a few who had voted for the
Drew resolution were safely machine; while many who had voted against it were antimachine, but had
voted against the resolution under misapprehension of just what it stood for[13].
Although the reform majority in the Assembly could prevent the adoption of the "gag rules," it could not,
after it had failed to elect the Speaker, govern the appointment of the committees. By and large, the Assembly
committees were controlled as were the Senate committees by machine standbys. The Election Laws
Committee, which was to pass upon the Direct Primary bill, was safely in machine hands. Grove L. Johnson,
as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, herded the young lawyers thereon like so many sheep. Johnson was
in effect the committee.
The Committee on Corporations and the Committee on Common Carriers, before which railroad regulation
bills might come, were safely in majority for the machine.
One apparent exception to the rule was the Committee on Public Morals, which gave the AntiGambling bill
its start toward passage. But this committee, which did so much to secure the passage of the AntiGambling
bill, held up the Local Option bill at Speaker Stanton's request, until the last week of the session, thus making
its passage in the Assembly impossible.
A curious mistake was made by the machine, when Telfer of San Jose was made Chairman of the Committee
on Contingent Expenses. Telfer is not only antimachine, but possessed of a nonpolitical honesty which
proved very distressing to the machine before the session was over.
Telfer as Chairman of the committee refused to "O. K." extravagant charges for the materials furnished the
Assembly. As a result, bills for hire of typewriters had to be reduced, pencils counted and other astonishing
reductions made.
Telfer saved the State several hundred dollars, but caused many a heartache. Telfer's appointment to a
committee which he made important, shows that the machine element as well as the antimachine sometimes
makes mistakes. But in spite of its minor mistakes, in spite of the antimachine majority, so admirably did
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the machine organize the Assembly for its purposes, that in the closing days of the session not only were
vicious measures passed without much difficulty, but the Assembly was made the graveyard of good
bills[14].
[11] If ever the People of California secure control of the State Legislature through machinefree
representatives with the courage to dare and the ability to do, one of the most important pieces of work will
be to sweep aside the mass of precedent which the machine has for years been gradually embodying into the
rules of Senate and Assembly. What is needed is a set of rules that shall promote the expression of the wishes
of the majority. The curse of technicality does not hamper the Judiciary alone; it hampers the legislative
branch of government as well. Note Wolfe's ability to deadlock the Senate after the Assembly Amendments
to the Direct Primary bill had been rejected. Chapter XI.
[12] The vote by which this was done was as follows:
For the Drew resolution and against the committee rules: Assemblymen Black, Bohnett, Callan, Cattell,
Cogswell, Collum, Costar, Cronin, Drew, Flint, Gibbons, Hammon, Hanlon, Hayes, Hewitt, Hinkle, Hopkins,
Irwin, Johnson of Placer, Juilliard, Lightner, Maher, Melrose, Mendenhall, Odom, Otis, O'Neil, Polsley,
Preston, Rech, Rutherford, Sackett, Silver, Stuckenbruck, Telfer, Wagner, Webber, Wheelan, Whitney,
Wilson and Young. 41.
Against the Drew resolution and for the committee rules: Assemblymen Barndollar, Beardslee, Beban,
Coghlan, Collier, Cullen, Dean, Feeley, Flavelle, Fleisher, Gerdes, Greer, Griffiths, Hans, Hawk, Holmquist,
Johnson of Sacramento, Johnson of San Diego, Johnston, Leeds, Macauley, McClelland, McManus, Moore,
Mott, Nelson, Perine, Pugh, Pulcifer, Schmitt, Stanton, Transue 32.
[13] A gentleman who for a number of years has been identified with the reform element in the Assembly,
writes of this feature of the machine's hold on the Legislature as follows: "One of the principal difficulties
with the Legislature as it is now constituted and has been for many years past, is that the machine or
organization always endeavors to secure the election of young men who haven't very fixed opinions and who
are easily influenced; not knowing the machine tactics and the real object behind the legislation they do not
seem to see the necessity for standing firm and for that reason are often led into voting for or against
measures which they would not were they more familiar with the tricks of the machine men. A new grist of
legislators is what the organization is always looking for. They want a certain number of old "standbys"
who will do their dirty work for a mere pittance or some paltry reward, real or anticipated, and with these
men to influence and control the younger members their purpose is easily, accomplished."
[14] See Passage of Wheelan Bills, chapter XVII; Passage of Change of Venue bill, chapter XVI. Examples
of good bills defeated in the Assembly in the closing days of the session were the Judicial Column bill, and
the Holohan measure removing the party circle from the election ballot.
Chapter IV. The Machine in Control.
Deliberately Held Up Measures in Committees Until the Close of the Session, When Senate and Assembly
Were Forced to Take Snap Judgment on Hundreds of Measures In the Confusion Thus Created, Good Bills
Were Defeated and Bad Ones Passed.
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The Legislature organized, the machine and antimachine forces settled down to the work of the session. The
situation was unique. The antimachine element had a comfortable majority in the Assembly and at least a
bare majority in the Senate. But the machine controlled the committees of both Houses, had selected the
presiding officers, and had dictated the selection of the majority of the attaches. When, for example, it was
suggested that in the event of a close vote in the Senate on the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill, it might be
found necessary to send the SergeantatArms after Senators who might attempt to dodge the vote, not a
single attache of the SergeantatArms' office could be named who was in sympathy with the movement
against the gamblers. Incidentally, however, it was discovered that the clerk of the important Senate Enrolling
and Engrossing Committee had been an employee at Frank Daroux's notorious Sausalito poolrooms. These
were disquieting discoveries for the reform element.
Although the machine controlled the strategic positions of the organization of the Legislature, it was still in
the minority in each House. This meant that the machine could not, in open fight, pass a vicious or
undesirable measure, or put through any of its schemes. The machine's course soon became apparent. If the
machine could not put laws on the statute books to its liking, it could block the passage of good measures.
Having crafty leaders in both Senate and Assembly, and, above all, controlling the committees, the machine
was admirably prepared to do this. By employing delaying tactics which would have done credit to a
specialist in criminal defense, the machine devoted the first two months of the session to the blocking of
legislation.
The methods employed were very simple. As soon as a bill was introduced it was referred to a committee of
the House in which it originated. The committee would hold the measure until the reform element gave
indications of protesting[15]. The bill would then be returned. If possible it would be further delayed by
amendment on second or third reading. If finally passed by the House of its origin, it would be sent to the
other House, where it would be referred to a committee. In the majority of cases the committee could hold it
indefinitely. In such cases as the committees were forced to report on measures that had passed the other
House, the measure would be amended, which necessitated its being reprinted, and again acted upon by the
House of its origin[16], all of which made for delay.
But it must not be thought that the Senate and Assembly were left in idleness during the first two months of
the session. Such is by no means the case; Senators and Assemblymen never worked harder. The machine
leaders during the first month of the session craftily kept the members wrangling in committees. During the
second month the Senate was kept working day and night passing comparatively unimportant Senate bills,
and the Assembly working as hard passing Assembly bills; but the Senate passed very few Assembly bills
and the Assembly very few Senate bills. As a measure must pass both Houses to become a law, few bills
were sent to the Governor for his approval. Thus during the first two months of the session many bills passed
in one house or the other, but pitifully few passed the Legislature.
The reform element, working sixteen hours a day not unlike so many mice in a wheel, were apparently in
complete ignorance of the situation which they were creating. Senators whose bills had passed the Senate
began to complain that they could not get the measures out of the Assembly committee; Assemblymen whose
measures had passed the Assembly were as loud in their charges that their bills were being held up in Senate
committees. The machine actually turned this early dissatisfaction to its advantage. Soon it was being
announced on the floor of the Assembly: "If Senate committees will not act on Assembly bills, then the
Assembly committees will not act on Senate bills." The Senate made the same threats as to Assembly bills.
So, for about a week, Senate committees openly slighted Assembly bills, while Assembly committees in
retaliation slighted Senate bills. The situation was very amusing; it was, too, highly satisfactory to the
machine.
About the first week in March the Legislature adjourned March 24 the antimachine members awoke to
the fact that in spite of their day and night sessions, little had been accomplished. The further disquieting
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discovery was made that the bulk of the Assembly bills which had passed the Assembly were being held in
Senate committees, while the Senate bills which had passed the Senate, were apparently anchored in
Assembly committees, and that the machine controlled the committees. The reform members of each House
had good cause for alarm. Every Senator and Assemblyman has his "pet" measures. The reform Senators and
Assemblymen found that to get their bills out of committees they would have to treat with the machine. Such
a Senator or Assemblyman, with his constituents clamoring for the passage of a bill held up in a
machinecontrolled committee, had some claim to pardon if he turned suddenly attentive to the machine
olive branch. And the machine, by the way, always has the olive branch out. Stand in with us, is their
constant advance, and we will see you through.
As a result of these delaying tactics, literally hundreds of bills which had needlessly been held up in
committees were forced upon the consideration of the Senate during the last three weeks of the session. Each
House made records of passing more than 100 bills a day. There was little pretense of reading the measures
as required by the State Constitution. The clerk at the desk mumbled over their titles; they were voted upon
and became laws. In the rush to get through, as will be shown by example in other chapters, Senators and
Assemblymen voted for measures to which they were openly opposed. The machine minority was merely
reaping the benefits of a situation which the cleverness of its leaders had created.
Although machineadvocated and unimportant measures could be passed in such a situation, bills which the
machine opposed could not be[17]. Machineopposed measures were either held up in committees until their
passage was out of the question, or they were denied consideration in Senate or Assembly, or their advocates
worn out by the tactics of the machine leaders. Senate Bill 220, which removed the party circle from the
election ballot, passed in the Senate after a bitter contest, was held up in the Assembly until five days before
adjournment, and then denied a second reading. Boynton's Senate Bill 249, providing for the arrangement of
judicial candidates on the ballot without designation of party affiliations, intended to take the Judiciary out of
politics, which after a long contest passed the Senate, was held up in the Assembly until the day before
adjournment, when it was denied passage. This bill was introduced in the Senate on January 12. So popular
was it, such was the demand for its passage, that it was not openly opposed. It was finally defeated on March
23, the day before adjournment. Thus two months and eleven days were required to wear out its advocates.
About March 1, the machine began to crowd the antimachine element for early adjournment. At that time
not far from 2000 bills were recorded in the Senate and Assembly histories. The action had the effect of a
good stiff push to a man sliding down hill; the antimachine forces had the votes to prevent adjournment but
the machine's adjournment plans added considerably to antimachine discomfiture. Senator Wolfe actually
gave notice that on Friday, March 5, he would move that the Legislature adjourn on March 13. This would
have given a fortnight for consideration of nearly 2000 bills. At the time of Wolfe's motion, there were
pending the Direct Primary bill, the Railroad Regulation bills, the Commonwealth Club bills, the Islais Creek
Harbor bills, and scores of other important measures, the passage of which had unnecessarily albeit most
cleverly been delayed.
As a result of clever manipulation, dating from the first day of the session, the machine was thus in the
closing days, in spite of the majority against it, able to pass, amend or defeat measures, pretty much as its
leaders desired. The antimachine forces, Republican and Democratic, were during those last days, merely
reaping the harvest which they had sown when they permitted the DemocraticRepublican machine to take
the organization of the Legislature out of their hands.
[15] The Senate Committee on Election Laws, for example, held the Direct Primary bill for thirtyeight days,
and finally reported it back so amended that it had to be rewritten. See chapters VI and VII on efforts of the
machine to hold the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill in committee.
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[16] It was stated on the floor of the Assembly, that were the Ten Commandments to be adopted by the
Assembly, the Senate would find some excuse for amending them.
[17] The most astonishing example of this was furnished by the passage of the Change of Venue bill in the
Senate. See chapter XVI.
Chapter V. Election of United States Senator.
Opposition to Perkins Overcome by the Dead Weight of the Machine Movement Against His Reelection
Failed for Want of Leadership Proceedings Without Warmth or Enthusiasm.
No funeral was ever attended by greater somberness than was the reelection of George C. Perkins to the
United States Senate, January 1213, 1909. The nominating speeches were made without enthusiasm; not a
cheer greeted Senator or Assemblyman charged with the task of putting the aged Senator in nomination.
Pulcifer of Alameda, who made the nominating speech in the Assembly, was received with icy calmness.
Even when the Alamedan referred to the veteran Senator as "one whose hair has grown white and whose eyes
have grown dim in the service of his country," not so much as a ripple of applause stirred the chamber. When
the speaker concluded his review of the Senator's life and political career, the incipient murmur of approval
which somebody started died away for want of vitality.
In the Senate, the task of nominating Perkins fell to Stetson of Alameda. But Stetson's nominating speech was
received with no more enthusiasm than was that of the shifty Pulcifer. The "system," the "organization," the
"machine," have it as you will, returned George C. Perkins to the United States Senate. The people of
California had no voice in it, nor, for that matter, the Legislature, although the majority of the Legislature was
opposed to the machine. In carrying out the ignoble part prepared for them prepared for them by the
"machine" which a majority of them opposed the members of Senate and Assembly went through the forms
prescribed without a hand clap and without a cheer.
But it must not be thought that the reelection of Senator Perkins was without opposition. Indeed, it met with
the same sort of honest but ineffective resistance that attended the election of Stanton to the Speakership of
the Lower House. And like the campaign against Stanton the opposition to Perkins got nowhere because of
the lack of leadership, organization and plan of action on the part of the resisting legislators.
The machine had been preparing for Perkins' reelection for months; but the opposition to Perkins made no
move until after the November elections.
The first outward sign of opposition came from Assemblyman E. J. Callan of the Thirtyninth District, the
fighting reform district of San Francisco. Callan, three or four weeks before the Legislature convened, fell
into a trap which the wily Alameda County politician had set some time previous. Perkins had long before
invited criticism of his "record," which meant his votes on issues that had been passed upon by the United
States Senate. As a matter of fact, such votes mean little, for the misplaced "courtesy of the Senate," under
which schemers betray the people, makes it possible for even recognized "reformers" to be forced to vote
against most desirable measures. The other fellows of the Perkins stripe when brought to book on their
"record" can always give in defense: 'Why, your reformer, Senator So and So, did the same thing.' To be sure,
a La Follette does kick over the traces once in a while, in which event he usually votes alone, while the
solemn victims of "courtesy" vote against him according to Senatorial custom, not to use the more expressive
word, stupidity.
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Thus, when Perkins craftily invited his opponents to attack him on his record, they dodged the trap gingerly,
all save Callan. Callan didn't walk, he rushed into it, sending a scathing letter to Perkins on that gentleman's
Senatorial record. Perkins' reply and explanation came as a counter blow. The fire was tempered out of
Callan's letter. Callan had permitted Perkins to select the fighting ground, and Perkins had exhibited
admirable judgment.
The attack on Perkins had better been made on his attitude toward the shipping interests of California the
development of the isthmian route to New York, for example; on his attitude toward the machine, whose
stranglehold upon the State is locked with federal patronage; on his attitude toward the socalled "Roosevelt
policies"; on his attitude toward the Roosevelt administration, upon which he hung with the dead weight of
crafty, persistent obstruction. There were plenty of vulnerable points in the Perkins armor, but naturally in
selecting the point of attack, Perkins carefully avoided them. So Callan's bolt rebounded harmlessly, to the
astonishment of the various wellmeaning reformers, and the intense satisfaction of the machine, whose
somewhat anxious leaders recognized full well that Callan's discomfiture would discourage attacks from
other possibly effective sources.
The next move against Perkins came the week before the Legislature convened. A number of antimachine
Republicans met at San Francisco to canvass the situation, and formulate a plan to defeat Perkins if possible.
It was found that on joint Senate and Assembly ballot, the Democrats would have twentynine votes and the
Republicans ninetyone. Sixtyone votes are required for the election of a Senator. The Republicans at the
meeting considered these twentynine votes as with them in the selection of an antimachine Republican for
Perkins' place. The antimachine Republicans thus in revolt against the machine, themselves numbered
twenty Senators and Assemblymen, which made fortynine votes against Perkins. In addition, an even dozen
Republican Senators and Assemblymen were counted upon as willing to vote against Perkins if his defeat
could be shown to be certain. This would have given the antiPerkins element sixtyone votes, just enough
to elect. For one of their number to fail, meant a deadlock; for two, if Republicans, to fail meant Perkins'
election. It was a slender chance, but the possibility of success kept the movement alive until the hour of the
Senatorial caucus.
Those who were promoting the movement were not at the time aware that six of the Democratic
Assemblymen and one of the Democratic Senators were governed by such high conceptions of their duties as
citizens and responsibilities as legislators, that they were to cast their votes in the Senatorial election for a San
Francisco saloon keeper, on the ground that he is a "good fellow" and had "spent money liberally for the
party." This of itself made the defeat of Perkins impossible.
The antiPerkins forces were also handicapped by the fact that they had no candidate. The machine had been
craftily booming Perkins for years; the reformers had boomed nobody[19]. They were, then, without material
for a positive fight; all they could do was negative, which is always confession of weakness. In addition,
aside from the Bulletin, there was no San Francisco publication that could be counted upon to back their
movement. The Call was openly supporting Perkins. The movement against Perkins, while it admittedly
represented the attitude of the majority of the electors of the State, and the feeling of a safe majority of both
Houses of the Legislature, was without one element of real strength[20].
Under the United States Revised Statutes, the Legislature was called upon, to proceed on the second Tuesday
after organization, to elect Senator Perkins' successor. As the Legislature had organized on January 4, the
second Tuesday fell on January 12. The call for the Republican caucus to go through the form of selecting a
candidate for the Senate, was circulated the third and fourth days of the session. The Republican Senators all
signed it, not a few of them with the nonresistance of a wretch in the hands of a hangman.
More opposition developed in the Assembly. Callan and three or four others kept up their resistance to the
last, but when the caucus assembled on Friday evening, January 8, all the Republican Senators and
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Assemblymen who could do so were in attendance[21].
The caucus was of course hopelessly programmed for Perkins. Nevertheless, the better element of the party
endeavored to secure some expression from Senator Perkins as to his attitude toward the Western
transportation problem. This led to a heated debate which kept the caucus in session until a late hour. The
debate turned on the celebrated Bristow letter.
For years, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company has been able to prevent effective water competition by
way of the Isthmus of Panama. The Government has a line of steamers running from New York to the
Isthmus, and a railroad line across the Isthmus. With an additional line of steamers running from San
Francisco to Panama, the Government would have a through line from San Francisco to New York. This
would give genuine competition with the Southern Pacific system, and free the State from the grasp of the
transportation monopoly.
In August, 1907, Hon. J. L. Bristow, now United States Senator from Kansas, was appointed a Special
Panama Railroad Commissioner, to investigate the necessity and feasibility of putting on the Pacific line. Mr.
Bristow, in a report that fairly sizzled with criticism of Southern Pacific and Pacific Mail Steamship
Company methods, recommended that the government line be established. When Pacific freight rates were
arbitrarily raised just before the Legislature convened, shippers of the State appealed, not to Senator Perkins
or to Senator Flint, but to Senator Bristow from interior Kansas, asking that he concern himself with having
government steamers put on the San FranciscoPanama route. Bristow replied that he would do what he
could, that he was receiving many letters from Western shippers who favored the plan, but that the chief
difficulty in the way was the opposition of the California delegation in the Senate.
This Bristow letter caused all the trouble at the Perkins caucus. The suggestion was made that Perkins owed it
to the State to explain the charges brought against him by the Senator from Kansas. A resolution was
accordingly introduced providing that a telegram be sent Senator Perkins calling upon him to state whether
the charge made by Senator Bristow were true.
Immediately the proPerkins people assumed the dignified position that such a telegram would be an insult to
the venerable Senator from California. Nobody seems to have taken the trouble to state that the Bristow
charges were untrue, but that the requesting of the Senator to answer them would be an insult to that dignitary
was made subject of the warmest oratory. So warm was it, that the opposition to Perkins melted away like
wax or putty, if putty melts until but five members of the caucus had the courage to vote to ask Perkins to
declare himself on the transportation problem. Callan of San Francisco voted for it, so did Drew of Fresno, so
did Young of Berkeley and two others. But 77 members of the caucus voted against the resolution. Senator
Perkins was permitted to maintain a dignified silence on the Bristow charges. After the vote on the resolution,
Assemblyman Callan left the caucus.
But even with the Republican caucus nomination, Perkins did not receive the entire Republican vote. In the
Assembly, Callan voted for Chester Rowell of Fresno, and Sackett for Thomas R. Bard of Ventura. Fiftysix
of the Assembly votes, however, were cast for Perkins.
In the Senate, Perkins received thirtytwo votes. The thirty regular Republicans voted for him, as did Senator
Bell, the IndependentRepublican, and Senator Caminetti, Democrat. Senator Caminetti voted for Perkins
because Caminetti regarded Perkins, as nearly as could be determined, the choice of the electors to whom
Caminetti owed his election. Caminetti believes that the United States Senator should be selected by the
people of the State. The nearest he could get to this was to ascertain the wishes of the people of his district.
He was convinced that the people of his district wished to see Perkins reelected. So, regardless of partisan
considerations, Caminetti the Democrat voted for Perkins the Republican. Caminetti's explanation of his vote
is worthy of the most careful consideration[22].
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The regular candidate of the minority for the Democratic complimentary vote was J. O. Davis, a gentleman of
the highest character. But eight of the Democratic members voted against him. Seven of the eight,
Assemblymen Black, Collum, Hopkins, Lightner, O'Neil and Wheelan and Senator Hare voted for Harry P.
Flannery, a San Francisco saloonkeeper; the eighth, Senator Kennedy, voted for William H. Langdon. Six
Democratic Senators and thirteen Democratic Assemblymen voted for Mr. Davis. They were: Senators
Campbell, Cartwright, Curtin, Holohan, Miller, and Sanford; Assemblymen Baxter, Gibbons, Gillis, Irwin,
Johnson of Placer, Juilliard, Maher, Mendenhall, Odom, Polsley, Preston, Stuckenbruck and Webber.
[19] It is interesting to note that when a good citizen gives effective resistance to the machine, that the
machine invariably starts the cry "He is a candidate for the United States Senate." The open candidacy
and liberal advertising of a machine man for the Federal Senatorship causes no adverse comment. For an
antimachine man to so aspire or the suspicion in machine breasts that he so aspires is heralded as
evidence of his complete unworthy and irresponsibility.
[20] But when the machine Republicans of a State unite with Democrats to elect a machine man to the
Federal Senate, no such difficulties attend them. Note the election by a coalition of machine Republicans and
machine Democrats in Illinois of "Billy" Lorimer, the notorious "blond boss" of the stockyards, to the United
States Senate.
[21] Senator Bell, although a Republican, was excluded because he would not make his peace with Walter
Parker, the Southern Pacific boss of the political district lying south of Tehachepi. See Chapter 11,
Organization of the Senate.
[22] Caminetti's explanation of his vote, as printed in the Senate Journal, is in full as follows:
"Mr. President: During the campaign of 1906, in the Tenth Senatorial District, resulting in my election as
Senator, I made the question of 'The election of United States Senators by direct vote of the people' one of the
leading issues upon which I asked the suffrage of the people. I then pledged myself in all my speeches and in
the press, to endeavor to secure the passage of a law by the Legislature in case of my election having that
object in view, and in case of failure in the effort I would nevertheless follow that principle and vote for the
choice of a majority of the qualified electors of that district in the selection of a Senator during my term of off
cue.
"The last session of the Legislature failed to enact the necessary legislation on the subject, but the people of
my district have nevertheless plainly indicated to me that Hon. George C. Perkins was at the last election, and
now is, their choice for the United States Senatorship.
"Under these circumstances I feel in honor bound by my pledges to the people of the Tenth Senatorial
District, to record the choice of a majority of the qualified electors thereof for Hon. George C. Perkins for
United States Senator, hoping in so doing that it will never again be necessary for a member of the
Legislature to vote the choice of the people of his district in this, or any other, indirect way, but that this
Legislature will rise superior to partisanship and give to the people hereafter an opportunity, under suitable
laws, to vote directly for candidates for that office. Should this Legislature fail in this high duty to the public,
I trust that the people, in whom all power resides, will hereafter take up this matter in the way the people of
the Tenth Senatorial District did two years ago, and thus be able in all legislative districts of the State to
record their choice for the exalted office of United States Senator."
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Chapter VI. The AntiRacetrack Gambling Bill.
Supporters of the Measure Knew What They Wanted, Drew a Bill to Meet the Requirements of the Situation
and Refused to Compromise with the Machine Element Suggestive Series of "Errors" Attended Its Passage.
Of the three principal reform measures considered by the Legislature of 1909 the Direct Primary bill, the
Railroad Regulation bill and the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill the last named was the only one to become
a law untrimmed of its effective features. The AntiRacetrack Gambling bill passed the Assembly, passed the
Senate and was signed by the Governor precisely as it had been introduced; there was not so much as the
change of a comma allowed. The result is an antigambling law on California statute books which if it work
as well as it has in other States will prevent bookmaking and poolselling, thus relieving horse racing of the
incubus which has made the sport of kings disreputable[23].
Since the reform element succeeded in passing the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill without amendment, there
is widespread opinion that there was no opposition to its passage. As a matter of fact, nothing is farther from
the truth. Before a legislator reached Sacramento, the progambling lobby was on the ground, and continued
its holdup process until the Assembly, by a vote of 67 to 10, passed the measure, and by a vote of 57 to 19
refused to grant it reconsideration.
The writer remembers his first poll of the Senate on the antigambling issue, when only nineteen Senators
could be safely counted for it[24]; twentyone were necessary for its passage. To be sure, a number of the
Senators not included in the list of the nineteen who were from the beginning safe for the measure, were
pledged to vote for an antipool selling bill, but this did not necessarily mean the effective WalkerOtis bill
which had been drawn to prevent pool selling and bookmaking. Not a few unquestionably figured on voting
for a bill that would place them on record as against racetrack gambling, but do racetrack gambling little or
no harm.
These uncertain ones were blocked in their plan of action because the proponents of the AntiGambling bill
knew just what they wanted to do, namely, close up poolrooms and bookmakers' booths. They took the most
effective way to close them up, namely, adapted to California Constitution and criminal practice, the Hughes
antigambling law, the adoption of which Governor Hughes forced in New York, and which in New York
State had proved most effective.
The bill was drawn carefully and its backers in the Legislature and out of the Legislature let it be known that
no amendment, not so much as to change a comma, would be tolerated. The measure was introduced in the
Senate by Walker of Santa Clara, and in the Assembly by Otis of Alameda. It was known as the WalkerOtis
bill.
This determined stand for the passage of the measure just as it had been drawn thoroughly alarmed the
gambling lobby. "Reformers" who would not "compromise" proved a new experience. The machine never
compromises until it is whipped. Accordingly, when public opinion demanded action on the WalkerOtis
bill, the machine Senators began to talk of compromise. In fact, up to the hour of the vote on the bill in the
Senate, Senator Wolfe did not stop whining compromise. In his speech against the passage of the bill, just
before the final vote was taken he insisted: "There should have been a compromise measure agreed upon, a
bill for which we all could have voted."
The moment before Wolfe had been warning the Senate that to pass the WalkerOtis bill would tend to
wreck the Republican party in California. Just what the WalkerOtis bill had to do with Republican policies
Mr. Wolfe would no doubt have difficulty in answering. But the measure did have much to do with machine
policies. The machine had prevented the passage of the AntiGambling bill two years before, and was
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prepared to prevent the enactment of an effective antigambling law at the session of 1909. Senator Wolfe
undoubtedly fell into the common error of mistaking the machine for the Republican party.
However, the spirit of no compromise which gave Senator Wolfe so much concern saved the WalkerOtis
bill, and has given California an effective law. The lesson of the incident is that if effective laws are to be
placed on the statute books, there can be no compromise with the machine. There was compromise with the
machine in the direct primary issue, with the result that the Direct Primary law is in many respects a sham.
But that is another story to be told in another chapter. The antimachine element did not compromise with
the machine on the WalkerOtis bill, with the result that an effective law was passed.
From the beginning, the antigambling element let it be known that no suggestion of compromise would be
entertained. They announced boldly that if the machine succeeded in amending the measure, they, the
antigambling Senators and Assemblymen, would work to prevent the passage of the amended bill. The
position of these members of the Legislature who did not propose to be sidetracked by machine trickery is
well illustrated by an interview with Senator Walker, which appeared in the Sacramento Bee on January 19.
"If the Hughes bill can not pass the California Legislature in the form that it was passed in New York," said
Senator Walker, "I shall vote against the compromise or the amended bill. The people of California have
made clear their desire that an effective antigambling law, such as New York enjoys, be placed on the
statute books. To substitute anything else would be betrayal."[25]
So there was no compromise with the machine on the WalkerOtis bill, and the people were not betrayed, as
they were to be later in the passage of the Direct Primary bill and the, Railroad Regulation bill, where there
was compromise with the machine.
When the machine found there was to be no compromise, a curious series of mishaps became the lot of the
WalkerOtis bill, particularly in the Senate. The measure, when introduced, was, in the ordinary course of
legislation, referred to the Senate Committee on Public Morals. But it did not reach that committee until
several days after its introduction. When the discovery was made that it had not reached the committee, a
sensation budded but never bloomed. The facts, however, were brought out that the measure had been
reposing in the pocket of a clerk instead of going to the committee. This "error" was corrected, and the bill
turned over to its proper custodians.
Then came the discovery that the bill had not been properly printed; three words had been left out of the
printed bill in the State printer's office. This "error," as soon as discovered by Senator Walker, was corrected.
It was declared to be "trivial." But the "trivial" typographical and clerical errors in the Direct Primary bill in
the final count gave the machine its opportunity to amend the measure to machine liking. The writer has no
doubt in his own mind that the machine aimed to delay the passage of the WalkerOtis bill until the end of
the session, as it did the Direct Primary bill, and then amend it to suit machine purposes or defeat it
altogether.
Error even attended the recording of the passage of the bill. After a measure has passed the Senate, its title
must be read and approved, and an order made transmitting it to the Assembly, all of which must be recorded
in the Senate journal. The printed Senate journal of February 4, however, the day the bill was passed, merely
recorded the passage of the bill. Nothing appeared about its title having been read, or that it had been
transmitted to the Assembly. Walker discovered this "error," and a hasty inspection of the original minutes
followed. The original minutes contained the proper record as follows: "Title read and approved. Bill ordered
transmitted to the Assembly." But the two sentences had been omitted from the printed journal. The patient
Walker had the correction made. None of these irregularities, however, resulted in serious delay. Those
behind the measure watched their opponents closely, refused utterly to treat them with the "courtesy due
Senators," in fact, acted under the assumption that the gambling element would stop at nothing to defeat the
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bill. This watchfulness is an important although comparatively minor reason why the bill was passed.
Then came the machine's move to pass "an anti gambling bill" as a substitute for the WalkerOtis measure.
Martinelli in the Senate and Butler in the Assembly had introduced an AntiPool Selling, AntiBook Making
bill. The measure had much to commend it but was by no means so effective as the WalkerOtis bill. As a
last straw, the gambling element grasped at the MartinelliButler bill, and threw their influence on the side of
its passage. But here they again met with the uncompromising resistance of the reform element. There was
nothing left for the machine to do but make its fight on the floor of Senate and of Assembly. And the fight
came on in a way and with a suddenness which brought consternation upon the machine forces.
[23] The WalkerOtis bill is in full as follows:
Section 1. A new section is hereby added to the Penal Code to be known as Section three hundred and
thirtyseven a thereof and to read as follows:
aye. Every person, who engages in pool selling or bookmaking at any time or place; or who keeps or occupies
any room, shed, tenement, tent, booth, or building, float or vessel, or any part thereof, or who occupies any
place or stand of any kind, upon any public or private grounds within this State, with books, papers, apparatus
or paraphernalia, for the purpose of recording or registering bets or wagers, or of selling pools, or who
records or registers bets or wagers, or sells pools, upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or
power of endurance, of man or beast or between men or beasts, or upon the result of any lot, chance, casualty,
unknown or contingent event whatsoever; or who receives, registers, records or forwards, or purports or
pretends to receive, register, record or forward, in any manner whatsoever, any money, thing or consideration
of value, bet or wagered, or offered for the purpose of being bet or wagered, by or for any other person, or
sells pools, upon any such result; or who, being the owner, lessee, or occupant of any room, shed, tenement,
tent, booth or building, float or vessel, or part thereof, or of any grounds within this State, knowingly permits
the same to be used or occupied for any of these purposes, or therein keeps, exhibits or employs any device or
apparatus for the purpose of recording or registering such bets or wagers, or the selling of such pools, or
becomes the custodian or depositary for gain, hire or reward of any money, property or thing of value, staked,
wagered or pledged, or to be wagered or pledged upon any such result; or who aids, assists or abets in any
manner in any of the said acts, which are hereby forbidden, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail or
State prison for a period of not less than thirty days and not exceeding one year.
[24] Had not the people of the Twentyninth and Thirtyfirst Senatorial Districts revolted against the
machine at the general election of 1908, the WalkerOtis bill would probably have been defeated in the
Senate. In the chapter dealing with the passage of the MillerDrew Reciprocal Demurrage bill, it will be
shown how the Democratic Senators Holohan and Campbell were elected in the Republican Twentyninth
and Thirtyfirst Senatorial Districts, not because they were Democrats, but because the Republicans of those
districts, recognizing the real issue before the State the machine against the antimachine element voted
for Holohan and Campbell, knowing them to be for good government and a "square deal" for all. Holohan
and Campbell were from the beginning foremost in their support of the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill. To be
sure, at the final vote, only seven Senators voted against the measure. But it is generally conceded that when
the session opened, the gamblers had nineteen Senators who could have been prevailed upon to vote against
an effective antigambling bill. Had machine men sat in the seats occupied by Holohan and Campbell, the
gamblers would have had twentyone votes in the Senate, and the WalkerOtis bill would have been
defeated.
[25] Much of the credit for this determined stand is due Earl H. Webb, president of the AntiRacetrack
Gambling League, who managed the fight for effective antiracetrack gambling legislation not only during
the session of the Legislature, but before the Legislature convened. Mr. Webb first convinced himself that the
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WalkerOtis bill would stop pool selling and bookmaking; and that the measure would stand the test of
honest interpretation by the courts. Then he made his fight for it. To Mr. Webb, more than to any other one
person, is due the credit for its passage.
Chapter VII. Passage of the WalkerOtis Bill.
AntiMachine Element Forced the Issue and Compelled Early Action on the Measure Evidence That
Machine Planned to Defeat or Amend the Bill by Delaying Its Passage Until Toward the End of the Session.
As one looks back over the exciting first five weeks of the session, when the WalkerOtis bill was under
consideration, it is plain that the machine would have preferred to have made its initial fight in the Senate. If
defeated in the Senate, the enemies of the measure could have jockeyed for delay, prevented the passage of
the measure until the closing hours of the session, and then killed it or forced its supporters to accept
amendments.
But the initial fight did not come in the Senate. The Assembly was the battleground. The reason for this lies
principally in the fact that while Assemblyman W. B. Griffiths, of Napa, raises fast horses, he is not a
gambler, and is as much opposed to the bookmaking, poolselling features of the track as Senator Walker
himself. Griffiths was made chairman of the Assembly Committee on Public Morals. While this committee
has sundry sins to answer for, nevertheless it made an astonishingly clean record on the WalkerOtis bill. On
January 18, less than three weeks after the Legislature had assembled, Chairman Griffiths called his
committee together to take up the WalkerOtis bill.
Of the nine members of the committee, seven were present, Mott and Mendenhall alone failing to answer to
their names. Those present were: Griffiths, Cattell, Young, Dean, Perine, Fleisher and Wilson. The seven
members went through the bill paragraph by paragraph and decided unanimously to recommend it for
passage.
Had a dynamite bomb been set off under the Emeryville gambling establishment, greater consternation could
scarcely have seized upon the progambling element. The gamblers realized that the committee's prompt
action threatened the machine's plan to delay action on the measure until the closing days of the session. For
the moment all interest centered in Mott and Mendenhall, the two members of the committee who had been
absent when the measure had been considered. Twentyfour hours developed the fact that Mendenhall
sanctioned the action of his seven associates. This made eight of the nine committeemen for the bill. But the
ninth member, Assemblyman Mott of Alameda County, was very much offended at what the committee had
done.
Assemblyman Mott was elected as a LincolnRoosevelt League member. Probably the LincolnRoosevelt
League does not like to be reminded of that unfortunate fact. But the lesson of Mr. Mott is so necessary for
the LincolnRoosevelt League and all other reform movements that the conspicuous part which Mott played
against reform policies cannot be too much insisted upon. To be sure, Mr. Mott voted for the bill when it was
up for passage the LincolnRoosevelt Republican platform of his county pledged him to it. But there is a
deal of difference between supporting a measure and voting for it[26].
Mott was very much offended at what the committee had done and demanded that another meeting be held.
Such a meeting, to accommodate Mr. Mott, was held held in the office of Speaker Phil Stanton; held behind
closed doors; held with Jerk Burke, Southern Pacific lobbyist, safely entrenched across the hall from Speaker
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Stanton's office in the back office of SergeantatArms Stafford[27].
But Mott failed to change the position of his eight associates. The further consideration of the measure by the
committee which he demanded was denied. He accordingly took the fight for reconsideration to the floor of
the Assembly. The fact that eight of the committee were against him, apparently had no weight at all with Mr.
Mott.
Failing to force the committee to reconsider its action in recommending that the bill pass, Mott told his
troubles to the Assembly. In the Assembly Mott moved that the measure be rereferred to the Committee on
Public Morals, eight members of which had joined in recommending that it "do pass."
The motion was lost by a vote of 53 to 23. This was recognized as the test vote in the Assembly on the Anti
Racetrack Gambling bill. That the opponents of the bill failed to make a better showing fairly paralyzed the
progambling lobby. Mott, chagrined and discomfited, retired in confusion[28].
Assemblyman Gibbons managed at this point to tie the bill up for another day, by giving notice that on the
day following, he would move that the vote by which the bill was refused reference to the Committee on
Public Morals be reconsidered. The day following Mr. Gibbons made his motion but was voted down, thirty
Assemblymen supporting and fortyeight opposing him[29].
The Gibbons motion having been disposed of, Assemblyman Butler moved to amend the measure, by
substituting for it the MartinelliButler bill. But again did the antigambling element force the issue. The
motion was lost by a vote of 23 to 52.
Other proposed amendments having been voted down, Mr. Otis moved that the bill be put on its passage the
next day, January 21. This was a final blow at the machine's purpose to delay the passage of the bill as long
as possible, and was met with determined opposition. But the motion prevailed by a vote of 44 to 32.
The bill was on the following day put upon its final passage. The writer considers the real test vote on the bill
was cast on Mott's motion to refer the measure back to the Committee on Public Morals. The vote on the
passage of the measure counts for little under the circumstances. Sixtyseven Assemblymen voted for it; only
ten and every one of them from San Francisco voted against it.
By consulting the table showing the six votes on this bill Table "D" of the appendix it will be seen that
eleven of the twentythree Assemblymen who voted for Mott's motion to refer the measure back to the
Committee on Public Morals voted for its final passage. Two, Baxter and Schmitt, who had voted for the
Mott resolution, were absent when the final vote on the bill was taken, leaving only ten who had voted for the
Mott resolution to vote against the bill. The eleven who had voted for Mott's motion, but who switched to
safety when the vote on the bill's passage came, were: Beardslee, Greer, Johnson of Sacramento[30], Johnson
of San Diego, Johnston of Contra Costa, Moore, Mott, Nelson, Odom, Wagner, Webber 11.
There was just one more parliamentary move by which the WalkerOtis bill could be delayed in the
Assembly, to give notice of a motion to reconsider the vote by which the measure had been passed. Grove L.
Johnson came to the rescue with the notice. This tied the bill up for another twentyfour hours. On the 2nd
Johnson made his motion to reconsider but was defeated by a vote of nineteen to fiftyseven.
The table of the six votes on the WalkerOtis bill shows at a glance who voted consistently for the measure
on all of the numerous roll calls; who voted consistently against it; and who were pulled backward and
forward, voting one moment to satisfy the public demand that the bill be passed, and the next on the side of
the gambling interests[31].
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Public opinion was running high for the passage of the WalkerOtis bill by the time the measure reached the
Senate, after passing the Assembly, but the bill might still have been held up in the Senate committee[32] had
it not been for the ridiculous attack which Tom Williams, president of the California jockey Club, made upon
all who supported the measure, or all who Williams thought supported it.
The occasion was a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Public Morals, at which Williams was
asked to present the side of the opponents of the bill. The crowd that filled the Senate chamber expected from
Williams some reasons why the measure should be denied passage, but it was disappointed.
Instead of giving reasons in support of his position, Williams introduced the methods of the barroom into the
Senate chamber. He dramatically gave Rev. Frank K. Baker, of Sacramento, the lie, under conditions which
stamped Williams as a bully and a coward. His uncalledfor attack on Dr. Baker would have killed his
argument, but not content with this, he made probably the most astounding attack on the Protestant clergy of
the country ever heard in California, certainly the most astonishing ever heard in the Senate chamber of the
State[33].
The racetrack man's tirade did not give the reasons for continuance of gambling, which the people expected
to hear from him. Finally, when Williams was swamped by questions which his insolence and tactlessness
had provoked, Senator Frank Leavitt came to his rescue by moving adjournment. Leavitt's motion prevailed,
but not until Williams had effectively settled the fate of the WalkerOtis bill.
The Committee on Public Morals reported the bill back the next day with the recommendation that it do not
pass. The recommendation was that of Weed, Wolfe and Leavitt. While Kennedy and Savage failed to vote
for the recommendation, they made no minority report. But even with the unfavorable report, the measure
passed the Senate by a vote of 33 to 7. In the eleventh hour, uncertain Senators like Welch joined the winning
side, but the showing made by the gamblers was, all things considered, better than could have been
expected[34].
In the Senate and Assembly, out of a total vote of 120, the gambling element, which had year after year
succeeded in preventing the passage of an antiracetrack gambling bill, commanded on the measure's final
passage but seventeen votes. The incident illustrates what aroused public opinion, when it finds expression in
a definite plan of action, can compel.
But even with the measure's final passage, the delays that attended it continued. It passed the Senate on
Thursday, February 4. By the following Saturday, the measure had been correctly engrossed, but could not go
to the Governor until it had received the signature of Speaker Stanton of the Assembly. Stanton was out of
town. As a result, it was February 10, six days after it had passed the Senate, before it went to the Governor.
Governor Gillett took nine days to sign it, the Senate History showing that it was approved on February 19.
Because of the delays the gamblers were enabled to complete their season at the Emeryville track.
[26] Of the six votes taken in the Assembly on the WalkerOtis bill issue, Mott in effect voted four times
against the immediate passage of the measure. See Table "D."
[27] It was Jerk Burke's first appearance at the capital for the session. The danger which threatened the
gambling element brought to the capital every machine lobbyist within reach, from Frank Daroux down. It
was an anxious hour for the machine.
[28] This first test vote in the Assembly on the WalkerOtis bill was as follows:
For Mott's motion, and in effect against the bill: Baxter, Beardslee, Beban, Black, Coghlan, Collum, Cullen,
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Greer, Hopkins, Johnson of Sacramento (Grove L.), Johnson of San Diego, Johnston of Contra Costa,
Macauley, McManus, Moore, Mott, Nelson, Odom, O'Neil, Pugh, Schmitt, Wagner, Webber. 23.
Against Mott's motion, and in effect for the bill: Barndollar, Bratty, Bohnett, Butler, Callan, Cattell, Collier,
Costar, Cronin, Dean, Drew, Flavelle, Fleisher, Flint, Gerdes, Gibbons, Gillis, Griffiths, Hammon, Hanlon,
Hans. Hawk, Hayes, Hewitt, Hinkle, Holmquist, Irwin, Johnson of Placer, Juilliard, Kiwi, Leeds, Lightner,
Maher, McClellan, Melrose, Mendenhall, Otis, Perine, Polsley, Preston, Pulcifer, Rech, Rutherford, Sackett,
Silver, Stanton, Stuckenbruck, Telfer, Transue, Whitney, Wilson, Wylie, Young 53.
[29] The several votes taken on the WalkerOtis bill will be found In the table "D" of the appendix.
[30] Johnson of Sacramento voted for the bill to give notice that he would the next day move for its
reconsideration. Reconsideration can be secured only by a member voting with the majority. Had Johnson
voted against the bill he could not have secured its reconsideration.
[31] Attention is called to the vote on reconsideration of Assemblyman Feeley, of Alameda, another
LincolnRoosevelt member Mr. Feeley was absent when the vote on Mott's motion was taken. But Mr.
Feeley voted for the bill when it was on final passage, thus keeping his record straight. But Mr. Feeley
hastened to vote for reconsideration of the measure.
Mr. Feeley, like Mr. Mott, was nominated by the LincolnRoosevelt League because he could be elected. Mr.
Feeley furnishes another example of the folly of which reformers are sometimes guilty, of nominating men
whose best recommendation seems to be that they can be elected. To be elected is very important, to be sure;
but if a man when elected to the Legislature is to vote against reform policies, why should the antimachine
element nominate him, thereby losing all the chance they, might have had of electing a man who would be in
sympathy with their endeavors?
[32] In 1907, a measure similar to the WalkerOtis bill was killed in this way. It passed the Assembly and
was in the Senate referred to the Senate Committee on Public Morals. The committee refused to report it back
to the Senate, and friends of the measure could not secure enough votes on the floor of the Senate to compel
the committee to act. The committee (1907) consisted of Senators Irish, Leavitt, Lynch, Wolfe and Kennedy.
Irish and Lynch did not sit in the Senate of 1909, and could not be reappointed to the committee. But
Lieutenant Governor Porter distinguished himself by reappointing to the committee Wolfe, Leavitt and
Kennedy. Weed and Savage were added to take the places left vacant by Irish and Lynch. Weed in 1907
voted with Leavitt, Wolfe and Kennedy against compelling the committee to release the AntiRacetrack
Gambling bill. Senator Savage (1907) voted for the bill's release, but Senator Savage at the opening of the
session of 1909, was at least counted as opposed to the WalkerOtis bill. The gambling element had no
complaint to make of the Committee on Public Morals which Lieutenant Governor Porter had appointed.
[33] Williams was not the only gambler who injured the gamblers' cause that night. Frank Daroux, keeper of
the notorious Sausalito poolrooms, interrupted A. J. Treat, of Sausalito, who was speaking for the
WalkerOtis bill, to demand of him how it is that at the polls the gamblers of that city invariably defeat the
antigambling element.
"You will remember, Mr. Daroux," came back Treat, "that at the last general election you and I discussed that
question?"
"Yes," was the reply.
"And I asked you why you were in politics?" continued Treat.
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"Yes," said Daroux.
"And you told me," insisted Treat, "that you were in politics for principle."
"Yes," admitted the pool seller.
"And I asked you how you spelt it then; and I ask you how you spell it now?"
The crowd that packed the Senate Chamber, even the scores of racetrack touts that had been rushed to
Sacramento to give weight to the side of the gamblers, went wild at this. Treat was cheered to the echo.
Daroux slunk back into his seat silenced and was not heard from again the whole evening.
[34] The vote was as follows:
For the bill: Anthony, Bates, Bell, Bills, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Burnett, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright,
Curtin, Cutten, Estudillo, Holohan, Hurd, Kennedy, Lewis, Martinelli, McCartney, Miller, Price, Roseberry,
Rush, Sanford, Savage, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker, Welch, Willis, Wright 33.
Against the bill: Finn, Hare, Hartman, Leavitt, Reily, Weed, Wolfe 7.
Chapter VIII. The Direct Primary Bill.
Parallel Between It and the WalkerOtis Bill Attempt to Placate the Machine Weakened Position of Its
Supporters Most Serious Criticism Came from Advocates of the Direct Primary Idea What the Original
Measure Provided Machine's Plan of Campaign.
The parallel between the WalkerOtis AntiRacetrack Gambling bill and the WrightStanton Direct Primary
bill furnishes the most suggestive feature of the Legislative session. Each was based on a demand of a large
majority of the people of the State for the correction of an abuse; the one to prevent the prostitution of the
racecourse in the interest of the gambling element; the second to prevent the domination in public affairs of
the corrupt, corporationbacked political boss.
Each had been discussed in the public prints for months previous to the convening of the Legislature, and
each had been made in the popular view of affairs a sort of test by which the Legislature was to be judged.
Each had the support of not only the better element of electors, but the better element of each House of the
Legislature. Each had the determined secret opposition, and so far as it dared, the open opposition of the
machine.
The campaign which the machine planned against the bills was practically the same in each instance to
amend the measures into a condition of ineffectiveness, and then pass them as sop to The People. This would
have given The People a Direct Primary law without a direct primary; an AntiGambling law that would
neither close poolrooms nor interfere with bookmaking.
And here the parallel ends.
The proponents of the AntiGambling bill introduced an AntiGambling measure, showed that it was the
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best that could be drawn, and let it be known that they (the supporters of the measure) would, if it were
amended by the machine, vote against it.
The proponents of the Direct Primary bill, on the other hand, seemed possessed of the notion that they must
placate the machine if any Direct Primary bill were to be passed.
The backers of the AntiGambling bill treated the machine leaders as recognized enemies of the measure,
with whom there could be no compromise. The backers of the Direct Primary bill treated the machine leaders
as friends and allies, inviting them to offer suggestion and advice.
The results of the two campaigns speak for the effectiveness of the two methods. The AntiGambling
element put through an effective AntiGambling bill, refusing to compromise on so much as the change of a
comma. But in the case of the Direct Primary bill, the machine not only had the last word, but in the feature
of the nomination of United States Senators, the real bone of contention, amended the measure very much to
its liking.
Long before the Legislature convened it was common talk at San Francisco that the backers of the Direct
Primary bill were willing to accept any sort of a bill, so long as a direct primary measure be passed. Inasmuch
as it is quite possible that a legislative enactment called Direct Primary law may be a trifle worse than no
Direct Primary law at all, the jellyfish attitude of the leaders in the movement caused no little unfavorable
comment.
It did not seem to occur to the selfconstituted leaders that their proper course was to draw up the most
effective measure possible, let its effectiveness be known to the people as was done in the case of the
AntiGambling bill and insist that the Legislature go on record for or against it.
Instead, they endeavored to satisfy everybody, apparently attempted to come to a compromise understanding
with the machine, or at least to please machine leaders. Their theory seemed to be that if the measure were
not made too effective, the machine would not seriously oppose its passage, thus insuring a glorious and at
the same time, easy victory.
However unwarranted this assumption from appearances may be, such hidebound machine men as Wolfe and
Leavitt were consulted and flattered, apparently with the idea that although they had been abused like
pickpockets on previous occasions, they could be won over to the Direct Primary cause.
The stupidity of this policy was shown at the end of the session, when Wolfe and Leavitt dictated the terms
under which the Direct Primary bill should pass. Had the supporters of the AntiGambling bill pursued the
same policy, and treated the machine leaders as possible friends instead of recognized enemies, Wolfe,
Leavitt and the other machine leaders would unquestionably have dictated the provisions of the
AntiGambling bill, and have forced that compromise which Wolfe in his speech on the WalkerOtis bill
regretted so bitterly had not been made.
The purpose of the Direct Primary is primarily to take away from the political bosses the monopoly which the
convention system gives them in naming candidates for office, and to place such nomination in the hands of
The People. To this end, under the Direct Primary laws that have of recent years been adopted, the
bosscontrolled convention is done away with, and the candidate for office nominated by the direct vote of
The People.
The play of the machine was to make the direct nomination difficult and impracticable and, if possible,
entirely ineffective. The real supporters of the Direct Primary idea aimed to make the nomination as simple as
possible, and easily attained, that genuine expression of the choice of the electors could be secured.
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But instead of aiming at simplicity and direct methods, the Direct Primary bill, introduced in the Senate by
Wright and in the Assembly by Stanton[35], threw a confusing mass of partisan detail about the selection of
the primary candidate. It was made practically impossible for an independent citizen believing in the
principles of a given party, but withholding his right to exercise the citizen's judgment at the polls, to become
a primary candidate. Throughout, the measure made it smooth sailing for the mere partisan and extremely
hard for independent Republican or independent Democrat to secure party nomination[35a].
For example, the candidate for party nomination, was, according to the terms of the bill, required not only to
set forth the name of the party under which he might seek nomination, but to make affidavit "that he affiliated
with said party at the last preceding general election, and either that he did not vote thereat, or voted for a
majority of the candidates of said party at said next preceding general election, and intends to so vote at the
ensuing election."
Thus, no citizen who had not supported the majority of his party candidates at the previous election, and who
was unwilling to take an oath before their nomination, to support a majority of the candidates at the next
ensuing election, was to be eligible for primary nomination to office.
But this, and similar unfortunate provisions were practically lost sight of in the fight made over the provisions
for the nomination of United States Senators, and remained in the measure as it was finally enacted into law.
It may be, as the machine element contends, that provision for the nomination of United States Senators has
no place in a Direct Primary law, but the fact remains that The People have inseparably linked with the direct
primary idea the selection of United States Senators by direct vote.
The Federal laws provide that United States Senators shall be elected by the Legislature. But in States where
Direct Primary laws have been adopted, provisions have been made by which the names of candidates for the
United States Senate are placed on the primary ballot the same as the name of any other candidate for a State
office. The same Direct Primary laws give candidates for the Legislature opportunity to pledge themselves to
accept The People's decision, and as members of the Legislature to cast their votes for such candidate for the
United States Senate as The People may have named.
The Legislature is thus made to abide by The People's will in electing United States Senators, precisely as the
Electoral College is made to abide by The People's will in the election of the President.
To be sure, no candidate for the Legislature need take the pledge if he does not care to do so, but it is
recognized that where it is possible for the voter to express a choice for United States Senator, the legislative
candidate who fails to pledge himself to respect The People's choice would stand slim chances of election.
The Direct Primary law adopted by Oregon[35b] represents the highest development of the plan for popular
selection of United States Senators. In that State the candidate for the United States Senate is nominated the
same as any other candidate, the names of each successful primary nominee going on the regular ballot the
same as that of any candidate for State office.
The Senatorial candidate who receives the highest number of votes is not, of course, elected to the United
States Senate, but candidates to the Legislature are given opportunity to pledge themselves to respect the
wishes of the voters and elect to the Senate the candidate who is thus endorsed. The Legislative candidate
may sign such a pledge, or he may sign a statement that he will regard the popular vote for United States
Senator as merely advisory and not binding.
But it is noticeable that in Oregon and other States where such wholesome direct primary measures have
become laws the legislative candidate signs the pledge to abide by the mandate of the electors.
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Unquestionably The People of California expected some such provision in the California Direct Primary law.
Unfortunately, however, Senator Wright, who had charge of the bill, is not at all in sympathy with the Oregon
plan. It is claimed that the framers of the bill were as little in sympathy with the Oregon plan as Senator
Wright himself. At any rate, the bill, as a sort of compromise, gave the electors opportunity to express their
choice for United States Senator within party lines. The candidate for the Legislature was to be given
opportunity to pledge himself to abide, not by the selection of the electors of the State, but by the selection of
the electors of his party[36].
The name of a candidate for the United States Senate did not, under the original WrightStanton bill, go on
the final ticket. His choice was confined to the primaries and was at best to be regarded only by the legislators
of his own political faith. The People of California were not to be given a direct vote in the selection of
United States Senators, as are The People of Oregon.
If the framers of the WrightStanton Primary bill thought that their compromise on the United States Senator
feature of the measure would placate the machine, they were much disappointed. The machine fought the
arrangement for popular selection of United States Senators within party lines as positively as it would have
combated the Oregon plan itself.
Under either plan, the machine recognized there was always danger that the selection of a United States
Senator would actually be made by The People. This would mean loss to the machine of Federal patronage,
and Federal patronage is the sure rock upon which the machine in California is founded. Indeed, had either
plan been incorporated into law, the reelection of Senator Frank Flint would have been made practically
impossible. So the machine fought the WrightStanton plan as stubbornly as it would have opposed the
Oregon plan.
On the other hand, the best supporters of the Direct Primary idea were much disappointed that the Oregon
plan had not been incorporated into the bill. Not a few of them grew lukewarm in their support of the
measure. The extreme partisanship of its provisions and the failure to provide for popular selection of United
States Senators hurt the measure with its friends, and failed to placate its enemies. From the beginning the
most effective arguments against the bill were found in the bill itself.
This was demonstrated at the public hearing, held January 26th, to consider the various provisions of the
measure. The principal speakers were Hiram Johnson and Judge John F. Davis.
Mr. Johnson dealt with the Direct Primary in a general way. He spoke of it in its relation to practical politics,
showing that an effective Direct Primary would place this Government of ours back into the hands of The
People. That is what was wanted. Every point Johnson made was received with applause from the crowd that
packed the Senate Chamber. And when Johnson concluded with an appeal for "a Direct Primary law that
shall be a Direct Primary law in substance and not in form alone," he was cheered to the echo.
Judge Davis was not so fortunate in his text as was Mr. Johnson. Davis was there to discuss the details of the
bill. He had scarcely begun before he found himself between a cross fire of questions from those on the one
side who wanted an effective measure passed and on the other from those who wanted no Direct Primary at
all. The opponents of the Direct Primary scored few points; the believers in the measure did.
To save himself from a ridiculous position, Davis had to evade the question whether he would rather see an
able and effective Democrat elected to the United States Senate than a vicious and corrupt Republican. He
failed as miserably in attempting to justify the extreme partisan features of the bill. And the questions which
Judge Davis could not answer came from men who wanted to see an effective Direct Primary measure
enacted, not from the opponents of the Direct Primary theory.
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Of course this dissatisfaction of the advocates of an effective law encouraged the machine to action. The
measure was deliberately left with the Committee on Election Laws. The AntiGambling bill had passed both
Houses by February 4th, one month after the session had opened. But on that date, the Committee had just
begun consideration of the measure. To be sure, the Election Laws Committee had been stacked against the
Direct Primary bill, but the Public Morals Committee had been stacked against the AntiGambling bill as
well. But the opponents of racetrack gambling were satisfied with the WalkerOtis bill, while the proponents
of the Direct Primary for California were by no means satisfied with the WrightStanton bill.
So the machine dared do with the Direct Primary bill what it did not dare do with the AntiGambling bill.
The WalkerOtis bill had a standing which the WrightStanton bill did not have.
That the Committee on Election Laws did not act early in the session on the Direct Primary bill was not
because of the purpose of Senator Estudillo, Chairman of the Committee. Time after time did Estudillo call
meetings for consideration of the bill, and repeatedly, he found only himself, and Senators Stetson and
Wright in attendance. Finally, in February, Senator Estudillo succeeded in getting his committee together for
consideration of the allimportant measure.
That the machine proposed to make the bill inoperative was recognized from the moment the committee was
called to order. The manner in which this was to be done developed as rapidly. The machine's plan was as
follows:
(1) As to candidates:
The machine proposed to amend the bill so that either a majority or a high plurality vote should be required to
nominate candidates at the primary election. In the event of no candidate for a given office receiving a
majority or the required plurality, the nomination was to be made by a nominating convention as under the
old convention system. With such a provision it would have been easy for the machine to introduce a large
number of candidates at the primaries, thus making it impracticable for any one of them to receive a majority
or even a high plurality vote. This would have thrown nominations into a convention. Thus, while the State
would have had a Direct Primary law, it would have been practically impossible to nominate a candidate
under its provisions.
(2) As to United States Senators:
To deny The People a voice in the election of United States Senators, the machine had two plans:
(A) To cut all provisions for the election of United States Senators out of the bill.
(B) Failing in this, to amend the bill so that candidates for the Legislature would be required to regard the
choice of the electors of their several districts as advisory. The vote was in no way to be held binding, nor
was a legislative candidate to be required to sign a pledge to regard in any way the wishes of the electors.
Under this arrangement there could be as high as 100 candidates for the United States Senate endorsed at a
single election eighty from Assembly, twenty from Senatorial districts. The effect would be, of course, the
endorsement of at least several candidates, with the result that the Legislature would in the end be left to
choose as under the present system. Thus, while the State would have a law which apparently gave The
People a voice in the naming of Federal Senators, there would be no change whatever in the manner in which
the Federal Senators were nominated and elected.
[35] In addition to the WrightStanton bill, Senator Roseberry introduced a measure providing for a postal
primary. In the appendix will be found Senator Roseberry's views on the postal primary plan.
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[35a] The writer has been reliably informed that this concession was made to the machine before a member
of the Legislature reached Sacramento.
[35b] Senator Caminetti introduced a separate bill providing the Oregon plan for the popular choice of United
States Senators. He was requested not to press its passage BECAUSE IT MIGHT INJURE THE CHANCES
OF PASSAGE OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY BILL. The machine claquers is never at a loss for an excuse for
the defeat of a meritorious measure.
[36] The original WrightStanton bill provided two pledges, which the candidate for the Legislature was
given opportunity to sign. The first pledge bound him to abide by the choice of the electors of his party for
United States Senator. It read as follows:
"I further declare to The People of California and to The People of the .......... (Senatorial or Assembly)
District that during my term of office, without regard to my individual preference, I will always vote for that
candidate for United States Senator in Congress who shall have received for that office the highest number of
votes cast by my party at the September primary election next preceding the election of a Senator in
Congress."
If the legislative candidate did not care to sign this pledge, he was given the alternative of signing the
following:
"I further declare to The People of California and to The People of the ... (Senatorial or Assembly) District
that during my term of office I shall consider the vote of The People at any primary election for United States
Senator as nothing more than a recommendation, which I shall be at liberty wholly to disregard, if I see fit."
Chapter IX. Machine Defeated in the Senate.
Reform Forces, Regardless of Party, Unite to Secure the Passage of an Effective Direct Primary LawAgree
on a Compromise Measure and Succeed in Forcing It Through the Senate Machine Badly Beaten.
Senator Leroy A. Wright of San Diego introduced the Direct Primary bill in the Senate on January 17th, and
during the month that it slumbered in the Senate Committee on Election Laws there was no reason to believe
that Senator Wright was not in sympathy with the provisions of the measure. On February 1st, however,
Senator Wright made the astonishing confession before the Committee on Election Laws that he was not in
sympathy with that provision of his bill which gave legislative candidates opportunity to pledge themselves
to abide by the choice of the electors of the State for United States Senator. From that moment began Senator
Wright's fight against his own bill, which finally landed him in the camp of Leavitt, Wolfe and the other
machine Senators.
At the meeting of the Senate Committee on Election Laws, held February 1st, the solid six on the Committee,
Leavitt, Wolfe, Savage, Hartman, Kennedy and Hare, had voted two amendments into the bill which rendered
it absolutely useless for practical purposes.
The first amendment provided that a majority instead of a plurality vote should nominate, a provision as
unconstitutional as impracticable. The second amendment cut out of the measure all provision for popular
vote for United States Senators.
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This decided action on the part of the machine had brought consternation upon Estudillo and Stetson who
wanted to see an effective measure passed. Wright in this crisis took the floor to state his position.
"For my part," said Wright, "I would never sign a pledge to vote for the candidate for United States Senator
in Congress who shall have received for that office the highest number of votes cast by my party. I do
believe, however, that the people of this State demand a partisan Direct Primary law. But I think that the
people of Oregon recognize that they have made a mistake in going so far as they have. Under the pledge
required of candidates for the Legislature in the measure before us (the Wright bill) a member of the
Legislature might find himself compelled to vote for a candidate whom the voters of his district opposed. I
opposed this provision when the bill was drawn, but my objection was overruled. I now stand for the bill as it
has been introduced."
Wolfe, Leavitt and the rest of the machine Senators grinned exultantly as Wright stated that he did not
approve the provisions of his own bill. But the faces of Estudillo and of Stetson, who had been looking upon
Wright as their leader in the proprimary fight, fell. To employ the famous expression of Speaker Stanton of
the Assembly, they felt the ground slipping from under their feet. There was a sensation of farther slipping,
when Wright, author of the measure, proprimary leader and Callheralded reformer, offered an amendment
as substitute for popular Statewide choice for United States Senator, by making the vote for United States
Senator advisory only[37].
The grin of satisfaction on the faces of the machine Senators broadened as Wright read his amendment while
the faces of Estudillo and Stetson grew blanker. But the machine Senators were in no hurry. Things were
coming their way; there was no reason for them to rush matters. So they lazily took twentyfour hours to
think it over. Then they bluntly rejected Wright's compromise, the solid six, Wolfe, Leavitt, Savage,
Hartman, Kennedy and Hare voting against its acceptance.
Estudillo and Stetson voted to accept the compromise. They explained their votes. Their explanations showed
their earnestness in working for the best Direct Primary measure that could be passed which indicates what
might have been done under other leadership and a loyalty to Wright, the accepted leader in the Direct
Primary fight, which, to say the least, was misplaced.
"With this amendment," said Senator Stetson, in explaining his vote, "the bill is not onehalf so strong as it
was before. I do not like it. But I must train with one side or with the other, and for that reason shall vote for
Senator Wright's substitute."
Senator Estudillo stated that he voted for the amendment against his better judgment.
"I don't believe in your amendment, Senator Wright," said Estudillo, turning to that gentleman. "I don't think
it amounts to anything. I vote with you against my better judgment. I do not believe that this amendment will
give The People what they want an opportunity to vote directly for candidates for the United States Senate.
My opinion is that we should pass a good bill or no bill at all. I shall, however, yield to Senator Wright, who
is the recognized leader in this Direct Primary fight, and vote for his amendment."
And then the six machine members rejected the amendment.
There wasn't much left of the Direct Primary bill. The measure was, on February 16th, two weeks after the
application of the committee's pruning knife, reported back to the Senate with all reference to election of
United States Senators stricken from it, and the unconstitutional and impracticable majority vote required for
the nomination of candidates for office, instead of the constitutional and practical plurality vote, as originally
provided in the bill.
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The fact should not be lost sight of that the two Senators on the Committee on Election Laws who led the
fight against the Direct Primary bill, Leavitt and Wolfe, in the Committee on Public Morals led the fight
against the AntiGambling bill. Nor should it be forgotten that two of their most docile followers in the
Committee on Election Laws, Kennedy and Hare, are "Democrats." There was no partisanship shown in the
ranks of the opponents of the Direct Primary bill; machine Democrats and machine Republicans united for its
defeat. But when antimachine Republican and antimachine Democrats united for its passage, Wolfe and
Leavitt were shocked beyond measure.
Machine Senators denounced the antimachine Republicans as mongrels, enemies of the Republican party,
and insisted that if the antimachine Republicans persisted in continuing with the antimachine Democrats to
secure the passage of an effective Direct Primary law, the Republican party in California would go to smash.
The arrogant course of the machine members of the Election Laws Committee, had at least one good effect it
drove the antimachine Republicans and the anti machine Democrats together as a matter of selfdefense.
The antimachine Republicans and Democrats saw the machine Democrats and Republicans united to defeat
the passage of an effective Direct Primary measure. So the antimachine Republicans and Democrats
organized that they might successfully combat the organized machine Democrats and Republicans. For the
first time in the history of the California Legislature, so far as the writer knows, the Senate divided on the
only practical line of division for the enactment of good measures and the defeat of bad ones with the
antimachine Senators on one side and the machine Senators on the other.
The "bandwagon" Senators of the Welch variety, and the doubtful Senators, were left for the moment to
herd by themselves.
The antimachine forces held meetings caucuses if you like to decide upon the course to be pursued.
They numbered at first twenty members, fifteen Republicans and five Democrats. The Republicans were Bell,
Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Burnett, Cutten, Estudillo, Hurd, Price, Roseberry, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson,
Walker and Wright; the Democrats, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright, Miller and Holohan. George Van
Smith, of the San Francisco Call, credited with being an expert on Direct Primary legislation, was admitted to
the deliberations of the twenty.
Senator Price, however, became alarmed at the irregularity of antimachine Republicans meeting with anti
machine Democrats, gathered his virtuous partisan skirts about him and fled in dismay.
Senator Caminetti also left the meeting. Caminetti is a strong advocate of the Oregon plan for the election of
United States Senators. When Caminetti found Senator Wright, the accepted leader of the proprimary
forces, opposed not only to the Oregon plan, but to any plan that would give electors a Statewide vote for
United States Senators, he refused to go to Wright's assistance. Later on, however, when Wright went to
Caminetti pleading for support, Caminetti agreed to abide by the decisions of the antimachine caucus.
Curiously enough, after the machine had worn the antimachine forces out, Caminetti was the only Senator
who refused to accept the machine's amendments to the bill which the antimachine caucus had agreed upon.
With Price and Caminetti out, the antimachine forces were reduced to eighteen Senators, although it was
known that Rush sympathized with the movement but was not present because he had been unavoidably
detained.
The eighteen organized by electing Senator Estudillo chairman, and Senator Boynton secretary. Senator
Wright made a short address in which he virtually threw up his hands. He told what the WolfeLeavitt
element had done with the bill in committee, and stated that unless the antimachine forces got together, the
machine would amend the measure into ineffectiveness. Following Wright's address the antimachine
Senators considered the original WrightStanton bill under three heads:
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(1) Shall a mere plurality, or a majority, or a high plurality be required to nominate at a primary election?
(2) Shall the partisan features be eliminated from the measure?
(3) Shall the provisions of the measure be extended to the election of United States Senators?
The first question was brought up on Stetson's motion that a twentyfive per cent plurality be required to
nominate. The machine aimed to fix the plurality at forty per cent, but even the twentyfive per cent
compromise was denied. The motion received but four votes, in its favor.
Then came discussion of the clause quoted in the previous chapter, which requires of each primary candidate
that he make affidavit that he supported his party ticket at the previous election, and proposes to support it at
the coming election. It was understood by all who had any thing to do with the Direct Primary bill that the
clause made it impossible for a primary candidate to run on two primary tickets. Cartwright moved that the
clause be stricken from the bill. The motion was lost by a vote of 14 to 4. Senators like Black of Santa Clara
voted against the motion in the interest of harmony, although personally they favored the elimination of all
partisan features.
The question of primary nomination of candidates for the United States Senate was then taken up. Senator
Wright moved that the vote for Senators be advisory only, and that it be by Assembly and Senatorial districts
instead of Statewide, as the original bill provided. The vote was as follows:
For Wright's motion Burnett, Wright 2.
Against Wright's motion Bell, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Cartwright, Cutten, Holohan, Miller, Roseberry,
Stetson, Strobridge, Walker 12.
Excused from voting Campbell, Estudillo, Hurd, Thompson.
A scene of great confusion followed. Campbell, who had refused to vote because he insisted upon the Oregon
plan of electing United States Senators by direct vote of The People, insisted that the provision be
incorporated into the bill. He refused to be bound by any plan that would restrict the election within party
lines. So they blocked Campbell in one corner of the room with a table, and reasoned with him. Twentyone
votes were required to pass the Direct Primary bill in the Senate. At that time counting Rush, who was not
present at the caucus, the antimachine forces had only nineteen. They could not afford to lose even one of
their number.
Above the confusion, Senator Holohan managed to make his voice heard.
"Gentlemen," he said, "I would like to have the Oregon plan incorporated into this bill, But that seems to be
impracticable at this time. Eventually, I am sure California will adopt the Oregon plan of naming the United
States Senator, which to my way of thinking is the most common sense, the fairest, the most American plan.
But if we are to pass a Direct Primary measure at the present session, we must reach a basis of compromise.
Let us now get together and stand together on a measure upon which we can all agree. Let us pledge
ourselves to abide by the decision of this meeting, and stand or fall by the bill which we have agreed upon."
Holohan's counsel prevailed. The Senators present pledged themselves to abide by the decision of the
meeting and to stand or fall by the bill which they had agreed upon. And Senator Leroy A. Wright was
among them and was bound in honor as every Senator present was bound in honor to stand by the bill which
had been agreed upon.
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The uniting of the antimachine Senators to fight the combined machine Democrats and Republicans called
down upon the antimachine element the denunciation of the machine press. The Catkins newspapers, for
example, sputtered their condemnation of Republican Senators who would unite with Democratic Senators in
"rump caucus."
On the other hand the San Francisco Call, at that time warmly supporting the antimachine movement in the
Senate, was extreme in denouncing LieutenantGovernor Porter, presiding officer of the Senate, Leavitt,
Wolfe, and all others who were opposing the passage of the Direct Primary measure as it had originally been
introduced by Wright, and as it had been agreed upon in the reform caucus[38].
The fight in the Senate came on the second reading of the bill February 18th. On the 16th, however, the
setting for the contest had been fixed by the majority of the Committee on Election Laws, which reported
with favorable recommendation the measure as the Committee had cut it to pieces. The minority of the
Committee, Estudillo, Stetson and Wright, reported back the bill agreed upon by the nonpartisan caucus of
antimachine Senators.
But the fight did not come over either report. When the bill came up on the 18th for second reading and
amendment, Senator McCartney, on behalf of the machine forces, introduced a resolution over which the
contest waged. McCartney's resolution provided that the bill should be so amended that the primary vote for
United States Senator should be by districts and advisory only, and that for county and local offices a vote of
25 per cent and for State offices a vote of 40 per cent should nominate[39].
The debate was over this resolution. The motion for its adoption was defeated by a vote of twentyseven
against to thirteen for[40].
Incidentally, the debate settled one of the most important questions affecting the bill, namely, the percentage
of votes to be required for primary nominations. The machine, to render the measure inoperative, was
contending for a majority or at least a high plurality vote, while the antimachine element was contending for
a mere plurality. The debate developed the fact, that any provision for other than a mere plurality vote would
be unconstitutional. This service was performed by Senator Cutten of Humboldt[41]. Senator Cutten's clear
presentation of this much discussed point, settled the vote percentage question right there. When the measure
was under consideration by the Assembly Election Laws Committee, Grove L. Johnson did suggest that a 40
per cent plurality be required to nominate. But no serious attempt was made so to amend the bill, after
Cutten's speech, and the defeat of the McCartney amendment.
Naturally, the antimachine forces felt warmly encouraged by this complete defeat of the machine. The San
Francisco Call, the recognized advocate of the Direct Primary bill, the next day, February 19th, said of the
outcome:
"Twentyseven Senators at Sacramento stood true to their party pledges, and voiced the will of the people in
their votes on the Direct Primary bill yesterday. Thirteen other Senators wrote into the record conclusive
proof of their unfitness for the offices they hold, when they voted against the WrightStanton bill, and for the
corrupt political machine which is the Southern Pacific Railroad. Every man of these thirteen confessed
corruptionists knew what he was doing, knew whose will he was putting above The People's. Every one of
these thirteen betrayers of the public weal has written the epitaph of his political tombstone."
The Call was as generous in its praise of the antimachine Democrats and Republicans as it was bitter against
the machine Senators who had endeavored to force the McCartney amendment into the bill. While that paper
printed the names of the thirteen in bold, black type on the first page under the heading, "These Men Voted
for the Machine," in type just as bold and just as black it printed in an honor column the names of the
twentyseven who had voted against the McCartney amendment, under the heading, "These Men Voted for
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the People."
Said the Call in its admirable report of the defeat of the McCartney amendment, of the original nineteen
antimachine Senators who had organized to resist the machine:
"Genuine manhood has been on tap at every conference of the independents. They have not squabbled for
partisan advantage. They have worked together to give The People an honest and genuine Direct Primary
measure. Senator Wright won a brilliant fight. He won it with and through the earnest cooperation of the
unbossed Democrats and Republicans."
Said the Call of the measure itself in its issue of February 18th the day of the defeat of the machine
Senators:
"The Direct Primary bill is The People's bill. Such men as Dooling, Wright, Stanton, Davis and Cartwright
made it. There is no honest argument against it, there will be no honest Senators against it."
Such was the view of the Call on February 18. Few were willing to believe on that date that within a month
the Call would have thrown its influence on the side of Leavitt and Wolfe and Warren Porter in an attempt to
force part of the McCartney amendment into the Direct Primary bill. It did not seem possible then that within
a month the Call would be denouncing, ridiculing and misrepresenting Senators whose efforts had resulted in
the defeat of the McCartney amendment because of the refusal of these antimachine Senators to join with
the machine Senators whom they had once defeated, and accept the amendment which they had once
rejected. It did not then seem possible that on March 18th the Call would be behind the thirteen "betrayers of
the public weal," itself betraying the Senators whose "genuine manhood" had on February 18 appealed to its
editors so strongly.
But such was to be. And, too, the combination of Calkins Syndicate, LieutenantGovernor Porter, Senator
Leroy A. Wright, the San Francisco Call and the thirteen "betrayers of the public weal" proved too much for
the little band of antimachine Senators. And what is more, backed by the Call, the machine leaders finally
amended the Direct Primary bill, which on February 18th the Call had stated very positively no honest
Senator would be against.
[37] Wright's amendment had been carefully typewritten before the meeting. It read as follows,
"Party candidates for the office of United States Senator shall have their name placed on the official primary
election ballots of their respective parties in the manner herein provided for State Office, provided, however,
that the vote for candidate for United States Senator shall be an advisory vote for the purpose of ascertaining
the sentiment of the voters in their respective parties."
[38] On February 17th the Call said of Senator Eddie Wolfe's opposition to the bill:
"The fight (Direct Primary) promises to be both spirited and bitter. Eddie Wolfe of San Francisco, picked by
the machine to make its fight for the garroting of the Direct Primary bill, by the injection of a majority
nominating clause, has served notice that he proposes to tear the reformers to pieces."
Of Leavitt and other machine Senators, the Call on the same date said:
"Leavitt, who bossed the fight against the OtisWalker bill, will furnish the brains for the fight against the
Direct Primary bill, and every one of the seven who voted against the OtisWalker bill, are more or less
frankly against the primary bill. Savage, who did not vote against the WalkerOtis bill because his vote
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would have done no good, and Hartman and Hare, who did vote against the OtisWalker bill, have gone on
record against honest direct Primaries, as members of the majority of the Senate Committee on Election
Laws. Savage is frank enough to admit that he is opposed to any direct primary law."
[39] The McCartney resolution was in fullas follows:
"Resolved, That Senate Bill No. 3, and all pending amendments thereto, be and the same is hereby referred to
the Committee on Elections and Election Laws, with the following instructions:
"1. Amend the bill so as to give an advisory vote by districts on United States Senators."
"2. Amend the bill by providing for a percentage of votes before nomination by direct vote of the people, as
follows: If the highest candidate for any county or local office receive less than 25 per cent of the vote of his
party, and if the highest candidate for a State office receive less than 40 per cent of the vote of his party, that
the nomination shall be referred to a convention of delegates elected at the same time that candidates are
voted on by direct vote."
"3. Amend the bill by providing that the convention aforesaid shall prepare the platform of the party and
perfect party organization."
[40] The vote in full was as follows:
Against the McCartney amendment and in effect for the bill agreed upon by the antimachine Senators:
Anthony, Bell, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Burnett, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright, Curtin, Cutten, Estudillo,
Holohan, Hurd, Lewis, Martinelli, Miller, Price, Roseberry, Rush, Sanford, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson,
Walker, Welch, Wright 27.
For the McCartney amendment and in effect against the bill agreed upon by the antimachine Senators:
Bates, Bills, Finn, Hare, Hartman, Kennedy, Leavitt, McCartney, Reily, Savage, Weed, Willis, Wolfe 13.
[41] Cutten showed that Section 13, Article XX of the State Constitution provides that "a plurality of the
votes given at any election shall constitute a choice where not otherwise directed in this Constitution."
Senator Cutten then proceeded to demonstrate that a primary election is an election within the meaning of the
terms used. The Supreme Court of Indiana has so declared, and, coming nearer home, Cutten showed that the
California Supreme Court has so held also.
In The People vs. Cavanaugh, 112 California, the Supreme Court held that any primary election that should
become mandatory becomes an election and only those primaries that may be optional with a party as to
whether or not they should be held, are not elections.
The WrightStanton bill and the Direct Primary amendment to the Constitution make the direct primaries
mandatory, nor is there anything in the State Constitution providing that anything other than a plurality vote
shall be required to nominate. For the Legislature to have yielded to the machine's demand that a majority or
high plurality vote be required to nominate and inserted such a provision in the Direct Primary bill, would
have been to render that measure unconstitutional, for under the plain provisions of the Constitution only a
plurality vote can be required to nominate.
Were a majority or even high percentage plurality vote required to nominate, the Direct Primary law would
have been made unconstitutional, because:
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1. A plurality might not be equal to the percentage or majority.
2. A percentage or majority contemplates a convention to nominate in case the candidate does not receive the
percentage or majority, and a convention, the best authorities hold, is prohibited under the constitutional
amendment providing for the primary election.
Chapter X. Fight Over Assembly Amendments.
Machine Succeeds in Amending the Direct Primary Bill in the Assembly Assemblyman Pulcifer at Critical
Moment Votes with the Machine Senate, Although Held Up By Machine Element for a Week, Refuses to
Concur in Assembly's Action.
The machine Senators, having failed to amend the Direct Primary bill on its second reading, apparently
accepted their whipping, and allowed the measure to go through third reading and final passage without
opposition[42].
Twentyseven Senators at the final roll call voted for it; not one vote was cast against it. Even Leavitt and
Wolfe voted for it. The antimachine Senators had won "a glorious victory."
But the victory was one tempered with grave misgivings on the part of careful observers of machine trickery.
The fact that the bill as it had passed the Senate contained several serious clerical and typographical errors,
and that its title was unsatisfactory if not defective, worried the genuine supporters of the bill not a little. The
bill had been loosely drawn to begin with, and as originally introduced contained most unfortunate clerical
errors, which bobbed up at most inopportune times.
At every stage of its passage in the Senate such errors were uncovered, and after it had passed second
reading, no less than eight serious errors were discovered to be still in the bill. The only way these errors
could be corrected was by amendment.
The errors were called to the attention of Senator Wright and of George Van Smith of the Call, who were
urged to have them corrected in the Senate that the bill might go to the Assembly letter perfect, and without
necessity of amendment[43]. But both Van Smith and Wright were of the opinion that time would be gained
by leaving the Assembly to make the corrections.
The bill as it finally passed the Senate was a defective bill, the defects of which could be corrected in the
Assembly only by amendment. In the end the fate of the measure was made to hinge on these clerical and
typographical defects.
The Assembly Committee on Election Laws had been stacked against the passage of a Direct Primary bill,
precisely as the Senate Committee had been. At the first meeting held by the Committee to consider the
measure, it became evident that the majority of the Committee would, if it could, put the McCartney
amendments, which had been defeated in the Senate, into the bill.
Leeds, Chairman of the Committee, moved that the primary vote for United States Senator be made advisory
and by districts only, while Grove L. Johnson, in spite of the fact that such a provision is impracticable and
unconstitutional, stated that he wished a provision in the bill requiring a 40 per cent plurality to nominate,
instead of a mere plurality.
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Leeds and Johnson, taken together, stood for precisely what the machine had stood for in the Senate, namely,
an advisory, district vote for United States Senators and a 40 per cent plurality vote to nominate.
Speaker Stanton, although not a member of the Committee, was present at the meeting, and although he had
introduced the bill in the Assembly, announced that he was for so amending the measure that the vote for
United States Senator should be made merely advisory and by districts. This was pretty strong intimation that
there was trouble ahead for the Direct Primary bill. Stanton was in effect throwing down his own bill.
After several meetings, the Committee adopted amendments providing for the Leeds suggested advisory
district vote for United States Senators, providing for correction of the clerical and typographical errors, and
providing an oath from primary candidates that they would abide by the platform of their party to be adopted
after their nomination. This last amendment was defeated in the Assembly.
The only real opposition in the Committee to the machine's plan to make the primary vote for United States
Senators advisory only and by district, came from Assemblymen Hinkle of San Diego and Drew of Fresno.
Drew was ill most of the time and could not attend the meetings. The brunt of the fight for a Statewide vote
for United States Senators, therefore, fell on Hinkle.
He fought well.
Every effort was made to pull him down. He was told that his bills would be "killed."
He was deliberately misrepresented in papers which were endeavoring to force into the bill the advisory
district vote amendment, which, as introduced in the Senate by McCartney, had been rejected by the
antimachine Senators. Leavitt and Wolfe and Warren Porter were for the amendment, but the antimachine
Senators continued against it as they had on February 18th, the day of their "glorious victory" over the
machine in the Direct Primary fight.
But, astonishing as it may seem, the San Francisco Call[44], which up to the passage of the bill in the Senate
had fought the machine Senators so valiantly, was giving indication of siding with Wolfe and Leavitt. In its
issue of March 6th, the Call stated that Hinkle was alone of the Assembly Committee battling for the bill as it
passed the Senate. In another sentence the Call said: "Leeds, Rech, Hinkle and Pugh voted for the advisory
vote amendments."
That sentence was shown about the Capitol, and on it was based the story that Hinkle had "fallen down," and
would vote with the machine. All this added to the confusion of the situation.
But Hinkle had not "fallen down." He was in the fight just as hard as ever, and with Assemblyman Bohnett
organized the reform element in the Assembly to fight the machine amendments.
Those who were endeavoring to force the advisory district plan for nomination of Senators into the bill took
the most astonishing methods to force it upon the antimachine Senators. For example, the San Francisco
Call of March 4th said of it:
"The amendments proposed by Leeds and supported by Stanton are not even remotely related to the
McCartney proposition, which was voted down in the Senate."
The Call's statement was easily disproved, but it unquestionably confused the antimachine legislators, who
were insisting upon retaining the provision for Statewide vote for Senators in the bill[45].
And then came the cry that those who were opposing the LeedsMcCartney amendment were enemies of the
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Direct Primary, for the Assembly, it was alleged, was overwhelmingly in favor of the amendment, and would
not pass the bill without it. Jere Burke, John C. Lynch, and other patriots of their ilk were most insistent in
expression of this fear. But such men as Bohnett, Hinkle, Drew and other recognized antimachine leaders in
the Assembly were not to be bluffed in this way. They stood firmly for the passage of the bill as it had passed
the Senate.
The fight on the floor of the Assembly came over Leeds' motion to amend the bill by making the vote for
United States Senator advisory only and by districts. The vote on Leeds' motion was 37 to 37. The
"overwhelming majority" favoring the amendment, in spite of the use of every pull at the command of the
machine, had not materialized. As a majority vote was necessary to read the amendment into the bill, a
moment more and Speaker Stanton would have been forced to declare the amendment lost. This would have
meant final defeat for the machine, and the Direct Primary bill as it had passed the Senate would have gone to
final passage.
At this critical moment in the bill's history, however, Assemblyman Pulcifer[46], the LincolnRoosevelt
League member from Alameda county, got into action. He had voted against the amendment. But with his
vote really meaning defeat for the machine element, he promptly changed his vote from no to aye. This made
the vote 38 for the amendment and 36 against it. The amendment which the antimachine Senators had
fought so valiantly and so effectively was finally read into the bill[47].
The amendments necessary to correct the typographical and clerical errors which had been permitted to
remain in the bill as it passed the Senate, together with a number of ridiculous amendments which were
finally rejected by both Houses were then adopted, and the bill sent to the Senate[48].
The fact developed almost immediately that if the Senate refused to concur in the Assembly amendment
forcing the advisory district vote into the bill the Assembly would recede from the amendment. As a matter of
fact Assemblyman Collum, who voted for the amendment March 9th, voted on March 22d to recede from it.
Had the antimachine forces in the Assembly been held together, as they could have been had the question of
receding been put up to them fairly, few other changes with Collum's would have been sufficient to assure
success for the antimachine forces.
But in spite of the situation in the Assembly, Senator Wright, who was by this time working openly with
Wolfe, Leavitt and Warren Porter to secure the adoption of the Leeds amendment (which as the McCartney
amendment the Senate had already rejected), was insisting that the Assembly would not recede, and that
unless the Senate concurred with the Assembly amendment, nothing could save the Direct Primary bill from
being cut to pieces in Free Conference Committee.
Nevertheless, the Senate by a vote of 19 against to 20 for concurrence, did refuse to concur, 21 votes being
necessary for concurrence.
Senator Stetson was absent when the vote was taken, being ill at his home in Alameda county. Had he been
present he would have voted against concurrence in the amendments. This would have made the vote 20 to
20.
Originally, on February 18th, twentyseven Senators had voted against the LeedsMcCartney amendment,
but when Senator Wright switched to the machine, Senators Hurd and Burnett wobbled along after him. The
four bandwagon Senators, Lewis, Martinelli, Price and Welch, tagged along after them. This made the vote:
Against concurrence in the amendment and for the bill as it passed the Senate Anthony, Bell, Birdsall,
Black, Boynton, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright, Curtin, Cutten, Estudillo, Holohan, Miller, Roseberry,
Rush, Sanford, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker 19.
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For concurrence in the amendment and against the bill as it originally passed the Senate Bates, Bills,
Burnett, Finn, Hare, Hartman, Hurd, Kennedy, Leavitt, Lewis, Martinelli, McCartney, Price, Reily, Savage,
Weed, Welch, Willis, Wolfe, Wright 20.
Every one of the thirteen Senators who opposed the bill when it was first before the Senate, voted to concur.
Wright, Welch, Price, Martinelli, Lewis, Burnett and Hurd joining them, made their number twenty.
Under the rules which govern the Senate, in the event of a tie vote, all the Senators voting, the President of
the Senate, in this case Warren Porter, has the casting vote.
Had Senator Stetson been present, he would have voted with the antimachine Senators. This would have
made the vote 20 to 20. Warren Porter would then have had the deciding vote. He would have voted to
concur. Senator Stetson's illness temporarily saved the Direct Primary bill.
In the ordinary course of legislative business, the Senate having refused to concur in the Assembly
amendment, the bill would have gone back to the Assembly, the Assembly would have receded from the
amendment, and the machine's defeat would have been final. But the quickwitted Wolfe saw a way to
prevent such action. He promptly moved that the Senate reconsider the vote by which it had refused to concur
in the Assembly amendment. Wolfe commanded twenty votes of the Senators present, the antimachine
element nineteen. Wolfe required, however, twentyone to compel reconsideration. But when the question
came up, Wolfe still lacked the one vote necessary for reconsideration, the antimachine element was still
without the necessary twenty votes to tie the Senate, thus giving Warren Porter the deciding vote. Wolfe,
however, with his twenty votes, postponed consideration of his motion to reconsider the vote by which the
Senate had refused to concur. A somewhat extraordinary parliamentary situation, to say the least. But it
answered the machine's purpose. For a week[49a] the machine was able to hold the Senate in deadlock. All
business was practically suspended. For hours the reform Senators were compelled to sit in their seats waiting
the pleasure of President Porter and President Pro Tem. Wolfe to call the Senate to order. The folly of
permitting the machine to organize the Senate was forced home to every goodgovernment man present. The
machine because it controlled the Senate organization could and did arrogantly override the rights of the
Senate, giving the ultimatum that no business should be transacted until the antimachine Senators had
concurred in the machine amendments to the Direct Primary bill.
The machine's play was to bully, bluff or beg one of the antimachine Senators to desert to the machine,
which would have given the machine twentyone votes, enough for concurrence, or, failing in this, to force
the attendance of Senator Stetson, which would have tied the Senate, thus giving Warren Porter the deciding
vote. But before Senator Stetson, pale and plainly on the verge of breakdown, could be brought to
Sacramento, Senator Black became very ill and was obliged to go to his home at Palo Alto. Thus when
Stetson returned, the vote stood 20 to 19, precisely where it had been before. Performer Porter was still
denied the privilege of casting the deciding vote. For once the machine found itself squarely against a stone
wall, with the sympathy of the public strongly against its creatures and methods. Night after night as the fight
went on, the Senate gallery was packed with interested spectators, who cheered the antimachine Senators to
the echo. There were no cheers for the machine, but on one occasion at least the machine was hissed, when
one of its creatures attempted an attack on Senator Black.
Never did the machine work harder to switch antimachine Senators to its side. Jere Burke had characteristic
corner conferences, Johnny Lynch labored with antimachine Senators openly on the floor of the Senate
chamber, as did Warren Porter. From a southern county came the Chairman of the Republican County
Committee to tell his Senator who was voting with the antimachine element what a mistake he was making.
P. H. McCarthy "happened in" and worked with George Van Smith of the Call and Eddie Wolfe in the
fruitless attempt made to "pull down" Senator Anthony[49]. Antimachine Senators found their pet bills
being held up in Assembly Committees.
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But the nineteen antimachine members stood firm, in spite of the fact that Senator Wright, who had
originally led them, and George Van Smith, of the Call, who had originally advised them, and the Call, which
had originally backed them, were all working on the side of Leavitt and Wolfe and Porter and the thirteen
Senators of whom the Call had said on February 19, when they had voted for the amendment which they
were still supporting, "Every man of these thirteen confessed corruptionists knew what he was doing knew
whose will he was putting above The People's will. Every one of these thirteen betrayers of the public weal
has written the epitaph of his political tombstone."
And then the machine forces attacked Senator Black. Although Senator Black was lying ill at his home at
Palo Alto, the Call on March 18 stated that he was in hiding in Sacramento.
The Call on the same date expressed its deep regret for and its utter condemnation of, the "asinine filibuster,
designed to prevent a tie vote which would be decided by the LieutenantGovernor, Warren Porter, in favor
of concurrence in the Assembly amendment to the Direct Primary bill."
On February 18 the Call had objected very strenuously to Porter's attitude toward the Direct Primary bill. The
Call on that date said:
"Today the wolves (a pet name for the machine Senators), urged by their masters, will make their last stand
in the Senate against a people determined to be free. Warren Porter, the LieutenantGovernor of the fatted
soul, who professes all the virtues and practices all political evil, will be the whipperin."
One month later, March 18, the Call was complaining bitterly that the antimachine Senators would not
permit the same "LieutenantGovernor of the fatted soul" to whip them into line for the amendment to the
Direct Primary bill, which they had rejected on February 18, and for which the Call had praised them
generously. The Call's special representative at Sacramento, George Nan Smith, was by this time working
openly with Porter, Wolfe, Leavitt, Hartman, Lynch and Burke to compel Senate concurrence in the
Assembly amendments, while Senators Boynton, Black, Miller, Campbell, Holohan, Stetson and the other
antimachine Senators whom the Call had formerly backed in their efforts against the machine, had become
"pinhead politicians," in the columns of the Call, intent upon defeat of the Direct Primary bill.
The Call's extraordinary change and outrageous condemnation of the antimachine Senators of course
brought its protest. The people of Palo Alto met in mass meeting on March 21st, and adopted resolutions
condemning the Call's course[50]. Senator Black from his sick bed wrote a letter showing the Call's
insincerity and breach of faith with the proprimary Senators[51]. The paper was bitterly denounced on the
floor of the Senate.
But throughout the State the newspapers which stand for good government, and incidentally for an effective
direct primary law, were firm in their support of the antimachine Senators. Just before Senator Black was
taken ill, for example, at the time when Senator Stetson was unable to be at the capital, the Sacramento Star,
in an editorial article under the heading, "Illness a Blessing," cleverly put in a nutshell what the people were
thinking and the reform press was saying. "We do not desire to wish Senator Stetson any bad luck," said The
Star, "but if his slight indisposition should continue for a few days, or, in lieu of that, if some other solon of
the same faith as regards the Primary bill can only contract some minor ailment, there will be more joy than
sorrow among the people who want something approaching a real direct primary."[52]
Matters were brought to a climax when the performers through Senator Weed who was, by the way,
Chairman of the Committee on Public Morals, which reported adversely on the WalkerOtis billintroduced
a resolution, authorizing the SergeantatArms to bring Senator Black to Sacramento, even though a special
engine and coach be chartered for the purpose[53]. The resolution brought forth indignant protest from the
antimachine Senators, and a telegram from Senator Black to Warren Porter, denouncing the unwarranted
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proceedings[54]. Nevertheless, Doctor Douglass W. Montgomery of San Francisco, in spite of the fact that
four reputable physicians, Dr. Howard Black, Dr. H. B. Reynolds, Dr. J. C. Spencer and Dr. R. L. Wilbur,
had certified that Senator black's physical condition did not permit of his being removed to Sacramento, went
to Palo Alto with the SergeantatArms to investigate the sick Senator. Montgomery's investigations seem to
have been confined to the outside of Senator Black's house[55]. At any rate he did not see Senator Black. The
performance was given its sordid feature by Montgomery charging the Senate $400 for his services.
The Montgomery incident demonstrated clearly that the machine was whipped[56]. Senator Wolfe
accordingly on Monday, March 22, after holding the Senate in deadlock more than a week, moved that the
vote whereby the Senate had refused to concur in the Assembly amendment to the Direct Primary bill, be
reconsidered. This, the Senate as a matter of courtesy, at Senator Wolfe's request, did. It then refused to
concur in the Assembly's objectionable amendment. For the second time, the Senate went on record against
the machine's advisory districtvote plan for the election of United States Senators. For the second time the
antimachine element in the Senate, in its efforts to secure the passage of an effective direct primary
measure, had, fighting fair, and in the open, and above board always, defeated the machine. The machine
thereupon met the antimachine element with a trick that completely turned the tables, a trick by which the
antimachine forces were defeated, and the machine element placed in a position to amend the bill as it might
see fit.
[42] Senator Wolfe, on the day of his defeat in the Senate, told the writer that he would offer no further
opposition to the passage of the bill.
[43] Charles R. Detrick of Palo Alto, for example, called the attention of both Wright and Van Smith to the
errors, and offered his services for their correction, but his offer was declined.
[44] The Call's course is all the more reprehensible from the fact that it had for two years been declaring for
an effective Direct Primary law, and, indeed, assumed all the credit for the agitation for the reform.
[45] The Leeds amendment, which the Call stated was in no way related to the McCartney amendment, read
as follows:
"Party candidates for the office of United States Senator shall have their names placed on the official primary
election ballots of their respective parties in the manner herein provided for State officers, provided, however,
that the vote for candidates for United States Senator shall be an advisory vote for the purpose of ascertaining
the sentiment of the voters of the respective Senatorial and Assembly Districts in the respective parties."
The McCartney amendment of that section of the bill dealing with the nomination of Senators read:
"Amend the bill so as to give an advisory vote by districts on United States Senators."
It will be seen that the Leeds amendment and the McCartney amendment were not remotely, but very closely
related; were, in effect, the same.
[46] A similar example of Pulcifer's trickiness attended the defeat in the Assembly of Boynton's Senate bill
providing for a nonpartisan column on the election ballot for candidates for the Judiciary. The measure had
the backing of the reform element, and passed the Senate with but little opposition. At that time it would have
had even easier sailing in the Assembly. But the machine succeeded in preventing action on the measure In
the Assembly until a few hours before adjournment. In the rush of the close of the session, the measure, it is
alleged, was made subject of pretty vicious trading. But when it came to a showdown thirtyfive votes were
cast for the measure and twentynine against. Six more votes would have passed it. Had there been full
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attendance the bill would have been passed. A call of the House was ordered to compel such attendance, but
was finally discontinued, by Pulcifer, who had voted for the bill, voting for discontinuance, thus tying the
vote. This gave Speaker Stanton an opportunity to end proceedings under the call of the House, by casting the
deciding vote against continuance. Stanton, with Pulcifer's assistance, thus cast what was practically the
deciding vote that killed the bill. Had the call of the House been continued until all the Assemblymen were
brought in, the measure would probably have been passed.
[47] The vote in full was as follows:
For the amendment and against the bill as it had passed the Senate: Barndollar, Beatty, Beban, Black, Butler,
Coghlan, Collier, Collum, Cronin, Cullen, Feeley, Greer, Hammon, Hanlon, Hans, Hawk, Grove L. Johnson,
Johnson of San Diego, Johnston of Contra Costa, Leeds, Lightner, Macauley, McClellan, McManus,
Melrose, Mott, Nelson, O'Neil, Perine, Pugh, Pulcifer, Rech, Rutherford, Schmitt, Stanton, Transue, Wagner,
Wheelan 38.
Against the amendment and for the bill as it passed the Senate: Beardslee, Bohnett, Callan, Cattell, Cogswell,
Costar, Dean, Drew, Flint, Gerdes, Gibbons, Gillis, Griffiths, Hayes, Hewitt, Hinkle, Holmquist, Irwin,
Johnson of Placer, Juilliard, Kehoe, Maher, Mendenhall, Moore, Odom, Otis, Polsley, Preston, Sackett,
Silver, Stuckenbruck, Telfer, Whitney, Wilson, Wyllie, Young 36.
[48] When a bill passed by the Senate is amended in the Assembly the measure goes back to the Senate. If the
Senate concur in the amendments, that settles the matter. But if the Senate refuse to concur, then the bill goes
back to the Assembly, where that body may recede from its amendments or refuse to recede.
If the Assembly recede, the measure goes to the Governor just as it passed the Senate. If the Assembly refuse
to recede, the measure is referred to a conference committee of six, three appointed by the Speaker of the
Assembly and three by the President of the Senate.
The Conference Committee may consider only the amendments adopted by the Assembly. If the Conference
Committee fail to agree, or if either Senate or Assembly reject its report, then the bill goes to a Committee on
Free Conference. The Committee on Free Conference is permitted to make any amendment it sees fit. If its
report be rejected by either Senate or Assembly, the bill gets no further; is dead, without possibility of
resurrection.
Such was the maze of technicality into which LincolnRoosevelt Leaguer Pulcifer threw the Direct Primary
bill when he changed his vote from no to aye on the Leeds amendment.
[49a] The postponements were made from hour to hour. The reform Senators would be informed that the
matter would be taken up at eleven o'clock in the forenoon. At that hour, the machine would postpone
consideration until three o'clock in the afternoon. At three o'clock, further postponement would be ordered
until eight o'clock. At eight o'clock there would be postponement until the next morning. Twentyone votes
were necessary for concurrence in the Assembly Amendments, but a majority of those voting was sufficient
to secure postponement. The machine on this issue controlled twenty votes, one short of enough for
concurrence, but one more than the nineteen controlled by the antimachine element, and hence enough to
postpone from hour to hour consideration of Wolfe's motion.
[49] It is very amusing less than three months later to see those partners of the Direct Primary fight, P. H.
McCarthy and the San Francisco Call, in fierce political conflict at San Francisco.
[50] The resolutions adopted at Palo Alto read: "Resolved, That we note with disapproval the changed
attitude of the San Francisco Call upon the Direct Primary bill, and its attempt to discredit Senator Black and
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other friends of good government in the Legislature."
[51] Senator Black's letter covered the situation fully. It was addressed to the press of the State, and was as
follows: "No decent primary law would have been possible but for the combination of thirteen Republicans
and seven Democrats in the Senate who have stood together throughout this whole fight. Senator Wright and
the 'Call' were powerless in the contest until these twenty Senators got behind them.
"One of the conditions of this combination was a Statewide vote on United States Senator, and the 'Call'
fought with us against Senators Wolfe and Leavitt on this proposition. Immediately after the bill left the
Senate and got into the Assembly the 'Call' began to display a lack of interest in the primary fight. If it had
maintained its attitude in favor of the original bill these amendments never would have been proposed by the
Assembly."
"When the question of concurring in the Assembly amendments comes up, we find the 'Call' and Senator
Wright deserting the men who made the primary fight in the Senate and going over to the camp of the 'push'
politicians, who have always favored the district plan of nominating United States Senators."
"I take issue with the 'Call' when it says: 'As a matter of fact, the whole question of the United States
Senatorship is of little importance to the people of California,' etc."
"The United States Senatorship is the most important office to be filled by the people of California under the
provisions of the proposed Direct Primary law. The socalled district plan for nominating United States
Senators is worse than a makeshift. it provides for no pledge on the part of candidates and would be purely a
straw vote, binding on nobody."
"The stubborn fact remains that the 'Call,' after leading in the fight for an honest Direct Primary law for two
years and a half, has deserted the cause of the people at the most critical moment of the struggle."
"MARSHALL BLACK."
[52] The Star's clever editorial article is worth preserving. It was in full as follows: "There are times, it
appears, when the illness of a statesman is good for the people. We do not desire to wish Senator Stetson any
bad luck, but if his slight indisposition should continue for a few days, or, in lieu of that, if some other solon
of the same faith as regards the Primary bill, can only contract some minor ailment, there will be more joy
than sorrow among the people who want something approaching a real direct primary.
"As explained in The Star's news columns, had Senator Stetson not been ill, a tie vote on the proposition to
concur with the Assembly in amending the primary bill, presumably in the interest of Senator Frank Flint and
generally to machine advantage, would have occurred. And then it's unkind to say such things any person
with a grain of sense would know that Mr. 'Performing' Porter, our honored and distinguished
LieutenantGovernor, would break the tie by casting his vote for the machine.
"The evident intention of Senators who stand for the Wright bill in its original form, which is a start toward a
real direct primary (and that doesn't include Senator Wright, more's the pity) to dodge the possibility of the tie
vote by absenting themselves without leave is regrettable regrettable only because it is necessary. Their
action, with the aim of serving the best interests of the people, is highly honorable compared with the tactics
of the powers that be, even unto the Governor himself, who have been trying every means to club legislators
into line to stand by the 'organization' and defeat the will of the people.
"It's hard to be very sorry just now over Senator Stetson's illness, but he deserves a vote of thanks for
contracting that cold. And another for being on the right side."
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[53] The Weed resolution reads as follows: "Resolved, By the Senate of the State of California, That the
President of the Senate be and he is hereby authorized to instruct the SergeantatArms to Proceed at once to
Palo Alto with a competent physician, to be named by the President of the Senate, for the purpose of
ascertaining whether it is safe for Senator Black to proceed at once to Sacramento, to attend as a member of
the Senate the thirtyeighth session of the California Legislature, and
"Be it further resolved, That in the event that such examination results in disclosing a state of health wherein
it will be safe for Senator Black to be present, then the SergeantatArms shall bring him at once to
Sacramento and, if necessary, to secure an engine and coach for that purpose."
[54] Black's answering telegram was in full as follows: "I beg to inform you (LieutenantGovernor Porter)
and through you the Senate of California that I regard the resolutions adopted last Saturday in reference to my
absence, as discourteous, as a reflection on my honor and integrity and as proposing an infringement on my
privileges and rights as a Senator and citizen. I have, therefore declined to see the persons sent here under that
resolution, and shall continue to decline to see them until my physicians inform me that I can with safety
return to Sacramento.
"Ample evidence of my physical condition has been presented to your representatives by four reputable
physicians, and these physicians have furnished and will furnish evidence of my condition from time to time
as requested by you or by the Senate.
"MARSHALL BLACK."
[55] Dr. Montgomery's $400 report will be found in the appendix.
[56] The schemes resorted to to get Black back to Sacramento are almost beyond belief. It was even intimated
to him that his bills would be held up if he did not return. The following telegram scarcely requires comment:
Sacramento Cal Mch 2009 Hon. Marshall Black,
Palo Alto, Cal.
Your bill to issue bonds for general improvement fund before me. I would like to have you here to explain its
provisions and the necessity for it. 1250Pm J. N. GILLETT.
Chapter XI. Machine Amends Direct Primary Bill[57].
By Trick Prevents Senate From Concurring in Amendments to Correct Clerical and Typographical Errors,
Thus Creating a Situation Which Threw the Measure Into a Committee on Free Conference With Power to
Amend.
It is a very good rule to be sure that your rattlesnake is dead before placing yourself in a position to be bitten.
The reform Senators neglected this rule, with the result that after they had the machine element whipped on
the direct primary issue, they placed themselves in a position where the "performers" struck at them
viciously, and snatched victory from them.
As was shown in a previous chapter, the Direct Primary bill, after it had originally passed the Senate in the
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face of machine opposition, was allowed to go to the Assembly containing several serious clerical and
typographical errors. The Assembly corrected these errors by a series of ten amendments. It was necessary
for the Senate to concur in these amendments to get the bill into proper form. The amendments added in the
Assembly to which the antimachine Senators took exception, were seven in number and dealt principally
with the changing of the method of electing United States Senators, from the plan of Statewide vote, to that
of district, advisory vote. The seven were known as the "vicious amendments"; the ten correcting the
typographical errors were called the "necessary amendments." There is no good reason why the ten necessary
amendments should not have been made before the bill was first sent to the Assembly. But they were not, and
the errors which were thus left in the bill served the machine most advantageously when the final fight came.
After Wolfe had given up hope of compelling the reform Senators to concur in the vicious amendments read
into the bill in the Assembly, his play was to bring about a situation by which the bill would be thrown into a
Committee on Free Conference. The committee would be appointed by President Porter of the Senate, and by
Speaker Stanton of the Assembly. Such a committee would, of course, be in sympathy with machine policies,
and could be counted upon to amend the bill to the machine's liking. There is little doubt that the machine
leaders in the Senate and the machine leaders in the Assembly acted in conjunction in the proceedings which
followed Senator Wolfe's action in abandoning his efforts to force the antimachine Senators to support the
so called vicious Assembly amendments.
Wolfe's first move was to ask as a matter of courtesy that the Senate adopt his motion to reconsider the vote
by which it had the week before refused to concur in the Assembly amendment. This request the reform
element granted, purely as a matter of courtesy. Wolfe then edged up a step nearer.
No sooner had he received the courtesy of reconsideration than both he and Leavitt were to the fore with a
suggestion that the Senate should refuse to concur in all the amendments and let them be threshed out in the
Assembly. The purpose of the two machine leaders was apparent.
Had the Senate concurred in the ten Assembly amendments made necessary to correct typographical errors,
and refused to concur in the seven objectionable amendments, all that would have been necessary would have
been for the Assembly to recede from its objectionable amendments. But if Wolfe could so engineer matters
that the Senate would refuse to concur in all the amendments, then it would be necessary for the Assembly to
recede from all its amendments, including those intended to correct typographical errors, or send the bill to a
conference committee, to be selected by Stanton and Porter. From a Committee on Conference to a
Committee on Free Conference, also to be appointed by Stanton and Porter, and with full power to amend the
bill to its liking, was but a step. The Committee on Free Conference was Wolfe's aim. He eventually got it.
Boynton and Walker were quick to see the trend of Wolfe's requests, however, and Walker moved to vote on
the seven vicious amendments on one roll call, and on the ten correcting the typographical and clerical errors
on a second.
As a substitute Wolfe moved that the seventeen amendments be passed upon under one roll call.
At first Senators Cutten and Stetson apparently could not see the trend of Wolfe's scheming. In the debate
that ensued Wolfe pretended indignation that his motives were being questioned.
There was very good reason for questioning Senator Wolfe's motives, but Cutten and Stetson and even
Walker assured Wolfe that no reflection upon him was intended. What these men should have done was to
have denounced Wolfe right there as a trickster and made no bones about it. But on the absurd assumption
that a member of the State Senate is necessarily a gentleman, the much deserved denunciation did not come.
However, Wolfe's motion did not prevail and the amendments were taken up one by one. Six of the seven
vicious amendments were rejected, the first of the six by a vote of 19 to 20.
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This brought the Senate to the amendments intended to correct typographical and clerical errors. And here the
vote switched. The reformers had up to this time been voting to reject the amendments, because the
amendments were objectionable, while the programmers in the first instance voted for concurrence. But when
it came to amendments intended to correct typographical and clerical errors only, Wolfe and his following,
with the exception of Burnett, who refused to stand for any such dastardly piece of work, voted to refuse to
concur in the amendments, while the antimachine Senators, of course, voted to concur in them.
Burnett, voting with the antimachine element, gave them twenty votes, leaving Wolfe and his following
only nineteen. But twentyone votes were necessary for concurrence. The machine, while it could not force
the Senate to concur in the vicious amendments, could prevent the Senate's concurrence in the amendments to
correct the clerical and typographical errors. The bill was accordingly sent back to the Assembly with the
typographical and clerical amendments still in dispute.
Even before the bill had reached the Assembly, Senator Frank Leavitt and George Van Smith of The Call
were on the floor of that body, fighting to prevent the Assembly receding from its amendments.
When the Assembly grasped the fact that the Senate had refused to concur in the amendments necessary for
correction of typographical errors, those who were working for an effective Direct Primary bill were thrown
into the greatest confusion. Speaker Stanton's rulings which followed, were not calculated to relieve the
situation. Speaking from the desk, Stanton said:
"If you recede from some of these amendments and not from others where will your bill be? It will be dead.
The only thing that you can do to save the Direct Primary bill now is to recede from all the amendments and
let the typographical errors remain in the bill, or refuse to recede from any of the amendments and let the bill
go into conference. If you recede from some of the amendments and not from others, your bill is dead. We
cannot send this bill back to the Senate saying that the Assembly has receded from some of the amendments
and not from others."
Assemblymen Preston, Bohnett and others who were standing for an effective measure, were amazed at the
position which Stanton had taken.
"I cannot for the life of me," said Preston, "see why we cannot recede from part of the amendments and
refuse to recede from the others. Some of these amendments are really necessary for the good of the bill.
Others should be rejected. Give me fifteen minutes and I will guarantee to dig up authorities which will show
us the course to be pursued."
Assemblyman Bohnett confessed himself unable to understand why the Assembly could not send part of the
amendments to conference and not the others.
By this time matters had got so warm in the Assembly that Senator Leavitt found it necessary to lend dignity
to the occasion by taking his seat at the side of Speaker Stanton, whom he engaged in conversation. The
conference was, of course, carried on in whispers.
Assemblymen Young, Bohnett and others, finding that it would be impossible under the assumption of the
Speaker to refuse to recede from part of the amendments while receding from the others, advised the good
government members to refuse to recede from all the amendments, and pass the bill, typographical errors and
all.
It was demanded of Bohnett if this would not lead to the practical defeat of the measure. Bohnett insisted that
it would not; that the typographical errors, while deplorable, did not materially affect the bill.
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However, many of the better element of the Assembly did not dare to take the risk, and the motion to recede
was lost by a vote of 29 to 42[51].
Assemblymen who unquestionably stood for a good bill voted against receding. Had the vicious amendments
alone been under consideration, they would have voted to recede. Among these were such men as
Assemblyman Drew of Fresno. The Assembly, having refused to recede from its amendments, the bill went
to a Committee on Conference, appointed by Speaker Stanton and President Porter. The machine had gained
its point.
The Conference Committee consisted of Senators Wolfe, Leavitt and Wright, and Assemblymen Leeds,
Johnson of Sacramento, and Hewitt. Of the Committee, Hewitt[59] was the only member who favored a
Statewide vote for United States Senator, and opposed the advisory district vote. The committee had scarcely
been missed from Senate and Assembly chambers before it was back to report that no agreement could be
reached.
The same members were thereupon appointed as a Committee on Free Conference, which gave them power
to amend the bill. As a Committee on Free Conference they recommended the advisory district vote plan for
the nomination of United States Senators[60].
Senator Wolfe, having got the bill in shape to his liking, with a suave smirk upon his face, stated that he
trusted that all the Senators present would vote for the measure.
"Not on your life," came Caminetti's protest.
And Caminetti did not vote for the Free Conference Committee's report.
But in spite of Caminetti's protest, both Senate and Assembly adopted the Conference Committee's report.
They had to do so or defeat the bill entirely. Caminetti was the only Senator who voted against it. The
machine, after a fight of nearly two months, in which it was twice defeated in the Senate, and escaped defeat
in the Assembly by only one vote, that of Pulcifer, had carried its point, had succeeded in denying the people
of California the privilege of casting a practical, Statewide vote for United States Senators.
What the antimachine Senators[61] thought of the outcome is best expressed in the little speech which
Senator Stetson made his fellowSenators in explaining his vote to accept the report of the Committee on
Free Conference.
"Before voting on this matter," said Stetson, "lest any one in the future may think that I have been passed
something and didn't know it, I wish to explain my vote, and wish to say that this permission accorded a
candidate to go on record to support that candidate for United States Senate, who shall have the endorsement
of the greatest number of districts, comes from nobody and goes to nobody. It means nothing mere words
idle words. The only way in which a candidate could have been pledged would have been to provide a pledge
or instructions to the Legislature. The words 'shall be permitted' mean nothing and get nowhere. I shall vote
for this report, not because I want to, but because I have to if we are at this session to have any Direct
Primary law at all."
[57] The plain citizen will marvel at the lengths to which the machine went to prevent a provision being
incorporated into the Direct Primary bill for the selection by Statewide vote of United States Senators. The
plain citizen does not, however, look upon a United States Senator through the same eyes as the machine. To
the plain citizen that United States Senator is desirable who represents policies beneficial to his country and
his State; to the machine that United States Senator is desirable who will in effect turn his Federal patronage
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over to the machine. The election of United States Senators by Statewide vote would take their appointment
out of machine hands, which would mean loss to the machine of Federal patronage. For this reason the almost
unbelievable lengths to which the machine went to prevent the provision for Statewide vote for the election
of United States Senators being incorporated into the Direct Primary bill.
[58] The vote was as follows:
Ayes: Messrs. Bohnett, Callan, Cattell, Cogswell, Collum, Costar, Flavelle, Gerdes, Gibbons, Gillis, Hinkle,
Holmquist, Irwin, Johnson of Placer, Juilliard, Kehoe, Maher, Mendenhall, Odom, Otis, Polsley, Preston,
Sackett, Stuckenbruck, Telfer, Whitney, Wilson, Wyllie and Young 29.
Noes: Messrs. Barndollar, Beardslee, Beatty, Beban, Black, Butler, Coghlan, Collier, Cronin, Cullen, Drew,
Feeley, Fleisher, Flint, Greer, Griffiths, Hammon, Hanlon, Hans, Hawk, Hewitt, Johnson of Sacramento,
Johnson of San Diego, Leeds, Macauley, McClelland, McManus, Melrose, Moore, Mott, Nelson, Perine,
Pugh, Pulcifer, Rech, Rutherford, Schmitt, Silver, Stanton, Transue, Wagner, Wheelan 42.
[59] Hewitt voted against the amendments the day they were read into the bill.
[60] The Free Conference Committee's amendment was in full as follows:
"By nominating petitions signed and filed as provided by existing laws party candidates for the office of
United States Senator shall have their names placed on the official primary election ballots of their respective
parties, in the manner herein provided for State offices, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE VOTE FOR
CANDIDATES FOR UNITED STATES SENATORS SHALL BE AN ADVISORY VOTE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING THE SENTIMENT OF THE VOTERS IN THE RESPECTIVE
SENATORIAL AND ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS IN THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, and the Senatorial and
Assembly nominees shall be at liberty to vote either for the choice of such district expressed at said primary
election, or for the candidate for United States Senator who shall have received the endorsement of such
primary election in the greater number of districts electing members of his party to the Legislature."
[61] Stetson was not the only Senator to protest. Senators Campbell, Holohan and Miller sent to the
Secretary's desk the following explanation of their votes: "We voted for the Direct Primary bill because it
seems to be the best law that can be obtained under existing political conditions. We are opposed to many of
the features of this bill, and believe that the people at the first opportunity will instruct their representatives in
the Legislature to radically amend the same in many particulars, notably in regard to the election of United
States Senators, and the provisions that prevent the endorsement of a candidate by a political party or
organization other than the one that first nominated such candidate."
A second protest, signed by Senators Curtin, Cartwright and Sanford, was also printed in the Journal. It reads
as follows: "We voted to adopt the report of the Committee on Free Conference on Senate Bill No. 3, not
because we believe it to be what is desired by the people of this State, but because we believe it to be the only
bill that can be adopted at this late hour, as the Legislature is about to adjourn."
Chapter XII. The Railroad Regulation Issue.
Recent Increase in Freight Tariff Had Brought About a Condition Which Required Action Senate Divided
Into Supporters of an Effective and Supporters of an Ineffective Measure Manipulation by Which Measures
Were Placed in Hands of a MachineControlled Committee.
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Some one has very well said that the real test of a Legislature is its action on railroad measures. The
Legislature of 1909, if estimated by this standard would not appear to advantage. But to condemn the
Legislature of 1909 for its failure to give the State an effective railroad regulation law, is to condemn every
Legislature that has sat in California since the present State Constitution went into effect thirty years ago. The
Constitution empowers the Legislature to pass effective railroad regulation measures, but up to the session of
1909, the machine, or system, or organization one name is as fragrant as another had prevented the
passage, if we exclude the ineffective Act of 1880, of any railroad regulation law at all. The machine has ever
moved against the interests of the people and in the interest of its dominating factor and at the same time its
chief beneficiary, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. It has so manipulated the nomination and election
of Railroad Commissioners as to keep in that office men utterly dominated by railroad influences.
With weak and corrupt men as Railroad Commissioners, and machinedominated Legislatures which have
neglected to pass laws which would have made the Commission effective, or even provide funds for the
Commission to carry on its work, even had the Commissioners been so inclined, California has been left
helpless to oppose any extortion which the railroad might see fit to exact. The system of charging all that the
traffic will bear has governed utterly. For this the Southern Pacific Company can thank, and the People of
California condemn, the machine.
The cost to the people has been enormous. It was pretty conclusively shown at the Legislative investigation
into the cause of recent advance of freight rates, that upwards of $10,000,000[62] a year has in this one
instance been added to the freight charges exacted from the people of the Pacific Coast. The added burden
falls upon the Pacific Coast manufacturer, merchant, farmer, fruit grower, consumer. All from the highest to
the lowest help pay the tribute. Thirty years is a long period, and the arm of the railroad tributetaker
farreaching. The vast sums which, unrestricted, the Southern Pacific has been able to exact run into
enormous totals. From a dollar and cent standpoint, it has paid the Southern Pacific Company to control the
machine.
But the railroad's absolute domination of the State could not continue forever without protest that would
eventually force a hearing. This protest came toward the close of 1908. The increase in freight rates made just
before the Legislature of 1909 convened emphasized the necessity for the enactment of a law that should
galvanize the Railroad Commission into activity; ensure the enforcement of constitutional provisions for the
protection of the public against dominant transportation companies; in a word, provide effective railroad
regulation.
Governor Gillett in his biennial message to the Legislature, and Attorney General Webb in his biennial report
gave expression to this aroused public sentiment.
General Webb, after reviewing railroad conditions in California, on page 13 of his report says: "It is thus
apparent that the shippers of the State are practically helpless."
"I believe," continues the Attorney General, "that this review of the situation will show the imperative
necessity of prompt legislation on this subject, and under the Constitution of this State, the Legislature has
ample authority to enact the required legislation."
Governor Gillett, in his biennial message, takes practically the same stand as does Attorney General Webb.
"Our State," says the Governor on page 12 of his message, "has not kept pace with the majority of the States
of the Union in the enactment of laws regulating railroads in their business as common carriers."
"I can virtually promise you," said General Webb at a meeting of the Senate Committee on Corporations,
held on the evening of January 25th, "that in the event of this (the Stetson Railroad Regulation bill) becoming
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a law, and the Railroad Commission refusing or neglecting to act under its provisions, the Governor will call
the Legislature together in extraordinary session for their impeachment."[63]
There was no question of the aroused public sentiment in favor of the passage of a railroad regulation
measure. Even before the Legislature convened it became evident that some sort of a measure would have to
be passed; even the railroad lobby saw that. The Legislature accordingly divided on the question. As the fight
was carried on in the Senate the Assembly in the rush of the closing hours of the session merely putting its
"O. K." on what the Senate had done the division in the Senate alone will be considered. The division in
that body was:
(1) The minority, made up of the out and out machine Republicans and Democrats, who were prepared to
pass a measure which under the name railroad regulation would leave the railroads practically independent of
effective State supervision.
(2) The majority, which stood for the passage of an effective law.
The minority had the best captains in the Senate and was backed by the machine lobby made up principally of
Southern Pacific attorneys.
The majority was poor in generals. But it had the backing of the shippers of the State, who sent able
counsel to Sacramento to present the shippers' side.
And in the end the machine minority wore out and defeated the majority. A comparatively effective railroad
regulation bill was rejected and an ineffective measure passed.
Three railroad regulation measures were introduced in the Senate, their authors being Campbell, Stetson, and
Wright.
The Campbell bill had much to commend it, but was rejected without much consideration by either side.
Campbell was not in the program of either railroad or shippers. But before the session was over Campbell had
made himself felt. He had, too, introduced a Constitutional Amendment for the correction of railroad abuses,
which was to figure later on, but his bill was scarcely considered. The attorney for the shippers, in speaking
before the Senate Committee on Corporations, confessed that he had not read the Campbell bill.
The attorney for the Southern Pacific Company, however, attempted to split the antimachine forces by
praising the Campbell bill, and setting the antimachine Senators to disputing over the relative merits of the
Campbell and Stetson bills. But nothing came of this graceful little coup. Campbell and his followers were
too sensible to be caught by any such trickery. They gave their loyal support to the Stetson bill, and the
Campbell bill was allowed to die in the Senate Judiciary Committee. This narrowed the fight down to the
Stetson bill and the Wright bill.
The Stetson bill had been prepared in the office of Attorney General Webb, and at the instigation of Governor
Gillett. As originally introduced it contained certain defects, which were afterwards corrected, but such
Senators as Cutten, Caminetti, Black, Campbell, Miller, Cartwright, Bell and Thompson, admitted that the
measure could be made the basis of as effective a law as could be prepared under the present constitutional
provisions for the regulation of transportation companies.
The original measure was particularly weak in the section providing for demurrage charges. This was finally
corrected by the passage of a separate reciprocal demurrage bill, which had been introduced by Miller.
Another weakness in the Stetson bill as originally introduced was that the Railroad Commission was made a
sort of barrier between the Courts and those who had grievances against the transportation companies. This
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objection was corrected by amendments.
Numerous other amendments adopted from time to time made the Stetson bill probably as effective as a
California railroad regulation law can be made, under the Constitutional provision which places extraordinary
powers in the hands of the State Board of Railroad Commissioners.
Just where the Wright bill originated nobody seems to know for certainty. But Senator Wright introduced it.
Senator Wright was well selected for the job. For two years he had been groomed as the reformer who would
introduce the Statesaving Direct Primary Bill. So a railroad regulation measure introduced by Senator
Wright might at least be calculated to bear the stamp of respectability.
Like the Stetson bill, the Wright bill was based on the constitutional provisions which make the State Board
of Railroad Commissioners the center of railroad regulation in California. And here the parallel ends.
Comparison of the two measures is not at all to the advantage of the Wright bill.
The Stetson bill provided fine and imprisonment as penalty for infringement of its provisions; the Wright bill
provided fine only.
The Stetson bill had a definite antipass provision; the Wright bill as originally introduced had no such
provision.
The Stetson bill authorized not only the AttorneyGeneral, but the District Attorney of any county of the
State to proceed to enforce its provisions; the Wright bill granted the AttorneyGeneral alone such authority.
The Stetson bill required the Railroad Commissioners to meet at least once in every two weeks; the Wright
bill provided that such meetings should be held monthly.
The Stetson bill gave the Railroad Commissioners authority to make physical valuation of railroad properties;
the Wright bill contained no such provision.
The Stetson bill recognized all discriminations to be unjust; the Wright bill provided that no interference
should be instituted unless the discriminations complained of were shown to be unjust.
And finally, the Stetson bill provided that the State Board of Railroad Commissioners should have power to
fix absolute rates, thus insuring stability of rate schedules, while the Wright bill provided that the
Commissioners should fix maximum rates only, thus permitting the famous "fluidity" of schedules advocated
by machine lobby and Southern Pacific attorneys.
The contest between the supporters of the Wright and the supporters of the Stetson bill, finally narrowed
down to the question of providing for absolute or maximum rates.
The provision for the maximum rate in Senator Wright's bill, authorized the railroad regulating Commission
to fix the highest charge which a railroad may exact from a shipper. This is called the maximum rate. The
transportation company is authorized to lower the rate at will, but it cannot charge a rate beyond the
maximum as fixed by the Commission. This leaves the railroads to fix a sliding schedule of rates, so long as
they do not exceed the maximum. It gives the railroads the advantage of that "fluidity" of schedules, which
railroad attorneys insist is necessary for railroad prosperity.
The maximum rate is provided in the Interstate Commerce Act, but the Interstate Commerce Commissioners,
finding it impracticable, have for years been clamoring for Congress to authorize the fixing of absolute rates.
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The cry of the Interstate Commerce Commission has been taken up by the shipping interests, and from one
end of the country to the other there is growing demand that authority be placed somewhere to make railroad
rates, when fixed by a regulating Commission, absolute.
The absolute rate, or the fixed rate as it is better called, which was provided in the Stetson bill, can neither be
lowered nor raised by the railroads. Once fixed by the regulating Commission, it must remain until the
Commission grants permission for its change. The railroads cannot lower it any more than they can raise it.
The advantages of the absolute rate are many. In the first place, where the absolute rate is established, there
can be no discrimination, because the rate is known, it can neither be raised nor lowered, and the railroads
have no opportunity to favor one shipper at the expense of another.
In the second place, the shipper is guaranteed a stability of rate schedules which is deemed necessary for
settled business conditions. The merchant, for example, includes transportation charges in the cost price of
the goods in which he deals. But if the transportation charges on the same class of goods are subject to
frequent change, the merchant can never tell when his competitor is to be given the advantage of a sudden
lowering in freight rates. This uncertainty unsettles business. The merchant holds that transportation rates
should be just as stable as tariff rates. On this account, the merchant advocates fixed rates and stability of
schedules as against maximum rates and constantly shifting schedules.
The supporters of the Stetson bill, then, backed the shipping and merchant classes; while the supporters of the
Wright bill backed the contentions of the transportation companies.
The Campbell and the Stetson bills had been originally referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, while the
Wright bill had been referred to the Senate Committee on Corporations. For the first few weeks of the
session, no particular note had been taken of the Wright bill, attention being centered on the amendment of
the Stetson bill.
Things were going swimmingly with the Stetson bill, when the machine lobby awoke to the fact that
something was wrong in the Senate. There was at least some indication that the Senate would pass an
effective railroad regulation measure.
And then, before the advocates of the Stetson measure could tell exactly what was happening, the railroad
regulation measures were taken from the Judiciary Committee and placed in the hands of the Committee on
Corporations.
A glance at the personnel of the two Committees at least suggests why this was done.
The members of the Judiciary Committee were Willis, Wolfe, Wright, McCartney, Savage, Boynton,
Anthony, Burnett, Cutten, Estudillo, Martinelli, Roseberry, Stetson, Thompson, Curtin, Cartwright,
Caminetti, Miller, Campbell.
The nine Senators whose names are printed in Italics, when the issue came to vote on the floor of the Senate,
voted against the Stetson bill and for the Wright bill; nine of the ten whose names are printed in ordinary
letters voted for the Stetson bill and against the Wright bill. The tenth, Roseberry, was absent, but when he
found that the vote had been taken, stated that had he been present he would have voted for the Stetson bill
and against the Wright bill.
Furthermore, Estudillo, who finally voted for the Wright bill, did not approve the measure and voted for it
because he feared the absolute rate feature of the Stetson bill to be unconstitutional.
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Thus at the time the Stetson and the Campbell bills were taken from the Judiciary Committee, the Committee
was regarded as standing:
For the Wright bill 8.
Against the Wright bill 11.
For the Stetson bill 11.
Against the Stetson bill 8.
It was certainly not in the interest of the Stetson bill that the measure was taken from the Judiciary
Committee and sent to the Committee on Corporations.
A glance at the personnel of the Committee on Corporations reveals a significant state of affairs. The
Committee consisted of the following Senators: Bates, Welch, Wright, McCartney, Burnett, Bills, Walker,
Roseberry, Finn, Miller, Kennedy.
When the test came on the floor of the Senate, the nine of the eleven Senators whose names are printed in
italics voted for the Wright bill and against the Stetson bill. The two members whose names are printed in
ordinary letters, voted for the Stetson bill, and against the Wright bill.
The lineup of the Committee on Corporations, when the measures were taken from the Judiciary Committee
and sent to the Committee on Corporations, was then:
For the Wright Bill 9.
Against the Wright Bill 2.
For the Stetson Bill 2.
Against the Stetson Bill 9.
The change was certainly not made in the interest of the Stetson bill.
The incident stirred up Campbell and other antimachine Senators to the fighting pitch. An arrangement was
made, however, by which the measures were to be sent back to the Judiciary Committee after the Committee
on Corporations got through with them that the Judiciary Committee might pass upon their constitutionality.
The arrangement had two effects it silenced the unquieting protest of the antimachine Senators, and it
delayed consideration of the bills. But, as the sequel showed, the arrangement did not help the Stetson bill in
the least.
[62] The testimony was that of George J. Bradley, traffic manager of the Merchants' and Manufacturers'
Traffic Association of Sacramento. It was as follows:
It is estimated on conservative figures that the increase in eastbound California products, or Pacific Coast
products, I should correctly say, which is composed of canned fruits, canned vegetables and canned salmon,
of which there are several million cases, go from the North Pacific coast through either San Francisco or
through the North Pacific coast, the minimum being forty thousand pounds to the car, and the increase being
ten cents per hundred pounds, means forty dollars a car increase. Now, taking the number of cars of all those
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products that are shipped, it amounted to about and leather and other products it amounted to about four
million dollars eastbound. Now, when the question of westbound comes out, of course, it is practically
impossible for any man to say just exactly what that increase will mean in dollars and cents, and the only
way, therefore, to arrive at it is to take the percentage of proportion now in their westbound tariff, which is
composed of about between eight hundred and a thousand items. They have raised the rates from 10 to 25
cents on over two hundred articles, all of which move in quantities; in other words, the process by which the
tariff has been amended has been that in every instance where there was a commodity moving in quantities
the rate has been advanced; wherever there was no movement and they wished to encourage a movement,
they reduced the rate. Now, you take the five transcontinental lines that operate on the Pacific Coast, namely,
the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern on the north and the Canadian Pacific; the Southern Pacific and
the Santa Fe and the San Pedro and Los Angeles on the south, give you six trunk lines operating on the
Pacific Coast. If you will take their gross earnings, which amount to over four hundred millions, segregate
that by allowing fifty per cent of that to passenger service, which is a very conservative estimate, because the
passenger service does not amount to that, leaves two hundred million dollars of gross freight earnings. Take
five per cent of that for terminal business, and business is based on terminal rates from the coast, plus the
local back, because the rate, of course, is felt everywhere, the rates to the interior points are made on the
terminal rate, plus the local back. Take five per cent of that and their increase in every instance has been 10
per cent, and in some cases 16 2/3 and 20 per cent; but take a very liberal conservative estimate and put it at
five per cent and you have ten million dollars; now, split that in two and take two and a half per cent of it and
you have got five millions of dollars. Now, that and your four million dollars on eastbound freight and you
have nine millions of dollars increase in freight rates, and I believe that that is a conservative estimate. I don't
see how you could get at it any closer, because every man, it doesn't make any difference where he is, every
man that buys pays that ten to twenty per cent increase.
[63] Senator Caminetti on February 12 introduced a concurrent resolution calling for the removal of the
present Board of Railroad Commissioners from office. The Committee on Corporations reported adversely,
and on March 15th the resolution was finally rejected.
Chapter XIII. Machine Defeats the Stetson Bill.
Southern Pacific Attorney Succeeds in Clouding the Issue Railroad Claquers Active in Advocating the
Maximum Rate, Which Was Designated as Little Better Than No Rate At All No Fight Over the Bill in the
Assembly.
Having succeeded in transferring the railroad regulation measures from the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
majority of whose members were antimachine, to the Committee on Corporations, the majority of whose
members were machine, the machine proceeded to discredit the Stetson bill, by making it appear that the
State Constitution by implication prohibits the fixing of absolute railroad rates, and provides that the Railroad
Commissioners may fix maximum rates only. Peter F. Dunne was brought to Sacramento to make this
argument before the Senate Committee on Corporations.
Dunne, in his address, showed greater ability than integrity. When he had finished, even the antimachine
members of the Committee were completely befuddled. Walker, one of the members of the Committee who
is not a lawyer, groped in utter darkness thereafter, until he finally stumbled into the arms of Eddie Wolfe and
Frank Leavitt and Jere Burke, when the final vote on the railroad bills was taken. It was Walker's only
stumble of the session. But for his unfortunate vote against the Stetson bill and for the Wright bill, Walker
would have made an exceptionally clean record.
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Not only did Dunne befog the lay Senators of the Committee, he shook the faith of men like Miller and
Roseberry both lawyers on the constitutionality of the absolute rate. Miller recognizes that the absolute
rate is the only practical rate; but until the end of the session he was not prepared to say that it could be
constitutionally established. Dunne certainly did a good job. To be sure, his address was a mass of
misrepresentations, but of misrepresentations cunningly put. He shattered the implicit faith of the
antimachine Senators in the absolute rate. And that was what he had been sent to Sacramento to do. The evil
that Dunne did lived long after he had left the capital.
Curiously enough, neither the term "absolute rate" nor "maximum rate" appears in the State Constitution.
Article XII, Section 22, of the Constitution, provides that the Railroad Commissioners "shall have the power
and it shall be their duty to establish rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight by
railroad or other transportation companies."
Further on in the same section, it is provided that "any railroad corporation or transportation company which
shall fail or refuse to conform to such rates as shall be established by such Commissioners, or shall charge
rates in excess thereof, * * * shall be fined not exceeding $20,000 for each offense."
The dispute between those who stood for maximum rates that is to say, the members of the machine lobby,
the machine Senators, the Southern Pacific attorneys and those who wanted absolute rates namely, the
antimachine Senators and the attorneys representing large shipping interests waxed hot over the words in
the above quotation which are printed in Italics.
The advocates of the absolute rate held, with at least apparent reason, that the words "fail to conform to such
rates" mean just what the dictionaries say they do: That the railroad charging a rate in excess of that fixed by
the Railroad Commissioners, or a rate less than that fixed by the Commissioners, is not conforming to the
rates. Such, at least, seems reasonable construction of a very simple phrase.
But not so, insisted the railroad lobby. That aggregation of patriots skimmed over the words "fail to conform
to such rates," and saw only, "or shall charge in excess thereof." Inasmuch, the prorailroad element held, as
the Constitution says that the railroads shall not charge in excess of the rates fixed by the Railroad
Commissioners, the railroads are at liberty to reduce the rates as fixed by the Commissioners at will. In other
words, according to the prorailroad element, the Constitution authorizes the fixing of maximum rates only.
The prorailroad claquers even went so far as to claim that the Supreme Court has decided that the maximum
rate is the only rate that can be fixed under the State Constitution. They referred the doubtful to the notorious
decision in the Fresno passenger rate case known as the Edson decision.
But no question of maximum rates was involved in the Edson case. To be sure, Chief Justice Beatty took
occasion to say in his opinion in that case that his understanding had been that the State Constitution provides
for the maximum rate. But this had no place in the decision, was purely dictum, and is so regarded.
AttorneyGeneral Webb has an ingenious but very plausible explanation of Judge Beatty's muchdiscussed
observation. General Webb points out that previous to the adoption of the present State Constitution 1879
Justice Beatty had been engaged in the active practice of the law in this State. Up to the time of the adoption
of the Constitution of 1879 the maximum rate had prevailed in California. About that time, Judge Beatty
went to Nevada and was absent from the State for several years. Returning to California, after the State
Constitution had been adopted, Judge Beatty found no case in which the duties of the Railroad
Commissioners had been involved, until the Edson case came up.
"I am of the opinion," said General Webb in discussing this point, "that when the Chief justice spoke of the
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maximum rate in the Edson case he was governed by mental impressions received previous to 1879, when the
maximum rate was indeed the rule in California."
All this was a very pretty theory. To the commonsense mind "conform to the rates fixed" might mean
conform to them; the normal man might be unable to dig out of the Constitution any prohibition of absolute
rates. But the confusion caused by the raising of the question got the Stetson bill very much in the air.
During all the discussion, however, the Wright bill was not considered at all. Nobody was thinking of the
Wright bill that is to say, nobody outside of those scheming for its passage. Like a mongrel duck's egg
under a respectable hen, it was left to incubate undisturbed, to surprise everybody at the hatching.
Finding themselves unable to clear away the doubt which raising the question of the constitutionality of the
absolute rate had created, the antimachine Senators and the attorneys of the shippers finally, after the Wright
bill had been forced into prominence, put the case something like this:
"If the Courts decide that the maximum rate only is constitutional, then the Wright bill, which provides for
the maximum rate, will be constitutional, and the greater part of the Stetson bill will also be constitutional.
"But if the Courts decide that an absolute rate is the only rate justified under the Constitution, then the Wright
bill will be unconstitutional and all the Stetson bill constitutional."
This somewhat loose argument unquestionably kept certain Senators who recognized the impracticability of
the maximum rate, but feared for the constitutionality of the absolute rate, in line for the Stetson bill.
With the situation thus confused, all was in readiness to bring the Wright bill before the public. This was
done on February 17th. Up to that date the writer honestly believes that not two minutes had been devoted to
public discussion of this measure, although the Stetson bill had been discussed paragraph by paragraph, line
by line, every word weighed carefully.
The ceremony of giving the Wright bill prominence took place behind the closed doors of an executive
session of the Senate Committee on Corporations. These executive sessions, by the way, are seldom held
when the best interests of the public are to be conserved. The proceedings were evidently prearranged.
Senator Wright opened by moving that the policy of the Committee should be that the Railroad Regulation
measure to receive favorable consideration from the Committee must provide for the maximum rate.
The vote was as prompt as it was decisive. Senator Wright's motion carried by a vote of 7 to 3. The vote was
as follows:
For the maximum rate Bates, Welch, Wright, McCartney, Bills, Finn, Kennedy.
Against the maximum rate Walker, Roseberry, Miller.
Burnett, the eleventh member of the Committee, was absent.
Gradually it dawned upon Walker, Miller and Roseberry that this meant the favorable recommendation of the
Wright bill. The next moment that fact was hammered into them by the Committee deciding by the same
vote, 7 to 3, to recommend that the Stetson bill do not pass; and that the Wright bill do pass.
The machine had won the opening skirmish in the railroad regulation controversy. Incidentally it had come
out in the open squarely for the Wright bill. From that moment the machine Senators labored openly for the
passage of the measure. However, the machine was not yet out of the woods with its Railroad Regulation bill.
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The Senate Judiciary Committee had still to pass upon it, and the majority of the Judiciary Committee was
antimachine.
Wright followed the same course in the Judiciary Committee as he had taken in the Committee on
Corporations, namely, moved that it be the sense of the Committee that the Railroad Regulation bill to be
favorably considered by the Committee should provide for the maximum rate.
Wright's motion was, however, lost by a vote of 8 to 10. The Committee not only rejected the maximum rate,
but endorsed the absolute rate, thus reversing the Committee on Corporations. The vote by which this was
done was as follows:
Against the maximum rate, against the Wright bill and for the Stetson bill Campbell, Cutten, Miller,
Stetson, Thompson, Caminetti, Boynton, Roseberry, Curtin and Cartwright 10.
For the maximum rate, for the Wright bill and against the Stetson bill Anthony, Martinelli, McCartney,
Wright, Willis, Wolfe, Burnett and Estudillo 8.
Absent Savage 1.
Thus the Stetson bill after two months of machine effort against it, went to the floor of the Senate from the
Judiciary Committee with the recommendation that it "do pass." Of the forty Senators, nineteen were
lawyers, and every one of the nineteen was a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Thus the majority
of the lawyers of the Senate, in spite of the confusion which the machine claquers had created, were willing
to take their chances on the constitutionality of the Stetson bill.
But in fairness it must be admitted that members of the Judiciary Committee who voted for the absolute rate
provision of the Stetson bill were still in the befuddled condition in which Peter F. Dunne's sophistry had left
them. Senator Miller, for example, in explaining his vote for the absolute rate, said:
"I take this stand, not that I am convinced that the Supreme Court will decide the absolute rate to be
constitutional; I fear that it may not. But the maximum rate is little better than no rate at all. I wish the
absolute rate provided in this bill, that the Supreme Court may be given opportunity to pass upon it."
Senator Roseberry, who voted for the absolute rate, confessed himself as much at sea as was Senator Miller.
Senator Estudillo, who voted for the maximum rate, insisted that he had not been able to make up his mind
which should be adopted.
On the other hand, Senator Cutten, himself a lawyer and a close student of the legal questions involved, stated
that while he had thought originally that the maximum rate is the only constitutional rate that can be fixed, he
had been forced to come to the conclusion that the absolute rate alone is constitutional.
But in the end the Wright bill and not the Stetson bill passed the Senate. It passed after a day of debate in
which the issue became clouded, if anything, worse than at any stage of the proceedings. Leavitt and Wolfe,
with Wright chipping in with a metoo word now and then, led the debate in favor of the Wright bill.
Senators Stetson, Boynton, Cutten, Roseberry and Miller led the fight for the Stetson bill. Significant enough
was the fact that the lineup of Senate leaders was precisely the same as that in the fight which the machine
carried on against the Direct Primary bill.
Miller's argument in favor of the Stetson bill showed the confusion under which the advocates of effective
railroad regulation were laboring:
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"If we adopt the Wright bill," said Miller, "the railroads will be satisfied and never dispute it in the Courts.
Whereas, by the adoption of the Stetson bill the railroads will almost be compelled to appeal to the Courts,
and then we shall have a quick decision on the question in which we are all interested. If the Courts sustain
the Stetson bill, we shall have a law that will do all we want for the present."[64]
The debate on the measures was on a motion by Stetson that the Stetson bill be substituted for the Wright bill.
In this Stetson made a serious mistake. He staked his whole bill on one issue, that of absolute or maximum
rates. On all other points, the Stetson bill was better than the Wright bill. It was a mistake in policy for
Stetson to stake the fate of his measure on a single issue.
Stetson's motion was lost by a vote of 16 to 22; the Stetson bill was accordingly not substituted for the Wright
bill, and the Wright bill, which had come from the Judiciary Committee with a minority report back of it,
went to third reading and final passage.
The vote by which Stetson's motion was defeated, was as follows:
To substitute the Stetson bill for the Wright bill Bell, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Caminetti, Campbell,
Cartwright, Curtin, Cutten, Holohan, Lewis, Miller, Sanford, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson 16.
Against substituting the Stetson bill for the Wright bill Anthony, Bates, Bills, Burnett, Estudillo, Finn,
Hare, Hartman, Hurd, Kennedy, Leavitt, Martinelli, McCartney, Price, Reily, Savage, Walker, Weed, Welch,
Willis, Wolfe, Wright 22.
Senators Roseberry and Rush were absent from the room when the vote was taken but both were for the
Stetson bill, which would have made the vote 22 to 18 in favor of the Wright bill.
The twenty Senators whose names are printed in Italics are the twenty who voted with Leavitt and Wolfe to
maintain the deadlock on the Direct Primary bill that the measure might be so amended that the electors of
California would be denied a practical, Statewide vote for United States Senators. But one of the twenty,
Lewis, voted for the Stetson bill, while nineteen of them voted for the Wright bill.
On the other hand, only three of the Senators, Estudillo, Anthony and Walker, who stood out for an honest
Direct Primary law, voted against the Stetson bill and for the Wright bill. Walker had supported the Stetson
bill in the Committee on Corporations, but stumbled into the machine ranks when it came to final vote. Had
the antimachine had an organization, such as the machine Democrats and Republicans maintained, Walker's
blunder could have been prevented. Probably, too, Estudillo and Anthony would have remained with the
antimachine forces[65]. This would have given the Stetson bill twentyone votes, and assured its passage.
Another vote that should have been saved to the reformers was that of Burnett. Burnett was clearly tricked
into voting for the Wright bill. When the Stetson bill received the favorable recommendation of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, machine claquers filled the air with the indefinite promise that in the event of the
Wright bill becoming a law, a constitutional amendment would be adopted, by which all ambiguity in the
State Constitution on the question of maximum and absolute rates would be removed. The amendment was
then pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which finally reported it favorably.
After the Wright bill had been passed, the amendment was defeated by machine votes, as will be shown in the
next chapter.
In the closing days of the session, when Burnett was urging that steps be taken for investigation into the
increase of freight rates, he called attention to the fate of that railroadregulation amendment.
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"I was led to vote as I did for the Railroad Regulation bill," he said, "on the understanding that that
constitutional amendment would be adopted. As you know, it was defeated. My attitude on the regulation bill
would have been very different had I known that the amendment was to be rejected."
The Wright bill met with practically no opposition in the Assembly, being rushed through the Lower House
in the closing hours of the session. Had the Stetson bill passed the Senate, the machine would have tried to
block and amend it in the Assembly as was done with the Direct Primary bill, but the measure would
probably have been passed.
Had the antimachine forces in the Senate been organized, the Stetson, and not the Wright bill, would have
passed that body. Without organization, or even definite policy, in the face of organized machine opposition,
it is astonishing and at the same time most encouraging that eighteen of the forty Senators stood by the
Stetson bill to the end.
[64] The question to which Senator Miller referred was: Has the Legislature power under the Constitution to
authorize the Railroad Commissioners to fix the absolute rate? a question upon which the machine does not
propose the Supreme Court shall be required to pass.
[65] Walker and Estudillo were bitterly condemned for their vote for the Wright bill. Incidentally, the writer
has been roundly criticized for offering the excuse in their behalf that these two men indicated by their
attitude on other measures throughout the session that they would have continued with the reform element in
the matter of railroad regulation, had the antimachine Senators been organized to give effective resistance to
the machine. Perhaps the sanest of this criticism, certainly the most reasonable, is from a gentleman who was
a close observer of the work of the session. He says:
"The course of the railroad rate bill from my point of view looked somewhat different in many details, at any
rate, from your account of it. I cannot bring myself to think that it was defeated by any chance at the hands of
a friendly Legislature. I think that what chances there were were mostly added to the number of votes the bill
got and that the attitude of men like Walker and Estudillo on that bill was fundamental and to have been
expected from the start. Of course what you say about the woeful lack of organization amongst the individual
men was only too apparent. That phenomenon reaches back still deeper and is based upon the quality of
human nature which exerts itself more persistently and more energetically and with soldierlike rhythm of
compact organization when private selfish interests are involved, than when the general interest and
somewhat vague uncentered end of public welfare is concerned."
But in spite of this very reasonable view, from a very reasonable gentleman, the fact remains that in the
Committee on Corporations, Walker stood out against the machine on this very issue, and that in the direct
primary fight both Walker and Estudillo stood out against the machine to the end. Had the antimachine
element been organized, the Stetson bill and not the Wright bill would in all probability have been passed.
Chapter XIV. Railroad Measures.
Constitutional Amendment to Clear the Way for an Effective Railroad Regulation Bill Defeated Rate
Investigation Delayed Until Too Late for Effectiveness Resolution to Continue Investigation Defeated
Reciprocal Demurrage Bill Becomes a Law "Error" in the Full Crew Bill.
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The antimachine members of the Legislature had not proceeded far in their efforts to pass an effective
railroad regulation law, before they became convinced that at best only a makeshift measure is possible,
until certain alleged ambiguities of those sections of the State Constitution prescribing the powers and duties
of the State Board of Railroad Commissioners have been removed. Where, to the common sense mind, no
ambiguities exist, machine claquers and Southern Pacific attorneys can read them into the Constitution very
easily, as in the dispute as to whether the absolute or the minimum rate is constitutional.
Advised by the attorneys representing the shipping interests, the antimachine members undertook to
simplify the language of the sections in dispute, so that a wayfaring man though a Judge on the bench or a
machine legislator need not err in the construction thereof.
Early in the session, Senator Campbell had introduced a constitutional amendment to that end. The
amendment went to the Judiciary Committee on January 14th. The majority of the committee, openly against
the machine, favored the submission to the people of such an amendment. But it was not until February 22d
that the amendment or rather a substitute for it was reported back to the Senate.
The day following, February 23d, Senator Campbell had the measure rereferred to the committee, that an
amendment better calculated to meet the needs of the State might be prepared. The committee took until
March 5th to make its report. The antimachine Senators on the committee had to fight for every inch of the
way toward securing a report upon an effective amendment. This, however, they finally succeeded in doing.
The second substitute amendment smoothed out the ambiguities and the alleged ambiguities of the
Constitution, of which the machine legislators made so much during the session, and of which it is feared the
courts may make much later on. For the long list of constitutional powers and duties of the Railroad
Commissioners, which are so worded as to confuse the legal mind, the framers of the amendment substituted
the following:
"The Commission (Railroad) and each of its members shall have such powers and perform such duties as are
now or may hereafter be provided for by law." Under that simple permission there could have been no
question of the authority of the Legislature to empower the Railroad Commissioners to fix a system of
absolute rates. Section 23, Article XII., of the Constitution, which at least confused the lawyers employed by
the railroads to prevent the passage of the Stetson bill, was repealed entirely. The adoption of the amendment,
would, had it been approved by the people at the general election of 1910, have removed every impediment
which railroad attorneys claim to be in the way of an effective railroad regulation law for California.
Curiously enough the machine Senators who had been so much exercised over the alleged ambiguities of the
Constitution when the Stetson bill was under consideration were found opposed to the submission of the
amendment to the people. Every Senator who voted against the amendment had voted against the Stetson bill
and had voted for the Wright bill. Burnett, who had been led to believe when he voted for the Wright bill that
the amendment would be submitted to the people, voted for the amendment. Walker also switched back from
the machine. Wright and McCartney, who had voted against the Stetson bill, also went on record for the
amendment. The remaining fourteen Senators who voted for it, to a man, had voted for the Stetson bill and
against the passage of the Wright bill. But a twothirds vote of the Senate was required for the amendment's
adoption. This meant twentyseven votes. The amendment was defeated, the vote being nineteen for
submission of the measure to the people, and sixteen against[66].
This ended all hope of a model railroad regulation law for California until 1913, for the Constitution must be
amended before such a law can be realized. If a satisfactory amendment be adopted in 1911, it must before
going into effect be ratified by the people. This ratification would come in 1912. The Legislature of 1913
would then be able to proceed with the passage of the model statute.
An attempt to investigate the causes and the necessity of the arbitrary increase in transcontinental freight rates
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failed as completely as did the attempted amendment of the Constitution.
Early in the session, on January 18, to be exact, Senator Caminetti introduced a resolution which directed the
Senate Committee on Federal Relations to inquire into the cause of the increase in freight rates, and to report
its findings to the Senate. Two days later Caminetti introduced a second and companion resolution, which
provided that investigation should be made into the causes for the increase in express charges. On Senator
Leavitt's motion this last resolution was made a special order for January 22, when the first resolution was to
come up. The Senate on the 22d rereferred the resolutions back to the committee.
The Senate Committee on Federal Relations was, by Caminetti's clever; tactics in having the resolutions go to
that body, forced into a prominence which evidently worried the machine. It consisted of Burnett, Black and
Sanford. Black, Republican, and Sanford, Democrat, were working openly against the machine. Burnett,
while he managed to land on the machine side of things at critical points in the progress of the session, was
by no means a machine coolie. Had it been known that the Committee on Federal Relations was to be
charged with an investigation into railroad affairs, a very different committee would unquestionably have
been appointed. The machine's problem was to correct the blunder made when the antimachine forces were
given a majority on what had become a committee charged with the handling of an important railroad issue.
The ease with which the blunder was corrected speaks volumes for the machine's resourcefulness.
The air at the capitol suddenly became permeated with the idea that a committee of three was altogether too
small to conduct so important an investigation as that proposed in the Caminetti resolutions. Accordingly the
Committee on Federal Relations very readily recommended, when it reported the resolutions back to the
Senate with the recommendation that the investigation be held, that two Senators be added to the committee,
making it a committee of five. Had the machine observed the unwritten rules of Senatorial courtesy[67],
which machine Senators insist upon so loudly, the antimachine element would have been safe enough in
doing this. Senatorial courtesy required that the author of the resolutions, Caminetti, be made one of the two
additional members. This would have given the antimachine element at least three members of the enlarged
committee, a condition which did not line with machine purposes at all. So Senatorial courtesy was thrown to
the winds, Senator Caminetti was ignored, and Senators Wolfe and Bills were named as the additional
members of the committee. The machine seldom blunders, but when it does, usually covers its blunders with
astonishing directness and dispatch. A glance at the records made by Senators Wolfe and Bills, which will be
found in Table "A" of the Appendix, will show the truth of this statement.
The machine's next move was to delay the investigation. For one reason and another the investigation was
delayed. Finally, on February 19, Caminetti gave notice that on the following Tuesday, he would move that
the committee be discharged and a second committee ordered to carry out the instructions contained in the
resolutions. This declaration of war stirred the machine to action machine action. Assurances were given
that the investigation would be held, but it was March 12, almost two months after the resolution had been
introduced, and only twelve days before adjournment, before the committee placed its first witness on the
stand.
At that time the Senate was in the midst of the Direct Primary fight, and in addition, the machine after months
of planning was sending literally hundreds of measures into Senate and Assembly for final action. There was
no time nor were the members of the committee in a condition to conduct the investigation which the
antimachine element had contemplated. But hurried hearings were held, and a mass of evidence of railroad
and express company extortion brought into the open. The interested reader will find the testimony printed in
the Senate journal of March 23, 1909.
Men of the standing of Edwin Bonnheim[68], treasurer and manager of Weinstock, Lubin Co.; Russell D.
Carpenter, auditor of Hale Brothers, Inc.; J. O. Bracken, manager of the California Commercial Association;
C. H. Bentley of the California Fruit Canners Association; all testified that the increase in express and freight
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charges has worked great hardship upon the State. They showed that in the final analysis the consumer pays
the increased charges. Furthermore, testimony was produced which at least indicated that the transportation
companies, if economically not to say honestly managed, would receive fair returns on their legitimate
investments, were even lower freight rates to be charged than those exacted prior to the increase of 1908. It
was also shown that the State of California could institute and conduct an examination into railroad affairs
before the Interstate Commerce Commission[69]. It was clear to all that thorough investigation under the
Caminetti resolutions would prove of enormous benefit to the State. That the committee could do little or
nothing in the short time remaining before adjournment was also recognized. Burnett had come out for
thorough investigation, giving the antimachine forces a majority of the committee. Witness after witness
representing the large shippers and importers of the State urged that the investigation be carried on even after
the Legislature had adjourned. Burnett as chairman of the committee was urging this course, but it was March
23, the day before adjournment, before he could get his committee report ready, and filed with the Senate, as
basis for a resolution to continue the investigation after the Legislature had adjourned. There were but eleven
dependable antimachine Senators in addition to Burnett who were within reach of the capitol. But the
machine had a safe majority within call. Burnett's resolution was defeated, the investigation denied, by a vote
of twelve for to sixteen against[70].
But two important railroad measures were finally passed by the Legislature. The first of these was the "Full
Crew bill," which required adequate manning of railroad trains. After being heldup as long as the machine
dared, the bill was finally passed. But the "Full Crew bill" met with one of those unfortunate "errors"[71]
which played such important parts in the passage of the AntiGambling bill and the Direct Primary bill.
When the Legislature had adjourned this error was discovered, and Governor Gillett refused to sign the bill
because of it.
The second important railroad measure passed was the Reciprocal Demurrage bill, introduced in the Senate
by Miller, and in the Assembly by Drew. As finally passed the bill provides that railroad companies which
fail to supply shippers with cars when proper requisition has been made for them, shall pay the injured
shipper demurrage at the rate of $5 per car per day. On the other hand, shippers who fail to load or unload
cars after a stated time, are required to pay the railroad $6 daily as demurrage. The extra dollar which the
shippers are required to pay the railroads is exacted to compensate the railroads for rental of the car.
Similar laws up to the time of the passage of the MillerDrew bill had been adopted by seventeen States of
the Union, including Oregon and Texas. During the recent car shortage, it is alleged that empty cars needed in
California, were sent into Oregon and into Texas, that the railroads might escape the demurrage charges
exacted in those two States. California, without a demurrage law, was helpless. At the session of 1907,
however, the machine, in complete control of the Senate, defeated a reciprocal demurrage bill. To be sure the
demurrage was higher in the measure proposed in 1907 than in that passed at the session of 1909, but it was
the principle of demurrage, not its amount, that the machine was against in 1907. In 1909, however, not a
Senator voted against the bill. And in this connection there is a story told which unquestionably had its
bearing upon the fate of the Reciprocal Demurrage bill at the 1909 session. The story deals with a political
adventure in the life of one Henry Lynch.
Mr. Lynch voted against reciprocal demurrage in 1907. He voted neither for nor against reciprocal demurrage
in 1909, for he was not at Sacramento to vote. Mr. Lynch was not at Sacramento to vote in 1909, for one
reason at least, because he did vote against reciprocal demurrage in 1907.
Mr. Lynch hailed from the Thirtyfirst Senatorial District, which takes in San Benito and San Luis Obispo
counties. These counties are intensely Republican; they are also farming communities. And since the
onetime Senator Lynch voted against the Reciprocal Demurrage bill, the farmers have seen tons upon tons
of their products rot in the fields because they could not get cars to move their crops.
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But while the farmers of San Luis Obispo and San Benito counties were watching their products rot for want
of cars to move them, it is alleged that cars were being sent from California to Oregon to meet the
requisitions of Oregon shippers. Oregon had a reciprocal demurrage law on her statute books; California had
not.
Senator Lynch's vote against the Reciprocal Demurrage bill was made a sort of issue in San Benito and San
Luis Obispo counties at the election of 1908. A. E. Campbell, Democrat, was running against Mr. Lynch,
Republican, for the State Senate. Right or wrong the reader may judge which the farmers of the two
counties credited the defeat of the Reciprocal Demurrage bill not to the Republican Party, but to the
Republican machine, or better described perhaps as the RepublicanDemocratic machine, that dominates the
State, a machine which the people of California are just now engaged in smashing.
Being good Republicans, the people of Mr. Lynch's district gave Mr. Taft a plurality of more than 1,700;
remembering the defeat of the Reciprocal Demurrage bill, they gave Mr. Campbell, Democratic candidate for
the Senate, a plurality of 416. The fact that a United States Senator was to be elected didn't influence the
Republicans of San Luis Obispo County at all. They elected a Democrat to the State Senate because they
knew him to be free from machine domination a machine maintained for the purpose of defeating good
measures, such as the Reciprocal Demurrage bill, and furthering the passage of bad ones.
But the influence of Lynch's vote against the Reciprocal Demurrage bill was not confined to San Luis Obispo
and San Benito Counties. It spread over into the adjoining Twentyninth District, which takes in Santa Cruz
and San Mateo Counties. These counties are also intensely Republican. They gave Taft a plurality of 2,799.
But they gave the Democratic candidate for the State Senate, James B. Holohan, a plurality of 677. Holohan
ran 3,476 votes ahead of his ticket in a district where only 9,483 votes were cast for State Senator. Holohan
was known to be free of machine influences. He could be counted upon to vote for a Reciprocal Demurrage
bill without first consulting the Southern Pacific's political agent, Jere Burke. And the Republican whose
place he took in the Senate had voted against the Reciprocal Demurrage bill of 1907.
The election of Holohan and Campbell unquestionably had its influence on the passage of the Demurrage,
bill. Not a member of the Senate cast his vote against it, although several of the Senators who had voted
against the bill two years before, sat in the Senate of 1909. Among these were ten Senators who, during the
session of 1909, were conspicuously on the wrong side of most questions. They were Senators Bates,
Hartman, Leavitt, McCartney, Reily, Savage, Weed, Willis, Wolfe and Wright. The ten, for example,
constituted half the twenty Senators who opposed the plan to give The People Statewide popular vote in the
selection of United States Senators. Only seven Senators voted against the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill.
Five of the seven Hartman, Leavitt, Reily, Weed and Wolfe had voted against reciprocal demurrage in
1907. But there was a harkening to the demand of The People in 1909, which had been wanting two years
before. Seven of these ten Senators, who voted against reciprocal demurrage in 1907 Bates, Hartman,
McCartney, Savage, Willis, Wolfe and Wright voted for reciprocal demurrage in 1909. Three of them
Leavitt, Reily and Weed did not vote at all.
[66] The vote was as follows:
For the amendment: Bell, Birdsall, Boynton, Burnett, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright, Curtin, Cutten,
Holohan, McCartney, Miller, Roseberry, Rush, Strobridge, Sanford, Thompson, Walker, Wright 19.
Against the amendment: Anthony, Bills, Estudillo, Finn, Hartman, Hurd, Kennedy, Leavitt, Lewis, Price,
Reily, Savage, Weed, Welch, Willis, Wolfe 16.
[67] Machine Senators habitually exact the utmost consideration and courtesy from the antimachine
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Senators, and habitually repay it with deceit and trickery. The curious feature of this is that the antimachine
Senators continue to extend the courtesy and continue to be tricked and imposed upon. A shutting off of
"Senatorial courtesy" would go far toward solving the problem of machine domination of the Legislature.
[68] Mr. Bonnheim testified that prior to the new schedule of express rates enforced between New York and
the city of San Francisco, the rate was $8.00 per hundred for shipments of from 10,000 to 20,000 pounds;
$9.00 per hundred for 5,000 to 10,000 pounds; $10.00 per hundred for 2,000 to 5,000 pounds; $11.00 per
hundred from 1,000 to 2,000 pounds. and $12.00 from 500 to 1,000 pounds; $13.50 from 100 to 500 pounds.
That the withdrawal of the bulk rates in December, 1908, resulted in an advance of 35 per cent by the
withdrawal of the 2,000 pound rate, and an advance of 50 per cent by the withdrawal of the 5,000 pound rate;
an advance of 66 3/4 per cent by the withdrawal of the 10,000 pound rate, and that the withdrawal of the
20,000 pound rate amounted to an advance of 92 8/10 per cent.
[69] Senator Cartwright actually introduced a resolution calling upon the AttorneyGeneral to institute
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission:
To determine whether existing rates are reasonable or unreasonable.
To ascertain, fix and establish a reasonable schedule of freight rates, and to enforce the same.
To determine whether or not any existing rate is discriminatory.
And to prevent further discrimination between persons or places.
The resolution carried an appropriation of $25,000 to ensure competent legal and expert assistance.
The resolution was introduced on February 4. It went first to the Committee on Federal Relations, then to the
Judiciary Committee, then to the Committee on Finance, from which it emerged March 1 with the
recommendation that it be adopted. On March 2 it was sent back to the Committee on Finance and was never
heard from again. The enormous benefit to the State if such an investigation could be honestly and effectively
carried on, will be recognized.
[70] The vote was as follows:
For the resolution: Bell, Birdsall, Boynton, Burnett, Caminetti, Cutten, Estudillo, Holohan, Roseberry, Rush,
Sanford, Thompson 12.
Against the resolution: Anthony, Bates, Bills, Finn, Hartman, Hurd, Kennedy, Leavitt, Lewis, Martinelli,
Reily, Savage, Weed, Willis, Wolfe, Wright 16.
[71] E. F. Mitchell, Executive Secretary to Governor Gillett, makes the following statement regarding this
particular error:
The electric companies which run interurban trains, also claimed that the bill, as prepared, applied to them,
and would place upon them an unnecessary burden and expense.
"There is no doubt that section three of the act applies to motor cars and electric cars. The language is very
plain. Section one of the bill describes passenger trains, section two refers to freight trains, and section three
says "all other trains not propelled by steam locomotives." Now, there are only two classes of cars that are not
propelled by steam locomotives, and those are motor and electric cars. In the Governor's opinion, an error
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was made in endeavoring to amend it, so it would not apply to motor cars and electric cars. The amendment
was prepared, and we had here in the office, during the argument on the bill, the original committee
amendments proposed. The amendment was to be made after the word "train" on the second line and had this
amendment been made as contemplated, it would have excluded motor cars and electric cars, but instead of
having been made on line two, as expected, it was carried into line three, where it gave the bill an entirely
different meaning, It was one of those unfortunate things that crept into legislation through an oversight of
somebody, which could have been readily corrected if the bill had been watched. The insertion of this
amendment in the wrong place, instead of excluding motor cars and electric cars, as intended, included them.
This error was not discovered until the bill came up before the Governor for consideration."
Chapter XV. Defeat of the Commonwealth Club Bills.
Drawn By Committees of the Ablest San Francisco Attorneys Not Under Retainer of PrisonDodging
Captains of Industry Measures Not Allowed to Reach Senate or Assembly, but Killed in Committees
Grove L. Johnson's Keen Opposition.
The graft prosecution at San Francisco not only brought the fact squarely before the public that large
corporations sometimes catch the easiest way to achieve their purposes by bribing public officials, but that it
is a deal easier to pass a camel through the eye of a needle than a millionaire offender through the legal
cobwebs of technicality to a cell at San Quentin or Folsom[72].
That the technical defense in criminal cases was subject to grave abuses had been generally recognized. But it
took the graft cases at San Francisco to fairly rub this unpleasant fact into the lawabiding element. Because
for the first time in the practice of criminal law in California, unlimited wealth was available to employ the
best legal talent to defend men under indictment.
The defending lawyers took advantage of every technicality. They emphasized the most trivial of them.
Gradually it began to dawn upon The People that here were legal refuges, based upon the most absurd of
technicalities, the sweeping away of which would in no way injure the substantial rights of a person charged
with crime, refuges which were available to the rich man but denied to the poor or moderately welltodo.
To be sure, any person accused could make his technical defense if he had the means to employ the necessary
counsel. But in face of the astonishing performances going on in the courts at San Francisco, it soon became
apparent to the thoughtful, that no man, whose fortune was expressed in terms of less than five ciphers could
make such a defense.
Thus the unpalatable truth was forced home, that we have in California a technical defense available for the
rich man charged with crime, which is in effect denied even those of the socalled middle classes.
With this conviction came demand of reform of the criminal laws to ensure:
(1) A prompt trial of an accused person on the merits of the case.
(2) A prompt judgment in the case of a verdict of guilty.
(3) A prompt hearing of the case in the Court of Appeal.
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The machine was, of course, against any such "wicked innovations," as Assemblyman Grove L. Johnson
would have called them.
However, at San Francisco, three considerable bodies, the Bar Association, the Commonwealth Club and the
Citizens' League of Justice, took the matter up, and for months had the ablest lawyers of the State at any
rate the ablest not retained for the defense of capitalists under indictment at work wrestling with the
problem of simplifying the criminal codes and doing away so far as possible with technical defense, except in
such cases as the substantial rights of the defendant might be involved.
A committee consisting of J. C. McKinstry, J. J. Dwyer, Lester H. Jacobs, Oscar Cushing and Warren Olney
Jr. was appointed for this purpose by the Citizens' League of Justice. The Commonwealth Club appointed
Beverly L. Hodghead, Orrin K. McMurray, Alex. G. Eells, Fairfax H. Wheelan, Sidney V. Smith, Lester H.
Jacobs and Joseph Hutchinson. One would go far before finding more representative or more publicspirited
bodies of citizens, or more able exponents of the law.
The labors of the several committees resulted in what may in a broad way be regarded as two sets of bills
being prepared.
The first, known as the Commonwealth Club bills, were sixtyfive in number, and were introduced in the
Senate by Campbell, and in the Assembly by Butler. The second set was known as the Bar Association bills.
They were introduced in the Senate by Burnett. They were nine in number, and while apparently covering
much of the ground of the Commonwealth Club bills, were in no respects so complete as to method or detail.
The Bar Association bills pinpricked an abuse; the Commonwealth Club bills drove the knife in deep.
The sixtyfive Commonwealth Club bills were readily divided into three groups, those dealing with Grand
Juries and indictments, with trial juries and verdicts, and with appeals to the higher courts.
The general purpose of the measures dealing with Grand Juries was to make those bodies purely accusatory,
to make their findings conclusive and not subject to attack. The basis of the proposed amendments and
additions to the laws governing Grand Juries was that Grand Juries are primarily required to investigate secret
offenses, and should be regarded as purely accusatory bodies. On this theory the Commonwealth Club bills
made the indictment of a Grand Jury as binding as the action of a committing magistrate who holds a
defendant to answer. Had the Commonwealth Club bills become laws there would have been no more placing
of Grand Jurors on trial for having found indictments against persons able to employ crafty criminal lawyers.
But lest the defendant under investigation might be wronged, the Commonwealth Club measures so amended
the codes that a Grand Juror in any way biased against the defendant was required to absent himself from the
Grand Jury room when the defendant's case was under consideration. Under the proposed laws each Grand
Juror was required to take oath "not to participate in the inquiry as to any matter or affecting any person as to
which or whom he is biased or could not vote freely either way that the evidence presented would in justice
require him to vote."
The Commonwealth Club amendments regarding trial juries dealt with the problem in the same broad spirit.
The chief object sought was to avoid the trying of citizens called for jury service[73]. The proposed laws
obviated this by leaving it with the Judge to determine the qualifications of the juror, that is to say, the
examination of jurors in criminal cases was to have been taken out of the hands of the lawyers and required
of the Judge. To compensate the defendant for whatever substantial disadvantage he might suffer, the number
of his peremptory challenges was materially increased.
To prevent the setting aside of judgments on trifling technicalities, the proposed amendments provided that
the Judge should fix the legality of the jury panel by general order, after which challenges could not apply to
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the whole panel, although they still held as to individual jurors.
One of the most important of the provisions regarding trial jurors was that the reading of mere newspaper
reports of a case should not disqualify a trial juror, unless it were shown that the newspaper article purported
to be a true copy of the official testimony.
The fact that under the present law the term "reasonable doubt" is not given legal definition paves the way for
frequent miscarriages of justice. The Judge is required to define the term for the jury. The defendant may take
exception to the definition, thus paving the way for technical defense in the upper Courts. The
Commonwealth Club bills defined "reasonable doubt" to be, "that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence in the cause, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition
that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge."
Amendments were also proposed to the law governing instructions to juries. Under the present rule, each side
presents a long list of instructions for the Judge to give to the jury. If the Judge refuse to give the instructions
as requested, objections to his refusal can be taken and made basis for a technical defense[73a]. Under the
proposed amendments objection could be made only to such instructions as were given, not to those which
were not presented to the jury.
In none of those proposed amendments could the substantial rights of the defendant be said to be encroached
upon. But the proposed laws did clear away a mass of technicalities which has kept many a scamp out of jail.
The proposed amendments dealing with appeals in criminal cases aimed at prompt judgment and sentence
after conviction, prompt appeal and conclusion of the case.
To this end, the measures provided that upon conviction the defendant must be sentenced forthwith, and if
appeals were taken, taken on the judgment. Instead of the cumbersome bill of exceptions, which required
weeks and sometimes months to prepare, it was provided that the entire testimony given at the trial, together
with the complete minutes of the proceedings, should be sent to the higher tribunal. This would place before
the Appellate and Supreme Courts all the facts and testimony which the Lower Court had considered. This
feature of the Commonwealth Club bills was also covered by the measures which had been prepared by the
Bar Association.
Under the proposed Commonwealth Club amendments, the defendant was not permitted to appeal on
questions referring to the trial jury panels or the Grand jury, nor on any error not affecting his substantial
rights. Error in an immaterial issue, or of not sufficient importance to affect the substantial rights of the
defendant, was not, under the provisions of the Commonwealth Club bills, to be held ground for reversal.
"We believe," said the Committee which drew up the Commonwealth Club bills, "that what we have
proposed is in no way revolutionary and deprives the accused person of no substantial right. The amendments
proposed are merely designed to make the present law more effective, to relieve the Courts from the necessity
of considering trivial matters and to aid in determining more promptly whether a person accused of crime is
innocent or guilty."
The bills as introduced in the Assembly were referred to the Assembly Judiciary Committee. In the Senate,
the bills went to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The promoters of the Commonwealth Club bills made the mistake of treating the machine Senators and
Assemblymen as men who could be won over with reason and plain statement. Instead of fighting for their
bills and demanding their passage, the agents of the club were willing to listen courteously to suggestions
from tricksters intent upon the defeat of the measures, who were only playing for time.
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Carroll Cook was at Sacramento lobbying against the bills, as were others of that gentleman's view of affairs.
Cook actually appeared before the Assembly Judiciary Committee on invitation of one of its members. The
courtesy shown him by Grove L. Johnson, chairman of the Committee, was touching or nauseating, as one
might view it. Johnson, who was in effect the Committee, took occasion on the day of Cook's appearance to
denounce the measures as revolutionary, unconstitutional, vicious.
It is interesting to note that sixtythree of the sixtyfive bills as introduced in the Assembly never got beyond
Johnson's Committee. They died right there. The two exceptions got out of the Committee in the closing days
of the session, one on March 10th, the other on March 20th. They were reported out with the recommendation
that they do pass. It was then too late to take any action on them. They died on the Assembly file.
Those who were making a fight for the measures were kept running between the Judiciary Committee of the
Assembly and that of the Senate. The Senate Committee, while a majority of its members were against the
machine, was led by men who were not at all in sympathy with any plan that was calculated to clear away
legal cobwebs. On the pretext that the reforms proposed were covered by the Bar Association bills, or that the
measures were duplicated by other bills, or that they were loosely drawn, on any pretext, in fact, the Senate
Committee recommended that fiftytwo of the sixtyfive measures be withdrawn. And they were withdrawn.
Of the thirteen remaining, seven stuck in the Committee, died there; five, just before the session closed, were
referred back to the Senate with the recommendation that they do not pass. They didn't. Of the sixtyfive
bills, the Senate Committee gave only one favorable recommendation. This lone recipient of Committee
approval got back to the Senate on March 5th. It died on the files.
Such was the fate of the measures prepared under the direction of the Commonwealth Club for reform of the
methods of indictment, trial and appeal in criminal cases. The Bar Association bills received somewhat better
treatment.
Of the nine socalled Bar Association bills, eight passed the Senate; the other died in the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Of the eight which got through the Senate, two were defeated in the Assembly, while six passed
that body and went to the Governor.
Four of the six Bar Association bills which passed dealt with the repeal of those sections of the code which
provide for bills of exceptions in criminal cases and substituted the plan, described in considering the
Commonwealth Club bills, of providing the higher Court with complete record of the testimony and the
proceedings in the trial Court.
One of the two remaining measures requires sentence to be imposed upon a convicted felon in not less than
two nor more than five days after the verdict or plea of guilty, with the right reserved for the Court of
extending the time to ten days. The sixth measure defines "a motion in arrest of judgment."
Such was the outcome of the effort made by reputable lawyers and public spirited laymen to eliminate
quackery from the practice of the criminal law. But measures calculated to make the practice of the criminal
law even more involved and technical than it is were granted more consideration. Many of them passed both
houses. How they were passed and what they are will be considered in another chapter.
[72] No sooner had the indictments been returned in the San Francisco cases than the validity of the indicting
Grand Jury was attacked. For months that issue occupied the attention of the Courts. One by one the members
of the Grand Jury were dragged into Court, and in effect placed on trial that technical disqualification if such
existed might be established. The greater part of a day was, for example, consumed in thrashing over the
question whether one or three motions had been made in nominating the stenographer to the Grand Jury.
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Then came appeals to the higher Courts which occupied more months and all but endless labor and expense.
When the attacks on the Grand Jury had been met and disposed of, and the defendants brought to the trial
Court, the Prosecution found its labors scarcely begun. Every trial juror was placed on trial. Weeks and even
months were required, because of technical objections, to secure a trial jury.
Just before the Legislature convened, Abe Ruef, had, as example, been convicted by a jury in the securing of
which the metropolis of the State had been raked as with a finetooth comb for talesmen who were not
technically disqualified to serve. Thousands were available who would have given the defendant a fair trial,
but in all San Francisco very few could be found who were not because of one technical reason or another
disqualified.
After conviction came the defendant's appeal, in which the Most trivial reasons were accepted for freeing the
defendant whose technical defense had failed him in the lower Courts. Former Mayor Schmitz of San
Francisco, after conviction of extortion, and Abe Ruef, after having pleaded guilty to the charge, were given
their freedom under circumstances which, to put it mildly, shocked the whole State.
[73] A prominent San Francisco attorney told the writer recently that "the criminal lawyer too often questions
a talesman needlessly, not so much to disqualify him, as to get technical error into the record."
[73a] It was on a technicality of this kind that the District Court of Appeals found excuse for reversal of the
judgment in the case of Louis Glass, convicted of bribing a member of the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors. E. J. Zimmer, the auditor of the Pacific States Telephone Company, of which Glass was an
official, refused to testify at Glass' trial. The trial court refused to instruct the jury to disregard the refusal.
The Appellate Court held this to be a fatal error.
Chapter XVI. How the Change of Venue Bill Was Passed.
Slipped Through the Assembly Without Serious Opposition in Closing Days of the Session Passed by Trick
in the Senate Although a Majority of That Body Were Opposed to Its Passage Typical Case of Machine
"Generalship."
Given the presiding officers of the Senate and Assembly and the appointment of the Committees of both
bodies, the machine minority in the Legislature had comparatively little difficulty in preventing the passage
of desirable measures. Thus, the Commonwealth Club bills to simplify and expedite proceedings in criminal
cases, or, if you like, to prevent quackery in the practice of the criminal law, were, by clever manipulation,
defeated, although if fairly presented to Senate and Assembly they undoubtedly would have become
laws[74].
But when it came to passing vicious measures in the face of the opposition of the unorganized majority of
both Houses, the machine had a harder job on its hands. A majority vote of each House is required for the
passage of a measure. To get through its bills, then, the machine had to create a situation in which vicious
measures could be rushed through without the unorganized reformers knowing what was being done. By
preventing action on a large majority of the measures pending before the Legislature until the end of the
session, such a situation was created. In the confusion of the closing days of the session, not only were good
bills denied passage, but vicious bills, in spite of the opposition of a majority of the Legislature, were passed.
Some normally antimachine members in such a situation become worn out, get discouraged and vote for
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machine policies to secure machine support for measures, the passage of which their constituents at home are
demanding. Others, in the confusion of a whirlwind close of the session, vote for measures which they have
no time to read, and which they cannot understand. Thus, even with a majority of Senate and Assembly
against machine policies, the clever machine leaders often slip through measures which could not be passed
early in the session, when the members have opportunity to study the bills upon which they are called upon to
act, and before the ranks of the reform element have been broken.
This was very well illustrated at the Session of 1909 by the passage of the socalled Change of Venue
bill[74a]. This measure was introduced in the Assembly by Grove L. Johnson. Under its provisions a person
charged with crime would have been permitted upon his whim or caprice to allege bias and disqualify the
Judge before whom he was to be tried. The Legislature of 1907 was admittedly controlled by the machine,
but even the Legislature of 1907 did not dare pass the Change of Venue bill. The reform Legislature of 1909,
however, did pass it. The manner in which it was passed is a lesson in machine methods. To the credit of
Governor Gillett let it be said, however, that he vetoed the measure[75].
Grove L. Johnson having introduced the bill, it was referred to Johnson's committee, the Judiciary Committee
of the Assembly. The Committee held it until February 5, when it was referred back to the Assembly with the
recommendation that it "do pass." On March 13, eleven days before adjournment, it passed the Assembly, by
a vote of 42 to 15, 41 votes being required for its passage. Assemblymen like Drew, Telfer, Wilson and
Stuckenbruck, men who fought the machine and machine policies from the beginning to the end of the
session, voted for the bill. The negative vote of any two of them would have defeated it[76].
The passage in the Assembly of an important reform measure as late as March 13, would have meant its
defeat in the Senate. Though in the majority the antimachine Senators could not have forced a reform
measure through the machinecontrolled committees, machinecontrolled even when a majority of a
committee was antimachine[77]. Measures of the Change of Venue bill stamp, however, had a clear way.
The Change of Venue bill was on March 15 referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. On March 16,
twentyfour hours after, the Committee returned the bill with the recommendation that it do pass. On March
19, with twentytwo Senators opposed to its passage, and eighteen favoring it, with twentyone votes
necessary for its passage, the bill passed the Senate. This apparently impossible feat was, in the last two
weeks of the session, a comparatively easy task for the machine.
To begin with, Senator Black, who opposed the bill, was ill at his home at Palo Alto. This left twentyone
Senators against the measure and eighteen for. The lineup was as follows:
For the Change of Venue bill Anthony, Bates, Bills, Finn, Hare, Hartman, Hurd, Leavitt, Martinelli,
McCartney, Price, Reily, Savage, Weed, Welch, Willis, Wolfe, Wright 18.
Against the Change of Venue bill Bell, Birdsall, Boynton, Burnett[76a], Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright,
Curtin, Cutten, Estudillo, Holohan, Lewis, Kennedy, Miller, Roseberry, Rush, Sanford, Stetson, Strobridge,
Thompson, Walker 21.
On the face of it, the outlook for the passage of the Change of Venue bill in the Senate was not good. The
machine, however, planned to pass the bill on March 19.
The machine leaders went at the job systematically. When the Senators took their seats that Friday morning,
they found that at Senator Bates' request, Assembly Bill 6 (the Change of Venue bill) had been put on the
Special Urgency File. The Special Urgency File was to be considered at 8 o'clock Friday evening. Senator
Bates stated in an interview that he had placed Assembly Bill No. 6 on the Special Urgency File "at the
request of a fellow Senator." Who the fellow Senator was, Bates refused to say. Bates insisted, however, that
he knew nothing about Assembly Bill No, 6, and could give no reason why it should be made a matter of
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"special urgency." Senator Bates has since the Legislature adjourned been given a position of trust in the
United States Mint.
With the Change of Venue bill on the Special Urgency File, the next step was to get it considered at the
moment most favorable for machine purposes. Along about 11 o'clock in the forenoon the reader should
keep in mind that in the ordinary course of the Senate's work the Special Urgency File would not have been
considered until 8 o'clock that evening Senator Wolfe moved that the Special Urgency File be taken up out
of order. But before the Change of Venue bill could be reached, Senator Wright, who favored the passage of
the measure, was found to be absent from the Senate chamber. On Senator McCartney's motion, the Change
of Venue bill was temporarily passed on file. With the constant coming and going of Senators, there was no
time while the file was under consideration, that the eighteen Senators counted on to vote in a solid block for
the bill, were all present. The Senate concluded consideration of the Special Urgency File, and still the
Change of Venue bill had not been taken up. The Senate then took up the second reading of Assembly bills,
and then the Special File of Appropriation bills. A communication from Dr. Howard Black and Dr. Harry D.
Reynolds was read setting forth that Senator Black was too ill to leave Palo Alto. Bills were passed and bills
were withdrawn. Senator Strobridge reported that Senate Bill No. 862 had been correctly engrossed. And
through it all the machine was watching for the favorable moment to force the passage of the Change of
Venue bill.
The moment came just before noon. Like the snap of a trap Leavitt asked for unanimous consent to take up
Assembly Bill No. 6, out of order. The antimachine Senators are never guilty of discourteous treatment of a
fellow Senator. They granted the request.
Senator Wright vouched for the bill. He stated that it was a good bill and should be made a law. Senator
Wolfe spoke for it, in fact led the debate to secure its passage. On the other hand, Senator Boynton very
pointedly told Senator Wright that the bill was not a good measure and should not be passed "Judges of the
Supreme Court tell me," said Boynton, "that this is a bad bill."
Senator Cutten made a strong speech against the bill, which he denounced as bad in principle. Holohan stated
that if the measure became a law it would give a bunco steerer a chance to disqualify every decent Judge in
the State. Roseberry denounced the measure as vicious.
When the vote was taken, every Senator who supported it was in his seat, but Burnett, Estudillo and Rush
were absent. This would have made the vote 18 to 18, the backers of the measure requiring three more
affirmative votes for its passage. But Miller and Lewis were led to vote for the measure, which made 20 votes
for the bill and 16 against it. At this point the bill lacked one vote of passage. Estudillo was, however,
brought in under call of the Senate, and under what amounted to misrepresentation, voted for the measure.
This passed the bill by a vote of 21 to 18. Boynton changed his vote from no to aye, to give notice that on the
next legislative day he would move to reconsider the vote by which the bill had been passed. But before he
could give notice the Senate took its noon recess. Boynton under the rules had all day in which to notify the
Senate of his intention, but to make assurance doubly sure, he told the clerk at the desk not to send the bill to
the Assembly for he would as soon as the Senate reconvened, give notice of his motion to reconsider.
Nevertheless, when the Senate reconvened, Boynton found that the bill had been rushed over to the
Assembly, "to save time," according to the excuse given.
Senator Boynton insisted that the bill be returned from the Assembly. Wolfe asked Boynton "as a matter of
Senatorial courtesy," to permit the vote on the bill to be taken on a motion to have it returned from the
Assembly. This request was so ludicrous, in view of the treatment that had been accorded Boynton, that it
provoked a smile. Boynton refused to be "courteous," the bill was returned from the Assembly and regularly
reconsidered the next day.
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With 21 votes against the measure, there seemed little doubt that it would be reconsidered and defeated.
Twentyone votes were necessary for reconsideration. Lewis and Miller had thought better of their vote of
Friday and were prepared to vote against the bill. Estudillo, understanding the measure thoroughly, was
anxious to set himself right in the record by voting against it. These, with Burnett and Rush, gave twentyone
votes, enough to force reconsideration and to defeat the bill.
But there was a weak link in the combination,Kennedy. Senator Kennedy voted throughout the session
consistently with the WolfeLeavitt element, but he voted against the Change of Venue bill. When Saturday
morning came, however, Kennedy could not be found. When reconsideration of the bill came up, Burnett and
Rush were out in the hallway. Miller and Lewis voted to reconsider, which made the vote eighteen to
eighteen. Twentyone votes were necessary for reconsideration. With Kennedy, Burnett and Rush,
reconsideration could be forced and the bill defeated. The only way the absent Senators could be reached was
through a call of the Senate, which required a majority vote of those present. A motion for a call of the Senate
was defeated by a vote of eighteen to eighteen[78].
This was the real test vote on the Change of Venue bill. It will be seen that Miller and Lewis and Estudillo,
who had voted for the bill the day before, voted for a call of the Senate. They would, on reconsideration, have
voted against the bill, and its passage on reconsideration would have been impossible. Had Kennedy or Rush
or Burnett been present, the motion for a call of the Senate would have prevailed, the vote on the Change of
Venue bill been reconsidered, and the measure defeated.
Half an hour later, when Kennedy's vote was necessary to enable the machine to continue the deadlock on the
Direct Primary bill, Kennedy turned up to do his part in that not very creditable performance.
In this way did the machine element secure the passage of the Change of Venue bill. It was a question of
good generalship, or, if you like, trickery. Perhaps trickery is the better name for it.
[74] Black's Senate bill, 1,144, came very near being defeated in the Assembly by similar "good generalship."
The measure in effect prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors within a mile and a half of Stanford
University. Assemblyman Bohnett was in charge of the bill.
Bohnett, the day that the bill was to come up, was called from the room to attend a committee meeting.
Immediately did the Assembly show astonishing activity in consideration of the file. So fast did they go that
the Stanford bill seemed destined to be reached while Bohnett was out of the room. Had it been reached with
Bohnett away it could have been dropped to the bottom of the file, where it would have been lost, so far as
the session of the Legislature of 1909 was concerned.
Charles R. Detrick, of Palo Alto, happened to go to the Assembly chamber at this critical moment and took in
the situation at a glance. He accordingly hunted up Bohnett, who got back to the Assembly chamber before
the bill could be reached on file. For once "good generalship" had failed at the legislative session of 1909.
[74a] In 1907, the Change of Venue bill was slipped through the Assembly, but in a form not to affect the San
Francisco graft cases. In the Senate, however, it was amended to apply to Ruef, Schmitz and their associates.
The exposure of this turn raised such a storm that the bill was not brought to vote. However, on the night
before adjournment, the measure was slipped through the Senate as an amendment tacked on another bill. But
the trick was discovered in the Assembly and defeated.
[75] Governor Gillett's reasons for vetoing the bill are set forth in footnote 1, Chapter 1.
[76] The Assembly vote on the change of venue bill was as follows:
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For the Change of Venue bill Barndollar, Beatty, Black, Cattell, Coghlan, Collier, Collum, Cronin, Drew,
Feeley, Flint, Gibbons, Griffiths, Hammon, Hans, Hawk, Hayes, Hewitt, Hinkle, Holmquist, Johnson of
Sacramento, Johnson of San Diego, Juilliard, Lightner, Macauley, Maher, McClellan, McManus, Melrose,
Mendenhall, Moore, Mott, Pugh, Rech, Schmitt, Silver, Stuckenbruck, Telfer, Transue, Wagner, Wheelan,
and Wilson 42.
Against the Change of Venue bill Baxter, Bohnett, Butler, Callan, Cogswell, Dean, Gerdes, Gillis, Kehoe,
Otis, Polsley, Preston, Sackett, Whitney, and Young 15.
[77] The Senate Judiciary Committee for example.
[76a] The Senators whose names are printed in italics became involved in the confusion which led to the
passage of the measure.
[78] The vote was as follows:
For the call of the Senate Bell, Birdsall, Boynton, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright, Curtin, Cutten,
Estudillo, Holohan, Lewis, Miller, Roseberry, Sanford, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker 18.
Against the call of the Senate Anthony, Bates, Bills, Finn, Hare, Hartman, Hurd, Leavitt, Martinelli,
McCartney, Price, Reily, Savage, Weed, Welch, Willis, Wolfe, Wright 18.
Chapter XVII. Passage of the Wheelan Bills.
Measures Extended Abuses Which the Commonwealth Club Bills Had Been Drawn to Prevent Went
Through Both Houses Without the Members Thoroughly Understanding Their Significance.
The socalled Wheelan bills were passed in much the same way as was the Change of Venue bill. These
measures will perhaps be better understood in comparison with certain of the Commonwealth Club bills
which were considered in a previous chapter.
Among the Commonwealth bills was one which denied a defendant under indictment a copy of the testimony
taken in the Grand Jury room. The measure was drawn on the theory that Grand Juries deal principally with
secret offenses, and that the testimony had better be brought out before the trial Court. One object of the
proposed law was to prevent the defendant giving out testimony with the deliberate object of prejudicing the
entire community against him, and thus increasing the difficulty of getting petty juries to try him.
Furthermore, there are instances, as when Abe Ruef was before the Grand Jury at San Francisco, when the
ends of justice require that the testimony given shall be kept secret. But, in spite of these and other
considerations, the measure in question was allowed to die in Committee.
On the other hand two bills requiring that transcript of such testimony be given the defendant passed both
Senate and Assembly. They were introduced by Wheelan of San Francisco.
Section 925 of the Penal Code, as it stood up to the time of the opening of the session, provided that "the
Grand Jury whenever criminal causes are being investigated before them, on demand of the District Attorney
must appoint a competent stenographic reporter to be sworn and to report the testimony that may be given in
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such causes in shorthand, and reduce the same upon request of the District Attorney to long hand or
typewriting." It was thus left with the District Attorney to say whether the stenographic reporter should be
present, and whether his notes should be transcribed.
The first of the Wheelan bills, Assembly bill 221[79], amended the law by cutting out the words in italics "on
demand of the District Attorney" and "upon request of the District Attorney," making it mandatory upon the
Grand Jury to have the reporter in attendance.
Further on in the section and in Assembly bill 222[79], it was provided that a true copy of the testimony thus
taken should be given the defendant at the time of his arraignment.
These two measures passed both Senate and Assembly.
Assembly bill 223[79], also introduced by Wheelan, provided another cause for the setting aside of an
indictment by the Court in which the defendant is arraigned, upon such defendant's motion. The
Commonwealth bills aimed to prevent technical attacks upon indictments. The third of the Wheelan bills
No. 223 opened the way for further technical attacks, by providing that the Court must set aside the
indictment "when it appears from the testimony taken before the Grand jury that the defendant has been
indicted upon a criminal charge without reasonable or probable cause."
This measure passed both Houses. It opened the way for review before the Court of the testimony taken in the
Grand jury room, and endless technical objections, all of which by clever counsel can be employed to delay
the case being brought before a trial jury, and in the end perhaps wear out the prosecution, thus preventing the
case being tried on its merits. With that section in the law two years ago, it is a question whether the
defendants in the graft prosecution at San Francisco would ever have been brought to trial.
It will be seen that while the Commonwealth Club bills aimed to decrease the opportunities for technical
defense of men charged with crime, and thus permit the cases being tried on their merits, the Wheelan bills
increased opportunity for technical objection.
The history of the passage of the Wheelan bills is practically the same in each instance.
The three bills were introduced by Mr. Wheelan on January 11th, and referred to the Assembly Judiciary
Committee. The Committee, which pigeonholed sixtythree of the Commonwealth Club bills, and reported
back the two remaining too late for passage, had better treatment in store for the Wheelan measures. They
were reported back to the Assembly on March 6th, at a time when the Assembly was fairly swamped with
pending measures. On March 17th, in the midst of a mass of legislation, they were slipped through the
Assembly without many of the members apparently knowing what they were. The Assembly journal of that
date shows that such men as Bohnett, Callan, Cattell, Cogswell, Flint, Gerdes, Gibbons, Gillis, Hayes,
Hewitt, Hinkle, Johnson of Placer, Juilliard, Kehoe, Mendenhall, Polsley, Stuckenbruck, Telfer, Whitney,
Wilson and Wyllie, who ordinarily voted for good measures and against bad ones, voted for the Wheelan
bills.
With the exception of Bill No. 223, not one vote was cast against the measures. The vote on Bill No. 223 was
the last taken. Gillis, who had voted for the two others, appears to have awakened to the fact that something
was wrong. At any rate, he voted against Bill 223.
His was the only vote cast against any of the three bills in the lower House, They appear to have gone
through the Assembly without thorough appreciation of their significance. At any rate, there were members
enough present, who were usually against bad measures, to have prevented the Wheelan bills securing the
fortyone votes necessary for their passage.
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A reform measure passing the Assembly on March 17th would have had no chance whatever in the Senate.
The Wheelan bills were more fortunate.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, before which the Commonwealth Club bills had dragged along for weeks,
received the Wheelan bills on March 17th, the day they passed the Assembly, and the same day, March 17th,
reported them back to the Senate with the recommendation that they do pass. On March 18th the measures
were read the second time in the Senate, and on March 20th, three days after they had passed the Assembly,
the Senate passed them.
Such is the difference in action on machinefavored bills and bills which the machine does not favor.
Incidentally, it may be said that at the time the Wheelan bills were before the Senate, the machine had that
body tied up in the fight on the Direct Primary bill.
The reform element at the mercy of the Senate organization was compelled to devote its whole attention
to the Direct Primary bill. The machine was thus left to run committees and Senate at its own free will. It was
an admirable situation from the machine standpoint.
But by the time the Wheelan bills had been hastened to the floor of the Senate, the reform Senators
apparently awoke to the fact that some sort of a job was on the way. When the bills came up for final passage,
however, the antimachine Senators were apparently as much at a loss concerning them as the antimachine
Assemblymen had been.
Bill number 221 came up first, and even Senator Bell, the staunchest opponent of bad laws of them all, voted
for it. With Senator Bell voted Caminetti, Estudillo, Rush, Thompson and Walker, who were ordinarily
against the passage of bad bills. As the measure received but twentythree votes, any three of these by voting
no could have defeated it.
Price, who had voted for the bill, gave notice, at the request of a fellow Senator, that on the next legislative
day he would move to reconsider the vote by which the bill had been passed.
Before taking up Assembly bill 222, companion bill to 221, the Senate passed three measures and considered
several others. By the time Assembly bill 222 was reached, Senator Bell had got his bearings, and voted
against it. Caminetti had also found himself, and although Caminetti voted for the measure, he gave notice,
that on the next legislative day he would move for its reconsideration.
The third of the bills, No. 223, followed 222, and Walker, who had voted for the two other bills, voted "no."
The bill was passed by twentythree votes, Cutten voting "aye" for the purpose of giving notice to reconsider.
The motions to reconsider were voted upon on the afternoon of Monday, March 22, the day of the final fight
on the Direct Primary bill in both Senate and Assembly. Nobody was thinking of much of anything else that
day. In every instance reconsideration was denied[80]. The vote by which they had passed the Senate stood.
[79] Governor Gillett signed Assembly bills Nos. 221 and 222. They are now the law of the State. Assembly
bill No. 223 he did not sign. It did not, therefore, become a law.
[80] The Assembly history of March 23, fails to record that the motions to reconsider were made on the three
Wheelan bills. In an article concerning these bills which the writer prepared for the Sacramento Bee,
governed by the official record of the measures, the History of the House in which they originated, he stated
that motions for their reconsideration were not made. The Senate Journal of March 22, however, pages 23
and 26, shows that these motions were made, and in all three cases defeated.
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Chapter XVIII. Defeat of the Local Option Bill.
Peculiar Arrangement by Which the Bill Was Sidetracked in the Assembly Stanton Promised That It
Should Pass the Lower House If It Passed the Senate How It Was Smothered in the Upper House.
Because there is no particular reason why California should not have a Local Option law, in the face of
popular demand for it, a large number of very worthy citizens assumed that one would be passed. The fact
seems to have been lost sight of that the tenderloin element opposes such legislation, and that the
management of the socalled liquor interests organized as the "Royal Arch," takes a shortsighted view of
Local Option provisions. The machine was thus interested. Its representatives in Senate and Assembly did not
propose that any Local Option bill should pass. So the Local Option bill was smothered. The smothering
process most suggestively indicates how such things can be done.
The measure was introduced in the Assembly by Wyllie and in the Senate by Estudillo. In the face of the
popular demand for the passage of such a bill, and the exasperation of a no small portion of the voters of the
State, at the mistake or trick by which in 1907 the only measure resembling a Local Option law was
rubbed off the statute books, it was not good policy to fight the bill in the open. So the machine proceeded to
do covertly what would have been "poor politics" to do openly[81].
The same bill having been introduced both in Senate and Assembly, the first step was to tie up either the
Assembly or the Senate measure, so that the whole crafty campaign against the bill's passage could be
confined to one House. The way in which this was done was simplicity itself. The Wyllie bill, as introduced
in the Assembly was, at the request of Speaker Stanton, held up in the Assembly Committee on Public
Morals. Most plausible reason was given for this course. It was pointed out that since the Assembly had gone
on record before the Senate on the antigambling bill, on women's suffrage[80a] and other "moral" issues, it
was unfair to compel the lower House to go on record before the Senate on the Local Option bill. Speaker
Stanton assured the proponents of the measure that if it passed the Senate, it should pass the Assembly.
Stanton accordingly recognized that the Assembly, given an opportunity, would pass the bill. Had it passed
the Assembly before the middle of February, it would unquestionably have passed the Senate. But the
proponents of the measure consented to the plan to make the Senate act first. The fight for the passage of the
bill accordingly took place in the Senate.
Before taking up the Senate measure introduced by Estudillo, the Wyllie bill may as well be disposed of. It
was introduced in the Assembly January 8th, and was sent to the Committee on Public Morals. There it lay
until March 13th, two months and five days, when the proponents of the measure, realizing that they were
being tricked, made their protest so loud that the measure was reported by the Committee, but without
recommendation. There was no time then to pass the bill, and on March 15th it was withdrawn by its author.
The Estudillo bill, as it was known on the Senate side of the Capitol, had a more eventful history. Introduced
in the Senate on January 8th, it had gone to the famous Committee on Election Laws, which had been stacked
for the defeat of the Direct Primary bill. Estudillo was, to be sure, Chairman of the Committee, but a lamb
herding lions never had a harder job on its hands than did Estudillo. He could not get his committee together
to consider the wellbacked Direct Primary bill, let alone the worthy but not politically supported local
option measure.
Along about the middle of February, however, Estudillo succeeded in getting the committee to act. By a vote
of four to four the committee refused to recommend the Local Option bill for passage. Senator Stetson, who
favored the passage of the measure, to compel committee action and get the bill before the Senate, thereupon
moved that the bill be referred back to the Senate with recommendation that it do not pass. Senator Stetson's
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motion prevailed.
Thus, the measure went back to the Senate with a majority committee report that it do not pass. But in spite
of this adverse report, the Senate passed the measure on second reading and sent it to engrossment and third
reading. It looked very much just then as though the bill would pass the Senate.
But the resourceful machine had other plans. When the measure came up for final passage on February 24th,
instead of being voted upon, and passed or defeated, it was amended.
To amend a bill on third reading exasperates those who are supporting it as nothing else can. The bill must,
when thus amended, be reprinted and reengrossed before it can be passed. The delays thus caused very often
result in the defeat of the measure.
But the reprinted and reengrossed Local Option bill got back to the Senate on February 26th, and its
supporters could think of no other possible excuse for delaying its passage.
But the machine could, and did. On Senator Wolfe's motion the reader will no doubt remember that Senator
Wolfe led the fight against the Direct Primary bill, against the AntiGambling bill and against the effective
Stetson Railroad Regulation bill on Senator Wolfe's motion the Local Option bill, instead of being put on
its final passage, was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
At that time, the closing days of February, the Judiciary Committee was fairly swamped with important
measures. The Railroad Regulation bills, the Initiative Amendment, the measures providing for the
simplification of methods of criminal procedure and other bills of scarcely less importance were pending
before that committee. Prompt action on the Local Option bill was out of the question. And, although a
majority of the committee favored the passage of the bill, the minority which was against it took precious
good care that no undue haste should attend its consideration. Estudillo was in constant attendance upon the
committee, but to little purpose. It was not until March 4th that the committee acted. The action was, of
course, recommendation that the bill do pass.
The bill had been amended from time to time, but as it was finally approved by the Judiciary Committee was
a reasonably effective measure. It provided that on a petition signed by 25 per cent of the electors of any city,
or town, or county, the question of license or no license must be put on the regular election ballot. If a
majority of the electors voted against the issuing of liquor licenses in any city or town or township, the
governing body could no longer issue saloon licenses. Outside incorporated cities and towns, the basis of
prohibition was made the township, although the vote was to be taken throughout the county.
After the measure had been returned from the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, Estudillo fought manfully
to have it considered. He finally succeeded, on March 8th, in having the bill made a special order, that is to
say, he arranged that the Senate should consider it at 8 o'clock of Thursday, March 11th.
But when Thursday came it developed that Senators Stetson and Boynton could not be present that evening,
and they asked Estudillo to have the vote on the measure postponed until noon of the next day, Friday. This
Estudillo attempted to do. The thing was done with other bills every day. Had Wolfe made the request, for
example, or even Estudillo on any other measure than the Local Option bill, the request would have been
granted without thought or comment. But on Wolfe's objection Estudillo's request was denied. The machine
saw its opportunity and succeeded in having consideration of the bill postponed until the following Monday,
March 15th. This meant the defeat of the bill. Even had it passed the Senate on that date, filibustering tactics
would have defeated it in the Assembly.
Nevertheless, the backers of the measure although pleaded with by weakkneed Senators to withdraw the
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bill insisted upon a vote being taken, when the measure came up on March 15th. This decision compelled
Wolfe to make his famous "Fate of the Republican Party" speech, in which he predicted that if the Local
Option bill became a law, utter wreck would come upon the Republican party in California. Birdsall,
Caminetti, Holohan, Rush, Sanford and Strobridge, whose votes were ordinarily recorded against the machine
Senators, voted against the bill, as did Anthony and Curtin. Wright voted for the measure, but otherwise those
who had voted against the WalkerOtis AntiGambling bill, against a Statewide vote for United States
Senators, against the Stetson Railroad Regulation bill, in a word, those whom for the want of a better term we
call machine Senators, voted solidly against the Local Option bill[82].
The final showing for the Local Option bill was not a good one, but in spite of it, many in touch with
conditions in the Senate held that had the vote been taken in the middle of February instead of the middle of
March, the bill would have had a good chance for passage. After the delay of ten weeks from the time of its
introduction until the final vote upon it, there was no chance at all for it to become a law.
[81] Up to the legislative session of 1907, the County Government Act provided that the Supervisors of a
county could submit any question including the matter of regulating the liquor traffic to the voters for the
purpose of ascertaining their opinion upon the issue. There was, however, no way to compel the Supervisors
to take the action that might be thus decided upon by popular vote. The Supervisors could act upon the vote
or ignore it, as they saw fit.
The Legislature of 1907 transferred the County Government Act to the Codes. For some reason, either by
intention or oversight, the section which permitted Supervisors to submit questions to the people for an
advisory vote was omitted. It has been held that this action of the Legislature repealed the section by
implication. It is held, therefore, that no law is upon the Statute books by which the people may be permitted
to vote even in an advisory capacity upon any question of police regulation or public policy.
[80a] A fine example of a lightning switch of plan on the part of the machine came in the fight on the
Women's Suffrage Amendment. The tenderloin and liquor interests in general are opposed to the submission
of this amendment to the people, which means, of course, that the machine is against it. To submit the
amendment to the people, fiftyfour votes are required in the Assembly and twentyseven in the Senate. This
year, the program was to let the amendment pass the Assembly and defeat it in the Senate. Assemblymen
were allowed to pledge themselves to its support until there were fiftyeight Assemblymen down to vote for
it. Grove L. Johnson had introduced the measure in the Assembly, and its adoption by that body seemed
assured.
But the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill got in the way of Woman's Suffrage in a most curious manner. When
the passage of this antigambling bill became a certainty, that branch of the group of tenderloin Senators
whose interests were wrapped up in racetrack gambling, became "very sore." In their disgruntlement they
decided to give reform full swing, and put the Woman's Suffrage Amendment through the Senate. This
attitude seriously alarmed the safe, sane and respectable leaders of the machine, who see all sorts of trouble
for the machine if women are given the ballot. So to prevent its tenderloin associates in the Senate doing
anything rash, the machine decided rather late in the day to defeat the amendment in the Assembly.
When this decision was reached, and the order to carry it into effect given, the machine Assemblymen who
had agreed to vote for the amendment coolly forgot their pledges. Instead of fiftyeight votes, only
thirtynine were cast for the amendment.
Grove L. Johnson, who had introduced it, and who pretended to support it, agreed to move for its
reconsideration. When the hour for the motion for reconsideration came, Johnson huddled up in his seat,
looking neither to right or left, let the opportunity pass.
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The vote by which the amendment was defeated was as follows:
For the amendment: Barndollar, Bohnett, Butler, Callan, Cattell, Coghlan, Cogswell, Collum, Costar, Cronin,
Drew, Gibbons, Gillis, Hayes, Hewitt, Hinkle, Holmquist, Hopkins, Johnson of Sacramento, Johnson of San
Diego, Johnson of Placer, Juilliard, Kehoe, Maher, Melrose, Mendenhall, Otis, O'Neil, Polsley, Pulcifer,
Sackett, Silver, Stuckenbruck, Telfer, Webber, Wheelan, Wilson, Wyllie, Young 39.
Against the amendment: Baxter, Beardslee, Beatty, Beban, Collier, Cullen, Dean, Feeley, Flavelle, Fleisher,
Flint, Gerdes, Greer, Griffiths, Hammon, Hanlon, Hans, Hawk, Johnston of Contra Costa, Leeds, Lightner,
Macaulay, McClellan, McManus, Moore, Mott, Nelson, Odom, Preston, Pugh, Rech, Rutherford, Schmitt,
Stanton, Transue, Wagner, Whitney 37.
[82] The vote on the local option bill was as follows:
For the bill Bell, Black, Boynton, Campbell, Cartwright, Cutten, Estudillo, Miller, Roseberry, Thompson,
Walker, Wright 12.
Against the bill Anthony, Bills, Birdsall, Burnett, Caminetti, Curtin, Finn, Hare, Hartman, Holohan, Hurd,
Kennedy, Leavitt, Lewis, Martinelli, McCartney, Price, Reily, Rush, Sanford, Strobridge, Weed, Welch,
Willis, Wolfe 25.
Chapter XIX. Defeat of the Initiative Amendment.
As in the Case of Other Reform Measures It Was Held Back Until Near the Close of the Session Principle
Adopted by Many California Municipalities Machine Thoroughly Aroused to Its Importance.
A most estimable old lady once tried with indifferent success to hold back the incoming tide of the Atlantic
with a broom. As one watches the efforts of the machine, through such agents as Gus Hartman, Eddie Wolfe
and Frank Leavitt, to stem the reform movement which is sweeping the country, he is strongly reminded of
the old lady's endeavor.
To be sure, the machine, at the legislative session of 1909, by trick and clever manipulation succeeded in
preventing any very effective reform legislation going on the Statute books. But nevertheless the machine
was compelled in response to the popular demand to permit the passage of a direct primary law, however
inadequate and disappointing it may prove to be, and a railroad regulation law, however ineffective.
The machine's success was not on the whole so much in its permanent defeat of good measures as in delaying
their adoption. The machine, except in the case of the racetrack gamblers, could and did put off the day of
the people's reckoning with machineprotected interests, but on desperately small margins at times, and
under conditions which point plainly to the machine's ultimate undoing.
A bull once attempted to stop a freight train with his head. The train was brought to a standstill and the
animal driven off the track. A short time later the bull tried the same experiment with an express train. The
train did not stop, nor was it seriously delayed.
The aim of the reform movement is to place the government of Nation, State and city back into the hands of
the people. To this end States and municipalities throughout the country are trying the direct primary system
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of nominating candidates for office, extending the principle of local option, establishing the Initiative, the
Referendum and the Recall, and experimenting, often with admirable success, sometimes with discouraging
failure, with other "wicked innovations," as Assemblyman Grove L. Johnson would call them.
Without the machine fully appreciating what has been going on, California has for a decade or more been
pushing rapidly to the fore in the promotion of these reforms. In this State the reform policies have found
their best expression in recently adopted municipal charters. These charters must be ratified by the
Legislature, but up to the session just closed their ratification "wicked innovations and all" has met with
no particular opposition.
Thus we find most of the modern charters of California municipalities containing provisions for really
effective primary nominations by the people[83], for the initiation of laws, for the referendum, even for the
recall from office of corrupt officials, which have placed in the hands of the people of the cities a club over
the machine which has proved most effective.
But the machine is now fully alive to what such provisions as the initiative and the recall mean. When, for
example, the machine in control of the City Council attempted to deny the Western Pacific right of way
through the City of Sacramento, the people resorted to the charter provision granting them the Initiative, and
by their direct vote awarded the right of way.
Even while the Legislature was in session, one of the machine's most effective workers, Walter Parker, could
not be present at his post at Sacramento, because he was required at Los Angeles, where, because of the
"recall," the machine was in a peck of trouble.
The people of that city were employing the recall provision of their charter against the machine Mayor
trapped in corruption. Although the then Mayor is a "Democrat" and Parker a "Republican," Parker's presence
was required at Los Angeles to back the machine's efforts to hold the Mayor in his job.
So Parker could not be at Sacramento, where the machine really needed him. The machine leaders did not
think it possible that a real Mayor especially a machine Mayor could be dismissed from office through
such a "fool innovation" as the recall. But that's what, in spite of machine efforts, happened at Los Angeles.
These experiences and others like them, forced it upon the understanding of machine leaders that the
initiative, recall and similar "innovations," have a business end; that they put altogether too much power into
the hands of the people for the machine's safety.
Up to the session of 1909 there had been practically no opposition to the ratification of charters adopted by
the several municipalities. But this year the machine leader in the Senate, Wolfe, let it be known that he
would henceforth oppose "freak charters," "freak charters" to Senator Wolfe being those of the
initiativereferendumrecall order.
Several municipalities Berkeley, San Diego, Palo Alto, Santa Barbara, San Bernardino, Richmond, Los
Angeles, Pasadena and Oakland had either sent new charters or important amendments to existing charters
to the Legislature for ratification. Many of the charters and amendments came decidedly under Wolfe's ideas
of "freak." But there are some extremes to which the machine dare not go, and it did not dare to go on record
as against popular municipal government. Wolfe and his associates could and did grumble, but they did not
dare refuse the several charters and charter amendments ratification.
So they let the charters and charter amendments go by them and braced themselves against granting
Statewide initiative.
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That issue came up in the form of a proposed amendment to the State Constitution introduced by Senator
Black, which gave the people of the State the power enjoyed by the people of Oregon and of the more
advanced California municipalities, the power to initiate laws.
Black's amendment provided that on petition of eight per cent of the electors of the State proposing a law or
Constitutional amendment, such law or amendment must be submitted to a vote of the people at the next
general election, precisely as Constitutional amendments are now submitted. If the proposed law or
amendment received a majority vote it was to become a law of the State, independent of Legislative action. In
a word, the people of California, had the amendment carried, would have been able to initiate the laws which
govern them.
Naturally, the machine, always on thin ice at best, thoroughly aroused to what the initiative means, opposed
any such "wicked innovation."
In its opposition, the machine was backed by that extreme conservatism, which, while sincere enough,
forever hangs on the coattails of progress; the conservatism which even in New England as late as 1860 drew
back its respectable skirts from abolition; the conservatism which, dragged protesting over a crisis, never fails
to assume for itself all the credit for what has been accomplished. Thus the machine had some very
respectable assistance in its efforts against the Initiative Amendment, the measure which more than any other
before the Legislature was calculated to take the government of California out of machine hands[84].
On the other hand, the amendment had strong backing. It had been drawn up at the instance of the Direct
Legislation League, which numbers among its members many of the foremost bankers, capitalists, educators
and public men of the State Rudolph Spreckels, Francis J. Heney, James D. Phelan, of San Francisco, and
Dr. John R. Haynes of Los Angeles, and others fully as prominent being among the League's most active
supporters.
In addition, the amendment had the endorsement of the State Grange, of, the Labor Unions, of the State,
county and municipal Democratic conventions, and of many of the municipal and county Republican
conventions.
But there were plenty of reasons given why the amendment should not be submitted to the people. Perhaps
the most amusing came from Senator Wright, of Direct Primary and Railroad Regulation notoriety. Senator
Wright held that inasmuch as the Direct Primary will result in the election of highclass legislators, the
initiative will not be necessary.
But the two principal objections raised to the initiative were that:
1. It would lead to a flood of bills being submitted to the people.
2. That the people would not take sufficient interest in the proposed laws to consider them carefully.
Both these objections were readily answered by the proponents of the amendment, who gave the experience
of States in which the initiative has been tried.
Oregon, for example, adopted the initiative in 1902. In 1904 but two proposed laws were introduced under it;
in 1906, five; and in 1908, nineteen. Inasmuch as in 1908 California voted upon twentyone constitutional
amendments and statutes which had been submitted by the Legislature of 1907, it will be seen that Oregon
was not particularly submerged by a flood of electorinitiated legislation.
In Canton Berne, Switzerland, where for half a century all the laws have been adopted by the initiative
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system, the average of laws proposed has been only two and a half a year.
As to the second objection, it was easily shown that in Oregon the keenest interest is taken in the measures
proposed through the initiative. Some were shown to have been adopted by enormous majorities; others to
have been rejected by majorities as large.
Thus the objections to the amendment were easily disposed of.
Their arguments answered, the opponents of the amendment schemed to prevent its consideration until the
closing days of the session or prevent consideration entirely.
In the Assembly, the amendment had been introduced by Drew of Fresno. It was referred to the Committee
on Constitutional Amendments, where it was smothered to death. Although referred to the committee on
January 11, the committee took no action upon it. Coghlan of San Francisco was chairman of the committee;
associated with him were Legislators of the types of Johnson of Sacramento, McClelland and Baxter. In vain
those advocating the adoption of the amendment urged the committee to act. Meetings were indeed arranged,
at which the proponents of the reform would be present, but the committeemen would fail to attend.
A less exasperating, but no less effective fight was carried on in the Senate.
On the Senate side, the amendment introduced by Black went to the Judiciary Committee. This committee
was made up of the nineteen lawyers in the Senate, every lawyer going on the committee. But Warren Porter
named the order of their rank, and the chairman and the four ranking members of the committee voted
eternally with the WolfeLeavitt faction. On a straight vote the majority of the committee was against the
machine, as was shown in the fight for an effective railroad regulation bill. But when it came to getting
results in the Senate Judiciary Committee, craft and leadership, as has been shown in previous chapters, not
infrequently overcame numbers.
On February 16, the reform element of the committee insisted that action be taken on the amendment.
Chairman Willis was reluctant to put the question. Few machine members of the committee were in
attendance. The antimachine members were insistent. Willis was finally forced to put the question, and the
amendment, after the percentage of voters required to sign a petition for the initiation of a law had been
raised from eight to twelve per cent, was favorably reported back to the Senate.
But Senator Willis was able to do on the floor of the Senate what he had been unable to do in the committee,
namely, secure further delay. He protested to the Senate at the "snap judgment" of his committee, with the
result that it was rereferred to that body. The committee, however, for the second time sent it back to the
Senate with the recommendation that it be adopted.
Then followed a series of delays in the Senate, so that the measure was not brought to vote until March 11th.
For the adoption of a Constitutional amendment, a twothirds vote twentyseven is required in the
Senate. The proponents of the amendment had good reason to believe that that number of Senators would
vote for its adoption. The Senators counted upon to vote for the amendment were: Anthony, Bell, Birdsall,
Black, Boynton, Caminetti, Campbell, Cutten, Estudillo, Hare, Kennedy, McCartney, Reily, Roseberry,
Rush, Sanford, Stetson, Thompson, Walker, Welch 20, who actually voted for the amendment; Finn,
Strobridge, Cartwright and Holohan, who were absent when the vote was taken, but who were pledged to the
reform; Lewis, Bills, Curtin and Miller, who were counted on the side of the amendment until it came to a
vote. This made twentyeight votes, one more than enough for adoption.
Kennedy, Reily, Welch, Finn and Hare, usually against reform legislation, were counted for the Initiative
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because of convention obligations which could not well be ignored. Lewis, McCartney and Bills were
counted for it because of their alleged promise of its support; Curtin and Miller because the Democratic State
Convention had endorsed the Initiative, and for the further reason that Curtin and Miller were ordinarily for
reform legislation.
But on the vote, the unfortunate Hare, Kennedy, Reily, McCartney and Welch remained true to their
obligations, while Curtin and Miller disappointed those who had expected their support. The negative vote of
Bills and Lewis did not cause much disappointment, for little else was to have been expected, and anyway,
the negative votes of Curtin and Miller were enough to defeat the amendment.
Curtin and Miller, in spite of their party's endorsement of the policy, expressed themselves as "scandalized"
at such an idea as the Initiative. But as good men as Miller and Curtin were scandalized at the idea of
abolition in 1860, only to become the most earnest supporters of the Emancipation Proclamation three years
later.
Reform waves, like the Atlantic Ocean, are not kept back with brooms or Gus Hartmans.
[83] For example the charters of Los Angeles and of Berkeley. The Berkeley charter is a model in this
respect. It provides that any qualified citizen may become a candidate for municipal office, by petition of
twentyfive electors, AND IN NO OTHER WAY. The party tag is thus done away with. At the election, if a
candidate receive a majority of the votes he is declared elected. If no candidate receive a majority, then a
second election is held at which the two candidates receiving the highest pluralities become candidates, the
names of all other candidates who participated at the first election are dropped. The candidate at the second
election who receives the majority is declared elected. A movement is on foot to have a similar provision
incorporated into the San Francisco charter.
[84] "As a source of public education upon which free government must always rest, as a means of
conservative progress, upon which the continued life of all nations depends, as a check upon paternalism and
rich gifts calculated to lull to sleep the love of freedom, as the key that may be used to open the door to equal
opportunity, the Initiative is fundamentally more important than all other proposed reforms put together. "
Arthur Twining Hadley, LL. D., in "The Constitutional Position of Property in America."
It is interesting to note, that nearly a quarter of a century ago. Bryce in his American Commonwealth, pointed
out that this country could not without the initiation of laws by The People enjoy the fruits of its institutions.
Chapter XX. Defeat of the AntiJapanese Bills[86].
Stir Storm in the Assembly, But All the Bills Were Finally Defeated Grove L. Johnson Denounces Action
of Governor Gillett and President Roosevelt Speaker Stanton Places Himself in a Very Embarrassing
Position His Effective Speech Becomes a Joke.
The Japanese problem under the bludgeoning of the big stick in the skilled hands of President Roosevelt, and
free application of the organization switch in the hands of Governor Gillett, was kept fairly well under control
during the entire session. That the problem is real was demonstrated by the numerous resolutions and
alienregulation bills which were introduced in both Houses. The Assembly, however, was the scene of the
final defeat of the antiJapanese element. There the legislative campaign against the Japanese was fought out,
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and there it was lost.
The contest in the Assembly narrowed down to three measures, Assembly Bill 78, introduced by Drew of
Fresno, known as the "Alien Land Bill"; Assembly Bill 14, known as the "AntiJapanese School Bill," and
Assembly Bill 32, known as the "Municipal Segregation Bill," both introduced by Johnson of Sacramento.
The final defeat of these bills settled the Japanese question so far as the legislative session of 1909 was
concerned.
Drew's Alien Land bill was by far the most important of the three. It was in effect a copy of the alien land law
at present in force in the State of Illinois, and generally known as the "Illinois Law." Under its provisions an
alien acquiring title to lands situate in this State, was given five years in which to become a citizen of the
United States; failing to become a citizen, he was required to dispose of his holdings to a citizen; failing so to
do, the necessary machinery was provided for the District Attorney of the county in which the land was
situated to dispose of it, and turn the proceeds of the sale over to the alien owner. Ample protection was
provided for alien minors who might possess or might become possessed of California real property.
Furthermore, under the provisions of the law, the leasing of land to aliens for a longer period than one year
was prohibited.
Though the word, "Japanese," did not appear, the bill's introduction was a shot which if not heard round the
world, at least reached Washington on the East and Tokio on the West. Finally, on January 25, Governor
Gillett made the Alien bills pending before the Legislature subject of a special message to Senate and
Assembly, in which he urged the Legislature to do nothing that would disrupt the pleasant relations existing
between America and Japan, and recommended that an appropriation be made to enable the Labor
Commissioner to take a census showing the number of Japanese now in the State, with such other
information regarding them as could be used in making a proper report to the President and Congress[87a].
Governor Gillett in the paragraph of his message[87] which dealt with the Alien Land bill, stated that the
measure might be amended so that its passage would not embarrass the Federal Government. Mr. Drew
promptly sent the Governor a note, inquiring "how amended." The Governor replied[88], stating that, in his
judgment the best possible law that could be passed on the question of alien ownership of land would be the
law which had been adopted by Oklahoma. Furthermore, the Governor expressed the opinion that such a law
would be satisfactory to President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Mr. Drew was quick to act on the suggestion. He not only yielded to the Governor's wishes[89], but in the
teeth of the severest opposition from the San Francisco delegation, forced delay of the passage of his bill until
the Oklahoma law could be substituted for that taken from the Illinois Statutes.
The substitute measure provided that "no alien shall acquire title or own land in the State of California," but
the provisions of the act further provided that the law "shall not apply to lands now owned in this State by
aliens so long as they are held by their present owners."
The substitute measure was introduced on February 1st; it came up for passage on February 3rd. In the two
days which elapsed between the introduction and final action on the bill, the high State authorities decided to
oppose it. Speaker Phil Stanton employed his influence against it; one by one its supports who could "be
reached" were "pulled down." Drew found himself at the final with slight following. The bill was defeated by
the decisive vote of 28 to 48. Mott gave notice of motion to reconsider, but the next day reconsideration was
denied.
The day following the defeat of the Alien Land bill, February 4th, the "AntiJapanese School Bill" and the
"Municipal Segregation Bill" came up for final action. There was also Assembly Bill 15, classed as an
antiJapanese measure, which came up on the same day. It, as in the case of the two others, had been
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introduced by Johnson of Sacramento, by far the ablest parliamentarian in the Legislature. Drew had used
facts and figures when arguing for his alien land bills; Johnson seasoned his statistics with a sarcasm[90] as
peppery as one of Mr. Roosevelt's ingenuous opinions on "nature fakers." But while Mr. Johnson entertained
with his wit and his invective, he failed to overcome the tremendous influence, State and Federal, that had
been brought to bear against his bills. Assembly Bill 15, denying aliens the right to serve as directors on
California corporations, was defeated by a vote of 15 for to 53 against. Assembly Bill 32, the "Municipal
Segregation Bill,"[91] was defeated by the close vote of 39 for to 35 against, 41 votes being required for its
passage.
And then the Assembly took another tack, and by a vote of 45 to 29, passed Assembly Bill 14, the
AntiJapanese School bill. Leeds changed his vote from no to aye to give notice that he would the next
legislative day move to reconsider the vote by which the bill had been passed. The Assembly then adjourned.
The day had been eventful. A more eventful was to follow.
The passage of Assembly Bill 14, after the defeat of the other socalled antiJapanese measures, brought a
characteristic telegram from President Roosevelt to Governor Gillett. "This (Assembly Bill 14) is the most
offensive bill of them all," telegraphed the President, "and in my judgment is clearly unconstitutional, and we
should at once have to test it in the courts. Can it not be stopped in the Legislature or by veto?"
Governor Gillett incorporated that telegram in a message which he sent to Senate and Assembly the next day.
"A telegram so forcible as this," said the Governor, "from the President of the United States, is entitled to full
consideration, and demands that no hasty or illconsidered action be taken by this State which may involve
the whole country. It seems to me that it is time to lay sentiment and personal opinion and considerations
aside and take a broad and unprejudiced view of the important question involved in the proposed legislation,
and in a calm and dispassionate manner pass upon them, keeping in mind not only the interests of our State,
but of the Nation as well, and the duty we owe to it in observing the treaties entered into by it with a friendly
power."
"I trust," concluded the Governor, "that no action will be taken which will violate any treaty made by our
country or in any manner question its good faith. I most respectfully submit this message to you with the full
hope and belief that when final action shall be taken nothing will be done which can be the subject of
criticism by the people of this Nation, and that no law will be enacted which will be in contravention of the
Constitution or any treaty of the United States."
The Governor's message was not at all well received[92]; in fact, Governor and message were denounced by
both Republican and Democratic Assemblymen.
From the hour that the bill had been passed, the Governor had been in consultation with his lieutenants in the
Assembly. Speaker Stanton made canvass of the situation. But little headway was made. That reconsideration
would be denied was evident. Leeds, to save the situation, moved that reconsideration be postponed until
February 10th. An amendment was made that it be rereferred to the Judiciary Committee. It was on this
amended motion that the issue was fought out.
"I know what you want," declared Johnson of Sacramento in his opening speech, "and you know it. You want
to bury this bill. You want time to hold another caucus on the question and decide what you will do. You
want time to take another canvass of this Assembly."
Had the question been put when Johnson had concluded, reconsideration would unquestionably have been
denied. In the emergency, Speaker Stanton left his desk and took the floor to plead for delay. For once in his
life, at least, Phil Stanton was impressive. He did not say much, and as the sequel showed he had little to
say but there was a suggestion of thundering guns and sacked cities and marching armies in his words, that
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caused the listening statesmen to follow him with unstatesmenlike uneasiness.
"It was not my intention," said Stanton, "to take the floor unless we were confronted by some grave crisis.
Such a crisis is, in my opinion, upon us. I not only believe it, but I know it. But my lips are sealed."
"I would that I could tell you what I know, but I cannot for the present. But I can tell you that we are treading
upon dangerous ground. I can feel it slipping from under my feet."
"In my judgment this matter should be postponed. I believe that further information will, within a few days,
be given you."
The psychological moment had come in the history of Assembly Bill 14. All eyes were turned on Johnson of
Sacramento. It was for him to say whether the postponement asked should be granted. Had Johnson said
"no," such was the attitude of the Assembly at that moment, reconsideration of the measure would
unquestionably have been denied, and Assembly Bill 14 declared passed by the House of its origin.
But Johnson did not say "no."[93] Instead, he entered upon a rambling excuse for advocating acquiescence in
Stanton's request for delay. He rambled on that he believed that Governor Gillett had been indiscreet; that he
(Johnson) did not propose to be dictated to by a "fanatical President eternally seeking the limelight."
"But," concluded Johnson, "I have listened to the words of our Speaker, and I see that he is profoundly
moved. For this reason I am willing that the bill go over until Wednesday, but out of respect to our Speaker,
and for no one else on earth."
When Johnson sat down, one could have heard a pin drop. Not a dissenting voice was heard. Further
consideration of the measure was postponed until February 10.
The day preceding final action on the bill was given over to conferences and caucuses. The Democrats
caucused and agreed to stand as a unit for the bill. Grove L. Johnson's immediate followers rallied to its
support. On the other hand, a conference of those opposing the measure was held in Governor Gillett's office.
Grove L. Johnson is alleged to have been called to the carpet. He was asked to withdraw his support of the
measure. Johnson is quoted as replying:
"Show me why I should not support it. Give me the reasons, the facts and figures, why Roosevelt has any
right to interfere with this measure. I want something definite. I have heard these suppositions and
insinuations for years and years. Let me know, gentlemen, what information you have confided to you that
should induce me to withdraw my support and bow to the telegram from Roosevelt."
The hour for reconsideration of the bill, 11 a. m. of February 10, arrived with the situation practically
unchanged. Assemblyman Transue, Stanton's right hand man in the fight against the bill, presented an
elaborate resolution, laboriously prepared by the opponents of the measure, setting forth why it should be
defeated[94]. In it the right of the State to pass such schoolregulating laws as it may see fit was affirmed,
and the constitutionality of the pending measure alleged, but the Assembly was urged to do nothing to disturb
the relations existing between this Government and a friendly power. The resolution did not strengthen the
position of the opponents of the bill in the least. In fact, several of their number were estranged. So worked
up had the Assemblymen become, that Beardslee of San Joaquin moved that Transue's resolution be
considered in executive session, but the motion was lost. The resolution was later withdrawn.
The debate turned principally on demands from the supporters of the bill, that Speaker Stanton tell why he
had felt "the ground slipping from under his feet" in his speech of six days before. But Stanton wouldn't or
couldn't tell. He leaned on his gavel through it all looking very foolish indeed.
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These speeches of denunciation pleased the supporters of the bill immensely, but the luxury of denouncing
Stanton defeated the bill. Had the vote been taken at the forenoon session, reconsideration would undoubtedly
have been denied. But so much time was taken in making Stanton feel foolish, that the hour of recess arrived,
and the Assembly scattered until two o'clock.
This brief respite gave the opponents of the measure a last opportunity. They improved it by bringing over to
their side enough members of the San Francisco delegation to win reconsideration, and the measure's defeat.
When the Assembly reconvened after the noon recess, the members by a vote of 43 to 34 granted the bill
reconsideration, and by a vote of 37 ayes to 41 noes defeated it[95].
Although the Senate escaped the sensational scenes that attended the suppression of the Japanese problem in
the Assembly, nevertheless Japanese bills and resolutions, with attending debates, made their appearance
there. Caminetti, for example, introduced a duplicate of the Johnson antiJapanese School bill, which was
referred to the Senate Committee on Education and never heard from again.
Senate Bill No. 492, introduced by Senator Anthony, made more trouble. This measure gave the people of the
State an opportunity to express themselves at the polls on the Japanese question. The Committee on Labor,
Capital and Immigration recommended the measure for passage, and it was finally forced to a vote, being
defeated by twelve votes for and twentytwo against[96].
A series of Senate antiJapanese resolutions which were finally included in Senate joint Resolution No.
6[97], almost led to a riot in the Assembly. After a deal of pulling and hauling in the Senate the resolution
was finally adopted and went to the Assembly. In the Assembly, Speaker Stanton, as "a select committee of
one," took the resolution under his protection. The indications being that the "select committee of one" would
fail to report, a storm was started by an attack on Stanton's authority to be a "select committee of one" at all.
The assailants were repulsed. Nevertheless, "the select committee of one," after holding the measure a week,
recommended that it be referred to the Committee on Federal Relations. The measure was finally adopted and
went to the Governor.
[86] The Assembly vote on the four principal Japanese issues will be found in Table I of the Appendix.
[87a] A bill providing funds for such a census was introduced and became a law.
[87] The paragraph in Governor Gillett's message which deals with the Alien Land bill, read as follows:
"If you believe the general policy of this State and its future development demands that all aliens, that is,
citizens of other countries, should be discouraged in making investments here, and that no alien should be
permitted to become the owner in fee simple of any lands within this State agricultural, grazing or mineral,
or of any city property for the purposes of trade, commerce or manufacturing then enact a law forbidding
the same, but see to it that it affects the subjects of all nations alike, and that under its provisions the citizens
of Japan shall have equal privileges with those of England and other favored nations; otherwise you might
create a situation which may prove to be embarrassing to the Federal Government. Mr. Drew's bill might be
so amended, but in its present form it clearly, as no doubt was intended, discriminates against the citizens of
China and Japan. Whether any bill should pass at this time which will discourage foreign capital from
seeking investments in our State is a most serious question and one not lightly to be considered. But that is a
question I leave for you to solve."
[88] The Governor's letter was in full as follows:
Hon. A. M. Drew: Your little note was received.
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"I am inclined to think that the best possible law that can be passed on the question of alien ownership of land
would be the law adopted by Oklahoma. You will find it in the session laws of the State of Oklahoma, 1907
and 1908. The book is on file in the State Library. The Act is on page 481.
"I would strike out of the first line the words 'who is not a citizen of the United States,' because that is
useless. No alien is a citizen of the United States, and cannot be.
"Then I notice the second line of Section 3, instead of having 'devise,' the word is 'device.' I suppose this must
be a typographical error.
"To this bill might be added the last section of your bill, extending the time in which leases can be given so
many years on agricultural property and so many years on city property. I think one year is rather short;
inasmuch as this would apply to all aliens alike, I would be reasonable as to the length of time for which
leases should be granted.
"I am also of the opinion that President Roosevelt and Secretary Root would agree that this bill would be all
right in fact, I have telegrams from them which would indicate such to be the fact. Of course, the question
whether or not it would be policy to pass an alien law in this State is something that the Legislature would
have to consider, but if such a law is to pass, as I say, I am inclined to believe that one like the Oklahoma law
would probably be the best."
[89] Assemblyman Drew's reply to the Governor's letter suggesting that the Oklahoma law be substituted for
the original bill, was as follows:
"Your esteemed favor of the 26th inst., is before me, and I can assure you that I appreciate the spirit in which
you have considered the Alien Land bill, presented by myself in the Assembly. I am strictly in accord with
the changes you suggest. The words 'who is not a citizen of the United States' are surplusage and could easily
have been left out, but they are found in both the Illinois and Oklahoma laws. I am glad the President takes
the view of the matter that he does, and you may rest assured that I will work in harmony with yourself.
However, I deem it advisable that some law should be enacted at this session of the Legislature. I think it will
be wisdom on our part to take this step, and surely our neighbor, Japan, cannot complain so long as the bill is
applicable to all aliens alike. I will submit to you a draft of the amended bill as soon as I can get it in shape."
[90] Johnson addressed himself directly to President Roosevelt and Governor Gillett. The following
paragraphs are taken at random from his speech:
"I expect some member of the Assembly to introduce a bill here, the first section of which shall read: 'Before
any legislation is enacted it shall bear the approval of James N. Gillett and President Roosevelt and if it is
denied, the bill shall be withdrawn.' "
"Some of you think legislation is like patent medicine. It must bear on the bill, the label: 'None genuine
without the note, This is a good bill, James N. Gillett.' "
"What right have we, mere Assemblymen, to have an opinion on any matter? Why should we, who were sent
here by the people for the sake of convenience and formality, have any independence in our thought? What
right have we to do anything but listen in awe and reverence to the words of wisdom that drop from the
tongues of Governor James N. Gillett and Theodore Roosevelt?
"Of course we must surrender our individual opinion, and bow to the superior intellects of the 'Imperial
Power,' which Mr. Beardslee loves so well. Since we must vote, as a matter of course, what right have we to
vote otherwise than as the distinguished Governor and President say in their infinite certainty?"
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Johnson complained bitterly of the interference of the President with the State and of the Governor with the
Legislature.
"I have," said Johnson, "all respect for the intellect of James N. Gillett, Governor of California, and for his
superior, President Roosevelt. But I am sent into this Chamber by my constituents and not by Governor
James N. Gillett. I have been returned here again and again, and not because I bowed to the authority of
James N. Gillett. I am here for the good of my people, the people who supported me, and who expect me to
support them. I know more about the Japanese than Governor Gillett and President Roosevelt put together. I
am not responsible to either of them."
"I am responsible to the mothers and fathers of Sacramento County who have their little daughters sitting side
by side in the school rooms with matured Japs, with their base minds, their lascivious thoughts, multiplied by
their race and strengthened by their mode of life."
"I am here to protect the children of these parents. To do all that I can to keep any Asiatic man from mingling
in the same school with the daughters of our people. You know the results of such a condition; you know
how far it will go, and I have seen Japanese 25 years old sitting in the seats next to the pure maids of
California. I shuddered then and I shudder now, the same as any other parent will shudder to think of such a
condition."
[91] The purpose of the Municipal Segregation bill, as set forth in its title, was "to confer power upon
municipalities to protect the health, morals and peace of their inhabitants by restricting undesirable, improper
and unhealthy persons and persons whose practices are dangerous to public morals and health and peace to
certain prescribed limits, and prescribing a punishment for a violation of this Act."
The bill in full was as follows:
"Section 1. Whenever in the opinion of the governing body of any municipality the presence of undesirable,
improper and unhealthy persons, or the presence of persons whose practices are dangerous to public morals
and health and peace is deemed to exist in the said municipality and to be dangerous to the public morals and
health and peace of said municipality and its inhabitants, the said governing body is hereby empowered to so
declare by ordinance and is hereby empowered and authorized to prescribe by ordinance the district and
limits within which said persons shall reside in said municipality, and thereafter it shall be unlawful for any
person of the class so declared to reside in any other portion of said municipality than within the said district
and limits so fixed.
"See. 2. A violation of the provisions of this Act shall be deemed a misdemeanor and shall be punished as
such."
[92] "Never before have I heard of a time," said Assemblyman Cronin, "when a Governor has sent such a
message to a Legislature. I am responsible to my constituents for my actions on this floor and I resent such
interference. I hold the Governor's action to be indiscreet. He has no more right to send such a message to this
House than have we to dictate to the Supreme Court a policy on any action pending before it, on the ground
that the best interests of the State depend upon their regarding our Instructions.
"Can we dictate to the Governor the course that is to be pursued in an executive matter? Let us stand by our
guns."
"If the men change their votes on account of this fanciful talk from the President and the Governor," said
Johnson of Sacramento, "I shall certainly be pained and surprised. They do not know the conditions as I know
them. We have a right to protect our State, and it will not interfere with any international relations, and they
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know it. Their specious argument will not change my vote one bit. I know what The People want what I
want. I know influence has been brought to bear. It will be further brought to bear. Now I trust this vote will
not suffer by you men changing your minds for such groundless reasons."
"Since yesterday," said Assemblyman Gibbons, "I have changed my views. I thought there were three
departments in this Government, but I find I was mistaken. I recognize the error of my youthful belief. I
know now that the Legislative and the Executive are one, or, rather, that the Executive is the Legislative."
[93] The question has been asked was Johnson sincere in his advocacy of the AntiJapanese measures? The
writer does not presume to answer; the workings of Grove L. Johnson's mind and conscience are, for the
writer at least, too intricate for analysis. But Grove L. Johnson voted for antiracetrack gambling bills for
years, spoke for them and fought for them as keenly as he did for the AntiJapanese bills, always on the
losing side. But when an antiracetrack gambling bill was before the Assembly with some prospect of
passage, Grove L. Johnson was found the leader of those opposed to its passage. In the case in point, to
Grove L. Johnson, and not President Roosevelt or Governor Gillett, or even Phil Stanton, is due the credit for
postponement of consideration of Assembly Bill 14, a postponement which meant its defeat.
[94] The Transue resolution will be found in full In the appendix.
[95] Speaker Stanton very modestly took much credit for the defeat of the bill. The following telegram was
on its way to Washington almost before the vote had been announced:
"Sacramento, February 10.Theodore Roosevelt, White House Washington, D. C. The Assembly just
reconsidered and refused passage of the Japanese School bill. My congratulations.
P. A. STANTON."
The reply was as follows:
"Washington, February 10.Hon. P. A. Stanton, Speaker of the Assembly, Sacramento, Cal. Accept my
heartiest thanks and congratulations for the great service you have rendered on behalf of The People of the
United States. I thank the people of California and their representatives in the Legislature.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT."
A further telegram was sent to Governor Gillett:
"Washington, February 10. To Governor J. N. Gillett, Sacramento Cal. Accept my heartiest
congratulations. All good Americans appreciate what you have done. Pray extend my congratulations
individually to all who have aided you. I feel that the way in which California has done what was right for the
Nation makes it more than ever obligatory on the Nation in every way to safeguard the interests of California.
All that I personally can do toward this end, whether in public or private life, shall most certainly be done.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT."
[96] The vote on Senate Bill 492 was as follows:
For the bill Anthony, Black, Burnett, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright, Finn, Hartman, Holohan, Reily,
Sanford, and Welch 12.
Against the bill Bates, Bell, Bills, Birdsall, Boynton, Curtin, Cutten, Hurd, Leavitt, Lewis, Martinelli,
McCartney, Miller, Price, Rush, Savage, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker, Weed, Willis, and Wright 22.
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Absentees Estudillo, Hare, Kennedy, Roseberry, Stetson, and Wolfe 6.
[97] Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, which, as finally adopted, was a committee substitute for Senate Joint
Resolution Nos. 6, 7, 11 and 17. It follows:
Whereas, The progress, happiness, and prosperity of the people of a nation depend upon a homogeneous
population;
Whereas, The influx from overpopulated nations of Asia of people who are unsuited for American citizenship
or for assimilation with the Caucasian race, has resulted and will result in lowering the American standard of
life and the dignity and wageearning capacity of American labor;
Whereas, The exclusion of Chinese laborers under the existing exclusion laws of the United States has tended
to preserve the economic and social welfare of the people;
Whereas, We view with alarm any proposed repeal of such exclusion laws and the substituting therefor of
general laws;
Whereas, The interest of California can best be safeguarded by the retention of said exclusion laws, and by
extending their terms and provisions to other Asiatic people;
Whereas, The people of the Eastern states, and the United States generally, have an erroneous impression as
to the real sentiment of the people of the Pacific Coast relative to the Asiatic question;
Whereas, We think it right and proper that the people of this country should be advised as to our true position
on that question; therefore, be it
Resolved, by the Senate and Assembly jointly, That we respectfully urge the Congress of the United States to
maintain intact the present Chinese exclusion laws and instead of taking any action looking to the repeal of
said exclusion laws, to extend the terms and provisions thereof so as to apply to and include all Asiatics;
Resolved, That our Senators be instructed and Representatives in Congress requested to use all honorable
means to carry out the foregoing recommendation and requests;
Resolved, That the Governor of California be, and he is, directed to transmit a certified copy of these
resolutions to the President and Speaker, respectively, of the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States, and to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress.
The resolution was adopted in the Senate by the following vote:
Ayes Senators Anthony, Bates, Bills, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Burnett, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright,
Curtin, Cutten, Finn, Hare, Hartman, Holohan, Kennedy, Leavitt, Lewis, McCartney, Miller, Reily, Rush,
Sanford, Savage, Walker, Welch, and Wolfe 28.
Noes Senators Bell, Price, Roseberry, Stetson, Thompson, Weed, and Willis 7.
The resolution was adopted in the Assembly on March 23. There was no call for the ayes and noes, and no
record was made of the vote.
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Chapter XXI. The Rule Against Lobbying.
Scandals of the Session of 1907 and the Dread of Pinkerton Detectives Led to a Rule Under Which Machine
Lobbyists Could Work with Perfect Safety, While Advocates of Reform Measures Could Be Barred From
Both Senate and Assembly.
One of the principal scandals of the Legislative session of 1907 was the openness with which machine
lobbyists invaded Senate and Assembly chamber. They went so far as to move from member to member
during rollcalls, giving Senator or Assemblyman, as the case might be, a proprietary tap on the shoulder, to
direct his vote.
Word of the scandal got as far away from Sacramento as San Luis Obispo County, where A. E. Campbell
became a candidate for the Senate against H. W. Lynch, largely on the machine issue. Campbell pledged
himself ,to denounce such lobbyists as Jere Burke, the Southern Pacific attorney, if they appeared on the floor
of the Senate, and to have them ejected from the chamber.
When Campbell reached Sacramento he let it be known that such would be his policy. Campbell is thickset
and shaggy of eyebrow; his beard shows black on his face two hours after shaving. He has all the earmarks of
a born fighter. He didn't look good to the machine, and his words didn't sound good. Incidentally, Jere Burke
discreetly kept out of the Senate chamber while the Senate was in session.
Another thing which gave machine members of both Houses, as well as machine hangerson, much concern,
was the rumor started along in December that certain publicspirited citizens of Los Angeles and San
Francisco would maintain at the Capital during the session a lobby to protect the interests of the people, just
as the machine lobby looks after the wellbeing of machineprotected corporations and individuals.
This rumor caused great distress. It had all sorts of versions. One story was that a corps of Pinkertons would
be employed to look for bugs in bills, boodle in sacks, and boodleitching palms. Another account had it that
the supervision was to be carried on by the San Francisco graft prosecution, and that Burns men would be in
constant attendance. A report, started early in the session, that a Burns detective had secured a job as
Assembly clerk almost threw that body into hysterics.
Campbell's threats and the antimachine lobby rumors seem to have had their effect upon the Committee on
Rules of each House. At any rate, both Senate and Assembly adopted rules that no person engaged in
presenting any business to the Legislature or its Committees should be permitted to do business with a
member while the House to which the member belonged was in session. Persons transgressing this rule were
to be removed from the floor of the House in which the offense was committed, and kept out during the
remainder of the session.
The rule was employed in one instance only. George Baker Anderson, of The People's Legislative Bureau,
was ruled out of the Assembly, and, in effect, out of the Senate Chamber. Jere Burke kept away from both,
but it was probably Campbell's threat more than the rule that influenced Burke. With these two exceptions,
the lobbyists had pretty much the run of both chambers. It should be said, however, that while none of those
lobbyists were threatened with expulsion from the floor of either House for advocating machinebacked
measures and policies, persons advocating reform measures were threatened with the antilobbying rules.
But Anderson was the only one to suffer because of them.
The curious feature of Anderson's case was that nobody seems to have been able to discover that he ever did
any lobbying, or asked a member of either body to support or oppose any measure or policy, or that he even
so much as spoke to a legislator while the House to which the legislator belonged was in session.
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Anderson was in charge of a Legislative Bureau, one purpose of which was to keep the newspapers of the
State which were not represented by correspondents at the Capital, informed of the votes on the various
measures, and other items of importance or interest. Somebody early in the session called the bureau a
"lobby," and somebody else improved the title by calling it "People's Lobby."
And then certain Senators and Assemblymen awoke to the startling discovery that in the Legislative Bureau,
presided over by Anderson, was the People's Lobby that was to employ Pinkerton's or Burns' men to watch
the Legislature. Anderson was a marked man from that moment.
Curiously enough this theory of Anderson's purpose didn't anger a single member of Senate or Assembly
who, during the nearly three months that followed, voted against machineadvocated measures, and for
measures which the machine opposed. Assemblymen of the type of Bohnett, Hinkle, Cattell, Callan and
Drew, Senators like Bell, Black, Campbell and Holohan either treated the Pinkerton story as a joke or thought
that a little Pinkerton watchfulness might be a pretty good proposition, all things considered.
On the other hand, many of the Senators and Assemblymen who were in constant opposition to reform
policies, were very much exercised that anybody should have the audacity to have a watch kept upon the
Legislature. This intense feeling found perhaps its best expression in Assemblyman McManus' denunciation
of Anderson, when the question of having Anderson "investigated" was before the Assembly.
"It is a sad state of affairs," said McManus, "if a band of Pinkertons are here to follow the members up. We
aren't everyday streetcar conductors. We don't have to have spotters to watch us."
But perhaps the most astonishing feature of the whole astonishing Anderson incident is that nobody was ever
able to connect him with a detective of any stripe whatsoever, Burns, Pinkerton, or unclassified. But this did
not prevent his being ruled off the floor of the Assembly, and, in effect, of the Senate.
As the most amazing rumors about Anderson many started as jokes[98] multiplied, the indignation of
certain Assemblymen and Senators increased. Matters came to a climax when Anderson sent a number of
letters to members who had been absent from the chamber when the first vote was taken on the WalkerOtis
AntiGambling bill, asking them if they would be willing to give the reasons for their absence.
The difference in the effect of the letters was astonishing. Assemblyman Prescott F. Cogswell, who had been
favored with one of them, stated on the floor of the Assembly that he had been glad of the opportunity to
make known the cause of his absence when the vote was taken. On the other hand, Assemblyman Wheelan,
who had received a duplicate of the letter which Cogswell had welcomed, was very much cast down.
Wheelan, arising to a question of personal privilege, read the letter, and wanted to know if he hadn't been
"insulted[99]."
Assemblyman Beardslee hastened to assure Mr. Wheelan that he had been. Furthermore, Beardslee thumped
his ample chest a thump, and announced:
"I, too, am insulted, for my brother has been insulted, and who insults my brother, insults me."
That seemed to settle it. The Committee on Rules was instructed to investigate the letter incident.
The Committee on Rules consisted of Johnston of Contra Costa, Transue, Grove L. Johnson, Beardslee and
Stanton, the Committee, by the way, of "gag rules" notoriety. The investigation was held behind closed doors.
Anderson was asked about the letter and his purpose in writing it, to all of which he replied directly and
without hesitation. And then came the burning question of the hour:
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"How many Pinkertons are there in your employ in Sacramento, Mr. Anderson?" asked Johnson.
Anderson refused to answer the question. His wiser course would perhaps have been to answer truthfully,
"None at all," and end the joke. But that was Anderson's business. He declined to answer.
Anderson's refusal to answer was solemnly reported by the committee back to the Assembly. Some members
when the report was read laughed, others were made very serious indeed. It was finally decided that the
investigation of Anderson should be turned over to the Judiciary Committee, of which Grove L. Johnson was
chairman.
The Judiciary Committee was solemnly authorized to send for persons and papers, and administer oaths.
While the investigation was pending, Anderson was denied admittance to the Assembly chamber. As the
press badge, admitting Anderson to both Assembly and Senate chambers had been taken from him, he was
unable to enter the Senate chamber either.
And the Assembly Judiciary Committee failed to investigate. Although Anderson demanded that he be given
a hearing, and the matter settled, one way or the other, the Judiciary Committee would not and did not act.
Under the Assembly resolution ordering the investigation, however, Anderson was for nearly two months
barred from both the Assembly and Senate chambers. The session closed without the investigation being
held.
It may be said in this connection that neither in the State Statutes, nor in the rules of either Senate or
Assembly, is there a word which prohibits the employing of detectives at a Legislative session. Even though
Johnson's committee had investigated Anderson's case, and discovered that he was really employing
detectives, it is difficult to see how his punishment could have been justified. The incident is certainly one of
the most extraordinary of the session of any Legislative session ever held in this State, in fact.
The most interesting point in the Anderson case was that when pinned down for a reason for excluding him
from the Assembly chamber, the offended Assemblyman would invariably reply that he was excluded under
the rule which prohibited lobbying.
Curiously enough, however, lobbying, in spite of the rule, continued on the floors of both Houses even during
sessions.
When the Islais Creek Harbor bill was under consideration in the Assembly, for example, Carroll Cook, and
others interested in the defeat of the measure as it had passed the Senate, appeared openly on the floor and in
the lobby of the Assembly, even when the debate was going on, and worked for amendment of the measure to
suit their aims. All this resulted in the greatest confusion. But Speaker Stanton seemed absolutely unable to
cope with the situation. The lobbying and the confusion continued in spite of Stanton's efforts to enforce
something of the appearance of order.
Such scenes were often duplicated in the Senate. When the fight over the Direct Primary bill had the Senate
by the ears, Johnnie Lynch, George Van Smith, even President of the Senate Warren Porter, exerted
themselves to compel concurrence in the machinebacked Assembly amendments. This was done in the
Senate chamber, when the Senate was in session, and Johnnie Lynch and Van Smith in particular were
conspicuous in the work in behalf of the machine's policy.
But it was noticeable, that those who advocated reform policies took no such liberties on the floor of either
House. They knew better. The danger involved for the lobbyist for reform measures was emphasized the
night the measure prohibiting the sale of intoxicants within a mile and a half of Stanford University passed
the Assembly.
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Charles R. Detrick of Palo Alto, during the call of the House ordered on account of the Stanford bill, was
discussing the merits of the measure with Assemblyman Bohnett, who was leading the fight for its passage. It
was not a case of lobbying at all, for both men were for the bill,
Nevertheless, Assemblyman Schmitt[99a], who overheard Detrick mention the measure, warned the Stanford
man, that if he (Detrick) did not cease his "lobbying" for the bill that he (Schmitt) would have him (Detrick)
excluded from the chamber.
Senator Walker, although a member of the Senate, had much the same experience. Walker was discussing the
Stanford bill with a friend, when one of the opponents of the measure threatened him with expulsion from the
floor of the Assembly if he did not desist.
And even while these threats were being made against the proponents of the bill, opponents of the measure
were working openly on the floor of the Assembly chamber against its passage. No suggestion was made that
the rule prohibiting lobbying be enforced against them.
[98] A party of newspapermen were in Anderson's office one evening, when two or three machine men came
in. With a wink to Anderson one of the newspapermen asked "The head of your detective bureau is that
keen looking young fellow, with reddish brown hair and brown eyes, is he not, Anderson?" Anderson joined
in the Joke and nodded. One of the machine men left the room immediately. Within an hour, a hunt was being
made from one end of Sacramento to the other, for a "keenlooking young man with reddish brown hair and
brown eyes."
[99] The communication which insulted Wheelan read as follows:
The Hon. Albert P. Wheelan, Member of Assembly.
Dear Sir:
The People's Legislative Bureau, organized chiefly for the collection and dissemination of accurate
information regarding legislation, and the attitude of members of the Legislature thereon, notes that you are
recorded as having been absent when the roll was called on the motion to refer the AntiRacetrack Gambling
bill back to the committee.
As our record is intended to be permanent, and will be placed in the hands of all the newspapers and civic
organizations throughout the State, we wish to ask if you have any objection to furnishing us the reason for
your absence, so that we may enter it upon our record. Respectfully yours,
GEORGE B. ANDERSON,
Secretary.
[99a] This is the same Schmitt who objected so strenuously to professors of the State University being
identified with reform movements.
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Chapter XXII. The Machine Lobbyist At Work.
How, Jere Burke Arrayed the County Officials of the State Against Two Beneficial Measures How the
Power of the Southern Pacific Was Employed Against a California Enterprise Danger Which Constantly
Menaces Legitimate Enterprises.
The problem of drawing the line between legitimate and reprehensible lobbying has perplexed wiser men
than sat in the California Legislature of 1909.
On the side of the lobbyist it may be said there seems no good reason why a citizen or representative of a
corporation which is interested in pending legislation should not appear at the Capitol and in a legitimate way
present his case to the members of the Legislature. In fact, the theory of committee consideration of measures
introduced in Senate or Assembly, is based on the principle that it is the citizen's right to be heard on any
matter that may be pending before the Legislature. The citizen cannot be heard before either the Senate or
Assembly; he can, however, present his case to the committee the decision of which carries weight with that
branch of the Legislature for which it acts. No one can object, for example, that Mr. P. F. Dunne appeared
before the Senate Committee on Corporations, when the Railroad Regulation bill was under consideration, to
present the railroad's side. Mr. Dunne appeared openly and aboveboard, and although he sought deliberately
to misrepresent the situation to the Committee, nevertheless to object to his visiting Sacramento, or even to
the work which he did while there, would be forced and farfetched.
In the same way, Mr. Seth Mann, representing the shippers of California, appeared before the Committee and
presented the side of the shippers. Mr. Mann spoke for the shippers precisely as Mr. Dunne spoke for the
railroads. Mr. Mann, however, did not stoop to misrepresentation and deception.
But if Mr. Dunne for the railroads or Mr. Mann for the shippers had departed from openlypresented
argument to buttonhole Senators or Assemblymen to tell them they must vote for or against a given measure,
or look out for trouble, immediately would he be open to criticism. If either went during roll call from
Legislator to Legislator to tell the members how they were to vote, again would he be justly criticized. Or had
Mr. Dunne employed the influence of the great corporation which he represents to defeat or pass a measure in
which his company can have no legitimate interest, again would there be good reason for complaint. Mr.
Dunne could very properly while acting as agent of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company urge in a
legitimate way the corporation's objections to the Demurrage bill, to the Full Crew bill, to the Railroad
Regulation bill, or any other measure affecting common carriers. But for Mr. Dunne to have employed the
influence of his position as political representative of a common carrier to force the passage of the Change of
Venue bill for example, or defeat an effective Direct Primary bill, or the Party Circle bill, or the Judicial
Column bill, would have been most reprehensible, for the Southern Pacific Company can have no legitimate
interest in any of these measures.
So far as the writer knows, Mr. Dunne did not concern himself with any measure, except those in which his
company was legitimately interested. But paid servants of the Southern Pacific Company were at Sacramento
throughout the entire session, and managed to have their fingers in about all that was going on. The most
conspicuous of them was Mr. J. T. Burke, more familiarly known as "Jere" Burke.
A fair sample of Burke's methods and Burke is merely typical of the objectionable lobbyist is found in
the campaign which was carried on against Senate Bills 1229 and 1230. Had these measures become laws, it
would have been possible for county assessors to discover property, owned principally by public service
corporations, which at present escapes taxation. It is estimated that the total taxable value of this untaxed
property is $100,000,000. It is not taxed because assessors have no means of reaching it. Mr. Burke's
company could have no legitimate interest in Senate Bills 1229 and 1230. This statement is made, of course,
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on the assumption that the officials of the Southern Pacific Company aim to make honest returns to the tax
collector. But to return to Senate Bills 1229 and 1230, and Burke's connection with them.
The two measures were intended to amend sections of the Codes relating to the assessment of property.
Section 3681 of the Political Code provides that "during the session of the Board (of Supervisors sitting as a
Board of Equalization) it may direct the Assessor to assess any taxable property that has escaped assessment,
or to add to the amount, number and quality of property, when a false or incompetent list has been rendered."
Under this section, as it at present reads, the Supervisors may direct the Assessor to assess property that may
have escaped assessment, but there is no machinery provided by which the property may be discovered.
Senate Bill 1229 provided the machinery by which the unassessed property might be discovered, by adding to
the section quoted above: "And the Board (the Supervisors sitting as a Board of Equalization) may employ
legal or other assistance in discovering any taxable property that has escaped assessment in the performance
of their duties under this section."
Senate Bill 1230, the companion bill, provided that the Supervisors may subpena witnesses in all matters
pending before them when sitting as a Board of Equalization. Under the present law, they can compel
attendance of witnesses only upon the particular point under consideration.
The necessity of the amendments was generally admitted. The task of the Assessor is at best no easy one.
Through his deputies he must list all the property in his county that he can find.
The holdings of the small property owners are in sight, and, down to the last chicken, go on the assessment
roll.
The property of the large corporation is not so readily discovered and $100,000,000 worth of it, according to
conservative estimate, escapes assessment. The Assessors, with comparatively small force of deputies, have
no way to force its assessment.
The Board of Supervisors, sitting as a Board of Equalization, may know that the unassessed property is in
existence, but has no way to reach it. The Board may, under section 3681 of the Political Code quoted above,
direct the Assessor to assess it, but the law stops there. There is no machinery provided for the discovery of
the property. Senate Bills 1229 and 1230 provided the machinery. They were introduced by Senator Sanford
of Mendocino. Before their significance was appreciated by Southern Pacific lobbyists, the Senate Judiciary
Committee had recommended them for passage.
When Burke did grasp the significance of the measures, he demanded of Sanford that they be withdrawn. The
argument which Burke advanced against them was in effect as follows:
"These bills are the most unAmerican propositions I ever heard of," said Burke. "They make of the Boards
of Supervisors inquisitorial bodies. The corporations have property which they prefer to conceal. They prefer
arbitrary assessments. They do not care to make returns to the Assessor. The passage of these bills would
compel them to make returns."
In other words, the corporations, if Jere Burke, their legislative representative, reflects their sentiments, prefer
that the Assessors continue to guess at the value of their properties. If the guess be too high, the corporations
can compel reductions; if the guess be too low, they rest content. But, however the corporations may approve
the guessing method of assessment, it has not proved equable, has not been fair to the farmer, the merchant
and the householder, who under oath make honest returns to the Assessor.
Burke's argument, however, failed to move Sanford. The Senator from Mendocino refused to withdraw the
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bills. And then a curious thing happened. The members of the Senate were, within three days after Sanford
had refused to withdraw the bills, fairly swamped with telegrams and letters from County Assessors and
County Supervisors, protesting against the passage of the bills, on the ground that their passage would be a
reflection upon the County Assessors of the State. Many who thus telegraphed or wrote, stated that they had
not seen the bills but added in effect, "We understand that they are bad bills and should be defeated."
Of course, there was no evidence that Burke or his agents had instigated the telegrams. But there was a
shrewd suspicion that such was the case. Sanford's answer to the Supervisors and Assessors was most
effective. He mailed them copies of the Sacramento Bee which set forth the actual purpose of the bills, and
copies of the bills themselves. Immediately Assessors and Supervisors who had wired their Senators to
oppose the bills, sent telegrams withdrawing their opposition.
In passing it may be said that neither bill passed the Senate. Bill No. 1229 passed second reading, but was
amended on third reading, March 11, and was not heard of again. Bill No. 1230 passed second reading, but
was not read the third time. There are other ways to kill good bills than to bluff their authors into
withdrawing them, or by stirring up Statewide antagonism to them. The incident shows, however, the
Statewide ramifications of the machine. Within three days it was possible for the machine to create the
impression from one end of the State to the other, that Senate Bills 1229 and 1230 were bad bills, measures
casting reflection upon the County Assessors. Only the prompt action of Senator Sanford dispelled this
impression. It also demonstrates the powerful backing behind the machine agents kept at Sacramento during a
Legislative session.
It is bad enough when the farreaching influence of the machine is employed to defeat measures which
provide the machinery to enable public officials to enforce the law, against beneficiaries of the system, but
when one of the agents employs this influence to promote his personal interests in a matter in which the
particular corporation which he represents can have no interest whatever, particular emphasis is given the
evils of the machine domination and reprehensible lobbying. To illustrate:
A peculiar situation which has developed at Owens Lake in Inyo County, made it necessary and proper that
slight amendment be made to the law of eminent domain. The water of Owens Lake is heavily charged with
soda. Some years ago, the Inyo Development Company was organized to recover this soda. The company
invested $200,000 in establishing a sodaash plant at the lakeside. This does not include the cost of building
a railroad from the Lake to Mound House, Nevada, a distance of about 400 miles. The investment proved a
success. The company harvests as high as 10,000 tons of soda ash a year. As the product is worth as high as
$30 a ton at San Francisco, the enterprise adds an important industry to the developed resources of the State.
The method of recovering the soda is simple. The water is drawn from the lake into vats, where it is left to
evaporate. The soda is then recovered.
Owing to the fact that the waters of Owens Lake are constantly receding, a considerable strip of land has,
during recent years, been uncovered between the company's holdings near the lake. and the water. The water
from which the soda is reclaimed has to be piped over this land.
Recently former employees of the Inyo Development Company took up the land lying between the
company's property and the lake, and under the name of the Natural Soda Products Company, propose to go
into the business of manufacturing soda ash on their own account.
Not long since the new company began to complain of the old company's pipe, which crosses the new
company's land. The old company saw that it had trouble ahead unless it could condemn a strip of the
recently reclaimed land for a pipe line. It was found, however, that there is no law in California by which this
could be done. Under the law of eminent domain land could be condemned for almost any other purpose than
to establish a pipe line to carry water not to be used for irrigation or domestic purposes. An attempt was
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therefore made to have the law governing eminent domain amended so as to read that land could be
condemned "for oil pipe lines and pipe lines for conducting the waters of any lake which are not fit for
irrigation or domestic purposes, and which contain soda or other minerals' or chemical substances in solution,
and also pumps and machinery for raising the same and forcing the same through such pipes."
This amendment was included in Senate Bill 797, and in the companion Assembly Bill 815. Senate Bill 797
passed the Senate and was referred to the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly, where the amendment
providing for the soda water pipe line was added. This bill received a favorable recommendation from the
Assembly Judiciary Committee and was returned to the Assembly. And then a very mysterious thing
happened. Without apparent reason the bill was referred to the Assembly Committee on Corporations.
Provision for soda water pipe lines, so far as the Assembly was concerned, came to a sudden ending.
At the time Senate Bill 797 was undergoing suppression in the Assembly, the companion bill, Assembly Bill
815, was pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. The measure was amended to make possible the
condemnation of land for a soda water pipe line. Chairman Willis of the Committee expressed himself as
satisfied with the amendment. And as amended, the bill was referred back to the Senate with the
recommendation that it do pass as amended. Two days later, however, Senator Willis stated on the floor of
the Senate that he had information from Inyo County which convinced him that the amendment was not
desirable, and should be excluded from the bill. He stated that the county officials of Inyo County opposed
the amendment, and for that reason suggested that the amendment be dropped. He stated that the Assembly
would refuse to concur in the amendment even though the bill were passed with it. Mr. Willis' wishes were
respected and the bill reamended. Provisions for condemning land for soda water pipe lines came to as dead
a stop in the Senate as in the Assembly. The next development in this comparatively unimportant incident of
the session, was the discovery that Mr. J. T. Burke of Berkeley, member of the Southern Pacific law
department, the Jere Burke of Southern Pacific lobbying, is one of the directors of the Natural Soda Products
Company, which owns the land over which the Inyo Development Company would build a pipe line, a pipe
line upon which the future prosperity of the Inyo Development Company largely rests. Burke was alleged to
have opposed the amendment and so far as the writer knows the charge was never denied and with having
brought about the defeat of the amendment. In other words, Mr. Burke is charged with throwing the full
weight of the influence of the large corporation (the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, which he
represents) on the side of a small corporation in which he is a director, and against a third corporation, which
has large interests at stake. And the citizen who stands for fair play should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Burke's corporation, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, is the principal factor in the machine which
works against good government, fair play, the "square deal" in business and politics which President
Roosevelt insisted upon. The Inyo Development Company failed in its perfectly legitimate purpose because
arrayed against it was in effect the political influence of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the
tenderloin, and all the other elements that go to make up the political machine in California. And the fact
should not be lost sight of that no other independent enterprise in California, even where it has, as has the
Inyo Development Company, hundreds of thousands of dollars invested, is immune against similar
experiences.
Early in the session when the lobbying question was, because of the excitement over Anderson, decidedly
prominent, Sanford in the Senate and Callan in the Assembly introduced bills requiring lobbyists who appear
at the Capitol during a legislative session to register their names, the names of their employers and the
amount and nature of their compensation. At the close of the session they were, under the terms of the
measures, required to file a detailed statement of their expenditures.
Had these measures become laws they might have proved very embarrassing to certain gentlemen who were
very well received by the machine element in both Senate and Assembly chamber.
But they didn't become laws.
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The Assembly bill went to the Assembly Judiciary Committee, which held it two months, finally, on March
16th, reporting it to the Assembly without recommendation. On March 19th, the measure was refused
passage.
The Senate bill went to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Committee referred it back to the Senate with
the recommendation that it do not pass. On January 29th, it, too, was defeated.
The lobbying problem, like Jere Burke, continues with us.
Chapter XXIII. Influence of the San Francisco Delegation.
Casts Nearly Twentyfive Per Cent of the Vote in Each House Majority Invariably Found on the Side of
the Machine Opposed Passage of the WalkerOtis Bill Instrumental in Amending the Direct Primary
Law Defeated Local Option Bill.
The popular idea that the State outside San Francisco is not concerned about political conditions at the
metropolis is not borne out by the record of the legislative session of 1909. The San Francisco delegations in
Senate and Assembly had, as they always have had and will have for many a year to come, the deciding voice
in practically all important issues.
San Francisco elects within one of 25 per cent of the members of the State Senate, and within two of 25 per
cent of the Assembly. In other words, nine of the forty Senators come from San Francisco, and eighteen of
the eighty Assemblymen. The nine San Francisco Senators and the eighteen San Francisco Assemblymen
join with the outside members in making laws not for San Francisco alone, but for the entire State. Their
numbers give them decided advantage. The character of the laws passed at a legislative session almost
invariably bears the stamp of the character of the San Francisco delegation. The character of the delegation
depends upon political conditions at San Francisco. The whole State, then, is concerned in the efforts of the
best citizenship of the metropolis to oust from power the corrupt element that has so long dominated San
Francisco politics.
The record of the San Francisco delegation at the session of 1909, while better in the Assembly than in the
Senate, is not one for San Francisco or the State for that matter to enthuse over. The votes on test
questions of the eighteen members of the Assembly and of the nine members of the Senate, will be found set
forth in tables in the appendix.
The table showing the votes of the nine San Francisco Senators covers sixteen roll calls, on which the San
Francisco Senators cast 128 votes, ninetynine of which were in support of machine policies and only
twentynine against. Thus the nine Senators averaged on sixteen roll calls, eleven votes for the machine and
three votes against. Had the San Francisco Senators broken even on the issues involved; that is to say, had
sixtyfour of the 128 votes been cast for the machine, and sixtyfour against the machine, and the sixtyfour
antimachine votes been evenly distributed among the several issues, the machine would have been defeated
on every issue coming before the Senate.
The Assembly showing is not quite so overwhelmingly machine as that of the Senate, but it is bad enough.
Eleven roll calls are considered. On these the eighteen San Francisco Assemblymen cast a total of 165 votes,
of which 108 were for machine policies and fiftyseven against. Thus, even in the Assembly, the vote was
approximately 2 to 1 in favor of the machine. Of the fiftyseven antimachine votes, eleven were cast by
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Callan, who made an absolutely clean record, nine by Gerdes and seven by Lightner, a total of twentyseven
for the three. Deducted from the total of antimachine votes, this leaves only thirty antimachine votes for
the remaining fifteen members of the delegation. Or to put it the other way, Callan, Gerdes and Lightner cast
among them only four machine votes, which leaves 104 machine votes cast by the other fifteen San Francisco
members.
On the individual issues the San Francisco Senators and Assemblymen made as bad a showing as does their
vote in the aggregate. The passage of the WalkerOtis Racetrack Gambling bill for example demonstrates
that the poolsellers had little hold upon the legislators of any community of the State outside of San
Francisco. In the Senate but seven votes were cast against the bill. Five of the seven came from the San
Francisco delegation Finn, Hare, Hartman, Reily and Wolfe. The two remaining came from Alameda and
ShastaSiskiyou Counties. Leavitt, representing Alameda, and Weed, representing Shasta and Siskiyou,
voted with the five San Francisco Senators against suppressing bookmaking and poolselling.
The record of the San Francisco Assembly delegation on the antigambling measure is scarcely less
suggestive. Before the WalkerOtis bill could pass the Assembly the proponents of the measure had to win
six fights, as is shown by the table giving the several votes taken in the Assembly on the WalkerOtis bill.
The three most important of the six were:
1. To prevent the bill being referred back to the Committee on Public Morals.
2. To pass the measure on third reading without amendment.
3. To prevent reconsideration of the vote by which the bill had been passed.
In the first fight twentythree Assemblymen voted to refer the bill back to the Committee. Of these twelve
more than onehalf were from San Francisco.
The day of the second fight, only ten Assemblymen voted on the side of the gamblers. Every one of the ten
was from San Francisco.
In the third fight, on the motion to reconsider, nineteen Assemblymen voted for reconsideration. Of these,
ten, more than fifty per cent, were from San Francisco.
Or, to put it in a lump, in the three most important fights over the WalkerOtis bill in the Assembly, in the
aggregate fiftytwo votes were cast against the measure. Of these, thirtytwo were from San Francisco
Assemblymen. Only twenty were from outside San Francisco.
The universal demand throughout the State for the passage of an antipool selling measure offset the
influence and the vote of the San Francisco delegation in both Senate and Assembly. But in the issues more
involved, where the lines were more closely drawn, San Francisco practically made the laws for the whole
State. This could be demonstrated by many instances. The most striking perhaps are shown by the histories of
the Direct Primary measure and the Railroad Regulation bills.
When the first fight over the Direct Primary bill came up in the Senate, it will be remembered, the
antimachine forces defeated the machine by a vote of twentyseven to thirteen. Of the thirteen Senators
who voted to amend the bill to the liking of Wolfe and Leavitt, six almost fifty per cent were from San
Francisco. They were Finn, Hare, Hartman, Kennedy, Reily, Wolfe.
When the machine element had succeeded in amending the Direct Primary measure to its liking in the
Assembly and there came a new alignment on the bill in the Senate, eight of the nine San Francisco Senators
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voted with Wolfe and Leavitt for the amendments, which denied the people of California Statewide vote on
candidates for the United States Senate. One San Francisco Senator only, Anthony, voted with the better
element in the Senate, against the amendments.
Had only two of the nine Senators from San Francisco voted for the bill in its original form, the measure
would have been passed by a vote of twentyone to nineteen without the machine amendments.
The influence of the San Francisco members in shaping the Direct Primary law was even more forcibly
illustrated in the Assembly. Of the eighteen San Francisco Assemblymen, fifteen voted for the Assembly
amendments, two, Callan and Gerdes, voted against them, and Hopkins is not recorded as voting.
It will be remembered that the amendments were read into the bill by a vote of thirtysix to thirtyeight. Had
the San Francisco delegation divided even on this vote, had nine voted for the amendments and nine against,
the vote would have been fortythree against putting them in the bill, and thirtytwo for, the bill would not
have been amended in the Assembly; it would have become a law in the same shape that it had originally
passed the Senate. It is noticeable that in an Assembly of eighty members, only twentythree of the
Assemblymen who voted for the Assembly amendments to the Direct Primary bill were from outside San
Francisco. In the Senate eight of the twenty Senators who voted for the amendments were from San
Francisco, only twelve were from outside that city. Thus, out of 120 members in the Legislature, ninetythree
of whom were from outside San Francisco, only thirtyfive from districts outside the metropolis voted for the
Assembly, or machine amendments to the Direct Primary bill. But twentythree of the twentyseven San
Francisco Senators and Assemblymen did vote for them, and only three of the San Francisco members voted
against them.
It will be seen that the people of California who live outside San Francisco are decidedly interested in the
character of Senators and Assemblymen whom that city sends to the Legislature.
The people of San Francisco are, of course, as much concerned over reasonable regulation of the
transportation companies as Californians living outside that city. But the San Francisco Senators were a unit
in their opposition to the passage of an effective railroad regulation measure.
The fight over the railroad regulation came in the Senate. The final lineup showed eighteen Senators for the
effective Stetson bill and against the ineffective Wright bill; while twentytwo Senators were against the
Stetson bill and for the Wright bill. The Wright bill was accordingly passed. Every one of the nine San
Francisco Senators voted for the Wright bill. Only thirteen Senators who voted for the Wright bill were from
outside San Francisco.
In a word, the proponents of the Stetson bill were from the start handicapped by a solid delegation of nine
from San Francisco which they could not overcome. Had three of the nine San Francisco Senators been for
the Stetson bill, that measure would now be the law of California.
The transportation issue was fought out in the Assembly over the Sanford Senate resolution endorsing
Bristow's plan to establish a line of Government steamers between San Francisco and Panama. The fruit
growers of Southern California are particularly interested in this project. The Assembly, however, amended
all reference to the Bristow report and all criticism of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and the railroads
out of the resolution.
Of the eighteen San Francisco Assemblymen only one, Callan, voted against the amendments; fourteen
Beatty, Beban, Coghlan, Collum, Cullen, Hopkins, Lightner, Macauley, McManus, Nelson, O'Neil, Pugh,
Perine and Wheelan voted for the amendments, while three Black, Gerdes and Schmitt did not vote at
all.
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The Local Option bill was also killed by San Francisco votes. This measure was strongly backed by the rural
districts. The various counties, particularly those engaged in farming, dairying and fruit growing, sent
representatives to the Legislature instructed to vote for Local Option. The issue in all ways concerned the
country districts rather than the large cities. But the votes of the San Francisco Senators defeated the Local
Option bill.
The first fight over the Local Option bill came when in the ordinary course of events it reached third reading.
Instead of letting a vote be taken on the measure, Wolfe moved that it be referred to the Judiciary Committee.
This was clearly a move against the passage of the bill, for it meant delay which might prove fatal. But
Wolfe's motion prevailed by a vote of twenty to fifteen. The nine San Francisco Senators voted to refer the
bill to the committee, only eleven Senators from outside San Francisco voted with them.
The nine members from San Francisco continued consistent in their opposition to the measure. When the
Local Option bill did come to a vote their nine votes were cast against it.
The people of Del Norte county and the people of San Diego county are denied the privilege of voting "Wet
or dry" because of the opposition to the Local Option bill of the solid San Francisco delegation in the Senate.
It will be seen that the people of these distant counties are decidedly interested in political conditions in San
Francisco, for in a large way the character of the San Francisco delegation in the Legislature is unmistakably
reflected in the laws which are passed for the government of the entire State.
Taken as a whole, the San Francisco delegation in Senate and Assembly were nothing for that city to be
proud of, and at a critical moment San Francisco came near paying dearly for her Hartmans, Hares,
Macauleys and McManuses. But for the intervention of the country members the Islais Creek bond project
would have been defeated.
The improvement calls for the purchase of sixtythree water blocks at Islais Creek to be converted into an
inland harbor. The future development of San Francisco depends largely upon this improvement. But private
interests demanded that nineteen of the sixtythree blocks be excluded from the plan, which would have
rendered the whole project impracticable. When the fight came on, San Francisco Senators and Assemblymen
opposed the purchase of the sixtythree blocks.
To begin with, Senator Wolfe, as member of the State Harbors Committee, had signed a report which
recommended that fortyfour blocks only be purchased. But Wolfe afterwards insisted that he had signed the
report not knowing what he was doing.
When the fight for the improvement came up in the Senate, only two Senators, Hartman and Reily, both of
San Francisco, opposed the project. They were in the end ignominiously defeated, every Senator present
voting against them. But both Hartman and Reily did the best they knew how to defeat the purchase of the
area necessary for the improvement.
The San Francisco delegation in its opposition to the Islais Creek project had better success in the Assembly.
Nine San Francisco Assemblymen, Beban, Black, Cullen, Lightner, Macauley, McManus, O'Neil, Perine and
Wheelan, united against the measure as it had passed the Senate. They succeeded in throwing doubt upon the
necessity of the purchase of sixtythree blocks, and finally won twentytwo outside members over to their
way of thinking. Had it not been for the efforts of Assemblymen Callan, Beatty and Nelson of San Francisco,
backed by the Los Angeles delegation, the Islais Creek Harbor project would unquestionably have been
defeated in the Assembly, solely because of the opposition of nine San Francisco Assemblymen.
But there is plenty of evidence of improved political conditions at San Francisco. An antimachine Board of
Supervisors is standing out manfully against the demands of machineprotected interests. The District
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Attorney's office is, indeed, pressing representatives of those interests pretty close to the doors of the
penitentiary, although the District Attorney is handicapped by laws for which San Francisco is largely
responsible, because of the character of the men whom session after session she has sent to the Legislature.
There is, however, enough to warrant the belief that San Francisco will improve the character of the
Assembly and Senate delegation. Upon such improvement, the wellbeing of the whole State largely
depends.
Chapter XXIV. Attacks On And Defense of the Fish Commission
Fast Becoming a Powerful Political Factor Enormous Fund Which It Expends Practically Without Check.
Legislative Investigation Blocked Scheme to Give Commissioners Salary Fails.
Without the general public realizing just what is going on, the machine is, in the State Fish and Game
Commission, building up an adjunct which seems destined to play an important part in any fight that may be
carried on by the independent electors to break the machine's stranglehold upon the State. Naturally the
machine element in the Legislature was prepared always to rally to the defense of the Commission, and the
defense was necessary, for the Commission is vulnerable, and was attacked at many points.
The Commission is perhaps the most extraordinary institution in the State. At its head is General George
Stone, onetime chairman of the Republican State Central Committee. At its tail is Jake Steppacher, another
onetime potent politician who has passed the days of his usefulness. Between Stone at the lead and
Steppacher at the tail, is an astonishing array of formerly prominent politicians, as well as politicians who are
decidedly in the present. In fact, the Fish and Game Commission is fast becoming one of the most potent
adjuncts to the State political machine, that strictly nonpartisan organization which guards the interests of
the tenderloin, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the racetrack gamblers, their associates and allies,
and which rather presumptuously assumes to be the Republican Party of California.
One of the features of the session of 1909 was the keen little fight of the antimachine members of the
Legislature to restore the Fish and Game Commission to its onetime simplicity, legitimacy and usefulness,
and the efforts of the machine members to prevent this.
Up to two years ago, under the name of Fish Commission, the now Fish and Game Commission did most
admirable work on an allowance of about $50,000. So far as the writer can ascertain, the Commission's
income up to 1907 never exceeded $54,000 in any one year; usually it was a trifle under $50,000.
But in 1907 a tax of $1 a year was imposed upon all citizens of California who wished to go hunting. Citizens
of other States, wishing to hunt in California, are under the same law taxed $10 a year, while foreigners are
taxed $25. The law provides that the income thus raised be turned over to the Fish Commission.
The first year that the law was in force, the Commission received $116,579 on account of it. This, with
moneys received from State appropriations, fines collected and the like, swelled the Commission's income for
that year, the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, to $184,467.70, an increase of more that $130,000 from the
previous fiscal year.
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, the cost of conducting the Governor's office, including the
Governor's salary, the salaries of his secretaries and clerks, stationery, postage stamps, secret service,
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everything in a word in connection with the office, was $32,377.
In the same way the expense of conducting the State Controller's office was $23,417; of the State Treasurer's
office, $16,751 ; of the Attorney General's office, $33,082; of the Surveyor General's office, $20,679; of the
State Superintendent of Schools' office, $22,380.
But the General Stone captained or perhaps generaled Fish Commission had for that year a modest bit of
$184,467. The Fish Commission then, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, cost California almost six
times as much as did the Governor's office, eight times as much as did the Controller's office, eleven times as
much as did the State Treasurer's office, almost six times as much as did the Attorney General's office, more
than nine times as much as the Surveyor General's office, and eight times as much as did the State
Department of Public Instruction. And let it be borne in mind that this does not include the sums which the
various counties paid for game wardens and for local protection of game, the best protection, by the way, and
the most practical.
The $184,467, did not go to the counties. It went exclusively to General Stone's Commission. It will be seen
that General Stone's Commission has a very good thing of it.
Another surprising feature of the StoneGeneraled Commission is that there is little check upon its
expenditures. If the Governor wishes to raise the salary of his secretary or one of his stenographers he must
appeal to the Legislature for permission. The State Controller, the State Treasurer, the Secretary of State, the
State superintendent of Schools, and so on down the list Of State officials, are powerless to increase the
salary of an assistant or of a clerk, or of an office boy, without legislative sanction.
But not so General Stone's Commission. The Commission is left to do pretty much as it pleases with its
income. So, recently, without saying a word to anybody, it increased the salary of one of its deputies
(Vogelsang) from $200 to $300 a month. Three hundred dollars a month is $3600 a year. Up to this year the
salary of the State Controller, of the Secretary of State, of the State Treasurer, of the Surveyor General, of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, etc., was only $3,000 a year. So it will be seen that one of General
Stone's Deputies was drawing $600 a year more salary from the State than the elected State officials.
Jake Steppacher and other politicians, finding easy berths in the Commission, were also granted generous
salary increases.
But in ways other than generous increase in the salaries of its deputies has the Fish Commission shown its
kingly independence. The law provides that each State official and Commission shall, biennially, in the
September before the Legislature convenes, file with the Governor a report of its activities and expenditures.
This enables the Governor to make such recommendations as he may deem necessary in his message to the
Legislature. The Controller, Attorney General, in fact all the State officials and departments, observed the law
last September with but one exception. The Fish Commission, costing the State from six to eleven times more
money that the State departments, did not file a report with the Governor.
The fact that the Commission had filed no report in September, the generous increase in salaries of its
deputies, alleged instances of arbitrary conduct of its representatives, resulted in a resolution being introduced
by Assemblyman Harry Polsley, demanding that the Commission be made the subject of legislative inquiry.
The resolution was referred to the Assembly Committee on Fish and Game, a committee notoriously in
sympathy with the Commission. The Committee held a sort of preliminary hearing which resulted in a
general whitewashing[100]. Polsley made out what was generally regarded as a prima facie case against the
Commission, but the Committee did not choose to consider it such, and so the investigation got no
further[100a].
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But it was noticeable after the "preliminary hearing" that the advocates of the Fish Commission measures did
not show up so sprightly confident of their passage as before. Polsley's efforts were by no means lost. Many
measures intended to strengthen the already gigantically strong Commission failed of passage, or had their
viciousness amended out of them, which, had it not been for Polsley's efforts, might have become laws.
The most important of these was Senate Bill 741. The measure as originally introduced by Senator Willis
provided that "every person in the State of California, who hunts, pursues or kills any of the wild birds or
animals, excepting predatory birds or animals, or fishes for or catches with hook and line any of the protected
fish of this State, without first procuring a license therefor, as provided in this Act, is guilty of a
misdemeanor."
Had the act become a law as introduced, not only those who hunt, but those who fish, would have been
obliged to pay one dollar for a license. Thus, if a family of father, mother and three children wanted to go
fishing, they would first have had to pay five dollars for the privilege.
The writer has it from a gentleman who has made careful study of the Fish Commission and its ways that the
licensing of amateur fishers would have increased the income of the Fish and Game Commission $150,000 a
year. This, with the income already enjoyed by the Commission of $184,000 a year, would have swelled its
annual income to more than $330,000. This sum is $90,000 more than it cost to maintain the Stockton
Hospital for the Insane for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908; $125,000 more than the maintenance of the
Agnews Asylum for that year; $122,000 more than the cost of the maintenance of the Folsom State Prison.
The Fish and Game Commission was scarcely modest in its demands[101].
Naturally, the backers of the Fish and Game Commission made a hard fight for the measure's passage. But in
spite of their efforts they could not edge it through the Senate until March 3d. In the Assembly, the measure
met genuine opposition.
The Assembly Committee on Fish and Game of course recommended it for passage, and on March 15th, after
a hot fight, it actually passed the Assembly. But Cattell gave notice of reconsideration. Incidentally, Governor
Gillett let it be known that he would veto any measure that required amateur fishermen to pay license. This
was a damper upon the Fish Commission crowd. When Cattell called the bill up for reconsideration it was
reconsidered and defeated. However, Leeds accepted an amendment which struck out the clause which
provided that amateur fishermen must pay a license tax. On Leeds' motion the next day, the amended bill was
reconsidered and passed.
The three Fish and Game Commissioners serve without salary. Their compensation comes from the pleasure
of disbursing upwards of $200,000 a year, what political prestige there may be in it, and rather generous
expense money[102]. But a bill was introduced to give each Commissioner a salary of $3,000 a year. The
measure did not become law, for which the writer believes much credit is due Assemblymen Polsley of Red
Bluff. The State was thus saved $9,000 a year. General Stone and his associates are just that amount out of
pocket. They have, however, given no indication of resigning their offices because the salary has been denied
them.
But if the Fish and Game Commission was unsuccessful in increasing its revenue and putting through other
measures from the standpoint of its members advantageous, its opponents were quite as unsuccessful in their
attacks upon the Commission. Like the panther cat that guards her young, the agents of the Commission
fought to retain the advantages which they had secured in 1907, and were generally successful.
The chief of the attacks was that of Assemblyman Polsley, author of Assembly Bill 433. This bill wasn't very
long, contained less than five lines, in fact, and just fortythree words, but its passage would have saved the
people of California more than $100,000 a year, or almost as much as it costs the State to run the Governor's
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office, the Controller's office, the State Treasurer's office and the office of State Superintendent of Schools
combined. Assembly Bill 433 repealed the law of 1907, under which hunters are required to pay the Fish and
Game Commission for the privilege of going hunting. The bill was introduced January 15th. It was referred to
the notorious Assembly Committee on Fish and Game. There it was held until March 10th. It was then
referred back to the Assembly with the recommendation that it "do not pass." That settled Assembly Bill 433.
Another measure which caused the agents of the Fish Commission much worry was introduced in the
Assembly by Preston and in the Senate by Sanford. This bill provided that $50,000 should be paid out of the
Fish and Game Commission fund each year to be used in paying bounties for exterminating coyotes. This
would have left the Commission only about $130,000 a year. Naturally, the agents of the Commission
resented the raid on their funds. The measure was referred to the Assembly Committee on Fish and Game.
This was on January 18th. And it never was heard of after.
The companion Senate measure, introduced by Sanford, got further, but not much. The Senate Committee
reported it "without recommendation." But even so, it passed second reading and went to engrossment and
third reading. There it languished. On March 18th it was withdrawn by its author.
Another measure which gave the Commissioners a deal of worry was one introduced by Johnson of Placer,
which provided that to each hunter who took fifty blue jay heads to the County's Clerk's office should be
issued a hunter's license free. It was thought that this would encourage boys to kill blue jays for the hunter's
license prize, value one dollar. But General Stone could not see it that way.
"If this bill becomes a law," said General Stone, "we shall have to retrench somewhere."
The bill didn't become a law, and the Fish and Game Commission was saved.
But the most "unkindest cut of all" came when the Assembly attempted to break into that sacred Fish and
Game Commission fund by way of resolution. The Assembly actually adopted a resolution calling for a
Commission to be appointed by the Governor for the purpose of ascertaining the feasibility of dividing the
State into game districts, and generously providing $5,000 out of the Fish Commission fund for that purpose.
Naturally the agents of the Fish Commission were scandalized at this proposed reckless expenditure of
moneys from their fund by somebody else. But they were powerless. The resolution went through.
Rather late in the session the Assembly discovered that under the law it cannot "resolute" money out of any
fund other than the Assembly contingent fund. The resolution was not, therefore, worth the paper it was
printed on. Once again the sacred Fish Commission fund was saved.
But the Assembly could switch money out of the fund by legislative enactment, and a bill covering the same
ground as the resolution was introduced without delay.
The measure passed the Assembly but did not reach the Senate until March 22d, two days before
adjournment. That was very late for such a measure, but a heroic effort was made to secure its passage.
On Estudillo's motion, an attempt was made to suspend the State Constitution, declare the bill a matter of
special urgency, and pass it forthwith. But the motion failed. Again did the Fish Commission escape a raid on
its fund.
Senator Walker and Assemblyman Rutherford introduced measures providing for a distribution of the fund
with counties, which at any rate looked pretty good to the counties, although the agents of the Fish
Commission were not pleased at all.
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The bills provided that onehalf of the moneys collected from the sale of hunters' licenses, and on account of
fines for infringement of the State game laws, should be paid to the counties in which collected, and the
balance go to the Fish Commission fund.
Walker's bill was introduced on January 8th. It went to the Senate Committee on Fish and Game and was
never heard of after.
Rutherford's bill was introduced on January 15th. It went to the Assembly Committee on Fish and Game.
Like the Walker bill, the Rutherford bill was lost in committee oblivion.
Such, from the standpoint of the more important bills to increase and to decrease the Fish Commission fund,
was the record of fish and game legislation. The Fish and Game Commission and its overgrown fund is
still with us. But it might have been infinitely worse. Bad little boys who play hookey from Sundayschool to
go fishing, for example, might have in addition to the other frightful penalties imposed on them been
compelled to pay a license tax of $1 for the privilege.
[100] That the Fish and Game Committee would whitewash the Commission was recognized from the first.
Even members of the machine who stand for genuine game protection objected to this committee making the
investigation. When the motion was made to refer the resolution to this committee, Assemblyman Greer of
Sacramento, took the floor to protest:
"It is useless to refer the matter to the Committee on Fish and Game," said Greer, "for we all know what that
committee will do. We'll get no action there. Let it go to some committee that will give it consideration."
[100a] The Fish and Game Commission was very bitter against Polsley and all who approved his course.
Because of the incident, Game Warden Welch of Santa Cruz County lost his position. Welch was a county
official, paid by the county. The Commission complained that he had written a letter to Polsley commending
the Assemblyman for his effort to secure a report 'from the Commission. Santa Cruz County receives a
monthly stipend from the Commission toward the support of the Brookdale hatchery. The writer is reliably
informed that one of the Commissioners stated that the Commission would do nothing for Santa Cruz County
so long as "that man Welch" remained in office. Welch was removed by the Supervisors. Welch has a
nationalwide reputation as a game warden, and such papers as the "Forest and Stream," New York, and
"Sports Afield," Chicago, have joined the California press in denunciation of his dismissal.
As these pages are going through the press, word comes from Santa Cruz that Welch has been reinstated by
Judge Lucas F. Smith of the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County.
In summarizing his findings, Judge Smith holds that the local Board of Supervisors exceeded its legal power
in declaring vacant the office of voluntary warden, which Welch held; exceeded its legal authority in
removing Welch without specific charges being prepared, notice served on him and an opportunity given for
a hearing.
[101] All sorts of estimates have been made of the income that would have been enjoyed by the Fish and
Game Commission, had this bill become a law. The lowest that the writer knows of, made by a disinterested
person, places the increase at $50,000 a year.
[102] Some of the commission's expense accounts on file with the State Controller are curiosities. For
example, General Stone when he is on commission business taxes the fund $1 for breakfast, $1 for lunch, $1
for dinner. It thus costs the Commission three annual hunter's licenses to feed General Stone for a day.
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Chapter XXV. The Rewarding of the Faithful.
Senators and Assemblymen Whose Votes Were Cast Against Reform Measures Given State and Federal
Positions in Some Instances, in Others Appointed to Holdover Committees or Sent on Trips at the Expense of
the State.
The machine has many ways of rewarding the faithful who persist until the end. The faithful member of
Senate or Assembly may be rewarded by a Federal appointment (Senator Bates has just been graciously
recognized in this way[102a]) or he may be given a State job (witness Senator Price or Assemblyman
Beardslee) ; or he may be put on a legislative holdover committee to investigate something, or to represent
the State at something, or to prepare some kind of a bill to be introduced at the next session of the
Legislature.
This last is perhaps the most genteel method of reward. It entails little work, gives the beneficiary a certain
distinction and pays very well.
Nine Senators were rewarded in this way in the closing hours of the session of 1909. There might have been
ten, but that prince of "bandwagon" Senators, Welch, had to be rewarded twice, so but nine got holdover
committeeships. They are Wolfe, Welch, Wright, Willis, Leavitt, Bills (labeled Republicans), Kennedy, Hare
and Curtin (labeled Democrats). The names of the nine are not unfamiliar. With the exception of that of
Curtin, their votes during the session were consistently cast on the side of the machine. For them to be
rewarded came as a matter of course.
The machine will continue to reward such men until the people take the Legislature out of machine hands.
But that is another story.
The Legislative Holdover Committee is about as useless a thing as can be imagined. This is very well
illustrated by the State's experience with the socalled Harbors Committee, appointed by the Legislature of
1907 to inquire into harbor conditions throughout the State.
The committee consisted of three Senators and three Assemblymen. The Senators managed to incur expenses
of $2,524.20. Assemblymen were more modest. Their expenses were only $1,851.80, making a total expense
charge for the committee of $4,376.
But the $4,376 covers the committee's expenses only, does not provide compensation for the committeemen.
A bill appropriating $6,000 for that purpose was introduced at the session of 1909. This gave the
committeemen $1,000 each for their services. It made the investigation cost the State $10,376[102b].
The Harbors Committee or somebody or something else, the writer is not sure which prepared an
elaborate report of the committee's findings. But owing to a surprising blunder that involved Senator Wolfe
most curiously, the report was not filed until March 23, the day before the Legislature adjourned. The report
was ordered printed in the journal, but it did not appear in the journal of the 23rd, which was circulated on the
morning of the 24th. Instead, was a note to the effect that it would appear in the corrected journal. So, few
knew that it had been filed at all, and it went unnoticed by the daily press.
But the details of the report[102c] were known to the general public long before it was filed with the Senate,
and its provisions made Senator Wolfe appear to exceptional disadvantage. Wolfe was a member of the
Harbors Committee, as was Senator Wright. Among the recommendations set forth in the report as originally
prepared, was one that fortyfour blocks only of land be purchased by the State for the improvement of the
San Francisco Harbor at Islais Creek, instead of the sixtythree blocks necessary for practical harbor
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development.
Senator Wolfe was a warm advocate of the sixtythree block plan which is the only practical plan, by the
way, and shows that Senator Wolfe can land on the right side of things occasionally. But it was very
discouraging for Senator Wolfe to be confronted with the unfiled report of his own Harbors Committee,
endorsed by his own signature as committeeman, in which the purchase of only fortyfour blocks was urged.
Senator Wolfe's defense was ingenious. He stated that he had signed the report as a matter of courtesy, not
really knowing what it contained. The incident illustrates the value to the State of such legislative
investigations.
But in spite of the curious history of Wolfe's Harbors Committee, he was given another holdover committee
in 1909. The Senate on Wolfe's motion adopted a resolution setting aside $5,000 to meet the expenses of
a holdover committee to consist of three members to investigate the cause of recent advances in the cost of
foodstuffs. Senators Wolfe, Welch and Hare are honored with the appointments. LieutenantGovernor Porter
appointed.
Senator Wolfe, from the machine standpoint, certainly earned the distinction thus thrust upon him, and his
share of the money. Senator Wolfe was not in good health during the session, but in spite of his indisposition
he managed to be present in the Senate Chamber, where often, pale, haggard and plainly on the verge of
breakdown, he fought valiantly against the reform measures which were aimed at the prestige of the State
machine, and the domination of the tenderloin, the Southern Pacific Railroad, the racetrack gamblers and
allied interests in State politics.
Wolfe led the fight against the WalkerOtis AntiGambling bill, against the Local Option bill, against the
effective Stetson Railroad Regulation bill, against the Direct Primary bill, against admitting Senator Bell of
Pasadena to the Republican caucus, against the bill to prohibit the sale of intoxicants within a mile and a half
of Stanford University, against the initiative amendment to the Constitution, against the amendment to the
Constitution to correct ambiguities as to the powers and duties of the State Railroad Commission, and against
Burnett's resolution for the investigation of the cause of the increase in freight rates and express charges.
Senator Wolfe also led the fight for the passage of the Change of Venue bill.
Curiously enough, Senator Wolfe's stock argument, used in most of the opposition to reform measures, was
to the effect that if such measures became laws, the Republican party in California would be undermined.
Senator Wolfe's argument had great weight with Republicans like Leavitt and Weed and Democrats like Hare
and Kennedy. For the "good of the Republican party," these gentlemen generally voted as Senator Wolfe
dictated.
Senator Welch, the second member of the Pure Food Committee, is at least entitled to gracious consideration
at the hands of the WolfeLeavitt element. Senator Welch was one of the twentyseven Callheralded heroes
who defeated the WolfeLeavitt element in the first fight on the Direct Primary bill in the Senate. And
Senator Welch was one of the seven heroes who "flopped" to the WolfeLeavitt side when the psychological
moment came. Welch's one vote in the final struggle would have decided the Direct Primary fight for the side
of the reform element. But when the reform element needed Welch he was found snugly quartered with
Wolfe and Leavitt.
Welch voted for the WalkerOtis bill, but he was one of the last members of the Senate to be counted for that
measure. Indeed, Welch caught the rear of the bandwagon on that issue just in time.
On railroad issues Welch's record is as good as the Southern Pacific Railroad could wish. He voted against
the adoption of the practical absolute rate, and for the impracticable maximum rate; he voted for the
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ineffective Wright bill and against the effective Stetson bill. He voted against the Constitutional Amendment
simplyfying the wording of the Constitution in those sections which prescribe the powers and duties of the
Railroad Commissioners.
So Senator Welch had his appointment to the Food Investigation Committee due him. He was also made
member of the Legislative Committee to represent the State at the AlaskaYukon Exposition, of which more
later. Thus Senator Welch rounded out the session very satisfactorily to Senator Welch and to the machine, if
not to the State of California.
Senator Hare is down in the legislative records as a Democrat. He voted on most measures consistently under
the lead of Wolfe and Leavitt. His appointment need not, therefore, cause surprise.
When the Direct Primary bill was before the Senate Committee on Election Laws, Hare's vote was with those
of Wolfe and Leavitt to make the measure as ineffective as possible. Hare was among the thirteen unworthies
who voted against the measure when the first fight was made for it on the floor of the Senate; he was among
the twenty who finally, under Wolfe's leadership, held the measure up in the Senate until by trick it could be
amended to the machine's liking. Hare was one of the seven Senators who voted against the WalkerOtis
AntiGambling bill. He was one of those who voted for the passage of the Change of Venue bill.
On railroad measures Hare voted against the Stetson bill and for the Wright bill, against the absolute rate and
for the maximum rate. He voted against the amendment to the Constitution to clear up the alleged ambiguity
regarding the powers and duties of the Railroad Commissioners.
Lack of space prevents continuance of the review of Hare's votes. But enough has been said to show that this
"Democrat" was entitled to the honor at the hands of the Performer, Republican Lieutenant Governor Warren
Porter, of appointment to the Holdover Committee which, under the leadership of Senator Eddie Wolfe, will
investigate the cause of the increase in the price of foodstuffs.
But a far more desirable appointment was to the committee which is to represent the State at the
AlaskaYukon Pacific Exposition. By concurrent resolution the Senate and Assembly decided that seven
Senators, seven Assemblymen, one Lieutenant Governor (Warren Porter) and one Governor (Gillett) should
attend the exposition at the State's expense. For this purpose $7,000 of the State's money has been provided.
The seven Senators appointed by Performer Porter are Wright, Willis, Welch, Leavitt, Bills, Kennedy, Curtin.
The seven Assemblymen appointed by Speaker Stanton are Transue, Beardslee, Leeds, Hewitt, McManus,
McClellan and Schimtt.
The records of the Senators thus honored show them worthy the machine's consideration. Their votes on the
banner measures before the Legislature last winter were as follows:
Against the WalkerOtis bill, to prohibit poolselling and bookmaking (AntiGambling bill) Leavitt 1.
For the WalkerOtis billBills, Curtin, Kennedy, Willis, Welch, Wright 6.
Only seven Senators voted against the WalkerOtis bill. Of the seven Leavitt is given the Alaska trip; Wolfe
and Hare are put on the Food Investigation Committee. Thus of nine Senators who got on holdover
committees three were among the seven who voted in the interest of the gambling element.
The records made by the State Senators who will attend the exposition at the State's expense in the Direct
Primary fight are quite as suggestive. When the first attempt was made in the Senate to force the machine
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amendments into the bill, February 18, the seven Senators voted as follows:
For the machine's amendments Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt, Willis.
Against the machine's amendments Curtin, Welch, Wright.
Thirteen Senators on February 18 voted for the machine's amendments. Of their number Hare and Wolfe are
on the Food Investigation Committee; Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt and Willis are to attend the exposition at the
State's expense. Thus six of the thirteen have been rewarded.
The machine, having failed to amend the Direct Primary bill in the Senate, amended it in the Assembly.
When the measure was returned to the Senate, six of the seven Senators who will attend the exposition voted
to concur in the Assembly amendments. They were, Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt, Welch, Willis and Wright. Only
one of the seven voted against the machine amendments, Curtin.
The records of the seven favored, triptaking Senators on railroad regulation measures are as follows:
For the Wright bill, against the Stetson bill; for the maximum rate, against the absolute rate Leavitt, Welch,
Willis, Wright, Bills, Kennedy 6.
Against the Wright bill, for the Stetson bill, against the maximum rate, for the absolute rate Curtin 1.
Against the constitutional amendment to make clear the powers and duties of Railroad Commissioners
Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt, Welch, Willis 5.
For the amendment Curtin, Wright 2.
Against the Burnett resolution calling for an investigation of the cause for an increase in freight rates Bills,
Kennedy, Leavitt, Willis, Wright 5.
For the resolution 0.
Absent or not voting Curtin, Welch 2.
The records of the seven on the Local Option bill and the Change of Venue bill are:
Against Local Option Leavitt, Welch, Willis, Bills, Curtin, Kennedy 6.
For Local Option Wright 1.
For the Change of Venue bill Bills, Leavitt, Welch, Willis, Wright 5.
Against the Change of Venue bill Curtin, Kennedy 2.
Kennedy, to be sure, voted against the Change of Venue bill when that measure passed the Senate. But
Senator Kennedy was unaccountably absent the next morning when the Change of Venue bill was taken up
on a motion for reconsideration. Because of Kennedy's absence, the motion to reconsider the measure was
lost, and its defeat prevented. Senator Kennedy is scarcely entitled to credit for being recorded on the right
side of this measure.
Nine Senators are included in the two holdover committees which are under consideration. As Wolfe and
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Hare invariably voted with Leavitt, it will be seen that eight of the nine voted against the Stetson bill and for
the Wright bill; seven of the nine voted against the Constitutional amendment to make plain the constitutional
powers and duties of the Railroad Commissioners; seven of the nine voted against investigating the cause of
increase in freight and express rates to the Pacific Coast; eight of the nine voted against local option; seven
voted for the Change of Venue bill, and one of the two others as good as voted for it, although on record
against the measure.
As Republican Senators Bell, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Cutten, Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge and
Thompson, who were invariably on the right side of things, look upon the records of the "Democrats" and
"Republicans" included among the nine favored receivers of plums, they can scarcely be blamed for
demanding with the discouraged little boy What's the use of being good, anyhow?
And as the Democratic Senators, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright, Holohan, Miller and Sanford, who
worked with the antimachine Republicans for the passage of good laws and the defeat of bad ones look
upon the favored Hare and Kennedy they cannot be blamed if the same question occurs to them also.
The indications are that the Senators who were thus overlooked will have "to wait for theirs," until The
People of California, and not the machine, award the prizes for faithful public service.
Of the seven Assemblymen who will attend the AlaskaYukon Exposition, one, Hewitt, voted against the
machine on every important issue that came up. The other six are a spotted lot.
The six Beardslee, Leeds, McManus, McClellan, Schmitt and Transue voted for the famous "gag rules"
which the Assembly rejected by a vote of 41 to 32. Indeed, Beardslee and Transue were on the Committee on
Rules which the Assembly, when it rejected the Committee's rules, repudiated.
In the fight for the passage of the WalkerOtis AntiGambling bill, two of the six, Leeds and Transue,
managed to keep their records straight. On the six rollcalls taken on the measure before it passed the
Assembly, Beardslee voted five times against the bill and once for it; McManus voted six times against it;
Schmitt voted five times against it, on one rollcall he did not vote; while McClellan voted four times for it
and twice against.
Five of the six, Beardslee, Leeds, McManus, McClellan and Schmitt voted against forcing out of the
Committee on Federal Relations the Sanford resolution, which called for a government line of steamers from
Panama to San Francisco. The five voted for the Johnson amendments to the resolutions, which cut out all
criticizing reference to the rateboosting combinations between the great transportation companies. Transue
was absent when the vote to force the resolution out of committee was taken. But he was present to vote for
the Johnson amendments.
Five of the six, Leeds, McManus, McClellan, Schmitt and Transue, voted for the machine amendments to the
Direct Primary bill, which were read into that measure in the Assembly, and which resulted in the Senate
deadlock over the measure. Beardslee voted against the amendments.
Five of the six Beardslee, Leeds, McManus, McClellan and Transue voted against the Holohan bill to
remove the party circle from the election ballot. Schmitt did not vote on this measure.
Assemblyman Hewitt will, at the AlaskaYukon, find himself in distinguished company. From the
WolfeLeavittJohnson standpoint, he is the only one of his associates who cannot be said to have earned the
preferment thrust upon him.
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[102a] As these forms are going through the press, word comes that Senator Willis has been made Assistant
United States District Attorney at Los Angeles. See Willis' record, Table "A" of the appendix.
[102b] The State Constitution provides no method of compensation for such services. The providing of this
compensation, therefore, becomes a matter of great delicacy. It is done, under a decision of the Supreme
Court that that tribunal cannot go back of a legislative Act, but must abide by the wording of the Act. The
appropriation bills to compensate the members for their services on holdover Committees are worded to
meet the opinion of the courts. The money is invariably appropriated "to pay the claim of," etc. The
Legislature is, according to the courts, the sole Judge of whether the alleged claim is a claim and not a
petition for a gift. The "to pay theclaimof" bills never fail to pull down the money.
[102c] The report as originally drawn, and as it was signed by Senator Wolfe and his associates.
Chapter XXVI. The Holdover Senators.
Eleven of Them May Be Counted Upon to Vote Against the Machine at the Session of 1911, Two Are
Doubtful, One Will Probably Vote with the Majority, While Six May Be Counted Upon to Support Machine
Policies.
Twenty of the 120 members who sat in the Legislature of 1909 half of the forty Senators hold over and
will serve in the Legislature of 1911. The twenty constitute the strength with which the machine and the
antimachine forces will enter the field in the struggle for control of the Legislature two years hence.
The machine has, long before this, taken stock of those twenty holdover Senators. Machine agents
unquestionably know what the holdover members owe and to whom indebted; know their family history;
know the church to which they belong, their lodges, their likes, their dislikes and their prejudices; know how
they can be "reached" if vulnerable; know how they can be "kept in line" if already tarred with the machine
brush.
But the plain citizen, not within the charmed circle of machine protection, is not concerning himself much
about these holdovers. He scarcely knows their names. It is safe to say that not 2 per cent of the voters of
California could offhand name the twenty holdover members of the Upper House of the Legislature.
In other words, the machine is posted, and the citizen is not. And here is the secret of much of the machine's
success. In its campaign for control of affairs, the machine knows to a nicety just what to expect from men in
public life; the plain citizen is without such information.
In the Appendix will be found a table, "Table H," showing the votes of the twenty holdover Senators on
sixteen roll calls. Representative citizens, all standing for good government, may differ as to the desirability
or undesirability of several of the measures included in the list. But by and large the average normal citizen
will hold that certain of the sixteen measures are desirable and others undesirable. Thus all would probably
agree that the Change of Venue bill is undesirable legislation, and declare the WalkerOtis AntiRacetrack
Gambling measure to be desirable, although they might honestly differ on the Local Option bill.
On the sixteen roll calls the twenty holdover Senators cast 283 votes. Of the 283, 164 are recorded against
what the normal citizen would regard as bad measures, or for what the normal citizen would regard as good
measures. In other words, speaking broadly, 164 of the 283 votes were cast against machine policies. Only
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119 were cast with the machine. In other words, over the whole session, on what may be fairly considered the
most important roll calls taken in the Senate, the holdover Senators cast 164 votes against the machine and
only 119 votes for the machine. This isn't a bad showing to start with.
The showing is strengthened by the fact that ninetytwo of the 119 machine votes were cast by eight
Senators, Finn, Wolfe, Bills, Martinelli, Hurd, Hare, Lewis and Welch. Senator Finn of San Francisco heads
the list with fifteen of these negative votes. On one occasion Senator Finn didn't vote. After Finn comes
Wolfe, also from San Francisco, with thirteen of the ninetytwo negative or machine votes to his credit or his
discredit; Bills of Sacramento and Martinelli of Marin follow with twelve each; Hurd of Los Angeles with
eleven; Hare of San Francisco and Lewis of San Joaquin with ten each, and Welch of San Francisco with
nine.
This leaves twentyseven machine votes to be divided among twelve of the holdover Senators, about two
votes on an average each.
Burnett is credited with seven of the twentyseven, which reduces the number to twenty for eleven Senators.
Of the twenty votes, seven were cast in the two ballots taken on the Local Option issue, again the bill; and
eight were cast in two ballots against the Holohan bill to remove the party circle from the election ballot.
Thus, excluding the votes on local option, and on the Party Circle bill, on twelve important ballots, eleven of
the holdover Senators cast only five votes for machine policies.
The eleven are Birdsall, Campbell, Cutten, Estudillo, Holohan, Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge,
Thompson and Walker.
These eleven Senators, as judged by their performances at the session just closed, may be depended upon to
vote for good bills and against bad ones at the session of 1911.
To this list should be added the name of Burnett. Burnett got off wrong on the Stetson Railroad Regulation
bill, and managed to land with the Wolfe element in the direct primary fight. But there is good reason to
believe that Burnett was very sick of his company before the session closed. The probabilities are that
Senator Burnett feels more at home with Senators Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson and Cutten than with Hare,
Finn and Wolfe.
Senator Hurd is another holdover who started out very well, but went badly astray after the vote on the
Railroad Regulation bills. Like Burnett, Hurd showed signs toward the end of the session of feeling himself
in uncongenial company. There is reason to believe that Hurd at the next session will be found voting with
the ThompsonStetsonStrobridge element.
Senator Welch will be found voting with the majority. This reduces the number of holdover Senators who can
be counted upon to accept Wolfe's leadership, machine Senators, if you like, to six. The lineup of the twenty
holdovers, then, would on this basis be as follows:
Antimachine Birdsall, Cutten, Estudillo, Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson, Walker
(Republicans), Campbell, Holohan (Democrats) 11.
Doubtful Burnett, Hurd (Republicans) 2.
With the majority Welch (Republican) 1.
Machine Bills, Finn, Lewis[103], Martinelli, Wolfe (Republicans), Hare (Democrat) 6.
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On this basis the antimachine element will start with all the advantage in the struggle for control of the
Senate in 1911. If Burnett and Hurd vote with the eleven antimachine Senators, it will be necessary to elect
only eight antimachine Senators that the reform element may control the Senate. This will mean twentytwo
votes for the reform element, for Welch, if he is to be judged by past performances, will be found with the
majority.
From present indications, four important fights will be made at the Legislative session of 1911.
(1) To pass an effective railroad regulation measure and to amend those sections of the State Constitution
which prescribe the duties and powers of the Railroad Commissioners.
(2) To amend the Direct Primary law passed at the session just closed to meet with the popular demand for an
effective measure.
(3) To grant local option to the counties.
(4) To adopt an amendment to the State Constitution granting the initiative to the electors of the State.
Significantly enough, the lineup of the holdover Senators in the Direct Primary deadlock of the last session
was nine to eleven, the eleven Senators who divide but five machine votes between them standing out against
Wolfe and Leavitt for an effective provision for the selection of United States Senators by Statewide vote,
while the six machine Senators, the "bandwagon" Senator and the two doubtfuls, voted with Wolfe and
Leavitt.
But the probabilities are that in the event of the antimachine element controlling the Senate of 1911,
Burnett, Hurd, Lewis, Martinelli and Welch would join with the reform forces to make necessary
amendments to the measure. When the Direct Primary bill was first before the Senate, these five Senators
united with the Good Government forces and assisted in defeating the machine's amendment. When the bill
was amended in the Assembly, however, the five flopped to the machine side. Indeed, only four of the twenty
holdover Senators voted for the machine's amendments to the Direct Primary bill when the measure was first
passed upon by the Senate. They were Bills, Finn, Hare and Wolfe.
The holdover Senators made their poorest showing on the railroad measures. When the test came on the
Stetson bill the twenty holdovers split even, ten being for the effective Stetson bill, ten for the ineffective
Wright bill. The lineup was as follows:
For the Stetson bill Birdsall, Campbell, Cutten, Holohan, Lewis, Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge,
Thompson 10.
For the Wright bill Bills, Burnett, Estudillo, Finn, Hare, Hurd, Martinelli, Walker, Welch, Wolfe 10.
Lewis, who usually voted with the performers, voted for the Stetson bill. But the reform forces lost two votes,
those of Walker and Estudillo. On another vote on the same issue, however, Burnett, Estudillo and Walker
would probably be found with the antimachine forces supporting an effective measure. This would make the
vote of the holdover Senators, thirteen for effective railroad regulation, and seven for a measure of the Wright
law variety.
The holdovers made a good showing on the Initiative amendment, eleven voting for it and five against it, four
not voting at all. The vote was as follows:
For the Initiative Birdsall, Campbell, Cutten, Estudillo, Hare, Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Thompson,
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Walker, Welch 11.
Against the Initiative Bills, Hurd, Lewis, Martinelli, Wolfe 5.
Not voting Burnett, Finn, Holohan, Strobridge 4.
Of the four who did not vote, three, Burnett, Holohan and Strobridge, would have voted for the amendment.
Finn would probably have voted against it. This would have made the vote fourteen to six in the amendment's
favor. It will be seen that those who would have the initiative granted the people, have a good start for the
next session.
The outlook for local option is not so reassuring. Of the holdover Senators who ordinarily were for measures
which give the people a voice in the management of public affairs, Birdsall, Holohan, Rush and Strobridge
were unalterably opposed to the local option idea. The six machine Senators, of course, opposed it, which
with the votes of Burnett, Welch and Hurd placed thirteen of the twenty holdover Senators against the
measure.
Six of the holdovers voted for the Local Option bill Campbell, Cutten, Estudillo, Roseberry, Thompson and
Walker.
Stetson was absent and did not vote. He, however, favored the bill. His vote would have made it 13 to 7. Thus
on the vote on their bill at the last session, the local option forces have seven of the holdover Senators with
them, and thirteen against.
On the other hand, seventeen of the holdover Senators voted for the WalkerOtis AntiRacetrack Gambling
bill, while only three, Finn, Hare and Wolfe, voted against it. Thus on the moral issue, as well as the political
and the industrial, the antimachine element is stronger in the holdover delegation in the Senate than is the
machine. It rests with the good citizenship of California to maintain its advantage by electing to the Senate in
1910, men who will stand with the majority of the holdover members for the passage of good and the defeat
of vicious measures.
[103] Lewis voted with the antimachine element in the Railroad Regulation fight, one of the most severe
tests of the session. Persons who know Lewis well stated that he will, if the antimachine forces be
effectively organized at the session of 1911, be found against the machine. It is "up to Senator Lewis."
Chapter XXVII. The Retiring Senators.
Of the Twenty Whose Terms of Office Will Have Expired, the Machine Loses Eleven, the AntiMachine
Element Seven Two Who Voted With the Machine on Occasion Were Usually on the Side of Good
Government.
Twenty of the forty Senators who sat in the Legislature of 1909, must, if they sit in the Legislature of 1911,
be reelected at the general elections in November 1910. They are: Senators Anthony of San Francisco, Bates
of Alameda, Bell of Pasadena, Black of Santa Clara, Boynton of Yuba, Caminetti of Amador, Cartwright of
Fresno, Curtin of Tuolumne, Hartman of San Francisco, Kennedy of San Francisco, Leavitt of Alameda,
McCartney of Los Angeles, Miller of Kern, Price of Sonoma, Reily of San Francisco, Sanford of Mendocino,
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Savage of Los Angeles, Weed of Siskiyou, Willis of San Bernardino and Wright of San Diego.
By consulting Table A of the Appendix, it will be seen that on sixteen roll calls the forty members of the
Senate of 1909 voted 570 times. Of the 570 votes 311 were cast against what are regarded as machine
policies; 259 for such policies. Of the 311 antimachine votes, 164 were cast by holdover Senators, and were
considered in the last chapter, while 147 were cast by Senators whose successors will be elected in 1910.
Thus it will be seen, that on this basis, more desirable Senators will hold over than those whose terms of
office will have expired before the next Legislature convenes.
On the basis of the machine votes the result is as satisfactory. On the sixteen roll calls, 259 machine votes
were cast. Of these 140 were cast by the retiring Senators, and only 119 by those who will hold over, and
who will sit in the Legislature of 1911. So, on the whole, the machine loses and the people gain in the
retirement of the twenty Senators.
In point of numbers the result is as satisfactory. The machine will lose eleven Senators: Bates, Hartman,
Kennedy, Leavitt, McCartney, Price, Reily, Savage, Weed, Willis and Wright; while the antimachine forces
will lose only seven who can be counted constantly for reform policies: Bell, Black, Boynton, Caminetti,
Cartwright, Miller and Sanford.
This leaves only Anthony and Curtin to be accounted for. Both these men stood out against the machine's
amendments to the Direct Primary bill, Anthony in particular standing against the severest pressure that could
be brought to compel him to vote against the interests of his constituents and of the State. But Anthony could
not be moved. On the railroad measures, however, Anthony voted with the machine. But he voted for the
WalkerOtis bill, and, generally speaking, for all measures which made for political reforms. With any sort
of organization of the reform forces, Anthony could be counted upon as safe for reform. His record on the
Direct Primary bill certainly entitles him to the highest consideration.
Curtin also was as a general thing with the reform element. He voted, however, against the bill to do away
with the party circle and he voted against the Local Option bill, but in so doing he merely followed the lead
of such men as Birdsall, who, while out and out against the machine, were at the same time against local
option and lukewarm on ballot reform. Birdsall, however, finally voted for the bill to remove the party circle
from the election ballot, although he had on the first ballot voted against the bill. Curtin did not, however,
change his vote. But Curtin did vote against the Initiative Amendment. On the other hand, Curtin's record on
the Direct Primary bill, on the Railroad Regulation bills, and on the AntiGambling bill is all that could be
desired.
While the retirement of all the Senators who do not hold over would strengthen the reform element in the
Senate, nevertheless the State can ill afford to lose the services of the seven who stood out so valiantly
against machine policies. Senator Bell heads the list, with Caminetti, Black, Boynton and Sanford close
seconds.
Senator Bell not only made the best record made in the Senate of 1909, but he made the best record of the
Senate of 1907. Conscientious, fully awake to the responsibilities of his position, alive to the tricks of the
machine leaders, in constant attendance, Senator Bell proved himself during the two sessions that he has
served in the Senate, a power for good government. His absence from the session of 1911 would be a loss to
the State.
Senators Black and Boynton at the session of 1909 made records quite as good as that made by Senator Bell.
On the sixteen roll calls taken as tests of the standing of the several Senators, Black voted but once against
reform policies. On the first ballot on the Party Circle bill he voted against the measure, but the day
following, corrected his mistake by voting for the measure. Boynton voted to return the Local Option bill to
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the Judiciary Committee, but at the final test his vote was recorded for the bill[103a]. Thus neither of the two
Senators can be said to have voted with the machine even on comparatively unimportant issues.
Senator Caminetti probably gave the machine more worry during the session than any other one Senator.
Caminetti has, a way of saying out loud what his antimachine associates are thinking, which is not at all
popular with the machine. True to principle, he, a Democrat, voted for United States Senator Perkins because,
from Caminetti's viewpoint, no other candidate came so near to being the popular choice of the people as
Perkins, and Caminetti holds that the people and not the Legislature should select the United States Senator.
The machine was glad of Caminetti's vote for Perkins, but was not at all pleased with the departure of a
Democrat voting for a Republican. Caminetti's course continued in by all the members of the Legislature, and
the machine would lose its monopoly of Federal Senatormaking.
Caminetti's record is admirable. To be sure, he opposed Local Option, but he fought as few others fought for
an effective Direct Primary law, for effective railroad regulation, in fact for practically all the reform policies
which the antimachine forces advocated and the machine opposed. Senator Sanford also voted for and
worked for reform policies. Like Caminetti, however, he opposed the Local Option bill and voted against it.
Senator Miller, on the other hand, supported the Local Option bill, but slipped more seriously than did either
Caminetti or Sanford, by voting with the machine Senators against the Initiative amendment. Miller's work
for effective railroad regulation and for an effective Direct Primary law, won him the deserved admiration
and confidence of the better element of the Legislature. Senator Cartwright voted but twelve times on the
sixteen roll calls, but the twelve included the votes on the Direct Primary issues, on railroad regulation, and
on all the moral issues considered. And each time, Senator Cartwright's vote was cast on the side of good
government.
On the other side, the machine side, Senator Bates distinguished himself but once during the session. It was
Senator Bates who, to oblige a friend, had the notorious Change of Venue bill placed on the Special Urgency
File, thus making the passage of the bill possible. Senator Bates' vote and influence such as it was were
thrown in the balance against giving the people of California a Statewide vote the only practical vote for
United States Senators. He voted against the effective Stetson bill; he voted for the ineffective Railroad
Regulation bill. In fact, aside from the WalkerOtis bill, Bates was on the machine side of practically every
issue[104].
Senator Hartman was during the session a mere machine vote. He was always on hand, always voted, and
voted with the machine. It was Senator Hartman who named an employee of the notorious Sausalito
gambling rooms for an important committee clerkship. So far as the writer can recall, Hartman made but two
speeches during the session; one against the WalkerOtis AntiGambling bill, one against the Islais Creek
Harbor bill, the passage of which meant so much for San Francisco, the city, by the way, responsible for
Hartman's presence at Sacramento.
On the sixteen roll calls under consideration, Hartman voted sixteen times for machine policies. As a vote,
Hartman is a valuable machine asset; otherwise a nonentity.
Those who have read the previous chapters have already formed their opinion of the advisability of returning
to the Senate, Kennedy, the hero of the passage of the Change of Venue bill; McCartney, the author of the
famous amendment to the Direct Primary bill; Weed, who introduced the resolution to drag Senator Black
from his sick bed at Palo Alto; Reily, who with Senator Hartman, alone of all the Senate stood out against the
passage of the Islais Creek Harbor bills; Willis, who as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, backed such
measures as the Change of Venue bill, and opposed such measures as the Commonwealth Club bills; Savage,
who in committee and out of it, opposed the Statewide vote plan for nominating United States Senators, and
Senator Price.
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Price did not distinguish himself particularly. On the sixteen roll calls included in Table A, his vote was
recorded against the machine as many as four times. But there were ten Senators who did even worse.
However, a story of the closing days of the session is quite characteristic of Senator Price.
An important roll call was on if the writer remembers correctly, it was on Burnett's motion to continue the
investigation into the causes of the increase of freight and express rates. Price was present, but did not answer
to the call of his name. The advocates of the resolution insisted that all vote, and demanded a call of the
Senate. The doors were ordered closed, at which order Price made a run for the door. Caminetti saw the
move, understood it and started to intercept the fleeing Senator. But if Caminetti were quick, Price was
quicker. Caminetti missed his grab at Price, and so chased that gentleman to the door of the Senate chamber.
The assistant SergeantatArms at the door was just swinging it closed as Price shot through. The
determined Caminetti made a last grab at Price's coattails, but too late. The massive doors banged closed,
with Price, coattails and all, on the outside, and the balked Caminetti on the inside. Price didn't vote on that
roll call.
The failure to return Leavitt to the Senate will be a decided loss for the machine, one hard to offset. Next to
Wolfe, Leavitt was by far the ablest floor leader in the Senate. The brute force of the man, his grossness, his
indifference to public opinion, made him an ideal machine leader. Leavitt's return from Alameda seems
extremely doubtful. His district takes in the notorious gambling community, Emeryville, which will be
purged of the thug element that has dominated it, by the enforcement of the WalkerOtis law. With the loss
of this portion of his constituency, Senator Leavitt's chance of reelection from Emeryville appears slim
indeed.
But, according to rather persistent rumor, Senator Leavitt may be returned to the Senate, not from Alameda,
but from the SiskiyouShasta District, the district represented by Weed. Leavitt has property up there, and
the story runs that he will be a candidate from that part of the State. The voters of Shasta and Siskiyou,
however, may conclude that they have something to say about it.
Senator Wright, the last of the Senators whose terms will have expired before the next session of the
Legislature convenes, is being mentioned as a "reform candidate" for Governor. The idea seems to be that he
will run on his record made at the session of 1909. If this be true, he may not be a candidate for reelection to
the Senate. Senator Wright's record as a State Senator has already been treated at length.
[103a] Senator Boynton was a consistent supporter of the Local Option bill from the beginning to the end of
the session. He held, however, that the bill as originally drawn was not in proper form, and explained that he
voted to have the bill returned to the committee that amendments, which he deemed necessary, could be
made.
[104] Since the Legislature adjourned Senator Bates has been given a lucrative position in the United States
Mint.
Chapter XXVIII. Conclusion.
Events of the Session of 1909 Show That Before Any Effective Reform Can Be Brought About in California,
Good Government Republicans and Democrats Must Unite to Organize Senate and Assembly Appointment
of Senate Committees May Be Taken Out of the Hands of the LieutenantGovernor.
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In the opening chapter it was stated that the machine element in the Legislature of 1909, although in the
minority, defeated the purposes of the reform majority, because of three principal reasons:
(1) The reform element was without organization.
(2) The reform members had, except in the antiracetrack gambling fight, no definite plan of action.
(3) The reform members of both Houses permitted the machine to name presiding officers and appoint
committees.
This third reason must appeal to those who have read the foregoing pages as the most important of all. The
story of every machine success, in face of opposition, is that of advantage gained through the moral support
given by the presiding officers[105], or of cooperation of committees, or of both. But, unfortunately, a
stupid partisanship a partisanship which the machine finds far more potent than bribe money makes this
cause of machine success more difficult to overcome than either of the others. Already a movement is on
foot, the details of which the writer is not at liberty to make public, that will unite the reform element of the
next Legislature into a working body, from the day nominations are made. Steps to this end were taken before
the last Legislature adjourned. In the same way, the work of bringing reform issues before the public
reform of the ballot laws, amendment of the Direct Primary law, the simplification of the mode of criminal
procedure is being taken up in the same effective, commonsense way as was the AntiRacetrack Gambling
bill. But here the progress of the commonsense element of machine opposition seems to halt. In spite of their
experience of the last session, Democrats and Republicans who stand for good government hesitate at the
suggestion of nonpartisan organization of Senate and Assembly. The writer has shown in the foregoing
chapters that the machine Republicans and the machine Democrats were for practical purposes a unit in the
organization of the Legislature of 1909. Why, then, should not the antimachine Republicans and the
antimachine Democrats unite for purposes of organization, just as they united, at the session of 1909, to
oppose vicious measures and to work for the passage of good bills? That is a question which has never been
satisfactorily answered. It leads us, however, to the question of the real line of division in Senate and
Assembly, and, for that matter, in State politics[106].
That the real division is no longer between political parties, or even between party factions, is apparent to the
observer who has given the question any attention at all.
Not once, for example, did the California Legislature of 1909 divide on a party question; nor did it have to
deal with any problem that had not at one time or another been endorsed by both parties. Both Democrats and
Republicans in either State or county platforms had declared for the passage of an AntiRacetrack Gambling
law, for an effective Direct Primary law, for an effective Railroad Regulation law, for the submission to the
people of a Constitutional Amendment granting the people the privilege of initiating laws. In the same way,
county conventions of both parties and county conventions are the closest to the people and most
representative of them had declared for local option, for the election of United States Senators by direct
vote of the people, for amendments to the codes that should simplify proceedings in criminal cases, for
effective railroad regulation. Estimating the purposes of the two parties by their county and State platforms,
none of these reforms can be regarded as any more Democratic than Republican, and these were the issues
with which the Legislature of 1909 was called upon to deal.
A glance at the tables of votes in the appendix will show that the Assemblymen and the Senators who voted
against the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill, generally speaking, voted against the effective Stetson Railroad
Regulation bill and for the ineffective Wright bill, opposed the provision in the Direct Primary bill giving the
people an effective part in the selection of United States Senators, supported the passage of the Change of
Venue bill, opposed the passage of the Local Option bill, opposed the submission of the Initiative amendment
to the electors of the State. This negative element, opposed to policies which the normal citizen regards as
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making for the State's best interests, has in these pages been called the machine[107].
As has been shown in these pages, the interests of the several beneficiaries of the system are in effect pooled;
one element helps the other. The managers of the several elements, the political agents, if you like, of the
tenderloin, Southern Pacific, racetrack, and publicservice monopolies generally; in a word, all who seek to
evade the law or to secure undue special privileges or to continue secure in the possession of such privileges
already secured, recognize that they must hang together or submit to a reckoning with the public, which must
necessarily result in the breaking of the particular monopoly which each enjoys, be it in transportation,
nickelintheslot graft, or traffic in the bodies of young women. Should the political bureau of the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company, for example, lose the support of the tenderloin, or of the racetrack gamblers, or of
any other powerful group of its political associates, the corporation could no longer continue its stranglehold
upon the State. But none of its associates would dare thus offend. Such is the machine, which, in the name of
a protective tariff, "sound money," Abraham Lincoln, or Theodore Roosevelt, has organized the Legislature
of California for sixteen years. Previous to 1895, there were California Legislatures organized in the name of
Thomas Jefferson. But the machine has not taken the name of Thomas Jefferson in vain in California for
many years[108].
Nevertheless, although acting under the name Republican, the machine is quite as dependent upon
"Democrats" as upon "Republicans," and as dependent upon either as upon the tenderloin, the brewery trust
or the racetrack gambling element. It monopolizes neither party, but it divides both parties. Or it may be
described as a canker that has eaten into both, diseased both, rendered both unwholesome, until a condition
exists in the dominating parties that requires that the uncorrupted element of both unite to cut the diseased
portion away[109].
As the machine divides the parties, so did it divide the Republican and Democratic delegations in the Senate
and the Assembly of the California Legislature of 1909. Hare and Kennedy, for example, Democratic
Senators, voted constantly with Wolfe and Leavitt, Republican Senators, for machine policies. Nor was the
opposition restricted to party lines. Black and Boynton and Cutten, Republican Senators, were found voting
constantly with Campbell and Holohan, Democratic Senators, against the machine. Between Black and
Wolfe, Republicans, there was nothing in common during the entire session; nor was there anything in
common between Campbell and Kennedy, Democrats. On practically every important issue, however,
Kennedy, Democrat, and Wolfe, Republican, made common cause, while Black, Republican, and Campbell,
Democrat, opposed them.
The same comparisons could be made in the Assembly, where such Democrats as Wheelan and Baxter were
found with Mott and Coghlan, Republicans, supporting machine policies, while opposed to them were
antimachine Republicans of the character of Bohnett and Callan, and antimachine Democrats like Polsley
and Mendenhall.
Thus, for practical purposes, the Legislature can not be divided on party lines. The only practical line of
division is between the machine element, and the antimachine element. Such, at the session of 1909, was the
division on every important issue; such will it be at the legislative session of 1911. Why should not the same
division govern the organization of Senate and Assembly?
As a matter of fact, the machine disregards party lines even in organizing. In making up its committees it
considers fealty to machine interests above party name. For example, Hare and Kennedy were the Democratic
Senators who this year affiliated with the machine. Kennedy was appointed to practically every important
committee, at least to those before which important fights were to be made. Thus we find him on the
Committee on Commerce and Navigation, Contingent Expenses, Elections and Election Laws, Prisons and
Reformatories, and Public Morals, Hare was appointed to the Committee on Commerce and Navigation,
Elections and Election Laws, Labor, Capital and Immigration, Municipal Corporations, Printing, and Public
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Buildings and Grounds. In committees, as well as on the floor of the Senate, Hare and Kennedy were found
as a general thing casting their influence and their votes on the side of machine policies.
Had the antimachine Democrats and the antimachine Republicans in Senate and Assembly, who worked
together for the same ends and voted together on practically every important issue, taken the same course,
and united for the organization of the two Houses, reform measures which were defeated by narrow margins
would have been made laws, and machine measures which became laws defeated.
Such being the case, is it not the duty of the antimachine Republicans and the antimachine Democrats who
may sit in the Legislature of 1911, to organize both Senate and Assembly to resist machine purposes and
policies?
This can be done comparatively easily in the Assembly, where a movement to elect the Speaker such as was
started by Drew of Fresno this year, if carried out, would take the Assembly out of machine hands. Although
the organization of the Senate looks more difficult, because the Senate has no voice in the selection of its
presiding officer, nevertheless, even though a Warren Porter occupy the post of LieutenantGovernor, at the
session of 1911 the reform element can elect its President pro tem., and appoint the Senate committees. In
other words, a majority of the Senate, may if it see fit, take the appointing of the committees out of the hands
of the LieutenantGovernor.
There are two important precedents for this course, one established by a Democratic Senate; the other by a
Republican Senate.
The Democratic precedent was established in 1887. In that year Robert W. Waterman, a Republican, was
LieutenantGovernor and presiding officer of the Senate. The Senate was made up of twentysix Democrats
and fourteen Republicans. The Democratic majority organized the Senate under the following rule, which
will be found in the Senate journal of that session:
"All Committees of the Senate, special and standing, and all joint Committees on the part thereof, shall be
elected by the Senate unless otherwise ordered."
The Republican precedent was made in 1897. In that year, William T. Jeter, a Democrat, was
LieutenantGovernor, while a majority of the Senators were Republicans. Instead of leaving the appointing
of the committees to the Democratic LieutenantGovernor, the Republican Senators adopted a rule that "all
standing committees of the Senate shall be named by the Senate, unless otherwise ordered, and the first
named shall be chairman thereof. All other committees shall be appointed in such manner as the Senate shall
determine."
In other words, the Republican majority of the Senate named the Senate committees of the session of 1897,
taking their appointment out of the hands of the LieutenantGovernor as the Democrats had done ten years
before. There is no good reason why the members of the antimachine majority in the Senate should not have
taken the same course in 1909, and named the committees. Had they done so, and named the President pro
tem., they would have organized the Senate in the interest of those policies in advancing which they were
soon in open revolt against LieutenantGovernor Porter, the machine Senators and the machine lobby.
Failing to do so, they placed themselves under a handicap which they were unable to overcome.
The reform element of the Legislature of 1911 will have in the experience of the reform element of the
session of 1909, an important lesson. And The People of California, who will elect that Legislature, have a
lesson as important. The successes of the machine at the session of 1909, where a clear majority of both
Houses opposed machine policies, demonstrated that the wellbeing of the State requires that the opponents
of the machine in Senate and Assembly, regardless of party label, organize the Legislature. But back of this is
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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the even more important requirement that there be elected to the Legislature American citizens, with the
responsibility of their citizenship upon them, rather than partisans, burdened until their good purposes are
made negative, by the responsibility of their partisanship.
[105] See, for example, Speaker Stanton's ruling on the Direct Primary bill when the Assembly was
considering the question of receding from its amendments.
[106] The machine recognizes the real division, if the reform element does not. The machine, for example,
calls itself Republican, and as such controls the patronage of the San Francisco water front. The appointments
to water front jobs are, of course, partisan, but the writer is reliably informed that as many "Democrats" as
"Republicans" are employed there. Senators Hare and Kennedy, we have seen, although Democrats, got
appointments to holdover committees. The machine recognizes but one line in politics, that which divides
those who support machine policies from those who stand for good government and the square deal. When
those who stand for good government and the square deal become as clear sighted, the fight against the
machine will not be quite so unequal.
[107] The term "machine" is, as a general thing, rather lightly used. It is made to stand for everything, from
what might be and should be perfectly legitimate party organization, to the Southern Pacific political bureau.
The Southern Pacific political bureau is, as a matter of fact, the dominating factor in machine affairs, which
gives some reason for dubbing the machine Southern Pacific. But it is nor more the Southern Pacific machine
than it is the Tenderloin machine or the Racetrack gamblers' machine, or the United Railroads machine, or
the Electric Power Trust machine.
[108] Bryce in his American Commonwealth, more than a quarter of a century ago, showed the hollowness of
the contention of the machine element for arty consideration. "The interest of a Boss in political questions,"
said Bryce in one of his admirable chapters on this subject, "is usually quite secondary. Here and there one
may be found and who is a politician in the European sense, who, whether sincerely or not, purports and
professes to be interested in some principle or measure affecting the welfare of the country. But the
attachment of the ringster is usually given wholly to the concrete party, that is, to the men who compose it,
regarded as officeholders or officeseekers; and there is often not even a profession of zeal for any party
doctrine. As a noted politician happily observed to a friend of mine: 'You know, Mr. R., there are no politics
in politics.' "
[109] One has a wider view of this condition if he look out beyond the Sacramento Capitol, into the Senate
Hall at Washington. The following is from an editorial article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post,
of June 12 last:
"The Iron trade is still in a depressed state. Output is much below the capacity of the mills, and prices have
not recovered from the demoralization of early spring. Yet the other day the common stock of the Steel Trust
sold higher than ever before. When issued, this common stock was rather thinner than water, and it
represented mostly a capitalization of the Trust's tariff graft. At the new high price the market valuation of the
graft, therefore, is some three hundred million dollars. A few days before this new high price was made,
eighteen Democratic Senators voted with the Aldrich Republicans to take iron ore from the free list where
the House bill had put it and protect it by a substantial duty. This action was generally regarded as insuring
a continuation of the Trust's tariff graft. Hence a record price for the common stock was logical enough,
although the iron trade was not exactly flourishing at the moment.
"Similar acts by Democratic Senators were denounced by President Cleveland as party perfidy and dishonor;
but the regrettable fact is there is only one party in the United States Senate just one party, with some
scattering Republicans and Democratic Insurgents. For the purpose of getting elected and making stump
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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speeches, different labels and catchwords are employed; but when it comes down to real business in the
matter of taxing eightyodd million users of iron and steel products for the benefit of an opulent trust, we
find fortythree Republican Senators and eighteen Democratic Senators staunchly voting aye, against
fourteen Republicans and ten Democrats who vote nay.
"With over half of the Democratic members of the Upper House fondly recording themselves as Little
Brothers to Protection, there is slight danger that the tariff will be revised otherwise than by its friends."
Appendix
Tables of Votes.
The test votes given in the several tables record in every instance the result of a contest between the machine
and the antimachine forces in Senate or Assembly. It is quite evident that a unanimous vote cannot be
counted a test vote. Thus the unanimous vote by which the Reciprocal Demurrage bill passed the Senate
cannot be regarded as a test, although the machine fought the demurrage principle viciously in 1907.
Nor can a vote on a measure be taken as a test vote, where the vote was taken without the members fully
realizing what was before them. Thus the votes on the Wheelan bills do not appear in either Senate or
Assembly tables. These measures were slipped through Senate and Assembly without the members of either
House fully realizing what the bills were, their purpose, or farreaching effects. To be sure, a member of the
Legislature should know what he is voting on, but when one considers the incidents of the whirlwind close
of the session of 1909, the injustice of holding a member accountable for inadvertently voting for a measure
which he had intended to oppose, becomes apparent.
Following this rule, a vote on a given measure may be a test vote in one House and not in the other. The
Change of Venue bill is an example in point. The Change of Venue bill was slipped through the Assembly,
without the members fully realizing its import, and hence without opposition. But in the Senate the issue was
fought out. The Senate vote on the Change of Venue bill, then, is taken as a test vote, while the Assembly
vote on the same measure is not so regarded. In the same way, the vote on the substitution of the Wright bill
for the Stetson Railroad Regulation bill was a test vote in the Senate. But in the Assembly there was no test
vote taken on the railroad regulation measures, for the Wright bill was put through practically without
opposition. The test railroad vote in the Assembly came on the Sanford resolution providing for government
steamships on the Pacific. There was no test vote on this in the Senate, for in the Senate it was adopted
practically without opposition.
Table A Records of Senators.
The records of the members of the Senate on sixteen test votes are shown in Table A. The names of the
Senators are arranged in the order of the number of times their votes were recorded on the side of progress
and reform, the name of the Senator with the most positive votes to his credit appearing at the top of the list,
and the Senator with the least number at the bottom.
While few will quarrel with the fact that Senator Bell's name leads the list, while Senators Finn and Hartman
divide negative honors at the bottom, nevertheless the arrangement is not, strictly speaking, fair, although it is
probably as fair as it could be made.
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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Senator Walker, for example, has only one antireform vote registered against him, but it was, perhaps, the
most important test vote of the session, that on the Railroad Regulation measures. Senator Cutten, on the
other hand, voted on the reform side of every question with the exception of the measure intended to work
political reform by removing the party circle from the election ballot. Senator Cutten is recorded twice
against this bill, it being necessary, in justice to all the Senators, to give both the votes taken on this measure.
But considering the relative importance of the Railroad Regulation bills and the Party Circle bill, all must
admit that Senator Cutten made a better record than Senator Walker, although Cutten's name appears below
that of Walker.
Unavoidable absence from the Senate Chamber cut down the records of several of the Senators. Black and
Stetson, whose severe illness kept them from Sacramento toward the end of the session, furnish examples of
this.
Then again, the Party Circle bill and the Local Option bill were measures on which several of the strongest of
the opponents of the machine differed with the majority of their antimachine associates. With the four votes
taken on these two issues out of the reckoning, Bell, Thompson, Roseberry, Cutten, Campbell, Boynton,
Sanford, Cartwright, Black, Holohan, Birdsall, Stetson, Rush and Strobridge, have not one vote for a
machinebacked policy against them. Caminetti's vote to amend the Stanford bill excludes him from the list,
but as this measure was of the same character and policy as the Local Option bill, Caminetti's name should in
justice be included among those of the Senators who made practically clear records. Looking at the table in a
broad way, the first nineteen Senators of the list made antimachine records. Of the eleven caucus
Republicans among them, only one voted against admitting Bell to the Republican caucus.
The nineteen voted for the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill, they voted every time against the machine on the
Direct Primary issue, only two of them voted for the Change of Venue bill, only two of them voted against
the Railroad Regulation bill. These comparisons can be carried out indefinitely, and always to the advantage
of the nineteen.
Senator Wright is twentieth on the list; Senator Anthony is twentyfirst. Those who followed these two
Senators through the Direct Primary bill fight will see immediately that Wright has crowded into undeserved
standing. There is a very good reason for this. In the Senate, the roll of Senators is called alphabetically, and
Senator Wright's name is the last on the list. A glance at the table will show that Senator Wright did not vote
once against the machine when his vote would have decided the issue. He voted for the AntiRacetrack
Gambling bill, but before him thirtytwo Senators had voted for the bill, and only seven against it. Wright's
thirtythird affirmative vote counted for nothing. On the other hand, when Wright's name was reached on roll
call on the Change of Venue bill, with the vote standing nineteen for the bill and sixteen against, and
twentyone votes necessary for its passage, Senator Wright cast the twentieth affirmative vote, thus ensuring
the measure's passage. In the same way, Senator Wright's vote the following day, tied the score on the motion
for a call of the Senate, thus defeating the motion, and preventing reconsideration of the Change of Venue bill
which would have meant its defeat.
The query is: Had the vote on the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill stood nineteen against the bill, and twenty
for, when Wright's name was reached, with twentyone votes necessary for its passage, would Wright's vote
have been cast for or against it? Any person who has any doubt on the question, is referred to Senator
Wright's part in the passage of the amended Direct Primary bill, and in the defeat of the Stetson bill.
It is most advantageous to have one's name at the bottom of a roll call. Senator Wright's position above that
of Senators Anthony and Burnett, emphasizes the necessity of considering these tables in connection with the
chapters dealing with the several issues involved. From the first days of the session Senators Anthony and
Burnett gave indications that had the antimachine forces been organized, they would have been found
consistently against the machine. At any rate, their records are admittedly more creditable than that made by
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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Senator Wright.
The Sixteen Test Votes.
Senator Bell did not vote in the Senate Republican caucus, nor did the nine Democratic Senators. Thus in the
sixteen votes recorded, Bell and the Democratic members voted only fifteen times. An outline of each of the
several issues involved follows:
Senate A The first test vote of the Republican majority which came in the Republican caucus described in
Chapter II, on motion to admit Senator Bell to caucus privileges. Lost by a vote of 16 to 14.
Senate B Vote on proposed McCartney Amendments to Direct Primary bill. Amendments defeated by vote
of 27 to 13. See Chapter IX.
Senate C Senate vote on AntiRacetrack Gambling bill. See Chapter VII.
Senate D Vote on Wolfe's motion to send the Local Option bill back to the Judiciary Committee. See
Chapter XVIII.
Senate E First vote on Senate Bill 220, abolishing the party circle on the election ballot. Measure was
defeated by vote of 15 to 23.
Senate F Vote by which the above Senate Bill 220 was passed on reconsideration. Note the Senators who
changed to the side favoring the measure.
Senate G Test vote on Senate Bill 1144, known as the "Stanford Bill," which prohibited the sale of
intoxicants within a mile and a half of a University. The measure was aimed at the low groggeries maintained
in the vicinity of the campus at Stanford. It was fought by the same tenderloin element that had opposed the
AntiRacetrack Gambling bill. Senator Wolfe moved to amend the measure to exclude fraternal club houses
and hotels of fifty bedrooms or more, from its provisions. The amendment would have delayed and perhaps
defeated the bill. Wolfe's motion was defeated.
Senate H Vote by which the above Senate Bill 1144 was finally passed.
Senate I First test railroad vote in the Senate Senator Stetson moved that Stetson bill be substituted for the
Wright bill. The motion was defeated by a vote of 16 to 22. Had Rush and Roseberry been present they
would have voted on the side of the Stetson measure. This would have made the vote twentytwo for the
Wright bill, and eighteen for the Stetson bill. See Chapter XIII.
Senate J Vote on the Initiative Amendment. See Chapter XIX.
Senate K Vote on the Local Option bill. See Chapter XVIII.
Senate L Vote on Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 4, to eliminate ambiguities from those sections of
the State Constitution which prescribe the powers and duties of the Railroad Commission. See Chapter XIV.
Senate M Vote on Assembly amendments to the Direct Primary bill. Wright moved that the Senate concur
in the amendments. The motion was lost, but on Wolfe's motion to reconsider the vote, the Senate was held in
deadlock for more than a week. See Chapters X and XI.
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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Senate N Vote on Change of Venue bill. See Chapter XVI.
Senate O Vote on motion to reconsider vote by which Change of Venue bill was passed. See Chapter XVI.
Senate P Vote on Burnett's motion that the investigation into the causes for the increase of freight and
express rates be continued after the Legislature adjourned. See Chapter XIV.
Tables B and C Record of Assemblymen.
The two tables showing the votes of the members of the Assembly include eleven test votes. The names of
the Assemblymen are arranged as in the case of the Senators with the names of those who made the best
records at the top.
It will be seen that fourteen Assemblymen voted against the machine on every roll call, eight were absent on
one roll call each, but voted the ten times they were present against the machine, while three members voted
'once each with the machine, and ten times against it. These twentyfive members, voting 267 times, cast 264
votes on the side of progress and reform, and three votes for machine policies. The record indicates what
might have been done in the Assembly had the reform forces been organized. Indeed, the forty leading
Assemblymen, casting 421 votes, cast only 48 votes for machine policies and 373 against.
The same considerations governed the selection of test votes in the Assembly as in the Senate. The votes are
as follows:
Assembly A The first test vote in the Assembly was on Drew's resolution to reject the report of the
Committee on Rules. The resolution was adopted, and the machine's plan to force "gag rules" on the
Assembly failed. See Chapter III Organization of the Assembly.
Assembly B The test vote on the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill. The Committee on Public Morals had
recommended that the bill "do pass." Mott moved that the bill be rereferred to the committee. Motion lost
by a vote of 53 to 23. See Chapter VII.
Assembly C Vote on the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill. See Chapter VII.
Assembly D Vote on motion to reconsider the vote by which the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill was passed.
See Chapter VII.
Assembly E The test railroad vote in the Assembly came on Drew's motion to recall Senate Joint
Resolution No. 3 from committee. The resolution called for a line of governmentowned steamships on the
Pacific from San Francisco to Panama. The resolution, having been adopted by the Senate, went to the
Assembly and was referred to the Committee on Federal Relations. To hasten action on the resolution, Drew
moved that it be recalled from the committee. A twothirds vote was necessary for Drew's motion to prevail.
The motion failed to carry by a vote of 36 for to 29 against.
Assembly F Vote on motion to strike out of Senate joint Resolution No. 3considered under E those
sections which referred to Commissioner Bristow's report recommending that the Government steamship line
be established, and criticizing the combinations made between the several transportation companies. The
motion prevailed by a vote of 43 to 30.
Assembly G Assembly test vote on the Direct Primary bill. Vote taken on Leed's motion that vote on
United States Senators be advisory and by districts. The motion prevailed by a vote of 38 to 36. See Chapter
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 133
Page No 136
X.
Assembly H Vote on proposed amendments to the Islais Creek Harbor bill. Motion was made to amend by
substituting 44 blocks for the 63 necessary for the improvement. Had this been done, the work would have
been made impracticable. Motion lost by a vote of 30 to 45. See Chapter XXIII, "Influence of the San
Francisco Delegation."
Assembly I Leeds moved that Senate Bill 220 removing the party circle from the election ballot be denied
second reading. The motion prevailed by a vote of thirtysix for, to thirtyfive against.
Assembly J Vote on Senate Bill 1144 (the Stanford bill), to prohibit the sale of intoxicants within a mile
and a half of Stanford University.
Assembly K Vote on the Judicial Column bill. This measure provided that the names of candidates for the
Judiciary be placed in a separate nonpartisan column on the election ballot. The bill passed the Senate, but
was defeated in the Assembly.
The Other Tables.
Table D shows the six votes on the AntiRacetrack Gambling bill. See Chapter VII.
Tables E and F Show the records of the San Francisco delegation in the Senate and Assembly. See Chapter
XXIII.
Table G Shows the records on sixteen test votes of the twenty Senators whose terms of office will have
expired before the next session convenes. See Chapter XXVII.
Table H Shows the records on sixteen test votes of the twenty Senators who were elected in 1908, and who
hold over to serve in the session of 1911. See Chapter XXVI.
Table I Shows records of the members of the Assembly on the four principal votes arising out of the fight
for the passage of the socalled AntiJapanese bills. See Chapter XX.
Table ARecords of Senators on Sixteen Test Votes
* indicates vote on side of Progress and Reform
0 indicates vote against Progress and Reform
A B C D E F G __________________________________________________________________________
To Test To refer To do Second admit vote Walker Local away Vote First Bell on Otis Option Bill with party
Vote to Direct Bill. to Party Circle Stanford Caucus. Primary Committee. Circle. Bill. Bill.
__________________________________________________________________________ Senator Aye No
Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
__________________________________________________________________________ 1 Bell * * * * *
* 2 Thompson * * * * 0 * * 3 Roseberry * * * * 0 * * 4 Walker * * * * * * * 5 Cutten * * * * 0 0 * 6
Campbell * * * * * 7 Boynton * * * 0 * * 8 Sanford * * 0 * * * 9 Cartwright * * * * * 10 Caminetti * * 0 * *
0 11 Estudillo 0 * * * * * * 12 Black * * * * 0 * * 13 Holohan * * 0 * * 14 Miller * * * * * 15 Birdsall * * *
0 0 * 16 Stetson * * * * * 17 Rush * * * 0 * * 18 Curtin * * * 0 * 19 Strobridge * * * 0 0 0 * 20 Wright 0 * *
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 134
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* * * * 21 Anthony * * * 0 0 * 22 Burnett 0 * * 0 0 0 23 McCartney 0 0 * 0 * 24 Kennedy 0 * 0 * * 0 25
Lewis 0 * * 0 0 0 26 Willis 0 0 * * * * 0 27 Welch * * * 0 0 0 28 Bates 0 0 * * 0 0 * 29 Price 0 * * 0 0 0 * 30
Savage * 0 * 0 0 0 * 31 Bills 0 0 * * 0 0 * 32 Leavitt 0 0 0 * * * * 33 Hare 0 0 0 * * 0 34 Hurd 0 * * 0 0 * 35
Martinelli 0 * * 0 0 0 0 36 Wolfe 0 0 0 0 * * 0 37 Reily * 0 0 0 0 0 38 Weed 0 0 0 * 0 0 39 Finn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 Hartman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
__________________________________________________________________________ Totals 14 16 13
27 33 7 20 15 16 22 23 15 8 22
H I J K L M
______________________________________________________________________________ Second
Test Vote Local Assembly Vote Railroad Initiative Option Railroad Amendment Stanford Regulation.
Amendment. Bill. Amendment. to Direct Bill. Primary.
______________________________________________________________________________ Senator
Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
______________________________________________________________________________ 1 Bell * * *
* * * 2 Thompson * * * * * * 3 Roseberry * * * * * 4 Walker * 0 * * * * 5 Cutten * * * * * * 6 Campbell * *
* * * * 7 Boynton * * * * * 8 Sanford * * * 0 * * 9 Cartwright * * * * * 10 Caminetti * * * 0 * * 11 Estudillo
* 0 * * 0 * 12 Black * * * * * 13 Holohan * * 0 * * 14 Miller * * 0 * * * 15 Birdsall * * 0 * * 16 Stetson * *
* 17 Rush * * 0 * * 18 Curtin * * 0 0 * * 19 Strobridge * * 0 * * 20 Wright * 0 0 * * 0 21 Anthony * 0 * 0 0
* 22 Burnett * 0 0 * 0 23 McCartney * 0 * 0 * 0 24 Kennedy 0 0 * 0 0 0 25 Lewis * * 0 0 0 0 26 Willis * 0 0
0 0 0 27 Welch 0 * 0 0 0 28 Bates * 0 0 0 29 Price * 0 0 0 0 0 30 Savage * 0 0 0 0 31 Bills * 0 0 0 0 0 32
Leavitt 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 Hare 0 0 * 0 0 34 Hurd 0 0 0 0 0 35 Martinelli * 0 0 0 0 36 Wolfe * 0 0 0 0 0 37 Reily 0
* 0 0 0 38 Weed 0 0 0 0 0 39 Finn 0 0 0 0 0 40 Hartman 0 0 0 0 0 0
___________________________________________________________________________ Totals 29 5 16
22 20 15 12 25 19 16 20 19
N O P __________________________________________________________________ To Test Totals
Change To To of reconsider investigate For Against Absent Venue Change of Freight Reform Reform Bill.
Venue Bill. Rates. __________________________________________________________________ Senator
Aye No Aye No Aye No __________________________________________________________________ 1
Bell * * * 15 0 0 2 Thompson * * * 15 1 0 3 Roseberry * * * 14 1 1 4 Walker * * 14 1 1 5 Cutten * * * 14 2 0
6 Campbell * * 13 0 2 7 Boynton * * * 13 1 2 8 Sanford * * * 13 2 0 9 Cartwright * * 12 0 3 10 Caminetti *
* * 12 3 0 11 Estudillo 0 * * 12 4 0 12 Black * * * 11 1 4 14 Miller 0 * 11 2 2 15 Birdsall * * * 11 3 2 16
Stetson * * 10 0 6 17 Rush * 10 2 4 18 Curtin * * 10 3 2 19 Strobridge * * 10 4 2 20 Wright 0 0 0 9 7 0 21
Anthony 0 0 7 8 1 22 Burnett * 5 7 4 23 McCartney 0 0 5 8 3 24 Kennedy * 0 5 9 1 25 Lewis 0 * 0 5 10 1 26
Willis 0 0 0 5 11 0 27 Welch 0 0 4 9 3 28 Bates 0 0 0 4 10 2 29 Price 0 0 4 11 1 30 Savage 0 0 0 4 11 1 31
Bills 0 0 0 4 12 0 32 Leavitt 0 0 0 4 12 0 33 Hare 0 0 3 10 2 34 Hurd 0 0 0 3 11 2 35 Martinelli 0 0 0 3 12 1
36 Wolfe 0 0 0 3 13 0 37 Reily 0 0 0 2 12 2 38 Weed 0 0 0 1 13 2 39 Finn 0 0 0 0 15 1 40 Hartman 0 0 0 0 16
0 _________________________________________________________________ Totals 21 16 18 18 12 16
311 259 60
Table BRecords of Assemblymen on Eleven Test Votes
Forty Members Making Best Records
* indicates vote on side of Progress and Reform
0 indicates vote against Progress and Reform
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A B C D E F
_________________________________________________________________________________ Drew's
To Motion to To Return Vote on To To recall amend Reject WalkerOtis Walker reconsider S. J. R. S. J.
Committee's Bill to Otis WalkerOtis No. 3 from R. No. Rules. Committee Bill. Bill. Committee. 3.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Assemblymen Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
_________________________________________________________________________________ 1
Bohnett * * * * * * 2 Callan * * * * * * 3 Cattell * * * * * * 4 Costar * * * * * * 5 Gibbons * * * * * * 6
Hewitt * * * * * * 7 Johnson, P. H. * * * * * * 8 Mendenhall * * * * * * 9 Polsley * * * * * * 10 Preston * * *
* * * 11 Telfer * * * * * * 12 Whitney * * * * * * 13 Wilson * * * * * * 14 Young * * * * * * 15 Cogswell *
* * * * 16 Drew * * * * * * 17 Gillis * * * * * 18 Juilliard * * * * * 19 Kehoe * * * * * 20 Maher * * * * * 21
Sackett * * * * * * 22 Wyllie * * * * * 23 Flint * * * * * * 24 Hinkle * * * * * * 25 Stuckenbruck * * * * * *
26 Gerdes 0 * * * * 27 Holmquist 0 * * * * * 28 Otis * * * * * 0 29 Irwin * * * * * 30 Rutherford * * * * * 0
31 Griffiths 0 * * * * 32 Odom * 0 * * * 33 Hayes * * * * 0 * 34 Lightner * * * * 0 35 Melrose * * * * * 0 36
Silver * * * * * 0 37 Beatty * * * 0 38 Cronin * * * * * 0 39 Barndollar 0 * * * * 0 40 Rech * * * * 0 0
________________________________________________________________________________ Totals 32
4 1 38 40 0 0 40 33 2 9 28
G H I J K Totals
__________________________________________________________________________________ To To
deny Test Vote amend Party Vote on Vote on on Direct Islais Circle Stanford Judicial For Against Absent
Primary. Creek Bill Bill. Column Reform Reform Harbor Second Bill. Bill. Reading.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Assemblymen Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
__________________________________________________________________________________ 1
Bohnett * * * * * 11 0 0 2 Callan * * * * * 11 0 0 3 Cattell * * * * * 11 0 0 4 Costar * * * * * 11 0 0 5
Gibbons * * * * * 11 0 0 6 Hewitt * * * * * 11 0 0 7 Johnson, P. H. * * * * * 11 0 0 8 Mendenhall * * * * *
11 0 0 9 Polsley * * * * * 11 0 0 10 Preston * * * * * 11 0 0 11 Telfer * * * * * 11 0 0 12 Whitney * * * * *
11 0 0 13 Wilson * * * * * 11 0 0 14 Young * * * * * 11 0 0 15 Cogswell * * * * * 10 0 1 16 Drew * * * * 10
0 1 17 Gillis * * * * * 10 0 1 18 Juilliard * * * * * 10 0 1 19 Kehoe * * * * * 10 0 1 20 Maher * * * * * 10 0 1
21 Sackett * * * * 10 0 1 22 Wyllie * * * * * 10 0 1 23 Flint * * 0 * * 10 1 0 24 Hinkle * * 0 * * 10 1 0 25
Stuckenbruck * 0 * * * 10 1 0 26 Gerdes * * * * * 9 1 1 27 Holmquist * * * * 0 9 2 0 28 Otis * * 0 * * 9 2 0
29 Irwin * 0 * 0 * 8 2 1 30 Rutherford 0 * * * 0 8 3 0 31 Griffiths * * 0 * 7 2 2 32 Odom * 0 * * 7 2 2 33
Hayes * 0 0 * 7 3 1 34 Lightner 0 0 * * * 7 3 1 35 Melrose 0 * 0 * 0 7 4 0 36 Silver * 0 0 * 0 7 4 0 37 Beatty
0 * * 0 * 6 3 2 38 Cronin 0 * 0 0 6 4 1 39 Barndollar 0 * 0 * 0 6 5 0 40 Rech 0 * 0 * 0 6 5 0
__________________________________________________________________________________ Totals
7 33 6 34 10 28 36 2 31 7 373 48 19
Table CRecords of Assemblymen on Eleven Test Votes
Forty Members Making Poorest Records
* indicates vote on side of Progress and Reform
0 indicates vote against Progress and Reform
(a) Changed Vote from no to aye to give notice to reconsider. Was against the bill.
A B C D E ____________________________________________________________________________
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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Page No 139
Drew's Motion to To Return Vote on To To recall Reject WalkerOtis Walker reconsider S. J. R.
Committee's Bill to Otis WalkerOtis No. 3 from Rules. Committee Bill. Bill. Committee.
____________________________________________________________________________ Assemblymen
Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
____________________________________________________________________________ 41 Hammon *
* * * 42 Hawk 0 * * * * 43 Stanton 0 * * * * 44 Transue 0 * * * 45 Hanlon * * * * 0 46 Wagner * 0 * 0 * 47
Webber * 0 * * 0 48 Butler * * * 0 49 Collum * 0 0 50 Dean 0 * * * 0 51 Perine 0 * * * 52 Pulcifer 0 * * * 0
53 Collier 0 * * * 0 54 Moore 0 0 * 0 55 Leeds 0 * * * 0 56 Nelson 0 0 * * 0 57 Fleisher 0 * * * 0 58 Flavelle
0 * * * 0 59 McClelland 0 * * * 0 60 Beardslee 0 0 * 0 0 61 Hans 0 * * * 0 62 Johnson, G. L. 0 0 * 0 0 63
Baxter 0 0 0 64 Wheelan * * 0 65 Schmidt 0 0 0 0 66 Black * 0 0 0 67 O'Neil * 0 0 0 0 68 Coghlan 0 0 0 0 69
Hopkins * 0 0 0 70 Johnson, T. D. 0 0 * 0 0 71 Pugh 0 0 0 0 0 72 Feeley 0 * 0 0 73 Johnson, P. A. 0 0 * 0 0
74 Greer 0 0 * 0 0 75 Mott 0 0 * 0 0 76 Cullen 0 0 0 0 77 Beban 0 0 0 0 78 Macauley 0 0 0 0 0 79 McManus
0 0 0 0 0 ____________________________________________________________________________
Totals 9 28 22 15 27 10 19 17 3 27 Totals from Table B 32 4 1 38 40 0 0 40 33 2 Grand Total 41 32 23 53 67
10 19 57 36 29
F G H I J K _______________________________________________________________________ To To
To deny amend Test Vote amend Party Vote on Vote on S. J. on Direct Islais Circle Stanford Judicial R. No.
Primary. Creek Bill Bill. Column 3. Harbor Second Bill. Bill. Reading.
_________________________________________________________________________ Assemblymen
Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
_________________________________________________________________________ 41 Hammon 0 0 0
* 42 Hawk * 0 0 0 0 43 Stanton 0 0 * 0 0 44 Transue 0 0 * 0 * 0 45 Hanlon 0 0 0 0 * 0 46 Wagner 0 0 * 0 * 0
47 Webber * 48 Butler 0 0 * 0 49 Collum 0 0 * * 0 * 50 Dean 0 * 0 0 51 Perine 0 0 0 0 * 52 Pulcifer 0 0 0 *
53 Collier 0 0 0 0 * 54 Moore 0 * * 0 0 * 55 Leeds 0 0 * 0 0 0 56 Nelson 0 0 * * 0 0 57 Fleisher 0 0 0 58
Flavelle 0 0 0 0 59 McClelland 0 0 0 0 0 60 Beardslee 0 * 0 0 * 0 61 Hans 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 Johnson, G. L. 0 0 0
* * 0 63 Baxter 0 0 * * 64 Wheelan 0 0 0 0 65 Schmidt 0 * * (a) 0 66 Black 0 0 * 0 0 67 O'Neil 0 0 0 * 68
Coghlan 0 0 * * 0 0 69 Hopkins 0 70 Johnson, T. D. 0 0 0 71 Pugh 0 0 * 0 72 Feeley 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 Johnson,
P. A. 0 0 0 0 0 74 Greer 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 Mott 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 Cullen 0 0 0 0 0 77 Beban 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 Macauley
0 0 0 0 0 79 McManus 0 0 0 0 0
_________________________________________________________________________ Totals 34 2 31 3
24 11 26 7 9 15 4 22
Totals from Table B 9 28 7 33 6 34 10 28 36 2 31 7
Grand Total 43 30 38 36 30 45 36 35 45 17 35 29
Totals ___________________________________________ For Against Absent Reform Reform
___________________________________________ Assemblymen
___________________________________________ 42 Hawk 5 5 1 43 Stanton 5 5 1 44 Transue 5 5 1 45
Hanlon 5 6 0 46 Wagner 5 6 0 47 Webber 4 2 5 48 Butler 4 4 3 49 Collum 4 5 2 50 Dean 4 5 2 51 Perine 4 5
2 52 Pulcifer 4 5 2 53 Collier 4 6 1 54 Moore 4 6 1 55 Leeds 4 7 0 56 Nelson 4 7 0 57 Fleisher 3 5 3 58
Flavelle 3 6 2 59 McClelland 3 7 1 60 Beardslee 3 8 0 61 Hans 3 8 0 62 Johnson, G. L. 3 8 0 63 Baxter 2 5 4
64 Wheelan 2 5 4 65 Schmidt 2 6 3 66 Black 2 7 2 67 O'Neil 2 7 2 68 Coghlan 2 8 1 69 Hopkins 1 4 6 70
Johnson, T. D. 1 7 3 71 Pugh 1 8 2 72 Feeley 1 9 1 73 Johnson, P. A. 1 9 1 74 Greer 1 10 0 75 Mott 1 10 0 76
Cullen 0 9 2 77 Beban 0 10 1 78 Macauley 0 10 1 79 McManus 0 10 1
________________________________________ Totals 107 258 64 Totals from Table B 373 48 19 Grand
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 137
Page No 140
Total 480 306 83
Table DRecord of Assemblymen on AntiRacetrack Gambling Bill (WalkerOtis Bill)
F shows vote For the Bill
A shows vote Against the Bill
A B C D __________________________________________________________ Assembly Vote Motion to
Reconsider Butler's Motion to on WalkerOtis Return Bill Defeat of Motion Put Bill Bill. to Mott's to Amend
on its Committee. Motion. Bill. Passage.
__________________________________________________________ Assemblymen Aye No Aye No Aye
No Aye No __________________________________________________________ Barndollar F F F A
Baxter A A A A Beardslee A A A A Beatty F F F Beban A A A A Black A A A A Bohnett F F F F Butler F
F A A Callan F F F F Cattell F F F F Coghlan A A A A Cogswell F F F Collier F F F F Collum A A A A
Costar F F F F Cronin F F F F Cullen A A A Dean F F F F Drew F F F F Feeley A A A Flavelle F F F F
Fleisher F F F F Flint F F F F Gerdes F F F F Gibbons F A F Gillis F F F F Greer A A A A Griffiths F F F F
Hammon F F F F Hanlon F F F F Hans F F F F Hawk F A F F Hayes F F F F Hewitt F F F F Hinkle F F F F
Holmquist F F F F Hopkins A A A A Irwin F A A A Johnson, G. L. A A A A Johnson, P. A. A A A A
Johnson, P. H. F Johnston, T. D. A A A A Juilliard F A A A Kehoe F F F F Leeds F F F F Lightner F F F A
Macauley A A A A Maher F F F A McClellan F A F A McManus A A A A Melrose F F F F Mendenhall F F
F F Moore A A F A Mott A A F A Nelson A A A A Odom A A F A Otis F F F F O'Neil A A A A Perine F F
F A Polsley F F F F Preston F F F F Pugh A A A A Pulcifer F F F F Rech F F F F Rutherford F F F F Sackett
F F Schmitt A A A A Silver F F F F Stanton F F F F Stuckenbruck F F F F Telfer F F F F Transue F F F F
Wagner A A F F Webber A A A A Wheelan A A A Whitney F F F F Wilson F F F F Wyatt Wyllie F F F F
Young F F F F __________________________________________________________ Totals 23 53 30 48
23 52 44 32
E F Totals __________________________________________________________ Assembly Vote Vote
Vote on For Against on WalkerOtis on Motion to the the Absent. Bill. Bill. Reconsider. Bill. Bill.
__________________________________________________________ Assemblymen Aye No Aye No
__________________________________________________________ Barndollar F F 5 1 Baxter A 5 1
Beardslee F A 1 5 Beatty F F 5 1 Beban A A 6 Black A A 6 Bohnett F F 6 Butler F F 4 2 Callan F F 6 Cattell
F F 6 Coghlan A A 6 Cogswell F F 5 1 Collier F F 6 Collum A 5 1 Costar F F 6 Cronin F F 6 Cullen A A 5 1
Dean F F 6 Drew F F 6 Feeley F A 1 4 1 Flavelle F F 6 Fleisher F F 6 Flint F F 6 Gerdes F F 6 Gibbons F F 4
1 1 Gillis F F 6 Greer F A 1 5 Griffiths F F 6 Hammon F F 6 Hanlon F F 6 Hans F F 6 Hawk F F 5 1 Hayes F
F 6 Hewitt F F 6 Hinkle F F 6 Holmquist F F 6 Hopkins A A 6 Irwin F F 3 3 Johnson, G. L. F A 1 5 Johnson,
P. A. F A 1 5 Johnson, P. H. F F 3 3 Johnston, T. D. F A 1 5 Juilliard F F 3 3 Kehoe F F 6 Leeds F F 6
Lightner F F 5 1 Macauley A A 6 Maher F F 5 1 McClellan F F 4 2 McManus A A 6 Melrose F F 6
Mendenhall F F 6 Moore F 2 3 1 Mott F A 2 4 Nelson F F 2 4 Odom F F 3 3 Otis F F 6 O'Neil A A 6 Perine
F F 5 1 Polsley F F 6 Preston F F 6 Pugh A A 6 Pulcifer F F 6 Rech F F 6 Rutherford F F 6 Sackett F F 4 2
Schmitt A 5 1 Silver F F 6 Stanton F F 6 Stuckenbruck F F 6 Telfer F F 6 Transue F F 6 Wagner F A 3 3
Webber F F 2 4 Wheelan F 1 3 2 Whitney F F 6 Wilson F F 6 Wyatt Wyllie F F 6 Young F F 6
________________________________________________________ Totals 67 10 19 57 321 137 16
Table ERecords of the San Francisco Senate Delegation on Sixteen Test Votes
* indicates vote on side of Progress and Reform
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 138
Page No 141
0 indicates vote against Progress and Reform
A B C D E F G H
______________________________________________________________________________ To Test To
refer To do Second admit vote Walker Local away Vote First Second Bell on Otis Option Bill with party
Vote Vote to Direct Bill. to Party Circle Stanford Stanford Caucus. Primary Committee. Circle. Bill. Bill.
Bill. ______________________________________________________________________________
Senator Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
______________________________________________________________________________ Anthony *
* * 0 0 * * Burnett 0 * * 0 0 0 * Finn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hare 0 0 0 * * 0 0 Hartman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kennedy 0 *
0 * * 0 0 Reily * 0 0 0 0 0 Welch * * * 0 0 0 Wolfe 0 0 0 0 * * 0 *
______________________________________________________________________________ Totals 3 4 6
3 4 5 9 0 3 6 4 5 5 0 3 4
I J K L M N O
_______________________________________________________________________________
Test Vote Local Assembly Change To Railroad Initiative Option Railroad Amendment of reconsider
Regulation. Amendment. Bill. Amendment. to Direct Venue Change of Primary. Bill. Venue Bill.
________________________________________________________________________________ Senator
Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
________________________________________________________________________________ Anthony
0 * 0 0 * 0 0 Burnett 0 0 * 0 Finn 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hare 0 * 0 0 0 0 Hartman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kennedy 0 * 0 0 0 *
Reily 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 Welch 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 Wolfe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
________________________________________________________________________________ Totals 0
9 5 2 0 9 1 7 8 1 7 1 0 7
P Totals __________________________________ To investigate For Against Freight Reform Reform Rates.
__________________________________ Senator Aye No __________________________________
Anthony 0 7 8 Burnett * 5 7 Finn 0 0 15 Hare 3 10 Hartman 0 0 16 Kennedy 0 5 9 Reily 0 2 12 Welch 0 4 9
Wolfe 0 3 13 __________________________________ Totals 1 6 29 99
Table FRecords of San Francisco Assembly Delegation on Eleven Test Votes
* indicates vote on side of Progress and Reform
0 indicates vote against Progress and Reform
(a) Changed Vote from no to aye to give notice to reconsider. Was against the bill.
A B C D E F
______________________________________________________________________________ Drew's To
Motion to To Return Vote on To To recall amend Reject WalkerOtis Walker reconsider S. J. R. S. J.
Committee's Bill to Otis WalkerOtis No. 3 from R. No. Rules. Committee Bill. Bill. Committee. 3.
______________________________________________________________________________
Assemblymen Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
______________________________________________________________________________ Beatty * *
* 0 Beban 0 0 0 0 0 Black * 0 0 0 Callan * * * * * * Coghlan 0 0 0 0 0 Collum * 0 0 0 Cullen 0 0 0 0 0
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 139
Page No 142
Gerdes 0 * * * * Hopkins * 0 0 0 0 Lightner * * * * 0 Macauley 0 0 0 0 0 0 McManus 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nelson 0 0
* * 0 0 O'Neil * 0 0 0 0 0 Pugh 0 0 0 0 0 0 Perine 0 * * * 0 Schmitt 0 0 0 0 Wheelan * * 0 0
______________________________________________________________________________ Totals 7 10
12 5 7 10 10 6 2 7 14 1
G H I J K Totals
________________________________________________________________________________ To To
deny Test Vote amend Party Vote on Vote on on Direct Islais Circle Stanford Judicial For Against Absent
Primary. Creek Bill Bill. Column Reform Reform Harbor Second Bill. Bill. Reading.
________________________________________________________________________________
Assemblymen Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
________________________________________________________________________________ Beatty 0
* * 0 * 6 3 2 Beban 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 Black 0 0 * 0 0 2 7 2 Callan * * * * * 11 0 0 Coghlan 0 * * 0 0 2 8 1
Collum 0 * * 0 * 4 5 2 Cullen 0 0 0 0 0 9 2 Gerdes * * * * * 9 1 1 Hopkins 1 4 6 Lightner 0 0 * * * 7 3 1
Macauley 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 McManus 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 Nelson 0 * * 0 0 4 7 0 O'Neil 0 0 * 2 7 2 Pugh 0 * 0 1 8 2
Perine 0 0 0 * 4 5 2 Schmitt 0 * a* 0 2 6 3 Wheelan 0 0 0 2 5 4
________________________________________________________________________________ Totals 15
2 9 8 5 9 5 9 5 7 57 108 33
Table GRecords of OutGoing Senators on Sixteen Test Votes
Must Be ReElected to Sit in Next Senate
* indicates vote on side of Progress and Reform
0 indicates vote against Progress and Reform
A B C D E F G ________________________________________________________________________ To
Test To refer To do Second admit vote Walker Local away Vote First Bell on Otis Option Bill with party
Vote to Direct Bill. to Party Circle Stanford Caucus. Primary Committee. Circle. Bill. Bill.
________________________________________________________________________ Senator Aye No
Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
________________________________________________________________________ Anthony * * * 0 0
* Bates 0 0 * * 0 0 * Bell * * * * * * Black * * * * 0 * * Boynton * * * 0 * * Caminetti * * 0 * * 0 Cartwright
* * * * * Curtin * * * 0 * Hartman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kennedy 0 * 0 * * 0 Leavitt 0 0 0 * * * * McCartney 0 0 * 0
* Miller * * * * * Price 0 * * 0 0 0 * Reily * 0 0 0 0 0 Sanford * * 0 * * * Savage * 0 * 0 0 0 * Weed 0 0 0 *
0 0 Willis 0 0 * * * * 0 Wright 0 * * * * * *
________________________________________________________________________ Totals 5 8 9 11 16
4 10 8 10 9 12 6 4 12
H I J K L M ___________________________________________________________________________
Second Test Vote Local Assembly Vote Railroad Initiative Option Railroad Amendment Stanford
Regulation. Amendment. Bill. Amendment. to Direct Bill. Primary.
___________________________________________________________________________ Senator Aye
No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
___________________________________________________________________________ Anthony * 0 *
0 0 * Bates * 0 0 0 Bell * * * * * * Black * * * * * Boynton * * * * * Caminetti * * * 0 * * Cartwright * * * *
* Curtin * * 0 0 * * Hartman 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kennedy 0 0 * 0 0 0 Leavitt 0 0 0 0 0 0 McCartney * 0 * 0 * 0 Miller
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 140
Page No 143
* * 0 * * * Price * 0 0 0 0 0 Reily 0 * 0 0 0 Sanford * * * 0 * * Savage * 0 0 0 0 Weed 0 0 0 0 0 Willis * 0 0
0 0 0 Wright * 0 0 * * 0
___________________________________________________________________________ Totals 14 3 8
12 9 10 6 12 9 9 11 9
O P Totals __________________________________________________ To To reconsider investigate For
Against Change of Freight Reform Reform Venue Bill. Rates.
__________________________________________________ Senator Aye No Aye No
__________________________________________________ Anthony 0 0 7 8 Bates 0 0 4 10 Bell * * 15 0
Black 11 1 Boynton * * 13 1 Caminetti * * 12 3 Cartwright * 12 0 Curtin * 10 3 Hartman 0 0 0 16 Kennedy 0
5 9 Leavitt 0 0 4 12 McCartney 0 5 8 Miller * 0 11 2 Price 0 4 11 Reily 0 0 2 12 Sanford * * 13 2 Savage 0 0
4 11 Weed 0 0 1 13 Willis 0 0 5 11 Wright 0 0 9 7
__________________________________________________ Totals 7 11 4 10 147 140
Table HRecords of Holdover Senators on Sixteen Test Votes
* indicates vote on side of Progress and Reform
0 indicates vote against Progress and Reform
A B C D E F G ________________________________________________________________________ To
Test To refer To do Second admit vote Walker Local away Vote First Bell on Otis Option Bill with party
Vote to Direct Bill. to Party Circle Stanford Caucus. Primary Committee. Circle. Bill. Bill.
________________________________________________________________________ Senator Aye No
Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
________________________________________________________________________ Bills 0 0 * * 0 0 *
Birdsall * * * 0 0 * Burnett 0 * * 0 0 0 Campbell * * * * * Cutten * * * * 0 0 * Estudillo 0 * * * * * * Finn 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 Hare 0 0 0 * * 0 Holohan * * 0 * * Hurd 0 * * 0 0 * Lewis 0 * * 0 0 0 Martinelli 0 * * 0 0 0 0
Roseberry * * * * 0 * * Rush * * * 0 * * Stetson * * * * * Strobridge * * * 0 0 0 * Thompson * * * * 0 * *
Walker * * * * * * * Welch * * * 0 0 0 Wolfe 0 0 0 0 * * 0
________________________________________________________________________ Totals 9 8 4 16 17
3 10 7 6 13 11 9 4 10
H I J K L M ___________________________________________________________________________
Second Test Vote Local Assembly Vote Railroad Initiative Option Railroad Amendment Stanford
Regulation. Amendment. Bill. Amendment. to Direct Bill. Primary.
___________________________________________________________________________ Senator Aye
No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
___________________________________________________________________________ Bills * 0 0 0 0
0 Birdsall * * 0 * * Burnett * 0 0 * 0 Campbell * * * * * * Cutten * * * * * * Estudillo * 0 * * 0 * Finn 0 0 0
0 0 Hare 0 0 * 0 0 Holohan * * 0 * * Hurd 0 0 0 0 0 Lewis * * 0 0 0 0 Martinelli * 0 0 0 0 Roseberry * * * * *
Rush * * 0 * * Stetson * * * Strobridge * * 0 * * Thompson * * * * * * Walker * 0 * * * * Welch 0 * 0 0 0
Wolfe * 0 0 0 0 0
___________________________________________________________________________ Totals 2 8 10
11 5 6 13 10 7 9 10 9
N O P Totals _________________________________________________________ Change To To of
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 141
Page No 144
reconsider investigate For Against Venue Change of Freight Reform Reform Bill. Venue Bill. Rates.
_________________________________________________________ Senator Aye No Aye No Aye No
_________________________________________________________ Bills 0 0 0 4 12 Birdsall * * * 11 3
Burnett * 5 7 Campbell * * 13 0 Cutten * * * 14 2 Estudillo 0 * * 12 4 Finn 0 0 0 15 Hare 0 0 0 3 11 Holohan
* * * 11 2 Hurd 0 0 0 3 11 Lewis 0 * 0 5 10 Martinelli 0 0 0 3 12 Roseberry * * * 14 1 Rush * 10 2 Stetson *
* 10 0 Strobridge * * 10 4 Thompson * * * 15 1 Walker * * 14 1 Welch 0 0 0 4 9 Wolfe 0 0 0 3 13
_________________________________________________________ Totals 9 9 11 7 8 6 164 119
Table IRecords of Assemblymen on Four Test Votes on AntiJapanese Bills
F shows vote For the Bill
A shows vote Against the Bill
* Leeds changed his vote from "no" to "aye" to give notice of reconsideration.
A B C D
___________________________________________________________________________
Assembly Vote on Assembly Assembly First Vote Second Vote
WalkerOtis Bill. Bill No. Bill No. Assembly Bill Assembly Bill
78. 32. No. 14. No. 14.
___________________________________________________________________________
Assemblymen Aye No Aye No Aye No Aye No
___________________________________________________________________________
Barndollar A A A A
Baxter F F F F
Beardslee A A A A
Beatty F F F F
Beban A F F A
Black F F F F
Bohnett A A F A
Butler A A F F
Callan F F F F
Cattell A A A A
Coghlan A A
Cogswell A A A A
Collier A A A A
Collum F F F F
Costar A A A A
Cronin F F F F
Cullen F F F F
Dean A A A A
Drew F F
Feeley A A A A
Flavelle A
Fleisher A A A A
Flint A A A A
Gerdes F
Gibbons F F F F
Gillis F F F F
Greer A A A A
Griffiths A A A A
Hammon A A A A
Hanlon A A A A
Hans A A A A
Hawk A A A A
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 142
Page No 145
Hayes A F F F
Hewitt A A A A
Hinkle A A F A
Holmquist A A F A
Hopkins F F F F
Irwin F A F F
Johnson, G. L. F F F F
Johnson, P. A. A F A A
Johnson, P. H. F F F F
Johnston, T. D. A F F F
Juilliard F F F F
Kehoe A F F F
Leeds A A F* A
Lightner A F F F
Macauley F F F F
Maher F F F F
McClellan A A A A
McManus A F F F
Melrose A A A A
Mendenhall F F F F
Moore A A A A
Mott A F F F
Nelson F F F F
Odom F F F
Otis A F F F
O'Neil F F F F
Perine A F F A
Polsley F F F F
Preston F A F A
Pugh F F F F
Pulcifer A A A A
Rech A A A A
Rutherford A A
Sackett A A A A
Schmitt A F F A
Silver A F F A
Stanton A A A A
Stuckenbruck F F F F
Telfer F F F F
Transue A A A A
Wagner A A A A
Webber F F F
Wheelan F F F F
Whitney A F F F
Wilson F F F F
Wyatt
Wyllie A A F A
Young A A A A
___________________________________________________________________________
Totals 28 48 39 35 46 28 37 41
Outline of and Arguements in Favor of the Postal Direct Primary.
By Senator L. H. Roseberry, Who Introduced the Postal Direct Primary Bill at the Session of 1909.
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 143
Page No 146
In order to understand the full purpose and effect of the proposed Postal Direct Primary law, it is necessary to
ascertain the purpose of any system of nominations by a Direct Primary.
The sole complaint against the present system of nominations by conventions is based upon the objection that
party nominations are made by a few interested parties, and that the popular choice is absolutely ignored. To
remedy this evil the system of direct nominations by the voters has been suggested at primary elections. It
therefore follows that that system, or primary, which will get out the largest number of votes or the greatest
expression of the people on the choice of candidates is, of necessity, the best primary law. If it is true that all
present direct primaries, which provide for voting at a certain time and place in person, in the form that
general elections are now conducted, only draw out a little over onehalf of the registered vote of all parties,
it then follows beyond question, that all present direct primary laws are only half successful. Upon an
examination of statistics gathered from the various States in which direct primary laws are now in operation,
it is seen that only 55% to 60% of the registered vote within those States has ever been cast at any single
primary election. For instance, at the primary election held in the State of Oregon in the fall of 1908, 55% of
the registered Republican vote was cast, and less than 25% of the Democratic vote. In the State of
Washington about 57% of the registered vote was cast in 1908, the only vote yet taken under the new Direct
Primary law. In the State of Wisconsin, while 60% of the total registered vote was cast in 1906, only a little
over 40% was cast at the primary election held In the year 1908. Other statistics could be offered from all the
other States, having the direct primary system of nominations, from which it would appear that practically a
little over 55% or even less of the registered vote has been secured at any direct primary election. Therefore,
based upon these figures, it becomes patent that the present form of direct nominations, to wit: voting at a
certain time and place in person only, under the same rules and regulations as at general elections, is only half
successful.
It was for the purpose of bringing out at least a part of this great unvoted 45% of qualified electors, to take a
part in naming the candidates who should go before the people at the general elections, that the Postal Direct
Primary law was conceived.
While there is no present example of the working of a system of direct nominations through a ballot cast
through the mails for public officials, there are a number of instances in which ballots are being taken by mail
with wonderful success and completeness. Formerly, labor unions, fraternal societies, chambers of
commerce, Granger organizations, alumni associations, and other civic, religious and benevolent
associations, balloted on propositions submitted to their membership in the form that primary and general
elections are now held in public elections. The vote secured from their memberships was so meager and
unsatisfactory that the system of voting by mail was inaugurated, and with such splendid results, that now it
is being used exclusively by a majority of the above organizations, as a method of voting upon propositions
and officers coming before them for election. Where only 10% to 15% of the votes were cast under the old
plan of voting in person at a particular time and place, 75%, and even 90% of the votes are now cast through
the mails, and it is significant to note that the plan of voting by mail has been found by the organizations
using it to be free from any objections. This fact, together with the unanimous vote cast, led to the idea of
casting votes by mail at direct primaries for the nomination of public officers by political parties. The system
that has been proposed is extremely simple, and it appears highly reasonable and practicable. A short outline
of the provisions of the bill will assist in an understanding of the arguments offered in its favor and those
advanced to refute the objections urged against this Postal Direct Primary Act.
In the first place, each elector, at the time of registering, declares his party allegiance, and this is entered upon
his original affidavit of registration. At the same time, he is given a party voting number, which is written or
printed upon his affidavit of registration. The Secretary of State, every four years, declares the color of ballots
to be used by each party separately. For instance, all Republican ballots throughout the State, at every
election must be printed upon pink colored paper and none other; the Democratic ballot upon white colored
paper and none other, and so on among the other political parties.
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 144
Page No 147
In order for a candidate's name to be proposed to go on to the primary ballot, it must be proposed by a
prescribed number of qualified electors, within the district in which that candidate is to be elected, which
names must be subscribed to a verified petition. This entitles the candidate's name to be printed upon the
primary ballot. Within ten days before the primary, or return day, the clerk of the board or body which is
delegated by law to prepare for election matters must print, prepare and send out, primary election ballots for
each separate political party through the United States mails in the following manner: To each elector within
the jurisdiction is mailed a plain unmarked envelope, addressed to the business or home address of each
separate elector, containing a selfaddressed and stamped return envelope, returnable to the Board of
Election of that precinct, together with one party primary election ballot, for the use of that elector. If the
elector happens to be a Republican the color of his ballot will be pink, and only the names of the Republican
candidates will be printed thereon. On the outside end of the ballot is printed the elector's party voting
number, which voting number is separate and distinct from every other voting number in that precinct. On the
outside end of the return envelope is a line left for the original signature of the elector to whom the ballot is
mailed, whereon he must either subscribe his signature in ink, or if he be an incapable voter, and is assisted,
must have his own name subscribed thereon, together with the names of two freeholders in that precinct, who
assisted him in voting. Upon receipt of the envelope containing his ballot, the voter marks a cross (X) at the
names of the candidates for whom he votes, and then folds his ballot so that all the names thereon are turned
inside and out of sight, and his party voting number appears on the outside end of the envelope. (In the same
manner that he now folds his ballot at a general election.) He then encloses this ballot in the stamped return
envelope, seals the same, signs his name on the end of the envelope, and deposits it in a postoffice box. It
then goes to the postoffice directed by law, addressed to the Primary or Return Board, who alone are
authorized by law to receive these envelopes from the postmaster, and then only on the day and hour
designated by law and in public. Upon return day, the Board receives all of these primary election envelopes
from the postoffice, takes them to a public place, and after counting the number received, and comparing with
the number originally sent out, compares each signature on each envelope with the same signature subscribed
on the original affidavit of registration, and if it be genuine, opening the envelope, removing the ballot
therefrom, without opening the same, observing that the color of the ballot corresponds to the party color to
which that elector belongs, then tearing off the voting number, which appears on the end of the ballot, after
comparing it with the voting number written on that elector's affidavit of registration, and then finally
depositing the ballot into a general ballot box, into which all the ballots of each political party are deposited.
It will thus appear that every ballot has been checked in three ways to identify it as being the original ballot
sent to that elector, and as the one cast personally by him: First, it was contained in an envelope bearing his
original signature; it bore his own party voting number, which was separate and distinct from every other
party voting number in that precinct, and was printed under the authority of law only upon one ballot,
namely, the ballot he receives; and finally it was upon the color of paper which only the political party with
which that elector was affiliated was allowed by law to use. Every other political party's ballots were printed
upon different colored paper.
This makes it practically impossible for any ballot to be cast or counted other than the one lawfully mailed
and regularly received and voted and mailed in person by the elector to whom it was sent.
Even the most prejudiced opponents of the Postal Direct Primary bill admit that there are no practical reasons
why it would not operate very successfully in the rural districts and the smaller cities and towns. Such an
admission is a very farreaching argument for the bill as a general working measure for direct nominations. It
is an open confession that the plan is workable and meritorious. The only objection that has been urged with
any semblance of force is the argument that the ballot could be easily corrupted in large cities, where the
opportunities for fraud are great, and where the intelligence and honesty of certain classes of voters is low. It
is suggested with considerable merit that among the foreign and ignorant classes in the great centers of
population, corruption of suffrage is a matter easily accomplished; that there would be many of such voters
willing to lend themselves to any scheme to deliver their primary ballots to certain persons to be voted as
they desired under the names of the Individual electors.
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 145
Page No 148
At first blush, this argument appears to have some force, but upon close reading of the provisions of the bill,
and its necessary effect upon the Practical operation of a primary campaign, it must be admitted that this sole
objection is largely argumentative. In the first place, as pointed out above, each ballot must be cast by the
person to whom it was sent, for it is contained in an envelope bearing the elector's own known signature.
Therefore none other can vote the ballot. In the second place, the bill provides for extreme penal penalties for
any one tampering with ballots, assisting a voter in the marking of a ballot (other than incapable voters),
standing about and watching an elector mark his ballot, or in any wise influencing, or observing a voter in the
marking of his ballot at the time it is voted, sealed in the envelope and dropped in the postoffice. All the
penalties are for imprisonment and not for fines. This, then, will force any plan to secure ballots or corrupt
the same to be done secretly and illegally. It must appear that there can be no extensive system of vote
corruption carried on without discovery. It must further appear that there would be extremely few who would
care to general or direct any extensive plan of corrupting or influencing primary ballots. It would be too risky
a proceeding. If then votes were corrupted, it would have to be done very secretly and amongst only a trusted
few. Therefore the percentage influenced in this manner could not be large.
Another bar to any tampering with ballots would be the check which each political party and each candidate
would have upon the other. It would be a matter of political capital for one party to detect leaders or
organizations within another party tampering with or corrupting the vote at its primary election. The various
candidates for the different offices within the same party would watch one another with extreme vigilance to
detect any attempt to influence or corrupt the ballots against them.
Lastly, it is suggested that because of the fact that these primary election ballots would be sent at the same
time to thousands of different places throughout the precinct and city, and would be opened in offices and in
homes on the same day, and in all probability fully 75% of them would be voted and remailed on the same
day received; that it would be practically impossible to devise any system that would reach out and get these
countless ballots in a thousand different places within a space of a few hours or a day. They would be too
scattered to be gotten hold of or traced with any degree of success.
It must appear from a broadminded consideration of the practical workings of this Postal Direct Primary law
that there is no valid reason why it would not work with splendid success even in the congested and illiterate
districts of our larger cities. But even admitting for the sake of argument that a certain percentage of the
ignorant and vicious vote could be corrupted by the bosses, it certainly could not be large. It could not
possibly exceed ten per cent of the registered vote. In light of the fact that this system would bring out at least
twentyfive per cent more votes than any other primary law has ever succeeded in bringing out, it is seen at a
glance that the corrupted vote would be far outweighed and overbalanced by the much larger percentage of
decent vote that would be secured for the first time by means of this postal system of voting. The argument,
then, is unanswerable in favor of this Postal Direct Primary law.
And it would for the first time give the intelligent and honest elements in all political parties the direct control
of the power of nomination for public offices. Moreover, the mere fact that it would cause a larger number of
people to vote would be of inestimable value, for it would tend to rouse and awaken public interest in civic
affairs and by thus doing would educate and train the minds of the better classes in election affairs, and could
not help but raise the honesty and power of popular suffrage. In other words, it would accomplish in the
fullest degree, the results sought to be obtained by every direct primary law, namely, a popular choice of
candidates for public office, with the power of selection for once actually in the hands of the honest electors.
In conclusion, it might be well to mention that this system of voting by mail would protect the suffrage of
many of our best citizens, who, under present laws, are practically disfranchised. Such men are travelers, the
sick, sailors, trainmen, and other men who, by reason of their occupation or misfortune, are forced to be
absent from the place of their voting precincts on election day, but who could and would vote if an
opportunity was extended to them to vote by mail. This would constitute no small class of voters.
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Dr. Montgomery's Report.
55 Dr. Montgomery's report to the Senate was as follows:
Palo Alto, Cal., March 22, 1909.
LieutenantGovernor Warren R. Porter,
President State Senate, Sacramento, Cal.
On the afternoon of March 21, 1909, about 4:30 p. m., J. L. Martin, SergeantatArms of the Senate of the
State of California, called on me and informed me that I had been designated by the President of the Senate to
proceed with him to Palo Alto, and to consult with the physicians of Senator Marshall Black, to ascertain if
Senator Black's health was such as to permit him to go to Sacramento. I arrived at the office of Dr. Howard
Black, Senator Black's physician, at about 9:30 p. m., March 21, 1909, and there met Dr. Howard Black, Dr.
H. B. Reynolds, Dr. J. C. Spencer and Dr. R. L. Wilbur. These physicians said they had held a consultation
and had made an examination of Senator Marshall Black that afternoon; according to their statement, Senator
Marshall Black had arrived in Palo Alto about five days previously suffering from inflammation of the eyes,
commonly called "pink eye," and that this inflammation of the eyes had almost entirely cleared up, but that
the inflammation traveled down the throat and bronchial tubes. According to their statement to me on the
evening of March 21, 1909, Senator Marshall Black was suffering from bronchopneumonia, and symptoms
of inflammation in the lower lobe of the left lung, the temperature that afternoon was ninetynine and the
pulse ninety. The heart was in good condition. The cough was severe and the expectoration abundant. I stated
to these physicians that I was delegated by the Senate of the State of California to make a thorough and
complete examination of Senator Black for the purpose of ascertaining at what time it would be safe for
Senator Black to proceed to Sacramento. I was informed by Dr. Howard Black that Senator Marshall Black
would not permit me to see him. I then asked Senator Black's physicians, individually and collectively, if in
their opinion, in Senator Black's present physical condition any serious inconvenience or injury would accrue
to Senator Black from a personal examination by me. They all stated that, on their part, they were perfectly
willing that such examination should be held by the Senate physician, and that such an examination in their
opinion could do no injury. I asked if the patient was in sound and disposing mind. I was answered he was.
At about 10 a. m., March 22, 1909, I again called on Dr. Howard Black, renewing my request of the previous
evening to see Senator Marshall Black. Senator Black, through the physician, still declined to receive me. I
then asked Dr. Howard Black when, in his opinion, Senator Marshall Black would be in condition to proceed
to Sacramento. He said that at the consultation of the previous day it was concluded that it would be a week
before Senator Black would be in such a condition as to enable him with safety to undertake the Journey. As
this consultation was held on March 21st, it would, in their opinion, be March 28th before Senator Black
would be in a condition to proceed to Sacramento. I asked if, in his opinion, Senator Black was convalescing.
He said that in his opinion he was. He said that Senator Black's temperature this morning was 100, his pulse
90, his cough still severe, and there still was evidence of inflammation in the lower lobe of the left lung.
Personally, from what I know of Senator Black's physicians, I believe these facts to be true. Taking it for
granted that these facts are true, I do not find that, from them alone, I can conclude that Senator Black is
unable to proceed to Sacramento. In order to concur in this opinion of Senator Black's physicians I would
have to see the patient.
Douglass W. Montgomery, M. D.
Delegated by LieutenantGovernor Warren R. Porter to examine into the state of health of Senator Marshall
Black.
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The AntiJapanese Bill's Resolution.
94 The resolution was in full as follows:
Whereas, Assembly Bill, No. 14, introduced by Mr. Johnson of Sacramento, and reading as follows:
An Act
To Amend Section 1662 of the Political Code
The people of the State of California, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Section 1662 of the Political Code is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
1662. Every school, unless otherwise provided by law, must be open for the admission of all children
between six and twentyone years of age residing in the district and the board of school trustees, or city
board of education, have power to admit adults and children not residing in the district, whenever good
reasons exist therefor. Trustees shall have the power to exclude children of filthy or vicious habits, or
children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases, and also to establish separate schools for Indian
children and for the children of Mongolian, or Japanese, or Chinese descent. When such separate schools are
established, Indian, Chinese, Japanese or Mongolian children must not be admitted into any other school;
provided, that in cities and towns in which the kindergarten has been adopted or may hereafter be adopted as
part of the public primary schools, children may be admitted to such kindergarten classes at the age of four
years; and provided further, that in cities or school districts in which separate classes have been or may
hereafter be established, for the instruction of the deaf, children may be admitted to such classes at the age of
three years.
Is now pending before this Assembly; and
Whereas, It has been represented by the President of the United States that the passage of this bill will, in
some manner undisclosed, disturb the relations now existing between the government of the United States
and the government of Japan; and
Whereas, The President of the United States has made known to this Assembly, through the Governor of this
State and through the Speaker of this Assembly, his wish that said bill be not passed; and
Whereas, The President of the United States has caused it to be represented to this body that it is his
judgment that said bill would conflict with the treaty now existing between the government of the United
States and the government of Japan, and because of such conflict the passage of such bill would be beyond
the power of the Legislature of this State, and
Whereas, The Governor of this State and the Speaker of this Assembly have conveyed to this body their
desire that this bill be not passed; and
Whereas, It is the desire of this body to accede to the wishes of the Chief Executive of this State, and the
Speaker of this Assembly; therefore be it
Resolved, That it is fitting and proper that a statement of the position of this Assembly upon this question be
made, to the end that a mistaken impression do not result from the failure of the Assembly to pass this bill; be
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
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it further
Resolved, That such position is as follows:
1. The school system of the State of California is an institution of the State alone, maintained, supported,
conducted and controlled wholly under and in accordance with the powers reserved to the State.
2. That the power to maintain, conduct and control the State school system has not been granted to the
Federal Government.
3. That the Legislature of California may properly pass any law relative to the school system of this State that
in its judgment may seem best.
4. That by said Assembly Bill No. 14 it is not designed to deprive children of Indian, Mongolian, Chinese, or
Japanese descent of equal school privileges and opportunities, but, on the contrary, to these there shall be
given, and for these there shall be provided the same privileges and opportunities as are given to and provided
for all other children.
5. That Assembly Bill No. 14 contemplates the establishment and maintenance of separate schools for
different races, but all schools so established and maintained shall afford equal and the same facilities for
instruction.
6. That this Assembly recognize it to be a duty resting upon the State to furnish to children of Indian,
Mongolian, Chinese, or Japanese descent the same facilities and opportunities as are furnished to children of
other races and affirm that no more can be required and that nothing different is contemplated by said Act.
That said Act gives to children of Indian, Mongolian, Chinese, or Japanese descent who are subjects of other
countries the same rights and privileges as are given to native born citizens of California, and no power has
the right to demand more. That this Assembly is disposed to accede to the wishes of the Federal Government
as conveyed to us by the Governor of this State and the Speaker of this Assembly, but while doing so we
reaffirm and reassert that the subject matter of Assembly Bill No. 14 is purely and exclusively a matter of
State concern, falling within the reserve powers of the State, and violates no provision of the Federal
Constitution.
7. That it is the judgment of this Assembly that said bill does not conflict with the treaty existing between the
government of the United States and the government of Japan, and that we recognize the authority to make
treaties is by the Federal Constitution, vested in the President and Senate of the United States, we affirm that
the right to administer our State school system can not be controlled by treaty made by the President and the
Senate of the United States, nor by action of the President alone.
8. And finally, while we recognize that Assembly Bill No. 14 is drawn and could be passed by the Legislature
of this State in full conformity with the powers reserved to the State and vouchsafed to it by the Federal
Constitution, we are unwilling to do aught which may disturb the relations existing between this government
and a friendly power, and for this reason alone, we recommend that Assembly Bill No. 14 be reconsidered
and withdrawn.
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909
Story of the Session of the California Legislature of1909 149
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