Immanuel Kant .........................................................................................................................................1

PREFACE ...............................................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS........................................3

I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics ................................................................................................3

II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty ...................................................................5

III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty ...............................................................6

IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties? .........................................................................................6

V. Explanation of these two Notions.......................................................................................................7

VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by Jurisprudence), but only for the

Maxims of Action....................................................................................................................................8

VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict, Obligation......................................8

VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties.............................................................9

IX. What is a Duty of Virtue? ................................................................................................................11

X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of Ethics is Synthetical...................11

XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue may be thus exhibited .....12

XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally ..................13

XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics.......................15

XIV. Of Virtue in General.....................................................................................................................16

XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from Jurisprudence ................................................17

XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself....................................................................17

XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength) ...............................................17

VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of

VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict, Obligation

X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of Ethics is Synthetical

XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue may be thus exhibited

XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally

XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics

If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of rational knowledge based on concepts), then

there must also be for this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any condition of

intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for

every practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore also for Ethics, in order to be able to

present it as a true science (systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily).

As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in

the elective will, which has to be limited in its external relations according to laws of freedom; without

regarding any end which is the matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere scientific doctrine

*One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not, therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he

who makes the rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he joins with this the

necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action, must not be spun out into the most subtile threads of

metaphysic, unless a legal duty is in question; in which case meum and tuum must be accurately determined

in the balance of justice, on the principle of equality of action and action, which requires something like

mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere ethical duty. For in this case the question is not only to

know what it is a duty to do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have can be easily

decided), but the chief point is the inner principle of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be

also the spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the man who joins to his knowledge this

Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea of it that we should go back to metaphysical

elements in order to make the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every feeling) a motive

of action. For what sort of notion can we form of the mighty power and herculean strength which would be

sufficient to overcome the vicebreeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her "arms from the armoury of

metaphysics," which is a matter of speculation that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching in

lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out with fragments of metaphysics, becomes

ridiculous. But it is not, therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics the first principles of

ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty,

otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a

certain feeling which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral, may, perhaps, even satisfy

the popular teacher, provided he desires as the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone

in every case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be consistent with itself?" But if it

were merely feeling that made it our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be dictated

But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based on any feeling, but such a principle is really

nothing else than an obscurely conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's reasoning faculty; as the

teacher will easily find who tries to catechize his pupils in the Socratic method about the imperative of duty

and its application to the moral judgement of his actions. The mode of stating it need not be always

metaphysical, and the language need not necessarily be scholastic, unless the pupil is to be trained to be a

philosopher. But the thought must go back to the elements of metaphysics, without which we cannot expect

If we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological, or purely sensitive, or even moral feeling (from

what is subjectively practical instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of the will, the end, not

from its form that is the law, in order from thence to determine duties; then, certainly, there are no

metaphysical elements of ethics, for feeling by whatever it may be excited is always physical. But then

ethical teaching, whether in schools, or lecturerooms, etc., is corrupted in its source. For it is not a matter of

indifference by what motives or means one is led to a good purpose (the obedience to duty). However

disgusting, then, metaphysics may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly, or even

brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is, nevertheless, an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go

back to its principles even in ethics, and to begin by going to school on its benches.

We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the principles of duty, so far as it is derived

from pure reason, it was still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness; in such a way, however,

that a certain moral happiness not resting on empirical causes was ultimately arrived at, a selfcontradictory

nonentity. In fact, when the thinking man has conquered the temptations to vice, and is conscious of having

done his (often hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction which may well be called

happiness, in which virtue is her own reward. Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, is the

real motive of his acting virtuously. The notion of duty, says be, does not immediately determine his will; it is

only by means of the happiness in prospect that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other hand, since he can

promise himself this reward of virtue only from the consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the

latter must have preceded: that is, be must feel himself bound to do his duty before he thinks, and without

thinking, that happiness will be the consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in his

assignment of cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he is conscious of his obedience to duty: and

he can only be moved to obedience to duty if be foresees that he will thereby become happy. But in this

reasoning there is also a contradiction. For, on the one side, he must obey his duty, without asking what effect

this will have on his happiness, consequently, from a moral principle; on the other side, he can only recognize

something as his duty when he can reckon on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and consequently

I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I believe, to the simplest expressions the

distinction between pathological and moral pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must precede the

obedience to the law in order that one may act according to the law is pathological, and the process follows

the physical order of nature; that which must be preceded by the law in order that it may be felt is in the

moral order. If this distinction is not observed; if eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is adopted as the

principle instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of the inner legislation), the consequence is the

The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those who are accustomed only to physiological

explanations will not admit into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws dictatorially

proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves irresistibly forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being able to

explain what lies wholly beyond that sphere, namely, freedom of the elective will, elevating as is this

privilege, that man has of being capable of such an idea. They are stirred up by the proud claims of

speculative reason, which feels its power so strongly in the fields, just as if they were allies leagued in

defence of the omnipotence of theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist that idea; and

thus they are at present, and perhaps for a long time to come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the moral

Ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy (philosophia moral is) generally, which was also called the

doctrine of duties. Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part of moral philosophy,

namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not subject to external laws (for which in German the name

Tugendlehre was found suitable). Thus the system of general deontology is divided into that of jurisprudence

(jurisprudentia), which is capable of external laws, and of ethics, which is not thus capable, and we may let

The notion of duty is in itself already the notion of a constraint of the free elective will by the law; whether

this constraint be an external one or be selfconstraint. The moral imperative, by its categorical (the

unconditional ought) announces this constraint, which therefore does not apply to all rational beings (for

there may also be holy beings), but applies to men as rational physical beings who are unholy enough to be

seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the moral law, although they themselves recognize its authority;

and when they do obey it, to obey it unwillingly (with resistance of their inclination); and it is in this that the

constraint properly consists.* Now, as man is a free (moral) being, the notion of duty can contain only

selfconstraint (by the idea of the law itself), when we look to the internal determination of the will (the

spring), for thus only is it possible to combine that constraint (even if it were external) with the freedom of

*Man, however, as at the same time a moral being, when he considers himself objectively, which he is

qualified to do by his pure practical reason, (i.e., according to humanity in his own person). finds himself

holy enough to transgress the law only unwillingly; for there is no man so depraved who in this transgression

would not feel a resistance and an abhorrence of himself, so that he must put a force on himself. It is

impossible to explain the phenomenon that at this parting of the ways (where the beautiful fable places

Hercules between virtue and sensuality) man shows more propensity to obey inclination than the law. For, we

can only explain what happens by tracing it to a cause according to physical laws; but then we should not be

able to conceive the elective will as free. Now this mutually opposed selfconstraint and the inevitability of it

The impulses of nature, then, contain hindrances to the fulfilment of duty in the mind of man, and resisting

forces, some of them powerful; and he must judge himself able to combat these and to conquer them by

means of reason, not in the future, but in the present, simultaneously with the thought; he must judge that he

Now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust opponent is called fortitude (fortitudo), and

when concerned with the opponent of the moral character within us, it is virtue (virtus, fortitudo moralis).

Accordingly, general deontology, in that part which brings not external, but internal, freedom under laws is

Jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of external freedom (the condition of consistency with

itself, if its maxim became a universal law), that is, with law. Ethics, on the contrary, supplies us with a

matter (an object of the free elective will), an end of pure reason which is at the same time conceived as an

objectively necessary end, i.e., as duty for all men. For, as the sensible inclinations mislead us to ends (which

are the matter of the elective will) that may contradict duty, the legislating reason cannot otherwise guard

against their influence than by an opposite moral end, which therefore must be given a priori independently

An end is an object of the elective will (of a rational being) by the idea of which this will is determined to an

action for the production of this object. Now I may be forced by others to actions which are directed to an end

as means, but I cannot be forced to have an end; I can only make something an end to myself. If, however, I

am also bound to make something which lies in the notions of practical reason an end to myself, and

therefore besides the formal determining principle of the elective will (as contained in law) to have also a

material principle, an end which can be opposed to the end derived from sensible impulses; then this gives the

notion of an end which is in itself a duty. The doctrine of this cannot belong to jurisprudence, but to ethics,

since this alone includes in its conception selfconstraint according to moral laws.

For this reason, ethics may also be defined as the system of the ends of the pure practical reason. The two

parts of moral philosophy are distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of constraint. That

ethics contains duties to the observance of which one cannot be (physically) forced by others, is merely the

consequence of this, that it is a doctrine of ends, since to be forced to have ends or to set them before one's

Now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum virtutis) follows from the definition of virtue

given above compared with the obligation, the peculiarity of which has just been shown. There is in fact no

other determination of the elective will, except that to an end, which in the very notion of it implies that I

cannot even physically be forced to it by the elective will of others. Another may indeed force me to do

something which is not my end (but only means to the end of another), but he cannot force me to make it my

own end, and yet I can have no end except of my own making. The latter supposition would be a

contradiction an act of freedom which yet at the same time would not be free. But there is no contradiction

in setting before one's self an end which is also a duty: for in this case I constrain myself, and this is quite

consistent with freedom.* But how is such an end possible? That is now the question. For the possibility of

the notion of the thing (viz., that it is not selfcontradictory) is not enough to prove the possibility of the

*The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can be morally forced (by the mere idea of duty),

so much the freer he is. The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and strong mind not to

give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on, however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who

yet desists from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he finds that it would cause him to

neglect an official duty or a sick father; this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this very thing,

We can conceive the relation of end to duty in two ways; either starting from the end to find the maxim of the

dutiful actions; or conversely, setting out from this to find the end which is also duty. jurisprudence proceeds

in the former way. It is left to everyone's free elective will what end he will choose for his action. But its

maxim is determined a priori; namely, that the freedom of the agent must be consistent with the freedom of

Ethics, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start from the ends which the man may propose to

himself, and hence give directions as to the maxims he should adopt, that is, as to his duty; for that would be

to take empirical principles of maxims, and these could not give any notion of duty; since this, the categorical

ought, has its root in pure reason alone. Indeed, if the maxims were to be adopted in accordance with those

ends (which are all selfish), we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all. Hence in ethics the

notion of duty must lead to ends, and must on moral principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to

Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in itself a duty, and how such an end is possible, it

is here only necessary to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue, and why it is so called.

To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moral is generatim), but all duties do not imply a

corresponding right (facultas juridica) of another to compel any one, but only the duties called legal duties.

Similarly to all ethical obligation corresponds the notion of virtue, but it does not follow that all ethical duties

are duties of virtue. Those, in fact, are not so which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, object of

the elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral determination of the will (e.g., that the dutiful

action must also be done from duty). It is only an end which is also duty that can be called a duty of virtue.

Hence there are several of the latter kind (and thus there are distinct virtues); on the contrary, there is only

one duty of the former kind, but it is one which is valid for all actions (only one virtuous disposition).

The duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of justice in this respect; that it is morally

possible to be externally compelled to the latter, whereas the former rests on free selfconstraint only. For

finite holy beings (which cannot even be tempted to the violation of duty) there is no doctrine of virtue, but

only moral philosophy, the latter being an autonomy of practical reason, whereas the former is also an

autocracy of it. That is, it includes a consciousness not indeed immediately perceived, but rightly concluded,

from the moral categorical imperative of the power to become master of one's inclinations which resist the

law; so that human morality in its highest stage can yet be nothing more than virtue; even if it were quite pure

(perfectly free from the influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which is poetically personified under the

Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay

of Cochius) as a long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this is not an effect of

wellresolved and firm principles ever more and more purified, then, like any other mechanical arrangement

brought about by technical practical reason, it is neither armed for all circumstances nor adequately secured

To virtue = + a is opposed as its logical contradictory (contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of virtue

(moral weakness) = o; but vice = a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter oppositum); and it is not merely a

needless question but an offensive one to ask whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more strength of

mind than great virtues. For by strength of mind we understand the strength of purpose of a man, as a being

endowed with freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of himself (in his senses) and therefore in a

healthy condition of mind. But great crimes are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of healthy

mind shudder. The question would therefore be something like this: whether a man in a fit of madness can

have more physical strength than if he is in his senses; and we may admit this without on that account

ascribing to him more strength of mind, if by mind we understand the vital principle of man in the free use of

his powers. For since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the inclinations that weaken

reason, which does not prove strength of mind, this question would be nearly the same as the question

whether a man in a fit of illness can show more strength than in a healthy condition; and this may be directly

denied, since the want of health, which consists in the proper balance of all the bodily forces of the man, is a

weakness in the system of these forces, by which system alone we can estimate absolute health.

An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the

object is produced. Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end without himself

making the object of his elective will his end, hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of

the agent, not an affect of physical nature. Now, since this act which determines an end is a practical principle

which commands not the means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore unconditionally),

hence it is a categorical imperative of pure practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of

Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it. For since there are free

actions, there must also be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst these ends there

must also be some which are at the same time (that is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none

such, then since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical reason might have would be valid

only as means to other ends, and a categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which destroys

Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to himself in accordance with the sensible

impulses of his nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws objects which he ought to

make his end. We may call the former technical (subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of

prudence in the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral (objective) doctrine of ends. This

distinction is, however, superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is clearly

separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present instance, anthropology). The latter resting on

empirical principles, whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on principles given a

We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and on the other the perfection of others,

For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by virtue of the impulse of their nature), but

this end cannot without contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself inevitably wills does not

come under the notion of duty, for this is a constraint to an end reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a

contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own happiness with all his power.

It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound

to promote it. For it is just in this that the perfection of another man as a person consists, namely, that he is

able of himself to set before him his own end according to his own notions of duty; and it is a contradiction to

require (to make it a duty for me) that I should do something which no other but himself can do.

The word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is sometimes understood as a notion belonging to

transcendental philosophy; viz., the notion of the totality of the manifold which taken together constitutes a

thing; sometimes, again, it is understood as belonging to teleology, so that it signifies the correspondence of

the properties of a thing to an end. Perfection in the former sense might be called quantitative (material), in

the latter qualitative (formal) perfection. The former can be one only, for the whole of what belongs to the

one thing is one. But of the latter there may be several in one thing; and it is of the latter property that we here

When it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally (properly speaking, to humanity), that it is in

itself a duty to make this our end, it must be placed in that which may be the effect of one's deed, not in that

which is merely an endowment for which we have to thank nature; for otherwise it would not be duty.

Consequently, it can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's power (or natural capacity) and also of one's

will (moral disposition) to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. The supreme element in the former (the

power) is the understanding, it being the faculty of concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts which

refer to duty. First it is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the rudeness of his nature, out of his animal

nature more and more to humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to supply the

defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by

reason as technically practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds (as art), but reason, as morally

practical, absolutely commands him to do it, and makes this end his duty, in order that he may be worthy of

the humanity that dwells in him. Secondly, to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous

disposition, that, namely, in which the law is also the spring of his dutiful actions, and to obey it from duty,

for this is internal morally practical perfection. This is called the moral sense (as it were a special sense,

sensus moralis), because it is a feeling of the effect which the legislative will within himself exercises on the

faculty of acting accordingly. This is, indeed, often misused fanatically, as though (like the genius of

Socrates) it preceded reason, or even could dispense with judgement of reason; but still it is a moral

It is inevitable for human nature that a should wish and seek for happiness, that is, satisfaction with his

condition, with certainty of the continuance of this satisfaction. But for this very reason it is not an end that is

also a duty. Some writers still make a distinction between moral and physical happiness (the former

consisting in satisfaction with one's person and moral behaviour, that is, with what one does; the other in

satisfaction with that which nature confers, consequently with what one enjoys as a foreign gift). Without at

present censuring the misuse of the word (which even involves a contradiction), it must be observed that the

feeling of the former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, perfection. For he who is to feel himself

happy in the mere consciousness of his uprightness already possesses that perfection which in the previous

If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to promote as my end, it must be the happiness of

other men whose (permitted) end I hereby make also mine. It still remains left to themselves to decide what

they shall reckon as belonging to their happiness; only that it is in my power to decline many things which

they so reckon, but which I do not so regard, supposing that they have no right to demand it from me as their

own. A plausible objection often advanced against the division of duties above adopted consists in setting

over against that end a supposed obligation to study my own (physical) happiness, and thus making this,

which is my natural and merely subjective end, my duty (and objective end). This requires to be cleared up.

Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to transgression of one's duty; accordingly it would seem that

strength, health, a competence, and welfare generally, which are opposed to that influence, may also be

regarded as ends that are also duties; that is, that it is a duty to promote our own happiness not merely to

make that of others our end. But in that case the end is not happiness but the morality of the agent; and

happiness is only the means of removing the hindrances to morality; permitted means, since no one bas a

right to demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral ends. It is not directly a duty to seek a competence

for one's self; but indirectly it may be so; namely, in order to guard against poverty which is a great

temptation to vice. But then it is not my happiness but my morality, to maintain which in its integrity is at

The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law (even though I abstract from every end which is the

matter of the law); as is shown by the formal principle of duty in the categorical imperative: "Act so that the

maxims of thy action might become a universal law." But in ethics this is conceived as the law of thy own

will, not of will in general, which might be that of others; for in the latter case it would give rise to a judicial

duty which does not belong to the domain of ethics. In ethics, maxims are regarded as those subjective laws

which merely have the specific character of universal legislation, which is only a negative principle (not to

contradict a law in general). How, then, can there be further a law for the maxims of actions?

It is the notion of an end which is also a duty, a notion peculiar to ethics, that alone is the foundation of a law

for the maxims of actions; by making the subjective end (that which every one has) subordinate to the

objective end (that which every one ought to make his own). The imperative: "Thou shalt make this or that

thy end (e. g., the happiness of others)" applies to the matter of the elective will (an object). Now since no

free action is possible, without the agent having in view in it some end (as matter of his elective will), it

follows that, if there is an end which is also a duty, the maxims of actions which are means to ends must

contain only the condition of fitness for a possible universal legislation: on the other hand, the end which is

also a duty can make it a law that we should have such a maxim, whilst for the maxim itself the possibility of

For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by the condition of fitness for a universal

legislation, which is the formal principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary character of actions, and

is by this distinguished from recommendation (in which one only desires to know the best means to an end).

This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law can only command the maxim of the

actions, not the actions themselves, this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude (latitudo) for

the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign how and how much we should do by the action towards

the end which is also duty. But by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to make exceptions from

the maxim of the actions, but only the permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e. g., the general

love of our neighbour by the love of parents); and this in fact enlarges the field for the practice of virtue. The

more indeterminate the duty, and the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the man to the action, and

VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action 8

the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of obedience thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of

Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but

their transgression is not necessarily demerit (demeritum) = a, but only moral unworth = o, unless the agent

made it a principle not to conform to those duties. The strength of purpose in the former case is alone

properly called virtue [Tugend] (virtus); the weakness in the latter case is not vice (vitium), but rather only

lack of virtue [Untugend], a want of moral strength (defectus moralis). (As the word Tugend is derived from

taugen [to be good for something], Untugend by its etymology signifies good for nothing.) Every action

contrary to duty is called transgression (peccatum). Deliberate transgression which has become a principle is

Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an upright man) is nothing meritorious, yet the

conformity of the maxim of such actions regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice is meritorious. For

by this the man makes the right of humanity or of men his own end, and thereby enlarges his notion of duty

beyond that of indebtedness (officium debiti), since although another man by virtue of his rights can demand

that my actions shall conform to the law, he cannot demand that the law shall also contain the spring of these

actions. The same thing is true of the general ethical command, "Act dutifully from a sense of duty." To fix

this disposition firmly in one's mind and to quicken it is, as in the former case, meritorious, because it goes

But just for or reason, those duties also must be reckoned as of indeterminate obligation, in respect of which

there exists a subjective principle which ethically rewards them; or to bring them as near as possible to the

notion of a strict obligation, a principle of susceptibility of this reward according to the law of virtue; namely,

a moral pleasure which goes beyond mere satisfaction with oneself (which may be merely negative), and of

When this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of promoting their natural ends, which are

recognized as such by all men (making their happiness his own), we might call it the sweet merit, the

consciousness of which creates a moral enjoyment in which men are by sympathy inclined to revel; whereas

the bitter merit of promoting the true welfare of other men, even though they should not recognize it as such

(in the case of the unthankful and ungrateful), has commonly no such reaction, but only produces a

satisfaction with one's self, although in the latter case this would be even greater.

(a) Physical perfection; that is, cultivation of all our faculties generally for the promotion of the ends set

before us by reason. That this is a duty, and therefore an end in itself, and that the effort to effect this even

without regard to the advantage that it secures us, is based, not on a conditional (pragmatic), but an

unconditional (moral) imperative, may be seen from the following consideration. The power of proposing to

ourselves an end is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With the end of

humanity in our own person is therefore combined the rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving

well of humanity by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out all sorts of possible

ends, so far as this power is to be found in man; that is, it is a duty to cultivate the crude capacities of our

nature, since it is by that cultivation that the animal is raised to man, therefore it is a duty in itself.

This duty, however, is merely ethical, that is, of indeterminate obligation. No principle of reason prescribes

how far one must go in this effort (in enlarging or correcting his faculty of understanding, that is, in

acquisition of knowledge or technical capacity); and besides the difference in the circumstances into which

men may come makes the choice of the kind of employment for which he should cultivate his talent very

arbitrary. Here, therefore, there is no law of reason for actions, but only for the maxim of actions, viz.:

"Cultivate thy faculties of mind and body so as to be effective for all ends that may come in thy way,

(b) Cultivation of Morality in ourselves. The greatest moral perfection of man is to do his duty, and that from

duty (that the law be not only the rule but also the spring of his actions). Now at first sight this seems to be a

strict obligation, and as if the principle of duty commanded not merely the legality of every action, but also

the morality, i.e., the mental disposition, with the exactness and strictness of a law; but in fact the law

commands even here only the maxim of the action, namely, that we should seek the ground of obligation, not

in the sensible impulses (advantage or disadvantage), but wholly in the law; so that the action itself is not

commanded. For it is not possible to man to see so far into the depth of his own heart that he could ever be

thoroughly certain of the purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of his mind even in one single action,

although he has no doubt about the legality of it. Nay, often the weakness which deters a man from the risk of

a crime is regarded by him as virtue (which gives the notion of strength). And how many there are who may

have led a long blameless life, who are only fortunate in having escaped so many temptations. How much of

the element of pure morality in their mental disposition may have belonged to each deed remains hidden even

Accordingly, this duty to estimate the worth of one's actions not merely by their legality, but also by their

morality (mental disposition), is only of indeterminate obligation; the law does not command this internal

action in the human mind itself, but only the maxim of the action, namely, that we should strive with all our

power that for all dutiful actions the thought of duty should be of itself an adequate spring.

(a) Physical Welfare. Benevolent wishes may be unlimited, for they do not imply doing anything. But the

case is more difficult with benevolent action, especially when this is to be done, not from friendly inclination

(love) to others, but from duty, at the expense of the sacrifice and mortification of many of our appetites. That

this beneficence is a duty results from this: that since our selflove cannot be separated from the need to be

loved by others (to obtain help from them in case of necessity), we therefore make ourselves an end for

others; and this maxim can never be obligatory except by having the specific character of a universal law, and

consequently by means of a will that we should also make others our ends. Hence the happiness of others is

I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare without hope of recompense: because it is my

duty, and it is impossible to assign definite limits how far that may go. Much depends on what would be the

true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. For

that one should sacrifice his own happiness, his true wants, in order to promote that of others, would be a

selfcontradictory maxim if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is only indeterminate; it has a certain

latitude within which one may do more or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely. The law

(b) Moral wellbeing of others (salus moral is) also belongs to the happiness of others, which it is our duty to

promote, but only a negative duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse of conscience, although its origin

is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like grief, fear, and every other diseased condition. To take care that

he should not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not indeed my duty but his business;

nevertheless, it is my duty to do nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for which his

conscience may hereafter torment him, that is, it is my duty not to give him occasion of stumbling. But there

are no definite limits within which this care for the moral satisfaction of others must be kept; therefore it

Virtue is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to duty. All strength is known only by the

obstacles that it can overcome; and in the case of virtue the obstacles are the natural inclinations which may

come into conflict with the moral purpose; and as it is the man who himself puts these obstacles in the way of

his maxims, hence virtue is not merely a selfconstraint (for that might be an effort of one inclination to

constrain another), but is also a constraint according to a principle of inward freedom, and therefore by the

All duties involve a notion of necessitation by the law, and ethical duties involve a necessitation for which

only an internal legislation is possible; juridical duties, on the other hand, one for which external legislation

also is possible. Both, therefore, include the notion of constraint, either selfconstraint or constraint by

others. The moral power of the former is virtue, and the action springing from such a disposition (from

reverence for the law) may be called a virtuous action (ethical), although the law expresses a juridical duty.

For it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to regard the rights of men as holy.

But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue, is, properly speaking, a duty of virtue. The

former may concern merely the form of the maxims; the latter applies to the matter of them, namely, to an

end which is also conceived as duty. Now, as the ethical obligation to ends, of which there may be many, is

only indeterminate, because it contains only a law for the maxim of actions, and the end is the matter (object)

of elective will; hence there are many duties, differing according to the difference of lawful ends, which may

be called duties of virtue (officia honestatis), just because they are subject only to free selfconstraint, not to

Virtue, being a coincidence of the rational will, with every duty firmly settled in the character, is, like

everything formal, only one and the same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is also duty, that is, as

regards the matter which one ought to make an end, there may be several virtues; and as the obligation to its

maxim is called a duty of virtue, it follows that there are also several duties of virtue.

The supreme principle of ethics (the doctrine of virtue) is: "Act on a maxim, the ends of which are such as it

might be a universal law for everyone to have." On this principle a man is an end to himself as well as others,

and it is not enough that he is not permitted to use either himself or others merely as means (which would

imply that be might be indifferent to them), but it is in itself a duty of every man to make mankind in general

The principle of ethics being a categorical imperative does not admit of proof, but it admits of a justification

from principles of pure practical reason. Whatever in relation to mankind, to oneself, and others, can be an

end, that is an end for pure practical reason: for this is a faculty of assigning ends in general; and to be

indifferent to them, that is, to take no interest in them, is a contradiction; since in that case it would not

determine the maxims of actions (which always involve an end), and consequently would cease to be

practical reasons. Pure reason, however, cannot command any ends a priori, except so far as it declares the

That external constraint, so far as it withstands that which hinders the external freedom that agrees with

general laws (as an obstacle of the obstacle thereto), can be consistent with ends generally, is clear on the

principle of contradiction, and I need not go beyond the notion of freedom in order to see it, let the end which

each may be what he will. Accordingly, the supreme principle of jurisprudence is an analytical principle. On

the contrary the principle of ethics goes beyond the notion of external freedom and, by general laws, connects

further with it an end which it makes a duty. This principle, therefore, is synthetic. The possibility of it is

This enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external freedom and of its limitation by the merely

formal condition of its constant harmony; this, I say, in which, instead of constraint from without, there is set

up freedom within, the power of selfconstraint, and that not by the help of other inclinations, but by pure

practical reason (which scorns all such help), consists in this fact, which raises it above juridical duty; that by

it ends are proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of the moral imperative, and

the supposition of freedom which it necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the rational will

that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the

imperative, which commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of selfconstraint, that of

an end; not one that we have, but that we ought to have, which, therefore, pure practical reason has in itself,

whose highest, unconditional end (which, however, continues to be duty) consists in this: that virtue is its

own end and, by deserving well of men, is also its own reward. Herein it shines so brightly as an ideal to

human perceptions, it seems to cast in the shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to

transgression.* This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact that as we have no measure for the degree

of strength, except the greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in our case are the

inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective conditions of estimation of a magnitude for the objective

conditions of the magnitude itself. But when compared with human ends, all of which have their obstacles to

be overcome, it is true that the worth of virtue itself, which is its own end, far outweighs the worth of all the

utility and all the empirical ends and advantages which it may have as consequences.

We may, indeed, say that man is obliged to virtue (as a moral strength). For although the power (facultas) to

overcome all imposing sensible impulses by virtue of his freedom can and must be presupposed, yet this

power regarded as strength (robur) is something that must be acquired by the moral spring (the idea of the

law) being elevated by contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of reason in us, and at the same time also

XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue may be thus exhibited 12

These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them, he is not bound to acquire them. They

are: the moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for ourselves (selfesteem). There is

no obligation to have these, since they are subjective conditions of susceptibility for the notion of duty, not

objective conditions of morality. They are all sensitive and antecedent, but natural capacities of mind

(praedispositio) to be affected by notions of duty; capacities which it cannot be regarded as a duty to have,

but which every man has, and by virtue of which he can be brought under obligation. The consciousness of

them is not of empirical origin, but can only follow on that of a moral law, as an effect of the same on the

This is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure, merely from the consciousness of the agreement or

disagreement of our action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the elective will proceeds from

the idea of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it or its

effect to the deed; and here the sensitive state (the affection of the internal sense) is either a pathological or a

moral feeling. The former is the feeling that precedes the idea of the law, the latter that which may follow it.

Now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it; for all consciousness of obligation supposes

this feeling in order that one may become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the notion of duty; but

every man (as a moral being) has it originally in himself; the obligation, then, can only extend to the

cultivation of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration of its inscrutable origin; and this is effected by

showing how it is just, by the mere conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in its own purity and

apart from every pathological stimulus; and it is improper to call this feeling a moral sense; for the word

sense generally means a theoretical power of perception directed to an object; whereas the moral feeling (like

pleasure and displeasure in general) is something merely subjective, which supplies no knowledge. No man is

wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he were totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally

dead; and, to speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could no longer produce any effect

on this feeling, then his humanity would be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality and

be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical beings. But we have no special sense for (moral)

good and evil any more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but we have a susceptibility

of the free elective will for being moved by pure practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call the

Similarly, conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral

being, has it originally within him. To be bound to have a conscience would be as much as to say to be under

a duty to recognize duties. For conscience is practical reason which, in every case of law, holds before a man

his duty for acquittal or condemnation; consequently it does not refer to an object, but only to the subject

(affecting the moral feeling by its own act); so that it is an inevitable fact, not an obligation and duty. When,

therefore, it is said, "This man has no conscience," what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates. For if

he really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done according to duty, nor reproach

XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally 13

himself with violation of duty, and therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a

I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only observe what follows from what has just been

said, namely, that there is no such thing as an erring conscience. No doubt it is possible sometimes to err in

the objective judgement whether something is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the subjective whether I have

compared it with my practical (here judicially acting) reason for the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred I

would not have exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is neither truth nor error.

Unconscientiousness is not want of conscience, but the propensity not to heed its judgement. But when a man

is conscious of having acted according to his conscience, then, as far as regards guilt or innocence, nothing

more can be required of him, only he is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is duty or not; but

when it comes or has come to action, then conscience speaks involuntarily and inevitably. To act

conscientiously can, therefore, not be a duty, since otherwise it would be necessary to have a second

The duty here is only to cultivate our con. science, to quicken our attention to the voice of the internal judge,

Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition, and I cannot love because I will to do so, still less because

I ought (I cannot be necessitated to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to love. Benevolence,

however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of action, may be subject to a law of duty. Disinterested

benevolence is often called (though very improperly) love; even where the happiness of the other is not

concerned, but the complete and free surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another (even a

superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being also our duty. But all duty is necessitation or constraint,

although it may be selfconstraint according to a law. But what is done from constraint is not done from love.

It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether we love them or not, and this duty loses

nothing of its weight, although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not such as to be found

particularly worthy of love when we know it more closely. Hatred of men, however, is always hateful: even

though without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion from mankind (the solitary

misanthropy). For benevolence still remains a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to

To hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere feeling of horror of vice, the will having no

influence on the feeling nor the feeling on the will. Beneficence is a duty. He who often practises this, and

sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last really to love him whom he has benefited. When,

therefore, it is said: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," this does not mean, "Thou shalt first of all

love, and by means of this love (in the next place) do him good"; but: "Do good to thy neighbour, and this

beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit of inclination to beneficence)."

The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore alone be direct. This is a pleasure

immediately connected with the idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that is, to be

Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement

about an object which it would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty it could only be

conceived as such by means of the respect which we have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as

XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally 14

much as to say to be bound in duty to have a duty. When, therefore, it is said: "Man has a duty of

selfesteem," this is improperly stated, and we ought rather to say: "The law within him inevitably forces

from him respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a peculiar kind) is a basis of certain duties,

that is, of certain actions which may be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot say that he has a

duty of respect for himself; for he must have respect for the law within himself, in order to be able to

First. A duty can have only a single ground of obligation; and if two or more proof of it are adduced, this is a

certain mark that either no valid proof has yet been given, or that there are several distinct duties which have

For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by means of rational knowledge from concepts,

not like mathematics, through the construction of concepts. The latter science admits a variety of proofs of

one and the same theorem; because in intuition a priori there may be several properties of an object, all of

which lead back to the very same principle. If, for instance, to prove the duty of veracity, an argument is

drawn first from the harm that a lie causes to other men; another from the worthlessness of a liar and the

violation of his own selfrespect, what is proved in the former argument is a duty of benevolence, not of

veracity, that is to say, not the duty which required to be proved, but a different one. Now, if, in giving a

variety of proof for one and the same theorem, we flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will

compensate the lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very unphilosophical resource, since it

betrays trickery and dishonesty; for several insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not produce

certainty, nor even probability. They should advance as reason and consequence in a series, up to the

sufficient reason, and it is only in this way that they can have the force of proof. Yet the former is the usual

Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in the degree in which certain maxims are

followed, but only in the specific quality of the maxims (their relation to the law). In other words, the vaunted

principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean between two vices, is false.* For instance, suppose that good

management is given as the mean between two vices, prodigality and avarice; then its origin as a virtue can

neither be defined as the gradual diminution of the former vice (by saving), nor as the increase of the

expenses of the miserly. These vices, in fact, cannot be viewed as if they, proceeding as it were in opposite

directions, met together in good management; but each of them has its own maxim, which necessarily

*The common classical formulae of ethics medio tutissimus ibis; omne mimium vertitur in vitium; est

modus in rebus, etc., medium tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum ["You will go

most safely in the middle" (Virgil); "Every excess develops into a vice"; "There is a mean in all things, etc."

(Horace); "Happy they who steadily pursue a middle course"; "Virtue is the mean between two vices and

equally removed from either" (Horace).] contain a poor sort of wisdom, which has no definite principles; for

this mean between two extremes, who will assign it for me? Avarice (as a vice) is not distinguished from

frugality (as a virtue) by merely being the lat pushed too far; but has a quite different principle; (maxim),

namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of one's means, but in the mere possession of them,

renouncing enjoyment; just as the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive enjoyment of one's

means, but in the bad maxim which makes the use of them, without regard to their maintenance, the sole end.

For the same reason, no vice can be defined as an excess in the practice of certain actions beyond what is

proper (e.g., Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus); or, as a less exercise of them than is fitting

XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics 15

(Avaritia est defectus, etc.). For since in this way the degree is left quite undefined, and the question whether

conduct accords with duty or not, turns wholly on this, such an account is of no use as a definition.

Thirdly. Ethical virtue must not be estimated by the power we attribute to man of fulfilling the law; but,

conversely, the moral power must be estimated by the law, which commands categorically; not, therefore, by

the empirical knowledge that we have of men as they are, but by the rational knowledge how, according to

the ideas of humanity, they ought to be. These three maxims of the scientific treatment of ethics are opposed

Virtue signifies a moral strength of will. But this does not exhaust the notion; for such strength might also

belong to a holy (superhuman) being, in whom no opposing impulse counteracts the law of his rational will;

who therefore willingly does everything in accordance with the law. Virtue then is the moral strength of a

man's will in his obedience to duty; and this is a moral necessitation by his own law giving reason, inasmuch

as this constitutes itself a power executing the law. It is not itself a duty, nor is it a duty to possess it

(otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a duty), but it commands, and accompanies its command with

a moral constraint (one possible by laws of internal freedom). But since this should be irresistible, strength is

requisite, and the degree of this strength can be estimated only by the magnitude of the hindrances which man

creates for himself, by his inclinations. Vices, the brood of unlawful dispositions, are the monsters that he has

to combat; wherefore this moral strength as fortitude (fortitudo moral is) constitutes the greatest and only true

martial glory of man; it is also called the true wisdom, namely, the practical, because it makes the ultimate

end of the existence of man on earth its own end. Its possession alone makes man free, healthy, rich, a king,

etc., nor either chance or fate deprive him of this, since he possesses himself, and the virtuous cannot lose his

All the encomiums bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral perfection can lose nothing of their

practical reality by the examples of what men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter; anthropology

which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot impair anthroponomy which is erected by the

unconditionally legislating reason; and although virtue may now and then be called meritorious (in relation to

men, not to the law), and be worthy of reward, yet in itself, as it is its own end, so also it must be regarded as

Virtue considered in its complete perfection is, therefore, regarded not as if man possessed virtue, but as if

virtue possessed the man, since in the former case it would appear as though he had still had the choice (for

which he would then require another virtue, in order to select virtue from all other wares offered to him). To

conceive a plurality of virtues (as we unavoidably must) is nothing else but to conceive various moral objects

to which the (rational) will is led by the single principle of virtue; and it is the same with the opposite vices.

The expression which personifies both is a contrivance for affecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a

moral sense. Hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, but a subjective exposition of the

Metaphysic of Morals; in which the emotions that accompany the force of the moral law make the that force

to be felt; for example: disgust, horror, etc., which gives a sensible moral aversion in order to gain the

This separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in general rests, is founded on this: that the

notion of freedom, which is common to both, makes it necessary to divide duties into those of external and

those of internal freedom; the latter of which alone are ethical. Hence this internal freedom which is the

condition of all ethical duty must be discussed as a preliminary (discursus praeliminaris), just as above the

Habit (habitus) is a facility of action and a subjective perfection of the elective will. But not every such

facility is a free habit (habitus libertatis); for if it is custom (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity of action which,

by frequent repetition, has become a necessity, then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and therefore

not a moral habit. Virtue therefore cannot be defined as a habit of free lawabiding actions, unless indeed we

add "determining itself in its action by the idea of the law"; and then this habit is not a property of the elective

will, but of the rational will, which is a faculty that in adopting a rule also declares it to be a universal law,

and it is only such a habit that can be reckoned as virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom: to be

master of oneself in a given case (animus sui compos) and to have command over oneself (imperium in

semetipsum), that is to subdue his emotions and to govern his passions. With these conditions, the character

(indoles) is noble (erecta); in the opposite case, it is ignoble (indoles abjecta serva).

Emotions and passions are essentially distinct; the former belong to feeling in so far as this coming before

reflection makes it more difficult or even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus praeceps). And

reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of

one's understanding, joined with the strength of a mental excitement, is only a lack of virtue (Untugend), and

as it were a weak and childish thing, which may very well consist with the best will, and has further this one

good thing in it, that this storm soon subsides. A propensity to emotion (e.g., resentment) is therefore not so

closely related to vice as passion is. Passion, on the other hand, is the sensible appetite grown into a

permanent inclination (e. g., hatred in contrast to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it

leaves room for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for itself; and thus when the

inclination falls upon what contradicts the law, to brood on it, to allow it to root itself deeply, and thereby to

take up evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this is then specifically evil, that is, it is a true vice.

Virtue, therefore, in so far as it is based on internal freedom, contains a positive command for man, namely,

that he should bring all his powers and inclinations under his rule (that of reason); and this is a positive

precept of command over himself which is additional to the prohibition, namely, that he should not allow

himself to be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since, unless reason takes the

reins of government into its own hands, the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.

This word (apathy) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant want of feeling, and therefore subjective

indifference with respect to the objects of the elective will; it is supposed to be a weakness. This

misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to that want of emotion which is to be

distinguished from indifference. In the former, the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their

influence on the moral feeling only because the respect for the law is more powerful than all of them

together. It is only the apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively sympathy with good rise

to an emotion, or rather degenerate into it. Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to

this that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended in virtuous practices:

*Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the name of fool, and the just of unjust, if he pursue virtue herself beyond

For otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise or too virtuous. The emotion always belongs

to the sensibility, no matter by what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength of virtue is the mind at

rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring its law into practice. That is the state of health in the moral

life; on the contrary, the emotion, even when it is excited by the idea of the good, is a momentary glitter

which leaves exhaustion after it. We may apply the term fantastically virtuous to the man who will admit

nothing to be indifferent in respect of morality (adiaphora), and who strews all his steps with duties, as with

traps, and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a man eats fish or flesh, drink beer or wine, when both

agree with him; a micrology which, if adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its rule a tyranny.

Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the beginning. The former follows from the fact

that, objectively considered, it is an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty constantly to approximate to it.

The second is founded subjectively on the nature of man which is affected by inclinations, under the

influence of which virtue, with its maxims adopted once for all, can never settle in a position of rest; but, if it

is not rising, inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be based on custom (for this

belongs to the physical character of the determination of will); but even if the practice of them become a

custom, the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the choice of his maxims, which freedom is the

The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man (before which "his thoughts accuse or excuse one another")

Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him

in awe (reverence combined with fear); and this power which watches over the laws within him is not

something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is incorporated in his being. It follows him like his

shadow, when he thinks to escape. He may indeed stupefy himself with pleasures and distractions, but cannot

avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his

utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he cannot avoid hearing it.

Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral capacity, called conscience, has this

peculiarity in it, that although its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled

by his reason to transact it as if at the command of another person. For the transaction here is the conduct of a

trial (causa) before a tribunal. But that he who is accused by his conscience should be conceived as one and

the same person with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would

always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as

the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid selfcontradiction. Now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal

person which reason frames to itself. Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be

one who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the inward part of man; at the same time he must also be

allobliging, that is, must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as

his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must

at the same time possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could not give his commands

their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing

power over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a

responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in

11. VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action, page = 11

12. VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict, Obligation, page = 11

15. X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of Ethics is Synthetical, page = 14

16. XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue may be thus exhibited, page = 15

17. XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally, page = 16

18. XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics, page = 18

20. XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from Jurisprudence, page = 20

22. XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength), page = 20