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Euthyphro ............................................................................................................................................................1

Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in the Porch of the King

Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use.

Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the

Soc. A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of

the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a

Euth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against you?

Soc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young

man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who

are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he

has found me out, and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state

is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with

the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and

clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will afterwards attend to the

elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor.

Euth. I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite will turn out to be the truth. My

opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way

Soc. He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a

poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his

Euth. I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say,

comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He

knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the

assembly about divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet

every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.

Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise;

but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom

to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.

Soc. I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a

benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that

the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would only laugh at me, as you say

that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and

Euth. I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I think

Soc. By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A

man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his

Soc. I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relativesclearly he was; for if he

Euth. I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a

relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer

when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the

murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then

even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now

the man who is dead was a poor dependent of mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in

Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and

slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a

diviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he

regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was

just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the

messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the

part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, dead man

was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father.

Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.

Soc. Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and impious so very

exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing

Euth. The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact

Soc. Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus

comes on I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and

now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You,

Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions;

and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you

should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old;

that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if

Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do

Euth. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the

Soc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one

appears to notice you not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has

indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said

that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in

every action always the same? and impiety, again is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same

Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or

of any similar crimewhether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may bethat makes no difference;

and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of

the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others:of the principle, I mean, that the

impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most

righteous of the gods?and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured

his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner.

And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of

Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impietythat I cannot away with these

stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well

informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can

I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really

Euth. Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.

Soc. And do you really believe that the gods, fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the

like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of

them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is

Euth. Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things

Soc. I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would

rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question,

What is "piety"? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.

Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?

Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general

idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the

Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by

which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such

Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

Soc. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what

you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your

Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is

pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites

Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?

Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good

friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one

Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?

Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?

Soc. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set

us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will

suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil,

honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we

are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.

Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?

Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and

dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differenceswould

Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?

Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,about these they

Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to

Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?

Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I

certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is

loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may

very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable

to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of

Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer:

Soc. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of

Euth. I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of

law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.

Soc. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?

Soc. Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that

Soc. Then they do not argue that the evildoer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who

Soc. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them

say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to

Soc. But they join issue about the particularsgods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute

about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust.

Soc. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof

have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the

master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the

interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son

ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods

absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as

Euth. It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very dear indeed to you.

Soc. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will

Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into

my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all

the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and

impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately

defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear

to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the

gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the

gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or

Soc. Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this

admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to

Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate,

Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own

Euth. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.

Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand

is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the

Soc. I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being

led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what

Soc. Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some

Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led

because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of

this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of

action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a

state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a

Soc. And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved,

Soc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the

Soc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is

Soc. Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as

Soc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledge by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be

Soc. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because

Soc. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved

because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that

which dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy

because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one

another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because

it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness,

to offer an attribute only, and not the essencethe attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse

to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure,

but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter

Euth. I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on

Soc. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or

propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are

placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some

other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.

Euth. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly,

but you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

Soc. Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, I move

those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of

Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I

perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of

piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, thenIs not that which is pious necessarily

Soc. And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part

Soc. And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered

friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty

in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus)

Soc. I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear

poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.

Soc. But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the

Soc. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, where

there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more

extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more

Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious,

or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the

Soc. Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the

enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of

number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having

Soc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell

Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the

Euth. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is

Soc. That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about which I should like to have further

information, What is the meaning of "attention"? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when

applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not

every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?

Soc. I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

Soc. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?

Soc. In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?that would be your meaning,

Soc. And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in

the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and

Soc. As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the art of the ox herd, and all other

Soc. And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or

improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?

Soc. And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the

Euth. You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I mean.

Soc. Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?

Soc. Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some objectwould

Soc. Again, there is an art which ministers to the shipbuilder with a view to the attainment of some result?

Soc. As there is an art which ministers to the housebuilder with a view to the building of a house?

Soc. And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to

accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed

Soc. Tell me then, oh tell mewhat is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?

Soc. Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say

Soc. Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the

Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?

Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me

simply say that piety or holiness is learning, how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and

sacrifices. Such piety, is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the

Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro,

if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct medearly not: else why, when we

reached the point, did you turn, aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you by this

time thenature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he

leadsI must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are

Soc. Yes, my friend; the. reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore

nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service

Soc. And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no, in an

Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?

Soc. But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what

benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good

thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally

clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very

Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?

Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?

Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?

Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you

accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far

greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you

will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same

Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to

Soc. Then either we were wrong in former assertion; or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.

Soc. Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of

pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell

me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell.

If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on

behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing

wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure,

therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide

Soc. Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the

nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would

have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations,

in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.