The Great Boer War ...........................................................................................................................................1

Arthur Conan Doyle .................................................................................................................................1

Preface To The Final Edition ..................................................................................................................2

CHAPTER I. THE BOER NATIONS ....................................................................................................2

CHAPTER II. THE CAUSE OF QUARREL .......................................................................................11

CHAPTER III. THE NEGOTIATIONS ...............................................................................................18

CHAPTER IV. THE EVE OF WAR ....................................................................................................23

CHAPTER V. TALANA HILL ............................................................................................................31

CHAPTER VI. ELANDSLAAGTE AND RIETFONTEIN .................................................................37

CHAPTER VII. THE BATTLE OF LADYSMITH .............................................................................41

CHAPTER VIII. LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE ...........................................................................47

CHAPTER IX. BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN .............................................................................56

CHAPTER X. THE BATTLE OF STORMBERG ...............................................................................61

CHAPTER XI. BATTLE OF COLENSO ............................................................................................65

CHAPTER XII. THE DARK HOUR ...................................................................................................73

CHAPTER XIII. THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH ................................................................................77

CHAPTER XIV. THE COLESBERG OPERATIONS ........................................................................87

CHAPTER XV. SPION KOP ...............................................................................................................92

CHAPTER XVI. VAALKRANZ .........................................................................................................99

CHAPTER XVII. BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE............................................................................103

CHAPTER XVIII. THE SIEGE AND RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY ...................................................111

CHAPTER XIX. PAARDEBERG .....................................................................................................118

CHAPTER XX. ROBERTS'S ADVANCE ON BLOEMFONTEIN .................................................127

CHAPTER XXI. STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF LORD ROBERTS'S MARCH .................................131

CHAPTER XXII. THE HALT AT BLOEMFONTEIN .....................................................................137

CHAPTER XXIII. THE CLEARING OF THE SOUTHEAST .......................................................144

CHAPTER XXIV. THE SIEGE OF MAFEKING .............................................................................150

CHAPTER XXV. THE MARCH ON PRETORIA ............................................................................157

CHAPTER XXVI. DIAMOND HILL RUNDLE'S OPERATIONS ............................................165

CHAPTER XXVII. THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION ..............................................................170

CHAPTER XXVIII. THE HALT AT PRETORIA ............................................................................177

CHAPTER XXIX. THE ADVANCE TO KOMATIPOORT .............................................................183

CHAPTER XXX. THE CAMPAIGN OF DE WET ..........................................................................191

CHAPTER XXXII. THE SECOND INVASION OF CAPE COLONY ............................................208

CHAPTER XXXIV. THE WINTER CAMPAIGN ............................................................................225

CHAPTER XXXV. THE GUERILLA OPERATIONS IN CAPE COLONY ...................................235

CHAPTER XXXVI. THE SPRING CAMPAIGN .............................................................................242

CHAPTER XXXVII. THE CAMPAIGN OF JANUARYAPRIL, 1902 .........................................255

CHAPTER XXXVIII. DE LA REY'S CAMPAIGN OF 1902 ...........................................................263

CHAPTER XXXIX. THE END .........................................................................................................269

During the course of the war some sixteen Editions of this work have appeared, each of which was, I hope, a

little more full and accurate than that which preceded it. I may fairly claim, however, that the absolute

mistakes made have been few in number, and that I have never had occasion to reverse, and seldom to

modify, the judgments which I have formed. In this final edition the early text has been carefully revised and

all fresh available knowledge has been added within the limits of a single volume narrative. Of the various

episodes in the latter half of the war it is impossible to say that the material is available for a complete and

final chronicle. By the aid, however, of the official dispatches, of the newspapers, and of many private letters,

I have done my best to give an intelligible and accurate account of the matter. The treatment may

occasionally seem too brief but some proportion must be observed between the battles of 18991900 and the

My private informants are so numerous that it would be hardly possible, even if it were desirable, that I

should quote their name~. Of the correspondents upon whose work I have drawn for my materials, I would

acknowledge my obligations to Messrs. Burleigh, Nevinson, Battersby, Stuart, Amery, Atkins, Baillie,

Kinneir, Churchill, James, Ralph, Barnes, Maxwell, Pearce, Hamilton, and others. Especially I would

mention the gentleman who represented the `Standard' in the last year of the war, whose accounts of

Vlakfontein, Von Donop's Convoy, and Tweebosch were the only reliable ones which reached the public.

Take a community of Dutchmen of the type of those who defended themselves for fifty years against all the

power of Spain at a time when Spain was the greatest power in the world. Intermix with them a strain of

those inflexible French Huguenots who gave up home and fortune and left their country for ever at the time

of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The product must obviously be one of the most rugged, virile,

unconquerable races ever seen upon earth. Take this formidable people and train them for seven generations

in constant warfare against savage men and ferocious beasts, in circumstances under which no weakling

could survive, place them so that they acquire exceptional skill with weapons and in horsemanship, give them

a country which is eminently suited to the tactics of the huntsman, the marksman, and the rider. Then, finally,

put a finer temper upon their military qualities by a dour fatalistic Old Testament religion and an ardent and

consuming patriotism. Combine all these qualities and all these impulses in one individual, and you have the

modern Boer the most formidable antagonist who ever crossed the path of Imperial Britain. Our military

history has largely consisted in our conflicts with France, but Napoleon and all his veterans have never

treated us so roughly as these hardbitten farmers with their ancient theology and their inconveniently

Look at the map of South Africa, and there, in the very centre of the British possessions, like the stone in a

peach, lies the great stretch of the two republics, a mighty domain for so small a people. How came they

there? Who are these Teutonic folk who have burrowed so deeply into Africa? It is a twicetold tale, and yet

it must be told once again if this story is to have even the most superficial of introductions. No one can know

or appreciate the Boer who does not know his past, for he is what his past has made him.

It was about the time when Oliver Cromwell was at his zenith in 1652, to be pedantically accurate that

the Dutch made their first lodgment at the Cape of Good Hope. The Portuguese had been there before them,

but, repelled by the evil weather, and lured forwards by rumours of gold, they had passed the true seat of

empire and had voyaged further to settle along the eastern coast. Some gold there was, but not much, and the

Portuguese settlements have never been sources of wealth to the mother country, and never will be until the

day when Great Britain signs her huge cheque for Delagoa Bay. The coast upon which they settled reeked

with malaria. A hundred miles of poisonous marsh separated it from the healthy inland plateau. For centuries

these pioneers of South African colonisation strove to obtain some further footing, but save along the courses

of the rivers they made little progress. Fierce natives and an enervating climate barred their way.

But it was different with the Dutch. That very rudeness of climate which had so impressed the Portuguese

adventurer was the source of their success. Cold and poverty and storm are the nurses of the qualities which

make for empire. It is the men from the bleak and barren lands who master the children of the light and the

heat. And so the Dutchmen at the Cape prospered and grew stronger in that robust climate. They did not

penetrate far inland, for they were few in number and all they wanted was to be found close at hand. But they

built themselves houses, and they supplied the Dutch East India Company with food and water, gradually

budding off little townlets, Wynberg, Stellenbosch, and pushing their settlements up the long slopes which

lead to that great central plateau which extends for fifteen hundred miles from the edge of the Karoo to the

Valley of the Zambesi. Then came the additional Huguenot emigrants the best blood of France three

hundred of them, a handful of the choicest seed thrown in to give a touch of grace and soul to the solid

Teutonic strain. Again and again in the course of history, with the Normans, the Huguenots, the Emigr s, one

can see the great hand dipping into that storehouse and sprinkling the nations with the same splendid seed.

France has not founded other countries, like her great rival, but she has made every other country the richer

by the mixture with her choicest and best. The Rouxs, Du Toits, Jouberts, Du Plessis, Villiers, and a score of

For a hundred more years the history of the colony was a record of the gradual spreading ,of the Afrikaners

over the huge expanse of veld which lay to the north of them. Cattle raising became an industry, but in a

country where six acres can hardly support a sheep, large farms are necessary for even small herds. Six

thousand acres was the usual size, and five pounds a year the rent payable to Government. The diseases

which follow the white man had in Africa, as in America and Australia, been fatal to the natives, and an

epidemic of smallpox cleared the country for the newcomers. Further and further north they pushed, founding

little towns here and there, such as GraafReinet and Swellendam, where a Dutch Reformed Church and a

store for the sale of the bare necessaries of life formed a nucleus for a few scattered dwellings. Already the

settlers were showing that independence of control and that detachment from Europe which has been their

most prominent characteristic. Even the sway of the Dutch Company (an older but weaker brother of John

Company in India) had caused them to revolt. The local rising, however, was hardly noticed in the universal

cataclysm which followed the French Revolution. After twenty years, during which the world was shaken by

the Titanic struggle between England and France in the final counting up of the game and paying of the

In all our vast collection of States there is probably not one the titledeeds to which are more incontestable

than to this one. We had it by two rights, the right of conquest and the right of purchase. In 1806 our troops

landed, defeated the local forces, and took p05session of Cape Town. In 1814 we paid the large sum of six

million pounds to the Stadholder for the transference of this and some South American land. It was a bargain

which was probably made rapidly and carelessly in that general redistribution which was going on. As a

house of call upon the way to India the place was seen to be of value, but the country itself was looked upon

as unprofitable and desert. What would Castlereagh or Liverpool have thought could they have seen the items

which we were buying for our six million pounds? The inventory would have been a mixed one of good and

of evil; nine fierce Kaffir wars, the greatest diamond mines in the world, the wealthiest gold mines, two

costly and humiliating campaigns with men whom we respected even when we fought with them, and now at

last, we hope, a South Africa of peace and prosperity, with equal rights and equal duties for all men. The

future should hold something very good for us in that land, for if we merely count the past we should be

compelled to say that we should have been stronger, richer, and higher in the world's esteem had our

possessions there never passed beyond the range of the guns of our menofwar. But surely the most arduous

is the most honourable, and, looking back from the end of their journey, our descendants may see that our

long record of struggle, with its mixture of disaster and success, its outpouring of blood and of treasure, has

The titledeeds to the estate are, as I have said, good ones, but there is one singular and ominous flaw in their

provisions. The ocean has marked three boundaries to it, but the fourth is undefined. There is no word of the

`Hinterland;' for neither the term nor the idea had then been thought of. Had Great Britain bought those vast

regions which extended beyond the settlements? Or were the discontented Dutch at liberty to pass onwards

and found fresh nations to bar the path of the AngloCeltic colonists? In that question lay the germ of all the

trouble to come. An American would realise the point at issue if he could conceive that after the founding of

the United States the Dutch inhabitants of the State of New York had trekked to the westward and established

fresh communities under a new flag. Then, when the American population overtook these western States,

they would be face to face with the problem which this country has had to solve. If they found these new

States fiercely antiAmerican and extremely unprogressive, they would experience that aggravation of their

At the time of their transference to the British flag the colonists Dutch, French, and German numbered

some thirty thousand. They were slaveholders, and the slaves were about as numerous as themselves. The

prospect of complete amalgamation between the British and the original settlers would have seemed to be a

good one, since they were of much the same stock, and their creeds could only be distinguished by their

varying degrees of bigotry and intolerance. Five thousand British emigrants were landed in 1820, settling on

the Eastern borders of the colony, and from that time onwards there was a slow but steady influx of English

speaking colonists. The Government had the historical faults and the historical virtues of British rule. It was

mild, clean, honest, tactless, and inconsistent. On the whole, it might have done very well had it been content

to leave things as it found them. But to change the habits of the most conservative of Teutonic races was a

dangerous venture, and one which has led to a long series of complications, making up the troubled history of

South Africa. The Imperial Government has always taken an honourable and philanthropic view of the rights

of the native and the claim which he has to the protection of the law. We hold and rightly, that British justice,

if not blind, should at least be colourblind. The view is irreproachable in theory and incontestable in

argument, but it is apt to be irritating when urged by a Boston moralist or a London philanthropist upon men

whose whole society has been built upon the assumption that the black is the inferior race. Such a people like

to find the higher morality for themselves, not to have it imposed upon them by those who live under entirely

different conditions. They feel and with some reason that it is a cheap form of virtue which, from the

serenity of a wellordered household in Beacon Street or Belgrave Square, prescribes what the relation shall

be between a white employer and his halfsavage, halfchildish retainers. Both branches of the AngloCeltic

The British Government in South Africa has always played the unpopular part of the friend and protector of

the native servants. It was upon this very point that the first friction appeared between the old settlers and the

new administration. A rising with bloodshed followed the arrest of a Dutch farmer who had maltreated his

slave. It was suppressed, and five of the participants were hanged. This punishment was unduly severe and

exceedingly injudicious. A brave race can forget the victims of the field of battle, but never those of the

scaffold. The making of political martyrs is the last insanity of statesmanship. It is true that both the man who

arrested and the judge who condemned the prisoners were Dutch, and that the British Governor interfered on

the side of mercy; but all this was forgotten afterwards in the desire to make racial capital out of the incident.

It is typical of the enduring resentment which was left behind that when, after the Jameson raid, it seemed

that the leaders of that illfated venture might be hanged, the beam was actually brought from a farmhouse at

Cookhouse Drift to Pretoria, that the Englishmen might die as the Dutchmen had died in 1816. Slagter's Nek

marked the dividing of the ways between the British Government and the Afrikaners.

And the separation soon became more marked. There were injudicious tamperings with the local government

and the local ways, with a substitution of English for Dutch in the law courts. With vicarious generosity, the

English Government gave very lenient terms to the Kaffir tribes who in 1834 had raided the border farmers.

And then, finally, in this same year there came the emancipation of the slaves throughout the British Empire,

It must be confessed that on this occasion the British philanthropist was willing to pay for what he thought

was right. It was a noble national action, and one the morality of which was in advance of its time, that the

British Parliament should vote the enormous sum of twenty million pounds to pay compensation to the

slaveholders, and so to remove an evil with which the mother country bad no immediate connection. It was as

well that the thing should have been done when it was, for had we waited till the colonies affected had

governments of their own it could never have been done by constitutional methods. With many a grumble the

good British householder drew his purse from his fob, and he paid for what he thought to be right. If any

special grace attends the virtuous action which brings nothing but tribulation in this world, then we may hope

for it over this emancipation. We spent our money, we ruined our West Indian colonies, and we started a

disaffection in South Africa, the end of which we have not seen. Yet if it were to be done again we should

doubtless do it. The highest morality may prove also to be the highest wisdom when the halftold story

But the details of the measure were less honourable than the principle. It was carried out suddenly, so that the

country had no time to adjust itself to the new conditions. Three million pounds were earmarked for South

Africa, which gives a price per slave of from sixty to seventy pounds, a sum considerably below the current

local rates. Finally, the compensation was made payable in London, so that the farmers sold their claims at

reduced prices to middlemen. Indignation meetings were held in every little townlet and cattle camp on the

Karoo. The old Dutch spirit was up the spirit of the men who cut the dykes. Rebellion was useless. But a

vast untenanted land stretched to the north of them. The nomad life was congenial to them, and in their huge

oxdrawn wagons like those bullockcarts in which some of their old kinsmen came to Gaul they had

vehicles and homes and forts all in one. One by one they were loaded up, the huge teams were inspanned, the

women were seated inside, the men, with their longbarrelled guns, walked alongside, and the great exodus

was begun. Their herds and flocks accompanied the migration, and the children helped to round them in and

drive them. One tattered little boy of ten cracked his sjambok whip behind the bullocks. He was a small item

in that singular crowd, but he was of interest to us, for his name was Paul Stephanus Kruger.

It was a strange exodus, only comparable in modern times to the sallying forth of the Mormons from Nauvoo

upon their search for the promised laud of Utah. The country was known and sparsely settled as far north as

the Orange River, but beyond there was a great region which had never been penetrated save by some daring

hunter or adventurous pioneer. It chanced if there be indeed such an element as chance in the graver

affairs of man that a Zulu conqueror had swept over this land and left it untenanted, save by the dwarf

bushmen, the hideous aborigines, lowest of the human race. There were fine grazing and good soil for the

emigrants. They traveled in small detached parties, but their total numbers were considerable, from six to ten

thousand according to their historian, or nearly a quarter of the whole population of the colony. Some of the

early bands perished miserably. A large number made a trystingplace at a high peak to the east of

Bloemfontein in what was lately the Orange Free State. One party of the emigrants was cut off by the

formidable Matabeli, a branch of the great Zulu nation. The survivors declared war upon them, and showed in

this, their first campaign, the extraordinary ingenuity in adapting their tactics to their adversary which has

been their greatest military characteristic. The commando which rode out to do battle with the Matabeli

numbered, it is said, a hundred and thirtyfive farmers. Their adversaries were twelve thousand spearmen.

They met at the Marico River, near Mafeking. The Boers combined the use of their horses and of their rifles

so cleverly that they slaughtered a third of their antagonists without any loss to themselves. Their tactics were

to gallop up within range of the enemy, to fire a volley, and then to ride away again before the spearmen

could reach them. When the savages pursued the Boers fled. When the pursuit halted the Boers halted and the

rifle fire began anew. The strategy was simple but most effective. When one remembers how often since then

our own horsemen have been pitted against savages in all parts of the world, one deplores that ignorance of

This victory of the `voortrekkers' cleared all the country between the Orange River and the Limpopo, the sites

of what has been known as the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In the meantime another body of the

emigrants had descended into what is now known as Natal, and had defeated Dingaan, the great Chief of the

Zulus. Being unable, owing to the presence of their families, to employ the cavalry tactics which had been so

effective against the Matabeli, they again used their ingenuity to meet this new situation, and received the

Zulu warriors in a square of laagered wagons, the men firing while the women loaded. Six burghers were

killed and three thousand Zulus. Had such a formation been used forty years afterwards against these very

And now at the end of their great journey, after overcoming the difficulties of distance, of nature, and of

savage enemies, the Boers saw at the end of their travels the very thing which they desired least that

which they had come so far to avoid the flag of Great Britain. The Boers had occupied Natal from within,

but England had previously done the same by sea, and a small colony of Englishmen had settled at Port

Natal, now known as Durban. The home Government, however, had acted in a vacillating way, and it was

only the conquest of Natal by the Boers which caused them to claim it as a British colony. At the same time

they asserted the unwelcome doctrine that a British subject could not at will throw off his allegiance, and that,

go where they might, the wandering farmers were still only the pioneers of British colonies. To emphasise the

fact three companies of soldiers were Bent in 1842 to what is now Durban the usual Corporal's guard with

which Great Britain starts a new empire. This handful of men was waylaid by the Boers and cut up, as their

successors have been so often since. The survivors, however, fortified themselves, and held a defensive

position as also their successors have done so many times since until reinforcements arrived and the

farmers dispersed. It is singular how in history the same factors will always give the same result. Here in this

first skirmish is an epitome of all our military relations with these people. The blundering headstrong attack,

the defeat, the powerlessness of the farmer against the weakest fortifications it is the same tale over and

over again in different scales of importance. Natal from this time onward became a British colony, and the

majority of the Boers trekked north and east with bitter hearts to tell their wrongs to their brethren of the

Had they any wrongs to tell? It is difficult to reach that height of philosophic detachment which enables the

historian to deal absolutely impartially where his own country is a party to the quarrel. But at least we may

allow that there is a case for our adversary. Our annexation of Natal had been by no means definite, and it

was they and not we who first broke that bloodthirsty Zulu power which threw its shadow across the country.

It was hard after such trials and such exploits to turn their back upon the fertile land which they had

conquered, and to return to the bare pastures of the upland veldt. They carried out of Natal a heavy sense of

injury, which has helped to poison our relations with them ever since. It was, in a way, a momentous episode,

this little skirmish of soldiers and emigrants, for it was the heading off of the Boer from the sea and the

confinement of his ambition to the land. Had it gone the other way, a new and possibly formidable flag would

The emigrants who had settled in the huge tract of country between the Orange River in the south and the

Limpopo in the north had been recruited by newcomers from the Cape Colony until they numbered some

fifteen thousand souls. This population was scattered over a space as large as Germany, and larger than

Pennsylvania, New York, and New England. Their form of government was individualistic and democratic to

the last degree compatible with any sort of cohesion. Their wars with the Kaffirs and their fear and dislike of

the British Government appear to have been the only ties which held them together. They divided and

subdivided within their own borders, like a germinating egg. The Transvaal was full of lusty little

highmettled communities, who quarreled among themselves as fiercely as they had done with the authorities

at the Cape. Lydenburg, Zoutpansberg, and Potchefstroom were on the point of turning their rifles against

each other. In the south, between the Orange River and the Vaal, there was no form of government at all, but

a welter of Dutch farmers, Basutos, Hottentots, and halfbreeds living in a chronic state of turbulence,

recognising neither the British authority to the south of them nor the Transvaal republics to the north. The

chaos became at last unendurable, and in 1848 a garrison was placed in Bloemfontein and the district

incorporated in the British Empire. The emigrants made ~ futile resistance at Boomplats, and after a single

At this period the Transvaal, where most of the Boers had settled, desired a formal acknowledgment of their

independence, which the British authorities determined once and for all to give them. The great barren

country, which produced little save marksmen, had no attractions for a Colonial Office which was bent upon

the limitation of its liabilities. A Convention was concluded between the two parties, known as the Sand

River Convention, which is one of the fixed points in South African history. By it the British Government

guaranteed to the Boer farmers the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves by their own

laws without any interference upon the part of the British. It stipulated that there should be no slavery, and

with that single reservation washed its hands finally, as it imagined, of the whole question. So the South

In the very year after the Sand River Convention a second republic, the Orange Free State, was created by the

deliberate withdrawal of Great Britain from the territory which she had for eight years occupied. The Eastern

Question was already becoming acute, and the cloud of a great war was drifting up, visible to all men. British

statesmen felt that their commitments were very heavy in every part of the world, and the South African

annexations had always been a doubtful value and an undoubted trouble. Against the will of a large part of

the inhabitants, whether a majority or not it is impossible to say, we withdrew our troops as amicably as the

Romans withdrew from Britain, and the new republic was left with absolute and unfettered independence. On

a petition being presented against the withdrawal, the Home Government actually voted fortyeight thousand

pounds to compensate those who had suffered from the change. Whatever historical grievance the Transvaal

may have against Great Britain, we can at least, save perhaps in one matter, claim to have a very clear

conscience concerning our dealings with the Orange Free State. Thus in 1852 and in 1854 were born those

sturdy States who were able for a time to hold at bay the united forces of the empire.

In the meantime Cape Colony, in spite of these secessions, had prospered exceedingly, and her population

English, German, and Dutch had grown by 1870 to over two hundred thousand souls, the Dutch still

slightly predominating. According to the Liberal colonial policy of Great Britain, the time had come to cut

the cord and let the young nation conduct its own affairs. In 1872 complete selfgovernment was given to it,

the Governor, as the representative of the Queen, retaining a nominal unexercised veto upon legislation.

According to this system the Dutch majority of the colony could, and did, put their own representatives into

power and run the government upon Dutch lines. Already Dutch law had been restored, and Dutch put on the

same footing as English as the official language of the country. The extreme liberality of such measures, and

the uncompromising way in which they have been carried out, however distasteful the legislation might seem

to English ideas, are among the chief reasons which made the illiberal treatment of British settlers in the

Transvaal so keenly resented at the Cape. A Dutch Government was ruling the British in a British colony, at a

moment when the Boers would not give an Englishman a vote upon a municipal council in a city which he

had built himself. Unfortunately, however, 'the evil that men do lives after them,' and the ignorant Boer

farmer continued to imagine that his southern relatives were in bondage, just as the descendant of the Irish

For twentyfive years after the Sand River Convention the burghers of the South African Republic had

pursued a strenuous and violent existence, fighting incessantly with the natives and sometimes with each

other, with an occasional fling at the little Dutch republic to the south. The semitropical sun was waking

strange ferments in the placid Friesland blood, and producing a race who added the turbulence and

restlessness of the south to the formidable tenacity of the north. Strong vitality and violent ambitions

produced feuds and rivalries worthy of medieval Italy, and the story of the factious little communities is like a

chapter out of Guicciardini. Disorganisation ensued. The burghers would not pay taxes and the treasury was

empty. One fierce Kaffir tribe threatened them from the north, and the Zulus on the east. It is an exaggeration

of English partisans to pretend that our intervention saved the Boers, for no one can read their military history

without seeing that they were a match for Zulus and Sekukuni combined. But certainly a formidable invasion

was pending, and the scattered farmhouses were as open to the Kaffirs as our farmers' homesteads were in the

American colonies when the Indians were on the warpath. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the British

Commissioner, after an inquiry of three months, solved all questions by the formal annexation of the country.

The fact that he took possession of it with a force of some twentyfive men showed the honesty of his belief

that no armed resistance was to be feared. This, then, in 1877 was a complete reversal of the Sand River

There did not appear to be any strong feeling at the time against the annexation. The people were depressed

with their troubles and weary of contention. Burgers, the President, put in a formal protest, and took up his

abode in Cape Colony, where he had a pension from the British Government. A memorial against the

measure received the signatures of a majority of the Boer inhabitants, but there was a fair minority who took

the other view. Kruger himself accepted a paid office under Government. There was every sign that the

people, if judiciously handled, would settle down under the British flag. It is even asserted that they would

themselves have petitioned for annexation had it been longer withheld. With immediate constitutional

government it is possible that even the most recalcitrant of them might have been induced to lodge their

But the empire has always had poor luck in South Africa, and never worse than on that occasion. Through no

bad faith, but simply through preoccupation and delay, the promises made were not instantly fulfilled. Simple

primitive men do not understand the ways of our circumlocution offices, and they ascribe to duplicity what is

really red tape and stupidity. If the Transvaalers had waited they would have had their Volksraad and all that

they wanted. But the British Government had some other local matters to set right, the rooting out of

Sekukuni and the breaking of the Zulus, before they would fulfill their pledges. The delay was keenly

resented. And we were unfortunate in our choice of Governor. The burghers are a homely folk, and they like

an occasional cup of coffee with the anxious man who tries to rule them. The three hundred pounds a year of

coffee money allowed by the Transvaal to its President is by no means a mere form. A wise administrator

would fall into the sociable and democratic habits of the people. Sir Theophilus Shepstone did so. Sir Owen

Lanyon did not. There was no Volksraad and no coffee, and the popular discontent grew rapidly. In three

years the British had broken up the two savage hordes which had been threatening the land. The finances, too,

had been restored. The reasons which had made so many favour the annexation were weakened by the very

It cannot be too often pointed out that in this annexation, the startingpoint of our troubles, Great Britain,

however mistaken she may have been, had no obvious selfish interest in view. There were no Rand mines in

those days, nor was there anything in the country to tempt the most covetous. An empty treasury and two

native wars were the reversion which we took over. It was honestly considered that the country was in too

distracted a state to govern itself, and had, by its weakness, become a scandal and a danger to its neighbours.

There was nothing sordid in our action, though it may have been both injudicious and highhanded.

In December 1880 the Boers rose. Every farmhouse sent out its riflemen, and the trystingplace was the

outside of the nearest British fort. All through the country small detachments were surrounded and besieged

by the farmers. Standerton, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Lydenburg, Wakkerstroom, Rustenberg, and Marabastad

were all invested and all held out until the end of the war. In the open country we were less fortunate. At

Bronkhorst Spruit a small British force was taken by surprise and shot down without harm to their

antagonists. The surgeon who treated them has left it on record that the average number of wounds was five

per man. At Laing's Nek an inferior force of British endeavoured to rush a hill which was held by Boer

riflemen. Half of our men were killed and wounded. Ingogo may be called a drawn battle, though our loss

was more heavy than that of the enemy. Finally came the defeat of Majuba Hill, where four hundred infantry

upon a mountain were defeated and driven off by a swarm of sharpshooters who advanced under the cover of

boulders. Of all these actions there was not one which was more than a skirmish, and had they been followed

by a final British victory they would now be hardly remembered. It is the fact that they were skirmishes

which succeeded in their object which has given them an importance which is exaggerated. At the same time

they may mark the beginning of a new military era, for they drove home the fact only too badly learned by

us that it is the rifle and not the drill which makes the soldier. It is bewildering that after such an

experience the British military authorities continued to serve out only three hundred cartridges a year for rifle

practice, and that they still encouraged that mechanical volley firing which destroys all individual aim. With

the experience of the first Boer war behind them, little was done, either in tactics or in musketry, to prepare

the soldier for the second. The value of the mounted rifleman, the shooting with accuracy at unknown ranges,

The defeat at Majuba Hill was followed by the complete surrender of the Gladstonian Government, an act

which was either the most pusillanimous or the most magnanimous in recent history. It is hard for the big

man to draw away from the small before blows are struck but when the big man has been knocked down

three times it is harder still. An overwhelming British force was in the field, and the General declared that he

held the enemy in the hollow of his hand. Our military calculations have been falsified before now by these

farmers, and it may be that the task of Wood and Roberts would have been harder than they imagined; but on

paper, at least, it looked as if the enemy could be crushed without difficulty. So the public thought, and yet

they consented to the upraised sword being stayed. With them, as apart from the politicians, the motive was

undoubtedly a moral and Christian one. They considered that the annexation of the Transvaal had evidently

been an injustice, that the farmers had a right to the freedom for which they fought, and that it was an

unworthy thing for a great nation to continue an unjust war for the sake of a military revenge. It was the

height of idealism, and the result has not been such as to encourage its repetition.

An armistice was concluded on March 5th, 1881, which led up to a peace on the 23rd of the same month. The

Government, after yielding to force what it had repeatedly refused to friendly representations, made a clumsy

compromise in their settlement. A policy of idealism and Christian morality should have been thorough if it

were to be tried at all. It was obvious that if the annexation were unjust, then the Transvaal should have

reverted to the condition in which it was before the annexation, as defined by the Sand River Convention. But

the Government for some reason would not go so far as this. They niggled and quibbled and bargained until

the State was left as a curious hybrid thing such as the world has never seen. It was a republic which was part

of the system of a monarchy, dealt with by the Colonial Office, and included under the heading of `Colonies'

in the news columns of the `Times.' It was autonomous, and yet subject to some vague suzerainty, the limits

of which no one has ever been able to define. Altogether, in its provisions and in its omissions, the

Convention of Pretoria appears to prove that our political affairs were as badly conducted as our military in

It was evident from the first that so illogical and contentious an agreement could not possibly prove to be a

final settlement, and indeed the ink of the signatures was hardly dry before an agitation was on foot for its

revision. The Boers considered, and with justice, that if they were to be left as undisputed victors in the war

then they should have the full fruits of victory. On the other hand, the Englishspeaking colonies had their

allegiance tested to the uttermost. The proud AngloCeltic stock is not accustomed to be humbled, and yet

they found themselves through the action of the home Government converted into members of a beaten race.

It was very well for the citizen of London to console his wounded pride by the thought that he had done a

magnanimous action, but it was different with the British colonist of Durban or Cape Town, who by no act of

his own, and without any voice in the settlement, found himself humiliated before his Dutch neighbour. An

ugly feeling of resentment was left behind, which might perhaps have passed away had the Transvaal

accepted the settlement in the spirit in which it was meant, but which grew more and more dangerous as

during eighteen years our people saw, or thought that they saw, that one concession led always to a fresh

demand, and that the Dutch republics aimed not merely at equality, but at dominance in South Africa.

Professor Bryce, a friendly critic, after a personal examination of the country and the question, has left it

upon record that the Boers saw neither generosity nor humanity in our conduct, but only fear. An outspoken

race, they conveyed their feelings to their neighbours. Can it be wondered at that South Africa has been in a

ferment ever since, and that the British Africander has yearned with an intensity of feeling unknown in

The Government of the Transvaal after the war was left in the hands of a triumvirate, but after one year

Kruger became President, an office which he continued to hold for eighteen years. His career as ruler

vindicates the wisdom of that wise but unwritten provision of the American Constitution by which there is a

limit to the tenure of this office. Continued rule for half a generation must turn a man into an autocrat. The

old President has said himself, in his homely but shrewd way, that when one gets a good ox to lead the team

it is a pity to change him. If a good ox, however, is left to choose his own direction without guidance, he may

During three years the little State showed signs of a tumultuous activity. Considering that it was as large as

France and that the population could not have been more than 50,000, one would have thought that they

might have found room without any inconvenient crowding. But the burghers passed beyond their borders in

every direction. The President cried aloud that he had been shut up in a kraal, and he proceeded to find ways

out of it. A great trek was projected for the north, but fortunately it miscarried. To the east they raided

Zululand, and succeeded, in defiance of the British settlement of that country, in tearing away one third of it

and adding it to the Transvaal. To the west, with no regard to the threeyearold treaty, they invaded

Bechuanaland, and set up the two new republics of Goshen and Stellaland. So outrageous were these

proceedings that Great Britain was forced to fit out in 1884 a new expedition under Sir Charles Warren for

the purpose of turning these freebooters out of the country. It may be asked, why should these men be called

freebooters if the founders of Rhodesia were pioneers? The answer is that the Transvaal was limited by treaty

to certain boundaries which these men transgressed, while no pledges were broken when the British power

expanded to the north. The upshot of these trespasses was the scene upon which every drama of South Africa

rings down. Once more the purse was drawn from the pocket of the unhappy taxpayer, and a million or so

was paid out to defray the expenses of the police force necessary to keep these treatybreakers in order. Let

this be borne in mind when we assess the moral and material damage done to the Transvaal by that

In 1884 a deputation from the Transvaal visited England, and at their solicitation the clumsy Treaty of

Pretoria was altered into the still more clumsy Convention of London. The changes in the provisions were all

in favour of the Boers, and a second successful war could hardly have given them more than Lord Derby

handed them in time of peace. Their style was altered from the Transvaal to the South African Republic, a

change which was ominously suggestive of expansion in the future. The control of Great Britain over their

foreign policy was also relaxed, though a power of veto was retained. But the most important thing of all, and

the fruitful cause of future trouble, lay in an omission. A suzerainty is a vague term, but in politics, as in

theology, the more nebulous a thing is the more does it excite the imagination and the passions of men. This

suzerainty was declared in the preamble of the first treaty, and no mention of it was made in the second. Was

it thereby abrogated or was it not? The British contention was that only the articles were changed, and that

the preamble continued to hold good for both treaties. They pointed out that not only the suzerainty, but also

the independence, of the Transvaal was proclaimed in that preamble, and that if one lapsed the other must do

so also. On the other hand, the Boers pointed to the fact that there was actually a preamble to the second

Convention, which would seem, therefore, to have taken the place of the first. The point is so technical that it

appears to be eminently one of those questions which might with propriety have been submitted to the

decision of a board of foreign jurists or possibly to the Supreme Court of the United States. If the decision

had been given against Great Britain, we might have accepted it in a chastened spirit as a fitting punishment

for the carelessness of the representative who failed to make our meaning intelligible. Carlyle has said that a

political mistake always ends in a broken head for somebody. Unfortunately the somebody is usually

somebody else. We have read the story of the political mistakes. Only too soon we shall come to the broken

This, then, is a synopsis of what had occurred up to the signing of the Convention, which finally established,

or failed to establish, the position of the South African Republic. We must now leave the larger questions,

and descend to the internal affairs of that small State, and especially to that train of events which has stirred

There might almost seem to be some subtle connection between the barrenness and worthlessness of a surface

and the value of the minerals which lie beneath it. The craggy mountains of Western America, the arid plains

of West Australia, the icebound gorges of the Klondyke, and the bare slopes of the Witwatersrand veldt

Gold had been known to exist in the Transvaal before, but it was only in 1886 that it was realised that the

deposits which lie some thirty miles south of the capital are of a very extraordinary and valuable nature. The

proportion of gold in the quartz is not particularly high, nor are the veins of a remarkable thickness, but the

peculiarity of the Rand mines lies in the fact that throughout this 'banket' formation the metal is so uniformly

distributed that the enterprise can claim a certainty which is not usually associated with the industry. It is

quarrying rather than mining. Add to this that the reefs which were originally worked as outcrops have now

been traced to enormous depths, and present the same features as those at the surface. A conservative

estimate of the value of the gold has placed it at seven hundred millions of pounds.

Such a discovery produced the inevitable effect. A great number of adventurers flocked into the country,

some desirable and some very much the reverse. There were circumstances, however, which kept away the

rowdy and desperado element who usually make for a newly opened goldfield. It was not a class of mining

which encouraged the individual adventurer. There were none of those nuggets which gleamed through the

mud of the dollies at Ballarat, or recompensed the fortyniners in California for all their travels and their

toils. It was a field for elaborate machinery, which could only be provided by capital. Managers, engineers,

miners, technical experts, and the tradesmen and middlemen who live upon them, these were the Uitlanders,

drawn from all the races under the sun, but with the AngloCeltic vastly predominant. The best engineers

were American, the best miners were Cornish, the best managers were English, the money to run the mines

was largely subscribed in England. As time went on, however, the German and French interests became more

extensive, until their joint holdings are now probably as heavy as those of the British. Soon the population of

the mining centres became greater than that of the whole Boer community, and consisted mainly of men in

The situation was an extraordinary one. I have already attempted to bring the problem home to an American

by suggesting that the Dutch of New York had trekked west and founded an antiAmerican and highly

unprogressive State. To carry out the analogy we will now suppose that that State was California, that the

gold of that State attracted a large inrush of American citizens, who came to outnumber the original

inhabitants, that these citizens were heavily taxed and badly used, and that they deafened Washington with

their outcry about their injuries. That would be a fair parallel to the relations between the Transvaal, the

That these Uitlanders had very real and pressing grievances no one could possibly deny. To recount them all

would be a formidable task, for their whole lives were darkened by injustice. There was not a wrong which

had driven the Boer from Gape Colony which he did not now practise himself upon others and a wrong

may be excusable in 1885 which is monstrous in 1895. The primitive virtue which had characterised the

farmers broke down in the face of temptation. The country Boers were little affected, some of them not at all,

but the Pretoria Government became a most corrupt oligarchy, venal and incompetent to the last degree.

Officials and imported Hollanders handled the stream of gold which came in from the mines, while the

unfortunate Uitlander who paid ninetenths of the taxation was fleeced at every turn, and met with laughter

and taunts when he endeavoured to win the franchise by which he might peaceably set right the wrongs from

which he suffered. He was not an unreasonable person. On the contrary, he was patient to the verge of

meekness, as capital is likely to be when it is surrounded by rifles. But his situation was intolerable, and after

successive attempts at peaceful agitation, and numerous humble petitions to the Volksraad, lie began at last to

realise that he would never obtain redress unless he could find some way of winning it for himself.

Without attempting to enumerate all the wrongs which embittered the Uitlanders, the more serious of them

1. That they were heavily taxed and provided about seveneighths of the revenue of the country. The revenue

of the South African Republicwhich had been 154,000l. in 1886, when the gold fields were openedhad

grown in 1899 to four million pounds, and the country through the industry of the newcomers had changed

from one of the poorest to the richest in the whole world (per head of population).

2. That in spite of this prosperity which they had brought, they, the majority of the inhabitants of the country,

were left without a vote, and could by no means influence the disposal of the great sums which they were

3. That they had no voice in the choice or payment of officials. Men of the worst private character might be

placed with complete authority over valuable interests. Upon one occasion the Minister of Mines attempted

himself to jump a mine, having officially learned some flaw in its title. The total official salaries had risen in

1899 to a sum sufficient to pay 40l. per head to the entire male Boer population.

4. That they had no control over education. Mr. John Robinson, the Director General of the Johannesburg

Educational Council, has reckoned the sum spent on Uitlander schools as 6501. out of 63,0001. allotted for

education, making one shilling and tenpence per head per annum on Uitlander children, and eight pounds six

shillings per head on Boer childrenthe Uitlander, as always, paying seveneighths of the original sum.

5. No power of municipal government. Watercarts instead of pipes, filthy buckets instead of drains, a corrupt

and violent police, a high death~rate in what should be a health resort all this in a city which they had

6. Despotic government in the matter of the press and of the right of public meeting.

8. Continual harassing of the mining interest by vexatious legislation. Under this head came many grievances,

some special to the mines and some affecting all Uitlanders. The dynamite monopoly, by which the miners

had to pay 600,0001. extra per annum in order to get a worse quality of dynamite; the liquor laws, by which

onethird of the Kaffirs were allowed to be habitually drunk; the incompetence and extortions of the

Stateowned railway; the granting of concessions for numerous articles of ordinary consumption to

individuals, by which high prices were maintained; the surrounding of Johannesburg by tolls from which the

town had no profit these were among the economical grievances, some large, some petty, which ramified

And outside and beyond all these definite wrongs imagine to a free born progressive man, an American or a

Briton, the constant irritation of being absolutely ruled by a body of twentyfive men, twentyone of whom

had in the case of the Selati Railway Company been publicly and circumstantially accused of bribery, with

full details of the bribes received, while to their corruption they added such crass ignorance that they argue in

the published reports of the Volksraad debates that using dynamite bombs to bring down rain was firing at

God, that it is impious to destroy locusts, that the word 'participate' should not be used because it is not in the

Bible, and that postal pillar boxes are extravagant and effeminate. Such OBITER DICTA may be amusing at

a distance, but they are less entertaining when they come from an autocrat who has complete power over the

>From the fact that they were a community extremely preoccupied by their own business, it followed that the

Uitlanders were not ardent politicians, and that they desired to have a share in the government of the State for

the purpose of making the conditions of their own industry and of their own daily lives more endurable. How

far there was need of such an interference may be judged by any fairminded man who reads the list of their

complaints. A superficial view may recognise the Boers as the champions of liberty, but a deeper insight must

see that they (as represented by their elected rulers) have in truth stood for all that history has shown to be

odious in the form of exclusiveness and oppression. Their conception of liberty has been a selfish one, and

they have consistently inflicted upon others far heavier wrongs than those against which they had themselves

As the mines increased in importance and the miners in numbers, it was found that these political disabilities

affected some of that cosmopolitan crowd far more than others, in proportion to the amount of freedom to

which their home institutions had made them accustomed. The continental Uitlanders were more patient of

that which was unendurable to the American and the Briton. The Americans, however, were in so great a

minority that it was upon the British that the brunt of the struggle for freedom fell. Apart from the fact that

the British were more numerous than all the other Uitlanders combined, there were special reasons why they

should feel their humiliating position more than the members of any other race. In the first place, many of the

British were British South Africans, who knew that in the neighbouring countries which gave them birth the

most liberal possible institutions had been given to the kinsmen of these very Boers who were refusing them

the management of their own drains and water supply. And again, every Briton knew that Great Britain

claimed to be the paramount power in South Africa, and so he felt as if his own land, to which he might have

looked for protection, was conniving at and acquiescing in his ill treatment. As citizens of the paramount

power, it was peculiarly galling that they should be held in political subjection. The British, therefore, were

But it is a poor cause which cannot bear to fairly state and honestly consider the case of its opponents. The

Boers had made, as has been briefly shown, great efforts to establish a country of their own. They had

travelled far, worked hard, and fought bravely. After all their efforts they were fated to see an influx of

strangers into their country, some of them men of questionable character, who outnumbered the original

inhabitants. If the franchise were granted to these, there could be no doubt that though at first the Boers might

control a majority of the votes, it was only a question of time before the newcomers would dominate the Raad

and elect their own President, who might adopt a policy abhorrent to the original owners of the land. Were

the Boers to lose by the ballotbox the victory which they had won by their rifles? Was it fair to expect it?

These newcomers came for gold. They got their gold. Their companies paid a hundred per cent. Was not that

enough to satisfy them? If they did not like the country why did they not leave it? No one compelled them to

stay there. But if they stayed, let them be thankful that they were tolerated at all, and not presume to interfere

with the laws of those by whose courtesy they were allowed to enter the country.

That is a fair statement of the Boer position, and at first sight an impartial man might say that there was a

good deal to say for it; but a closer examination would show that, though it might be tenable in theory, it is

In the present crowded state of the world a policy of Thibet may be carried out in some obscure corner, but it

cannot be done in a great tract. of country which lies right across the main line of industrial progress. The

position is too absolutely artificial. A handful of people by the right of conquest take possession of an

enormous country over which they are dotted at such intervals that it is their boast that one farmhouse cannot

see the smoke of another, and yet, though their numbers are so disproportionate to the area which they cover,

they refuse to admit any other people upon equal terms, but claim to be a privileged class who shall dominate

the newcomers completely. They are outnumbered in their own land by immigrants who are far more highly

educated and progressive, and yet they hold them down in a way which exists nowhere else upon earth. What

is their right? The right of conquest. Then the same right may be justly invoked to reverse so intolerable a

situation. This they would themselves acknowledge. 'Come on and fight ! Come on!' cried a member of the

Volksraad when the franchise petition of the Uitlanders was presented. 'Protest! Protest! What is the good of

protesting?' said Kruger to Mr. W. Y. Campbell; 'you have not got the guns, I have.' There was always the

final court of appeal. Judge Creusot and Judge Mauser were always behind the President.

Again, the argument of the Boers would be more valid had they received no benefit from these immigrants. If

they had ignored them they might fairly have stated that they did not desire their presence. But even while

they protested they grew rich at the Uitlander's expense. They could not have it both ways. It would be

consistent to discourage him and not profit by him, or to make him comfortable and build the State upon his

money; but to illtreat him and at the same time to grow strong by his taxation must surely be an injustice.

And again, the whole argument is based upon the narrow racial supposition that every naturalised citizen not

of Boer extraction must necessarily be unpatriotic. This is not borne out by the examples of history. The

newcomer soon becomes 'as proud of his country and as jealous of her liberty as the old. Had President

Kruger given the franchise generously to the Uitlander, his pyramid would have been firm upon its base and

not balanced upon its apex. It is true that the corrupt oligarchy would have vanished, and the spirit of a

broader more tolerant freedom influenced the counsels of the State. But the republic would have become

stronger and more permanent, with a population who, if they differed in details, were united in essentials.

Whether such a solution would have been to the advantage of British interests in South Africa is quite another

question. In more ways than one President Kruger has been a good friend to the empire.

So much upon the general question of the reason why the Uitlander should agitate and why the Boer was

obdurate. The details of the long struggle between the seekers for the franchise and the refusers of it may be

quickly sketched, but they cannot be entirely ignored by any one who desires to understand the inception of

At the time of the Convention of Pretoria (1881) the rights of burghership might be obtained by one year's

residence. In 1882 it was raised to five years, the reasonable limit which obtains both in Great Britain and in

the United States. Had it remained so, it is safe to say that there would never have been either an Uitlander

question or a great Boer war. Grievances would have been righted from the inside without external

In 1890 the inrush of outsiders alarmed the Boers, and the franchise was raised so as to be only attainable by

those who had lived fourteen years in the country. The Uitlanders, who were increasing rapidly in numbers

and were suffering from the formidable list of grievances already enumerated, perceived that their wrongs

were so numerous that it was hopeless to have them set right seriatim, and that only by obtaining the leverage

of the franchise could they hope to move the heavy burden which weighed them down. In 1893 a petition of

13,000 Uitlanders, couched in most respectful terms, was submitted to the Raad, but met with contemptuous

neglect. Undeterred, however, by this failure, the National Reform Union, an association which organised the

agitation, came back to the attack in 1894. They drew up a petition which was signed by 35,000 adult male

Uitlanders, a greater number than the total Boer male population of the country. A small liberal body in the

Raad supported this memorial and endeavoured in vain to obtain some justice for the newcomers. Mr. Jeppe

was the mouthpiece of this select band. 'They own half the soil, they pay at least three quarters of the taxes,'

said he. 'They are men who in capital, energy, and education are at least our equals.

What will become of us or our children on that day when we may find ourselves in a minority of one in

twenty without a single friend among the other nineteen, among those who will then tell us that they wished

to be brothers, but that we by our own act have made them strangers to the republic?' Such reasonable and

liberal sentiments were combated by members who asserted that the signatures could not belong to

lawabiding citizens, since they were actually agitating against the law of the franchise, and others whose

intolerance was expressed by the defiance of the member already quoted, who challenged the Uitlanders to

come out and fight. The champions of exclusiveness and racial hatred won the day. The memorial was

rejected by sixteen votes to eight, and the franchise law was, on the initiative of the President, actually made

more stringent than ever, being framed in such a way that during the fourteen years of probation the applicant

should give up his previous nationality, so that for that period he would really belong to no country at all. No

hopes were held out that any possible attitude upon the part of the Uitlanders would soften the determination

of the President and his burghers. One who remonstrated was led outside the State buildings by the President,

who pointed up at the national flag. 'You see that flag?' said he. 'If I grant the franchise, I may as well pull it

down.' His animosity against the immigrants was bitter. 'Burghers, friends, thieves, murderers, newcomers,

and others,' is the conciliatory opening of one of his public addresses. Though Johannesburg is only

thirtytwo miles from Pretoria, and though the State of which he was the head depended for its revenue upon

This settled animosity was deplorable, but not unnatural. A man imbued with the idea of a chosen people, and

unread in any book save the one which cultivates this very idea, could not be expected to have learned the

historical lessons of the advantages which a State reaps from a liberal policy. To him it was as if the

Ammonites and Moabites had demanded admission into the twelve tribes. He mistook an agitation against the

exclusive policy of the State for one against the existence of the State itself. A wide franchise would have

made his republic firmbased and permanent. It was a small minority of the Uitlanders who had any desire to

come into the British system. They were a cosmopolitan crowd, only united by the bond of a common

injustice. But when every other method had failed, and their petition for the rights of freemen had been flung

back at them, it was natural that their eyes should turn to that flag which waved to the north, the west, and the

south of them the flag which means purity of government with equal rights and equal duties for all men.

Constitutional agitation was laid aside, arms were smuggled in, and everything prepared for an organised

The events which followed at the beginning of 1896 have been so thrashed out that there is, perhaps, nothing

left to tell except the truth. So far as the Uitlanders themselves are concerned, their action was most

natural and justifiable, and they have no reason to exculpate themselves for rising against such oppression as

no men of our race have ever been submitted to. Had they trusted only to themselves and the justice of their

cause, their moral and even their material position would have been infinitely stronger. But unfortunately

there were forces behind them which were more questionable, the nature and extent of which have never yet,

in spite of two commissions of investigation, been properly revealed. That there should have been any

attempt at misleading inquiry, or suppressing documents in order to shelter individuals, is deplorable, for the

impression left I believe an entirely false one must be that the British Government connived at an

It had been arranged that the town was to rise upon a certain night, that Pretoria should be attacked, the fort

seized, and the rifles and ammunition used to arm the Uitlanders. It was a feasible device, though it must

seem to us, who have had such an experience of the military virtues of the burghers, a very desperate one. But

it is conceivable that the rebels might have held Johannesburg until the universal sympathy which their cause

excited throughout South Africa would have caused Great Britain to intervene. Unfortunately they had

complicated matters by asking for outside help. Mr. Cecil Rhodes was Premier of the Cape, a man of

immense energy, and one who had rendered great services to the empire. The motives of his action are

obscure certainly, we may say that they were not sordid, for he has always been a man whose thoughts

were large and whose habits were simple. But whatever they may have been whether an illregulated

desire to consolidate South Africa under British rule, or a burning sympathy with the Uitlanders in their fight

against injustice it is certain that he allowed his lieutenant, Dr. Jameson, to assemble the mounted police

of the Chartered Company, of which Rhodes was founder and director, for the purpose of cooperating with

the rebels at Johannesburg. Moreover, when the revolt at Johannesburg was postponed, on account of a

disagreement as to which flag they were to rise under, it appears that Jameson (with or without the orders of

Rhodes) forced the hand of the conspirators by invading the country with a force absurdly inadequate to the

work which he had taken in hand. Five hundred policemen and three field guns made up the forlorn hope who

started from near Mafeking and crossed the Transvaal border upon December 29th, 1895. On January 2nd

they were surrounded by the Boers amid the broken country near Dornkop, and after losing many of their

number killed and wounded, without food and with spent horses, they were compelled to lay down their

The Uitlanders have been severely criticised for not having sent out a force to help Jameson in his difficulties,

but it is impossible to see how they could have acted in any other manner. They had done all they could to

prevent Jameson coming to their relief, and now it was rather unreasonable to suppose that they should

relieve their reliever. Indeed, they had an entirely exaggerated idea of the strength of the force which he was

bringing, and received the news of his capture with incredulity. When it became confirmed they rose, but in a

halfhearted fashion which was not due to want of courage, but to the difficulties of their position. On the one

hand, the British Government disowned Jameson entirely, and did all it could to discourage the rising; on the

other, the President had the raiders in his keeping at Pretoria, and let it be understood that their fate depended

upon the behaviour of the Uitlanders. They were led to believe that Jameson would be shot unless they laid

down their arms, though, as a matter of fact, Jameson and his people had surrendered upon a promise of

quarter. So skillfully did Kruger use his hostages that he succeeded, with the help of the British

Commissioner, in getting the thousands of excited Johannesburgers to lay down their arms without

bloodshed. Completely outmanoeuvred by the astute old President, the leaders of the reform movement used

all their influence in the direction of peace, thinking that a general amnesty would follow; but the moment

that they and their people were helpless the detectives and armed burghers occupied the town, and sixty of

To the raiders themselves the President behaved with great generosity. Perhaps he could not find it in his

heart to be harsh to the men who had managed to put him in the right and won for him the sympathy of the

world. His own illiberal and oppressive treatment of the newcomers was forgotten in the face of this illegal

inroad of filibusters. The true issues were so obscured by this intrusion that it has taken years to clear them,

and perhaps they will never be wholly cleared. It was forgotten that it was the bad government of the country

which was the real cause of the unfortunate raid. From then onwards the government might grow worse and

worse, but it was always possible to point to the raid as justifying everything. Were the Uitlanders to have the

franchise? How could they expect it after the raid? Would Britain object to the enormous importation of arms

and obvious preparations for war? They were only precautions against a second raid. For years the raid stood

in the way, not only of all progress, but of all remonstrance. Through an action over which they had no

control, and which they had done their best to prevent, the British Government was left with a bad case and a

The raiders were sent home, where the rank and file were very properly released, and the chief officers were

condemned to terms of imprisonment which certainly did not err upon the side of severity. Cecil Rhodes was

left unpunished, he retained his place in the Privy Council, and his Chartered Company continued to have a

corporate existence. This was illogical and inconclusive. As Kruger said, 'It is not the dog which should be

beaten, but the man who set him on to me.' Public opinion in spite of, or on account of, a crowd of

witnesses was ill informed upon the exact bearings of the question, and it was obvious that as Dutch

sentiment at the Cape appeared already to be thoroughly hostile to us, it would be dangerous to alienate the

British Africanders also by making a martyr of their favourite leader. But whatever arguments may be

founded upon expediency, it is clear that the Boers bitterly resented, and with justice, the immunity of

In the meantime, both President Kruger and his burghers had shown a greater severity to the political

prisoners from Johannesburg than to the armed followers of Jameson. The nationality of these prisoners is

interesting and suggestive. There were twentythree Englishmen, sixteen South Africans, nine Scotchmen,

six Americans, two Welshmen, one Irishman, one Australian, one Hollander, one Bavarian, one Canadian,

one Swiss, and one Turk. The prisoners were arrested in January, but the trial did not take place until the end

of April. All were found guilty of high treason. Mr. Lionel Phillips, Colonel Rhodes (brother of Mr. Cecil

Rhodes), George Farrar, and Mr. Hammond, the American engineer, were condemned to death, a sentence

which was afterwards commuted to the payment of an enormous fine. The other prisoners were condemned to

two years' imprisonment, with a fine of 2,OOOL. each. The imprisonment was of the most arduous and trying

sort, and was embittered by the harshness of the gaoler, Du Plessis. One of the unfortunate men cut his throat,

and several fell seriously ill, the diet and the sanitary conditions being equally unhealthy. At last at the end of

May all the prisoners but six were released. Four of the six soon followed, two stalwarts, Sampson and

Davies, refusing to sign any petition and remaining in prison until they were set free in 1897. Altogether the

Transvaal Government received in fines from the reform prisoners the enormous sum of 212,000L. A certain

comic relief was immediately afterwards given to so grave an episode by the presentation of a bill to Great

Britain for 1,677,938L. 3s. 3d. the greater part of which was under the heading of moral and intellectual

The raid was past and the reform movement was past, but the causes which produced them both remained. It

is hardly conceivable that a statesman who loved his country would have refrained from making some effort

to remove a state of things which had already caused such grave dangers, and which must obviously become

more serious with every year that passed. But Paul Kruger had hardened his heart, and was not to be moved.

The grievances of the Uitlanders became heavier than ever. The one power in the land to which they had been

able to appeal for some sort of redress amid their grievances was the law courts. Now it was decreed that the

courts should be dependent on the Volksraad. The Chief Justice protested against such a degradation of his

high office, and he was dismissed in consequence without a pension. The judge who had condemned the

reformers was chosen to fill the vacancy, and the protection of a fixed law was withdrawn from the

A commission appointed by the State was sent to examine into the condition of the mining industry and the

grievances from which the newcomers suffered. The chairman was Mr. Schalk Burger, one of the most liberal

of the Boers, and the proceedings were thorough and impartial. The result was a report which amply

vindicated the reformers, and suggested remedies which would have gone a long way towards satisfying the

Uitlanders. With such enlightened legislation their motives for seeking the franchise would have been less

pressing. But the President and his Raad would have none of the recommendations of the commission. The

rugged old autocrat declared that Schalk Burger was a traitor to his country for having signed such a

document, and a new reactionary committee was chosen to report upon the report. Words and papers were the

only outcome of the affair. No amelioration came to the newcomers. But at least they had again put their case

publicly upon record, and it had been endorsed by the most respected of the burghers. Gradually in the press

of the Englishspeaking countries the raid was ceasing to obscure the issue. More and more clearly it was

coming out that no permanent settlement was possible where the majority of the population was oppressed by

the minority. They had tried peaceful means and failed. They had tried warlike means and failed. What was

there left for them to do? Their own country, the paramount power of South Africa, had never helped them.

Perhaps if it were directly appealed to it might do so. It could not, if only for the sake of its own imperial

prestige, leave its children for ever in a state of subjection. The Uitlanders determined upon a petition to the

Queen, and in doing so they brought their grievances out of the limits of a local controversy into the broader

field of international politics. Great Britain must either protect them or acknowledge that their protection was

beyond her power. A direct petition to the Queen praying for protection was signed in April 1899 by

twentyone thousand Uitlanders. From that time events moved inevitably towards the one end. Sometimes

the surface was troubled and sometimes smooth, but the stream always ran swiftly and the roar of the fall

The British Government and the British people do not desire any direct authority in South Africa. Their one

supreme interest is that the various States there should live in concord and prosperity, and that there should be

no need for the presence of a British redcoat within the whole great peninsula. Our foreign critics, with their

misapprehension of the British colonial system, can never realise that whether the fourcoloured flag of the

Transvaal or the Union Jack of a selfgoverning colony waved over the gold mines would not make the

difference of one shilling to the revenue of Great Britain. The Transvaal as a British province would have its

own legislature, its own revenue, its own expenditure, and its own tariff against the mother country, as well

as against the rest of the world, and England be none the richer for the change. This is so obvious to a Briton

that he has ceased to insist upon it, and it is for that reason perhaps that it is so universally misunderstood

abroad. On the other hand, while she is no gainer by the change, most of the expense of it in blood and in

money falls upon the home country. On the face of it, therefore, Great Britain had every reason to avoid so

formidable a task as the conquest of the South African Republic. At the best she had nothing to gain, and at

the worst she had an immense deal to lose. There was no room for ambition or aggression. It was a case of

There could be no question of a plot for the annexation of the Transvaal. In a free country the Government

cannot move in advance of public opinion, and public opinion is influenced by and reflected in the

newspapers. One may examine the files of the press during all the months of negotiations and never find one

reputable opinion in favour of such a course, nor did one in society ever meet an advocate of such a measure.

But a great wrong was being done, and all that was asked was the minimum change which would set it right,

and restore equality between the white races in Africa. 'Let Kruger only be liberal in the extension of the

franchise,' said the paper which is most representative of the sanest British opinion, 'and he will find that the

power of the republic will become not weaker, but infinitely more secure. Let him once give the majority of

the resident males of full age the full vote, and he will have given the republic a stability and power which

nothing else can. If he rejects all pleas of this kind, and persists in his present policy, he may possibly stave

off the evil day, and preserve his cherished oligarchy for another few years; but the end will be the same.' The

extract reflects the tone of all of the British press, with the exception of one or two papers which considered

that even the persistent ill usage of our people, and the fact that we were peculiarly responsible for them in

this State, did not justify us in interfering in the internal affairs of the republic. It cannot be denied that the

Jameson raid and the incomplete manner in which the circumstances connected with it had been investigated

had weakened the force of those who wished to interfere energetically on behalf of British subjects. There

was a vague but widespread feeling that perhaps the capitalists were engineering the situation for their own

ends. It is difficult to imagine how a state of unrest and insecurity, to say nothing of a state of war, can ever

be to the advantage of capital, and surely it is obvious that if some archschemer were using the grievances

of the Uitlanders for his own ends the best way to checkmate him would be to remove those grievances. The

suspicion, however, did exist among those who like to ignore the obvious and magnify the remote, and

throughout the negotiations the hand of Great Britain was weakened, as her adversary had doubtless

calculated that it would be, by an earnest but fussy and faddy minority. Idealism and a morbid, restless

conscientiousness are two of the most dangerous evils from which a modern progressive State has to suffer.

It was in April 1899 that the British Uitlanders sent their petition praying for protection to their native

country. Since the April previous a correspondence had been going on between Dr. Leyds, Secretary of State

for the South African Republic, and Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, upon the existence or

nonexistence of the suzerainty. On the one hand, it was contended that the substitution of a second

convention had entirely annulled the first; on the other, that the preamble of the first applied also to the

second. If the Transvaal contention were correct it is clear that Great Britain had been tricked and jockeyed

into such a position, since she had received no quid pro quo in the second convention, and even the most

careless of Colonial Secretaries could hardly have been expected to give away a very substantial something

for nothing. But the contention throws us back upon the academic question of what a suzerainty is. The

Transvaal admitted a power of veto over their foreign policy, and this admission in itself, unless they openly

tore up the convention, must deprive them of the position of a sovereign State. On the whole, the question

must be acknowledged to have been one which might very well have been referred to trustworthy arbitration.

But now to this debate, which had so little of urgency in it that seven months intervened between statement

and reply, there came the bitterly vital question of the wrongs and appeal of the Uitlanders. Sir Alfred Milner,

the British Commissioner in South Africa, a man of liberal views who had been appointed by a Conservative

Government, commanded the respect and confidence of all parties. His record was that of an able,

clearheaded man, too just to be either guilty of or tolerant of injustice. To him the matter was referred, and a

conference was arranged between President Kruger and him at Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free

State. They met on May 30th. Kruger had declared that all questions might be discussed except the

independence of the Transvaal. 'All, all, all!' he cried emphatically. But in practice it was found that the

parties could not agree as to what did or what did not threaten this independence. What was essential to one

was inadmissible to the other. Milner contended for a five years' retroactive franchise, with provisions to

secure adequate representation for the mining districts. Kruger offered a seven years' franchise, coupled with

numerous conditions which whittled down its value very much, promised five members out of thirtyone to

represent a majority of the male population, and added a provision that all differences should be subject to

arbitration by foreign powers, a condition which is incompatible with any claim to suzerainty. The proposals

of each were impossible to the other, and early in June Sir Alfred Milner was back in Cape Town and

President Kruger in Pretoria, with nothing settled except the extreme difficulty of a settlement. The current

was running swift, and the roar of the fall was already sounding louder in the ear.

On June 12th Sir Alfred Milner received a deputation at Cape Town and reviewed the situation. 'The

principle of equality of races was,' he said, essential for South Africa. The one State where inequality existed

kept all the others in a fever. Our policy was one not of aggression, but of singular patience, which could not,

however, lapse into indifference.' Two days later Kruger addressed the Raad. 'The other side had not

conceded one tittle, and I could not give more. God has always stood by us. I do not want war, but I will not

give more away. Although our independence has once been taken away, God had restored it.' He spoke with

sincerity no doubt, but it is hard to hear God invoked with such confidence for the system which encouraged

the liquor traffic to the natives, and bred the most corrupt set of officials that the modern world has seen.

A dispatch from Sir Alfred Milner, giving his views upon the situation, made the British public recognise, as

nothing else had done, how serious the position was, and how essential it was that an earnest national effort

'The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted answer is that things will right themselves if

left alone. But, in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for years, and it has led to their going

from bad to worse. It is not true that this is owing to the raid. They were going from bad to worse before the

raid. We were on the verge of war before the raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The

effect of the raid has been to give the policy of leaving things alone a new lease of life, and with the old

'The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing

under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to her Majesty's Government for redress, does steadily

undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain within the Queen's dominions. A section of the press,

not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a republic embracing all South

Africa, and supports it by menacing references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with the

Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of war, it would receive from a section of her

Majesty's subjects. I regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a ceaseless stream of malignant lies

about the intentions of her Majesty's Government, is producing a great effect on a large number of our Dutch

fellow colonists. Language is frequently used which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right,

even in this colony, to their fellowcitizens of British birth. Thousands of men peaceably disposed, and if left

alone perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are being drawn into disaffection, and there is

'I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propaganda but some striking proof of the

intention of her Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa.'

Such were the grave and measured words with which the British proconsul warned his countrymen of what

was to come. He saw the stormcloud piling in the north, but even his eyes had not yet discerned how near

Throughout the end of June and the early part of July much was hoped from the mediation of the heads of the

Afrikander Bond, the political union of the Dutch Cape colonists. On the one hand, they were the kinsmen of

the Boers; on the other, they were British subjects, and were enjoying the blessings of those liberal

institutions which we were anxious to see extended to the Transvaal. 'Only treat our folk as we treat yours!

Our whole contention was compressed into that prayer. But nothing came of the mission, though a scheme

endorsed by Mr. Hofmeyer and Mr. Herholdt, of the Bond, with Mr. Fischer of the Free State, was introduced

into the Raad and applauded by Mr. Schreiner, the Africander Premier of Cape Colony. In its original form

the provisions were obscure and complicated, the franchise varying from nine years to seven under different

conditions. In debate, however, the terms were amended until the time was reduced to seven years, and the

proposed representation of the gold fields placed at five. The concession was not a great one, nor could the

representation, five out of thirtyone, be considered a generous provision for the majority of the population;

but the reduction of the years of residence was eagerly hailed in England as a sign that a compromise might

be effected. A sigh of relief went up from the country. 'If,' said the Colonial Secretary, 'this report is

confirmed, this important change in the proposals of President Kruger, coupled with previous amendments,

leads Government to hope that the new law may prove to be the basis of a settlement on the lines laid down

by Sir Alfred Milner in the Bloemfontein Conference.' He added that there were some vexatious conditions

attached, but concluded, 'Her Majesty's Government feel assured that the President, having accepted the

principle for which they have contended, will be prepared to reconsider any detail of his scheme which can be

shown to be a possible hindrance to the full accomplishment of the object in view, and that he will not allow

them to be nullified or reduced in value by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of administration.' At

the same time, the 'Times' declared the crisis to be at an end. 'If the Dutch statesmen of the Cape have

induced their brethren in the Transvaal to carry such a Bill, they will have deserved the lasting gratitude, not

only of their own countrymen and of the English colonists in South Africa, but of the British Empire and of

But this fair prospect was soon destined to be overcast. Questions of detail arose which, when closely

examined, proved to be matters of very essential importance. The Uitlanders and British South Africans, who

had experienced in the past how illusory the promises of the President might be, insisted upon guarantees.

The seven years offered were two years more than that which Sir Alfred Milner had declared to be an

irreducible minimum. The difference of two years would not have hindered their acceptance, even at the

expense of some humiliation to our representative. But there were conditions which excited distrust when

drawn up by so wily a diplomatist. One was that the alien who aspired to burghership had to produce a

certificate of continuous registration for a certain time. But the law of registration had fallen into disuse in the

Transvaal, and consequently this provision might render the whole Bill valueless. Since it was carefully

retained, it was certainly meant for use. The door had been opened, but a stone was placed to block it. Again,

the continued burghership of the newcomers was made to depend upon the resolution of the first Raad, so that

should the mining members propose any measure of reform, not only their Bill but they also might be swept

out of the house by a Boer majority. What could an Opposition do if a vote of the Government might at any

moment unseat them all? It was clear that a measure which contained such provisions must be very carefully

sifted before a British Government could accept it as a final settlement and a complete concession of justice

to its subjects. On the other hand, it naturally felt loth to refuse those clauses which offered some prospect of

an amelioration in their condition. It took the course, therefore, of suggesting that each Government should

appoint delegates to form a joint commission which should inquire into the working of the proposed Bill

before it was put into a final form. The proposal was submitted to the Raad upon August 7th, with the

addition that when this was done Sir Alfred Milner was prepared to discuss anything else, including

The suggestion of this joint commission has been criticised as an unwarrantable intrusion into the internal

affairs of another country. But then the whole question from the beginning was about the internal affairs of

another country, since the internal equality of the white inhabitants was the condition upon which

selfgovernment was restored to the Transvaal. It is futile to suggest analogies, and to imagine what France

would do if Germany were to interfere in a question of French franchise. Supposing that France contained as

many Germans as Frenchmen, and that they were illtreated, Germany would interfere quickly enough and

continue to do so until some fair MODUS VIVENDI was established. The fact is that the case of the

Transvaal stands alone, that such a condition of things has never been known, and that no previous precedent

can apply to it, save the general rule that a minority of white men cannot continue indefinitely to tax and

govern a majority. Sentiment inclines to the smaller nation, but reason and justice are all on the side of

A long delay followed upon the proposal of the Secretary of the Colonies. No reply was forthcoming from

Pretoria. But on all sides there came evidence that those preparations for war which had been quietly going

on even before the Jameson raid were now being hurriedly perfected. For so small a State enormous sums

were being spent upon military equipment. Cases of rifles and boxes of cartridges streamed into the arsenal,

not only from Delagoa Bay, but even, to the indignation of the English colonists, through Cape Town and

Port Elizabeth. Huge packingcases, marked 'Agricultural Instruments' and 'Mining Machinery,' arrived from

Germany and France, to find their places in the forts of Johannesburg or Pretoria. Men of many nations but of

a similar type showed their martial faces in the Boer towns. The CONDOTTIERI of Europe were as ready as

ever to sell their blood for gold, and nobly in the end did they fulfill their share of the bargain. For three

weeks and more during which Mr. Kruger was silent these eloquent preparations went on. But beyond them,

and of infinitely more importance, there was one fact which dominated the situation. A burgher cannot go to

war without his horse, his horse cannot move without grass, grass will not come until after rain, and it was

still some weeks before the rain would be due. Negotiations, then, must not be unduly hurried while the veldt

was a bare russetcoloured dustswept plain. Mr. Chamberlain and the British public waited week after week

for their answer. But there was a limit to their patience, and it was reached on August 26th, when the Colonial

Secretary showed, with a plainness of speech which is as unusual as it is welcome in diplomacy, that the

question could not be hung up for ever. 'The sands are running down in the glass,' said he. 'If they run out, we

shall not hold ourselves limited by that which we have already offered, but, having taken the matter in hand,

we will not let it go until we have secured conditions which once for all shall establish which is the

paramount power in South Africa, and shall secure for our fellowsubjects there those equal rights and equal

privileges which were promised them by President Kruger when the independence of the Transvaal was

granted by the Queen, and which is the least that in justice ought to be accorded them.' Lord Salisbury, a little

time before, had been equally emphatic. 'No one in this country wishes to disturb the conventions so long as

it is recognised that while they guarantee the independence of the Transvaal on the one side, they guarantee

equal political and civil rights for settlers of all nationalities upon the other. But these conventions are not

like the laws of the Medes and the Persians. They are mortal, they can be destroyed... and once destroyed

they can never be reconstructed in the same shape.' The longenduring patience of Great Britain was

In the meantime a fresh dispatch had arrived from the Transvaal which offered as an alternative proposal to

the joint commission that the Boer Government should grant the franchise proposals of Sir Alfred Milner on

condition that Great Britain withdrew or dropped her claim to a suzerainty, agreed to arbitration, and

promised never again to interfere in the internal affairs of the republic. To this Great Britain answered that

she would agree to arbitration, that she hoped never again to have occasion to interfere for the protection of

her own subjects, but that with the grant of the franchise all occasion for such interference would pass away,

and, finally, that she would never consent to abandon her position as suzerain power. Mr. Chamberlain's

dispatch ended by reminding the Government of the Transvaal that there were other matters of dispute open

between the two Governments apart from the franchise, and that it would be as well to have them settled at

the same time. By these he meant such questions as the position of the native races and the treatment of

On September 2nd the answer of the Transvaal Government was returned. It was short and uncompromising.

They withdrew their offer of the franchise. They reasserted the nonexistence of the suzerainty. The

negotiations were at a deadlock. It was difficult to see how they could be reopened. In view of the arming of

the burghers, the small garrison of Natal had been taking up positions to cover the frontier. The Transvaal

asked for an explanation of their presence. Sir Alfred Milner answered that they were guarding British

interests, and preparing against contingencies. The roar of the fall was sounding loud and near.

On September 8th there was held a Cabinet Council one of the most important in recent years. A message

was sent to Pretoria, which even the opponents of the Government have acknowledged to be temperate, and

offering the basis for a peaceful settlement. It begins by repudiating emphatically the claim of the Transvaal

to be a sovereign international State in the same sense in which the Orange Free State is one. Any proposal

The British Government, however, was prepared to accept the five years' 'franchise' as stated in the note of

August 19th, assuming at the same time that in the Raad each member might talk his own language.

'Acceptance of these terms by the South African Republic would at once remove tension between the two

Governments, and would in all probability render unnecessary any future intervention to secure redress for

grievances which the Uitlanders themselves would be able to bring to the notice of the Executive Council and

'Her Majesty's Government are increasingly impressed with the danger of further delay in relieving the strain

which has already caused so much injury to the interests of South Africa, and they earnestly press for an

immediate and definite reply to the present proposal. If it is acceded to they will be ready to make immediate

arrangements... to settle all details of the proposed tribunal of arbitration... If, however, as they most

anxiously hope will not be the case, the reply of the South African Republic should be negative or

inconclusive, I am to state that her Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider

the situation DE NOVO, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement.'

Such was the message, and Great Britain waited with strained attention for the answer. But again there was a

delay, while the rain came and the grass grew, and the veldt was as a mounted rifleman would have it. The

burghers were in no humour for concessions. They knew their own power, and they concluded with justice

that they were for the time far the strongest military power in South Africa. 'We have beaten England before,

but it is nothing to the licking we shall give her now,' cried a prominent citizen, and he spoke for his country

as he said it. So the empire waited and debated, but the sounds of the bugle were already breaking through the

wrangles of the politicians, and calling1 the nation to be tested once more by that hammer of war and

The message sent from the Cabinet Council of September 8th was evidently the precursor either of peace or

of war. The cloud must burst or blow over. As the nation waited in hushed expectancy for a reply it spent

some portion of its time in examining and speculating upon those military preparations which might be

needed. The War Office had for some months been arranging for every contingency, and had made certain

dispositions which appeared to them to be adequate, but which our future experience was to demonstrate to

It is curious in turning over the files of such a paper as the 'Times' to observe how at first one or two small

paragraphs of military significance might appear in the endless columns of diplomatic and political reports,

how gradually they grew and grew, until at last the eclipse was complete, and the diplomacy had been thrust

into the tiny paragraphs while the war filled the journal. Under July 7th comes the first glint of arms amid the

drab monotony of the state papers. On that date it was announced that two companies of Royal Engineers and

departmental corps with reserves of supplies and ammunition were being dispatched. Two companies of

engineers! Who could have foreseen that they were the vanguard of the greatest army which ever at any time

of the world's history has crossed an ocean, and far the greatest which a British general has commanded in the

On August 15th, at a time when the negotiations had already assumed a very serious phase, after the failure of

the Bloemfontein conference and the dispatch of Sir Alfred Milner, the British forces in South Africa were

absolutely and absurdly inadequate for the purpose of the defence of our own frontier. Surely such a fact must

open the eyes of those who, in spite of all the evidence, persist that the war was forced on by the British. A

statesman who forces on a war usually prepares for a war, and this is exactly what Mr. Kruger did and the

British authorities did not. The overbearing suzerain power had at that date, scattered over a huge frontier,

two cavalry regiments, three field batteries, and six and a half infantry battalions say six thousand men.

The innocent pastoral States could put in the field forty or fifty thousand mounted riflemen, whose mobility

doubled their numbers, and a most excellent artillery, including the heaviest guns which have ever been seen

upon a battlefield. At this time it is most certain that the Boers could have made their way easily either to

Durban or to Cape Town. The British force, condemned to act upon the defensive, could have been masked

and afterwards destroyed, while the main body of the invaders would have encountered nothing but an

irregular local resistance, which would have been neutralised by the apathy or hostility of the Dutch colonists.

It is extraordinary that our authorities seem never to have contemplated the possibility of the Boers taking the

initiative, or to have understood that in that case our belated reinforcements would certainly have had to land

In July Natal had taken alarm, and a strong representation had been sent from the prime minister of the

colony to the Governor, Sir W. Hely Hutchinson, and so to the Colonial Office. It was notorious that the

Transvaal was armed to the teeth, that the Orange Free State was likely to join her, and that there had been

strong attempts made, both privately and through the press, to alienate the loyalty of the Dutch citizens of

both the British colonies. Many sinister signs were observed by those upon the spot. The veldt had been

burned unusually early to ensure a speedy grasscrop after the first rains, there had been a collecting of

horses, a distribution of rifles and ammunition. The Free State farmers, who graze their sheep and cattle upon

Natal soil during the winter, had driven them off to places of safety behind the line of the Drakensberg.

Everything pointed to approaching war, and Natal refused to be satisfied even by the dispatch of another

regiment. On September 6th a second message was received at the Colonial Office, which states the case with

'The Prime Minister desires me to urge upon you by the unanimous advice of the Ministers that sufficient

troops should be dispatched to Natal immediately to enable the colony to be placed in a state of defence

against an attack from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. I am informed by the General Officer

Commanding, Natal, that he will not have enough troops, even when the Manchester Regiment arrives, to do

more than occupy Newcastle and at the same time protect the colony south of it from raids, while Laing's

Nek, Ingogo River and Zululand must be left undefended. My Ministers know that every preparation has

been made, both in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, which would enable an attack to be made on

Natal at short notice. My Ministers believe that the Boers have made up their minds that war will take place

almost certainly, and their best chance will be, when it seems unavoidable, to deliver a blow before

reinforcements have time to arrive. Information has been received that raids in force will be made .by way of

Middle Drift and Greytown and by way of Bond's Drift and Stangar, with a view to striking the railway

between Pietermaritzburg and Durban and cutting off communications of troops and supplies. Nearly all the

Orange Free State farmers in the Klip River division, who stay in the colony usually till October at least, have

trekked, at great loss to themselves; their sheep are lambing on the road, and the lambs die or are destroyed.

Two at least of the Entonjanani district farmers have trekked with all their belongings into the Transvaal, in

the first case attempting to take as hostages the children of the natives on the farm. Reliable reports have been

received of attempts to tamper with loyal natives, and to set tribe against tribe in order to create confusion

and detail the defensive forces of the colony. Both food and warlike stores in large quantities have been

accumulated at Volksrust, Vryheid and Standerton. Persons who are believed to be spies have been seen

examining the bridges on the Natal Railway, and it is known that there are spies in all the principal centres of

the colony. In the opinion of Ministers, such a catastrophe as the seizure of . Laing's Nek and the destruction

of the northern portion of the railway, or a successful raid or invasion such as they have reason to believe is

contemplated, would produce a most demoralising effect on the natives and on the loyal Europeans in the

colony, and would afford great encouragement to the Boers and to their sympathisers in the colonies, who,

although armed and prepared, will probably keep quiet unless they receive some encouragement of the sort.

They concur in the policy of her Majesty's Government of exhausting all peaceful means to obtain redress of

the grievances of the Uitlanders and authoritatively assert the supremacy of Great Britain before resorting to

war; but they state that this is a question of defensive precaution, not of making war.'

In answer to these and other remonstrances the garrison of Natal was gradually increased, partly by troops

from Europe, and partly by the dispatch of five thousand British troops from India. The 2nd Berkshires, the

1st Royal Munster Fusiliers, the 1st Manchesters, and the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers arrived in succession with

reinforcements of artillery. The 5th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, and 19th Hussars came from India, with

the 1st Devonshires, 1st Gloucesters, 2nd King's Royal Rifles and 2nd Gordon Highlanders. These with the

21st, 42nd, and 53rd batteries of Field Artillery made up the Indian Contingent. Their arrival late in

September raised the number of troops in South Africa to 22,000, a force which was inadequate to a contest

in the open field with the numerous, mobile, and gallant enemy to whom they were to be opposed, but which

proved to be strong enough to stave off that overwhelming disaster which, with our fuller knowledge, we can

As to the disposition of these troops a difference of opinion broke out between the ruling powers in Natal and

the military chiefs at the spot. Prince Kraft has said, 'Both strategy and tactics may have to yield to politics ';

but the political necessity should be very grave and very clear when it is the blood of soldiers which has to

pay for it. Whether it arose from our defective intelligence, or from that caste feeling which makes it hard for

the professional soldier to recognise (in spite of deplorable past experiences) a serious adversary in the

mounted farmer, it is certain that even while our papers were proclaiming that this time, at least, we would

not underrate our enemy, we were most seriously underrating him. The northern third of Natal is as

vulnerable a military position as a player of kriegspiel could wish to have submitted to him. It runs up into a

thin angle, culminating at the apex in a difficult pass, the illomened Laing's Nek, dominated by the even

more sinister bulk of Majuba. Each side of this angle is open to invasion, the one from the Transvaal and the

other from the Orange Free State. A force up at the apex is in a perfect trap, for the mobile enemy can flood

into the country to the south of them, cut the line of supplies, and throw up a series of entrenchments which

would make retreat a very difficult matter. Further down the country, at such positions as Ladysmith or

Dundee, the danger, though not so imminent, is still an obvious one, unless the defending force is strong

enough to hold its own in the open field and mobile enough to prevent a mounted enemy from getting round

its flanks. To us, who are endowed with that profound military wisdom which only comes with a knowledge

of the event, it is obvious that with a defending force which could not place more than 12,000 men in the

fighting line, the true defensible frontier was the line of the Tugela. As a matter of fact, Ladysmith was

chosen, a place almost indefensible itself, as it is dominated by high hills in at least two directions.

Such an event as the siege of the town appears never to have been contemplated, as no guns of position were

asked for or sent. In spite of this, an amount of stores, which is said to have been valued at more than a

million of pounds, was dumped down at this small railway junction, so that the position could not be

evacuated without a crippling loss. The place was the point of bifurcation of the main line, which divides at

this little town into one branch running to Harrismith in the Orange Free State, and the other leading through

the Dundee coal fields and Newcastle to the Laing's Nek tunnel and the Transvaal. An importance, which

appears now to have been an exaggerated one, was attached by the Government of Natal to the possession of

the coal fields, and it was at their strong suggestion, but with the concurrence of General Penn Symons, that

the defending force was divided, and a detachment of between three and four thousand sent to Dundee, about

forty miles from the main body, which remained under General Sir George White at Ladysmith. General

Symons underrated the power of the invaders, but it is hard to criticise an error of judgment which has been

so nobly atoned and so tragically paid for. At the time, then, which our political narrative has reached, the

time of suspense which followed the dispatch of the Cabinet message of September 8th, the military situation

had ceased to be desperate, but was still precarious. Twentytwo thousand regular troops were on the spot

who might hope to be reinforced by some ten thousand colonials, but these forces had to cover a great

frontier, the attitude of Cape Colony was by no means wholehearted and might become hostile, while the

black population might conceivably throw in its weight against us. Only half the regulars could be spared to

defend Natal, and no reinforcements could reach them in less than a month from the outbreak of hostilities. If

Mr. Chamberlain was really playing a game of bluff, it must be confessed that he was bluffing from a very

For purposes of comparison we may give some idea of the forces which Mr. Kruger and Mr. Steyn could put

in the field, for by this time it was evident that the Orange Free State, with which we had had no shadow of a

dispute, was going, in a way which some would call wanton and some chivalrous, to throw in its weight

against us. The general press estimate of the forces of the two republics varied from 25,000 to 35,000 men.

Mr. J. B. Robinson, a personal friend of President Kruger's and a man who had spent much of his life among

the Boers, considered the latter estimate to be too high. The calculation had no assured basis to start from. A

very scattered and isolated population, among whom large families were the rule, is a most difficult thing to

estimate. Some reckoned from the supposed natural increase during eighteen years, but the figure given at

that date was itself an assumption. Others took their calculation from the number of voters in the last

presidential election: but no one could tell how many abstentions there had been, and the fighting age is five

years earlier than the voting age in the republics. We recognise now that all calculations were far below the

true figure. It is probable, however, that the information of the British Intelligence Department was not far

wrong. According to this the fighting strength of the Transvaal alone was 32,000 men, and of the Orange Free

State 22,000. With mercenaries and rebels from the colonies they would amount to 60,000, while a

considerable rising of the Cape Dutch would bring them up to 100,000. In artillery they were known to have

about a hundred guns, many of them (and the fact will need much explaining) more modern and powerful

than any which we could bring against them. Of the quality of this large force there is no need to speak. The

men were brave, hardy, and fired with a strange religious enthusiasm. They were all of the seventeenth

century, except their rifles. Mounted upon their hardy little ponies, they possessed a mobility which

practically doubled their numbers and made it an impossibility ever to outflank them. As marksmen they

were supreme. Add to this that they had the advantage of acting upon internal lines with shorter and safer

communications, and one gathers how formidable a task lay before the soldiers of the empire. When we turn

from such an enumeration of their strength to contemplate the 12,000 men, split into two detachments, who

awaited them in Natal, we may recognise that, far from bewailing our disasters, we should rather congratulate

ourselves upon our escape from losing that great province which, situated as it is between Britain, India, and

At the risk of a tedious but very essential digression, something must be said here as to the motives with

which the Boers had for many years been quietly preparing for war. That the Jameson raid was not the cause

is certain, though it probably, by putting the Boer Government into a strong position, had a great effect in

accelerating matters. What had been done secretly and slowly could be done more swiftly and openly when

so plausible an excuse could be given for it. As a matter of fact, the preparations were long antecedent to the

raid. The building of the forts at Pretoria and Johannesburg was begun nearly two years before that wretched

incursion, and the importation of arms was going on apace. In that very year, 1895, a considerable sum was

But if it was not the raid, and if the Boers had no reason to fear the British Government, with whom the

Transvaal might have been as friendly as the Orange Free State had been for forty years, why then should

they arm? It was a difficult question, and one in answering which we find ourselves in a region of conjecture

and suspicion rather than of ascertained fact. But the fairest and most unbiased of historians must confess that

there is a large body of evidence to show that into the heads of some of the Dutch leaders, both in the

northern republics and in the Cape, there had entered the conception of a single Dutch commonwealth,

extending from Cape Town to the Zambesi, in which flag, speech, and law should all be Dutch. It is in this

aspiration that many shrewd and wellinformed judges see the true inner meaning of this persistent arming,

of the constant hostility, of the forming of ties between the two republics (one of whom had been

reconstituted and made a sovereign independent State by our own act), and finally of that intriguing which

endeavoured to poison the affection and allegiance of our own Dutch colonists, who had no political

grievances whatever. They all aimed at one end, and that end was the final expulsion of British power from

South Africa and the formation of a single great Dutch republic. The large sum spent by the Transvaal in

secret service money a larger sum, I believe, than that which is spent by the whole British Empire

would give some idea of the subterranean influences at work. An army of emissaries, agents, and spies,

whatever their mission, were certainly spread over the British colonies. Newspapers were subsidised also, and

In the very nature of things a huge conspiracy of this sort to substitute Dutch for British rule in South Africa

is not a matter which can be easily and definitely proved. Such questions are not discussed in public

documents, and men are sounded before being taken into the confidence of the conspirators. But there is

plenty of evidence of the individual ambition of prominent and representative men in this direction, and it is

hard to believe that what many wanted individually was not striven for collectively, especially when we see

how the course of events did actually work towards the end which they indicated. Mr. J. P. FitzPatrick, in

'The Transvaal from Within ' a book to which all subsequent writers upon the subject must acknowledge

their obligations narrates how in 1896 he was approached by Mr. D. P. Graaff, formerly a member of the

Cape Legislative Council and a very prominent Afrikander Bondsman, with the proposition that Great Britain

should be pushed out of South Africa. The same politician made the same proposal to Mr. Beit. Compare

with this the following statement of Mr. Theodore Schreiner, the brother of the Prime Minister of the Cape:

'I met Mr. Reitz, then a judge of the Orange Free State, in Bloemfontein between seventeen and eighteen

years ago, shortly after the retrocession of the Transvaal, and when he was busy establishing the Afrikander

Bond. It must be patent to every one that at that time, at all events, England and its Government had no

intention of taking away the independence of the Transvaal, for she had just "magnanimously" granted the

same; no intention of making war on the republics, for she had just made peace; no intention to seize the

Rand gold fields, for they were not yet discovered. At that time, then, I met Mr. Reitz, and he did his best to

get me to become a member of his Afrikander Bond, but, after studying its constitution and programme, I

refused to do so, whereupon the following colloquy in substance took place between us, which has been

'REITZ: Why do you refuse? Is the object of getting the people to take an interest in political matters not a

'MYSELF: Yes, it is ; but I seem to see plainly here between the lines of this constitution much more

'MYSELF: I see quite clearly that the ultimate object aimed at is the overthrow of the British power and the

'REITZ (with his pleasant conscious smile, as of one whose secret thought and purpose had been discovered,

and who was not altogether displeased that such was the case) : Well, what if it is so?

'MYSELF: You don't suppose, do you, that that flag is going to disappear from South Africa without a

'REITZ (with the same pleasant selfconscious, self satisfied, and yet semiapologetic smile) : Well, I

'MYSELF: Only this, that when that struggle takes place you and I will be on opposite sides; and what is

more, the God who was on the side of the Transvaal in the late war, because it had right on its side will be on

the side of England, because He must view with abhorrence any plotting and scheming to overthrow her

'Thus the conversation ended, but during the seventeen years that have elapsed I have watched the

propaganda for the overthrow of British power in South Africa being ceaselessly spread by every possible

means the press, the pulpit, the platform, the schools, the colleges, the Legislature until it has

culminated in the present war, of which Mr. Reitz and his coworkers are the origin and the cause. Believe

me, the day on which F. W. Reitz sat down to pen his ultimatum to Great Britain was the proudest and

happiest moment of his life, and one which had for long years been looked forward to by him with eager

Compare with these utterances of a Dutch politician of the Cape, and of a Dutch politician of the Orange Free

State, the following passage from a speech delivered by Kruger at Bloemfontein in the year 1887:

'I think it too soon to speak of a United South Africa under one flag. Which flag was it to be? The Queen of

England would object to having her flag hauled down, and we, the burghers of the Transvaal, object to

hauling ours down. What is to be done? We are now small and of little importance, but we are growing, and

'The dream of our life,' said another, 'is a union of the States of South Africa, and this has to come from

within, not from without. When that is accomplished, South Africa will be great.'

Always the same theory from all quarters of Dutch thought, to be followed by many signs that the idea was

being prepared for in practice. I repeat that the fairest and most unbiased historian cannot dismiss the

And to this one may retort, why should they not conspire? Why should they not have their own views as to

the future of South Africa? Why should they not endeavour to have one universal flag and one common

speech? Why should they not win over our colonists, if they can, and push us into the sea? I see no reason

why they should not. Let them try if they will. And let us try to prevent them. But let us have an end of talk

about British aggression, of capitalist designs upon the gold fields, of the wrongs of a pastoral people, and all

the other veils which have been used to cover the issue. Let those who talk about British designs upon the

republics turn their attention for a moment to the evidence which there is for republican designs upon the

colonies. Let them reflect that in the one system all white men are equal, and that on the other the minority of

one race has persecuted the majority of the other, and let them consider under which the truest freedom lies,

which stands for universal liberty and which for reaction and racial hatred. Let them ponder and answer all

Leaving these wider questions of politics, and dismissing for the time those military considerations which

were soon to be of such vital moment, we may now return to the course of events in the diplomatic struggle

between the Government of the Transvaal and the Colonial Office. On September 8th, as already narrated, a

final message was sent to Pretoria, which stated the minimum terms which the British Government could

accept as being a fair concession to her subjects in the Transvaal. A definite answer was demanded, and the

There were few illusions in this country as to the difficulties of a Transvaal war. It was clearly seen that little

honour and immense vexation were in store for us. The first Boer war still smarted in our minds, and we

knew the prowess of the indomitable burghers. But our people, if gloomy, were none the less resolute, for

that national instinct which is beyond the wisdom of statesmen had borne it in upon them that this was no

local quarrel, but one upon which the whole existence of the empire hung. The cohesion of that empire was to

be tested. Men had emptied their glasses to it in time of peace. Was it a meaningless pouring of wine, or were

they ready to pour their hearts' blood also in time of war? Had we really founded a series of disconnected

nations, with no common sentiment or interest, or was the empire an organic whole, as ready to thrill with

one emotion or to harden into one resolve as are the several States of the Union? That was the question at

issue, and much of the future history of the world was at stake upon the answer.

Already there were indications that the colonies appreciated the fact that the contention was no affair of the

mother country alone, but that she was upholding the rights of the empire as a whole, and might fairly look to

them to support her in any quarrel which might arise from it. As early as July 11th, Queensland, the fiery and

semitropical, had offered a contingent of mounted infantry with machine guns; New Zealand, Western

Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia followed in the order named. Canada,

with the strong but more deliberate spirit of the north, was the last to speak, but spoke the more firmly for the

delay. Her citizens were the least concerned of any, for Australians were many in South Africa but Canadians

few. None the less, she cheerfully took her share of the common burden, and grew the readier and the

cheerier as that burden came to weigh more heavily. From all the men of many hues who make up the British

Empire, from Hindoo Rajahs, from West African Houssas, from Malay police, from Western Indians, there

came offers of service. But this was to be a white man's war, and if the British could not work out their own

salvation then it were well that empire should pass from such a race. The magnificent Indian army of 150,000

soldiers, many of them seasoned veterans, was for the same reason left untouched. England has claimed no

credit or consideration for such abstention, but an irresponsible writer may well ask how many of those

foreign critics whose respect for our public morality appears to be as limited as their knowledge of our

principles and history would have advocated such self denial had their own countries been placed in the same

On September 18th the official reply of the Boer Government to the message sent from the Cabinet Council

was published in London. In manner it was unbending and unconciliatory; in substance, it was a complete

rejection of all the British demands. It refused to recommend or propose to the Raad the five years' franchise

and the other measures which had been defined as the minimum which the Home Government could accept

as a fair measure of justice towards the Uitlanders. The suggestion that the debates of the Raad should be

bilingual, as they have been in the Cape Colony and in Canada, was absolutely waived aside. The British

Government had stated in their last dispatch that if the reply should be negative or inconclusive they reserved

to themselves the right to 'reconsider the situation DE NOVO and to formulate their own proposals for a final

settlement.' The reply had been both negative and inconclusive, and on September 22nd a council met to

determine what the next message should be. It was short and firm, but so planned as not to shut the door upon

peace. Its purport was that the British Government expressed deep regret at the rejection of the moderate

proposals which had been submitted in their last dispatch, and that now, in accordance with their promise,

they would shortly put forward their own plans for a settlement. The message was not an ultimatum, but it

In the meantime, upon September 21st the Raad of the Orange Free State had met, and it became more and

more evident that this republic, with whom we had no possible quarrel, but, on the contrary, for whom we

had a great deal of friendship and admiration, intended to throw in its weight against Great Britain. Some

time before, an offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded between the two States, which must,

until the secret history of these events comes to be written, appear to have been a singularly rash and

unprofitable bargain for the smaller one. She had nothing to fear from Great Britain, since she had been

voluntarily turned into an independent republic by her and had lived in peace with her for forty years. Her

laws were as liberal as our own. But by this suicidal treaty she agreed to share the fortunes of a State which

was deliberately courting war by its persistently unfriendly attitude, and whose reactionary and narrow

legislation would, one might imagine, have alienated the sympathy of her progressive neighbour. There may

have been ambitions like those already quoted from the report of Dr. Reitz's conversation, or there may have

been a complete hallucination as to the comparative strength of the two combatants and the probable future of

South Africa; but however that may be, the treaty was made, and the time had come to test how far it would

The tone of President Steyn at the meeting of the Raad, and the support which he received from the majority

of his burghers, showed unmistakably that the two republics would act as one. In his opening speech Steyn

declared uncompromisingly against the British contention, and declared that his State was bound to the

Transvaal by everything which was near and dear. Among the obvious military precautions which could no

longer be neglected by the British Government was the sending of some small force to protect the long and

exposed line of railway which lies just outside the Transvaal border from Kimberley to Rhodesia. Sir Alfred

Milner communicated with President Steyn as to this movement of troops, pointing out that it was in no way

directed against the Free State. Sir Alfred Milner added that the Imperial Government was still hopeful of a

friendly settlement with the Transvaal, but if this hope were disappointed they looked to the Orange Free

State to preserve strict neutrality and to prevent military intervention by any of its citizens. They undertook

that in that case the integrity of the Free State frontier would be strictly preserved. Finally, he stated that there

was absolutely no cause to disturb the good relations between the Free State and Great Britain, since we were

animated by the most friendly intentions towards them. To this the President returned a somewhat ungracious

answer, to the effect that he disapproved of our action towards the Transvaal, and that he regretted the

movement of troops, which would be considered a menace by the burghers. A subsequent resolution of the

Free State Raad, ending with the words, 'Come what may, the Free State will honestly and faithfully fulfill its

obligations towards the Transvaal by virtue of the political alliance existing between the two republics,'

showed how impossible it was that this country, formed by ourselves and without a shadow of a cause of

quarrel with us, could be saved from being drawn into the whirlpool. Everywhere, from over both borders,

came the news of martial preparations. Already at the end of September troops and armed burghers were

gathering upon the frontier, and the most incredulous were beginning at last to understand that the shadow of

a great war was really falling across them. Artillery, war munitions, and stores were being accumulated at

Volksrust upon the Natal border, showing where the storm might be expected to break. On the last day of

September, twentysix military trains were reported to have left Pretoria and Johannesburg for that point. At

the same time news came of a concentration at Malmani, upon the Bechuanaland border, threatening the

railway line and the British town of Mafeking, a name destined before long to be familiar to the world.

On October 3rd there occurred what was in truth an act of war, although the British Government, patient to

the verge of weakness, refused to regard it as such, and continued to draw up their final state paper. The mail

train from the Transvaal to Cape Town was stopped at Vereeniging, and the week's shipment of gold for

England, amounting to about half a million pounds, was taken by the Boer Government. In a debate at Cape

Town upon the same day the Africander Minister of the Interior admitted that as many as 404 trucks had

passed from the Government line over the frontier and had not been returned. Taken in conjunction with the

passage of arms and cartridges through the Cape to Pretoria and Bloemfontein, this incident aroused the

deepest indignation among the Colonial English and the British public, which was increased by the reports of

the difficulty which border towns, such as Kimberley and Vryburg, had had in getting cannon for their own

defence. The Raads had been dissolved, and the old President's last words had been a statement that war was

certain, and a stern invocation of the Lord as final arbiter. England was ready less obtrusively but no less

On October 2nd President Steyn informed Sir Alfred Milner that he had deemed it necessary to call out the

Free State burghers that is, to mobilise his forces. Sir A. Milner wrote regretting these preparations, and

declaring that he did not yet despair of peace, for he was sure that any reasonable proposal would be

favourably considered by her Majesty's Government. Steyn's reply was that there was no use in negotiating

unless the stream of British reinforcements ceased coming into South Africa. As our forces were still in a

great minority, it was impossible to stop the reinforcements, so the correspondence led to nothing. On

October 7th the army reserves for the First Army Corps were called out in Great Britain and other signs

shown that it had been determined to send a considerable force to South Africa. Parliament was also

summoned that the formal national assent might be gained for those grave measures which were evidently

It was on October 9th that the somewhat leisurely proceedings of the British Colonial Office were brought to

a head by the arrival of an unexpected and audacious ultimatum from the Boer Government. In contests of

wit, as of arms, it must be confessed that the laugh has been usually upon the side of our simple and pastoral

South African neighbours. The present instance was no exception to the rule. While our Government was

cautiously and patiently leading up to an ultimatum, our opponent suddenly played the very card which we

were preparing to lay upon the table. The document was very firm and explicit, but the terms in which it was

drawn were so impossible that it was evidently framed with the deliberate purpose of forcing an immediate

war. It demanded that the troops upon the borders of the republic should be instantly withdrawn, that all

reinforcements which had arrived within the last year should leave South Africa, and that those who were

now upon the sea should be sent back without being landed. Failing a satisfactory answer within fortyeight

hours, 'the Transvaal Government will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of her Majesty's

Government as a formal declaration of war, for the consequences of which it will not hold itself responsible.'

The audacious message was received throughout the empire with a mixture of derision and anger. The answer

'10th October. Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the peremptory demands of the

Government of the South African Republic, conveyed in your telegram of the 9th October. You will inform

the Government of the South African Republic in reply that the conditions demanded by the Government of

the South African Republic are such as her Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss.'

And so we have come to the end of the long road, past the battle of the pens and the wrangling of tongues, to

the arbitration of the LeeMetford and the Mauser. It was pitiable that it should come to this. These people

were as near akin to us as any race which is not our own. They were of the same Frisian stock which peopled

our own shores. In habit of mind, in religion, in respect for law, they were as ourselves. Brave, too, they

were, and hospitable, with those sporting instincts which are dear to the AngloCeltic race. There was no

people in the world who had more qualities which we might admire, and not the least of them was that love

of independence which it is our proudest boast' that we have encouraged in others as well as exercised

ourselves. And yet we had come to this pass, that there was no room in all vast South Africa for both of us.

We cannot hold ourselves blameless in the matter. ' The evil that men do lives after them,' and it has been told

in this small superficial sketch where we have erred in the past in South Africa. On our hands, too, is the

Jameson raid, carried out by Englishmen and led by officers who held the Queen's Commission; to us, also,

the blame of the shuffling, halfhearted inquiry into that most unjustifiable business. These are matches

which helped to set the great blaze alight, and it is we who held them. Rut the fagots which proved to be so

inflammable, they were not of our setting. They were the wrongs done to half the community, the settled

resolution of the minority to tax and vex the majority, the determination of a people who had lived two

generations in a country to claim that country entirely for themselves. Behind them all there may have been

the Dutch ambition to dominate South Africa. It was no petty object for which Britain fought. When a nation

struggles uncomplainingly through months of disaster she may claim to have proved her conviction of the

justice and necessity of the struggle. Should Dutch ideas or English ideas of government prevail throughout

that huge country? The one means freedom for a single race, the other means equal rights to all white men

beneath one common law. What each means to the coloured races let history declare. This was the main issue

to be determined from the instant that the clock struck five upon the afternoon of Wednesday, October the

eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninetynine. That moment marked the opening of a war destined to determine

the fate of South Africa, to work great changes in the British Empire, to seriously affect the future history of

the world, and incidentally to alter many of our views as to the art of war. It is the story of this war which,

with limited material but with much aspiration to care and candour, I shall now endeavour to tell.

It was on the morning of October 12th, amid cold and mist, that the Boer camps at Sandspruit and Volksrust

broke up, and the burghers rode to the war. Some twelve thousand of them, all mounted, with two batteries of

eight Krupp guns each, were the invading force from the north, which hoped later to be joined by the

Freestaters and by a contingent of Germans and Transvaalers who were to cross the Free State border. It was

an hour before dawn that the guns started, and the riflemen followed close behind the last limber, so that the

first light of day fell upon the black sinuous line winding down between the hills. A spectator upon the

occasion says of them : 'Their faces were a study. For the most part the expression worn was one of

determination and bulldog pertinacity. No sign of fear there, nor of wavering. Whatever else may be laid to

the charge of the Boer, it may never truthfully be said that he is a coward or a man unworthy of the Briton's

steel.' The words were written early in the campaign, and the whole empire will endorse them today. Could

we have such men as willing fellowcitizens, they are worth more than all the gold mines of their country.

This main Transvaal body consisted of the commando of Pretoria, which comprised 1,800 men, and those of

Heidelberg, Middelburg, Krugersdorp, Standerton, Wakkerstroom, and Ermelo, with the State Artillery, an

excellent and highly organised body who were provided with the best guns that have ever been brought on to

a battlefield. Besides their sixteen Krupps, they dragged with them two heavy sixinch Creusot guns, which

were destined to have a very important effect in the earlier part of the campaign. In addition to these native

forces there were a certain number of European auxiliaries. The greater part of the German corps were with

the Free State forces, but a few hundred came down from the north. There was a Hollander corps of about

two hundred and fifty and an Irish or perhaps more properly an IrishAmericancorps of the same

The men might, by all accounts, be divided into two very different types. There were the town Boers,

smartened and perhaps a little enervated by prosperity and civilisation, men of business and professional men,

more alert and quicker than their rustic comrades. These men spoke English rather than Dutch, and indeed

there were many men of English descent among them. But the others, the most formidable both in their

numbers and in their primitive qualities, were the backveldt Boers, the sunburned, tanglehaired,

fullbearded farmers, the men of the Bible and the rifle, imbued with the traditions of their own guerrilla

warfare. These were perhaps the finest natural warriors upon earth, marksmen, hunters, accustomed to hard

fare and a harder couch. They were rough in their ways and speech, but, in spite of many calumnies and some

few unpleasant truths, they might compare with most disciplined armies in their humanity and their desire to

A few words here as to the man who led this singular host. Piet Joubert was a Cape Colonist by birth a

fellow countryman, like Kruger himself, of those whom the narrow laws of his new country persisted in

regarding as outside the pale. He came from that French Huguenot blood which has strengthened and refined

every race which it has touched, and from it he derived a chivalry and generosity which made him respected

and liked even by his opponents. In many native broils and in the British campaign of 1881 he had shown

himself a capable leader. His record in standing out for the independence of the Transvaal was a very

consistent one, for he had not accepted office under the British, as Kruger had done, but had remained always

an irreconcilable. Tall and burly, with hard grey eyes and a grim mouth half hidden by his bushy beard, he

was a fine type of the men whom he led. He was now in his sixtyfifth year, and the fire of his youth had, as

some of the burghers urged, died down within him; but he was experienced, crafty, and warwise, never

Besides this northern army there were two other bodies of burghers converging upon Natal. One, consisting

of the commandoes from Utrecht and the Swaziland districts, had gathered at Vryheid on the flank of the

British position at Dundee. The other, much larger, not less probably than six or seven thousand men, were

the contingent from the Free State and a Transvaal corps, together with Schiel's Germans, who were making

their way through the various passes, the Tintwa Pass, and Van Reenen's Pass, which lead through the grim

range of the Drakensberg and open out upon the more fertile plains of Western Natal. The total force may

have been something between twenty and thirty thousand men. By all accounts they were of an astonishingly

high heart, convinced that a path of easy victory lay before them, and that nothing could bar their way to the

sea. If the British commanders underrated their opponents, there is ample evidence that the mistake was

A few words now as to the disposition of the British forces, concerning which it must be borne in mind that

Sir George White, though in actual command, had only been a few days in the country before war was

declared, so that the arrangements fell to General Penn Symons, aided or hampered by the advice of the local

political authorities. The main position was at Ladysmith, but an advance post was strongly held at Glencoe,

which is five miles from the station of Dundee and forty from Ladysmith. The reason for this dangerous

division of force was to secure each end of the Biggarsberg section of the railway, and also to cover the

important collieries of that district. The positions chosen seem in each case to show that the British

commander was not aware of the number and power of the Boer guns, for each was equally defensible

against rifle fire and vulnerable to an artillery attack. In the case of Glencoe it was particularly evident that

guns upon the hills above would, as they did, render the position untenable. This outlying post was held by

the 1st Leicester Regiment, the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, and the first battalion of Rifles, with the 18th Hussars,

three companies of mounted infantry, and three batteries of field artillery, the 13th, 67th, and 69th. The 1st

Royal Irish Fusiliers were on their way to reinforce it, and arrived before the first action. Altogether the

The main body of the army remained at Ladysmith. These consisted of the 1st Devons, the 1st Liverpools,

and the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, with the 1st Gloucesters, the 2nd King's Royal Rifles, and the 2nd Rifle

Brigade, reinforced later by the Manchesters. The cavalry included the 5th Dragoon Guards, the 5th Lancers,

a detachment of 19th Hussars, the Natal Carabineers, the Natal Mounted Police, and the Border Mounted

Rifles, reinforced later by the Imperial Light Horse, a fine body of men raised principally among the refugees

from the Rand. For artillery there were the 21st, 42nd, and 53rd batteries of field artillery, and No.10

Mountain Battery, with the Natal Field Artillery, the guns of which were too light to be of service, and the

23rd Company of Royal Engineers. The whole force, some eight or nine thousand strong, was under the

immediate command of Sir George White, with Sir Archibald Hunter, fresh from the Soudan, General

The first shock of the Boers, then, must fall upon 4,000 men. If these could be overwhelmed, there were

8,000 more to be defeated or masked. Then what was there between them and the sea? Some detachments of

local volunteers, the Durban Light Infantry at Colenso, and the Natal Royal Rifles, with some naval

volunteers at Estcourt. With the power of the Boers and their mobility it is inexplicable how the colony was

saved. We are of the same blood, the Boers and we, and we show it in our failings. Overconfidence on our

part gave them the chance, and overconfidence on theirs prevented them from instantly availing themselves

The outbreak of war was upon October 11th. On the 12th the Boer forces crossed the frontier both on the

north and on the west. On the 13th they occupied Charlestown at the top angle of Natal. On the 15th they had

reached Newcastle, a larger town some fifteen miles inside the border. Watchers from the houses saw six

miles of canvastilted bullock wagons winding down the passes, and learned that this was not a raid but an

invasion. At the same date news reached the British headquarters of an advance from the western passes, and

of a movement from the Buffalo River on the east. On the 13th Sir George White had made a reconnaissance

in force, but had not come in touch with the enemy. On the 15th six of the Natal Police were surrounded and

captured at one of the drifts of the Buffalo River. On the 18th our cavalry patrols came into touch with the

Boer scouts at Acton Homes and Besters Station, these being the voortrekkers of the Orange Free State force.

On the 18th also a detachment was reported from Hadders Spruit, seven miles north of Glencoe Camp. The

Two days later, on the early morning of October 20th, the forces came at last into collision. At halfpast three

in the morning, well before daylight, the mounted infantry picket at the junction of the roads from Landmans

and Vants Drifts was fired into by the Doornberg commando, and retired upon its supports. Two companies

of the Dublin Fusiliers were sent out, and at five o'clock on a fine but misty morning the whole of Symons's

force was under arms with the knowledge that the Boers were pushing boldly towards them. The khakiclad

lines of fighting men stood in their long thin ranks staring up at the curves of the saddleback hills to the

north and east of them, and straining their eyes to catch a glimpse of the enemy. Why these same

saddleback hills were not occupied by our own people is, it must be confessed, an insoluble mystery. In a

hollow on one flank were the 18th Hussars and the mounted infantry. On the other were the eighteen

motionless guns, limbered up and ready, the horses fidgeting and stamping in the raw morning air.

And then suddenly could that be they? An officer with a telescope stared intently and pointed. Another

and another turned a steady field glass towards the same place. And then the men could see also, and a little

A long sloping hill Talana Hill olivegreen in hue, was stretching away in front of them. At the

summit it rose into a rounded crest. The mist was clearing, and the curve was hardoutlined against the

limpid blue of the morning sky. On this, some two and a half miles or three miles off, a little group of black

dots had appeared. The clear edge of the skyline had become serrated with moving figures. They clustered

There had been no smoke, but there came a long crescendo hoot, rising into a shrill wail. The shell hummed

over the soldiers like a great bee, and sloshed into soft earth behind them. Then another and yet another

and yet another. But there was no time to heed them, for there was the hillside and there the enemy. So at

it again with the good old murderous obsolete heroic tactics of the British tradition! There are times when, in

spite of science and booklore, the best plan is the boldest plan, and it is well to fly straight at your enemy's

throat, facing the chance that your strength may fail before you can grasp it. The cavalry moved off round the

enemy's left flank. The guns dashed to the front, unlimbered, and opened fire. The infantry were moved

round in the direction of Sandspruit, passing through the little town of Dundee, where the women and

children came to the doors and windows to cheer them. It was thought that the hill was more accessible from

that side. The Leicesters and one field battery the 67th were left behind to protect the camp and to

watch the Newcastle Road upon the west. At seven in the morning all was ready for the assault.

Two military facts of importance had already been disclosed. One was that the Boer percussionshells were

useless in soft ground, as hardly any of them exploded; the other that the Boer guns could outrange our

ordinary fifteenpounder field gun, which had been the one thing perhaps in the whole British equipment

upon which we were prepared to pin our faith. The two batteries, the 13th and the 69th, were moved nearer,

first to 3,000, and then at last to 2,300 yards, at which range they quickly dominated the guns upon the hill.

Other guns had opened from another crest to the east of Talana, but these also were mastered by the fire of

the 13th Battery. At 7.30 the infantry were ordered to advance, which they did in open order, extended to ten

paces. The Dublin Fusiliers formed the first line, the Rifles the second, and the Irish Fusiliers the third.

The first thousand yards of the advance were over open grassland, where the range was long, and the yellow

brown of the khaki blended with the withered veldt. There were few casualties until the wood was reached,

which lay halfway up the long slope of the hill. It was a plantation of larches, some hundreds of yards across

and nearly as many deep. On the left side of this wood that is, the left side to the advancing troops

there stretched a long nullah or hollow, which ran perpendicularly to the hill, and served rather as a conductor

of bullets than as a cover. So severe was the fire at this point that both in the wood and in the nullah the

troops lay down to avoid it. An officer of Irish Fusiliers has narrated how in trying to cut the straps from a

fallen private a razor lent him for that purpose by a wounded sergeant was instantly shot out of his hand. The

gallant Symons, who had refused to dismount, was shot through the stomach and fell from his horse mortally

wounded. With an excessive gallantry, he had not only attracted the enemy's fire by retaining his horse, but

he had been accompanied throughout the action by an orderly bearing a red pennon. 'Have they got the hill?

Have they got the hill?' was his one eternal question as they carried him dripping to the rear. It was at the

>From now onwards it was as much a soldiers' battle as Inkermann. In the shelter of the wood the more eager

of the three battalions had pressed to the front until the fringe of the trees was lined by men from all of them.

The difficulty of distinguishing particular regiments where all were clad alike made it impossible in the heat

of action to keep any sort of formation. So hot was the fire that for the time the advance was brought to a

standstill, but the 69th battery, firing shrapnel at a range of 1,400 yards, subdued the rifle fire, and about

Above the wood there was an open space some hundreds of yards across, bounded by a rough stone wall built

for herding cattle. A second wall ran at right angles to this down towards the wood. An enfilading rifle fire

had been sweeping across this open space, but the wall in front does not appear to have been occupied by the

enemy, who held the kopje above it. To avoid the cross fire the soldiers ran in single file under the shelter of

the wall, which covered them to the right, and so reached the other wall across their front. Here there was a

second long delay, the men dribbling up from below, and firing over the top of the wall and between the

chinks of the stones. The Dublin Fusiliers, through being in a more difficult position, had been unable to get

up as quickly as the others, and most of the hardbreathing excited men who crowded under the wall were of

the Rifles and of the Irish Fusiliers. The air was so full of bullets that it seemed impossible to live upon the

other side of this shelter. Two hundred yards intervened between the wall and the crest of the kopje. And yet

Out of the huddled line of crouching men an officer sprang shouting, and a score of soldiers vaulted over the

wall and followed at his heels. It was Captain Connor, of the Irish Fusiliers, but his personal magnetism

carried up with him some of the Rifles as well as men of his own command. He and half his little forlorn

hope were struck down he, alas! to die the same night but there were other leaders as brave to take his

place. 'Forrard away, men, forrard away!' cried Nugent, of the Rifles. Three bullets struck him, but he

continued to drag himself up the boulderstudded hill. Others followed, and others, from all sides they came

running, the crouching, yelling, khakiclad figures, and the supports rushed up from the rear. For a time they

were beaten down by their own shrapnel striking into them from behind, which is an amazing thing when one

considers that the range was under 2,000 yards. It was here, between the wall and the summit, that Colonel

Gunning, of the Rifles, and many other brave men met their end, some by our own bullets and some by those

of the enemy; but the Boers thinned away in front of them, and the anxious onlookers from the plain below

But it was, it must be confessed, a Pyrrhic victory. We had our hill, but what else had we? The guns which

had been silenced by our fire had been removed from the kopje. The commando which seized the hill was

that of Lucas Meyer, and it is computed that he had with him about 4,000 men. This figure includes those

under the command of Erasmus, who made halfhearted demonstrations against the British flank. If the

shirkers be eliminated, it is probable that there were not more than a thousand actual combatants upon the

hill. Of this number about fifty were killed and a hundred wounded. The British loss at Talana Hill itself was

41 killed and 180 wounded, but among the killed were many whom the army could ill spare. The gallant but

optimistic Symons, Gunning of the Rifles, Sherston, Connor, Hambro, and many other brave men died that

An incident which occurred immediately after the action did much to rob the British of the fruits of the

victory. Artillery had pushed up the moment that the hill was carried, and had unlimbered on Smith's Nek

between the two hills, from which the enemy, in broken groups of 50 and 100, could be seen streaming away.

A fairer chance for the use of shrapnel has never been. But at this instant there ran from an old iron church on

the reverse side of the hill, which had been used all day as a Boer hospital, a man with a white flag. It is

probable that the action was in good faith, and that it was simply intended to claim a protection for the

ambulance party which followed him. But the too confiding gunner in command appears to have thought that

an armistice had been declared, and held his hand during those precious minutes which might have turned a

defeat into a rout. The chance passed, never to return. The double error of firing into our own advance and of

failing to fire into the enemy's retreat makes the battle one which cannot be looked back to with satisfaction

In the meantime some miles away another train of events had led to a complete disaster to our small cavalry

force a disaster which robbed our dearly bought infantry victory of much of its importance. That action

alone was undoubtedly a victorious one, but the net result of the day's fighting cannot be said to have been

certainly in our favour. It was Wellington who asserted that his cavalry always got him into scrapes, and the

whole of British military history might furnish examples of what he meant. Here again our cavalry got into

trouble. Suffice it for the civilian to chronicle the fact, and leave it to the military critic to portion out the

One company of mounted infantry (that of the Rifles) had been told off to form an escort for the guns. The

rest of the mounted infantry with part of the 18th Hussars (Colonel Moller) had moved round the right flank

until they reached the right rear of the enemy. Such a movement, had Lucas Meyer been the only opponent,

would have been above criticism; but knowing, as we did, that there were several commandoes converging

upon Glencoe it was obviously taking a very grave and certain risk to allow the cavalry to wander too far

from support. They were soon entangled in broken country and attacked by superior numbers of the Boers.

There was a time when they might have exerted an important influence upon the action by attacking the Boer

ponies behind the hills, but the opportunity was allowed to pass. An attempt was made to get back to the

army, and a series of defensive positions were held to cover the retreat, but the enemy's fire became too hot to

allow them to be retained. Every route save one appeared to be blocked, so the horsemen took this, which led

them into the heart of a second commando of the enemy. Finding no way through, the force took up a

defensive position, part of them in a farm and part on a kopje which overlooked it.

The party consisted of two troops of Hussars, one company of mounted infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers, and

one section of the mounted infantry of the Rifles about two hundred men in all. They were subjected to a

hot fire for some hours, many being killed and wounded. Guns were brought up, and fired shell into the

farmhouse. At 4.30 the force, being in a perfectly hopeless position, laid down their arms. Their ammunition

was gone, many of their horses had stampeded, and they were hemmed in by very superior numbers, so that

no slightest slur can rest upon the survivors for their decision to surrender, though the movements which

brought them to such a pass are more open to criticism. They were the vanguard of that considerable body of

humiliated and bitterhearted men who were to assemble at the capital of our brave and crafty enemy. The

remainder of the 18th Hussars, who under Major Knox had been detached from the main force and sent

across the Boer rear, underwent a somewhat similar experience, but succeeded in extricating themselves with

a loss of Six killed and ten wounded. Their efforts were by no means lost, as they engaged the attention of a

considerable body of Boers during the day and were able to bring some prisoners back with them.

The battle of Talana Hill was a tactical victory but a strategic defeat. It was a crude frontal attack without any

attempt at even a feint of flanking, but the valour of the troops, from general to private, carried it through.

The force was in a position so radically false that the only use which they could make of a victory was to

cover their own retreat. From all points Boer commandoes were converging upon it, and already it was

understood that the guns at their command were heavier than any which could be placed against them. This

was made more clear on October 21st, the day after the battle, when the force, having withdrawn overnight

from the useless hill which they had captured, moved across to a fresh position on the far side of the railway.

At four in the afternoon a very heavy gun opened from a distant hill, altogether beyond the extreme range of

our artillery, and plumped shell after shell into our camp. It was the first appearance of the great Creusot. An

officer with several men of the Leicesters, and some of our few remaining cavalry, were bit. The position was

clearly impossible, so at two in the morning of the 22nd the whole force was moved to a point to the south of

the town of Dundee. On the same day a reconnaissance was made in the direction of Glencoe Station, but the

passes were found to be strongly occupied, and the little army marched back again to its original position.

The command had fallen to Colonel Yule, who justly considered that his men were dangerously and uselessly

exposed, and that his correct strategy was to fall back, if it were still possible, and join the main body at

Ladysmith, even at the cost of abandoning the two hundred sick and wounded who lay with General Symons

in the hospital at Dundee. It was a painful necessity, but no one who studies the situation can have any doubt

of its wisdom. The retreat was no easy task, a march by road of some sixty or seventy miles through a very

rough country with an enemy pressing on every side. Its successful completion without any loss or any

demoralisation of the troops is perhaps as fine a military exploit as any of our early victories. Through the

energetic and loyal cooperation of Sir George White, who fought the actions of Elandslaagte and of

Rietfontein in order to keep the way open for them, and owing mainly to the skillful guidance of Colonel

Dartnell, of the Natal Police, they succeeded in their critical manoeuvre. On October 23rd they were at Beith,

on the 24th at Waselibank Spruit, on the 25th at Sunday River, and next morning they marched, sodden with

rain, plastered with mud, dogtired, but in the best of spirits, into Ladysmith amid the cheers of their

comrades. A battle, six days without settled sleep, four days without a proper meal, winding up with a single

march of thirtytwo miles over heavy ground and through a pelting rain storm that was the record of the

Dundee column. They had fought and won, they had striven and toiled to the utmost capacity of manhood,

and the end of it all was that they had reached the spot which they should never have left. But their endurance

could not be lost no worthy deed is ever lost. Like the light division, when they marched their fifty odd

unbroken miles to be present at Talavera, they leave a memory and a standard behind them which is more

important than success. It is by the tradition of such sufferings and such endurance that others in other days

While the Glencoe force had struck furiously at the army of Lucas Meyer, and had afterwards by hard

marching disengaged itself from the numerous dangers which threatened it, its comrades at Ladysmith bad

loyally cooperated in drawing off the attention of the enemy and keeping the line of retreat open.

On October 20th the same day as the Battle of Talana Hill the line was cut by the Boers at a point

nearly midway between Dundee and Ladysmith. A small body of horsemen were the forerunners of a

considerable commando, composed of Freestaters, Transvaalers, and Germans, who had advanced into Natal

through Botha's Pass under the command of General Koch. They had with them the two MaximNordenfelds

which had been captured from the Jameson raiders, and were now destined to return once more to British

On the evening of that day General French, with a strong reconnoitering party, including the Natal

Carabineers, the 5th Lancers, and the 21st battery, had defined the enemy's position. Next morning (the 21st)

he returned, but either the enemy had been reinforced during the night or he had underrated them the day

before, for the force which he took with him was too weak for any serious attack. He had one battery of the

Natal artillery, with their little sevenpounder popguns, five squadrons of the Imperial Horse, and, in the train

which slowly accompanied his advance, half a battalion of the Manchester Regiment. Elated by the news of

Talana Hill, and anxious to emulate their brothers of Dundee, the little force moved out of Ladysmith in the

Some at least of the men were animated by feelings such as seldom find a place in the breast of the British

soldier as he marches into battle. A sense of duty, a belief in the justice of his cause, a love for his regiment

and for his country, these are the common incentives of every soldier. But to the men of the Imperial Light

Horse, recruited as they were from among the British refugees of the Rand, there was added a burning sense

of injustice, and in many cases a bitter hatred against the men whose rule had weighed so heavily upon them.

In this singular corps the ranks were full of wealthy men and men of education, who, driven from their

peaceful vocations in Johannesburg, were bent upon fighting their way back to them again. A most unmerited

slur had been cast upon their courage in connection with the Jameson raid a slur which they and other

similar corps have washed out for ever in their own blood and that of their enemy. Chisholm, a fiery little

Lancer, was in command, with Karri Davis and WoolsSampson, the two stalwarts who had preferred

Pretoria Gaol to the favours of Kruger, as his majors. The troopers were on fire at the news that a cartel had

arrived in Ladysmith the night before, purporting to come from the Johannesburg Boers and Hollanders,

asking what uniform the Light Horse wore, as they were anxious to meet them in battle. These men were

fellow townsmen and knew each other well. They need not have troubled about the uniform, for before

It was about eight o'clock on a bright summer morning that the small force came in contact with a few

scattered Boer outposts, who retired, firing, before the advance of the Imperial Light Horse. As they fell back

the green and white tents of the invaders came into view upon the russetcoloured hillside of Elandslaagte.

Down at the red brick railway station the Boers could be seen swarming out of the buildings in which they

had spent the night. The little Natal guns, firing with obsolete black powder, threw a few shells into the

station, one of which, it is said, penetrated a Boer ambulance which could not be seen by the gunners. The

accident was to be regretted, but as no patients could have been in the ambulance the mischance was not a

But the busy, smoky little sevenpounder guns were soon to meet their master. Away up on the distant

hillside, a long thousand yards beyond their own furthest range, there was a sudden bright flash. No smoke,

only the throb of flame, and then the long sibilant scream of the shell, and the thud as it buried itself in the

ground under a limber. Such judgment of range would have delighted the most martinet of inspectors at

Okehampton. Bang came another, and another, and another, right into the heart of the battery. The six little

guns lay back at their extremest angle, and all barked together in impotent fury. Another shell pitched over

them, and the officer in command lowered his fieldglass in despair as he saw his own shells bursting far

short upon the hillside. Jameson's defeat does not seem to have been due to any defect in his artillery. French,

peering and pondering, soon came to the conclusion that there were too many Boers for him, and that if those

fifteenpounders desired target practice they should find some other mark than the Natal Field Artillery. A

few curt orders, and his whole force was making its way to the rear. There, out of range of those perilous

guns, they halted, the telegraph wire was cut, a telephone attachment was made, and French whispered his

troubles into the sympathetic ear of Ladysmith. He did not whisper in vain. What he had to say was that

where he had expected a few hundred riflemen he found something like two thousand, and that where he

expected no guns he found two very excellent ones. The reply was that by road and by rail as many men as

Soon they began to drop in, those useful reinforcements first the Devons, quiet, businesslike, reliable;

then the Gordons, dashing, fiery, brilliant. Two squadrons of the 5th Lancers, the 42nd R.F.A., the 21st

R.F.A., another squadron of Lancers, a squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards French began to feel that he

was strong enough for the task in front of him. He had a decided superiority of numbers and of guns. But the

others were on their favourite defensive on a hill. It would be a fair fight and a deadly one.

It was late after noon before the advance began. It was hard, among those billowing hills, to make out the

exact limits of the enemy's position. All that was certain was that 'they were there, and that we meant having

them out if it were humanly possible. 'The enemy are there,' said Ian Hamilton to his infantry; 'I hope you

will shift them out before sunset in fact I know you will.' The men cheered and laughed. In long open

lines they advanced across the veldt, while the thunder of the two batteries behind them told the Boer gunners

The idea was to take the position by a front and a flank attack, but there seems to have been some difficulty in

determining which was the front and which the flank. In fact, it was only by trying that one could know.

General White with his staff had arrived from Ladysmith, but refused to take the command out of French's

hands. It is typical of White's chivalrous spirit that within ten days he refused to identify himself with a

victory when it was within his right to do so, and took the whole responsibility for a disaster at which he was

not present. Now he rode amid the shells and watched the able dispositions of his lieutenant.

About halfpast three the action had fairly begun. In front of the advancing British there lay a rolling hill,

topped by a further one. The lower hill was not defended, and the infantry, breaking from column of

companies into open order, advanced over it. Beyond was a broad grassy valley which led up to the main

position, a long kopje flanked by a small sugarloaf one Behind the green slope which led to the ridge of

death an ominous and terrible cloud was driving up, casting its black shadow over the combatants. There was

the stillness which goes before some great convulsion of nature. The men pressed on in silence, the soft

thudding of their feet and the rattle of their sidearms filling the air with a low and continuous murmur. An

additional solemnity was given to the attack by that huge black cloud which hung before them.

The British guns had opened at a range of 4,400 yards, and now against the swarthy background there came

the quick smokeless twinkle of the Boer reply. It was an unequal fight, but gallantly sustained. A shot and

another to find the range; then a wreath of smoke from a bursting shell exactly where the guns had been,

followed by another and another. Overmatched, the two Boer pieces relapsed into a sulky silence, broken

now and again by short spurts of frenzied activity. The British batteries turned their attention away from

them, and began to search the ridge with shrapnel and prepare the way for the advancing infantry.

The scheme was that the Devonshires should hold the enemy in front while the main attack from the left flank

was carried out by the Gordons, the Manchesters, and the Imperial Light Horse. The words 'front' and 'flank,'

however, cease to have any meaning with so mobile and elastic a force, and the attack which was intended to

come from the left became really a frontal one, while the Devons found themselves upon the right flank of

the Boers. At the moment of the final advance the great black cloud had burst, and a torrent of rain lashed

into the faces of the men. Slipping and sliding upon the wet grass, they advanced to the assault.

And now amid the hissing of the rain there came the fuller, more menacing whine of the Mauser bullets, and

the ridge rattled from end to end with the rifle fire. Men fell fast, but their comrades pressed hotly on. There

was a long way to go, for the summit of the position was nearly 800 feet above the level of the railway. The

hillside, which had appeared to be one slope, was really a succession of undulations, so that the advancing

infantry alternately dipped into shelter and emerged into' a hail of bullets. The line of advance was dotted

with khakiclad figures, some still in death, some writhing in their agony. Amid the litter of bodies a major

of the Gordons, shot through the leg, sat philosophically smoking his pipe. Plucky little Chisholm, Colonel of

the Imperials, had fallen with two mortal wounds as he dashed forward waving a coloured sash in the air. So

long was the advance and so trying the hill that the men sank panting upon the ground, and took their breath

before making another rush. As at Talana Hill, regimental formation was largely gone, and men of the

Manchesters, Gordons, and Imperial Light Horse surged upwards in one long ragged fringe, Scotchman,

Englishman, and British Africander keeping pace in that race of death. And now at last they began to see their

enemy. Here and there among the boulders in front of them there was the glimpse of a slouched hat, or a peep

at a flushed bearded face which drooped over a rifle barrel. There was a pause, and then with a fresh impulse

the wave of men gathered themselves together and flung themselves forward. Dark figures sprang up from

the rocks in front. Some held up their rifles in token of surrender. Some ran with heads sunk between their

shoulders, jumping and ducking among the rocks. The panting breathless climbers were on the edge of the

plateau. There were the two guns which had flashed so brightly, silenced now, with a litter of dead gunners

around them and one wounded officer standing by a trail. A small body of the Boers still resisted. Their

appearance horrified some of our men. 'They were dressed in black frock coats and looked like a lot of rather

seedy business men,' said a spectator. 'It seemed like murder to kill them.' Some surrendered, and some

fought to the death where they stood. Their leader Koch, an old gentleman with a white beard, lay amidst the

rocks, wounded in three places. lie was treated with all courtesy and attention, but died in Ladysmith Hospital

In the meanwhile the Devonshire Regiment had waited until the attack had developed and had then charged

the hill upon the flank, while the artillery moved up until it was within 2,000 yards of the enemy's position.

The Devons met with a less fierce resistance than the others, and swept up to the summit in time to head off

But even so these dour fighters were not beaten. They clung desperately to the further edges of the plateau,

firing from behind the rocks. There had been a race for the nearest gun between an officer of the Manchesters

and a drummer sergeant of the Gordons. The officer won, and sprang in triumph on to the piece. Men of all

regiments swarmed round yelling and cheering, when upon their astonished ears there sounded the 'Cease fire

' and then the 'Retire.' It was incredible, and yet it pealed out again, unmistakable in its urgency. With the

instinct of discipline the men were slowly falling back. And then the truth of it came upon the minds of some

of them. The crafty enemy had learned our bugle calls. ' Retire be damned! shrieked a little bugler, and blew

the 'Advance ' with all the breath that the hillside had left him. The men, who had retired a hundred yards and

uncovered the guns, flooded back over the plateau, and in the Boer camp which lay beneath it a white flag

showed that the game was up. A squadron of the 5th Lancers and of the 5th Dragoon Guards, under Colonel

Gore of the latter regiment, had prowled round the base of the hill, and in the fading light they charged

through and through the retreating Boers, killing several, and making from twenty to thirty prisoners. It was

one of the very few occasions in the war where the mounted Briton overtook the mounted Boer.

'What price Majuba?' was the cry raised by some of the infantry as they dashed up to the enemy's position,

and the action may indeed be said to have been in some respects the converse of that famous fight. It is true

that there were many more British at Elandslaagte than Boers at Majuba, but then the defending force was

much more numerous also, and the British had no guns there. It is true, also, that Majuba is very much more

precipitous than Elandslaagte, but then every practical soldier knows that it is easier to defend a moderate

gla is than an abrupt slope, which gives cover under its boulders to the attacker while the defender has to

crane his head over the edge to look down. On the whole, this brilliant little action may be said to have

restored things to their true proportion, and to have shown that, brave as the Boers undoubtedly are, there is

no military feat within their power which is not equally possible to the British soldier. Talana Hill and

Elandslaagte, fought on successive days, were each of them as gallant an exploit as Majuba.

We had more to show for our victory than for the previous one at Dundee. Two MaximNordenfeld guns,

whose efficiency had been painfully evident during the action, were a welcome addition to our artillery. Two

hundred and fifty Boers were killed and wounded and about two hundred taken prisoners, the loss falling

most heavily upon the Johannesburgers, the Germans, and the Hollanders. General Koch, Dr. Coster, Colonel

Schiel, Pretorius, and other wellknown Transvaalers fell into our hands. Our own casualty list consisted of

41 killed and 220 wounded, much the same number as at Talana Hill, the heaviest losses falling upon the

In the hollow where the Boer tents had stood, amid the laagered wagons of the vanquished, under a murky

sky and a constant drizzle of rain, the victors spent the night. Sleep was out of the question, for all night the

fatigue parties were searching the hillside and the wounded were being carried in. Campfires were lit and

soldiers and prisoners crowded round them, and it is pleasant to recall that the warmest corner and the best of

their rude fare were always reserved for the downcast Dutchmen, while words of rude praise and sympathy

softened the pain of defeat. It is the memory of such things which may in happier days be more potent than

Having cleared the Boer force from the line of the railway, it is evident that General White could not continue

to garrison the point, as he was aware that considerable forces were moving from the north, and his first duty

was the security of Ladysmith. Early next morning (October 22nd), therefore, his weary but victorious troops

returned to the town. Once there he learned, no doubt, that General Yule had no intention of using the broken

railway for his retreat, but that he intended to come in a circuitous fashion by road. White's problem was to

hold tight to the town and at the same time to strike hard at any northern force so as to prevent them from

interfering with Yule's retreat. It was in the furtherance of this scheme that he fought upon October 24th the

action of Rietfontein, an engagement slight in itself, but important on account of the clear road which was

The army from the Free State, of which the commando vanquished at Elandslaagte was the vanguard, had

been slowly and steadily debouching from the passes, and working south and eastwards to cut the line

between Dundee and Ladysmith. It was White's intention to prevent them from crossing the Newcastle Road,

and for this purpose he sallied out of Ladysmith on Tuesday the 24th, having with him two regiments of

cavalry, the 5th Lancers and the 19th Hussars, the 42nd and 53rd field batteries with the 10th mountain

battery, four infantry regiments, the Devons, Liverpools, Gloucesters, and 2nd King's Royal Rifles, the

The enemy were found to be in possession of a line of hills within seven miles of Ladysmith, the most

conspicuous of which is called Tinta Inyoni. It was no part of General White's plan to attempt to drive him

from this position it is not wise generalship to fight always upon ground of the enemy's choosing but it

was important to hold him where he was, and to engage his attention during this last day of the march of the

retreating column. For this purpose, since no direct attack was intended, the guns were of more importance

than the infantry and indeed the infantry should, one might imagine, have been used solely as an escort for

the artillery. A desultory and inconclusive action ensued which continued from nine in the morning until

halfpast one in the afternoon. A welldirected fire of the Boer guns from the hills was dominated and

controlled by our field artillery, while the advance of their riflemen was restrained by shrapnel. The enemy's

guns were more easily marked down than at Elandslaagte, as they used black powder. The ranges varied from

three to four thousand yards. Our losses in the whole action would have been insignificant had it not

happened that the Gloucester Regiment advanced somewhat incautiously into the open and was caught in a

cross fire of musketry which struck down Colonel Wilford and fifty of his officers and men. Within four days

Colonel DickCunyngham, of the Gordons, Colonel Chisholm, of the Light Horse, Colonel Gunning, of the

Rifles, and now Colonel Wilford, of the Gloucesters, had all fallen at the head of their regiments. In the

afternoon General White, having accomplished his purpose and secured the safety of the Dundee column

while traversing the dangerous Biggarsberg passes, withdrew his force to Ladysmith. We have no means of

ascertaining the losses of the Boers, but they were probably slight. On our side we lost 109 killed and

wounded, of which only 13 cases were fatal. Of this total 64 belonged to the Gloucesters and 25 to the troops

raised in Natal. Next day, as already narrated, the whole British army was reassembled once more at

At the end of this first vigorous week of hostilities it is interesting to sum up the net result. The strategical

advantage had lain with the Boers. They had made our position at Dundee untenable and had driven us back

to Ladysmith. They had the country and the railway for tile northern quarter of the colony in their possession.

They had killed and wounded between six and seven hundred of our men, and they had captured some two

hundred of our cavalry, while we had been compelled at Dundee to leave considerable stores and our

wounded, including General Penn Symons, who actually died while a prisoner in their hands. On the other

hand, the tactical advantages lay with us. We had twice driven them from their positions, and captured two of

their guns. We had taken two hundred prisoners. and had probably killed and wounded as many as we had

lost. On the whole, the honours of that week's fighting in Natal may be said to have been fairly equal

Sir George White had now reunited his force, and found himself in command of a formidable little army

some twelve thousand in number. His cavalry included the 5th Lancers, the 5th Dragoons, part of the 18th

and the whole of the 19th Hussars, the Natal Carabineers, the Border Rifles, some mounted infantry, and the

Imperial Light Horse. Among his infantry were the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the Dublin Fusiliers, and the King's

Royal Rifles, fresh from the ascent of Talana Hill, the Gordons, the Manchesters, and the Devons who had

been blooded at Elandslaagte, the Leicesters, the Liverpools, the 2nd battalion of the King's Royal Rifles, the

2nd Rifle Brigade, and the Gloucesters, who had been so roughly treated at Rietfontein. He bad six batteries

of excellent field artillery the 13th, 21st, 42nd, 53rd, 67th, 69th, and No.10 Mountain Battery of screw

guns. No general could have asked for a more compact and workmanlike little force.

It had been recognised by the British General from the beginning that his tactics must be defensive, since he

was largely outnumbered and since also any considerable mishap to his force would expose the whole colony

of Natal to destruction. The actions of Elandslaagte and Rietfontein were forced upon him in order to

disengage his compromised detachment, but now there was no longer any reason why he should assume the

offensive. He knew that away out on the Atlantic a trail of transports which already extended from the

Channel to Cape de Verde were hourly drawing nearer to him with the army corps from England. In a

fortnight or less the first of them would be at Durban. It was his game, therefore, to keep his army intact, and

to let those throbbing engines and whirling propellers do the work of the empire. Had he entrenched himself

But so tame and inglorious a policy is impossible to a fighting soldier. He could not with his splendid force

permit himself to be shut in without an action. What policy demands honour may forbid. On October 27th

there were already Boers and rumours of Boers on every side of him. Joubert with his main body was moving

across from Dundee. The Freestaters were to the north and west. Their combined numbers were uncertain, but

at least it was already proved that they were far more numerous and also more formidable than had been

anticipated. We had had a taste of their artillery also, and the pleasant delusion that it would be a mere useless

encumbrance to a Boer force had vanished for ever. It was a grave thing to leave the town in order to give

battle, for the mobile enemy might swing round and seize it behind us. Nevertheless White determined to

On the 29th the enemy were visibly converging upon the town. From a high hill within rifleshot of the houses

a watcher could see no fewer than six Boer camps to the east and north. French, with his cavalry, pushed out

feelers, and coasted along the edge of the advancing host. His report warned White that if he would strike

before all the scattered bands were united he must do so at once. The wounded were sent down to

Pietermaritzburg, and it would bear explanation why the noncombatants did not accompany them. On the

evening of the same day Joubert in person was said to be only six miles off, and a party of his men cut the

water supply of the town. The Klip, however, a fairsized river, runs through Ladysmith, so that there was no

danger of thirst. The British had inflated and sent up a balloon, to the amazement of the backveldt Boers; its

report confirmed the fact that the enemy was in force in front of and around them.

On the night of the 29th General White detached two of his best regiments, the Irish Fusiliers and the

Gloucesters, with No.10 Mountain Battery, to advance under cover of the darkness and to seize and hold a

long ridge called Nicholson's Nek, which lay about six miles to the north of Ladysmith. Having determined to

give battle on the next day, his object was to protect his left wing against those Freestaters who were still

moving from the north and west, and also to keep a pass open by which his cavalry might pursue the Boer

fugitives in case of a British victory. This small detached column numbered about a thousand men whose

At five o'clock on the morning of the 30th the Boers, who had already developed a perfect genius for hauling

heavy cannon up the most difficult heights, opened fire from one of the hills which lie to the north of the

town. Before the shot was fired, the forces of the British had already streamed out of Ladysmith to test the

White's army was divided into three columns. On the extreme left, quite isolated from the others, was the

small Nicholson's Nek detachment under the command of Colonel Carleton of the Fusiliers (one of three

gallant brothers each of whom commands a British regiment). With him was Major Adye of the staff. On the

right British flank Colonel Grimwood commanded a brigade composed of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the

King's Royal Rifles, the Leicesters, the Liverpools, and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. In the centre Colonel Ian

Hamilton commanded the Devons, the Gordons, the Manchesters, and the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade,

which marched direct into the battle from the train which had brought them from Durban. Six batteries of

artillery were massed in the centre under Colonel Downing. French with the cavalry and mounted infantry

was on the extreme right, but found little opportunity for the use of the mounted arm that day.

The Boer position, so far as it could be seen, was a formidable one. Their centre lay upon one of the spurs of

Signal Hill, about three miles from the town. Here they had two fortypounders and three other lighter guns,

but their artillery strength developed both in numbers and in weight of metal as the day wore on. Of their

dispositions little could be seen. An observer looking westward might discern with his glass sprays of

mounted riflemen galloping here and there over the downs, and possibly small groups where the gunners

stood by their guns, or the leaders gazed down at that town which they were destined to have in view for such

a weary while. On the duncoloured plains before the town, the long thin lines, with an occasional shifting

sparkle of steel, showed where Hamilton's and Grimwood's infantry were advancing. In the clear cold air of

an African morning every detail could be seen, down to the distant smoke of a train toiling up the heavy

The scrambling, inconsequential, unsatisfactory action which ensued is as difficult to describe as it must have

been to direct. The Boer front covered some seven or eight miles, with kopjes, like chains of fortresses,

between. They formed a huge semicircle of which our advance was the chord, and they were able from this

position to pour in a converging artillery fire which grew steadily hotter as the day advanced. In the early part

of the day our fortytwo guns, working furiously, though with a want of accuracy which may be due to those

errors of refraction which are said to be common in the limpid air of the veldt, preserved their superiority.

There appears to have been a want of concentration about our fire, and at some periods of the action each

particular battery was firing at some different point of the Boer halfcircle. Sometimes for an hour on end the

Boer reply would die away altogether, only to break out with augmented violence, and with an accuracy

which increased our respect for their training. Huge shells the largest that ever burst upon a battlefield

hurled from distances which were unattainable by our fifteenpounders, enveloped our batteries in smoke

and flame. One enormous Creusot gun on Pepworth Hill threw a 96pound shell a distance of four miles, and

several 40pound howitzers outweighted our field guns. And on the same day on which we were so roughly

taught how large the guns were which labour and good will could haul on to the field of battle, we learned

also that our enemy to the disgrace of our Board of Ordnance be it recorded was more in touch with

modern invention than we were, and could show us not only the largest, but also the smallest, shell which had

yet been used. Would that it had been our officials instead of our gunners who heard the devilish little

onepound shells of the VickersMaxim automatic gun, exploding with a continuous string of crackings and

Up to seven o'clock our infantry had shown no disposition to press the attack, for with so huge a position in

front of them, and so many hills which were held by the enemy, it was difficult to know what line of advance

should be taken, or whether the attack should not be converted into a mere reconnaissance. Shortly after that

hour, however, the Boers decided the question by themselves developing a vigorous movement upon

Grimwood and the right flank. With field guns, Maxims, and rifle fire, they closed rapidly in upon him. The

centre column was drafted off, regiment by regiment, to reinforce the right. The Gordons, Devons,

Manchesters, and three batteries were sent over to Grimwood's relief, and the 5th Lancers, acting as infantry,

At nine o'clock there was a lull, but it was evident that fresh commandoes and fresh guns were continually

streaming into the firing line. The engagement opened again with redoubled violence, and Grimwood's three

advanced battalions fell back, abandoning the ridge which they had held for five hours. The reason for this

withdrawal was not that they could not continue to hold their position, but it was that a message had just

reached Sir George White from Colonel Knox, commanding in Ladysmith, to the effect that it looked as if the

enemy was about to rush the town from the other side. Crossing the open in some disorder, they lost heavily,

and would have done so more had not the 13th Field Battery, followed after an interval by the 53rd, dashed

forward, firing shrapnel at short ranges, in order to cover the retreat of the infantry. Amid the bursting of the

huge 96pound shells, and the snapping of the vicious little automatic onepounders, with a crossfire of

rifles as well, Abdy's and Dawkins' gallant batteries swung round their muzzles, and hit back right and left,

flashing and blazing, amid their litter of dead horses and men. So severe was the fire that the guns were

obscured by the dust knocked up by the little shells of the automatic gun. Then, when their work was done

and the retiring infantry had straggled over the ridge, the covering guns whirled and bounded after them. So

many horses had fallen that two pieces were left until the teams could be brought back for them, which was

successfully done through the gallantry of Captain Thwaites. The action of these batteries was one of the few

gleams of light in a not too brilliant day's work. With splendid coolness and courage they helped each other

by alternate retirements after the retreating infantry had passed them. The 21st Battery (Blewitt's) also

distinguished itself by its staunchness in covering the retirement of the cavalry, while the 42nd (Goulburn's)

suffered the heaviest losses of any. On the whole, such honours as fell to our lot were mainly with the

White must have been now uneasy for his position, and it had become apparent that his only course was to

fall back and concentrate upon the town. His left flank was up in the air, and the sound of distant firing,

wafted over five miles of broken country, was the only message which arrived from them. His right had been

pushed back, and, most dangerous of all, his centre had ceased to exist, for only the 2nd Rifle Brigade

remained there. What would happen if the enemy burst rudely through and pushed straight for the town? It

was the more possible, as the Boer artillery had now proved itself to be far heavier than ours. That terrible

96pounder, serenely safe and out of range, was plumping its great projectiles into the masses of retiring

troops. The men had had little sleep and little food, and this unanswerable fire was an ordeal for a force

which is retreating. A retirement may very rapidly become a rout under such circumstances. It was with some

misgivings that the officers saw their men quicken their pace and glance back over their shoulders at the

whine and screech of the shell. They were still some miles from home, and the plain was open. What could be

And at that very moment there came the opportune and unexpected answer. That plume of engine smoke

which the watcher had observed in the morning had drawn nearer and nearer, as the heavy train came puffing

and creaking up the steep inclines. Then, almost before it had drawn up at the Ladysmith siding, there had

sprung from it a crowd of merry bearded fellows, with ready hands and strange sea cries, pulling and hauling,

with rope and purchase to get out the long slim guns which they had lashed on the trucks. Singular carriages

were there, specially invented by Captain Percy Scott, and labouring and straining, they worked furiously to

get the 12pounder quickfirers into action. Then at last it was done, and the long tubes swept upwards to the

angle at which they might hope to reach that monster on the hill at the horizon. Two of them craned their long

inquisitive necks up and exchanged repartees with the big Creusot. And so it was that the weary and

dispirited British troops heard a crash which was louder and sharper than that of their field guns, and saw far

away upon the distant hill a great spurt of smoke and flame to show where the shell had struck. Another and

another and anotherand then they were troubled no more. Captain Hedworth Lambton and his men had

saved the situation. The masterful gun had met its own master and sank into silence, while the somewhat

bedraggled field force came trailing back into Ladysmith, leaving three hundred of their number behind them.

It was a high price to pay, but other misfortunes were in store for us which made the retirement of the

In the meantime we may follow the unhappy fortunes of the small column which had, as already described,

been sent out by Sir George White in order, if possible, to prevent the junction of the two Boer armies, and at

the same time to threaten the right wing of the main force, which was advancing from the direction of

Dundee, Sir George White throughout the campaign consistently displayed one quality which is a charming

one in an individual, but may be dangerous in a commander. He was a confirmed optimist. Perhaps his heart

might have failed him in the dark days to come had he not been so. But whether one considers the

nondestruction of the Newcastle Railway, the acquiescence in the occupation of Dundee, the retention of the

non combatants in Ladysmith until it was too late to get rid of their useless mouths, or the failure to make any

serious preparations for the defence of the town until his troops were beaten back into it, we see always the

same evidence of a man who habitually hopes that all will go well, and is in consequence remiss in making

preparations for their going ill. But unhappily in every one of these instances they did go ill, though the

slowness of the Boers enabled us, both at Dundee and at Ladysmith, to escape what might have been disaster.

Sir George White has so nobly and frankly taken upon himself the blame of Nicholson's Nek that an impartial

historian must rather regard his selfcondemnation as having been excessive. The immediate causes of the

failure were undoubtedly the results of pure illfortune, and depended on things outside his control. But it is

evident that the strategic plan which would justify the presence of this column at Nicholson's Nek was based

upon the supposition that the main army won their action at Lombard's Kop. In that case White might swing

round his right and pin the Boers between himself and Nicholson's Nek. In any case he could then reunite

with his isolated wing. But if he should lose his battlewhat then? What was to become of this detachment

five miles up in the air? How was it to be extricated? The gallant Irishman seems to have waved aside the

very idea of defeat. An assurance was, it is reported, given to the leaders of the column that by eleven o'clock

next morning they would be relieved. So they would if White had won his action. But

The force chosen to operate independently consisted of four and a half companies of the Gloucester regiment,

six companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and No. 10 Mountain Battery of six sevenpounder screwguns.

They were both old soldier regiments from India, and the Fusiliers had shown only ten days before at Talana

Hill the stuff of which they were made. Colonel Carleton, of the Fusiliers, to whose exertions much of the

success of the retreat from Dundee was due, commanded the column, with Major Adye as staff officer. On

the night of Sunday, October 29th, they tramped out of Ladysmith, a thousand men, none better in the army.

Little they thought, as they exchanged a jest or two with the outlying pickets, that they were seeing the last of

The road was irregular and the night was moonless. On either side the black loom of the hills bulked vaguely

through the darkness. The column tramped stolidly along, the Fusiliers in front, the guns and Gloucesters

behind. Several times a short halt was called to make sure of the bearings. At last, in the black cold hours

which come between midnight and morning, the column swung to the left out of the road. In front of them,

hardly visible, stretched a long black kopje. It was the very Nicholson's Nek which they had come to occupy.

Carleton and Adye must have heaved a sigh of relief as they realised that they had actually struck it. The

force was but two hundred yards from the position, and all had gone without a hitch. And yet in those two

hundred yards there came an incident which decided the fate both of their enterprise and of themselves.

Out of the darkness there blundered and rattled five horsemen, their horses galloping, the loose stones flying

around them. In the dim light they were gone as soon as seen. Whence coming, whither going, no one knows,

nor is it certain whether it was design or ignorance or panic which sent them riding so wildly through the

darkness. Somebody fired. A sergeant of the Fusiliers took the bullet through his hand. Some one else

shouted to fix bayonets. The mules which carried the spare ammunition kicked and reared. There was no

question of treachery, for they were led by our own men, but to hold two frightened mules, one with either

hand, is a feat for a Hercules. They lashed and tossed and bucked themselves loose, and an instant afterwards

were flying helter skelter through the column. Nearly all the mules caught the panic. In vain the men held on

to their heads. In the mad rush they were galloped over and knocked down by the torrent of frightened

creatures. In the gloom of that early hour the men must have thought that they were charged by cavalry. The

column was dashed out of all military order as effectively as if a regiment of dragoons had ridden over them.

When the cyclone had passed, and the men had with many a muttered curse gathered themselves into their

ranks once more, they realised how grave was the misfortune which had befallen them. There, where those

mad hoofs still rattled in the distance, were their spare cartridges, their shells, and their cannon. A mountain

gun is not drawn upon wheels, but is carried in adjustable parts upon muleback. A wheel bad gone south, a

trail east, a chase west. Some of the cartridges were strewn upon the road. Most were on their way back to

Ladysmith. There was nothing for it but to face this new situation and to determine what should be done.

It has been often and naturally asked, why did not Colonel Carleton make his way back at once upon the loss

of his guns and ammunition, while it was still dark? One or two considerations are evident. In the first place,

it is natural to a good soldier to endeavour to retrieve a situation rather than to abandon his enterprise. His

prudence, did he not do so, might become the subject of public commendation, but might also provoke some

private comment. A soldier's training is to take chances, and to do the best he can with the material at his

disposal. Again, Colonel Carleton and Major Adye knew the general plan of the battle which would be raging

within a very few hours, and they quite understood that by withdrawing they would expose General White's

left flank to attack from the forces (consisting, as we know now, of the Orange Freestaters and of the

Johannesburg Police) who were coming from the north and west. He hoped to be relieved by eleven, and he

believed that, come what might, he could hold out until then. These are the most obvious of the

considerations which induced Colonel Carleton to determine to carry out so far as he could the programme

which had been laid down for him and his command. He marched up the hill and occupied the position.

His heart, however, must have sunk when he examined it. It was very large too large to be effectively

occupied by the force which he commanded. The length was about a mile and the breadth four hundred yards.

Shaped roughly like the sole of a boot, it was only the heel end which he could hope to hold. Other hills all

round offered cover for Boer riflemen. Nothing daunted, however, he set his men to work at once building

sangars with the loose stones. With the full dawn and the first snapping of Boer Mausers from the hills

around they had thrown up some sort of rude defences which they might hope to hold until help should come.

But how could help come when there was no means by which they could let White know the plight in which

they found themselves? They had brought a heliograph with them, but it was on the back of one of those

accursed mules. The Boers were thick around them, and they could not send a messenger. An attempt was

made to convert a polished biscuit tin into a heliograph, but with poor success. A Kaffir was dispatched with

promises of a heavy bribe, but he passed out of history. And there in the clear cold morning air the balloon

hung to the south of them where the first distant thunder of White's guns was beginning to sound. If only they

could attract the attention of that balloon! Vainly they wagged flags at it. Serene and unresponsive it brooded

And now the Boers were thickening round them on every side. Christian do Wet, a name soon to be a

household word, marshaled the Boer attack, which was soon strengthened by the arrival of Van Dam and his

Police. At five o'clock the fire began, at six it was warm, at seven warmer still. Two companies of the

Gloucesters lined a sangar on the tread of the sole, to prevent any one getting too near to the heel. A fresh

detachment of Boers, firing from a range of nearly one thousand yards, took this defence in the rear. Bullets

fell among the men, and smacked up against the stone breastwork. The two companies were withdrawn, and

lost heavily in the open as they crossed it. An incessant rattle and crackle of rifle fire came from all round,

drawing very slowly but steadily nearer. Now and then the whisk of a dark figure from one boulder to another

was all that ever was seen of the attackers. The British fired slowly and steadily, for every cartridge counted,

but the cover of the Boers was so cleverly taken that it was seldom that there was much to aim at. 'All you

could ever see,' says one who was present, 'were the barrels of the rifles.' There was time for thought in that

long morning, and to some of the men it may have occurred what preparation for such fighting had they ever

had in the mechanical exercises of the parade ground, or the shooting of an annual bagful of cartridges at

exposed targets at a measured range. It is the warfare of Nicholson's Nek, not that of Laffan's Plain, which

During those weary hours lying on the bulletswept hill and listening to the eternal hissing in the air and

clicking on the rocks, the British soldiers could see the fight which raged to the south of them. It was not a

cheering sight, and Carleton and Adye with their gallant comrades must have felt their hearts grow heavier as

they watched. The Boers' shells bursting among the British batteries, the British shells bursting short of their

opponents. The Long Toms laid at an angle of fortyfive plumped their huge shells into the British guns at a

range where the latter would not dream of unlimbering. And then gradually the rifle fire died away also,

crackling more faintly as White withdrew to Ladysmith. At eleven o'clock Carleton's column recognised that

it had been left to its fate. As early as nine a heliogram had been sent to them to retire as the opportunity

The men had then been under fire for six hours, and with their losses mounting and their cartridges

dwindling, all hope had faded from their minds. But still for another hour, and yet another, and yet another,

they held doggedly on. Nine and a half hours they clung to that pile of stones. The Fusiliers were still

exhausted from the effect of their march from Glencoe and their incessant work since. Many fell asleep

behind the boulders. Some sat doggedly with their useless rifles and empty pouches beside them. Some

picked cartridges off their dead comrades. What were they fighting for? It was hopeless, and they knew it.

But always there was the honour of the flag, the glory of the regiment, the hatred of a proud and brave man to

acknowledge defeat. And yet it had to come. There wore some in that force who were ready for the reputation

of the British army, and for the sake of an example of military virtue, to die stolidly where they stood, or to

lead the 'Faughaballagh' boys, or the gallant 28th, in one last deathcharge with empty rifles against the

unseen enemy. They may' have been right, these stalwarts. Leonidas and his three hundred did more for the

Spartan cause by their memory than by their living valour. Man passes like the brown leaves, but the tradition

of a nation lives on like the oak that sheds them and the passing of the leaves is nothing if the bole be the

sounder for it. But a counsel of perfection is easy at a study table. There are other things to he said the

responsibility of officers for the lives of their men, the hope that they may yet be of service to their country.

All was weighed, all was thought of, and so at last the white flag went up. The officer who hoisted it could

see no one unhurt save himself, for all in his sangar were hit, and the others were so placed that he was under

the impression that they had withdrawn altogether. Whether this hoisting of the flag necessarily compromised

the whole force is a difficult question, but the Boers instantly left their cover, and the men in the sangars

behind, some of whom had not been so seriously engaged, were ordered by their officers to desist from firing.

It was not, as I have been told by those who were there, a sight which one would wish to have seen or care

now to dwell upon. Haggard officers cracked their swordblades and cursed the day that they had been born.

Privates sobbed with their stained faces buried in their hands. Of all tests of discipline that ever they had

stood, the hardest to many was to conform to all that the cursed flapping handkerchief meant to them. 'Father,

father, we had rather have died,' cried the Fusiliers to their priest. Gallant hearts, ill paid, ill thanked, how

poorly do the successful of the world compare with their unselfish loyalty and devotion!

But the sting of contumely or insult was not added to their misfortunes. There is a fellowship of brave men

which rises above the feuds of nations, and may at last go far, we hope, to heal them. From every rock there

rose a Boer strange, grotesque figures many of them walnutbrown and shaggybearded, and

swarmed on to the hill. No term of triumph or reproach came from their lips. 'You will not say now that the

young Boer cannot shoot,' was the harshest word which the least restrained of them made use of. Between

one and two hundred dead and wounded were scattered over the hill. Those who were within reach of human

help received all that could be given. Captain Rice, of the Fusiliers, was carried wounded down the hill on the

back of one giant, and he has narrated how the man refused the gold piece which was offered him. Some

asked the soldiers for their embroidered waistbelts as souvenirs of the day. They will for generations remain

as the most precious ornaments of some colonial farmhouse. Then the victors gathered together and sang

psalms, not jubilant but sad and quavering. The prisoners, in a downcast column, weary, spent, and unkempt,

filed off to the Boer laager at Waschbank, there to take train for Pretoria. And at Ladysmith a bugler of

Fusiliers, his arm bound, the marks of battle on his dress and person, burst in upon the camp with the news

that two veteran regiments had covered the flank of White's retreating army, but at the cost of their own

At the end of a fortnight of actual hostilities in Natal the situation of the Boer army was such as to seriously

alarm the public at home, and to cause an almost universal chorus of illnatured delight from the press of all

European nations. Whether the reason was hatred of ourselves, or the sporting instinct which backs the

smaller against the larger, or the influence of the ubiquitous Dr. Leyds and his secret service fund, it is certain

that the continental papers have never been so unanimous as in their premature rejoicings over what, with an

extraordinary want of proportion, and ignorance of our national character, they imagined to be a damaging

blow to the British Empire. France, Russia, Austria, and Germany were equally venomous against us, nor can

the visit of the German Emperor, though a courteous and timely action in itself, entirely atone for the

senseless bitterness of the press of the Fatherland. Great Britain was roused out of her habitual apathy and

disregard for foreign opinion by this chorus of execration, and braced herself for a greater effort in

consequence. She was cheered by the sympathy of her friends in the United States, and by the good wishes of

the smaller nations of Europe, notably of Italy, Denmark, Greece. Turkey, and Hungary.

The exact position at the end of this fortnight of hard slogging was that a quarter of the colony of Natal and a

hundred miles of railway were in the hands of the enemy. Five distinct actions had been fought, none of them

perhaps coming within the fair meaning of a battle. Of these one had been a distinct British victory, two had

been indecisive, one had been unfortunate, and one had been a positive disaster. We had lost about twelve

hundred prisoners and a battery of small guns. The Boers had lost two fine guns and three hundred prisoners.

Twelve thousand British troops had been shut up in Ladysmith, and there was no serious force between the

invaders and the sea. Only in those distant transports, where the grimy stokers shoveled and strove, were

there hopes for the safety of Natal and the honour of the Empire. In Cape Colony the loyalists waited with

bated breath, knowing well that there was nothing to check a Free State invasion, and that if it came no

bounds could be placed upon how far it might advance, or what effect it might have upon the Dutch

Leaving Ladysmith now apparently within the grasp of the Boers, who had settled down deliberately to the

work of throttling it, the narrative must pass to the western side of the seat of war, and give a consecutive

account of the events which began with the siege of Kimberley and led to the ineffectual efforts of Lord

On the declaration of war two important movements had been made by the Boers upon the west. One was the

advance of a considerable body under the formidable Cronje to attack Mafeking, an enterprise which

demands a chapter of its own. The other was the investment of Kimberley by a force which consisted

principally of Freestaters under the command of Wessels and Botha. The place was defended by Colonel

Kekewich, aided by the advice and help of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, who had gallantly thrown himself into the town

by one of the last trains which reached it. As the founder and director of the great De Beers diamond mines

he desired to be with his people in the hour of their need, and it was through his initiative that the town had

The troops which Colonel Kekewich had at his disposal consisted of four companies of the Loyal North

Lancashire Regiment (his own regiment), with some Royal Engineers, a mountain battery, and two machine

guns. In addition there were the extremely spirited and capable local forces, a hundred and twenty men of the

Cape Police, two thousand Volunteers, a body of Kimberley Light Horse, and a battery of light

sevenpounder guns. There were also eight Maxims which were mounted upon the huge mounds of debris

A small reinforcement of police had, under tragic circumstances, reached the town. Vryburg, the capital of

British Bechuanaland, lies 145 miles to the north of Kimberley. The town has strong Dutch sympathies, and

on the news of the approach of a Boer force with artillery it was evident that it could not be held. Scott, the

commandant of police, made some attempt to organise a defence, but having no artillery and finding little

sympathy, he was compelled to abandon his charge to the invaders. The gallant Scott rode south with his

troopers, and in his humiliation and grief at his inability to preserve his post he blew out his brains upon the

journey. Vryburg was immediately occupied by the Boers, and British Bechuanaland was formally annexed

to the South African Republic. This policy of the instant annexation of all territories invaded was habitually

carried out by the enemy, with the idea that British subjects who joined them would in this way be shielded

from the consequences of treason. Meanwhile several thousand Freestaters and Transvaalers with artillery

had assembled round Kimberley, and all news of the town was cut off. Its relief was one of the first tasks

which presented itself to the inpouring army corps. The obvious base of such a movement must be Orange

River, and there and at De Aar the stores for the advance began to be accumulated. At the latter place

especially, which is the chief railway junction in the north of the colony, enormous masses of provisions,

ammunition, and fodder were collected, with thousands of mules which the long arm of the British

Government had rounded up from many parts of the world. The guard over these costly and essential supplies

seems to have been a dangerously weak one. Between Orange River and De Aar, which are sixty miles apart,

there were the 9th Lancers, the Royal Munsters, the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and the 1st

Northumberland Fusiliers, under three thousand men in all, with two million pounds' worth of stores and the

Free State frontier within a ride of them. Verily if we have something to deplore in this war we have much

Up to the end of October the situation was so dangerous that it is really inexplicable that no advantage was

taken of it by the enemy. Our main force was concentrated to defend the Orange River railway bridge, which

was so essential for our advance upon Kimberley. This left only a single regiment without guns for the

defence of De Aar and the valuable stores. A fairer mark for a dashing leader and a raid of mounted riflemen

was never seen. The chance passed, however, as so many others of the Boers' had done. Early in November

Colesberg and Naauwpoort were abandoned by our small detachments, who concentrated at De Aar. The

Berkshires joined the Yorkshire Light Infantry, and nine field guns arrived also. General Wood worked hard

at the fortifying of the surrounding kopjes, until within a week the place had been made tolerably secure.

The first collision between the opposing forces at this part of the seat of war was upon November 10th, when

Colonel Gough of the 9th Lancers made a reconnaissance from Orange River to the north with two squadrons

of his own regiment, the mounted infantry of the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Royal Munsters, and the

North Lancashires, with a battery of field artillery. To the east of Belmont, about fifteen miles off, he came

on a detachment of the enemy with a gun. To make out the Boer position the mounted infantry galloped

round one of their flanks, and in doing so passed close to a kopje which was occupied by sharpshooters. A

deadly fire crackled suddenly out from among the boulders. Of six men hit four were officers, showing how

cool were the marksmen and how dangerous those dress distinctions which will probably disappear hence

forwards upon the field of battle. Colonel KeithFalconer of the Northumberlands, who had earned

distinction in the Soudan, was shot dead. So was Wood of the North Lancashires. Hall and Bevan of the

Northumberlands were wounded. An advance by train of the troops in camp drove back the Boers and

extricated our small force from what might have proved a serious position, for the enemy in superior numbers

were working round their wings. The troops returned to camp without any good object having been attained,

On November 12th Lord Methuen arrived at Orange River and proceeded to organise the column which was

to advance to the relief of Kimberley. General Methuen had had some previous South African experience

when in 1885 he had commanded a large body of irregular horse in Bechuanaland. His reputation was that of

The force which gradually assembled at Orange River was formidable rather from its quality than from its

numbers. It included a brigade of Guards (the 1st Scots Guards, 3rd Grenadiers, and 1st and 2nd

Coldstreams), the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd Northamptons, the 1st Northumberlands, and a wing

of the North Lancashires whose comrades were holding out at Kimberley, with a naval brigade of seamen

gunners and marines. For cavalry he had the 9th Lancers, with detachments of mounted infantry, and for

Extreme mobility was aimed at in the column, and neither tents nor comforts of any sort were permitted to

officers or men no light matter in a climate where a tropical day is followed by an arctic night. At

daybreak on November 22nd the force, numbering about eight thousand men, set off upon its eventful

journey. The distance to Kimberley was not more than sixty miles, and it is probable that there was not one

man in the force who imagined how long that march would take or how grim the experiences would be which

awaited them on the way. At the dawn of Wednesday, November 22nd, Lord Methuen moved forward until

he came into touch with the Boer position at Belmont. It was surveyed that evening by Colonel Willoughby

The force of the Boers was much inferior to our own, some two or three thousand in all, but the natural

strength of their position made it a difficult one to carry, while it could not be left behind us as a menace to

our line of communications. A double row of steep hills lay across the road to Kimberley, and it was along

the ridges, snuggling closely among the boulders, that our enemy was waiting for us. In their weeks of

preparation they had constructed elaborate shelter pits in which they could lie in comparative safety while

they swept all the level ground around with their rifle fire. Mr. Ralph, the American correspondent, whose

letters were among the most vivid of the war, has described these lairs, littered with straw and the debris of

food, isolated from each other, and each containing its grim and formidable occupant. 'The eyries of birds of

prey' is the phrase with which he brings them home to us. In these, with nothing visible but their peering eyes

and the barrels of their rifles, the Boor marksmen crouched, and munched their biltong and their mealies as

the day broke upon the morning of the 23rd. With the light their enemy was upon them.

It was a soldiers' battle in the good old primeval British style, an Alma on a small scale and against deadlier

weapons. The troops advanced in grim silence against the savagelooking, rocksprinkled, cragtopped

position which confronted them. They were in a fierce humour, for they had not breakfasted, and military

history from Agincourt to Talavera shows that want of food wakens a dangerous spirit among British troops.

A Northumberland Fusilier exploded into words which expressed the gruffness of his comrades. As a too

energetic staff officer pranced before their line he roared in his rough Northcountry tongue, 'Domn thee! Get

thee to hell, and let's fire! ' In the golden light of the rising sun the men set their teeth and dashed up the hills,

scrambling, falling, cheering, swearing, gallant men, gallantly led, their one thought to close with that grim

Lord Methuen's intention had been an attack from front and from flank, but whether from the Grenadiers

losing their bearings, or from the mobility of the Boers, which made a flank attack an impossibility, it is

certain that all became frontal. The battle resolved itself into a number of isolated actions in which the

various kopjes were rushed by different British regiments, always with success and always with loss. The

honours of the fight, as tested by the grim record of the casualty returns, lay with the Grenadiers, the

Coldstreams, the Northumberlands, and the Scots Guards. The brave Guardsmen lay thickly on the slopes,

but their comrades crowned the heights. The Boers held on desperately and fired their rifles in the very faces

of the stormers. One young officer had his jaw blown to pieces by a rifle which almost touched him. Another,

Blundell of the Guards, was shot dead by a wounded desperado to whom he was offering his waterbottle. At

one point a white flag was waved by the defenders, on which the British left cover, only to be met by a

volley. It was there that Mr. E. F. Knight, of the 'Morning Post,' became the victim of a double abuse of the

usages of war, since his wound, from which he lost his right arm, was from an explosive bullet. The man who

raised the flag was captured, and it says much for the humanity of British soldiers that he was not bayoneted

upon the spot. Yet it is not fair to blame a whole people for the misdeeds of a few, and it is probable that the

men who descended to such devices, or who deliberately fired upon our ambulances, were as much execrated

The victory was an expensive one, for fifty killed and two hundred wounded lay upon the hillside, and, like

so many of our skirmishes with the Boers, it led to small material results. Their losses appear to have been

much about the same as ours, and we captured some fifty prisoners, whom the soldiers regarded with the

utmost interest. They were a sullen slouching crowd rudely clad, and they represented probably the poorest of

the burghers, who now, as in the middle ages, suffer most in battle, since a long purse means a good horse.

Most of the enemy galloped very comfortably away after the action, leaving a fringe of sharpshooters among

the kopjes to hold back our pursuing cavalry. The want of horsemen and the want of horse artillery are the

two reasons which Lord Methuen gives why the defeat was not converted into a rout. As it was, the feelings

of the retreating Boers were exemplified by one of their number, who turned in his saddle in order to place

his outstretched fingers to his nose in derision of the victors. He exposed himself to the fire of half a battalion

while doing so, but he probably was aware that with our present musketry instruction the fire of a British

The remainder of the 23rd was spent at Belmont Camp, and next morning an advance was made to Enslin,

some ten miles further on. Here lay the plain of Enslin, bounded by a formidable line of kopjes as dangerous

as those of Belmont. Lancers and Rimington's Scouts, the feeble but very capable cavalry of the Army, came

in with the report that the hills were strongly held. Some more hard slogging was in front of the relievers of

The advance had been on the line of the CapetownKimberley Railway, and the damage done to it by the

Boors had been repaired to the extent of permitting an armoured train with a naval gun to accompany the

troops. It was six o' clock upon the morning of Saturday the 25th that this gun came into action against the

kopjes, closely followed by the guns of the field artillery. One of the lessons of the war has been to disillusion

us as to the effect of shrapnel fire. Positions which had been made theoretically untenable have again and

again been found to be most inconveniently tenanted. Among the troops actually engaged the confidence in

the effect of shrapnel fire has steadily declined with their experience. Some other method of artillery fire than

the curving bullet from an exploding shrapnel shell must be devised for dealing with men who lie close

These remarks upon shrapnel might be included in the account of half the battles of the war, but they are

particularly apposite to the action at Enslin. Here a single large kopje formed the key to the position, and a

considerable time was expended upon preparing it for the British assault, by directing upon it a fire which

swept the face of it and searched, as was hoped, every corner in which a rifleman might lurk. One of the two

batteries engaged fired no fewer than five hundred rounds. Then the infantry advance was ordered, the

Guards being held in reserve on account of their exertions at Belmont. The Northumberlands, Northamptons,

North Lancashires, and Yorkshires worked round upon the right, and, aided by the artillery fire, cleared the

trenches in their front. The honours of the assault, however, must be awarded to the sailors and marines of the

Naval Brigade, who underwent such an ordeal as men have seldom faced and yet come out as victors. To

them fell the task of carrying that formidable hill which had been so scourged by our artillery. With a grand

rush they swept up the slope, but were met by a horrible fire. Every rock spurted flame, and the front ranks

withered away before the storm of the Mauser. An eyewitness has recorded that the brigade was hardly

visible amid the sand knocked up by the bullets. For an instant they fell back into cover, and then, having

taken their breath, up they went again, with a deepchested sailor roar. There were but four hundred in all,

two hundred seamen and two hundred marines, and the losses in that rapid rush were terrible. Yet they

swarmed up, their gallant officers, some of them little boymiddies, cheering them on. Ethelston, the

commander of the ' Powerful,' was struck down. Plumbe and Senior of the Marines were killed. Captain

Prothero of the 'Doris' dropped while still yelling to his seamen to 'take that kopje and be hanged to it!' Little

Huddart, the middy, died a death which is worth many inglorious years. Jones of the Marines fell wounded,

but rose again and rushed on with his men. It was on these gallant marines, the men who are ready to fight

anywhere and anyhow, moist or dry, that the heaviest loss fell. When at last they made good their foothold

upon the crest of that murderous hill they had left behind them three officers and eightyeight men out of a

total of 206 a loss within a few minutes of nearly 50 per cent. The bluejackets, helped by the curve of the

hill, got off with a toll of eighteen of their number. Half the total British losses of the action fell upon this

little body of men, who upheld most gloriously the honour and reputation of the service from which they

were drawn. With such men under the white ensign we leave our island homes in safety behind us.

The battle of Enslin had cost us some two hundred of killed and wounded, and beyond the mere fact that we

had cleared our way by another stage towards Kimberley it is difficult to say what advantage we had from it.

We won the kopjes, but we lost our men. The Boer killed and wounded were probably less than half of our

own, and the exhaustion and weakness of our cavalry forbade us to pursue and prevented us from capturing

their guns. In three days the men had fought two exhausting actions in a waterless country and under a

tropical sun. Their exertions had been great and yet were barren of result. Why this should be so was

naturally the subject of keen discussion both in the camp and among the public at home. It always came back

to Lord Methuen's own complaint about the absence of cavalry and of horse artillery. Many very unjust

charges have been hurled against our War Office a department which in some matters has done

extraordinarily and unexpectedly well but in this question of the delay in the despatch of our cavalry and

artillery, knowing as we did the extreme mobility of our enemy, there is certainly ground for an inquiry.

The Boers who had fought these two actions had been drawn mainly from the Jacobsdal and Fauresmith

commandoes, with some of the burghers from Boshof. The famous Cronje, however, had been descending

from Mafeking with his old guard of Transvaalers, and keen disappointment was expressed by the prisoners

at Belmont and at Enslin that he had not arrived in time to take command of them. There were evidences,

however, at this latter action, that reinforcements for the enemy were coming up and that the labours of the

Kimberley relief force were by no means at an end. In the height of the engagement the Lancer patrols

thrown out upon our right flank reported the approach of a considerable body of Boer horsemen, who took up

a position upon a hill on our right rear. Their position there was distinctly menacing, and Colonel Willoughby

Verner was despatched by Lord Methuen to order up the brigade of Guards. The gallant officer had the

misfortune in his return to injure himself seriously through a blunder of his horse. His mission, however,

succeeded in its effect, for the Guards moving across the plain intervened in such a way that the

reinforcements, without an open attack, which would have been opposed to all Boor traditions, could not help

the defenders, and were compelled to witness their defeat. This body of horsemen returned north next day and

were no doubt among those whom we encountered at the following action of the Modder River.

The march from Orange River had begun on the Wednesday. On Thursday was fought the action of Belmont,

on Saturday that of Enslin. There was no protection against the sun by day nor against the cold at night.

Water was not plentiful, and the quality of it was occasionally vile. The troops were in need of a rest, so on

Saturday night and Sunday they remained at Enslin. On the Monday morning (November 27th) the weary

On Monday, November 27th, at early dawn, the little British army, a dustcoloured column upon the dusty

veldt, moved forwards again towards their objective. That night they halted at the pools of Klipfontein,

having for once made a whole day's march without coming in touch with the enemy. Hopes rose that possibly

the two successive defeats had taken the heart out of them and that there would be no further resistance to the

advance. Some, however, who were aware of the presence of Cronje, and of his formidable character, took a

juster view of the situation. And this perhaps is where a few words might be said about the celebrated leader

who played upon the western side of the seat of war the same part which Joubert did upon the east.

Commandant Cronje was at the time of the war sixtyfive years of age, a hard, swarthy man, quiet of

manner, fierce of soul, with a reputation among a nation of resolute men for unsurpassed resolution. His dark

face was bearded and virile, but sedate and gentle in expression. He spoke little, but what he said was to the

point, and he had the gift of those firewords which brace and strengthen weaker men. In hunting expeditions

and in native wars he had first won the admiration of his countrymen by his courage and his fertility of

resource. In the war of 1880 he had led the Boers who besieged Potchefstroom, and he had pushed the attack

with a relentless vigour which was not hampered by the chivalrous usages of war. Eventually he compelled

the surrender of the place by concealing from the garrison that a general armistice had been signed, an act

which was afterwards disowned by his own government. In the succeeding years he lived as an autocrat and a

patriarch amid his farms and his herds, respected by many and feared by all. For a time he was Native

Commissioner and left a reputation for hard dealing behind him. Called into the field again by the Jameson

raid, he grimly herded his enemies into an impossible position and desired, as it is stated, that the hardest

measure should be dealt out to the captives. This was the man, capable, crafty, ironhard, magnetic, who lay

with a reinforced and formidable army across the path of Lord Methuen's tired soldiers. It was a fair match.

On the one side the hardy men, the trained shots, a good artillery, and the defensive; on the other the

historical British infantry, duty, discipline, and a fiery courage. With a high heart the dustcoloured column

So entirely had hills and Boer fighting become associated in the minds of our leaders, that when it was known

that Modder River wound over a plain, the idea of a resistance there appears to have passed away from their

minds. So great was the confidence or so lax the scouting that a force equaling their own in numbers had

assembled with many guns within seven miles of them, and yet the advance appears to have been conducted

without any expectation of impending battle. The supposition, obvious even to a civilian, that a river would

be a likely place to meet with an obstinate resistance, seems to have been ignored. It is perhaps not fair to

blame the General for a fact which must have vexed his spirit more than ours ones sympathies go out to

the gentle and brave man, who was heard calling out in his sleep that he 'should have had those two guns '

but it is repugnant to common sense to suppose that no one, neither the cavalry nor the Intelligence

Department, is at fault for so extraordinary a state of ignorance.[Footnote: Later information makes it certain

that the cavalry did report the presence of the enemy to Lord Methuen.] On the morning of Tuesday,

November 28th, the British troops were told that they would march at once, and have their breakfast when

The army had been reinforced the night before by the welcome addition of the Argyll and Sutherland

Highlanders, which made up for the losses of the week. It was a cloudless morning, and a dazzling sun rose in

a deep blue sky. The men, though hungry, marched cheerily, the reek of their tobaccopipes floating up from

their ranks. It cheered them to see that the murderous kopjes had, for the time, been left behind, and that the

great plain inclined slightly downwards to where a line of green showed the course of the river. On the

further bank were a few scattered buildings, with one considerable hotel, used as a weekend resort by the

businessmen of Kimberley. It lay now calm and innocent, with its open windows looking out upon a smiling

garden; but death lurked at the windows and death in the garden, and the little dark man who stood by the

door, peering through his glass at the approaching column, was the minister of death, the dangerous Cronje.

In consultation with him was one who was to prove even more formidable, and for a longer time. Semitic in

face, highnosed, bushybearded, and eagleeyed, with skin burned brown by a life of the veldt it was De

la Rey, one of the trio of fighting chiefs whose name will always be associated with the gallant resistance of

His dispositions had been both masterly and original. Contrary to the usual military practice in the defence of

rivers, he had concealed his men upon both banks, placing, as it is stated, those in whose staunchness he had

least confidence upon the British side of the river, so that they could only retreat under the rifles of their

inexorable companions. The trenches had been so dug with such a regard for the slopes of the ground that in

some places a triple line of fire was secured. His artillery, consisting of several heavy pieces and a number of

machine guns (including one of the diabolical 'pompoms'), was cleverly placed upon the further side of the

stream, and was not only provided with shelter pits but had rows of reserve pits, so that the guns could be

readily shifted when their range was found. Rows of trenches, a broadish river, fresh rows of trenches,

fortified houses, and a good artillery well worked and well placed, it was a serious task which lay in front of

the gallant little army. The whole position covered between four and five miles.

An obvious question must here occur to the mind of every nonmilitary reader ' Why should this position

be attacked at all? Why should we not cross higher up where there were no such formidable obstacles?' The

answer, so far as one can answer it, must be that so little was known of the dispositions of our enemy that we

were hopelessly involved in the action before we knew of it, and that then it was more dangerous to extricate

the army than to push the attack. A retirement over that open plain at a range of under a thousand yards

would have been a dangerous and disastrous movement. Having once got there, it was wisest and best to see

The dark Cronje still waited reflective in the hotel garden. Across the veldt streamed the lines of infantry, the

poor fellows eager, after seven miles of that upland air, for the breakfast which had been promised them. It

was a quarter to seven when our patrols of Lancers were fired upon. There were Boers, then, between them

and their meal! The artillery was ordered up, the Guards were sent forward on the right, the 9th Brigade under

PoleCarew on the left, including the newly arrived Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. They swept onwards

into the fatal fire zone and then, and only then, there blazed out upon them four miles of rifles, cannon,

and machine guns, and they realised, from general to private, that they had walked unwittingly into the

Before the position was understood the Guards were within seven hundred yards of the Boer trenches, and the

other troops about nine hundred, on the side of a very gentle slope which made it most difficult to find any

cover. In front of them lay a serene landscape, the river, the houses, the hotel, no movement of men, no

smoke everything peaceful and deserted save for an occasional quick flash and sparkle of flame. But the

noise was horrible and appalling. Men whose nerves had been steeled to the crash of the big guns, or the

monotonous roar of Maxims and the rattle of Mauser fire, found a new terror in the malignant

'ploopplooping' of the automatic quickfirer. The Maxim of the Scots Guards was caught in the

hellblizzard from this thing each shell no bigger than a large walnut, but flying in strings of a score

and men and gun were destroyed in an instant. As to the rifle bullets the air was humming and throbbing with

them, and the sand was mottled like a pond in a shower. To advance was impossible, to retire was hateful.

The men fell upon their faces and huddled close to the earth, too happy if some friendly antheap gave them

a precarious shelter. And always, tier above tier, the lines of rifle fire rippled and palpitated in front of them.

The infantry fired also, and fired, and fired but what was there to fire at? An occasional eye and hand over

the edge of a trench or behind a stone is no mark at seven hundred yards. It would be instructive to know how

The cavalry was useless, the infantry was powerless there only remained the guns. When any arm is

helpless and harried it always casts an imploring eye upon the guns, and rarely indeed is it that the gallant

guns do not respond. Now the 75th and 18th Field Batteries came rattling and dashing to the front, and

unlimbered at one thousand yards. The naval guns were working at four thousand, but the two combined were

insufficient to master the fire of the pieces of large calibre which were opposed to them. Lord Methuen must

have prayed for guns as Wellington did for night, and never was a prayer answered more dramatically. A

strange battery came lurching up from the British rear, unheralded, unknown, the weary gasping horses

panting at the traces, the men, caked with sweat and dirt, urging them on into a last spasmodic trot. The

bodies of horses which had died of pure fatigue marked their course, the sergeants' horses tugged in the

gunteams, and the sergeants staggered along by the limbers. It was the 62nd Field Battery, which had

marched thirtytwo miles in eight hours, and now, hearing the crash of battle in front of them, had with one

last desperate effort thrown itself into the firing line. Great credit is due to Major Granet and his men. Not

even those gallant German batteries who saved the infantry at Spicheren could boast of a finer feat.

Now it was guns against guns, and let the best gunners win! We had eighteen fieldguns and the naval pieces

against the concealed cannon of the enemy. Back and forward flew the shells, howling past each other in

midair. The weary men of the 62nd Battery forgot their labours and fatigues as they stooped and strained at

their claycoloured 15pounders. Half of them were within rifle range, and the limber horses were the centre

of a hot fire, as they were destined to be at a shorter range and with more disastrous effect at the Tugela. That

the same tactics should have been adopted at two widely sundered points shows with what care the details of

the war had been prearranged by the Boer leaders. 'Before I got my horses out,' says an officer, 'they shot

one of my drivers and two horses and brought down my own horse. When we got the gun round one of the

gunners was shot through the brain and fell at my feet. Another was shot while bringing up shell. Then we

got a look in.' The roar of the cannon was deafening, but gradually the British were gaining the upper hand.

Here and there the little knolls upon the further side which had erupted into constant flame lay cold and

silent. One of the heavier guns was put out of action, and the other had been withdrawn for five hundred

yards. But the infantry fire still crackled and rippled along the trenches, and the guns could come no nearer

with living men and horses. It was long past midday, and that unhappy breakfast seemed further off than ever.

As the afternoon wore on, a curious condition of things was established. The guns could not advance, and,

indeed, it was found necessary to withdraw them from a 1,200 to a 2,800 yard range, so heavy were the

losses. At the time of the change the 75th Battery had lost three officers out of five, nineteen men, and

twentytwo horses. The infantry could not advance and would not retire. The Guards on the right were

prevented from opening out on the flank and getting round the enemy's line, by the presence of the Riet

River, which joins the Modder almost at a right angle. All day they lay under a blistering sun, the sleet of

bullets whizzing over their heads. 'It came in solid streaks like telegraph wires,' said a graphic correspondent.

The men gossiped, smoked, and many of them slept. They lay on the barrels of their rifles to keep them cool

enough for use. Now and again there came the dull thud of a bullet which had found its mark, and a man

gasped, or drummed with his feet; but the casualties at this point were not numerous, for there was some little

But in the meantime there had been a development upon the left which was to turn the action into a British

victory. At this side there was ample room to extend, and the 9th Brigade spread out, feeling its way down the

enemy's line, until it came to a point where the fire was less murderous and the approach to the river more in

favour of the attack. Here the Yorkshires, a party of whom under Lieutenant Fox had stormed a farmhouse,

obtained the command of a drift, over which a mixed force of Highlanders and Fusiliers forced their way, led

by their Brigadier in person. This body of infantry, which does not appear to have exceeded five hundred in

number, were assailed both by the Boer riflemen and by the guns of both parties, our own gunners being

unaware that the Modder had been successfully crossed. A small hamlet called Rosmead formed, however, a

POINT D'APPUI, and to this the infantry clung tenaciously, while reinforcements dribbled across to them

from the farther side. 'Now, boys, who's for otter hunting?' cried Major Coleridge, of the North Lancashires,

as he sprang into the water. How gladly on that baking, scorching day did the men jump into the river and

splash over, to climb the opposite bank with their wet khaki clinging to their figures! Some blundered into

holes and were rescued by grasping the unwound putties of their comrades. And so between three and four

o'clock a strong party of the British had established their position upon the right flank of the Boers, and were

holding on like grim death with an intelligent appreciation that the fortunes of the day depended upon their

'Hollo, here is a river!' cried Codrington when he led his forlorn hope to the right and found that the Riet had

to be crossed. 'I was given to understand that the Modder was fordable everywhere,' says Lord Methuen in his

official despatch. One cannot read the account of the operations without being struck by the casual, sketchy

knowledge which cost us so dearly. The soldiers slogged their way through, as they have slogged it before;

but the task might have been made much lighter for them had we but clearly known what it was that we were

trying to do. On the other hand, it is but fair to Lord Methuen to say that his own personal gallantry and

unflinching resolution set the most stimulating example to his troops. No General could have done more to

And now, as the long weary scorching hungry day came to an end, the Boers began at last to flinch from their

trenches. The shrapnel was finding them out and this force upon their flank filled them with vague alarm and

with fears for their precious guns. And so as night fell they stole across the river, the cannon were withdrawn,

the trenches evacuated, and next morning, when the weary British and their anxious General turned

themselves to their grim task once more, they found a deserted village, a line of empty houses, and a litter of

Lord Methuen, in congratulating the troops upon their achievement, spoke of 'the hardestwon victory in our

annals of war,' and some such phrase was used in his official despatch. It is hypercritical, no doubt, to look

too closely at a term used by a wounded man with the flush of battle still upon him, but still a student of

military history must smile at such a comparison between this action and such others as Albuera or Inkerman,

where the numbers of British engaged were not dissimilar. A fight in which five hundred men are killed and

wounded cannot be classed in the same category as those stern and desperate encounters where more of the

victors were carried than walked from the field of battle. And yet there were some special features which will

differentiate the fight at Modder River from any of the hundred actions which adorn the standards of our

regiments. It was the third battle which the troops had fought within the week, they were under fire for ten or

twelve hours, were waterless under a tropical sun, and weak from want of food. For the first time they were

called upon to face modern rifle fire and modern machine guns in the open. The result tends to prove that

those who hold that it will from now onwards be impossible ever to make such frontal attacks as those which

the English made at the Alma or the French at Waterloo, are justified in their belief. It is beyond human

hardihood to face the pitiless beat of bullet and shell which comes from modern quickfiring weapons. Had

our flank not made a lodgment across the river, it is impossible that we could have carried the position. Once

more, too, it was demonstrated how powerless the best artillery is to disperse resolute and wellplaced

riflemen. Of the minor points of interest there will always remain the record of the forced march of the 62nd

Battery, and artillerymen will note the use of gunpits by the Boers, which ensured that the range of their

The honours of the day upon the side of the British rested with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the

Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd Coldstreams, and the artillery. Out of a total casualty list of about 450, no

fewer than 112 came from the gallant Argylls and 69 from the Coldstreams. The loss of the Boers is

exceedingly difficult to gauge, as they throughout the war took the utmost pains to conceal it. The number of

desperate and longdrawn actions which have ended, according to the official Pretorian account, in a loss of

one wounded burgher may in some way be better policy, but does not imply a higher standard of public

virtue, than those long lists which have saddened our hearts in the halls of the War Office. What is certain is

that the loss at Modder River could not have been far inferior to our own, and that it arose almost entirely

from artillery fire, since at no time of the action were any large number of their riflemen visible. So it ended,

this long pelting match, Cronje sullenly withdrawing under the cover of darkness with his resolute heart filled

with fierce determination for the future, while the British soldiers threw themselves down on the ground

Lord Methuen's force had now fought three actions in the space of a single week, losing in killed and

wounded about a thousand men, or rather more than onetenth of its total numbers. Had there been evidence

that the enemy were seriously demoralised, the General would no doubt have pushed on at once to

Kimberley, which was some twenty miles distant. The information which reached him was, however, that the

Boers had fallen back upon the very strong position of Spytfontein, that they were full of fight, and that they

had been strongly reinforced by a commando from Mafeking. Under these circumstances Lord Methuen had

no choice but to give his men a wellearned rest, and to await reinforcements. There was no use in reaching

Kimberley unless he had completely defeated the investing force. With the history of the first relief of

Lucknow in his memory he was on his guard against a repetition of such an experience.

It was the more necessary that Methuen should strengthen his position, since with every mile which he

advanced the more exposed did his line of communications become to a raid from Fauresmith and the

southern districts of the Orange Free State. Any serious danger to the railway behind them would leave the

British Army in a very critical position, and precautions were taken for the protection of the more vulnerable

portions of the line. It was well that this was so, for on the 8th of December Commandant Prinsloo, of the

Orange Free State, with a thousand horsemen and two light sevenpounder guns, appeared suddenly at Enslin

and vigorously attacked the two companies of the Northampton Regiment who held the station. At the same

time they destroyed a couple of culverts and tore up three hundred yards of the permanent way. For some

hours the Northamptons under Captain Godley were closely pressed, but a telegram had been despatched to

Modder Camp, and the 12th Lancers with the ubiquitous 62nd Battery were sent to their assistance. The

Boers retired with their usual mobility, and in ten hours the line was completely restored.

Reinforcements were now reaching the Modder River force, which made it more formidable than when it had

started. A very essential addition was that of the 12th Lancers and of G battery of Horse Artillery, which

would increase the mobility of the force and make it possible for the General to follow up a blow after he had

struck it. The magnificent regiments which formed the Highland Brigade the 2nd Black Watch, the 1st

Gordons, the 2nd Seaforths, and the 1st Highland Light Infantry had arrived under the gallant and illfated

Wauchope. Four fiveinch howitzers had also come to strengthen the artillery. At the same time the

Canadians, the Australians, and several line regiments were moved up on the line from De Aar to Belmont. It

appeared to the public at home that there was the material for an overwhelming advance; but the ordinary

observer, and even perhaps the military critic, had not yet appreciated how great is the advantage which is

given by modern weapons to the force which acts upon the defensive. With enormous pains Cronje and De la

Rey were entrenching a most formidable position in front of our advance, with a confidence, which proved to

be justified that it would be on their own ground and under their own conditions that in this, as in the three

On the morning of Saturday, December 9th, the British General made an attempt to find out what lay in front

of him amid that semicircle of forbidding hills. To this end he sent out a reconnaissance in the early morning,

which included G Battery Horse Artillery, the 9th Lancers, and the ponderous 47 naval gun, which,

preceded by the majestic march of thirtytwo bullocks and attended by eighty seamen gunners, creaked

forwards over the plain. What was there to shoot at in those sunlit boulderstrewn hills in front? They lay

silent and untenanted in the glare of the African day. In vain the great gun exploded its huge shell with its

fifty pounds of lyddite over the ridges, in vain the smaller pieces searched every cleft and hollow with their

shrapnel. No answer came from the farstretching hills. Not a flash or twinkle betrayed the fierce bands who

lurked among the boulders. The force returned to camp no wiser than when it left.

There was one sight visible every night to all men which might well nerve the rescuers in their enterprise.

Over the northern horizon, behind those hills of danger, there quivered up in the darkness one long, flashing,

quivering beam, which swung up and down, and up again like a seraphic swordblade. It was Kimberley

praying for help, Kimberley solicitous for news. Anxiously, distractedly, the great De Beers searchlight

dipped and rose. And back across the twenty miles of darkness, over the hills where Cronje lurked, there

came that other southern column of light which answered, and promised, and soothed. 'Be of good heart,

Kimberley. We are here! The Empire is behind us. We have not forgotten you. It may be days, or it may be

About three in the afternoon of Sunday, December 10th, the force which was intended to clear a path for the

army through the lines of Magersfontein moved out upon what proved to be its desperate enterprise. The 3rd

or Highland Brigade included the Black Watch, the Seaforths, the Argyll and Sutherlands, and the Highland

Light Infantry. The Gordons had only arrived in camp that day, and did not advance until next morning.

Besides the infantry, the 9th Lancers, the mounted infantry, and all the artillery moved to the front. It was

raining hard, and the men with one blanket between two soldiers bivouacked upon the cold damp ground,

about three miles from the enemy's position. At one o'clock, without food, and drenched, they moved

forwards through the drizzle and the darkness to attack those terrible lines. Major Benson, R.A., with two of

Clouds drifted low in the heavens, and the falling rain made the darkness more impenetrable. The Highland

Brigade was formed into a column the Black Watch in front, then the Seaforths, and the other two behind.

To prevent the men from straggling in the night the four regiments were packed into a mass of quarter

column as densely as was possible, and the left guides held a rope in order to preserve the formation. With

many a trip and stumble the illfated detachment wandered on, uncertain where they were going and what it

was that they were meant to do. Not only among the rank and file, but among the principal officers also, there

was the same absolute ignorance. Brigadier Wauchope knew, no doubt, but his voice was soon to be stilled in

death. The others were aware, of course, that they were advancing either to turn the enemy's trenches or to

attack them, but they may well have argued from their own formation that they could not be near the riflemen

yet. Why they should be still advancing in that dense clump we do not now know, nor can we surmise what

thoughts were passing through the mind of the gallant and experienced chieftain who walked beside them.

There are some who claim on the night before to have seen upon his strangely ascetic face that shadow of

doom which is summed up in the one word 'fey.' The hand of coming death may already have lain cold upon

his soul. Out there, close beside him, stretched the long trench, fringed with its line of fierce, staring, eager

faces, and its bristle of gunbarrels. They knew he was coming. They were ready. They were waiting. But

still, with the dull murmur of many feet, the dense column, nearly four thousand strong, wandered onwards

through the rain and the darkness, death and mutilation crouching upon their path.

It matters not what gave the signal, whether it was the flashing of a lantern by a Boer scout, or the tripping of

a soldier over wire, or the firing of a gun in the ranks. It may have been any, or it may have been none, of

these things. As a matter of fact I have been assured by a Boer who was present that it was the sound of the

tins attached to the alarm wires which disturbed them. However this may be, in an instant there crashed out of

the darkness into their faces and ears a roar of pointblank fire, and the night was slashed across with the

throbbing flame of the rifles. At the moment before this outflame some doubt as to their whereabouts seems

to have flashed across the mind of their leaders. The order to extend had just been given, but the men bad not

had time to act upon it. The storm of lead burst upon the head and right flank of the column, which broke to

pieces under the murderous volley. Wauchope was shot, struggled up, and fell once more for ever. Rumour

has placed words of reproach upon his dying lips, but his nature, both gentle and soldierly, forbids the

supposition. 'What a pity!' was the only utterance which a brother Highlander ascribes to him. Men went

down in swathes, and a howl of rage and agony, heard afar over the veldt, swelled up from the frantic and

struggling crowd. By the hundred they dropped some dead, some wounded, some knocked down by the

rush and sway of the broken ranks. It was a horrible business. At such a range and in such a formation a

single Mauser bullet may well pass through many men. A few dashed forwards, and were found dead at the

very edges of the trench. The few survivors of companies A, B, and C of the Black Watch appear to have

never actually retired, but to have clung on to the immediate front of the Boer trenches, while the remains of

the other five companies tried to turn the Boer flank. Of the former body only six got away unhurt in the

evening after lying all day within two hundred yards of the enemy. The rest of the brigade broke and,

disentangling themselves with difficulty from the dead and the dying, fled back out of that accursed place.

Some, the most unfortunate of all, became caught in the darkness in the wire defences, and were found in the

morning hung up 'like crows,' as one spectator describes it, and riddled with bullets.

Who shall blame the Highlanders for retiring when they did? Viewed, not by desperate and surprised men,

but in all calmness and sanity, it may well seem to have been the very best thing which they could do. Dashed

into chaos, separated from their officers, with no one who knew what was to be done, the first necessity was

to gain shelter from this deadly fire, which had already stretched six hundred of their number upon the

ground. The danger was that men so shaken would be stricken with panic, scatter in the darkness over the

face of the country, and cease to exist as a military unit. But the Highlanders were true to their character and

their traditions. There was shouting in the darkness, hoarse voices calling for the Seaforths, for the Argylls,

for Company C, for Company H, and everywhere in the gloom there came the answer of the clansmen.

Within half an hour with the break of day the Highland regiments had reformed, and, shattered and

weakened, but undaunted, prepared to renew the contest. Some attempt at an advance was made upon the

right, ebbing and flowing, one little band even reaching the trenches and coming back with prisoners and

reddened bayonets. For the most part the men lay upon their faces, and fired when they could at the enemy;

but the cover which the latter kept was so excellent that an officer who expended 120 rounds has left it upon

record that he never once had seen anything positive at which to aim. Lieutenant Lindsay brought the

Seaforths' Maxim into the firingline, and, though all her crew except two were hit, it continued to do good

service during the day. The Lancers' Maxim was equally staunch, though it also was left finally with only the

Fortunately the guns were at hand, and, as usual, they were quick to come to the aid of the distressed. The sun

was hardly up before the howitzers were throwing lyddite at 4,000 yards, the three field batteries (18th, 62nd,

75th) were working with shrapnel at a mile, and the troop of Horse Artillery was up at the right front trying to

enfilade the trenches. The guns kept down the riflefire, and gave the wearied Highlanders some respite from

their troubles. The whole situation had resolved itself now into another Battle of Modder River. The infantry,

under a fire at from six hundred to eight hundred paces, could not advance and would not retire. The artillery

only kept the battle going, and the huge naval gun from behind was joining with its deep bark in the

deafening uproar. But the Boers had already learned and it is one of their most valuable military qualities

that they assimilate their experience so quickly that shell fire is less dangerous in a trench than among

rocks. These trenches, very elaborate in character, had been dug some hundreds of yards from the foot of the

hills, so that there was hardly any guide to our artillery fire. Yet it is to the artillery fire that all the losses of

the Boers that day were due. The cleverness of Cronje's disposition of his trenches some hundred yards ahead

of the kopjes is accentuated by the fascination which any rising object has for a gunner. Prince Kraft tells the

story of how at Sadowa he unlimbered his guns two hundred yards in front of the church of Chlum, and how

the Austrian reply fire almost invariably pitched upon the steeple. So our own gunners, even at a

twothousand yard mark, found it difficult to avoid overshooting the invisible line, and hitting the obvious

As the day wore on reinforcements of infantry came up from the force which had been left to guard the camp.

The Gordons arrived with the first and second battalions of the Coldstream Guards, and all the artillery was

moved nearer to the enemy's position. At the same time, as there were some indications of an attack upon our

right flank, the Grenadier Guards with five companies of the Yorkshire Light Infantry were moved up in that

direction, while the three remaining companies of Barter's Yorkshiremen secured a drift over which the

enemy might cross the Modder. This threatening movement upon our right flank, which would have put the

Highlanders into an impossible position had it succeeded, was most gallantly held back all morning, before

the arrival of the Guards and the Yorkshires, by the mounted infantry and the 12th Lancers, skirmishing on

foot. It was in this long and successful struggle to cover the flank of the 3rd Brigade that Major Milton, Major

Ray, and many another brave man met his end. The Coldstreams and Grenadiers relieved the pressure upon

this side, and the Lancers retired to their horses, having shown, not for the first time, that the cavalryman with

a modern carbine can at a pinch very quickly turn himself into a useful infantry soldier. Lord Airlie deserves

all praise for his unconventional use of his men, and for the gallantry with which he threw both himself and

While the Coldstreams, the Grenadiers, and the Yorkshire Light Infantry were holding back the Boer attack

upon our right flank the indomitable Gordons, the men of Dargai, furious with the desire to avenge their

comrades of the Highland Brigade, had advanced straight against the trenches and succeeded without any

very great loss in getting within four hundred yards of them. But a single regiment could not carry the

position, and anything like a general advance upon it was out of the question in broad daylight after the

punishment which we had received. Any plans of the sort which may have passed through Lord Methuen's

mind were driven away for ever by the sudden unordered retreat of the stricken brigade. They had been very

roughly handled in this, which was to most of them their baptism of fire, and they had been without food and

water under a burning sun all day. They fell back rapidly for a mile, and the guns were for a time left partially

exposed. Fortunately the lack of initiative on the part of the Boers which has stood our friend so often came

in to save us from disaster and humiliation. It is due to the brave unshaken face which the Guards presented

The Gordons and the Scots Guards were still in attendance upon the guns, but they had been advanced very

close to the enemy's trenches, and there were no other troops in support. Under these circumstances it was

imperative that the Highlanders should rally, and Major Ewart with other surviving officers rushed among the

scattered ranks and strove hard to gather and to stiffen them. The men were dazed by what they had

undergone, and Nature shrank back from that deadly zone where the bullets fell so thickly. But the pipes

blew, and the bugles sang, and the poor tired fellows, the backs of their legs so flayed and blistered by lying

in the sun that they could hardly bend them, hobbled back to their duty. They worked up to the guns once

But as the evening wore on it became evident that no attack could succeed, and that therefore there was no

use in holding the men in front of the enemy's position. The dark Cronje, lurking among his ditches and his

barbed wire, was not to be approached, far less defeated. There are some who think that, had we held on there

as we did at the Modder River, the enemy would again have been accommodating enough to make way for us

during the night, and the morning would have found the road clear to Kimberley. I know no grounds for such

an opinion but several against it. At Modder Cronje abandoned his lines, knowing that he had other and

stronger ones behind him. At Magersfontein a level plain lay behind the Boer position, and to abandon it was

to give up the game altogether. Besides, why should he abandon it? He knew that he had hit us hard. We had

made absolutely no impression upon his defences. Is it likely that he would have tamely given up all his

advantages and surrendered the fruits of his victory without a struggle? It is enough to mourn a defeat without

the additional agony of thinking that a little more perseverance might have turned it into a victory. The Boer

position could only be taken by outflanking it, and we were not numerous enough nor mobile enough to

outflank it. There lay the whole secret of our troubles, and no conjectures as to what might under other

About halfpast five the Boer guns, which had for some unexplained reason been silent all day, opened upon

the cavalry. Their appearance was a signal for the general falling back of the centre, and the last attempt to

retrieve the day was abandoned. The Highlanders were deadbeat ; the Coldstreams had had enough; the

mounted infantry was badly mauled. There remained the Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, and two or three line

regiments who were available for a new attack. There are occasions, such as Sadowa, where a General must

play his last card. There are others where with reinforcements in his rear, he can do better by saving his force

and trying once again. General Grant had an axiom that the best time for an advance was when you were

utter]y exhausted, for that was the moment when your enemy was probably utterly exhausted too, and of two

such forces the attacker has the moral advantage. Lord Methuen determined and no doubt wisely that it

was no occasion for counsels of desperation. His men were withdrawn in some cases withdrew

themselves outside the range of the Boer guns, and next morning saw the whole force with bitter and

The repulse of Magersfontein cost the British nearly a thousand men, killed, wounded, and missing, of which

over seven hundred belonged to the Highlanders. Fiftyseven officers had fallen in that brigade alone,

including their Brigadier and Colonel Downman of the Gordons. Colonel Codrington of the Coldstreams was

wounded early, fought through the action, and came back in the evening on a Maxim gun. Lord Winchester

of the same battalion was killed, after injudiciously but heroically exposing himself all day. The Black Watch

alone had lost nineteen officers and over three hundred men killed and wounded, a catastrophe which can

only be matched in all the bloody and glorious annals of that splendid regiment by their slaughter at

Ticonderoga in 1757, when no fewer than five hundred fell before Montcalm's muskets. Never has Scotland

had a more grievous day than this of Magersfontein. She has always given her best blood with lavish

generosity for the Empire, but it may be doubted if any single battle has ever put so many families of high

and low into mourning from the Tweed to the Caithness shore. There is a legend that when sorrow comes

upon Scotland the old Edinburgh Castle is lit by ghostly lights and gleams white at every window in the mirk

of midnight. If ever the watcher could have seen so sinister a sight, it should have been on this, the fatal night

of December 11, 1899. As to the Boer loss it is impossible to determine it. Their official returns stated it to be

seventy killed and two hundred and fifty wounded, but the reports of prisoners and deserters placed it at a

very much higher figure. One unit, the Scandinavian corps, was placed in an advanced position at

Spytfontein, and was overwhelmed by the Seaforths, who killed, wounded, or took the eighty men of whom it

was composed. The stories of prisoners and of deserters all speak of losses very much higher than those

In his comments upon the battle next day Lord Methuen was said to have given offence to the Highland

Brigade, and the report was allowed to go uncontradicted until it became generally accepted. It arose,

however, from a complete misunderstanding of the purport of Lord Methuen's remarks, in which he praised

them, as he well might, for their bravery, and condoled with them over the wreck of their splendid regiments.

The way in which officers and men hung on under conditions to which no troops have ever been exposed was

worthy of the highest traditions of the British army. From the death of Wauchope in the early morning, until

the assumption of the command of the brigade by HughesHallett in the late afternoon, no one seems to have

taken the direction. 'My lieutenant was wounded and my captain was killed,' says a private. 'The General was

dead, but we stayed where we were, for there was no order to retire.' That was the story of the whole brigade,

The most striking lesson of the engagement is the extreme bloodiness of modern warfare under some

conditions, and its bloodlessness under others. Here, out of a total of something under a thousand casualties

seven hundred were incurred in about five minutes, and the whole day of shell, machinegun, and rifle fire

only furnished the odd three hundred. So also at Ladysmith the British forces (White's column) were under

heavy fire from 5.30 to 11.30, and the loss again was something under three hundred. With conservative

generalship the losses of the battles of the future will be much less than those of the past, and as a

consequence the battles themselves will last much longer, and it will be the most enduring rather than the

most fiery which will win. The supply of food and water to the combatants will become of extreme

importance to keep them up during the prolonged trials of endurance, which will last for weeks rather than

days. On the other hand, when a General's force is badly compromised, it will be so punished that a quick

On the subject of the quartercolumn formation which proved so fatal to us, it must be remembered that any

other form of advance is hardly possible during a night attack, though at TelelKebir the exceptional

circumstance of the march being over an open desert allowed the troops to move for the last mile or two in a

more extended formation. A line of battalion doublecompany columns is most difficult to preserve in tho

darkness, and any confusion may lead to disaster. The whole mistake lay in a miscalculation of a few hundred

yards in the position of the trenches. Had the regiments deployed five minutes earlier it is probable (though

The action was not without those examples of military virtue which soften a disaster, and hold out a brighter

promise for the future. The Guards withdrew from the field as if on parade, with the Boer shells bursting over

their ranks. Fine, too, was the restraint of G Battery of Horse Artillery on the morning after the battle. An

armistice was understood to exist, but the naval gun, in ignorance of it, opened on our extreme left. The Boers

at once opened fire upon the Horse Artillery, who, recognising the mistake, remained motionless and

unlimbered in a line, with every horse, and gunner and driver in his place, without taking any notice of the

fire, which presently slackened and stopped as the enemy came to understand the situation. It is worthy of

remark that in this battle the three field batteries engaged, as well as G Battery, R.ll.A., each fired over 1,000

rounds and remained for 30 consecutive hours within 1,500 yards of the Boer position.

But of all the corps who deserve praise, there was none more gallant than the brave surgeons and ambulance

bearers, who encounter all the dangers and enjoy none of the thrills of warfare. All day under fire these men

worked and toiled among the wounded. Beevor, Ensor, Douglas, Probyn all were equally devoted. It is

almost incredible, and yet it is true, that by ten o'clock on the morning after the battle, before the troops had

returned to camp, no fewer than five hundred wounded were in the train and on their way to Cape Town.

Some attempt has now been made to sketch the succession of events which had ended in the investment of

Ladysmith in northern Natal, and also to show the fortunes of the force which on the western side of the seat

of war attempted to advance to the relief of Kimberley. The distance between these forces may be expressed

in terms familiar to the European reader by saying that it was that which separates Paris from Frankfort, or to

the American by suggesting that Ladysmith was at Boston and that Methuen was trying to relieve

Philadelphia. Waterless deserts and rugged mountain ranges divided the two scenes of action. In the case of

the British there could be no connection between the two movements, but the Boers by a land journey of

something over a hundred miles had a double choice of a route by which Cronje and Joubert might join

hands, either by the BloemfonteinJohannesburgLaing'sNek Railway, or by the direct line from

Harrismith to Ladysmith. The possession of these internal lines should have been of enormous benefit to the

Boers, enabling them to throw the weight of their forces unexpectedly from the one flank to the other.

In a future chapter it will be recorded how the Army Corps arriving from England was largely diverted into

Natal in order in the first instance to prevent the colony from being overrun, and in the second to rescue the

beleaguered garrison. In the meantime it is necessary to deal with the military operations in the broad space

After the declaration of war there was a period of some weeks during which the position of the British over

the whole of the northern part of Cape Colony was full of danger. Immense supplies had been gathered at De

Aar which were at the mercy of a Free State raid, and the burghers, had they possessed a cavalry leader with

the dash of a Stuart or a Sheridan, might have dealt a blow which would have cost us a million pounds' worth

of stores and dislocated the whole plan of campaign. However, the chance was allowed to pass, and when, on

November 1st, the burghers at last in a leisurely fashion sauntered over the frontier, arrangements had been

made by reinforcement and by concentration to guard the vital points. The objects of the British leaders, until

the time for a general advance should come, were to hold the Orange River Bridge (which opened the way to

Kimberley), to cover De Aar Junction, where the stores were, to protect at all costs the line of railway which

led from Cape Town to Kimberley, and to hold on to as much as possible of those other two lines of railway

which led, the one through Colesberg and the other through Stormberg, into the Free State. The two bodies of

invaders who entered the colony moved along the line of these two railways, the one crossing the Orange

River at Norval's Pont and the other at Bethulie. They enlisted many recruits among the Cape Colony Dutch

as they advanced, and the scanty British forces fell back in front of them, abandoning Colesberg on the one

line and Stormberg on the other. We have, then, to deal with the movements of two British detachments. The

one which operated on the Colesberg line which was the more vital of the two, as a rapid advance of the

Boers upon that line would have threatened the precious CapetownKimberley connection consisted

almost entirely of mounted troops, and was under the command of the same General French who had won the

battle of Elandslaagte. By an act of foresight which was only too rare upon the British side in the earlier

stages of this war, French, who had in the recent large manoeuvres on Salisbury Plain shown great ability as a

cavalry leader, was sent out of Ladysmith in the very last train which made its way through. His operations,

with his instructive use of cavalry and horse artillery, may be treated separately.

The other British force which faced the Boers who were advancing through Stormberg was commanded by

General Gatacre, a man who bore a high reputation for fearlessness and tireless energy, though he had been

criticised, notably during the Soudan campaign, for having called upon his men for undue and unnecessary

exertion. 'General Backacher' they called him, with rough soldierly chaff. A glance at his long thin figure,

his gaunt DonQuixote face, and his aggressive jaw would show his personal energy, but might not satisfy

the observer that he possessed those intellectual gifts which qualify for high command. At the action of the

Atbara he, the brigadier in command, was the first to reach and to tear down with his own hands the zareeba

of the enemy a gallant exploit of the soldier, but a questionable position for the General. The man's

General Gatacre was nominally in command of a division, but so cruelly had his men been diverted from

him, some to Buller in Natal and some to Methuen, that he could not assemble more than a brigade. Falling

back before the Boer advance, he found himself early in December at Sterkstroom, while the Boers occupied

the very strong position of Stormberg, some thirty miles to the north of him. With the enemy so near him it

was Gatacre's nature to attack, and the moment that he thought himself strong enough he did so. No doubt he

had private information as to the dangerous hold which the Boers were getting upon the colonial Dutch, and it

is possible that while Buller and Methuen were attacking east and west they urged Gatacre to do something to

The fact that he was about to do so, and even the hour of the start, appear to have been the common property

of the camp some days before the actual move. The 'Times' correspondent under the date December 7th

details all that it is intended to do. It is to the credit of our Generals as men, but to their detriment as soldiers,

that they seem throughout the campaign to have shown extraordinarily little power of dissimulation. They did

the obvious, and usually allowed it to be obvious what they were about to do. One thinks of Napoleon

striking at Egypt; how he gave it abroad that the real object of the expedition was Ireland, but breathed into

the ears of one or two intimates that in very truth it was bound for Genoa. The leading official at Tolilon had

no more idea where the fleet and army of France had gone than the humblest caulker in the yard. However, it

is not fair to expect the subtlety of the Corsican from the downright Saxon, but it remains strange and

deplorable that in a country filled with spies any one should have known in advance that a socalled 'surprise'

The force with which General Gatacre advanced consisted of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, 960 strong,

with one Maxim; the 2nd Irish Rifles, 840 strong, with one Maxim, and 250 Mounted Infantry. There were

two batteries of Field Artillery, the 74th and 77th. The total force was well under 3,000 men. About three in

the afternoon the men were entrained in open trucks under a burning sun, and for some reason, at which the

impetuous spirit of the General must have chafed, were kept waiting for three hours. At eight o'clock they

detrained at Molteno, and thence after a short rest and a meal they started upon the night march which was

intended to end at the break of day at the Boer trenches. One feels as if one were describing the operations of

It was nine o'clock and pitch dark when the column moved out of Molteno and struck across the black gloom

of the veldt, the wheels of the guns being wrapped in hide to deaden the rattle. It was known that the distance

was not more than ten miles, and so when hour followed hour and the guides were still unable to say that they

had reached their point it must have become perfectly evident that they had missed their way. The men were

dogtired, a long day's work had been followed by a long night's march, and they plodded along drowsily

through the darkness. The ground was broken and irregular. The weary soldiers stumbled as they marched.

Daylight came and revealed the column still looking for its objective, the fiery General walking in front and

leading his horse behind him. It was evident that his plans had miscarried, but his energetic and hardy

temperament would not permit him to turn back without a blow being struck. However one may commend

his energy, one cannot but stand aghast at his dispositions. The country was wild and rocky, the very places

for those tactics of the surprise and the ambuscade in which the Boers excelled. And yet the column still

plodded aimlessly on in its dense formation, and if there were any attempt at scouting ahead and on the flanks

the result showed how ineffectively it was carried out. It was at a quarter past four in the clear light of a South

African morning that a shot, and then another, and then a rolling crash of musketry, told that we were to have

one more rough lesson of the result of neglecting the usual precautions of warfare. High up on the face of a

steep line of hill the Boer riflemen lay hid, and from a short range their fire scourged our exposed flank. The

men appear to have been chiefly colonial rebels, and not Boers of the backveldt, and to that happy chance it

may be that the comparative harmlessness of their fire was due. Even now, in spite of the surprise, the

situation might have been saved had the bewildered troops and their harried officers known exactly what to

do. It is easy to be wise after the event, but it appears now that the only course that could commend itself

would be to extricate the troops from their position, and then, if thought feasible, to plan an attack. Instead of

this a rush was made at the hillside, and the infantry made their way some distance up it only to find that

there were positive ledges in front of them which could not be climbed. The advance was at a dead stop, and

the men lay down under the boulders for cover from the hot fire which came from inaccessible marksmen

above them. Meanwhile the artillery had opened behind them, and their fire (not for the first time in this

campaign) was more deadly to their friends than to their foes. At least one prominent officer fell among his

men, torn by British shrapnel bullets. Talana Hill and Modder River have shown also, though perhaps in a

less tragic degree, that what with the long range of modern artillery fire, and what with the difficulty of

locating infantry who are using smokeless powder, it is necessary that officers commanding batteries should

be provided with the coolest heads and the most powerful glasses of any men in the service, for a

responsibility which will become more and more terrific rests upon their judgment.

The question now, since the assault had failed, was how to extricate the men from their position. Many

withdrew down the hill, running the gauntlet of the enemy's fire as they emerged from the boulders on to the

open ground, while others clung to their positions, some from a soldierly hope that victory might finally

incline to them, others because it was clearly safer to lie among the rocks than to cross the bulletswept

spaces beyond. Those portions of the force who extricated themselves do not appear to have realised how

many of their comrades had remained behind, and so as the gap gradually increased between the men who

were stationary and the men who fell back all hope of the two bodies reuniting became impossible. All the

infantry who remained upon the hillside were captured. The rest rallied at a point fifteen hundred yards from

In the meanwhile three powerful Boer guns upon the ridge had opened fire with great accuracy, but

fortunately with defective shells. Had the enemy's contractors been as trustworthy as their gunners in this

campaign, our losses would have been very much heavier, and it is possible that here we catch a glimpse of

some consequences of that corruption which was one of the curses of the country. The guns were moved with

great smartness along the ridge, and opened fire again and again, but never with great result. Our own

batteries, the 74th and 77th, with our handful of mounted men, worked hard in covering the retreat and

It is a sad subject to discuss, but it is the one instance in a campaign containing many reverses which amounts

to demoralisation among the troops engaged. The Guards marching with the steadiness of Hyde Park off the

field of Magersfontein, or the men of Nicholson's Nek chafing because they were not led in a last hopeless

charge, are, even in defeat, object lessons of military virtue. But here fatigue and sleeplessness had taken all

fire and spirit out of the men. They dropped asleep by the roadside and had to be prodded up by their

exhausted officers. Many were taken prisoners in their slumber by the enemy who gleaned behind them.

Units broke into small straggling bodies, and it was a sorry and bedraggled force which about ten o'clock

came wandering into Molteno. The place of honour in the rear was kept throughout by the Irish Rifles, who

Our losses in killed and wounded were not severe military honour would have been less sore had they

been more so. Twentysix killed, sixtyeight wounded that is all. But between the men on the hillside and

the somnambulists of the column, six hundred, about equally divided between the Irish Rifles and the

Northumberland Fusiliers, had been left as prisoners. Two guns, too, had been lost in the hurried retreat.

It is not for the historian especially for a civilian historian to say a word unnecessarily to aggravate the

pain of that brave man who, having done all that personal courage could do, was seen afterwards sobbing on

the table of the waitingroom at Molteno, and bewailing his 'poor men.' He had a disaster, but Nelson had

one at Teneriffe and Napoleon at Acre, and built their great reputations in spite of it. But the one good thing

of a disaster is that by examining it we may learn to do better in the future, and so it would indeed be a

perilous thing if we agreed that our reverses were not a fit subject for open and frank discussion.

It is not to the detriment of an enterprise that it should be daring and call for considerable physical effort on

the part of those who are engaged in it. On the contrary, the conception of such plans is one of the signs of a

great military mind. But in the arranging of the details the same military mind should assiduously occupy

itself in foreseeing and preventing every unnecessary thing which may make the execution of such a plan

more difficult. The idea of a swift sudden attack upon Stormberg was excellent the details of the operation

How far the Boers suffered at Stormberg is unknown to us, but there seems in this instance no reason to doubt

their own statement that their losses were very slight. At no time was any body of them exposed to our fire,

while we, as usual, fought in the open. Their numbers were probably less than ours, and the quality of their

shooting and want of energy in pursuit make the defeat the more galling. On the other hand, their guns were

served with skill and audacity. They consisted of commandos from Bethulie, Rouxville, and Smithfield,

under the orders of Olivier, with those colonials whom they had seduced from their allegiance.

This defeat of General Gatacre's, occurring, as it did, in a disaffected district and one of great strategic

Fortunately no very evil result followed. No doubt the recruiting of rebels was helped, but there was no

forward movement and Molteno remained in our hands. In the meanwhile Gatacre's force was reinforced by a

fresh battery, the 79th, and by a strong regiment, the Derbyshires, so that with the 1st Royal Scots and the

wing of the Berkshires he was strong enough to hold his own until the time for a general advance should

come. So in the Stormberg district, as at the Modder River, the same humiliating and absurd position of

Two serious defeats had within the week been inflicted upon the British forces in South Africa. Cronje,

lurking behind his trenches and his barbed wire entanglements barred Methuen's road to Kimberley, while in

the northern part of Cape Colony Gatacre's wearied troops had been defeated and driven by a force which

consisted largely of British subjects. But the public at home steeled their hearts and fixed their eyes steadily

upon Natal. There was their senior General and there the main body of their troops. As brigade after brigade

and battery after battery touched at Cape Town, and were sent on instantly to Durban, it was evident that it

was in this quarter that the supreme effort was to be made, and that there the light might at last break. In club,

and dining room, and railway car wherever men met and talked the same words might be heard: 'Wait

It was upon October 30th that Sir George White had been thrust back into Ladysmith. On November 2nd

telegraphic communication with the town was interrupted. On November 3rd the railway line was cut. On

November 10th the Boers held Colenso and the line of the Tugela. On the 14th was the affair of the armoured

train. On the 18th the enemy were near Estcourt. On the 21st they had reached the Mooi River. On the 23rd

Hildyard attacked them at Willow Grange. All these actions will be treated elsewhere. This last one marks the

turn of the tide. >From then onwards Sir Redvers Ruller was massing his troops at Chieveley in preparation

for a great effort to cross the river and to relieve Ladysmith, the guns of which, calling from behind the line

of northern hills, told their constant tale of restless attack and stubborn defence.

But the task was as severe a one as the most fighting General Could ask for. On the southern side the banks

formed a long slope which could be shaved as with a razor by the rifle fire of the enemy. How to advance

across that broad open zone was indeed a problem. It was one of many occasions in this war in which one

wondered why, if a bulletproof shield capable of sheltering a lying man could be constructed, a trial should

not be given to it. Alternate rushes of companies with a safe rest after each rush would save the troops from

the continued tension of that deadly never ending fire. However, it is idle to discuss what might have been

done to mitigate their trials. The open ground had to be passed, and then they came to not the enemy, but

a broad and deep river, with a single bridge, probably undermined, and a single ford, which was found not to

exist in practice. Beyond the river was tier after tier of hills, crowned with stone walls and seamed with

trenches, defended by thousands of the best marksmen in the world, supported by an admirable artillery. If, in

spite of the advance over the open and in spite of the passage of the river, a ridge could still be carried, it was

only to be commanded by the next; and so, one behind the other, like the billows of the ocean, a series of hills

and hollows rolled northwards to Ladysmith. All attacks must be in the open. All defence was from under

cover. Add to this, that the young and energetic Louis Botha was in command of the Boers. It was a desperate

task, and yet honour forbade that the garrison should be left to its fate. The venture must be made.

The most obvious criticism upon the operation is that if the attack must be made it should not be made under

the enemy's conditions. We seem almost to have gone out of our way to make every obstacle the

glacislike approach, the river, the trenches as difficult as possible. Future operations were to prove that it

was not so difficult to deceive Boer vigilance and by rapid movements to cross the Tugela. A military

authority has stated, I know not with what truth, that there is no instance in history of a determined army

being stopped by the line of a river, and from Wellington at the Douro to the Russians on the Danube many

examples of the ease with which they may be passed will occur to the reader. But Buller had some

exceptional difficulties with which to contend. He was weak in mounted troops, and was opposed to an

enemy of exceptional mobility who might attack his flank and rear if he exposed them. He had not that great

preponderance of numbers which came to him later, and which enabled him to attempt a wide turning

movement. One advantage he had, the possession of a more powerful artillery, but his heaviest guns were

naturally his least mobile, and the more direct his advance the more effective would his guns be. For these or

other reasons he determined upon a frontal attack on the formidable Boer position, and he moved out of

The force which General Buller led into action was the finest which any British general had handled since the

battle of the Alma. Of infantry he had four strong brigades: the 2nd (Hildyard's) consisting of the 2nd

Devons, the 2nd Queen's or West Surrey, the 2nd West Yorkshire, and the 2nd East Surrey; the 4th Brigade

(Lyttelton's) comprising the 2nd Cameronians, the 3rd Rifles, the 1st Durhams, and the 1st Rifle Brigade; the

5th Brigade (Hart's) with the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught Rangers, 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, and

the Border Regiment, this last taking the place of the 2nd Irish Rifles, who were with Gatacre. There

remained the 6th Brigade (Barton's), which included the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, the 1st

Welsh Fusiliers, and the 2nd Irish Fusiliers in all about 16,000 infantry. The mounted men, who were

commanded by Lord Dundonald, included the 13th Hussars, the 1st Royals, Bethune's Mounted Infantry,

Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, three squadrons of South African Horse, with a composite regiment formed

from the mounted infantry of the Rifles and of the Dublin Fusiliers with squadrons of the Natal Carabineers

and the Imperial Light Horse. These irregular troops of horse might be criticised by martinets and pedants,

but they contained some of the finest fighting material in the army, some urged on by personal hatred of the

Boers and some by mere lust of adventure. As an example of the latter one squadron of the South African

Horse was composed almost entirely of Texan muleteers, who, having come over with their animals, had

Cavalry was General Buller's weakest arm, but his artillery was strong both in its quality and its number of

guns. There were five batteries (30 guns) of the Field Artillery, the 7th, 14th, 63rd, 64th, and 66th. Besides

these there were no fewer than sixteen naval guns from H.M.S.'Terrible ' fourteen of which were

12pounders, and the other two of the 47 type which had done such good service both at Ladysmith and

with Methuen. The whole force which moved out from Chieveley Camp numbered about 21,000 men.

The work which was allotted to the army was simple in conception, however terrible it might prove in

execution. There were two points at which the river might be crossed, one three miles off on the left, named

Bridle Drift, the other straight ahead at the Bridge of Colenso. The 5th or Irish Brigade was to endeavour to

cross at Bridle Drift, and then to work down the river bank on the far side so as to support the 2nd or English

Brigade, which was to cross at Colenso. The 4th Brigade was to advance between these, so as to help

either which should be in difficulties. Meanwhile on the extreme right the mounted troops under Dundonald

were to cover the flank and to attack Hlangwane Hill, a formidable position held strongly by the enemy upon

the south bank of the Tugela. The remaining Fusilier brigade of infantry was to support this movement on the

right. The guns were to cover the various attacks, and if possible gain a position from which the trenches

might be enfiladed. This, simply stated, was the work which lay before the British army. In the bright clear

morning sunshine, under a cloudless blue sky, they advanced with high hopes to the assault. Before them lay

the long level plain, then the curve of the river, and beyond, silent and serene, like some peaceful dream

landscape, stretched the lines and lines of gently curving hills. It was just five o'clock in the morning when

the naval guns began to bay, and huge red dustclouds from the distant foothills showed where the lyddite was

bursting. No answer came back, nor was there any movement upon the sunlit hills. It was almost brutal, this

furious violence to so gentle and unresponsive a countryside. In no place could the keenest eye detect a sign

of guns or men, and yet death lurked in every hollow and crouched by every rock.

It is so difficult to make a modern battle intelligible when fought, as this was, over a front of seven or eight

miles, that it is best perhaps to take the doings of each column in turn, beginning with the left flank, where

Under an unanswered and therefore an unaimed fire from the heavy guns the Irish infantry moved forward

upon the points which they had been ordered to attack. The Dublins led, then the Connaughts, the

Inniskillings, and the Borderers. Incredible as it may appear after the recent experiences of Magersfontein and

of Stormberg, the men in the two rear regiments appear to have been advanced in quarter column, and not to

have deployed until after the enemy's fire had opened. Had shrapnel struck this close formation, as it was

within an ace of doing, the loss of life must have been as severe as it was unnecessary.

On approaching the Drift the position or even the existence of which does not seem to have been very

clearly defined it was found that the troops had to advance into a loop formed by the river, so that they

were exposed to a very heavy crossfire upon their right flank, while they were rained on by shrapnel from in

front. No sign of the enemy could be seen, though the men were dropping fast. It is a weird and soulshaking

experience to advance over a sunlit and apparently a lonely countryside, with no slightest movement upon its

broad face, while the path which you take is marked behind you by sobbing, gasping, writhing men, who can

only guess by the position of their wounds whence the shots came which struck them down. All round, like

the hissing of fat in the pan, is the monotonous crackle and rattle of the Mausers; but the air is full of it, and

no one can define exactly whence it comes. Far away on some hill upon the skyline there hangs the least

gauzy veil of thin smoke to indicate whence the six men who have just all fallen together, as if it were some

grim drill, met their death. Into such a hellstorm as this it was that the soldiers have again and again

advanced in the course of this war, but it may be questioned whether they will not prove to be among the last

of mortals to be asked to endure such an ordeal. Other methods of attack must be found or attacks must be

abandoned, for smokeless powder, quickfiring guns, and modern rifles make it all odds on the defence!

The gallant Irishmen pushed on, flushed with battle and careless for their losses, the four regiments clubbed

into one, with all military organisation rapidly disappearing, and nothing left but their gallant spirit and their

furious desire to come to handgrips with the enemy. Rolling on in a broad wave of shouting angry men, they

never winced from the fire until they had swept up to the bank of the river. Northern Inniskilling and

Southern man of Connaught, orange and green, Protestant and Catholic, Celt and Saxon, their only rivalry

now was who could shed his blood most freely for the common cause. How hateful seem those provincial

The bank of the river had been gained, but where was the ford? The water swept broad and unruffled in front

of them, with no indication of shallows. A few dashing fellows sprang in, but their cartridges and rifles

dragged them to the bottom. One or two may even have struggled through to the further side, but on this there

is a conflict of evidence. It may be, though it seems incredible, that the river had been partly dammed to

deepen the Drift, or, as is more probable, that in the rapid advance and attack the position of the Drift was

lost. However this may be, the troops could find no ford, and they lay down, as had been done in so many

previous actions, unwilling to retreat and unable to advance, with the same merciless pelting from front and

flank. In every fold and behind every anthill the Irishmen lay thick and waited for better times. There are

many instances of their cheery and uncomplaining humour. Colonel Brooke, of the Connaughts, fell at the

head of his men. Private Livingstone helped to carry him into safety, and then, his task done, he confessed to

having 'a bit of a rap meself,' and sank fainting with a bullet through his throat. Another sat with a bullet

through both legs. 'Bring me a tin whistle and I'll blow ye any tune ye like,' he cried, mindful of the Dargai

piper. Another with his arm hanging by a tendon puffed morosely at his short black pipe. Every now and

then, in face of the impossible, the fiery Celtic valour flamed furiously upwards. 'Fix bayonets, men, and let

us make a name for ourselves,' cried a colour sergeant, and he never spoke again. For five hours, under the

tropical sun, the grimy parched men held on to the ground they had occupied. British shells pitched short and

fell among them. A regiment in support fired at them, not knowing that any of the line were so far advanced.

Shot at from the front, the flank, and the rear, the 5th Brigade held grimly on.

But fortunately their orders to retire were at hand, and it is certain that had they not reached them the

regiments would have been uselessly destroyed where they lay. It seems to have been Buller himself, who

showed extraordinary and ubiquitous personal energy during the day, that ordered them to fall back. As they

retreated there was an entire absence of haste and panic, but officers and men were hopelessly jumbled up,

and General Hart whose judgment may occasionally be questioned, but whose cool courage was beyond

praise had hard work to reform the splendid brigade which six hours before had tramped out of Chieveley

Camp. Between five and six hundred of them had fallen a loss which approximates to that of the Highland

Brigade at Magersfontein. The Dublins and the Connaughts were the heaviest sufferers.

So much for the mishap of the 5th Brigade. It is superfluous to point out that the same old omissions were

responsible for the same old results. Why were the men in quarter column when advancing against an unseen

foe? Why had no scouts gone forward to be certain of the position of the ford? Where were the clouds of

skirmishers which should precede such an advance? The recent examples in the field and the teachings of the

textbooks were equally set at naught, as they had been, and were to be, so often in this campaign. There may

be a science of war in the lecturerooms at Camberley, but very little of it found its way to the veldt. The

slogging valour of the private, the careless dash of the regimental officer these were our military assets

but seldom the care and foresight of our commanders. It is a thankless task to make such comments, but the

one great lesson of the war has been that the army is too vital a thing to fall into the hands of a caste, and that

it is a national duty for every man to speak fearlessly and freely what he believes to be the truth.

Passing from the misadventure of the 5th Brigade we come as we move from left to right upon the 4th, or

Lyttelton's Brigade, which was instructed not to attack itself but to support the attack on either side of it. With

the help of the naval guns it did what it could to extricate and cover the retreat of the Irishmen, but it could

play no very important part in the action, and its losses were insignificant. On its right in turn Hildyard's

English Brigade had developed its attack upon Colenso and the bridge. The regiments under Hildyard's lead

were the 2nd West Surrey, the 2nd Devons (whose first battalion was doing so well with the Ladysmith

force), the East Surreys, and the West Yorkshires. The enemy had evidently anticipated the main attack on

this position, and not only were the trenches upon the other side exceptionally strong, but their artillery

converged upon the bridge, at least a dozen heavy pieces, besides a number of quickfirers, bearing upon it.

The Devons and the Queens, in open order (an extended line of khaki dots, blending so admirably with the

plain that they were hardly visible when they halted), led the attack, being supported by the East Surrey and

the West Yorkshires. Advancing under a very heavy fire the brigade experienced much the same ordeal as

their comrades of Hart's brigade, which was mitigated by the fact that from the first they preserved their open

order in columns of halfcompanies extended to six paces, and that the river in front of them did not permit

that right flank fire which was so fatal to the Irishmen. With a loss of some two hundred men the leading

regiments succeeded in reaching Colenso, and the West Surrey, advancing by rushes of fifty yards at a time,

had established itself in the station, but a catastrophe had occurred at an earlier hour to the artillery which was

supporting it which rendered all. further advance impossible. For the reason of this we must follow the

This consisted of the important body of artillery who had been told off to support the main attack. It

comprised two field batteries, the 14th and the 66th, under the command of Colonel Long, and six naval guns

(two of 4.7, and four 12pounders) under Lieutenant Ogilvy of the 'Terrible.' Long has the record of being a

most zealous and dashing officer, whose handling of the Egyptian artillery at the battle of the Atbara had

much to do with the success of the action. Unfortunately, these barbarian campaigns, in which liberties may

be taken with impunity, leave an evil tradition, as the French have found with their Algerians. Our own close

formations, our adherence to volley firing, and in this instance the use of our artillery all seem to be legacies

of our savage wars. Be the cause what it may, at an early stage of the action Long's guns whirled forwards,

outstripped the infantry brigades upon their flanks, left the slowmoving naval guns with their oxteams

behind them, and unlimbered within a thousand yards of the enemy's trenches. From this position he opened

fire upon Fort Wylie, which was the centre of that portion of the Boer position which faced him.

But his two unhappy batteries were destined not to turn the tide of battle, as he had hoped, but rather to

furnish the classic example of the helplessness of artillery against modern rifle fire. Not even Mercer's

famous description of the effect of a flank fire upon his troop of horse artillery at Waterloo could do justice to

the blizzard of lead which broke over the two doomed batteries. The teams fell in heaps, some dead, some

mutilated, and mutilating others in their frantic struggles. One driver, crazed with horror, sprang on a leader,

cut the traces and tore madly off the field. But a perfect discipline reigned among the vast majority of the

gunners, and the words of command and the laying and working of the guns were all as methodical as at

Okehampton. Not only was there a most deadly rifle fire, partly from the lines in front and partly from the

village of Colenso upon their left flank, but the Boer automatic quickfirers found the range to a nicety, and

the little shells were crackling and banging continually over the batteries. Already every gun had its litter of

dead around it, but each was still fringed by its own group of furious officers and sweating desperate gunners.

Poor Long was down, with a bullet through his arm and another through his liver. 'Abandon be damned! We

don't abandon guns!' was his last cry as they dragged him into the shelter of a little donga hard by. Captain

Goldie dropped dead. So did Lieutenant Schreiber. Colonel Hunt fell, shot in two places. Officers and men

were falling fast. The guns could not be worked, and yet they could not be removed, for every effort to bring

up teams from the shelter where the limbers lay ended in the death of the horses. The survivors took refuge

from the murderous fire in that small hollow to which Long had been carried, a hundred yards or so from the

line of bulletsplashed cannon. One gun on the right was still served by four men who refused to leave it.

They seemed to bear charmed lives, these four, as they strained and wrestled with their beloved 15pounder,

amid the spurting sand and the blue wreaths of the bursting shells. Then one gasped and fell against the trail,

and his comrade sank beside the wheel with his chin upon his breast. The third threw up his hands and

pitched forward upon his face; while the survivor, a grim powderstained figure, stood at attention looking

death in the eyes until he too was struck down. A useless sacrifice, you may say; but while the men who saw

them die can tell such a story round the camp fire the example of such deaths as these does more than clang

For two hours the little knot of heartsick humiliated officers and men lay in the precarious shelter of the

donga and looked out at the bulletswept plain and the line of silent guns. Many of them were wounded.

Their chief lay among them, still calling out in his delirium for his guns. They had been joined by the gallant

Baptie, a brave surgeon, who rode across to the donga amid a murderous fire, and did what he could for the

injured men. Now and then a rush was made into the open, sometimes in the hope of firing another round,

sometimes to bring a wounded comrade in from the pitiless pelt of the bullets. How fearful was that

leadstorm may be gathered from the fact that one gunner was found with sixtyfour wounds in his body.

Several men dropped in these sorties, and the disheartened survivors settled down once more in the donga.

The hope to which they clung was that their guns were not really lost, but that the arrival of infantry would

enable them to work them once more. Infantry did at last arrive, but in such small numbers that it made the

situation more difficult instead of easing it. Colonel Bullock had brought up two companies of the Devons to

join the two companies (A and B) of Scots Fusiliers who had been the original escort of the guns, but such a

handful could not turn the tide. They also took refuge in the donga, and waited for better times.

In the meanwhile the attention of Generals Buller and Clery had been called to the desperate position of the

guns, and they had made their way to that further nullah in the rear where the remaining limber horses and

drivers were. This was some distance behind that other donga in which Long, Bullock, and their Devons and

gunners were crouching. 'Will any of you volunteer to save the guns?' cried Buller. Corporal Nurse, Gunner

Young, and a few others responded. The desperate venture was led by three aidesdecamp of the Generals,

Congreve, Schofield, and Roberts, the only son of the famous soldier. Two gun teams were taken down; the

horses galloping frantically through an infernal fire, and each team succeeded in getting back with a gun. But

the loss was fearful. Roberts was mortally wounded. Congreve has left an account which shows what a

modern rifle fire at a thousand yards is like. 'My first bullet went through my left sleeve and made the joint of

my elbow bleed, next a clod of earth caught me smack on the right arm, then my horse got one, then my right

leg one, then my horse another, and that settled us.' The gallant fellow managed to crawl to the group of

castaways in the donga. Roberts insisted on being left where he fell, for fear he should hamper the others.

In the meanwhile Captain Reed, of the 7th Battery, had arrived with two spare teams of horses, and another

determined effort was made under his leadership to save some of the guns. But the fire was too murderous.

Twothirds of his horses and half his men, including himself, were struck down, and General Buller

commanded that all further attempts to reach the abandoned batteries should be given up. Both he and

General Clery had been slightly wounded, and there were many operations over the whole field of action to

engage their attention. But making every allowance for the pressure of many duties and for the confusion and

turmoil of a great action, it does seem one of the most inexplicable incidents in British military history that

the guns should ever have been permitted to fall into the hands of the enemy. It is evident that if our gunners

could not live under the fire of the enemy it would be equally impossible for the enemy to remove the guns

under a fire from a couple of battalions of our infantry. There were many regiments which had hardly been

engaged, and which could have been advanced for such a purpose. The men of the Mounted Infantry actually

volunteered for this work, and none could have been more capable of carrying it out. There was plenty of

time also, for the guns were abandoned about eleven and the Boers did not venture to seize them until four.

Not only could the guns have been saved, but they might, one would think, have been transformed into an

excellent bait for a trap to tempt the Boers out of their trenches. It must have been with fear and trembling

that Cherry Emmett and his men first approached them, for how could they believe that such incredible good

fortune had come to them? However, the fact, humiliating and inexplicable, is that the guns were so left, that

the whole force was withdrawn, and that not only the ten cannon, but also the handful of Devons, with their

Colonel, and the Fusiliers were taken prisoners in the donga which had sheltered them all day.

We have now, working from left to right, considered the operations of Hart's Brigade at Bridle Drift, of

Lyttelton's Brigade in support, of Hildyard's which attacked Colenso, and of the luckless batteries which were

to have helped him. There remain two bodies of troops upon the right, the further consisting of Dundonald's

mounted men who were to attack Hlangwane Hill, a fortified Boer position upon the south of the river, while

Barton's Brigade was to support it and to connect this attack with the central operations.

Dundonald's force was entirely too weak for such an operation as the capture of the formidable entrenched

hill, and it is probable that the movement was meant rather as a reconnaissance than as an assault. He had not

more than a thousand men in all, mostly irregulars, and the position which faced him was precipitous and

entrenched, with barbedwire entanglements and automatic guns. But the gallant colonials were out on their

first action, and their fiery courage pushed the attack home. Leaving their horses, they advanced a mile and a

half on foot before they came within easy range of the hidden riflemen, and learned the lesson which had

been taught to their comrades all along the line, that given approximately equal numbers the attack in the

open has no possible chance against the concealed defence, and that the more bravely it is pushed the more

heavy is the repulse. The irregulars carried themselves like old soldiers, they did all that mortal man could do,

and they retired coolly and slowly with the loss of 130 of the brave troopers. The 7th Field Battery did all that

was possible to support the advance and cover the retirement. In no single place, on this day of disaster, did

one least gleam of success come to warm the hearts and reward the exertions of our muchenduring men.

Of Barton's Brigade there is nothing to be recorded, for they appear neither to have supported the attack upon

Hlangwane Hill on the one side nor to have helped to cover the illfated guns on the other. Barton was

applied to for help by Dundonald, but refused to detach any of his troops. If General Buller's real idea was a

reconnaissance in force in order to determine the position and strength of the Boer lines, then of course his

brigadiers must have felt a. reluctance to entangle their brigades in a battle which was really the result of a

misunderstanding. On the other hand, if, as the orders of the day seem to show, a serious engagement was

always intended, it is strange that two brigades out of four should have played so insignificant a part. To

Barton's Brigade was given the responsibility of seeing that no right flank attack was carried out by the

Boers, and this held it back until it was clear that no such attack was contemplated. After that one would have

thought that, had the situation been appreciated, at least two battalions might have been spared to cover the

abandoned guns with their rifle fire. Two companies of the Scots Fusiliers did share the fortunes of the guns.

Two others, and one of the Irish Fusiliers, acted in support, but the brigade as a whole, together with the 1st

Royals and the 13th Hussars, might as well have been at Aldershot for any bearing which their work had

And so the first attempt at the relief of Ladysmith came to an end. At twelve o'clock all the troops upon the

ground were retreating for the camp. There was nothing in the shape of rout or panic, and the withdrawal was

as orderly as the advance; but the fact remained that we had just 1,200 men in killed, wounded, and missing,

and had gained absolutely nothing. We had not even the satisfaction of knowing that we had inflicted as well

as endured punishment, for the enemy remained throughout the day so cleverly concealed that it is doubtful

whether more than a hundred casualties occurred in their ranks. Once more it was shown how weak an arm is

Our wounded fortunately bore a high proportion to our killed, as they always will do when it is rifle fire

rather than shell fire which is effective. Roughly we had 150 killed and about 720 wounded. A more

humiliating item is the 250 or so who were missing. These men were the gunners, the Devons, and the Scots

Fusiliers, who were taken in the donga together with small bodies from the Connaughts, the Dublins, and

other regiments who, having found some shelter, were unable to leave it, and clung on until the retirement of

their regiments left them in a hopeless position. Some of these small knots of men were allowed to retire in

the evening by the Boers, who seemed by no means anxious to increase the number of their prisoners.

Colonel Thackeray, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, found himself with a handful of his men surrounded by the

enemy, but owing to their good humour and his own tact he succeeded in withdrawing them in safety. The

losses fell chiefly on Hart's Brigade, Hildyard's Brigade, and the colonial irregulars, who bore off the honours

In his official report General Buller states that were it not for the action of Colonel Long and the subsequent

disaster to the artillery he thought that the battle might have been a successful one. This is a hard saying, and

throws perhaps too much responsibility upon the gallant but unfortunate gunner. There have been occasions

in the war when greater dash upon the part of our artillery might have changed the fate of the day, and it is

bad policy to be too severe upon the man who has taken a risk and failed. The whole operation, with its

advance over the open against a concealed enemy with a river in his front, was so absolutely desperate that

Long may have seen that only desperate measures could save the situation. To bring guns into action in front

of the infantry without having clearly defined the position of the opposing infantry must always remain one

of the most hazardous ventures of war. 'It would certainly be mere folly,' says Prince Kraft, 'to advance

artillery to within 600 or 800 yards of a position held by infantry unless the latter were under the fire of

infantry from an even shorter range.' This 'mere folly' is exactly what Colonel Long did, but it must be

remembered in extenuation that he shared with others the idea that the Boers were up on the hills, and had no

inkling that their front trenches were down at the river. With the imperfect means at his disposal he did such

scouting as he could, and if his fiery and impetuous spirit led him into a position which cost him so dearly it

is certainly more easy for the critic to extenuate his fault than that subsequent one which allowed the

abandoned guns to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nor is there any evidence that the loss of these guns did

seriously affect the fate of the action, for at those other parts of the field where the infantry had the full and

unceasing support of the artillery the result was not more favourable than at the centre.

So much for Colenso. A more unsatisfactory and in some ways inexplicable action is not to be found in the

range of British military history. And the fuller the light which has been poured upon it, the more

extraordinary does the battle appear. There are a preface and a sequel to the action which have put a severe

strain upon the charity which the British public has always shown that it is prepared to extend to a defeated

General. The preface is that General Buller sent word to General White that he proposed to attack upon the

17th, while the actual attack was delivered upon the 15th, so that the garrison was not prepared to make that

demonstration which might have prevented the besiegers from sending important reinforcements to Botha,

had he needed them. The sequel is more serious. Losing all heart at his defeat, General Buller, although he

had been officially informed that White had provisions for seventy days, sent a heliogram advising the

surrender of the garrison. White's first reply, which deserves to live with the anecdote of Nelson's telescope at

his blind eye, was to the effect that he believed the enemy had been tampering with Buller's messages. To this

Buller despatched an amended message, which with Sir George White's reply, is here appended:

'I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed; the enemy is too strong for my force except with siege operations, and

'How many days can you hold out? I suggest you firing away as much ammunition as you can, and making

best terms you can. I can remain here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in. I find

my infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp, and then only if water can be got, and it is scarce

here. Whatever happens, recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code books, and all deciphered

'Yours of today received and understood. My suggestion is that you take up strongest available position that

will enable you to keep touch of the enemy and harass him constantly with artillery fire, and in other ways as

much as possible. I can make food last for much longer than a month, and will not think of making terms till I

am forced to. You may have hit enemy harder than you think. All our native spies report that your artillery

fire made considerable impression on enemy. Have your losses been very heavy? If you lose touch of enemy,

it will immensely increase his opportunities of crushing me, and have worst effect elsewhere. While you are

in touch with him and in communication with me, he has both of our forces to reckon with. Make every effort

to get reinforcements as early as possible, including India, and enlist every man in both colonies who will

serve and can ride. Things may look brighter. The loss of 12,000 men here would be a heavy blow to

England. We must not yet think of it. I fear I could not cut my way to you. Enteric fever is increasing

alarmingly here. There are now 180 cases, all within last month. Answer fully. I am keeping everything secret

Much allowance is to be made for a man who is staggering under the mental shock of defeat and the physical

exertions which Buller had endured. That the Government made such allowance is clear from the fact that he

was not instantly recalled. And yet the cold facts are that we have a British General, at the head of 25,000

men, recommending another General, at the head of 12,000 men only twelve miles off, to lay down his arms

to an army which was certainly very inferior in numbers to the total British force; and this because he had

once been defeated, although he knew that there was still time for the whole resources of the Empire to be

poured into Natal in order to prevent so shocking a disaster. Such is a plain statement of the advice which

Buller gave and which White rejected. For the instant the fate not only of South Africa but even, as I believe,

of the Empire hung upon the decision of the old soldier in Ladysmith, who had to resist the proposals of his

own General as sternly as the attacks of the enemy. He who sorely needed help and encouragement became,

as his message shows, the helper and the encourager. It was a tremendous test, and Sir George White came

through it with a staunchness and a loyalty which saved us not only from overwhelming present disaster, but

from a hideous memory which must have haunted British military annals for centuries to come.

The week which extended from December 10th to December 17th, 1899, was the blackest one known during

our generation, and the most disastrous for British arms during the century. We had in the short space of

seven days lost, beyond all extenuation or excuse, three separate actions. No single defeat was of vital

importance in itself, but the cumulative effect, occurring as they did to each of the main British forces in

South Africa, was very great. The total loss amounted to about three thousand men and twelve guns, while

the indirect effects in the way of loss of prestige to ourselves and increased confidence and more numerous

It is singular to glance at the extracts from the European press at that time and to observe the delight and

foolish exultation with which our reverses were received. That this should occur in the French journals is not

unnatural, since our history has been largely a contest with that Power, and we can regard with complacency

an enmity which is the tribute to our success. Russia, too, as the least progressive of European States, has a

natural antagonism of thought, if not of interests, to the Power which stands most prominently for individual

freedom and liberal institutions. The same poor excuse may be made for the organs of the Vatican. But what

are we to say of the insensate railing of Germany, a country whose ally we have been for centuries? In the

days of Marlborough, in the darkest hours of Frederick the Great, in the great world struggle of Napoleon, we

have been the brothersinarms of these people. So with the Austrians also. If both these countries were not

finally swept from the map by Napoleon, it is largely to British subsidies and British tenacity that they owe it.

And yet these are the folk who turned most bitterly against us at the only time in modern history when we

had a chance of distinguishing our friends from our foes. Never again, I trust, on any pretext will a British

guinea be spent or a British soldier or sailor shed his blood for such allies. The political lesson of this writer

has been that we should make ourselves strong within the empire, and let all outside it, save only our kinsmen

of America, go their own way and meet their own fate without let or hindrance from us. It is amazing to find

that even the Americans could understand the stock from which they are themselves sprung so little that such

papers as the 'New York Herald' should imagine that our defeat at Colenso was a good opportunity for us to

terminate the war. The other leading American journals, however, took a more sane view of the situation, and

realised that ten years of such defeats would not find the end either of our resolution or of our resources.

In the British Islands and in the empire at large our misfortunes were met by a sombre but unalterable

determination to carry the war to a successful conclusion and to spare no sacrifices which could lead to that

end. Amid the humiliation of our reverses there was a certain undercurrent of satisfaction that the deeds of

our foemen should at least have made the contention that the strong was wantonly attacking the weak an

absurd one. Under the stimulus of defeat the opposition to the war sensibly decreased. It had become too

absurd even for the most unreasonable platform orator to contend that a struggle had been forced upon the

Boers when every fresh detail showed how thoroughly they had prepared for such a contingency and how

much we had to make up. Many who had opposed the war simply on that sporting instinct which backs the

smaller against the larger began to realise that what with the geographical position of these people, what with

the nature of their country, and what with the mobility, number, and hardihood of their forces, we had

undertaken a task which would necessitate such a military effort as we had never before been called upon to

make. when Kipling at the dawn of the war had sung of 'fifty thousand horse and foot going to Table Bay,'

the statement had seemed extreme. Now it was growing upon the public mind that four times this number

would not be an excessive estimate. But the nation rose grandly to the effort. Their only fear, often and loudly

expressed, was that Parliament would deal too tamely with the situation and fail to demand sufficient

sacrifices. Such was the wave of feeling over the country that it was impossible to hold a peace meeting

anywhere without a certainty of riot. The only London daily which had opposed the war, though very ably

edited, was overborne by the general sentiment and compelled to change its line. In the provinces also

opposition was almost silent, and the great colonies were even more unanimous than the mother country.

Misfortune had solidified us where success might have caused a sentimental opposition.

On the whole, the energetic mood of the nation was reflected by the decided measures of the Government.

Before the deepsea cables had told us the lists of our dead, steps had been taken to prove to the world how

great were our latent resources and how determined our spirit. On December 18th, two days after Colenso,

1. That as General Buller's hands were full in Natal the supervision and direction of the whole campaign

should be placed in the hands of Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff. Thus the famous old

soldier and the famous young one were called together to the assistance of the country.

3. That the 7th Division (10,000 men) should be despatched to Africa, and that an 8th Division should be

4. That considerable artillery reinforcements, including a howitzer brigade, should go out.

8. That mounted corps be raised at the discretion of the CommanderinChief in South Africa.

9. That the patriotic offers of further contingents from the colonies be gratefully accepted.

By these measures it was calculated that from seventy to a hundred thousand men would be added to our

South African armies, the numbers of which were already not short of a hundred thousand.

It is one thing, however, to draw up paper reinforcements, and it is another, in a free country where no

compulsion would be tolerated, to turn these plans into actual regiments and squadrons. But if there were any

who doubted that this ancient nation still glowed with the spirit of its youth his fears must soon have passed

away. For this fardistant war, a war of the unseen foe and of the murderous ambuscade, there were so many

volunteers that the authorities were embarrassed by their numbers and their pertinacity. It was a stimulating

sight to see those long queues of tophatted, frockcoated young men who waited their turn for the orderly

room with as much desperate anxiety as if hard fare, a veldt bed, and Boer bullets were all that life had that

was worth the holding. Especially the Imperial Yeomanry, a corps of riders and shots, appealed to the

sporting instincts of our race. Many could ride and not shoot, many could shoot and not ride, more candidates

were rejected than were accepted, and yet in a very short time eight thousand men from every class were

wearing the grey coats and bandoliers. This singular and formidable force was drawn from every part of

England and Scotland, with a contingent of hardriding Irish foxhunters. Noblemen and grooms rode knee

to knee in the ranks, and the officers included many wellknown country gentlemen and masters of hounds.

Well horsed and well armed, a better force for the work in hand could not be imagined. So high did the

patriotism run that corps were formed in which the men not only found their own equipment but contributed

their pay to the war fund. Many young men about town justified their existence for the first time. In a single

club, which is peculiarly consecrated to the JEUNESSE DOREE, three hundred members rode to the wars.

Without waiting for these distant but necessary reinforcements, the Generals in Africa had two divisions to

look to, one of which was actually arriving while the other was on the sea. These formed the 5th Division

under Sir Charles Warren, and the 6th Division under General KellyKenny. Until these forces should arrive

it was obviously best that the three armies should wait, for, unless there should be pressing need of help on

the part of the besieged garrisons or imminent prospects of European complications, every week which

passed was in our favour. There was therefore a long lull in the war, during which Methuen strengthened his

position at Modder River, Gatacre held his own at Sterkstroom, and Buller built up his strength for another

attempt at the relief of Ladysmith. The only connected series of operations during that time were those of

General French in the neighbourhood of Colesberg, an account of which will be found in their entirety

elsewhere. A short narrative may be given here of the doings of each of these forces until the period of

Methuen after the repulse at Magersfontein had fallen back upon the lines of Modder River, and had fortified

them in such a way that he felt himself secure against assault. Cronje, on the other hand, had extended his

position both to the right and to the left, and had strengthened the works which we had already found so

formidable. In this way a condition of inaction was established which was really very much to our advantage,

since Methuen retained his communications by rail, while all supplies to Cronje had to come a hundred miles

by road. The British troops, and especially the Highland Brigade, were badly in need of a rest after the very

severe ordeal which they had undergone. General Hector Macdonald, whose military record had earned the

soldierly name of 'Fighting Mac,' was sent for from India to take the place of the illfated Wauchope.

Pending his arrival and that of reinforcements, Methuen remained quiet, and the Boers fortunately followed

his example. From over the northern horizon those silver flashes of light told that Kimberley was dauntless in

the present and hopeful of the future. On January 1st the British post of Kuruman fell, by which twelve

officers and 120 police were captured. The town was isolated, and its capture could have no effect upon the

general operations, but it is remarkable as the only capture of a fortified post up to this point made by the

The monotony of the long wait was broken by one dashing raid carried out by a detachment from Methuen's

line of communications. This force consisted of 200 Queenslanders, 100 Canadians (Toronto Company), 40

mounted Munster Fusiliers, a New South Wales Ambulance, and 200 of the Duke of Cornwall's Light

Infantry with one horse battery. This singular force, so small in numbers and yet raked from the ends of the

earth, was under the command of Colonel Pilcher. Moving out suddenly and rapidly from Belmont, it struck

at the extreme right of the Boer line, which consisted of a laager occupied by the colonial rebels of that part

of the country. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the colonists at the prospect of action. 'At last!' was

the cry which went up from the Canadians when they were ordered to advance. The result was an absolute

success. The rebels broke and fled, their camp was taken, and forty of them fell into our hands. Our own loss

was slight, three killed and a few wounded. The flying column occupied the town of Douglas and hoisted the

British flag there; but it was decided that the time had not yet come when it could be held, and the force fell

back upon Belmont. The rebel prisoners were sent down to Cape Town for trial. The movement was covered

by the advance of a force under Babington from Methuen's force. This detachment, consisting of the 9th and

12th Lancers, with some mounted infantry and G troop of Horse Artillery, prevented any interference with

Pilcher's force from the north. It is worthy of record that though the two bodies of troops were operating at a

distance of thirty miles, they succeeded in preserving a telephonic connection, seventeen minutes being the

Encouraged by this small success, Methuen's cavalry on January 9th made another raid over the Free State

border, which is remarkable for the fact that, save in the case of Colonel Plumer's Rhodesian Force, it was the

first time that the enemy's frontier had been violated. The expedition under Babington consisted of the same

regiments and the same battery which had covered Pilcher's advance. The line taken was a southeasterly

one, so as to get far round the left flank of the Boer position. With the aid of a party of the Victorian Mounted

Rifles a considerable tract of country was overrun, and some farmhouses destroyed. The latter extreme

measure may have been taken as a warning to the Boers that such depredations as they had carried out in

parts of Natal could not pass with impunity, but both the policy and the humanity of such a course appear to

be open to question, and there was some cause for the remonstrance which President Kruger shortly after

addressed to us upon the subject. The expedition returned to Modder Camp at the end of two days without

having seen the enemy. Save for one or two similar cavalry reconnaissances, an occasional interchange of

longrange shells, a little sniping, and one or two false alarms at night, which broke the whole front of

Magersfontein into yellow lines of angry light, nothing happened to Methuen's force which is worthy of

record up to the time of that movement of General Hector Macdonald to Koodoosberg which may be

considered in connection with Lord Roberts's decisive operations, of which it was really a part.

The doings of General Gatacre's force during the long interval which passed between his disaster at

Stormberg and the final general advance may be rapidly chronicled. Although nominally in command of a

division, Gatacre's troops were continually drafted off to east and to west, so that it was seldom that he had

more than a brigade under his orders. During the weeks of waiting, his force consisted of three field batteries,

the 74th, 77th, and 79th, some mounted police and irregular horse, the remains of the Royal Irish Rifles and

the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st Royal Scots, the Derbyshire regiment, and the Berkshires, the

whole amounting to about 5,500 men, who had to hold the whole district from Sterkstroom to East London

on the coast, with a victorious enemy in front and a disaffected population around. Under these circumstances

he could not attempt to do more than to hold his ground at Sterkstroom, and this he did unflinchingly until the

line of the Boer defence broke down. Scouting and raiding expeditions, chiefly organised by Captain De

Montmorency whose early death cut short the career of one who possessed every quality of a partisan

leader broke the monotony of inaction. During the week which ended the year a succession of small

skirmishes, of which the town of Dordrecht was the centre, exercised the troops in irregular warfare.

On January 3rd the Boer forces advanced and attacked the camp of the Cape Mounted Police, which was

some eight miles in advance of Gatacre's main position. The movement, however, was a halfhearted one,

and was beaten off with small loss upon their part and less upon ours. From then onwards no movement of

importance took place in Gatacre's column until the general advance along the whole line had cleared his

In the meantime General Buller had also been playing a waiting game, and, secure in the knowledge that

Ladysmith could still hold out, he had been building up his strength for a second attempt to relieve the

hardpressed and muchenduring garrison. After the repulse at Colenso, Hildyard's and Barton's brigades

had remained at Chieveley with the mounted infantry, the naval guns, and two field batteries. The rest of the

force retired to Frere, some miles in the rear. Emboldened by their success, the Boers sent raiding parties over

the Tugela on either flank, which were only checked by our patrols being extended from Springfield on the

west to Weenen on the east. A few plundered farmhouses and a small list of killed and wounded horsemen on

Time here as elsewhere was working for the British, for reinforcements were steadily coming to Buller's

army. By the new year Sir Charles Warren's division (the 5th) was nearly complete at Estcourt, whence it

could reach the front at any moment. This division included the 10th brigade, consisting of the Imperial Light

Infantry, 2nd Somersets, the 2nd Dorsets, and the 2nd Middlesex; also the 11th, called the Lancashire

Brigade, formed by the 2nd Royal Lancaster, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, the 1st South Lancashire, and the

York and Lancaster. The division also included the 14th Hussars and the 19th, 20th, and 28th batteries of

Field Artillery. Other batteries of artillery, including one howitzer battery, came to strengthen Buller's force,

which amounted now to more than 30,000 men. Immense transport preparations had to be made, however,

before the force could have the mobility necessary for a flank march, and it was not until January 11th that

General Buller's new plans for advance could be set into action. Before describing what these plans were and

the disappointing fate which awaited them, we will return to the story of the siege of Ladysmith, and show

how narrowly the relieving force escaped the humiliation some would say the disgrace of seeing the

town which looked to them for help fall beneath their very eyes. That this did not occur is entirely due to the

fierce tenacity and savage endurance of the diseaseridden and halfstarved men who held on to the frail

Monday, October 30th, 1899, is not a date which can be looked back to with satisfaction by any Briton. In a

scrambling and illmanaged action we had lost our detached left wing almost to a man, while our right had

been hustled with no great loss but with some ignominy into Ladysmith. Our guns had been outshot, our

infantry checked, and our cavalry paralysed. Eight hundred prisoners may seem no great loss when compared

with a Sedan, or even with an Ulm; but such matters are comparative, and the force which laid down its arms

at Nicholson's Nek is the largest British force which has surrendered since the days of our great grandfathers,

Sir George White was now confronted with the certainty of an investment, an event for which apparently no

preparation had been made, since with an open railway behind him so many useless mouths had been

permitted to remain in the town. Ladysmith lies in a hollow and is dominated by a ring of hills, some near

and some distant. The near ones were in our hands, but no attempt had been made in the early days of the war

to fortify and hold Bulwana, Lombard's Kop, and the other positions from which the town might be shelled.

Whether these might or might not have been successfully held has been much disputed by military men, the

balance of opinion being that Bulwana, at least, which has a watersupply of its own, might have been

retained. This question, however, was already academic, as the outer hills were in the hands of the enemy. As

it was, the inner line Caesar's Camp, Wagon Hill, Rifleman's Post, and round to Helpmakaar Hill made

a perimeter of fourteen miles, and the difficulty of retaining so extensive a line goes far to exonerate General

White, not only for abandoning the outer hills, but also for retaining his cavalry in the town.

After the battle of Ladysmith and the retreat of the British, the Boers in their deliberate but effective fashion

set about the investment of the town, while the British commander accepted the same as inevitable, content if

he could stem and hold back from the colony the threatened flood of invasion. On Tuesday, Wednesday,

Thursday, and Friday the commandoes gradually closed in upon the south and east, harassed by some cavalry

operations and reconnaissances upon our part, the effect of which was much exaggerated by the press. On

Thursday, November 2nd, the last train escaped under a brisk fire, the passengers upon the wrong side of the

seats. At 2 P.M. on the same day the telegraph line was cut, and the lonely town settled herself somberly

down to the task of holding off the exultant Boers until the daysupposed to be imminent when the

relieving army should appear from among the labyrinth of mountains which lay to the south of them. Some

there were who, knowing both the enemy and the mountains, felt a cold chill within their hearts as they asked

themselves how an army was to come through, but the greater number, from General to private, trusted

One example of that historical luck was ever before their eyes in the shape of those invaluable naval guns

which had arrived so dramatically at the very crisis of the fight, in time to check the monster on Pepworth

Hill and to cover the retreat of the army. But for them the besieged must have lain impotent under the

muzzles of the huge Creusots. But in spite of the naive claims put forward by the Boers to some special

Providence a process which a friendly German critic described as `commandeering the Almighty' it is

certain that in a very peculiar degree, in the early months of this war there came again and again a happy

chance, or a merciful interposition, which saved the British from disaster. Now in this first week of

November, when every hill, north and south and east and west, flashed and smoked, and the great 96pound

shells groaned and screamed over the town, it was to the long thin 4�7's and to the hearty bearded men who

worked them, that soldiers and townsfolk looked for help. These guns of Lambton's, supplemented by two

oldfashioned 6�3 howitzers manned by survivors from No.10 Mountain Battery, did all that was possible to

keep down the fire of the heavy Boer guns. If they could not save, they could at least hit back, and

By the end of the first week of November the Boers had established their circle of fire. On the east of the

town, broken by the loops of the Klip River, is a broad green plain, some miles in extent, which furnished

grazing ground for the horses and cattle of the besieged. Beyond it rises into a long flattopped hill the

famous Bulwana, upon which lay one great Creusot and several smaller guns. To the north, on Pepworth Hill,

was another Creusot, and between the two were the Boer batteries upon Lombard's Kop. The British naval

guns were placed upon this side, for, as the open loop formed by the river lies at this end, it is the part of the

defences which is most liable to assault. From thence all round the west down to Besters in the south was a

continuous series of hills, each crowned with Boer guns, which, if they could not harm the distant town, were

at least effective in holding the garrison to its lines. So formidable were these positions that, amid much

outspoken criticism, it has never been suggested that White would have been justified with a limited garrison

in incurring the heavy loss of life which must have followed an attempt to force them.

The first few days of the siege were clouded by the death of Lieutenant Egerton of the 'Powerful,' one of the

most promising officers in the Navy. One leg and the other foot were carried off, as he lay upon the sandbag

parapet watching the effect of our fire. 'There's an end of my cricket,' said the gallant sportsman, and he was

On November 3rd a strong cavalry reconnaissance was pushed down the Colenso road to ascertain the force

which the enemy had in that direction. Colonel Brocklehurst took with him the 18th and 19th Hussars, the 5th

Lancers and the 5th Dragoon Guards, with the Light Horse and the Natal Volunteers. Some desultory fighting

ensued which achieved no end, and was chiefly remarkable for the excellent behaviour of the Colonials, who

showed that they were the equals of the Regulars in gallantry and their superiors in the tactics which such a

country requires. The death of Major Taunton, Captain Knapp, and young Brabant, the son of the General

who did such good service at a later stage of the war, was a heavy price to pay for the knowledge that the

By the end of this week the town had already settled down to the routine of the siege. General Joubert, with

the chivalry which had always distinguished him, had permitted the garrison to send out the noncombatants

to a place called Intombi Camp (promptly named Funkersdorp by the facetious) where they were safe from

the shells, though the burden of their support still fell of course upon the muchtried commissariat. The hale

and male of the townsfolk refused for the most part to avoid the common danger, and clung tenaciously to

their shottorn village. Fortunately the river has worn down its banks until it runs through a deep channel, in

the sides of which it was found to be possible to hollow out caves which were practically bombproof. Here

for some months the townsfolk led a troglodytic existence, returning to their homes upon that much

appreciated seventh day of rest which was granted to them by their Sabbatarian besiegers.

The perimeter of the defence had been divided off so that each corps might be responsible for its own section.

To the south was the Manchester Regiment upon the hill called C�sar's Camp. Between Lombard's Kop and

the town, on the northeast, were the Devons. To the north, at what seemed the vulnerable point, were the

Rifle Brigade, the Rifles, and the remains of the 18th Hussars. To the west were the 5th Lancers, 19th

Hussars, and 5th Dragoon Guards. The rest of the force was encamped round the outskirts of the town.

There appears to have been some idea in the Boer mind that the mere fact that they held a dominant position

over the town would soon necessitate the surrender of the army. At the end of a week they had realised,

however, just as the British had, that a siege lay before both. Their fire upon the town was heavy but not

deadly, though it became more effective as the weeks went on. Their practice at a range of five miles was

exceedingly accurate. At the same time their riflemen became more venturesome, and on Tuesday, November

7th, they made a halfhearted attack upon the Manchesters' position on the south, which was driven back

without difficulty. On the 9th, however, their attempt was of a more serious and sustained character. It began

with a heavy shellfire and with a demonstration of riflefire from every side, which had for its object the

prevention of reinforcements for the true point of danger, which again was C�sar's Camp at the south. It is

evident that the Boers had from the beginning made up their minds that here lay the key of the position, as the

two serious attacksthat of November 9th and that of January 6thwere directed upon this point.

The Manchesters at C�sar's Camp had been reinforced by the 1st battalion 60th Rifles, who held the

prolongation of the same ridge, which is called Waggon Hill. With the dawn it was found that the Boer

riflemen were within eight hundred yards, and from then till evening a constant fire was maintained upon the

hill. The Boer, however, save when the odds are all in his favour, is not, in spite of his considerable personal

bravery, at his best in attack. His racial traditions, depending upon the necessity for economy of human life,

are all opposed to it. As a consequence two regiments well posted were able to hold them off all day with a

loss which did not exceed thirty killed and wounded, while the enemy, exposed to the shrapnel of the 42nd

battery, as well as the riflefire of the infantry, must have suffered very much more severely. The result of

the action was a wellgrounded belief that in daylight there was very little chance of the Boers being able to

carry the lines. As the date was that of the Prince of Wales's birthday, a salute of twentyone shotted naval

The failure of the attempt upon Ladysmith seems to have convinced the enemy that a waiting game, in which

hunger, shellfire, and disease were their allies, would be surer and less expensive than an open assault. From

their distant hilltops they continued to plague the town, while garrison and citizens sat grimly patient, and

learned to endure if not to enjoy the crash of the 96pound shells, and the patter of shrapnel upon their

corrugatediron roofs. The supplies were adequate, and the besieged were fortunate in the presence of a

firstclass organiser, Colonel Ward of Islington fame, who with the assistance of Colonel Stoneman

systematised the collection and issue of all the food, civil and military, so as to stretch it to its utmost. With

rain overhead and mud underfoot, chafing at their own idleness and humiliated by their own position1 the

soldiers waited through the weary weeks for the relief which never came. On some days there was more

shellfire, on some less; on some there was sniping, on some none; on some they sent a little feeler of cavalry

and guns out of the town, on most they lay still such were the ups and downs of life in Ladysmith. The

inevitable siege paper, 'The Ladysmith Lyre,' appeared, and did something to relieve the monotony by the

exasperation of its jokes. Night, morning, and noon the shells rained upon the town until the most timid

learned fatalism if not bravery. The crash of the percussion, and the strange musical tang of the shrapnel

sounded ever in their ears. With their glasses the garrison could see the gay frocks and parasols of the Boer

The Boers were sufficiently numerous, aided by their strong positions and excellent artillery, to mask the

Ladysmith force and to sweep on at once to the conquest of Natal. Had they done so it is hard to see what

could have prevented them from riding their horses down to salt water. A few odds and ends, half battalions

and local volunteers, stood between them and Durban. But here, as on the Orange River, a singular paralysis

seems to have struck them. When the road lay clear before them the first transports of the army corps were

hardly past St. Vincent, but before they had made up their mind to take that road the harbour of Durban was

packed with our shipping and ten thousand men had thrown themselves across their path.

For a moment we may leave the fortunes of Ladysmith to follow this southerly movement of the Boers.

Within two days of the investment of the town they had swung round their left flank and attacked Colenso,

twelve miles south, shelling the Durban Light Infantry out of their post with a longrange fire. The British

fell back twentyseven miles and concentrated at Estcourt, leaving the allimportant Colenso railwaybridge

in the hands of the enemy. From this onwards they held the north of the Tugela, and many a widow wore

crepe before we got our grip upon it once more. Never was there a more critical week in the war, but having

got Colenso the Boers did little more. They formally annexed the whole of Northern Natal to the Orange Free

State a dangerous precedent when the tables should be turned. With amazing assurance the burghers

pegged out farms for themselves and sent for their people to occupy these newly won estates.

On November 5th the Boers had remained so inert that the British returned in small force to Colenso and

removed some stores which seems to suggest that the original retirement was premature. Four days passed

in inactivity four precious days for us and on the evening of the fourth, November 9th, the watchers on

the signal station at Table Mountain saw the smoke of a great steamer coming past Robben Island. It was the

'Roslin Castle' with the first of the reinforcements. Within the week the 'Moor,' 'Yorkshire,' 'Aurania,'

'Hawarden Castle,' 'Gascon,' Armenian,' 'Oriental,' and a fleet of others had passed for Durban with 15,000

But, now that it was too late, the Boers suddenly took the initiative, and in dramatic fashion. North of

Estcourt, where General Hildyard was being daily reinforced from the sea, there are two small townlets, or at

least geographical (and railway) points. Frere is about ten miles north of Estcourt, and Chieveley is five miles

north of that and about as far to the south of Colenso. On November 15th an armoured train was despatched

from Estcourt to see what was going on up the line. Already one disaster had befallen us in this campaign on

account of these clumsy contrivances, and a heavier one was now to confirm the opinion that, acting alone,

they are totally inadmissible. As a means of carrying artillery for a force operating upon either flank of them,

with an assured retreat behind, there may be a place for them in modern war, but as a method of scouting they

appear to be the most inefficient and also the most expensive that has ever been invented. An intelligent

horseman would gather more information, be less visible, and retain some freedom as to route. After our

The train contained ninety Dublin Fusiliers, eighty Durban Volunteers, and ten sailors, with a naval

7pounder gun. Captain Haldane of the Gordons, Lieutenant Frankland (Dublin Fusiliers), and Winston

Churchill, the wellknown correspondent, accompanied the expedition. What might have been foreseen

occurred. The train steamed into the advancing Boer army, was fired upon, tried to escape, found the rails

blocked behind it, and upset. Dublins and Durbans were shot helplessly out of their trucks, under a heavy fire.

A railway accident is a nervous thing, and so is an ambuscade, but the combination of the two must be

appalling. Yet there were brave hearts which rose to the occasion. Haldane and Frankland rallied the troops,

and Churchill the enginedriver. The engine was disentangled and sent on with its cab full of wounded.

Churchill, who had escaped upon it, came gallantly back to share the fate of his comrades. The dazed shaken

soldiers continued a futile resistance for some time, but there was neither help nor escape and nothing for

them but surrender. The most Spartan military critic cannot blame them. A few slipped away besides those

who escaped upon the engine. Our losses were two killed, twenty wounded, and about eighty taken. It is

remarkable that of the three leaders both Haldane and Churchill succeeded in escaping from Pretoria.

A double tide of armed men was now pouring into Southern Natal. From below, trainload after trainload of

British regulars were coming up to the danger point, feted and cheered at every station. Lonely farmhouses

near the line hung out their Union Jacks, and the folk on the stoep heard the roar of the choruses as the great

trains swung upon their way. From above the Boers were flooding down, as Churchill saw them, dour,

resolute, riding silently through the rain, or chanting hymns round their camp fires brave honest farmers,

but standing unconsciously for medi�valism and corruption, even as our roughtongued Tommies stood for

The invading force, the numbers of which could not have exceeded some few thousands, formidable only for

their mobility, lapped round the more powerful but less active force at Estcourt, and struck behind it at its

communications. There was for a day or two some discussion as to a further retreat, but Hildyard,

strengthened by the advice and presence of Colonel Long, determined to hold his ground. On November 21st

the raiding Boers were as far south as Nottingham Road, a point thirty miles south of Estcourt and only forty

miles north of the considerable city of Pietermaritzburg. The situation was serious. Either the invaders must

be stopped, or the second largest town in the colony would be in their hands. From all sides came tales of

plundered farms and broken households. Some at least of the raiders behaved with wanton brutality. Smashed

pianos, shattered pictures, slaughtered stock, and vile inscriptions, all exhibit a predatory and violent side to

the paradoxical Boer character.[Footnote: More than once I have heard the farmers in the Free State

acknowledge that the ruin which had come upon them was a just retribution for the excesses of Natal.]

The next British post behind Hildyard's at Estcourt was Barton's upon the Mooi River, thirty miles to the

south. Upon this the Boers made a halfhearted attempt, but Joubert had begun to realise the strength of the

British reinforcements and the impossibility with the numbers at his disposal of investing a succession of

British posts. He ordered Botha to withdraw from Mooi River and begin his northerly trek.

The turningpoint of the Boer invasion of Natal was marked, though we cannot claim that it was caused, by

the action of Willow Grange. This was fought by Hildyard and Walter Kitchener in command of the Estcourt

garrison, against about 2,000 of the invaders under Louis Botha. The troops engaged were the East and West

Surreys (four companies of the latter), the West Yorkshires, the Durban Light Infantry, No.7 battery R.F.A.,

The enemy being observed to have a gun upon a hill within striking distance of Estcourt, this force set out on

November 22nd to make a night attack and to endeavour to capture it. The hill was taken without difficulty,

but it was found that the gun had been removed. A severe counterattack was made at daylight by the Boers,

and the troops were compelled with no great loss and less glory to return to the town. The Surreys and the

Yorkshires behaved very well, but were placed in a difficult position and were badly supported by the

artillery. Martyn's Mounted Infantry covered the retirement with great gallantry, but the skirmish ended in a

British loss of fourteen killed and fifty wounded or missing, which was certainly more than that of the Boers.

From this indecisive action of Willow Grange the Boer invasion receded until General Buller, coming to the

front on November 27th, found that the enemy was once more occupying the line of the Tugela. He himself

moved up to Frere, where he devoted his time and energies to the collection of that force with which he has

One unexpected and little known result of the Boer expedition into Southern Natal was that their leader, the

chivalrous Joubert, injured himself through his horse stumbling, and was physically incapacitated for the

remainder of the campaign. He returned almost immediately to Pretoria, leaving the command of the Tugela

Leaving Buller to organise his army at Frere, and the Boer commanders to draw their screen of formidable

defences along the Tugela, we will return once more to the fortunes of the unhappy town round which the

interest of the world, and possibly the destiny of the Empire, were centering. It is very certain that had

Ladysmith fallen, and twelve thousand British soldiers with a million pounds' worth of stores fallen into the

hands of the invaders, we should have been faced with the alternative of abandoning the struggle, or of

reconquering South Africa from Cape Town northwards. South Africa is the keystone of the Empire, and for

the instant Ladysmith was the keystone of South Africa. But the courage of the troops who held the

shelltorn townlet, and the confidence of the public who watched them, never faltered for an instant.

December 8th was marked by a gallant exploit on the part of the beleaguered garrison. Not a whisper had

transpired of the coming sortie, and a quarter of an hour before the start officers engaged had no idea of it. 0

SI SIC OMNIA! At ten o'clock a band of men slipped out of the town. There were six hundred of them, all

irregulars, drawn from the Imperial Light Horse, the Natal Carabineers, and the Border Mounted Rifles,

under the command of Hunter, youngest and most dashing of British Generals. Edwardes and Boyston were

the subcommanders. The men had no knowledge of where they were going or what they had to do, but they

crept silently along under a drifting sky, with peeps of a quarter moon, over a mimosashadowed plain. At

last in front of them there loomed a dark mass it was Gun Hill, from which one of the great Creusots had

plagued them. A strong support (four hundred men) was left at the base of the hill, and the others, one

hundred Imperials, one hundred Borders and Carabineers, ten Sappers, crept upwards with Major Henderson

as guide. A Dutch outpost challenged, but was satisfied by a Dutchspeaking Carabineer. Higher and higher

the men crept, the silence broken only by the occasional slip of a stone or the rustle of their own breathing.

Most of them had left their boots below. Even in the darkness they kept some formation, and the right wing

curved forward to outflank the defence. Suddenly a Mauser crack and a spurt of flamethen another and

another! 'Come on, boys! Fix bayonets!' yelled Karri Davies. There were no bayonets, but that was a detail.

At the word the gunners were off, and there in the darkness in front of the storming party loomed the

enormous gun, gigantic in that uncertain light. Out with the huge breechblock! Wrap the long lean muzzle

round with a collar of guncotton! Keep the guard upon the run until the work is done! Hunter stood by with

a night light in his hand until the charge was in position, and then, with a crash which brought both armies

from their tents, the huge tube reared up on its mountings and toppled backwards into the pit. A howitzer

lurked beside it, and this also was blown into ruin. The attendant Maxim was dragged back by the exultant

captors, who reached the town amid shoutings and laughter with the first break of day. One man wounded,

the gallant Henderson, is the cheap price for the bestplanned and most dashing exploit of the war. Secrecy in

conception, vigour in execution they are the root ideas of the soldier's craft. So easily was the enterprise

carried out, and so defective the Boer watch, that it is probable that if all the guns had been simultaneously

attacked the Boers might have found themselves without a single piece of ordnance in the morning.[Footnote:

The destruction of the Creusot was not as complete as was hoped. It was taken back to Pretoria, three feet

were sawn off the muzzle, and a new breechblock provided. The gun was then sent to Kimberley, and it was

the heavy cannon which arrived late in the history of that siege and caused considerable consternation among

On the same morning (December 9th) a cavalry reconnaissance was pushed in the direction of Pepworth Hill.

The object no doubt was to ascertain whether the enemy were still present in force, and the terrific roll of the

Mausers answered it in the affirmative. Two killed and twenty wounded was the price which we paid for the

information. There had been three such reconnaissances in the five weeks of the siege, and it is difficult to see

what advantage they gave or how they are to be justified. Far be it for the civilian to dogmatise upon such

matters, but one can repeat, and to the best of one's judgment endorse, the opinion of the vast majority of

There were heart burnings among the Regulars that the colonial troops should have gone in front of them, so

their martial jealousy was allayed three nights later by the same task being given to them. Four companies of

the 2nd Rifle Brigade were the troops chosen, with a few sappers and gunners, the whole under the command

of Colonel Metcalfe of the same battalion. A single gun, the 4�7 howitzer upon Surprise Hill, was the

objective. Again there was the stealthy advance through the darkness, again the support was left at the bottom

of the hill, again the two companies carefully ascended, again there was the challenge, the rush, the flight,

Here and only here the story varies. For some reason the fuse used for the guncotton was defective, and half

an hour elapsed before the explosion destroyed the howitzer. When it came it came very thoroughly, but it

was a weary time in coming. Then our men descended the hill, but the Boers were already crowding in upon

them from either side. The English cries of the soldiers were answered in English by the Boers, and slouch

hat or helmet dimly seen in the mirk was the only badge of friend or foe. A singular letter is extant from

young Reitz (the son of the Transvaal secretary), who was present. According to his account there were but

eight Boers present, but assertion or contradiction equally valueless in the darkness of such a night, and there

are some obvious discrepancies in his statement. 'We fired among them,' says Reitz. 'They stopped and all

cried out "Rifle Brigade." Then one of them said "Charge!" One officer, Captain Paley, advanced, though he

had two bullet wounds already. Joubert gave him another shot and he fell on the top of us. Four Englishmen

got hold of Jan Luttig and struck him on the head with their rifles and stabbed him in the stomach with a

bayonet. He seized two of them by the throat and shouted "Help, boys!" His two nearest comrades shot two

of them, and the other two bolted. Then the English came up in numbers, about eight hundred, along the

footpath' (there were two hundred on the hill, but the exaggeration is pardonable in the darkness), 'and we lay

as quiet as mice along the bank. Farther on the English killed three of our men with bayonets and wounded

two. In the morning we found Captain Paley and twentytwo of them killed and wounded.' It seems evident

that Reitz means that his own little party were eight men, and not that that represented the force which

intercepted the retiring riflemen. Within his own knowledge five of his countrymen were killed in the scuffle,

so the total loss was probably considerable. Our own casualties were eleven dead, fortythree wounded, and

six prisoners, but the price was not excessive for the howitzer and for the MORALE which arises from such

exploits. Had it not been for that unfortunate fuse, the second success might have been as bloodless as the

first. 'I am sorry,' said a sympathetic correspondent to the stricken Paley. 'But we got the gun,' Paley

Amid the shellfire, the scanty rations, the enteric and the dysentery, one ray of comfort had always

brightened the garrison. Buller was only twelve miles away they could hear his guns and when his

advance came in earnest their sufferings would be at an end. But now in an instant this single light was shut

off and the true nature of their situation was revealed to them. Buller had indeed moved... but backwards. He

had been defeated at Colenso, and the siege was not ending but beginning. With heavier hearts but

undiminished resolution the army and the townsfolk settled down to the long, dour struggle. The exultant

enemy replaced their shattered guns and drew their lines closer still round the stricken town.

A record of the siege onwards until the break of the New Year centres upon the sordid details of the sick

returns and of the price of food. Fifty on one day, seventy on the next, passed under the hands of the

overworked and devoted doctors. Fifteen hundred, and later two thousand, of the garrison were down. The air

was poisoned by foul sewage and dark with obscene flies. They speckled the scanty food. Eggs were already

a shilling each, cigarettes sixpence, whisky five pounds a bottle: a city more free from gluttony and

Shellfire has shown itself in this war to be an excellent ordeal for those who desire martial excitement with

a minimum of danger. But now and again some black chance guides a bomb one in five thousand perhaps

to a most tragic issue. Such a deadly missile falling among Boers near Kimberley is said to have slain nine

and wounded seventeen. In Ladysmith too there are days to be marked in red when the gunner shot better

than he knew. One shell on December 17th killed six men (Natal Carabineers), wounded three, and destroyed

fourteen horses. The grisly fact has been recorded that five separate human legs lay upon the ground. On

December 22nd another tragic shot killed five and wounded twelve of the Devons. On the same day four

officers of the 5th Lancers (including the Colonel) and one sergeant were wounded a most disastrous day.

A little later it was again the turn of the Devons, who lost one officer killed and ten wounded. Christmas set

in amid misery, hunger, and disease, the more piteous for the grim attempts to amuse the children and live up

to the joyous season, when the present of Santa Claus was too often a 96pound shell. On the top of all other

troubles it was now known that the heavy ammunition was running short and must be husbanded for

emergencies. There was no surcease, however, in the constant hail which fell upon the town. Two or three

The monotonous bombardment with which the New Year had commenced was soon to be varied by a most

gallant and spiritstirring clash of arms. On January 6th the Boers delivered their great assault upon

Ladysmith an onfall so gallantly made and gallantly met that it deserves to rank among the classic fights

of British military history. It is a tale which neither side need be ashamed to tell. Honour to the sturdy

infantry who held their grip so long, and honour also to the rough men of the veldt, who, led by untrained

It may be that the Boers wished once for all to have done at all costs with the constant menace to their rear, or

it may be that the deliberate preparations of Buller for his second advance had alarmed them, and that they

realised that they must act quickly if they were to act at all. At any rate, early in the New Year a most

determined attack was decided upon. The storming party consisted of some hundreds of picked volunteers

from the Heidelberg (Transvaal) and Harrismith (Free State) contingents, led by de Villiers. They were

supported by several thousand riflemen, who might secure their success or cover their retreat. Eighteen heavy

guns had been trained upon the long ridge, one end of which has been called C�sar's Camp and the other

Waggon Hill. This hill, three miles long, lay to the south of the town, and the Boers had early recognised it as

being the most vulnerable point, for it was against it that their attack of November 9th had been directed.

Now, after two months, they were about to renew the attempt with greater resolution against less robust

opponents. At twelve o'clock our scouts heard the sounds of the chanting of hymns in the Boer camps. At two

in the morning crowds of barefooted men were clustering round the base of the ridge, and threading their

way, rifle in hand, among the mimosabushes and scattered boulders which cover the slope of the hill. Some

working parties were moving guns into position, and the noise of their labour helped to drown the sound of

the Boer advance. Both at C�sar's Camp, the east end of the ridge, and at Waggon Hill, the west end (the

points being, I repeat, three miles apart), the attack came as a complete surprise. The outposts were shot or

driven in, and the stormers were on the ridge almost as soon as their presence was detected. The line of rocks

C�sar's Camp was garrisoned by one sturdy regiment, the Manchesters, aided by a Colt automatic gun. The

defence bad been arranged in the form of small sangars, each held by from ten to twenty men. Some few of

these were rushed in the darkness, but the Lancashire men pulled themselves together and held on strenuously

to those which remained. The crash of musketry woke the sleeping town, and the streets resounded with the

shouting of the officers and the rattling of arms as the men mustered in the darkness and hurried to the points

Three companies of the Gordons had been left near C�sar's Camp, and these, under Captain Carnegie, threw

themselves into the struggle. Four other companies of Gordons came up in support from the town, losing

upon the way their splendid colonel, DickCunyngham, who was killed by a chance shot at three thousand

yards, on this his first appearance since he had recovered from his wounds at Elandslaagte. Later four

companies of the Rifle Brigade were thrown into the firing line, and a total of two and a half infantry

battalions held that end of the position. It was not a man too much. With the dawn of day it could be seen that

the Boers held the southern and we the northern slopes, while the narrow plateau between formed a bloody

debatable ground. Along a front of a quarter of a mile fierce eyes glared and rifle barrels flashed from behind

every rock, and the long fight swayed a little back or a little forward with each upward heave of the stormers

or rally of the soldiers. For hours the combatants were so near that a stone or a taunt could be thrown from

one to the other. Some scattered sangars still held their own, though the Boers had passed them. One such,

manned by fourteen privates of the Manchester Regiment, remained untaken, but had only two defenders left

With the coming of the light the 53rd Field Battery, the one which had already done so admirably at

Lombard's Kop, again deserved well of its country. It was impossible to get behind the Boers and fire straight

at their position, so every shell fired bad to skim over the heads of our own men upon the ridge and so pitch

upon tho reverse slope. Yet so accurate was the fire, carried on under an incessant rain of shells from the big

Dutch gun on Bulwana, that not one shot miscarried and that Major Abdy and his men succeeded in sweeping

the further slope without loss to our own fighting line. Exactly the same feat was equally well performed at

the other end of the position by Major Blewitt's 21st Battery, which was exposed to an even more searching

fire than the 53rd. Any one who has seen the iron endurance of British gunners and marvelled at the

answering shot which flashes out through the very dust of the enemy's exploding shell, will understand how

fine must have been the spectacle of these two batteries working in the open, with the ground round them

sharded with splinters. Eyewitnesses have left it upon record that the sight of Major Blewitt strolling up and

down among his guns, and turning over with his toe the last fallen section of iron, was one of the most vivid

and stirring impressions which they carried from The fight. Here also it was that the gallant Sergeant Bosley,

his arm and his leg stricken off by a Boer shell, cried to his comrades to roll his body off the trail and go on

At the same time as or rather earlier than the onslaught upon Caesar's Camp a similar attack had been

made with secrecy and determination upon the western end of the position called Waggon Hill. The

barefooted Boers burst suddenly with a roll of riflefire into the little garrison of Imperial Light Horse and

Sappers who held the position. Mathias of the former, DigbyJones and Dennis of the latter, showed that 'two

in the morning' courage which Napoleon rated as the highest of military virtues. They and their men were

surprised but not disconcerted, and stood desperately to a slogging match at the closest quarters. Seventeen

Sappers were down out of thirty, and more than half the little body of irregulars. This end of the position was

feebly fortified, and it is surprising that so experienced and sound a soldier as Ian Hamilton should have left it

so. The defence had no marked advantage as compared with the attack, neither trench, sangar, nor wire

entanglement, and in numbers they were immensely inferior. Two companies of the 60th Rifles and a small

body of the ubiquitous Gordons happened to be upon the hill and threw themselves into the fray, but they

were unable to turn the tide. Of thirtythree Gordons under Lieutenant MacNaughten thirty were

wounded.[Footnote: The Gordons and the Sappers were there that morning to reescort one of Lambton's 4�7

guns, which was to be mounted there. Ten seamen were with the gun, and lost three of their number in the

defence.] As our men retired under the shelter of the northern slope they were reinforced by another hundred

and fifty Gordons under the stalwart MillerWallnutt, a man cast in the mould of a Berserk Viking. To their

aid also came two hundred of the Imperial Light Horse, burning to assist their comrades. Another

halfbattalion of Rifles came with them. At each end of the long ridge the situation at the dawn of day was

almost identical. In each the stormers had seized one side, but were brought to a stand by the defenders upon

the other, while the British guns fired over the heads of their own infantry to rake the further slope.

It was on the Waggon Hill side, however, that the Boer exertions were most continuous and strenuous and

our own resistance most desperate. There fought the gallant de Villiers, while Ian Hamilton rallied the

defenders and led them in repeated rushes against the enemy's line. Continually reinforced from below, the

Boers fought with extraordinary resolution. Never will any one who witnessed that Homeric contest question

the valour of our foes. It was a murderous business on both sides. Edwardes of the Light Horse was struck

down. In a gunemplacement a strange encounter took place at pointblank range between a group of Boers

and of Britons. De Villiers of the Free State shot MillerWallnut dead, Ian Hamilton fired at de Villiers with

his revolver and missed him. Young Albrecht of the Light Horse shot de Villiers. A Boer named de Jaeger

shot Albrecht. DigbyJones of the Sappers shot de Jaeger. Only a few minutes later the gallant lad, who had

already won fame enough for a veteran, was himself mortally wounded, and Dennis, his comrade in arms and

There has been no better fighting in our time than that upon Waggon Hill on that January morning, and no

better fighters than the Imperial Light Horsemen who formed the centre of the defence. Here, as at

Elandslaagte, they proved themselves worthy to stand in line with the crack regiments of the British army.

Through the long day the fight maintained its equilibrium along the summit of the ridge, swaying a little that

way or this, but never amounting to a repulse of the stormers or to a rout of the defenders. So intermixed were

the combatants that a wounded man more than once found himself a rest for the rifles of his enemies. One

unfortunate soldier in this position received six more bullets from his own comrades in their efforts to reach

the deadly rifleman behind him. At four o'clock a huge bank of clouds which had towered upwards unheeded

by the struggling men burst suddenly into a terrific thunderstorm with vivid lightnings and lashing rain. It is

curious that the British victory at Elandslaagte was heralded by just such another storm. Up on the

bulletswept hill the long fringes of fighting men took no more heed of the elements than would two bulldogs

who have each other by the throat. Up the greasy hillside, foul with mud and with blood, came the Boer

reserves, and up the northern slope came our own reserve, the Devon Regiment, fit representatives of that

virile county. Admirably led by Park, their gallant Colonel, the Devons swept the Boers before them, and the

Rifles, Gordons, and Light Horse joined in the wild charge which finally cleared the ridge.

But the end was not yet. The Boer had taken a risk over this venture, and now he had to pay the stakes. Down

the hill he passed, crouching, darting, but the spruits behind him were turned into swirling streams, and as he

hesitated for an instant upon the brink the relentless sleet of bullets came from behind. Many were swept

away down the gorges and into the Klip River, never again to be accounted for in the lists of their

fieldcornet. The majority splashed through, found their horses in their shelter, and galloped off across the

great Bulwana Plain, as fairly beaten in as fair a fight as ever brave men were yet.

The cheers of victory as the Devons swept the ridge had heartened the weary men upon C�sar's Camp to a

similar effort. Manchesters, Gordons, and Rifles, aided by the fire of two batteries, cleared the longdebated

position. Wet, cold, weary, and without food for twentysix hours, the bedraggled Tommies stood yelling

It was a near thing. Had the ridge fallen the town must have followed, and history perhaps have been

changed. In the old stiffrank Majuba days we should have been swept in an hour from the position. But the

wily man behind the rock was now to find an equally wily man in front of him. The soldier had at last learned

something of the craft of the hunter. He clung to his shelter, he dwelled on his aim, he ignored his dressings,

he laid aside the eighteenthcentury traditions of his pigtailed ancestor, and he hit the Boers harder than they

had been hit yet. No return may ever come to us of their losses on that occasion; 80 dead bodies were

returned to them from the ridge alone, while the slopes, the dongas, and the river each had its own separate

tale. No possible estimate can make it less than three hundred killed and wounded, while many place it at a

much higher figure. Our own casualties were very serious and the proportion of dead to wounded unusually

high, owing to the fact that the greater part of the wounds were necessarily of the head. In killed we lost 13

officers, 135 men. In wounded 28 officers, 244 men a total of 420, Lord Ava, the honoured Son of an

honoured father, the fiery DickCunyngham, stalwart MillerWallnutt, the brave boy sappers DigbyJones

and Dennis, Adams and Packman of the Light Horse, the chivalrous Lafone we had to mourn quality as

well as numbers. The grim test of the casualty returns shows that it was to the Imperial Light Horse (ten

officers down, and the regiment commanded by a junior captain), the Manchesters, the Gordons, the Devons,

In the course of the day two attacks had been made upon other points of the British position, the one on

Observation Hill on the north, the other on the Helpmakaar position on the east. Of these the latter was never

pushed home and was an obvious feint, but in the case of the other it was not until Schutte, their commander,

and forty or fifty men had been killed and wounded, that the stormers abandoned their attempt. At every point

the assailants found the same scattered but impenetrable fringe of riflemen, and the same energetic batteries

Throughout the Empire the course of this great struggle was watched with the keenest solicitude and with all

that painful emotion which springs from impotent sympathy. By heliogram to Buller, and so to the farthest

ends of that great body whose nerves are the telegraphic wires, there came the announcement of the attack.

Then after an interval of hours came 'everywhere repulsed, but fighting continues.' Then, 'Attack continues.

Enemy reinforced from the south.' Then 'Attack renewed. Very hard pressed.' There the messages ended for

the day, leaving the Empire black with apprehension. The darkest forecasts and most dreary anticipations

were indulged by the most temperate and bestinformed London papers. For the first time the very

suggestion that the campaign might be above our strength was made to the public. And then at last there came

the official news of the repulse of the assault. Far away at Ladysmith, the weary men and their sorely tried

officers gathered to return thanks to God for His manifold mercies, but in London also hearts were stricken

solemn by the greatness of the crisis, and lips long unused to prayer joined in the devotions of the absent

Of the four British armies in the field I have attempted to tell the story of the western one which advanced to

help Kimberley, of the eastern one which was repulsed at Colenso, and of the central one which was checked

at Stormberg. There remains one other central one, some account of which must now be given.

It was, as has already been pointed out, a long three weeks after the declaration of war before the forces of the

Orange Free State began to invade Cape Colony. But for this most providential delay it is probable that the

ultimate fighting would have been, not among the mountains and kopjes of Stormberg and Colesberg, but

amid those formidable passes which lie in the Hex Valley, immediately to the north of Cape Town, and that

the armies of the invader would have been doubled by their kinsmen of the Colony. The ultimate result of the

war must have been the same, but the sight of all South Africa in flames might have brought about those

The invasion of the Colony was at two points along the line of the two railways which connect the countries,

the one passing over the Orange River at Norval's Pont and the other at Bethulie, about forty miles to the

eastward. There were no British troops available (a fact to be considered by those, if any remain, who

imagine that the British entertained any design against the Republics), and the Boers jogged slowly

southward amid a Dutch population who hesitated between their unity of race and speech and their

knowledge of just and generous treatment by the Empire. A large number were won over by the invaders,

and, like all apostates, distinguished themselves by their virulence and harshness towards their loyal

neighbours. Here and there in towns which were off the railway line, in Barkly East or Ladygrey, the farmers

met together with rifle and bandolier, tied orange puggarees round their hats, and rode off to join the enemy.

Possibly these ignorant and isolated men hardly recognised what it was that they were doing. They have

found out since. In some of the border districts the rebels numbered ninety per cent of the Dutch population.

In the meanwhile, the British leaders had been strenuously endeavouring to scrape together a few troops with

which to make some stand against the enemy. For this purpose two small forces were necessary the one to

oppose the advance through Bethulie and Stormberg, the other to meet the invaders, who, having passed the

river at Norval's Pont, had now occupied Colesberg. The former task was, as already shown, committed to

General Gatacre. The latter was allotted to General French, the victor of Elandslaagte, who had escaped in the

very last train from Ladysmith, and had taken over this new and important duty. French's force assembled at

Arundel and Gatacre's at Sterkstroom. It is with the operations of the former that we have now to deal.

General French, for whom South Africa has for once proved not the grave but the cradle of a reputation, had

before the war gained some name as a smart and energetic cavalry officer. There were some who, watching

his handling of a considerable body of horse at the great Salisbury manoeuvres in 1898, conceived the highest

opinion of his capacity, and it was due to the strong support of General Buller, who had commanded in these

peaceful operations, that French received his appointment for South Africa. In person he is short and thick,

with a pugnacious jaw. In character he is a man of cold persistence and of fiery energy, cautious and yet

audacious, weighing his actions well, but carrying them out with the dash which befits a mounted leader. He

is remarkable for the quickness of his decision 'can think at a gallop,' as an admirer expressed it. Such was

the man, alert, resourceful, and determined, to whom was entrusted the holding back of the Colesberg Boers.

Although the main advance of the invaders was along the lines of the two railways, they ventured, as they

realised how weak the forces were which opposed them, to break off both to the east and west, occupying

Dordrecht on one side and Steynsberg on the other. Nothing of importance accrued from the possession of

these points, and our attention may be concentrated upon the main line of action.

French's original force was a mere handful of men, scraped together from anywhere. Naauwpoort was his

base, and thence he made a reconnaissance by rail on November 23rd towards Arundel, the next hamlet along

the line, taking with him a company of the Black Watch, forty mounted infantry, and a troop of the New

South Wales Lancers. Nothing resulted from the expedition save that the two forces came into touch with

each other, a touch which was sustained for months under many vicissitudes, until the invaders were driven

back once more over Norval's Pont. Finding that Arundel was weakly held, French advanced up to it, and

established his camp there towards the end of December, within six miles of the Boer lines at Rensburg, to

the south of Colesberg. His mission with his present forces was to prevent the further advance of the

enemy into the Colony, but he was not strong enough yet to make a serious attempt to drive them out.

Before the move to Arundel on December 13th his detachment had increased in size, and consisted largely of

mounted men, so that it attained a mobility very unusual for a British force. On December 13th there was an

attempt upon the part of the Boers to advance south, which was easily held by the British Cavalry and Horse

Artillery. The country over which French was operating is dotted with those singular kopjes which the Boer

loves kopjes which are often so grotesque in shape that one feels as if they must be due to some error of

refraction when one looks at them. But, on the other hand, between these hills there lie wide stretches of the

green or russet savanna, the noblest field that a horseman or a horse gunner could wish. The riflemen clung to

the hills, French's troopers circled warily upon the plain, gradually contracting the Boer position by

threatening to cut off this or that outlying kopje, and so the enemy was slowly herded into Colesberg. The

small but mobile British force covered a very large area, and hardly a day passed that one or other part of it

did not come in contact with the enemy. With one regiment of infantry (the Berkshires) to hold the centre, his

hardriding Tasmanians, NewZealanders, and Australians, with the Scots Greys, the Inniskillings, and the

Carabineers, formed an elastic but impenetrable screen to cover the Colony. They were aided by two

batteries, 0 and R, of Horse Artillery. Every day General French rode out and made a close personal

examination of the enemy's position, while his scouts and outposts were instructed to maintain the closest

On December 30th the enemy abandoned Rensburg, which had been their advanced post, and concentrated at

Colesberg, upon which French moved his force up and seized Rensburg. The very next day, December 31st,

he began a vigorous and longcontinued series of operations. At five o'clock on Sunday evening he moved

out of Rensburg camp, with R and half of 0 batteries R.H.A., the 10th Hussars, the Inniskillings, and the

Berkshires, to take up a position on the west of Colesberg. At the same time Colonel Porter, with the

halfbattery of 0, his own regiment (the Carabineers), and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, left camp at two

on the Monday morning and took a position on the enemy's left flank. The Berkshires under Major

McCracken seized hill, driving a Boer picket off it, and the Horse enfiladed the enemy's right flank, and after

a risk artillery duel succeeded in silencing his guns. Next morning, however (January 2nd, 1900), it was

found that the Boers, strongly reinforced, were back near their old positions, and French had to be content to

These were not long in coming, for the Suffolk Regiment had arrived, followed by the Composite Regiment

(chosen from the Household Cavalry) and the 4th Battery R.F.A. The Boers, however, had also been

reinforced, and showed great energy in their effort to break the cordon which was being drawn round them.

Upon the 4th a determined effort was made by about a thousand of them under General Shoemann to turn the

left flank of the British, and at dawn it was actually found that they had eluded the vigilance of the outposts

and had established themselves upon a hill to the rear of the position. They were shelled off of it, however, by

the guns of 0 Battery, and in their retreat across the plain they were pursued by the 10th Hussars and by one

squadron of the Inniskillings, who cut off some of the fugitives. At the same time, De Lisle with his mounted

infantry carried the position which they had originally held. In this successful and wellmanaged action the

Boer loss was ninety, and we took in addition twentyone prisoners. Our own casualties amounted only to six

Encouraged by this success an attempt was made by the Suffolk Regiment to carry a hill which formed the

key of the enemy's position. The town of Colesberg lies in a basin surrounded by a ring of kopjes, and the

possession by us of any one of them would have made the place untenable. The plan has been ascribed to

Colonel Watson of the Suffolks, but it is time that some protest should be raised against this devolution of

responsibility upon subordinates in the event of failure. When success has crowned our arms we have been

delighted to honour our general; but when our efforts end in failure our attention is called to Colonel Watson,

Colonel Long, or Colonel Thorneycroft. It is fairer to state that in this instance General French ordered

The result was disastrous. At midnight four companies in canvas shoes or in their stocking feet set forth upon

their venture, and just before dawn they found themselves upon the slope of the hill. They were in a

formation of quarter column with files extended to two paces; H Company was leading. When halfway up a

warm fire was opened upon them in the darkness. Colonel Watson gave the order to retire, intending, as it is

believed, that the men should get under the shelter of the dead ground which they had just quitted, but his

death immediately afterwards left matters in a confused condition. The night was black, the ground broken, a

hail of bullets whizzing through the ranks. Companies got mixed in the darkness and contradictory orders

were issued. The leading company held its ground, though each of the officers, Brett, Carey, and Butler, was

struck down. The other companies had retired, however, and the dawn found this fringe of men, most of them

wounded, lying under the very rifles of the Boers. Even then they held out for some time, but they could

neither advance, retire, or stay where they were without losing lives to no purpose, so the survivors were

compelled to surrender. There is better evidence here than at Magersfontein that the enemy were warned and

ready. Every one of the officers engaged, from the Colonel to the boy subaltern, was killed, wounded, or

taken. Eleven officers and one hundred and fifty men were our losses in this unfortunate but not discreditable

affair, which proves once more how much accuracy and how much secrecy is necessary for a successful night

attack. Four companies of the regiment were sent down to Port Elizabeth to reofficer, but the arrival of the

In spite of this annoying check, French continued to pursue his original design of holding the enemy in front

and working round him on the east. On January 9th, Porter, of the Carabineers, with his own regiment, two

squadrons of Household Cavalry, the NewZealanders, the New South Wales Lancers, and four guns, took

another step forward and, after a skirmish, occupied a position called Slingersfontein, still further to the north

and east, so as to menace the main road of retreat to Norval's Pont. Some skirmishing followed, but the

position was maintained. On the 15th the Boers, thinking that this long extension must have weakened us,

made a spirited attack upon a position held by NewZealanders and a company of the 1st Yorkshires, this

regiment having been sent up to reinforce French. The attempt was met by a volley and a bayonet charge.

Captain Orr, of the Yorkshires, was struck down; but Captain Madocks, of the NewZealanders, who

behaved with conspicuous gallantry at a critical instant, took command, and the enemy was heavily repulsed.

Madocks engaged in a pointblank rifle duel with the frockcoated tophatted Boer leader, and had the good

fortune to kill his formidable opponent. Twentyone Boer dead and many wounded left upon the field made a

The next day, however (January 16th), the scales of fortune, which swung alternately one way and the other,

were again tipped against us. It is difficult to give an intelligible account of the details of these operations,

because they were carried out by thin fringes of men covering on both sides a very large area, each kopje

As French extended to the east and north the Boers extended also to prevent him from outflanking them, and

so the little armies stretched and stretched until they were two long mobile skirmishing lines. The actions

therefore resolve themselves into the encounters of small bodies and the snapping up of exposed patrols a

game in which the Boer aptitude for guerrilla tactics gave them some advantage, though our own cavalry

quickly adapted themselves to the new conditions. On this occasion a patrol of sixteen men from the South

Australian Horse and New South Wales Lancers fell into an ambush, and eleven were captured. Of the

remainder, three made their way back to camp, while one was killed and one was wounded.

The duel between French on the one side and Schoeman and Lambert on the other was from this onwards one

of maneuvering rather than of fighting. The dangerously extended line of the British at this period, over thirty

miles long, was reinforced, as has been mentioned, by the 1st Yorkshire and later by the 2nd Wiltshire and a

section of the 37th Howitzer Battery. There was probably no very great difference in numbers between the

two little armies, but the Boers now, as always, were working upon internal lines. The monotony of the

operations was broken by the remarkable feat of the Essex Regiment, which succeeded by hawsers and

goodwill in getting two 15pounder guns of the 4th Field Battery on to the top of Coleskop, a hill which

rises several hundred feet from the plain and is so precipitous that it is no small task for an unhampered man

to climb it. From the summit a fire, which for some days could not be localised by the Boers, was opened

upon their laagers, which had to be shifted in consequence. This energetic action upon the part of our gunners

may be set off against those other examples where commanders of batteries have shown that they had not yet

appreciated what strong tackle and stout arms can accomplish. The guns upon Coleskop not only dominated

all the smaller kopjes for a range of 9,000 yards, but completely commanded the town of Colesberg, which

By gradual reinforcements the force under French had by the end of January attained the respectable figure of

ten thousand men, strung over a large extent of country. His infantry consisted of the 2nd Berkshires, 1st

Royal Irish, 2nd Wiltshires, 2nd Worcesters, 1st Essex, and 1st Yorkshires; his cavalry, of the 10th Hussars,

the 6th Dragoon Guards, the Inniskillings, the NewZealanders, the N.S.W. Lancers, some Rimington

Guides, and the composite Household Regiment; his artillery, the R and 0 batteries of R.H.A., the 4th R.F.A.,

and a section of the 37th Howitzer Battery. At the risk of tedium I have repeated the units of this force,

because there are no operations during the war, with the exception perhaps of those of the Rhodesian

Column, concerning which it is so difficult to get a clear impression. The fluctuating forces, the vast range of

country covered, and the petty farms which give their names to positions, all tend to make the issue vague

and the narrative obscure. The British still lay in a semicircle extending from Slingersfontein upon the right

to Kloof Camp upon the left, and the general scheme of operations continued to be an enveloping movement

upon the right. General Clements commanded this section of the forces, while the energetic Porter carried out

the successive advances. The lines had gradually stretched until they were nearly fifty miles in length, and

something of the obscurity in which the operations have been left is due to the impossibility of any single

correspondent having a clear idea of what was occurring over so extended a front.

On January 25th French sent Stephenson and Brabazon to push a reconnaissance to the north of Colesberg,

and found that the Boers were making a fresh position at Rietfontein, nine miles nearer their own border. A

small action ensued, in which we lost ten or twelve of the Wiltshire Regiment, and gained some knowledge

of the enemy's dispositions. For the remainder of the month the two forces remained in a state of equilibrium,

each keenly on its guard, and neither strong enough to penetrate the lines of the other. General French

descended to Cape Town to aid General Roberts in the elaboration of that plan which was soon to change the

Reinforcements were still dribbling into the British force, Hoad's Australian Regiment, which had been

changed from infantry to cavalry, and J battery R.H.A. from India, being the last arrivals. But very much

stronger reinforcements had arrived for the Boers so strong that they were able to take the offensive. De la

Rey had left the Modder with three thousand men, and their presence infused new life into the defenders of

Colesberg. At the moment, too, that the Modder Boers were coming to Colesberg, the British had begun to

send cavalry reinforcements to the Modder in preparation for the march to Kimberley, so that Clements's

Force (as it had now become) was depleted at the very instant when that of the enemy was largely increased.

The result was that it was all they could do not merely to hold their own, but to avoid a very serious disaster.

The movements of De la Rey were directed towards turning the right of the position. On February 9th and

10th the mounted patrols, principally the Tasmanians, the Australians, and the Inniskillings, came in contact

with the Boers, and some skirmishing ensued, with no heavy loss upon either side. A British patrol was

surrounded and lost eleven prisoners, Tasmanians and Guides. On the 12th the Boer turning movement

developed itself, and our position on the right at Slingersfontein was strongly attacked.

The key of the British position at this point was a kopje held by three companies of the 2nd Worcester

Regiment. Upon this the Boers made a fierce onslaught, but were as fiercely repelled. They came up in the

dark between the set of moon and rise of sun, as they had done at the great assault of Ladysmith, and the first

dim light saw them in the advanced sangars. The Boer generals do not favour night attacks, but they are

exceedingly fond of using darkness for taking up a good position and pushing onwards as soon as it is

possible to see. This is what they did upon this occasion, and the first intimation which the outposts had of

their presence was the rush of feet and loom of figures in the cold misty light of dawn. The occupants of the

sangars were killed to a man, and the assailants rushed onwards. As the sun topped the line of the veldt half

But the Worcester men were steady old soldiers, and the battalion contained no less than four hundred and

fifty marksmen in its ranks. Of these the companies upon the hill had their due proportion, and their fire was

so accurate that the Boers found themselves unable to advance any further. Through the long day a desperate

duel was maintained between the two lines of riflemen. Colonel Cuningham and Major Stubbs were killed

while endeavouring to recover the ground which had been lost. Hovel and Bartholomew continued to

encourage their men, and the British fire became so deadly that that of the Boers was dominated. Under the

direction of Hacket Pain, who commanded the nearest post, guns of J battery were brought out into the open

and shelled the portion of the kopje which was held by the Boers. The latter were reinforced, but could make

no advance against the accurate rifle fire with which they were met. The Bisley champion of the battalion,

with a bullet through his thigh, expended a hundred rounds before sinking from loss of blood. It was an

excellent defence, and a pleasing exception to those too frequent cases where an isolated force has lost heart

in face of a numerous and persistent foe. With the coming of darkness the Boers withdrew with a loss of over

two hundred killed and wounded. Orders had come from Clements that the whole right wing should be drawn

in, and in obedience to them the remains of the victorious companies were called in by Hacket Pain, who

moved his force by night in the direction of Rensburg. The British loss in the action was twentyeight killed

and nearly a hundred wounded or missing, most of which was incurred when the sangars were rushed in the

While this action was fought upon the extreme right of the British position another as severe had occurred

with much the same result upon the extreme left, where the 2nd Wiltshire Regiment was stationed. Some

companies of this regiment were isolated upon a kopje and surrounded by the Boer riflemen when the

pressure upon them was relieved by a desperate attack by about a hundred of the Victorian Rifles. The gallant

Australians lost Major Eddy and six officers out of seven, with a large proportion of their men, but they

proved once for a]l that amid all the scattered nations who came from the same home there is not one with a

more fiery courage and a higher sense of martial duty than the men from the great island continent. It is the

misfortune of the historian when dealing with these contingents that, as a rule, by their very nature they were

employed in detached parties in fulfilling the duties which fall to the lot of scouts and light cavalry duties

which fill the casualty lists but not the pages of the chronicler. Be it said, however, once for all that

throughout the whole African army there was nothing but the utmost admiration for the dash and spirit of the

hardriding, straight, shooting sons of Australia and New Zealand. In a host which held many brave men

It was evident from this time onwards that the turning movement had failed, and that the enemy had

developed such strength that we were ourselves in imminent danger of being turned. The situation was a most

serious one: for if Clements's force could be brushed aside there would be nothing to keep the enemy from

cutting the communications of the army which Roberts had assembled for his march into the Free State.

Clements drew in his wings hurriedly and concentrated his whole force at Rensburg. It was a difficult

operation in the face of an aggressive enemy, but the movements were well timed and admirably carried out.

There is always the possibility of a retreat degenerating into a panic, and a panic at that moment would have

been a most serious matter. One misfortune occurred, through which two companies of the Wiltshire

regiment were left without definite orders, and were cut off and captured after a resistance in which a third of

then number was killed and wounded. No man in that trying time worked harder than Colonel Carter of the

Wiltshires (the night of the retreat was the sixth which he had spent without sleep), and the loss of the two

companies is to be set down to one of those accidents which may always occur in warfare. Some of the

Inniskilling Dragoons and Victorian Mounted Rifles were also cut off in the retreat, but on the whole

Clements was very fortunate in being able to concentrate his scattered army with so few mishaps. The

withdrawal was heartbreaking to the soldiers who had worked so hard and so long in extending the lines, but

it might be regarded with equanimity by the Generals, who understood that the greater strength the enemy

developed at Colesberg the less they would have to oppose the critical movements which were about to be

carried out in the west. Meanwhile Coleskop had also been abandoned, the guns removed, and the whole

force on February 14th passed through Rensburg and felt back upon Arundel, the spot from which six weeks

earlier French had started upon this stirring series of operations. It would not be fair, however, to suppose that

they had failed because they ended where they began. Their primary object had been to prevent the further

advance of the Freestaters into the colony, and, during the most critical period of the war, this had been

accomplished with much success and little loss. At last the pressure had become so severe that the enemy had

to weaken the most essential part of their general position in order to relieve it. The object of the operations

had really been attained when Clements found himself back at Arundel once more. French, the stormy petrel

of the war, had flitted on from Cape Town to Modder River, where a larger prize than Colesberg awaited

him. Clements continued to cover Naauwport, the important railway junction, until the advance of Roberts's

Whilst Methuen and Gatacre were content to hold their own at the Modder and at Sterkstroom, and whilst the

mobile and energetic French was herding the Boers into Colesberg, Sir Redvers Buller, the heavy, obdurate,

inexplicable man, was gathering and organising his forces for another advance upon Ladysmith. Nearly a

month had elapsed since the evil day when his infantry had retired, and his ten guns had not, from the frontal

attack upon Colenso. Since then Sir Charles Warren's division of infantry and a considerable reinforcement of

artillery had come to him. And yet in view of the terrible nature of the ground in front of him, of the fighting

power of the Boers, and of the fact that they were always acting upon internal lines, his force even now was,

There remained, however, several points in his favour. His excellent infantry were full of zeal and of

confidence in their chief. It cannot be denied, however much we may criticise some incidents in his

campaign, that he possessed the gift of impressing and encouraging his followers, and, in spite of Colenso,

the sight of his square figure and heavy impassive face conveyed an assurance of ultimate victory to those

around him. In artillery he was very much stronger than before, especially in weight of metal. His cavalry

was still weak in proportion to his other arms. When at last he moved out on January 10th to attempt to

outflank the Boers, he took with him nineteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and sixty guns,

which included six howitzers capable of throwing a 50lb lyddite shell, and ten longrange naval pieces.

Barton's Brigade and other troops were left behind to hold the base and line of communications.

Clery's Division Hildyard's Brigade 2nd West Surrey 2nd Devonshire 2nd West Yorkshire 2nd East Surrey

Hart's Brigade 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers 1st Border Regiment 1st Connaught Rangers 2nd Dublin Fusiliers

Field Artillery, three batteries, 19th, 28th, 63rd; one squadron 13th Hussars; Royal Engineers.

Warren's Division Lyttelton's Brigade 2nd Cameronians 3rd King's Royal Rifles 1st Durham Light Infantry

1st Rifle Brigade Woodgate's Brigade 2nd Royal Lancaster 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers 1st South Lancashire

York and Lancasters Field Artillery, three batteries, 7th, 78th, 73rd ; one squadron 13th Hussars.

Corps Troops Coke's Brigade Imperial Light Infantry 2nd Somersets 2nd Dorsets 2nd Middlesex 61st

Howitzer Battery; two 4.7 naval guns; eight naval 12pounder guns; one squadron 13th Hussars; Royal

Cavalry 1st Royal Dragoons 14th Hussars Four squadrons South African Horse One squadron Imperial Light

Horse Bethune's Mounted Infantry Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry One squadron Natal Carabineers One

squadron Natal Police One company King's Royal Rifles Mounted Infantry Six machine guns

About sixteen miles to the westward of Colenso there is a ford over the Tugela River which is called

Potgieter's Drift. General Buller's apparent plan was to seize this, together with the ferry which runs at this

point, and so to throw himself upon the right flank of the Colenso Boers. Once over the river there is one

formidable line of hills to cross, but if this were passed there would be comparatively easy ground until the

Ladysmith hills were reached. With high hopes Buller and his men sallied out upon their adventure.

Dundonald's cavalry force pushed rapidly forwards, crossed the Little Tugela, a tributary of the main river, at

Springfield, and established themselves upon the hills which command the drift. Dundonald largely exceeded

his instructions in going so far, and while we applaud his courage and judgment in doing so, we must

remember and be charitable to those less fortunate officers whose private enterprise has ended in disaster and

reproof. There can be no doubt that the enemy intended to hold all this tract, and that it was only the

quickness of our initial movements which forestalled them. Early in the morning a small party of the South

African Horse, under Lieutenant Carlisle, swam the broad river under fire and brought back the ferry boat, an

enterprise which was fortunately bloodless, but which was most coolly planned and gallantly carried out. The

way was now open to our advance, and could it have been carried out as rapidly as it had begun the Boers

might conceivably have been scattered before they could concentrate. It was not the fault of the infantry that

it was not so. They were trudging, mudspattered and jovial, at the very heels of the horses, after a forced

march which was one of the most trying of the whole campaign. But an army of 20,000 men cannot be

conveyed over a river twenty miles from any base without elaborate preparations being made to feed them.

The roads were in such a state that the wagons could hardly move, heavy rain had just fallen, and every

stream was swollen into a river; bullocks might strain, and traction engines pant, and horses die, but by no

human means could the stores be kept up if the advance guard were allowed to go at their own pace. And so,

having ensured an ultimate crossing of the river by the seizure of Mount Alice, the high hill which commands

the drift, the forces waited day after day, watching in the distance the swarms of strenuous dark figures who

dug and hauled and worked upon the hillsides opposite, barring the road which they would have to take. Far

away on the horizon a little shining point twinkled amid the purple haze, coming and going from morning to

night. It was the heliograph of Ladysmith, explaining her troubles and calling for help, and from the heights

of Mount Alice an answering star of hope glimmered and shone, soothing, encouraging, explaining, while the

stern men of the veldt dug furiously at their trenches in between. 'We are coming! We are coming!' cried

On Thursday, January 12th, Dundonald seized the heights, on the 13th the ferry was taken and Lyttelton's

Brigade came up to secure that which the cavalry had gained. On the 14th the heavy naval guns were brought

up to cover the crossing. On the 15th Coke's Brigade and other infantry concentrated at the drift. On the 16th

the four regiments of Lyttelton's Brigade went across, and then, and only then, it began to be apparent that

Buller's plan was a more deeply laid one than had been thought, and that all this business of Potgieter's Drift

was really a demonstration in order to cover the actual crossing which was to be effected at a ford named

Trichard's Drift, five miles to the westward. Thus, while Lyttelton's and Coke's Brigades were ostentatiously

attacking Potgieter's from in front, three other brigades (Hart's, Woodgate's, and Hildyard's) were marched

rapidly on the night of the 16th to the real place of crossing, to which Dundonald's cavalry had already

ridden. There, on the 17th, a pontoon bridge had been erected, and a strong force was thrown over in such a

way as to turn the right of the trenches in front of Potgieter's. It was admirably planned and excellently

carried out, certainly the most strategic movement, if there could he said to have been any strategic

movement upon the British side, in the campaign up to that date. On the 18th the infantry, the cavalry, and

most of the guns were safely across without loss of life. The Boers, however, still retained their formidable

internal lines, and the only result of a change of position seemed to be to put them to the trouble of building a

new series of those terrible entrenchments at which they had become such experts. After all the combinations

the British were, it is true, upon the right side of the river, but they were considerably further from Ladysmith

than when they started. There are times, however, when twenty miles are less than fourteen, and it was hoped

that this might prove to be among them. But the first step was the most serious one, for right across their front

lay the Boer position upon the edge of a lofty plateau, with the high peak of Spion Kop forming the left

corner of it. If once that main ridge could be captured or commanded, it would carry them halfway to the

goal. It was for that essential line of hills that two of the most dogged races upon earth were about to contend.

An immediate advance might have secured the position at once, but, for some reason which is inexplicable,

an aimless march to the left was followed by a retirement to the original position of Warren's division, and so

two invaluable days were wasted. We have the positive assurance of Commandant Edwards, who was Chief

of Staff to General Botha, that a vigorous turning movement upon the left would at this time have completely

A small success, the more welcome for its rarity, came to the British arms on this first day. Dundonald's men

had been thrown out to cover the left of the infantry advance and to feel for the right of the Boer position. A

strong Boer patrol, caught napping for once, rode into an ambuscade of the irregulars. some escaped, some

held out most gallantly in a kopje, but the final result was a surrender of twentyfour unwounded prisoners,

and the finding of thirteen killed and wounded, including de Mentz, the fieldcornet of Heilbron. Two killed

and two wounded were the British losses in this wellmanaged affair. Dundonald's force then took its

The British were now moving upon the Boers in two separate bodies, the one which included Lyttelton's and

Coke's Brigades from Potgieter's Drift, making what was really a frontal attack, while the main body under

Warren, who had crossed at Trichard's Drift, was swinging round upon the Boer right. Midway between the

two movements the formidable bastion of Spion Kop stood clearly outlined against the blue Natal sky. The

heavy naval guns on Mount Alice (two 4.7's and eight twelvepounders) were so placed as to support either

advance, and the howitzer battery was given to Lyttelton to help the frontal attack. For two days the British

pressed slowly but steadily on to the Boers under the cover of an incessant rain of shells. Dour and long

suffering the Boers made no reply, save with sporadic riflefire, and refused until the crisis should come to

On January 19th Warren's turning movement began to bring him into closer touch with the enemy, his

thirtysix field guns and the six howitzers which had returned to him crushing down the opposition which

faced him. The ground in front of him was pleated into long folds, and his advance meant the carrying of

ridge after ridge. In the earlier stages of the war this would have entailed a murderous loss; but we had

learned our lesson, and the infantry now, with intervals of ten paces, and every man choosing his own cover,

went up in proper Boer form, carrying position after position, the enemy always retiring with dignity and

decorum. There was no victory on one side or rout on the other only a steady advance and an orderly

retirement. That night the infantry slept in their fighting line, going on again at three in the morning, and light

broke to find not only rifles, but the longsilent Boer guns all blazing at the British advance. Again, as at

Colenso, the brunt of the fighting fell upon Hart's Irish Brigade, who upheld that immemorial tradition of

valour with which that name, either in or out of the British service, has invariably been associated. Upon the

Lancashire Fusiliers and the York and Lancasters came also a large share of the losses and the glory. Slowly

but surely the inexorable line of the British lapped over the ground which the enemy had held. A gallant

colonial, Tobin of the South African Horse, rode up one hill and signaled with his hat that it was clear. His

comrades followed closely at his heels, and occupied the position with the loss of Childe, their Major. During

this action Lyttelton had held the Boers in their trenches opposite to him by advancing to within 1,500 yards

of them, but the attack was not pushed further. On the evening of this day, January 20th, the British had

gained some miles of ground, and the total losses had been about three hundred killed and wounded. The

troops were in good heart, and all promised well for the future. Again the men lay where they had fought, and

again the dawn heard the crash of the great guns and the rattle of the musketry.

The operations of this day began with a sustained cannonade from the field batteries and 61st Howitzer

Battery, which was as fiercely answered by the enemy. About eleven the infantry began to go forward with

an advance which would have astonished the martinets of Aldershot, an irregular fringe of crawlers,

wrigglers, writhers, cronchers, all cool and deliberate, giving away no points in this grim game of death.

Where now were the officers with their distinctive dresses and flashing swords, where the valiant rushes over

the open, where the men who were too proud to lie down? the tactics of three months ago seemed as

obsolete as those of the Middle Ages. All day the line undulated forward, and by evening yet another strip of

rockstrewn ground had been gained, and yet another train of ambulances was bearing a hundred of our

wounded back to the base hospitals at Frere. It was on Hildyard's Brigade on the left that the fighting and the

losses of this day principally fell. By the morning of January 22nd the regiments were clustering thickly all

round the edges of the Boer main position, and the day was spent in resting the weary men, and in

determining at what point the final assault should be delivered. On the right front, commanding the Boer lines

on either side, towered the stark eminence of Spion Kop, so called because from its summit the Boer

voortrekkers had first in 1835 gazed down upon the promised land of Natal. If that could only be seized and

held! Buller and Warren swept its bald summit with their fieldglasses. It was a venture. But all war is a

venture; and the brave man is he who ventures most. One fiery rush and the masterkey of all these locked

doors might be in our keeping. That evening there came a telegram to London which left the whole Empire in

The troops which were selected for the task were eight companies of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, six of the

2nd Royal Lancasters, two of the 1st South Lancashires, 180 of Thorneycroft's, and half a company of

Under the friendly cover of a starless night the men, in Indian file, like a party of Iroquois braves upon the

war trail, stole up the winding and illdefined path which led to the summit. Woodgate, the Lancashire

Brigadier, and Blomfield of the Fusiliers led the way. It was a severe climb of 2,000 feet, coming after

arduous work over broken ground, but the affair was welltimed, and it was at that blackest hour which

precedes the dawn that the last steep ascent was reached. The Fusiliers crouched down among the rocks to

recover their breath, and saw far down in the plain beneath them the placid lights which showed where their

comrades were resting. A fine rain was falling, and rolling clouds hung low over their heads. The men with

unloaded rifles and fixed bayonets stole on once more, their bodies bent, their eyes peering through the mirk

for the first sign of the enemy that enemy whose first sign has usually been a shattering volley.

Thorneycroft's men with their gallant leader had threaded their way up into the advance. Then the leading

With slow steps and bated breath, the open line of skirmishers stole across it. Was it possible that it had been

entirely abandoned? Suddenly a raucous shout of `Wie da?' came out of the darkness, then a shot, then a

splutter of musketry and a yell, as the Fusiliers sprang onwards with their bayonets. The Boer post of Vryheid

burghers clattered and scrambled away into the darkness, and a cheer that roused both the sleeping armies

In the grey light of the breaking day the men advanced along the narrow undulating ridge, the prominent end

of which they had captured. Another trench faced them, but it was weakly held and abandoned. Then the

men, uncertain what remained beyond, halted and waited for full light to see where they were, and what the

work was which lay before them a fatal halt, as the result proved, and yet one so natural that it is hard to

blame the officer who ordered it. Indeed, he might have seemed more culpable had he pushed blindly on, and

About eight o'clock, with the clearing of the mist, General Woodgate saw how matters stood. The ridge, one

end of which he held, extended away, rising and falling for some miles. Had he the whole of the end plateau,

and had he guns, he might hope to command the rest of the position. But he held only half the plateau, and at

the further end of it the Boers were strongly entrenched. The Spion Kop mountain was really the salient or

sharp angle of the Boer position, so that the British were exposed to a cross fire both from the left and right.

Beyond were other eminences which sheltered strings of riflemen and several guns. The plateau which the

British held was very much narrower than was usually represented in the press. In many places the possible

front was not much more than a hundred yards wide, and the troops were compelled to bunch together, as

there was not room for a single company to take an extended formation. The cover upon this plateau was

scanty, far too scanty for the force upon it, and the shell fire especially the fire of the pompoms soon

became very murderous. To mass the troops under the cover of the edge of the plateau might naturally

suggest itself, but with great tactical skill the Boer advanced line from Commandant Prinsloo's Heidelberg

and Carolina commandos kept so aggressive an attitude that the British could not weaken the lines opposed to

them. Their skirmishers were creeping round too in such a way that the fire was really coming from three

separate points, left, centre, and. right, and every corner of the position was searched by their bullets. Early in

the action the gallant Woodgate and many of his Lancashire men were shot down. The others spread out and

held on, firing occasionally at the whisk of a riflebarrel or the glimpse of a broadbrimmed hat.

>From morning to midday, the shell, Maxim, and rifle fire swept across the kop in a continual driving

shower. The British guns in the plain below failed to localise the position of the enemy's, and they were able

to vent their concentrated spite upon the exposed infantry. No blame attaches to the gunners for this, as a hill

intervened to screen the Boer artillery, which consisted of five big guns and two pompoms.

Upon the fall of Woodgate, Thorneycroft, who bore the reputation of a determined fighter, was placed at the

suggestion of Buller in charge of the defence of the hill, and he was reinforced after noon by Coke's brigade,

the Middlesex, the Dorsets, and the Somersets, together with the Imperial Light Infantry. The addition of this

force to the defenders of the plateau tended to increase the casualty returns rather than the strength of the

defence. Three thousand more rifles could do nothing to check the fire of the invisible cannon, and it was this

which was the main source of the losses, while on the other hand the plateau had become so cumbered with

troops that a shell could hardly fail to do damage. There was no cover to shelter them and no room for them

to extend. The pressure was most severe upon the shal]ow trenches in the front, which had been abandoned

by the Boers and were held by the Lancashire Fusiliers. They were enfiladed by rifle and cannon, and the

dead and wounded outnumbered the hale. So close were the skirmishers that on at least one occasion Boer

and Briton found themselves on each side of the same rock. Once a handful of men, tormented beyond

endurance, sprang up as a sign that they had had enough, but Thorneycroft, a man of huge physique, rushed

forward to the advancing Boers. 'You may go to hell!' he yelled. 'I command here, and allow no surrender. Go

on with your firing.' Nothing could exceed the gallantry of Louis Botha's men in pushing the attack. Again

and again they made their way up to the British firing line, exposing themselves with a recklessness which,

with the exception of the grand attack upon Ladysmith, was unique in our experience of them. About two

o'clock they rushed one trench occupied by the Fusiliers and secured the survivors of two companies as

prisoners, but were subsequently driven out again. A detached group of the South Lancashires was

summoned to surrender. 'When I surrender,' cried ColourSergeant Nolan, 'it will be my dead body!' Hour

after hour of the unintermitting crash of the shells among the rocks and of the groans and screams of men torn

and burst by the most horrible of all wounds had shaken the troops badly. Spectators from below who saw the

shells pitching at the rate of seven a minute on to the crowded plateau marvelled at the endurance which held

the devoted men to their post. Men were wounded and wounded and wounded yet again, and still went on

fighting. Never since Inkerman had we had so grim a soldier's battle. The company officers were superb.

Captain Muriel of the Middlesex was shot through the check while giving a cigarette to a wounded man,

continued to lead his company, and was shot again through the brain. Scott Moncrieff of the same regiment

was only disabled by the fourth bullet which hit him. Grenfell of Thorneycroft's was shot, and exclaimed,

'That's all right. It's not much.' A second wound made him remark, 'I can get on all right.' The third killed

him. Ross of the Lancasters, who had crawled from a sickbed, was found dead upon the furthest crest. Young

Murray of the Scottish Rifles, dripping from five wounds, still staggered about among his men. And the men

were worthy of such officers. 'No retreat! No retreat!' they yelled when some of the front line were driven in.

In all regiments there are weaklings and hangbacks, and many a man was wandering down the reverse

slopes when he should have been facing death upon the top, but as a body British troops have never stood

The position was so bad that no efforts of officers or men could do anything to mend it. They were in a

murderous dilemma. If they fell back for cover the Boer riflemen would rush the position. If they held their

ground this horrible shell fire must continue, which they had no means of answering. Down at Gun Hill in

front of the Boer position we had no fewer than five batteries, the 78th, 7th, 73rd, 63rd, and 61st howitzer,

but a ridge intervened between them and the Boer guns which were shelling Spion Kop, and this ridge was

strongly entrenched. The naval guns from distant Mount Alice did what they could, but the range was very

long, and the position of the Boer guns uncertain. The artillery, situated as it was, could not save the infantry

There remains the debated question whether the British guns could have been taken to the top. Mr. Winston

Churchill, the soundness of whose judgment has been frequently demonstrated during the war, asserts that it

might have been done. Without venturing to contradict one who was personally present, I venture to tbink

that there is strong evidence to show that it could not have been done without blasting and other measures, for

which there was no possible time. Captain Hanwell of the 78th R.F.A., upon the day of the battle had the very

utmost difficulty with the help of four horses in getting a light Maxim on to the top, and his opinion, with that

of other artillery officers, is that the feat was an impossible one until the path had been prepared. When night

fell Colonel Sim was despatched with a party of Sappers to clear the track and to prepare two emplacements

Throughout the day reinforcements had pushed up the hill, until two full brigades had been drawn into the

fight. From the other side of the ridge Lyttelton sent up the Scottish Rifles, who reached the summit, and

added their share to the shambles upon the top. As the shades of night closed in, and the glare of the bursting

shells became more lurid, the men lay extended upon the rocky ground, parched and exhausted. They were

hopelessly jumbled together, with the exception of the Dorsets, whose cohesion may have been due to

superior discipline, less exposure, or to the fact that their khaki differed somewhat in colour from that of the

others. Twelve hours of so terrible an experience had had a strange effect upon many of the men. Some were

dazed and battlestruck, incapable of clear understanding. Some were as incoherent as drunkards. Some lay

in an overpowering drowsiness. The most were doggedly patient and longsuffering, with a mighty longing

Before evening fell a most gallant and successful attempt had been made by the third battalion of the King's

Royal Rifles from Lyttelton's Brigade to relieve the pressure upon their comrades on Spion Kop. In order to

draw part of the Boer fire away they ascended from the northern side and carried the hills which formed a

continuation of the same ridge. The movement was meant to be no more than a strong demonstration, but the

riflemen pushed it until, breathless but victorious, they stood upon the very crest of the position, leaving

nearly a hundred dead or dying to show the path which they had taken. Their advance being much further

than was desired, they were recalled, and it was at the moment that Buchanan Riddell, their brave Colonel,

stood up to read Lyttelton's note that he fell with a Boer bullet through his brain, making one more of those

gallant leaders who died as they had lived, at the head of their regiments. Chisholm, DickCunyngham,

Downman, Wilford, Gunning, Sherston, Thackeray, Sitwell, MacCarthy O'Leary, Airlie they have led

their men up to and through the gates of death. It was a fine exploit of the 3rd Rifles. 'A finer bit of

skirmishing, a finer bit of climbing, and a finer bit of fighting, I have never seen,' said their Brigadier. It is

certain that if Lyttelton had not thrown his two regiments into the fight the pressure upon the hilltop might

have become unendurable; and it seems also certain that if he had only held on to the position which the

And now, under the shadow of night, but with the shells bursting thickly over the plateau, the muchtried

Thorneycroft had to make up his mind whether he should hold on for another such day as he had endured, or

whether now, in the friendly darkness, he should remove his shattered force. Could he have seen the

discouragement of the Boers and the preparations which they had made for retirement, he would have held

his ground. But this was hidden from him, whille the horror of his own losses was but too apparent. Forty per

cent. of his men were down. Thirteen hundred dead and dying are a grim sight upon a widespread

battlefield, but when this number is heaped upon a confined space, where from a single high rock the whole

litter of broken and shattered bodies can be seen, and the groans of the stricken rise in one long droning

chorus to the ear, then it is an iron mind indeed which can resist such evidence of disaster. In a harder age

Wellington was able to survey four thousand bodies piled in the narrow compass of the breach of Badajos,

but his resolution was sustained by the knowledge that the military end for which they fell had been

accomplished. Had his task been unfinished it is doubtful whether even his steadfast soul would not have

flinched from its completion. Thorneycroft saw the frightful havoc of one day, and he shrank from the

thought of such another. 'Better six battalions safely down the hill than a mop up in the morning,' said he, and

he gave the word to retire. One who had met the troops as they staggered down has told me how far they were

from being routed. In mixed array, but steadily and in order, the long thin line trudged through the darkness.

Their parched lips would not articulate, but they whispered 'Water! Where is water?' as they toiled upon their

way. At the bottom of the hill they formed into regiments once more, and marched back to the camp. In the

morning the bloodspattered hilltop, with its piles of dead and of wounded, were in the hands of Botha and

his men, whose valour and perseverance deserved the victory which they had won. There is no doubt now

that at 3 A.M. of that morning Botha, knowing that the Rifles had carried Burger's position, regarded the

affair as hopeless, and that no one was more astonished than he when he found, on the report of two scouts,

How shall we sum up such an action save that it was a gallant attempt, gallantly carried out, and as gallantly

met? On both sides the results of artillery fire during the war have been disappointing, but at Spion Kop

beyond all question it was the Boer guns which won the action for them. So keen was the disappointment at

home that there was a tendency to criticise the battle with some harshness, but it is difficult now, with the

evidence at our command, to say what was left undone which could have altered the result. Had Thorneycroft

known all that we know, he would have kept his grip upon the hill. On the face of it one finds it difficult to

understand why so momentous a decision, upon which the whole operations depended, should have been left

entirely to the judgment of one who in the morning had been a simple LieutenantColonel. 'Where are the

bosses? ' cried a Fusilier, and the historian can only repeat the question. General Warren was at the bottom of

the hill. Had he ascended and determined that the place should still be held, he might have sent down the

wearied troops, brought up smaller numbers of fresh ones, ordered the Sappers to deepen the trenches, and

tried to bring up water and guns. It was for the divisional commander to lay his hand upon the reins at so

critical an instant, to relieve the weary man who had struggled so hard all day.

The subsequent publication of the official despatches has served little purpose, save to show that there was a

want of harmony between Buller and Warren, and that the former lost all confidence in his subordinate

during the course of the operations. In these papers General Buller expresses the opinion that had Warren's

operations been more dashing, he would have found his turning movement upon the left a comparatively easy

matter. In this judgment he would probably have the concurrence of most military critics. He adds, however,

'On the 19th, I ought to have assumed command myself. I saw that things were not going well indeed,

everyone saw that. I blame myself now for not having done so. I did not, because, if I did, I should discredit

General Warren in the estimation of the troops, and, if I were shot, and he had to withdraw across the Tugela,

and they had lost confidence in him, the consequences might be very serious. I must leave it to higher

authority whether this argument was a sound one.' It needs no higher authority than commonsense to say

that the argument is an absolutely unsound one. No consequences could be more serious than that the

operations should miscarry and Ladysmith remain unrelieved, and such want of success must in any case

discredit Warren in the eyes of his troops. Besides, a subordinate is not discredited because his chief steps in

to conduct a critical operation. However, these personal controversies may be suffered to remain in that

On account of the crowding of four thousand troops into a space which might have afforded tolerable cover

for five hundred the losses in the action were very heavy, not fewer than fifteen hundred being killed,

wounded, or missing, the proportion of killed being, on account of the shell fire, abnormally high. The

Lancashire Fusiliers were the heaviest sufferers, and their Colonel Blomfield was wounded and fell into the

hands of the enemy. The Royal Lancasters also lost heavily. Thorneycroft's had 80 men hit out of 180

engaged. The Imperial Light Infantry, a raw corps of Rand refugees who were enduring their baptism of fire,

lost 130 men. In officers the losses were particularly heavy, 60 being killed or wounded. The Boer returns

show some 50 killed and 150 wounded, which may not be far from the truth. Without the shell fire the British

General Buller had lost nearly two thousand men since he had crossed the Tugela, and his purpose was still

unfulfilled. Should he risk the loss of a large part of his force in storming the ridges in front of him, or should

he recross the river and try for an easier route elsewhere? To the surprise and disappointment both of the

public and of the army, he chose the latter course, and by January 27th he had fallen back, unmolested by the

Boers, to the other side of the Tugela. It must be confessed that his retreat was admirably conducted, and that

it was a military feat to bring his men, his guns, and his stores in safety over a broad river in the face of a

victorious enemy. Stolid and unmoved, his impenetrable demeanour restored serenity and confidence to the

angry and disappointed troops. There might well be heavy hearts among both them and the public. After a

fortnight's campaign, and the endurance of great losses and hardships, both Ladysmith and her relievers

found themselves no better off than when they started. Buller still held the commanding position of Mount

Alice, and this was all that he had to show for such sacrifices and such exertions. Once more there came a

weary pause while Ladysmith, sick with hope deferred, waited gloomily upon halfrations of horseflesh for

Neither General Buller nor his troops appeared to be dismayed by the failure of their plans, or by the heavy

losses which were entailed by the movement which culminated at Spion Kop. The soldiers grumbled, it is

true, at not being let go, and swore that even if it cost them twothirds of their number they could and would

make heir way through this labyrinth of hills with its fringe of death. So doubtless they might. But from first

to last their General had shown a great some said an exaggerated respect for human life, and he had no

intention of winning a path by mere slogging, if there were a chance of finding one by less bloody means. On

the morrow of his return he astonished both his army and the Empire by announcing that he had found the

key to the position and that he hoped to be in Ladysmith in a week. Some rejoiced in the assurance. Some

shrugged their shoulders. Careless of friends or foes, the stolid Buller proceeded to work out his new

In the next few days reinforcements trickled in which more than made up for the losses of the preceding

week. A battery of horse artillery, two heavy guns, two squadrons of the 14th Hussars, and infantry drafts to

the number of twelve or fourteen hundred men came to share the impending glory or disaster. On the morning

of February 5th the army sallied forth once more to have another try to win a way to Ladysmith. It was

known that enteric was rife in the town, that shell and bullet and typhoid germ had struck down a terrible

proportion of the garrison, and that the rations of starved horse and commissariat mule were running low.

With their comrades in many cases their linked battalions in such straits within fifteen miles of them,

The previous attempt had been upon the line immediately to the west of Spion Kop. If, however, one were to

follow to the east of Spion Kop, one would come upon a high mountain called Doornkloof. Between these

two peaks, there lies a low ridge, called Brakfontein, and a small detached hill named Vaalkranz. Buller's

idea was that if he could seize this small Vaalkranz, it would enable him to avoid the high ground altogether

and pass his troops through on to the plateau beyond. He still held the Ford at Potgieter's and commanded the

country beyond with heavy guns on Mount Alice and at Swartz Kop, so that he could pass troops over at his

will. He would make a noisy demonstration against Brakfontein, then suddenly seize Vaalkranz, and so, as he

The getting of the guns up Swartz Kop was a preliminary which was as necessary as it was difficult. A road

was cut, sailors, engineers, and gunners worked with a will under the general direction of Majors Findlay and

Apsley Smith. A mountain battery, two field guns, and six naval 12pounders were slung up by steel

hawsers, the sailors yeohoing on the halliards. The ammunition was taken up by hand. At six o'clock on the

morning of the 5th the other guns opened a furious and probably harmless fire upon Brakfontein, Spion Kop,

and all the Boer positions opposite to them. Shortly afterwards the feigned attack upon Brakfontein was

commenced and was sustained with much fuss and appearance of energy until all was ready for the

development of the true one. Wynne's Brigade, which had been Woodgate's, recovered already from its Spion

Kop experience, carried out this part of the plan, supported by six batteries of field artillery, one howitzer

battery, and two 4.7 naval guns. Three hours later a telegram was on its way to Pretoria to tell how

triumphantly the burghers had driven back an attack which was never meant to go forward. The infantry

retired first, then the artillery in alternate batteries, preserving a beautiful order and decorum. The last battery,

the 78th, remained to receive the concentrated fire of the Boer guns, and was so enveloped in the dust of the

exploding. shells that spectators could only see a gun here or a limber there. Out of this whirl of death it

quietly walked, without a bucket out of its place, the gunners drawing one wagon, the horses of which had

perished, and so effected a leisurely and contemptuous withdrawal. The gallantry of the gunners has been one

of the most striking features of the war, but it has never been more conspicuous than in this feint at

While the attention of the Boers was being concentrated upon the Lancashire men, a pontoon bridge was

suddenly thrown across the river at a place called Munger's Drift, some miles to the eastward. Three infantry

brigades, those of Hart, Lyttelton, and Hildyard, had been massed all ready to be let slip when the false attack

was sufficiently absorbing. The artillery fire (the Swartz Kop guns, and also the batteries which had been

withdrawn from the Brakfontein demonstration) was then turned suddenly, with the crashing effect of seventy

pieces, upon the real object of attack, the isolated Vaalkranz. It is doubtful whether any position has ever

been subjected to so terrific a bombardment, for the weight of metal thrown by single guns was greater than

that of a whole German battery in the days of their last great war. The 4pounders and 6pounders of which

Prince Kraft discourses would have seemed toys beside these mighty howitzers and 4�7's. Yet though the

hillside was sharded off in great flakes, it is doubtful if this terrific fire inflicted much injury upon the

About midday the infantry began to stream across the bridge, which had been most gallantly and efficiently

constructed under a warm fire, by a party of sappers, under the command of Major Irvine. The attack was led

by the Durham Light Infantry of Lyttelton's Brigade, followed by the 1st Rifle Brigade, with the Scottish and

3rd Rifles in support. Never did the old Light Division of Peninsular fame go up a Spanish hillside with

greater spirit and dash than these, their descendants, facing the slope of Vaalkranz. In open order they moved

across the plain, with a superb disregard of the crash and patter of the shrapnel, and then up they went, the

flitting figures, springing from cover to cover, stooping, darting, crouching, running, until with their glasses

the spectators on Swartz Kop could see the gleam of the bayonets and the strain of furious rushing men upon

the summit, as the Jast Boers were driven from their trenches. The position was gained, but little else. Seven

officers and seventy men were lying killed and wounded among the boulders. A few stricken Boers, five

unwounded prisoners, and a string of Basuto ponies were the poor fruits of victory those and the arid hill

It was during this advance that an incident occurred of a more picturesque character than is usual in modern

warfare. The invisibility of combatants and guns, and the absorption of the individual in the mass, have

robbed the battlefield of those episodes which adorned, if they did not justify it. On this occasion, a Boer

gun, cut off by the British advance, flew out suddenly from behind its cover, like a hare from its tussock, and

raced for safety across the plain. Here and there it wound, the horses stretched to their utmost, the drivers

stooping and lashing, the little gun bounding behind. To right to left, behind and before, the British shells

burst, lyddite and shrapnel, crashing and riving. Over the lip of a hollow, the gallant gun vanished, and within

a few minutes was banging away once more at the British advance. With cheers and shouts and laughter, the

British infantrymen watched the race for shelter, their sporting spirit rising high above all racial hatred, and

The Durhams had cleared the path, but the other regiments of Lyttelton's Brigade followed hard at their heels,

and before night they had firmly established themselves upon the hill. But the fatal slowness which had

marred General Buller's previous operations again prevented him from completing his success. Twice at least

in the course of these operations there is evidence of sudden impulse to drop his tools in the midst of his task

and to do no more for the day. So it was at Colenso, where an order was given at an early hour for the whole

force to retire, and the guns which might have been covered by infantry fire and withdrawn after nightfall

were abandoned. So it was also at a critical moment at this action at Vaalkranz. In the original scheme of

operations it had been planned that an adjoining hill, called the Green Hill, which partly commanded

Vaalkranz, should be carried also. The two together made a complete position, while singly each was a very

bad neighbour to the other. On the aidedecamp riding up, however, to inquire from General Buller whether

the time had come for this advance, he replied, 'We have done enough for the day,' and left out this essential

Speed was the most essential quality for carrying out his plan successfully. So it must always be with the

attack. The defence does not know where the blow is commg, and has to distribute men and guns to cover

miles of ground. The attacker knows where he will hit, and behind a screen of outposts he can mass his force

and throw his whole strength against a mere fraction of that of his enemy. But in order to do so he must be

quick. One tiger spring must tear the centre out of the line before the flanks can come to its assistance. If time

is given, if the long line can concentrate, if the scattered guns can mass, if lines of defence can be

reduplicated behind, then the one great advantage which the attack possesses is thrown away. Both at the

second and at the third attempts of Buller the British movements were so slow that had the enemy been the

slowest instead of the most mobile of armies, they could still always have made any dispositions which they

chose. Warren's dawdling in the first days of the movement which ended at Spion Kop might with an effort

be condoned on account of possible difficulties of supply, but it would strain the ingenuity of the most

charitable critic to find a sufficient reason for the lethargy of Vaalkranz. Though daylight comes a little after

four, the operations were not commenced before seven. Lyttelton's Brigade had stormed the hill at two, and

nothing more was done during the long evening, while officers chafed and soldiers swore, and the busy Boers

worked furiously to bring up their guns and to bar the path which we must take. General Buller remarked a

day or two later that the way was not quite so easy as it had been. One might have deduced the fact without

The brigade then occupied Vaalkranz and erected sangars and dug trenches. On the morning of the 6th, the

position of the British force was not dissimilar to that of Spion Kop. Again they had some thousands of men

upon a hilltop, exposed to shell fire from several directions and without any guns upon the hill to support

them. In one or two points the situation was modified in their favour, and hence their escape from loss and

disaster. A more extended position enabled the infantry to avoid bunching, but in other respects the situation

The original plan was that the taking of Vaalkranz should be the first step towards the outflanking of

Brakfontein and the rolling up of the whole Boer position. But after the first move the British attitude became

one of defence rather than of attack. Whatever the general and ultimate effect of these operations may have

been, it is beyond question that their contemplation was annoying and bewildering in the extreme to those

who were present. The position on February 6th was this. Over the river upon the hill was a singgle British

brigade, exposed to the fire of one enormous gun a 96pound Creusot, the longest of all Long Toms

which was stationed upon Doornkloof, and of several smaller guns and pompoms which spat at them from

nooks and crevices of the hills. On our side were seventytwo guns, large and small, all very noisy and

impotent. It is not too much to say, as it appears to me, that the Boers have in some ways revolutionised our

ideas in regard to the use of artillery, by bringing a fresh and healthy commonsense to bear upon a subject

which had been unduly fettered by pedantic rules. The Boer system is the single stealthy gun crouching

where none can see it. The British system is the six brave guns coming into action in line of full interval, and

spreading out into accurate dressing visible to all men. 'Always remember,' says one of our artillery maxims,

'that one gun is no gun.' Which is prettier on a fieldday, is obvious, but which is business let the many

duels between six Boer guns and sixty British declare. With black powder it was useless to hide the gun, as

its smoke must betray it. With smokeless powder the guns are so invisible that it was only by the detection

with powerful glasses of the dust from the trail on the recoil that the officers were ever able to localise the

guns against which they were fighting. But if the Boers had had six guns in line, instead of one behind that

kopje, and another between those distant rocks, it would not have been so difficult to say where they were.

Again, British traditions are all in favour of planting guns close together. At this very action of Vaalkranz the

two largest guns were so placed that a single shell bursting between them would have disabled them both.

The officer who placed them there, and so disregarded in a vital matter the most obvious dictates of

commonsense, would probably have been shocked by any want of technical smartness, or irregularity in the

routine drill. An overelaboration of trifles, and a want of grip of commonsense, and of adaptation to new

ideas, is the most serious and damaging criticism which can be levelled against our army. That the function of

infantry is to shoot, and not to act like spearmen in the Middle Ages; that the first duty of artillery is so far as

is possible to be invisible these are two of the lessons which have been driven home so often during the

Lyttelton's Brigade, then, held Vaalkranz; and from three parts of the compass there came big shells and little

shells, with a constant shower of longrange rifle bullets. Behind them, and as useful as if it had been on

Woolwich Common, there was drawn up an imposing mass of men, two infantry divisions, and two brigades

of cavalry, all straining at the leash, prepared to shed their blood until the spruits ran red with it, if only they

could win their way to where their halfstarved comrades waited for them. But nothing happened. Hours

passed and nothing happened. An occasional shell from the big gun plumped among them. One, through

some freak of gunnery, lobbed slowly through a division, and the men whooped and threw their caps at it as it

passed. The guns on Swartz Kop, at a range of nearly five miles, tossed shells at the monster on Doornkloof,

and finally blew up his powder magazine amid the applause of the infantry. For the army it was a picnic and a

But it was otherwise with the men up on Vaalkranz. In spite of sangar and trench, that cross fire was finding

them out; and no feint or demonstration on either side came to draw the concentrated fire from their position.

Once there was a sudden alarm at the western end of the hill, and stooping bearded figures with slouch hats

and bandoliers were right up on the ridge before they could be stopped, so cleverly had their advance been

conducted. But a fiery rush of Durhams and Rifles cleared the crest again, and it was proved once more how

much stronger is the defence than the attack. Nightfall found the position unchanged, save that another

pontoon bridge had been constructed during the day. Over this Hildyard's Brigade marched to relieve

Lyttelton's, who came back for a rest under the cover of the Swartz Kop guns. Their losses in the two days

had been under two hundred and fifty, a trifle if any aim were to be gained, but excessive for a mere

That night Hildyard's men supplemented the defences made by Lyttelton, and tightened their hold upon the

hill. One futile night attack caused them for an instant to change the spade for the rifle. When in the morning

it was found that the Boers had, as they naturally would, brought up their outlying guns, the tired soldiers did

not regret their labours of the night. It was again demonstrated how innocuous a thing is a severe shell fire, if

the position be an extended one with chances of cover. A total of forty killed and wounded out of a strong

brigade was the result of a long day under an incessant cannonade. And then at nightfall came the conclusion

that the guns were too many, that the way was too hard, and down came all their high hopes with the order to

withdraw once more across that accursed river. Vaalkranz was abandoned, and Hildyard's Brigade, seething

THE heroic moment of the siege of Ladysmith was that which witnessed the repulse of the great attack. The

epic should have ended at that dramatic instant. But instead of doing so the story falls back to an anticlimax

of crowded hospitals, slaughtered horses, and sporadic shell fire. For another six weeks of inactivity the brave

garrison endured all the sordid evils which had steadily grown from inconvenience to misfortune and from

misfortune to misery. Away in the south they heard the thunder of Buller's guns, and from the hills round the

town they watched with pale faces and bated breath the tragedy of Spion Kop, preserving a firm conviction

that a very little more would have transformed it into their salvation. Their hearts sank with the sinking of the

cannonade, and rose again with the roar of Vaalkranz. But Vaalkranz also failed them, and they waited on in

It has been already narrated how General Buller had made his three attempts for the relief of the city. The

General who was inclined to despair was now stimulated by despatches from Lord Roberts, while his army,

who were by no means inclined to despair, were immensely cheered by the good news from the Kimberley

side. Both General and army prepared for a last supreme effort. This time, at least, the soldiers hoped that

they would be permitted to burst their way to the help of their starving comrades or leave their bones among

the hills which had faced them so long. All they asked was a fight to a finish, and now they were about to

General Buller had tried the Boers' centre, he had tried their extreme right, and now he was about to try their

extreme left. There were some obvious advantages on this side which make it surprising that it was not the

first to be attempted. In the first place, the enemy's main position upon that flank was at Hlangwane

mountain, which is to the south of the Tugela, so that in case of defeat the river ran behind them. In the

second, Hlangwane mountain was the one point from which the Boer position at Colenso could be certainly

enfiladed, and therefore the fruits of victory would be greater on that flank than on the other. Finally, the

operations could be conducted at no great distance from the railhead, and the force would be exposed to little

danger of having its flank attacked or its communications cut, as was the case in the Spion Kop advance.

Against these potent considerations there is only to be put the single fact that the turning of the Boer right

would threaten the Freestaters' line of retreat. On the whole, the balance of advantage lay entirely with the

new attempt, and the whole army advanced to it with a premonition of success. Of all the examples which the

war has given of the enduring qualities of the British troops there is none more striking than the absolute

confidence and whole hearted delight with which, after three bloody repulses, they set forth upon another

On February 9th the movements were started which transferred the greater part of the force from the extreme

left to the centre and right. By the 11th Lyttelton's (formerly Clery's) second division and Warren's fifth

division had come eastward, leaving Burn Murdoch's cavalry brigade to guard the Westem side. On the 12th

Lord Dundonald, with all the colonial cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and a battery, made a strong

reconnaissance towards Hussar Hill, which is the nearest of the several hills which would have to be occupied

in order to turn the position. The hill was taken, but was abandoned again by General Buller after he had used

it for some hours as an observatory. A longrange action between the retiring cavalry and the Boers ended in

What Buller had seen during the hour or two which he had spent with his telescope upon Hussar Hill had

evidently confirmed him in his views, for two days later (February 14th) the whole army set forth for this

point. By the morning of the 15th twenty thousand men were concentrated upon the sides and spurs of this

eminence. On the 16th the heavy guns were in position, and all was ready for the advance.

Facing them now were the formidable Boer lines of Hlangwane Hill and Green Hill, which would certainly

cost several thousands of men if they were to take them by direct storm. Beyond them, upon the Boer flank,

were the hills of Monte Christo and Cingolo, which appeared to be the extreme outside of the Boer position.

The plan was to engage the attention of the trenches in front by a terrific artillery fire and the threat of an

assault, while at the same time sending the true flank attack far round to carry the Cingolo ridge, which must

On the 17th, in the early morning, with the first tinge of violet in the east, the irregular cavalry and the second

division (Lyttelton's) with Wynne's Brigade started upon their widely curving flanking march. The country

through which they passed was so broken that the troopers led their horses in single file, and would have

found themselves helpless in face of any resistance. Fortunately, Cingolo Hill was very weakly held, and by

evening both our horsemen and our infantry had a firm grip upon it, thus turning the extreme left flank of the

Boer position. For once their mountainous fortresses were against them, for a mounted Boer force is so

mobile that in an open position, such as faced Methuen, it is very hard and requires great celerity of

movement ever to find a flank at all. On a succession of hills, however, it was evident that some one hill must

mark the extreme end of their line, and Buller had found it at Cingolo. Their answer to this movement was to

Even now, however, the Boer leaders had apparently not realised that this was the main attack, or it is

possible that the intervention of the river made it difficult for them to send reinforcements. However that may

be, it is certain that the task which the British found awaiting them on the 18th proved to be far easier than

they had dared to hope. The honours of the day rested with Hildyard's English Brigade (East Surrey, West

Surrey, West Yorkshires, and 2nd Devons). In open order and with a rapid advance, taking every advantage

of the cover which was better than is usual in South African warfare they gained the edge of the Monte

Christo ridge, and then swiftly cleared the crest. One at least of the regiments engaged, the Devons, was

nerved by the thought that their own first battalion was waiting for them at Ladysmith. The capture of the hill

made the line of trenches which faced Buller untenable, and he was at once able to advance with Barton's

Fusilier Brigade and to take possession of the whole Boer position of Hlangwane and Green Hill. It was not a

great tactical victory, for they had no trophies to show save the worthless DEBRIS of the Boer camps. But it

was a very great strategical victory, for it not only gave them the whole south side of the Tugela, but also the

means of commanding with their guns a great deal of the north side, including those Colenso trenches which

had blocked the way so long. A hundred and seventy killed and wounded (of whom only fourteen were

killed) was a trivial price for such a result. At last from the captured ridges the exultant troops could see far

away the haze which lay over the roofs of Ladysmith, and the besieged, with hearts beating high with hope,

turned their glasses upon the distant mottled patches which told them that their comrades were approaching.

By February 20th the British had firmly established themselves along the whole south bank of the river,

Hart's brigade bad occupied Colenso, and the heavy guns had been pushed up to more advanced positions.

The crossing of the river was the next operation, and the question arose where it should be crossed. The

wisdom which comes with experience shows us now that it would have been infinitely better to have crossed

on their extreme left flank, as by an advance upon this line we should have turned their strong Pieters position

just as we had already turned their Colenso one. With an absolutely master card in our hand we refused to

play it, and won the game by a more tedious and perilous process. The assumption seems to have been made

(on no other hypothesis can one understand the facts) that the enemy were demoralised and that the positions

would not be strongly held. Our flanking advantage was abandoned and a direct advance was ordered from

On February 21st Buller threw his pontoon bridge over the river near Colenso, and the same evening his army

began to cross. It was at once evident that the Boer resistance had by no means collapsed. Wynne's

Lancashire Brigade were the first across, and found themselves hotly engaged before nightfall. The low

kopjes in front of them were blazing with musketry fire. The brigade held its own, but lost the Brigadier (the

second in a month) and 150 rank and file. Next morning the main body of the infantry was passed across, and

the army was absolutely committed to the formidable and unnecessary enterprise of fighting its way straight

The force in front had weakened, however, both in numbers and in morale. Some thousands of the Freestaters

had left in order to defend their own country from the advance of Roberts, while the rest were depressed by as

much of the news as was allowed by their leaders to reach them. But the Boer is a tenacious fighter, and

many a brave man was still to fall before Buller and White should shake hands in the High Street of

The first obstacle which faced the army, after crossing the river, was a belt of low rolling ground, which was

gradually cleared by the advance of our infantry. As night closed in the advance lines of Boers and British

were so close to each other that incessant rifle fire was maintamed until morning, and at more than one point

small bodies of desperate riflemen charged right up to the bayonets of our infantry. The morning found us

still holding our positions all along the line, and as more and more of our infantry came up and gun after gun

roared into action we began to push our stubborn enemy northwards. On the 21st the Dorsets, Middlesex, and

Somersets had borne the heat of the day. On the 22nd it was the Royal Lancasters, followed by the South

Lancashires, who took up the running. It would take the patience and also the space of a Kinglake in this

scrambling broken fight to trace the doings of those groups of men who strove and struggled through the rifle

fire. All day a steady advance was maintained over the low kopjes, until by evening we were faced by the

more serious line of the Pieter's Hills. The operations had been carried out with a monotony of gallantry.

Always the same extended advance, always the same rattle of Mausers and clatter of pompoms from a

ridge, always the same victorious soldiers on the barren crest, with a few crippled Boers before them and

many crippled comrades behind. They were expensive triumphs, and yet every one brought them nearer to

their goal. And now, like an advancing tide, they lapped along the base of Pieter's Hill. Could they gather

volume enough to carry themselves over? The issue of the longdrawn battle and the fate of Ladysmith hung

Brigadier Fitzroy Hart, to whom the assault was entrusted, is in some ways as singular and picturesque a type

as has been evolved in the war. A dandy soldier, always the picture of neatness from the top of his helmet to

the heels of his wellpolished brown boots, he brings to military matters the same precision which he affects

in dress. Pedantic in his accuracy, he actually at the battle of Colenso drilled the Irish Brigade for half an hour

before leading them into action, and threw out markers under a deadly fire in order that his change from close

to extended formation might be academically correct. The heavy loss of the Brigade at this action was to

some extent ascribed to him and affected his popularity; but as his men came to know him better, his

romantic bravery, his whimsical soldierly humour, their dislike changed into admiration. His personal

disregard for danger was notorious and reprehensible. 'Where is General Hart?' asked some one in action. 'I

have not seen him, but I know where you will find him. Go ahead of the skirmish line and you will see him

standing on a rock,' was the answer. He bore a charmed life. It was a danger to be near him. 'Whom are you

going to?' 'General Hart,' said the aidedecamp. 'Then goodbye!' cried his fellows. A grim humour ran

through his nature. It is gravely recorded and widely believed that he lined up a regiment on a hilltop in

order to teach them not to shrink from fire. Amid the laughter of his Irishmen, he walked through the open

files of his firing line holding a laggard by the ear. This was the man who had put such a spirit into the Irish

Brigade that amid that army of valiant men there were none who held such a record. 'Their rushes were the

quickest, their rushes were the longest, and they stayed the shortest time under cover,' said a shrewd military

observer. To Hart and his brigade was given the task of clearing the way to Ladysmith.

The regiments which he took with him on his perilous enterprise were the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 2nd

Dublin Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught Rangers, and the Imperial Light Infantry, the whole forming the famous

5th Brigade. They were already in the extreme British advance, and now, as they moved forwards, the

Durham Light Infantry and the 1st Rifle Brigade from Lyttelton's Brigade came up to take their place. The

hill to be taken lay on the right, and the soldiers were compelled to pass in single file under a heavy fire for

more than a mile until they reached the spot which seemed best for their enterprise. There, short already of

sixty of their comrades, they assembled and began a cautious advance upon the lines of trenches and sangars

For a time they were able to keep some cover, and the casualties were comparatively few. But now at last, as

the evening sun threw a long shadow from the hills, the leading regiment, the Inniskillings, found themselves

at the utmost fringe of boulders with a clear slope between them and the main trench of the enemy. Up there

where the shrapnel was spurting and the great lyddite shells crashing they could dimly see a line of bearded

faces and the black dots of the slouch hats. With a yell the Inniskillings sprang out, carried with a rush the

first trench, and charged desperately onwards for the second one. It was a supremely dashing attack against a

supremely steady resistance, for among all their gallant deeds the Boers have never fought better than on that

February evening. Amid such a smashing shell fire as living mortals have never yet endured they stood

doggedly, these hardy men of the veldt, and fired fast and true into the fiery ranks of the Irishmen. The yell of

the stormers was answered by the remorseless roar of the Mausers and the deepchested shouts of the

farmers. Up and up surged the infantry, falling, rising, dashing bullheaded at the crackling line of the trench.

But still the bearded faces glared at them over the edge, and still the sheet of lead pelted through their ranks.

The regiment staggered, came on, staggered again, was overtaken by supporting companies of the Dublins

and the Connaughts, came on, staggered once more, and finally dissolved into shreds, who ran swiftly back

for cover, threading their way among their stricken comrades. Never on this earth was there a retreat of which

the survivors had less reason to be ashamed. They had held on to the utmost capacity of human endurance.

Their Colonel, ten officers, and more than half the regiment were lying on the fatal hill. Honour to them, and

honour also to the gallant Dutchmen who, rooted in the trenches, had faced the rush and fury of such an

onslaught! Today to them, tomorrow to us but it is for a soldier to thank the God of battles for worthy

It is one thing, however, to repulse the British soldier and it is another to rout him. Within a few hundred

yards of their horrible ordeal at Magersfontein the Highlanders reformed into a military body. So now the

Irishmen fell back no further than the nearest cover, and there held grimly on to the ground which they had

won. If you would know the advantage which the defence has over the attack, then do you come and assault

this line of tenacious men, now in your hour of victory and exultation, friend Boer! Friend Boer did attempt

it, and skilfully too, moving a flanking party to sweep the position with their fire. But the brigade, though

sorely hurt, held them off without difficulty, and was found on the morning of the 24th to be still lying upon

Our losses had been very heavy, Colonel Thackeray of the Inniskillings, Colonel Sitwell of the Dublins, three

majors, twenty officers, and a total of about six hundred out of 1,200 actually engaged. To take such

punishment and to remain undemoralised is the supreme test to which troops can be put. Could the loss have

been avoided? By following the original line of advance from Monte Christo, perhaps, when we should have

turned the enemy's left. But otherwise no. The hill was in the way and had to be taken. In the war game you

cannot play without a stake. You lose and you pay forfeit, and where the game is fair the best player is he

who pays with the best grace. The attack was well prepared, well delivered, and only miscarried on account

of the excellence of the defence. We proved once more what we had proved so often before, that all valour

and all discipline will not avail in a frontal attack against brave coolheaded men armed with quickfiring

While the Irish Brigade assaulted Railway Hill an attack had been made upon the left, which was probably

meant as a demonstration to keep the Boers from reinforcing their comrades rather than as an actual attempt

upon their lines. Such as it was, however, it cost the life of at least one brave soldier, for Colonel Thorold, of

the Welsh Fusiliers, was among the fallen. Thorold, Thackeray, and Sitwell in one evening. Who can say that

The army was now at a deadlock. Railway Hill barred the way, and if Hart's men could not carry it by assault

it was hard to say who could. The 24th found the two armies facing each other at this critical point, the

Irishmen still clinging to the slopes of the hill and the Boers lining the top. Fierce rifle firing broke out

between them during the day, but each side was well covered and lay low. The troops in support suffered

somewhat, however, from a random shell fire. Mr. Winston Churchill has left it upon record that within his

own observation three of their shrapnel shells fired at a venture on to the reverse slope of a hill accounted for

nineteen men and four horses. The enemy can never have known how hard those three shells had hit us, and

so we may also believe that our artillery fire has often been less futile than it appeared.

General Buller had now realised that it was no mere rearguard action which the Boers were fighting, but that

their army was standing doggedly at bay; so he reverted to that flanking movement which, as events showed,

should never have been abandoned. Hart's Irish Brigade was at present almost the right of the army. His new

plan a masterly one was to keep Hart pinning the Boers at that point, and to move his centre and left

across the river, and then back to envelope the left wing of the enemy. By this manoeuvre Hart became the

extreme left instead of the extreme right, and the Irish Brigade would be the hinge upon which the whole

army should turn. It was a large conception, finely carried out. The 24th was a day of futile shell fire and

of plans for the future. The heavy guns were got across once more to the Monte Christo ridge and to

Hlangwane, and preparations made to throw the army from the west to the east. The enemy still snarled and

occasionally snapped in front of Hart's men, but with four companies of the 2nd Rifle Brigade to protect their

In the meantime, through a CONTRETEMPS between our outposts and the Boers, no leave had been given to

us to withdraw our wounded, and the unfortunate fellows, some hundreds of them, had lain between the lines

in agonies of thirst for thirtysix hours one of the most painful incidents of the campaign. Now, upon the

25th, an armistice was proclaimed, and the crying needs of the survivors were attended to. On the same day

the hearts of our soldiers sank within them as they saw the stream of our wagons and guns crossing the river

once more. What, were they foiled again? Was the blood of these brave men to be shed in vain? They ground

their teeth at the thought. The higher strategy was not for them, but back was back and forward was forward,

The 26th was occupied by the large movements of troops which so complete a reversal of tactics necessitated.

Under the screen of a heavy artillery fire, the British right became the left and the left the right. A second

pontoon bridge was thrown across near the old Boer bridge at Hlangwane, and over it was passed a large

force of infantry, Barton's Fusilier Brigade, Kitchener's (VICE Wynne's, VICE Woodgate's) Lancashire

Brigade, and two battalions of Norcott's (formerly Lyttelton's) Brigade. Coke's Brigade was left at Colenso to

prevent a counter attack upon our left flank and communications. In this way, while Hart with the Durhams

and the 1st Rifle Brigade held the Boers in front, the main body of the army was rapidly swung round on to

their left flank. By the morning of the 27th all were in place for the new attack.

Opposite the point where the troops bad been massed were three Boer hills; one, the nearest, may for

convenience sake be called Barton's Hill. As the army had formerly been situated the assault upon this hill

would have been a matter of extreme difficulty; but now, with the heavy guns restored to their commanding

position, from which they could sweep its sides and summits, it had recovered its initial advantage. In the

morning sunlight Barton's Fusiliers crossed the river, and advanced to the attack under a screaming canopy of

shells. Up they went and up, darting and crouching, until their gleaming bayonets sparkled upon the summit.

The masterful artillery had done its work, and the first long step taken in this last stage of the relief of

Ladysmith. The loss had been slight and the advantage enormous. After they had gained the summit the

Fusillers were stung and stung again by clouds of skirmishers who clung to the flanks of the hill, but their

Of the three Boer hills which had to be taken the nearest (or eastern one) was now in the hands of the British.

The furthest (or western one) was that on which the Irish Brigade was still crouching, ready at any moment

for a final spring which would take them over the few hundred yards which separated them from the trenches.

Between the two intervened a central hill, as yet untouched. Could we carry this the whole position would be

ours. Now for the final effort! Turn every gun upon it, the guns of Monte Christo, the guns of Hlangwane!

Turn every rifle upon it the rifles of Barton's men, the rifles of Hart's men, the carbines of the distant

cavalry! Scalp its crown with the machinegun fire! And now up with you, Lancashire men, Norcott's men!

The summit or a glorious death, for beyond that hill your suffering comrades are awaiting you! Put every

bullet and every man and all of fire and spirit that you are worth into this last hour; for if you fail now you

have failed for ever, and if you win, then when your hairs are white your blood will still run warm when you

think of that morning's work. The long drama had drawn to an end, and one short day's work is to show what

But there was never a doubt of it. Hardly for one instant did the advance waver at any point of its extended

line. It was the supreme instant of the Natal campaign, as, wave after wave, the long lines of infantry went

shimmering up the hill. On the left the Lancasters, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the South Lancashires, the York

and Lancasters, with a burr of north country oaths, went racing for the summit. Spion Kop and a thousand

comrades were calling for vengeance. 'Remember, men, the eyes of Lancashire are watching you,' cried the

gallant MacCarthy O'Leary. The old 40th swept on, but his dead body marked the way which they had taken.

On the right the East Surrey, the, Cameronians, the 3rd Rifles, the 1st Rifle Brigade, the Durhams, and the

gallant Irishmen, so sorely stricken and yet so eager, were all pressing upwards and onwards. The Boer fire

lulls, it ceases they are running! Wild hatwaving men upon the Hlangwane uplands see the silhouette of

the active figures of the stormers along the skyline and know that the position is theirs. Exultant soldiers

dance and cheer upon the ridge. The sun is setting in glory over the great Drakensberg mountains, and so also

that night set for ever the hopes of the Boer invaders of Natal. Out of doubt and chaos, blood and labour, had

come at last the judgment that the lower should not swallow the higher, that the world is for the man of the

twentieth and not of the seventeenth century. After a fortnight of fighting the weary troops threw themselves

down that night with the assurance that at last the door was ajar and the light breaking through. One more

Behind the line of hills which had been taken there extended a great plain as far as Bulwana that evil

neighbour who had wrought such harm upon Ladysmith. More than half of the Pieters position had fallen into

Buller's hands on the 27th, and the remainder had become untenable. The Boers had lost some five hundred

in killed, wounded, and prisoners.[Footnote: Accurate figures will probably never be obtained, but a

wellknown Boer in Pretoria informed me that Pieters was the most expensive fight to them of the whole

war.] It seemed to the British General and his men that one more action would bring them safely into

But here they miscalculated, and so often have we miscalculated on the optimistic side in this campaign that

it is pleasing to find for once that our hopes were less than the reality. The Boers had been beaten fairly

beaten and disheartened. It will always be a subject for conjecture whether they were so entirely on the

strength of the Natal campaign, or whether the news of the Cronje disaster from the western side had warned

them that they must draw in upon the east. For my own part I believe that the honour lies with the gallant

men of Natal, and that, moving on these lines, they would, Cronje or no Cronje, have forced their way in

And now the longdrawn story draws to a swift close. Cautiously feeling their way with a fringe of horse, the

British pushed over the great plain, delayed here and there by the crackle of musketry, but finding always that

the obstacle gave way and vanished as they approached it. At last it seemed clear to Dundonald that there

really was no barrier between his horsemen and the beleaguered city. With a squadron of Imperial Light

Horse and a squadron of Natal Carabineers he rode on until, in the gathering twilight, the Ladysmith picket

It is hard to say which had shown the greater endurance, the rescued or their rescuers. The town, indefensible,

lurking in a hollow under commanding hills, had held out for 118 days. They had endured two assaults and

an incessant bombardment, to which, towards the end, owing to the failure of heavy ammunition, they were

unable to make any adequate reply. It was calculated that 16,000 shells had fallen within the town. In two

successful sorties they had destroyed three of the enemy's heavy guns. They had been pressed by hunger,

horseflesh was already running short, and they had been decimated by disease. More than 2,000 cases of

enteric and dysentery had been in hospital at one time, and the total number of admissions had been nearly as

great as the total number of the garrison. Onetenth of the men had actually died of wounds or disease.

Ragged, bootless, and emaciated, there still lurked in the gaunt soldiers the martial spirit of warriors. On the

day after their relief 2,000 of them set forth to pursue the Boers. One who helped to lead them has left it on

record that the most piteous sight that he has ever seen was these wasted men, stooping under their rifles and

gasping with the pressure of their accoutrements, as they staggered after their retreating enemy. A

Verestschagen might find a subject these 2,000 indomitable men with their emaciated horses pursuing a

If the record of the besieged force was great, that of the relieving army was no less so. Through the blackest

depths of despondency and failure they had struggled to absolute success. At Colenso they had lost 1,200

men, at Spion Kop 1,700, at Vaalkranz 400, and now, in this last longdrawn effort, 1,600 more. Their total

losses were over 5,000 men, more than 20 per cent. of the whole army. Some particular regiments had

suffered horribly. The Dublin and Inniskilling Fusiliers headed the roll of honour with only five officers and

40 per cent. of the men left standing. Next to them the Lancashire Fusiliers and the Royal Lancasters had

been the hardest hit. It speaks well for Buller's power of winning and holding the confidence of his men that

in the face of repulse after repulse the soldiers still went into battle as steadily as ever under his command.

On March 3rd Buller's force entered Ladysmith in state between the lines of the defenders. For their heroism

the Dublin Fusiliers were put in the van of the procession, and it is told how, as the soldiers who lined the

streets saw the five officers and small clump of men, the remains of what had been a strong battalion,

realising, for the first time perhaps, what their relief had cost, many sobbed like children. With cheer after

cheer the stream of brave men flowed for hours between banks formed by men as brave. But for the purposes

of war the garrison was useless. A month of rest and food would be necessary before they could be ready to

So the riddle of the Tugela had at last been solved. Even now, with all the light which has been shed upon the

matter, it is hard to apportion praise and blame. To the cheerful optimism of Symons must be laid some of the

blame of the original entanglement; but man is mortal, and he laid down his life for his mistake. White, who

had been but a week in the country, could not, if he would, alter the main facts of the military situation. He

did his best, committed one or two errors, did brilliantly on one or two points, and finally conducted the

defence with a tenacity and a gallantry which are above all praise. It did not, fortunately, develop into an

absolutely desperate affair, like Mass na's defence of Genoa, but a few more weeks would have made it a

military tragedy. He was fortunate in the troops whom he commanded half of them old soldiers from India

[Footnote: An officer in high command in Ladysmith has told me, as an illustration of the nerve and

discipline of the troops, that though false alarms in the Boer trenches were matters of continual occurrence

from the beginning to the end of the siege, there was not one single occasion when the British outposts made

a mistake.] and exceedingly fortunate in his officers, French (in the operations before the siege),

Archibald Hunter, Ian Hamilton, Hedworth Lambton, DickCunyngham, Knox, De Courcy Hamilton, and all

the other good men and true who stood (as long as they could stand) by his side. Above all, he was fortunate

in his commissariat officers, and it was in the offices of Colonels Ward and Stoneman as much as in the

Buller, like White, had to take the situation as he found it. It is well known that his own belief was that the

line of the Tugela was the true defence of Natal. When he reached Africa, Ladysmith was already

beleaguered, and he, with his troops, had to abandon the scheme of direct invasion and to hurry to extricate

White's division. Whether they might not have been more rapidly extricated by keeping to the original plan is

a question which will long furnish an excellent subject for military debate. Had Buller in November known

that Ladysmith was capable of holding out until March, is it conceivable that he, with his whole army corps

and as many more troops as he cared to summon from England, would not have made such an advance in

four months through the Free State as would necessitate the abandonment of the sieges both of Kimberley

and of Ladysmith? If the Boers persisted in these sieges they could not possibly place more than 20,000 men

on the Orange River to face 60,000 whom Buller could have had there by the first week in December.

Methuen's force, French's force, Gatacre's force, and the Natal force, with the exception of garrisons for

Pietermaritzburg and Durban, would have assembled, with a reserve of another sixty thousand men in the

colony or on the sea ready to fill the gaps in his advance. Moving over a flat country with plenty of flanking

room, it is probable that he would have been in Bloemfontein by Christmas and at the Vaal River late in

January. What could the Boers do then? They might remain before Ladysmith, and learn that their capital and

their gold mines had been taken in their absence. Or they might abandon the siege and trek back to defend

their own homes. This, as it appears to a civilian critic, would have been the least expensive means of

fighting them; but after all the strain had to come somewhere, and the long struggle of Ladysmith may have

meant a more certain and complete collapse in the future. At least, by the plan actually adopted we saved

Having taken his line, Buller set about his task in a slow, deliberate, but pertinacious fashion. It cannot be

denied, however, that the pertinacity was largely due to the stiffening counsel of Roberts and the soldierly

firmness of White who refused to acquiesce in the suggestion of surrender. Let it be acknowledged that

Buller's was the hardest problem of the war, and that he solved it. The mere acknowledgment goes far to

soften criticism. But the singular thing is that in his proceedings he showed qualities which had not been

generally attributed to him, and was wanting in those very points which the public had imagined to be

charactenstic of him. He had gone out with the reputation of a downright John Bull fighter, who would take

punishment or give it, but slog his way through without wincing. There was no reason for attributing any

particular strategical ability to him. But as a matter of fact, setting the Colenso attempt aside, the crossing for

the Spion Kop enterprise, the withdrawal of the compromised army, the Vaalkranz crossing with the clever

feint upon Brakfontein, the final operations, and especially the complete change of front after the third day of

Pieters, were strategical movements largely conceived and admirably carried out. On the other hand, a

hesitation in pushing onwards, and a disinclination to take a risk or to endure heavy punishment, even in the

case of temporary failure, were consistent characteristics of his generalship. The Vaalkranz operations are

particularly difficult to defend from the charge of having been needlessly slow and halfhearted. This

'saturnine fighter,' as he had been called, proved to be exceedingly sensitive about the lives of his men an

admirable quality in itself, but there are occasions when to spare them today is to needlessly imperil them

tomorrow. The victory was his, and yet in the very moment of it he displayed the qualities which marred him.

With two cavalry brigades in band he did not push the pursuit of the routed Boers with their guns and endless

streams of wagons. It is true that he might have lost heavily, but it is true also that a success might have

ended the Boer invasion of Natal, and the lives of our troopers would be well spent in such a venture. If

cavalry is not to be used in pursuing a retiring enemy encumbered with much baggage, then its day is indeed

The relief of Ladysmith stirred the people of the Empire as nothing, save perhaps the subsequent relief of

Mafeking, has done during our generation. Even sober unemotional London found its soul for once and

fluttered with joy. Men, women, and children, rich and poor, clubman and cabman, joined in the universal

delight. The thought of our garrison, of their privations, of our impotence to relieve them, of the impending

humiliation to them and to us, had lain dark for many months across our spirits. It had weighed upon us, until

the subject, though ever present in our thoughts, was too painful for general talk. And now, in an instant, the

shadow was lifted. The outburst of rejoicing was.not a triumph over the gallant Boers. But it was our own

escape from humiliation, the knowledge that the blood of our sons had not been shed in vain, above all the

conviction that the darkest hour had now passed and that the light of peace was dimly breaking far away

that was why London rang with joy bells that March morning, and why those bells echoed back from every

town and hamlet, in tropical sun and in Arctic snow, over which the flag of Britain waved.

It has already been narrated how, upon the arrival of the army corps from England, the greater part was

drafted to Natal, while some went to the western side, and started under Lord Methuen upon the perilous

enterprise of the relief of Kimberley. It has also been hown how, after three expensive victories, Lord

Methuen's force met with a paralysing reverse, and was compelled to remain inactive within twenty miles of

the town which they had come to succour. Before describe how that succour did eventual]y arrive, some

'I am directed to assure you that there is no reason for apprehending that Kimberley or any part of the colony

either is, or in any contemplated event will be, in danger of attack. Mr. Schreiner is of opinion that your fears

are groundless and your anticipations in the matter entirely without foundation.' Such is the official reply to

the remonstrance of the inhabitants, when, with the shadow of war dark upon them, they appealed for help. It

is fortunate, however, that a progressive British town has usually the capacity for doing things for itself

without the intervention of officials. Kimberley was particularly lucky in being the centre of the wealthy and

alert De Beers Company, which had laid in sufficient ammunition and supplies to prevent the town from

being helpless in the presence of the enemy. But the cannon were popguns, firing a 7pound shell for a short

range, and the garrison contained only seven hundred regulars, while the remainder were mostly untrained

miners and artisans. Among them, however, there was a sprinkling of dangerous men from the northern wars,

and all were nerved by a knowledge that the ground which they defended was essential to the Empire.

Ladysmith was no more than any other strategic position, but Kimberley was unique, the centre of the richest

tract of ground for its size in the whole world. Its loss would have been a heavy blow to the British cause, and

On October 12th, several hours after the expiration of Kruger's ultimatum, Cecil Rhodes threw himself into

Kimberley. This remarkable man, who stood for the future of South Africa as clearly as the Dopper Boer

stood for its past, had, both in features and in character, some traits which may, without extravagance, be

called Napoleonic. The restless energy, the fertility of resource, the attention to detail, the wide sweep of

mind, the power of terse comment all these recall the great emperor. So did the simplicity of private life in

the midst of excessive wealth. And so finally did a want of scruple where an ambition was to be furthered,

shown, for example, in that enormous donation to the Irish party by which he made a bid for their

parliamentary support, and in the story of the Jameson raid. A certain cynicism of mind and a grim humour

complete the parallel. But Rhodes was a Napoleon of peace. The consolidation of South Africa under the

freest and most progressive form of government was the large object on which he had expended his energies

and his fortune but the development of the country in every conceivable respect, from the building of a

railway to the importation of a pedigree bull, engaged his unremitting attention.

It was on October 15th that the fifty thousand inhabitants of Kimberley first heard the voice of war. It rose

and fell in a succession of horrible screams and groans which travelled far over the veldt, and the outlying

farmers marvelled at the dreadful clamour from the sirens and the hooters of the great mines. Those who have

endured all the rifle, the cannon, and the hunger have said that those wild whoops from the sirens were

The Boers in scattered bands of horsemen were thick around the town, and had blocked the railroad. They

raided cattle upon the outskirts, but made no attempt to rush the defence. The garrison, who, civilian and

military, approached four thousand in number, lay close in rifle pit and redoubt waiting for an attack which

never came. The perimeter to be defended was about eight miles, but the heaps of tailings made admirable

fortifications, and the town had none of those inconvenient heights around it which had been such bad

neighbours to Ladysmith. Picturesque surroundings are not favourable to defence.

On October 24th the garrison, finding that no attack was made, determined upon a reconnaissance. The

mounted force, upon which most of the work and of the loss fell, consisted of the Diamond Fields Horse, a

small aumber of Cape Police, a company of Mounted Infantry, and a body called the Kimberley Light Horse.

With two hundred and seventy volunteers from this force Major ScottTurner, a redoubtable fighter, felt his

way the north until he came in touch with the Boers. The latter, who were much superior in numbers,

manoeuvred to cut him off, but the arrival of two companies of the North Lancashire Regiment turned the

scale in our favour. We lost three killed and twentyone wounded in the skirmish. The Boer loss is unknown,

On November 4th Commandant Wessels formally summoned the town, and it is asserted that he gave

Colonel Kekewich leave to send out the women and children. That officer has been blamed for not taking

advantage of the permission or at the least for not communicating it to the civil authorities. As a matter of

fact the charge rests upon a misapprehension. In Wessels' letter a distinction is made between Africander and

English women, the former being offered an asylum in his camp. This offer was made known, and half a

dozen persons took advantage of it. The suggestion, however, in the case of the English carried with it no

promise that they would be conveyed to Orange River, and a compliance with it would have put them as

helpless hostages into the hands of the enemy. As to not publishing the message it is not usual to publish such

official documents, but the offer was shown to Mr. Rhodes, who concurred in the impossibility of accepting

It is difficult to allude to this subject without touching upon the painful but notorious fact that there existed

during the siege considerable friction between the military authorities and a section of the civilians, of whom

Mr. Rhodes was chief. Among other characteristics Rhodes bore any form of restraint very badly, and chafed

mightily when unable to do a thing in the exact way which he considered best. He may have been a Napoleon

of peace, but his warmest friends could never describe him as a Napoleon of war, for his military forecasts

have been erroneous, and the management of the Jameson fiasco certainly inspired no confidence in the

judgment of any one concerned. That his intentions were of the best, and that he had the good of the Empire

at heart, may be freely granted; but that these motives should lead him to cabal against, and even to threaten,

the military governor, or that he should attempt to force Lord Roberts's hand in a military operation, was most

deplorable. Every credit may be given to him for all his aid to the military he gave with a good grace what

the garrison would otherwise have had to commandeer but it is a fact that the town would bave been more

united, and therefore stronger, without his presence. Colonel Kekewich and his chief staff officer, Major

On November 7th the bombardment of the town commenced from nine 9pounder guns to which the artillery

of the garrison could give no adequate reply. The result, however, of a fortnight's fire, during which seven

hundred shells were discharged, was the loss of two noncombatants. The question of food was recognised as

being of more importance than the enemy's fire. An early relief appeared probable, however, as the advance

of Methuen's force was already known. One pound of bread, two ounces of sugar, and half a pound of meat

were allowed per head. It was only on the small children that the scarcity of milk told with tragic effect. At

Ladysmith, at Mafeking, and at Kimberley hundreds of these innocents were sacrificed.

November 25th was a redletter day with the garrison, who made a sortie under the impression that Methuen

was not far off, and that they were assisting his operations. The attack was made upon one of the Boer

positions by a force consisting of a detachment of the Light Horse and of the Cape Police, and their work was

brilliantly successful. The actual storming of the redoubt was carried out by some forty men, of whom but

four were killed. They brought back thirtythree prisoners as a proof of their victory, but the Boer gun, as

usual, escaped us. In this brilliant affair ScottTurner was wounded, which did not prevent him, only three

days later, from leading another sortie, which was as disastrous as the first had been successful. Save under

very exceptional circumstances it is in modern warfare long odds always upon the defence, and the garrison

would probably have been better advised had they refrained from attacking the fortifications of their enemy

a truth which BadenPowell learned also at Game Tree Hill. As it was, after a temporary success the

British were blown back by the fierce Mauser fire, and lost the indomitable ScottTurner, with twentyone of

his brave companions killed and twentyeight wounded, all belongmg to the colonial corps. The Empire may

reflect with pride that the people in whose cause mainly they fought showed themselves by their gallantry and

Again the siege settled down to a monotonous record of decreasing rations and of expectation. On December

10 there came a sign of hope from the outside world. Far on the southern horizon a little golden speck

shimmered against the blue African sky. It was Methuen's balloon gleaming in the sunshine. Next morning

the low grumble of distant cannon was the sweetest of music to the listening citizens. But days passed

without further news, and it was not for more than a week that they learned of the bloody repulse of

Magersfontein, and that help was once more indefinitely postponed. Helio graphic communication had been

opened with the relieving army, and it is on record that the first message flashed through from the south was a

question about the number of a horse. With inconceivable stupidity this has been cited as an example of

military levity and incapacity. Of course the object of the question was a test as to whether they were really in

communication with the garrison. It must be confessed that the town seems to have contained some very

The New Year found the beleaguered city reduced to a quarter of a pound of meat per head, while the health

of the inhabitants began to break down under their confinement. Their interest, however, was keenly aroused

by the attempt made in the De Beers workshops to build a gun which might reach their opponents. This

remarkable piece of ordnance, constructed by an American named Labram by the help of tools manufactured

for the purpose and of books found in the town, took the shape eventually of a 28 lb. rifled gun, which proved

to be a most efficient piece of artillery. With grim humour, Mr. Rhodes's compliments had been inscribed

upon the shells a fair retort in view of the openly expressed threat of the enemy that in case of his capture

The Boers, though held off for a time by this unexpected piece of ordnance, prepared a terrible answer to it.

On February 7th an enormous gun, throwing a 96 lb. shell, opened from Kamfersdam, which is four miles

from the centre of the town. The shells, following the evil precedent of the Germans in 1870, were fired not at

the forts, but into the thickly populated city. Day and night these huge missiles exploded, shattering the

houses and occasionally killing or maiming the occupants. Some thousands of the women and children were

conveyed down the mines, wbere, in the electriclighted tunnels, they lay in comfort and safety. One

surprising revenge the Boers had, for by an extraordinary chance one of the few men killed by their gun was

the ingenious Labram who had constructed the 28pounder. By an even more singular chance, Leon, who

was responsible for bringing the big Boer gun, was struck immediately afterwards by a longrange rifleshot

The historian must be content to give a tame account of the siege of Kimberley, for the thing itself was tame.

Indeed 'siege' is a misnomer, for it was rather an investment or a blockade. Such as it was, however, the

inhabitants became very restless under it, and though there were never any prospects of surrender the utmost

impatience began to be manifested at the protracted delay on the part of the relief force. It was not till later

that it was understood how cunningly Kimberley had been used as a bait to hold the enemy until final

And at last the great day came. It is on record how dramatic was the meeting between the mounted outposts

of the defenders and the advance guard of the relievers, whose advent seems to have been equally unexpected

by friend and foe. A skirmish was in progress on February 15th between a party of the Kimberley Light

Horse and of the Boers, when a new body of horsemen, unrecognised by either side, appeared upon the plain

and opened fire upon the enemy. One of the strangers rode up to the patrol. 'What the dickens does K.L.H.

mean on your shoulderstrap?' he asked. 'It means Kimberley Light Horse. Who are you?' 'I am one of the

NewZealanders.' Macaulay in his wildest dream of the future of the muchquoted NewZealander never

pictured him as heading a rescue force for the relief of a British town in the heart of Africa.

The population had assembled to watch the mighty cloud of dust which rolled along the southeastern

horizon. What was it which swept westwards within its reddish heart? Hopeful and yet fearful they saw the

huge bank draw nearer and nearer. An assault from the whole of Cronje's army was the thought which passed

through many a mind. And then the dustcloud thinned, a mighty host of horsemen spurred out from it, and

in the extended farflung ranks the glint of spearheads and the gleam of scabbards told of the Hussars and

Lancers, while denser banks on either flank marked the position of the whirling guns. Wearied and spent with

a hundred miles' ride the dusty riders and the panting, dripping horses took fresh heart as they saw the broad

city before them, and swept with martial rattle and jingle towards the cheering crowds. Amid shouts and tears

To know how this bolt was prepared and how launched, the narrative must go back to the beginning of the

month. At that period Methuen and his men were still faced by Cronje and his entrenched forces, who, in

spite of occasional bombardments, held their position between Kimberley and the relieving army. French,

having handed over the operations at Colesberg to Clements, had gone down to Cape Town to confer with

Roberts and Kitchener. Thence they all three made their way to the Modder River, which was evidently about

to be the base of a more largely conceived series of operations than any which had yet been undertaken,

In order to draw the Boer attention away from the thunderbolt which was about to fall upon their left flank, a

strong demonstration ending in a brisk action was made early in February upon the extreme right of Cronje's

position. The force, consisting of the Highland Brigade, two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, No.7 Co. Royal

Engineers, and the 62nd Battery, was under the command of the famous Hector Macdonald. 'Fighting Mac' as

he was called by his men, had joined his regiment as a private, and had worked through the grades of

corporal, sergeant, captain, major, and colonel, until now, still in the prime of his manhood, he found himself

riding at the bead of a brigade. A bony, craggy Scotsman, with a square fighting head and a bulldog jaw, he

had conquered the exclusiveness and routine of the British service by the same dogged qualities which made

him formidable to Dervish and to Boer. With a cool brain, a steady nerve, and a proud heart, he is an ideal

leader of infantry, and those who saw him manoeuvre his brigade in the crisis of the battle of Omdurman

speak of it as the one great memory which they carried back from the engagement. On the field of battle he

turns to the speech of his childhood, the jagged, rasping, homely words which brace the nerves of the

northern soldier. This was the man who had come from India to take the place of poor Wauchope, and to put

The four regiments which composed the infantry of the force the Black Watch, the Argyll and

Sutherlands, the Seaforths, and the Highland Light Infantry left Lord Methuen's camp on Saturday,

February 3rd, and halted at Fraser's Drift, passing on next day to Koodoosberg. The day was very hot, and the

going very heavy, and many men fell out, some never to return. The drift (or ford) was found, however, to be

undefended, and was seized by Macdonald, who, after pitching camp on the south side of the river, sent out

strong parties across the drift to seize and entrench the Koodoosberg and some adjacent kopjes which, lying

some threequarters of a mile to the northwest of the drift formed the key of the position. A few Boer scouts

The effect of these messages was evident by Tuesday (February 6th), when the Boers were seen to be

assembling upon the north bank. By next morning they were there in considerable numbers, and began an

attack upon a crest held by the Seaforths. Macdonald threw two companies of the Black Watch and two of the

Highland Light Infantry into the fight. The Boers made excellent practice with a 7pounder mountain gun,

and their rifle fire, considering the good cover which our men had, was very deadly. Poor Tait, of the Black

Watch, good sportsman and gallant soldier, with one wound hardly healed upon his person, was hit again.

'They've got me this time,' were his dying words. Blair, of the Seaforths, had his carotid cut by a shrapnel

bullet, and lay for hours while the men of his company took turns to squeeze the artery. But our artillery

silenced the Boer gun, and our infantry easily held their riflemen. Babington with the cavalry brigade arrived

from the camp about 1.30, moving along the north bank of the river. In spite of the fact that men and horses

were weary from a tiring march, it was hoped by Macdonald's force that they would work round the Boers

and make an attempt to capture either them or their gun. But the horsemen seem not to have realised the

position of the parties, or that possibility of bringing off a considerable coup, so the action came to a tame

conclusion, the Boers retiring unpursued from their attack. On Thursday, February 8th, they were found to

have withdrawn, and on the same evening our own force was recalled, to the surprise and disappointment of

the public at home, who had not realised that in directing their attention to their right flank the column had

already produced the effect upon the enemy for which they had been sent. They could not be left there, as

they were needed for those great operations which were pending. It was on the 9th that the brigade returned;

on the 10th they were congratulated by Lord Roberts in person; and on the 11th those new dispositions were

made which were destined not only to relieve Kimberley, but to inflict a blow upon the Boer cause from

Small, brown, and wrinkled, with puckered eyes and alert manner, Lord Roberts in spite of his sixtyseven

years preserves the figure and energy of youth. The active openair life of India keeps men fit for the saddle

when in England they would only sit their club armchairs, and it is hard for any one who sees the wiry figure

and brisk step of Lord Roberts to realise that he has spent fortyone years of soldiering in what used to be

regarded as an unhealthy climate. He had carried into late life the habit of martial exercise, and a Russian

traveller has left it on record that the sight which surprised him most in India was to see the veteran

commander of the army ride forth with his spear and carry off the peg with the skill of a practised trooper. In

his early youth he had shown in the Mutiny that he possessed the fighting energy of the soldier to a

remarkable degree, but it was only in the Afghan War of 1880 that he had an opportunity of proving that he

had rarer and more valuable gifts, the power of swift resolution and determined execution. At the crisis of the

war he and his army disappeared entirely from the public ken only to emerge dramatically as victors at a

It is not only as a soldier, but as a man, that Lord Roberts possesses some remarkable characteristics. He has

in a supreme degree that magnetic quality which draws not merely the respect but the love of those who know

him. In Chaucer's phrase, he is a very perfect gentle knight. Soldiers and regimental officers have for him a

feeling of personal affection such as the unemotional British Army has never had for any leader in the course

of our history. His chivalrous courtesy, his unerring tact, his kindly nature, his unselfish and untiring devotion

to their interests have all endeared him to those rough loyal natures, who would follow him with as much

confidence and devotion as the GROGNARDS of the Guard had in the case of the Great Emperor. There

were some who feared that in Roberts's case, as in so many more, the donga and kopje of South Africa might

form the grave and headstone of a military reputation, but far from this being so he consistently showed a

wide sweep of strategy and a power of conceiving the effect of scattered movements over a great extent of

country which have surprised his warmest admirers. In the second week of February his dispositions were

ready, and there followed the swift series of blows which brought the Boers upon their knees. Of these we

shall only describe here the exploits of the fine force of cavalry which, after a ride of a hundred miles, broke

out of the heart of that reddish dustcloud and swept the Boer besiegers away from hardpressed Kimberley.

In order to strike unexpectedly, Lord Roberts had not only made a strong demonstration at Koodoosdrift, at

the other end of the Boer line, but he had withdrawn his main force some forty miles south, taking them down

by rail to Belmont and Enslin with such secrecy that even commanding officers had no idea whither the

troops were going. The cavalry which had come from French's command at Colesberg had already reached

the rendezvous, travelling by road to Naauwpoort, and thence by train. This force consisted of the

Carabineers, New South Wales Lancers, Inniskillings, composite regiment of Household Cavalry, 10th

Hussars, with some mounted infantry and two batteries of Horse Artillery, making a force of nearly three

thousand sabres. To this were added the 9th and 12th Lancers from Modder River, the 16th Lancers from

India, the Scots Greys, which had been patrolling Orange River from the beginning of the war, Rimington's

Scouts, and two brigades of mounted infantry under Colonels Ridley and Hannay. The force under this latter

officer had a severe skirmish on its way to the rendezvous and lost fifty or sixty in killed, wounded, and

missing. Five other batteries of Horse Artillery were added to the force, making seven in all, with a pontoon

section of Royal Engineers. The total number of men was about five thousand. By the night of Sunday,

February 11th, this formidable force had concentrated at Ramdam, twenty miles northeast of Belmont, and

was ready to advance. At two in the morning of Monday, February 12th, the start was made, and the long

sinuous line of nightriders moved off over the shadowy veldt, the beat of twenty thousand hoofs, the clank

of steel, and the rumble of gunwheels and tumbrils swelling into a deep low roar like the surge upon the

Two rivers, the Riet and the Modder, intervened between French and Kimberley. By daylight on the 12th the

head of his force had reached Waterval Drift, which was found to be defended by a body of Boers with a gun.

Leaving a small detachment to hold them, French passed his men over Dekiel's Drift, higher up the stream,

and swept the enemy out of his position. This considerable force of Boers had come from Jacobsdal, and

were just too late to get into position to resist the crossing. Had we been ten minutes later, the matter would

have been much more serious. At the cost of a very small loss he held both sides of the ford, but it was not

until midniglit that the whole long column was brought across, and bivouacked upon the northern bank. In

the morning the strength of the force was enormously increased by the arrival of one more horseman. It was

Roberts himself, who had ridden over to give the men a sendoff, and the sight of his wiry erect figure and

But the march of this second day (February 13th) was a military operation of some difficulty. Thirty long

waterless miles had to be done before they could reach the Modder, and it was possible that even then they

might have to fight an action before winning the drift. The weather was very hot, and through the long day

the sun beat down from an unclouded sky, while the soldiers were only shaded by the dustbank in which

they rode. A broad arid plain, swelling into stony hills, surrounded them on every side. Here and there in the

extreme distance, mounted figures moved over the vast expanse Boer scouts who marked in amazement

the advance of this great array. Once or twice these men gathered together, and a sputter of rifle fire broke out

upon our left flank, but the great tide swept on and carried them with it. Often in this desolate land the herds

of mottled springbok and of grey rekbok could be seen sweeping over the plain, or stopping with that

So all day they rode, hussars, dragoons, and lancers, over the withered veldt, until men and horses drooped

with the heat and the exertion. A front of nearly two miles was kept, the regiments moving two abreast in

open order; and the sight of this magnificent cloud of horsemen sweeping over the great barren plain was a

glorious one. The veldt had caught fire upon the right, and a black cloud of smoke with a lurid heart to it

covered the flank. The beat of the sun from above and the swelter of dust from below were overpowering.

Gun horses fell in the traces and died of pure exhaustion. The men, parched and silent, but cheerful, strained

their eyes to pierce the continual mirage which played over the horizon, and to catch the first glimpse of the

Modder. At last, as the sun began to slope down to the west, a thin line of green was discerned, the bushes

which skirt the banks of that illfavoured stream. With renewed heart the cavalry pushed on and made for the

drift, while Major Rimington, to whom the onerous duty of guiding the force had been entrusted, gave a sigh

of relief as he saw that he had indeed struck the very point at which he had aimed.

The essential thing in the movements had been speed to reach each point before the enemy could

concentrate to oppose them. Upon this it depended whether they would find five hundred or five thousand

waiting on the further bank. It must have been with anxious eyes that French watched his first regiment ride

down to Klip Drift. If the Boers should have had notice of his coming and have transferred some of their

40pounders, he might lose heavily before he forced the stream. But this time, at last, he had completely

outmanoeuvred them. He came with the news of his coming, and Broadwood with the 12th Lancers rushed

the drift. The small Boer force saved itself by flight, and the camp, the wagons, and the supplies remained

with the victors. On the night of the 13th he had secured the passage of the Modder, and up to the early

morning the horses and the guns were splashing through its coffeecoloured waters.

French's force had now come level to the main position of the Boers, but had struck it upon the extreme left

wing. The extreme right wing, thanks to the Koodoosdrift demonstration, was fifty miles off, and this line

was naturally very thinly held, save only at the central position of Magersfontein. Cronje. could not denude

this central position, for he saw Methuen still waiting in front of him, and in any case Klip Drift is

twentyfive miles from Magersfontein. But the Boer left wing, though scattered, gathered into some sort of

cohesion on Wednesday (February 14th), and made an effort to check the victorious progress of the cavalry.

It was necessary on this day to rest at Klip Drift, until KellyKenny should come up with the infantry to hold

what had been gained. All day the small bodies of Boers came riding in and taking up positions between the

Next morning the advance was resumed, the column being still forty miles from Kimberley with the enemy in

unknown force between. Some four miles out French came upon their position, two hills with a long low nek

between, from which came a brisk rifle fire supported by artillery. But French was not only not to be stopped,

but could not even be retarded. Disregarding the Boer fire completely the cavalry swept in wave after wave

over the low nek, and so round the base of the hills. The Boer riflemen upon the kopjes must have seen a

magnificent military spectacle as regiment after regiment, the 9th Lancers leading, all in very open order,

swept across the plain at a gallop, and so passed over the nek. A few score horses and half as many men were

left behind them, but forty or fifty Boers were cut down in the pursuit. It appears to have been one of the very

few occasions during the campaign when that obsolete and absurd weapon the sword was anything but a dead

And now the force had a straight run in before it, for it had outpaced any further force of Boers which may

have been advancing from the direction of Magersfontein. The horses, which had come a hundred miles in

four days with insufficient food and water, were so done that it was no uncommon sight to see the trooper not

only walking to ease his horse, but carrying part of his monstrous weight of saddle gear. But in spite of

fatigue the force pressed on until in the afternoon a distant view was seen, across the reddish plain, of the

brick houses and corrugated roofs of Kimberley. The Boer besiegers cleared off in front of it, and that night

(February 15th) the relieving column camped on the plain two miles away, while French and his staff rode in

The war was a cruel one for the cavalry, who were handicapped throughout by the nature of the country and

by the tactics of the enemy. They are certainly the branch of the service which had least opportunity for

distinction. The work of scouting and patrolling is the most dangerous which a soldier can undertake, and yet

from its very nature it can find no chronicler. The war correspondent, like Providence, is always with the big

battalions, and there never was a campaign in which there was more unrecorded heroism, the heroism of the

picket and of the vedette which finds its way into no newspaper paragraph. But in the larger operations of the

war it is difficult to say that cavalry, as cavalry, have justified their existence. In the opinion of many the

tendency of the future will be to convert the whole force into mounted infantry. How little is required to turn

our troopers into excellent foot soldiers was shown at Magersfontein, where the 12th Lancers, dismounted by

the command of their colonel, Lord Airlie, held back the threatened flank attack all the morning. A little

training in taking cover, leggings instead of boots, and a rifle instead of a carbine would give us a formidable

force of twenty thousand men who could do all that our cavalry does, and a great deal more besides. It is

undoubtedly possible on many occasions in this war, at Colesberg, at Diamond Hill, to say 'Here our cavalry

did well.' They are brave men on good horses, and they may be expected to do well. But the champion of the

cavalry cause must point out the occasions where the cavalry did something which could not have been done

by the same number of equally brave and equally wellmounted infantry. Only then will the existence of the

cavalry be justified. The lesson both of the South African and of the American civil war is that the light

A few more words as a sequel to this short sketch of the siege and relief of Kimberley. Considerable surprise

has been expressed that the great gun at Kamfersdam, a piece which must have weighed many tons and could

not have been moved by bullock teams at a rate of more than two or three miles an hour, should have eluded

our cavalry. It is indeed a surprising circumstance, and yet it was due to no inertia on the part of our leaders,

but rather to one of the finest examples of Boer tenacity in the whole course of the war. The instant that

Kekewich was sure of relief he mustered every available man and sent him out to endeavour to get the gun. It

had already been removed, and its retreat was covered by the strong position of Dronfield, which was held

both by riflemen and by light artillery. Finding himself unable to force it, Murray, the commander of the

detachment, remained in front of it. Next morning (Friday) at three o'clock the weary men and horses of two

of French's higades were afoot with the same object. But still the Boers were obstinately holding on to

Dronfield, and still their position was too strong to force, and too extended to get round with exhausted

horses. It was not until the night after that the Boers abandoned their excellent rearguard action, leaving one

light gun in the hands of the Cape Police, but having gained such a start for their heavy one that French, who

Lord Roberts's operations, prepared with admirable secrecy and carried out with extreme energy, aimed at

two different results, each of which he was fortunate enough to aftain. The first was that an overpowering

force of cavalry should ride round the Boer position and raise the siege of Kimberley: the fate of this

expedition has already been described. The second was that the infantry, following hard on the heels of the

cavalry, and holding all that they had gained, should establish itself upon Cronje's left flank and cut his

connection with Bloemfontein. It is this portion of the operations which has now to be described.

The infantry force which General Roberts had assembled was a very formidable one. The Guards he had left

under Methuen in front of the lines of Magersfontein to contain the Boer force. With them he had also left

those regiments which had fought in the 9th Brigade in all Methuen's actions. These, as will be remembered,

were the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd Northamptons, and one

wing of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. These stayed to hold Cronje in his position.

There remained tbree divisions of infantry, one of which, the ninth, was made up on the spot. These were

Sixth Division (KellyKenny) 12th Brigade (Knox) Oxford Light Infantry Gloucesters (2nd) West Riding

Buffs 18th Brigade (Stephenson) Essex Welsh Warwicks Yorks Seventh Division (Tucker) 14th Brigade

(Chermside) Scots Borderers Lincolns Hampshires Norfolks 15th Brigade (Wavell) North Staffords

Cheshires S. Wales Borderers East Lancashires Ninth Division (Colvile) Highland Brigade (Macdonald)

Black Watch Argyll and Sutherlands Seaforths Highland Light Infantry 19th Brigade (SmithDorrien)

With these were two brigade divisions of artillery under General Marshall, the first containing the 18th, 62nd,

and 75th batteries (Colonel Hall), the other the 76th, 81st, and 82nd (Colonel McDonnell). Besides these

there were a howitzer battery, a naval contingent of four 4.7 guns and four 12pounders under Captain

Bearcroft of the ' Philomel.' The force was soon increased by the transfer of the Guards and the arrival of

more artillery; but the numbers which started on Monday, February 12th, amounted roughly to twentyfive

thousand foot and eight thousand horse with 98 gunsa considerable army to handle in a foodless and almost

waterless country. Seven hundred wagons drawn by eleven thousand mules and oxen, all collected by the

genius for preparation and organisation which characterises Lord Kitchener, groaned and creaked behind the

Both arms had concentrated at Ramdam, the cavalry going down by road, and the infantry by rail as far as

Belmont or Enslin. On Monday, February 12th, the cavalry had started, and on Tuesday the infantry were

pressing hard after them. The first thing was to secure a position upon Cronje's flank, and for that purpose the

6th Division and the 9th (KellyKenny's and Colvils's) pushed swiftly on and arrived on Thursday, February

15th, at Klip Drift on the Modder, which had only been left by the cavalry that same morning. It was

obviously impossible to leave Jacobsdal in the hands of the enemy on our left flank, so the 7th Division

(Tucker's) turned aside to attack the town. Wavell's brigade carried the place after a sharp skirmish, chiefly

remarkable for the fact that the City Imperial Volunteers found themselves under fire for the first time and

bore themselves with the gallantry of the old trainbands whose descendants they are. Our loss was two

killed and twenty wounded, and we found ourselves for the first time firmly established in one of the enemy's

On the afternoon of Thursday, February 15th, our cavalry, having left Klip Drift in the morning, were

pushing hard for Kimberley. At Klip Drift was KellyKenny's 6th Division. South of Klip Drift at Wegdraai

was Colvile's 9th Division, while the 7th Division was approaching Jacobsdal. Altogether the British forces

were extended over a line of forty miles. The same evening saw the relief of Kimberley and the taking of

Jacobsdal, but it also saw the capture of one of our convoys by the Boers, a dashing exploit which struck us

It has never been cleared up whence the force of Boers came which appeared upon our rear on that occasion.

It seems to have been the same body which had already had a skirmish with Hannay's Mounted Infantry as

they went up from Orange Biver to join the rendezvous at Ramdam. The balance of evidence is that they had

not come from Colesberg or any distant point, but that they were a force under the command of Piet De Wet,

the younger of two famous brothers. Descending to Waterval Drift, the ford over the Riet, they occupied a

line of kopjes, which ought, one would have imagined, to have been carefully guarded by us, and opened a

brisk fire from rifles and guns upon the convoy as it ascended the northern bank of the river. Numbers of

bullocks were soon shot down, and the removal of the hundred and eighty wagons made impossible. The

convoy, which contained forage and provisions, bad no guard of its own, but the drift was held by Colonel

Ridley with one company of Gordons and one hundred and fifty mounted infantry without artillery, which

certainly seems an inadequate force to secure the most vital and vulnerable spot in the line of

communications of an army of forty thousand men. The Boers numbered at the first some five or six hundred

men, but their position was such that they could not be attacked. On the other hand they were not strong

enough to leave their shelter in order to drive in the British guard, who, lying in extended order between the

wagons and the assailants, were keeping up a steady and effective fire. Captain Head, of the East Lancashire

Regiment, a fine natural soldier, commanded the British firing line, and neither he nor any of his men

doubted that they could hold off the enemy for an indefinite time. In the course of the afternoon

reinforcements arrived for the Boers, but Kitchener's Horse and a field battery came back and restored the

balance of power. In the evening the latter swayed altogether in favour of the British, as Tucker appeared

upon the scene with the whole of the 14th Brigade; but as the question of an assault was being debated a

positive order arrived from Lord Roberts that the convoy should be abandoned and the force return.

If Lord Roberts needed justification for this decision, the future course of events will furnish it. One of

Napoleon's maxims in war was to concentrate all one's energies upon one thing at one time. Roberts's aim

was to outflank and possibly to capture Cronje's army. If he allowed a brigade to be involved in a rearguard

action, his whole swiftmoving plan of campaign might be dislocated. It was very annoying to lose a hundred

and eighty wagons, but it only meant a temporary inconvenience. The plan of campaign was the essential

thing. Therefore he sacrificed his convoy and hurried his troops upon their original mission. It was with

heavy hearts and bitter words that those who had fought so long abandoned their charge, but now at least

there are probably few of them who do not agree in the wisdom of the sacrifice. Our loss in this affair was

between fifty and sixty killed and wounded. The Boers were unable to get rid of the stores, and they were

eventually distributed among the local farmers and recovered again as the British forces flowed over the

country. Another small disaster occurred to us on the preceding day in the loss of fifty men of E company of

But great events were coming to obscure those small checks which are incidental to a war carried out over

immense distances against a mobile and enterprising enemy. Cronje had suddenly become aware of the net

which was closing round him. To the dark fierce man who had striven so hard to make his line of kopjes

impregnable it must have been a bitter thing to abandon his trenches and his rifle pits. But he was crafty as

well as tenacious, and he had the Boer horror of being cut off an hereditary instinct from fathers who had

fought on horseback against enemies on foot. If at any time during the last ten weeks Methuen had contained

him in front with a thin line of riflemen with machine guns, and had thrown the rest of his force on Jacobsdal

and the east, he would probably have attained the same result. Now at the rumour of English upon his flank

Cronje instantly abandoned his position and his plans, in order to restore those communications with

Bloemfontein upon which he depended for his supplies. With furious speed he drew in his right wing, and

then, one huge mass of horsemen, guns, and wagons, he swept through the gap between the rear of the British

cavalry bound for Kimberley and the head of the British infantry at Klip Drift. There was just room to pass,

and at it he dashed with the furious energy of a wild beast rushing from a trap. A portion of his force with his

heavy guns had gone north round Kimberley to Warrenton; many of the Freestaters also had slipped away

and returned to their farms. The remainder, numbering about six thousand men, the majority of whom were

This movement was carried out on the night of February 15th, and had it been a little quicker it might have

been concluded before we were aware of it. But the lumbering wagons impeded it, and on the Friday

morning, February 16th, a huge rolling cloud of dust on the northern veldt, moving from west to east, told our

outposts at Klip Drift that Cronje's army had almost slipped through our fingers. Lord Kitchener, who was in

command at Klip Drift at the moment, instantly unleashed his mounted infantry in direct pursuit, while

Knox's brigade sped along the northern bank of the river to cling on to the right haunch of the retreating

column. Cronje's men had made a night march of thirty miles from Magersfontein, and the wagon bullocks

were exhausted. It was impossible, without an absolute abandonment of his guns and stores, for him to get

This was no deer which they were chasing, however, but rather a grim old Transvaal wolf, with his teeth

flashing ever over his shoulder. The sight of those distant whitetilted wagons fired the blood of every

mounted infantryman, and sent the Oxfords, the Buffs, the West Ridings, and the Gloucesters racing along

the river bank in the glorious virile air of an African morning. But there were kopjes ahead, sown with fierce

Dopper Boers, and those tempting wagons were only to be reached over their bodies. The broad plain across

which the English were hurrying was suddenly swept with a storm of bullets. The long infantry line extended

yet further and lapped round the flank of the Boer position, and once more the terrible duet of the Mauser and

the LeeMetford was sung while the 81st field battery hurried up in time to add its deep roar to their higher

chorus. With fine judgment Cronje held on to the last moment of safety, and then with a swift movement to

the rear seized a further line two miles off, and again snapped back at his eager pursuers. All day the grim and

weary rearguard stalled off the fiery advance of the infantry, and at nightfall the wagons were still untaken.

The pursuing force to the north of the river was, it must be remembered, numerically inferior to the pursued,

so that in simply retarding the advance of the enemy and in giving other British troops time to come up,

Knox's brigade was doing splendid work. Had Cronje been well advised or well informed, he would have left

his guns and wagons in the hope that by a swift dash over the Modder he might still bring his army away in

safety. He seems to have underrated both the British numbers and the British activity.

On the night then of Friday, February 16th, Cronje lay upon the northern bank of the Modder, with his stores

and guns still intact, and no enemy in front of him, though Knox's brigade and Hannay's Mounted Infantry

were behind. It was necessary for Cronje to cross the river in order to be on the line for Bloemfontein. As the

river tended to the north the sooner he could cross the better. On the south side of the river, however, were

considerable British forces, and the obvious strategy was to hurry them forward and to block every drift at

which he could get over. The river runs between very deep banks, so steep that one might almost describe

them as small cliffs, and there was no chance of a horseman, far less a wagon, crossing at any point save

those where the convenience of traffic and the use of years had worn sloping paths down to the shallows. The

British knew exactly therefore what the places were which had to be blocked. On the use made of the next

The nearest drift to Cronje was only a mile or two distant, Klipkraal the name; next to that the Paardeberg

Drift; next to that the Wolveskraal Drift, each about seven miles from the other. Had Cronje pushed on

instant]y after the action, he might have got across at Klipkraal. But men, horses, and bullocks were equally

exhausted after a long twentyfour hours' marching and fighting. He gave his weary soldiers some hours'

rest, and then, abandoning seventyeight of his wagons, he pushed on Before daylight for the farthest off of

the three fords (Wolveskraal Drift). Could he reach and cross it before his enemies, he was safe. The

Klipkraal Drift had in the meanwhile been secured by the Buffs, the West Ridings, and the Oxfordshire Light

Infantry after a spirited little action which, in the rapid rush of events, attracted less attention than it deserved.

The brunt of the fighting fell upon the Oxfords, who lost ten killed and thirtynine wounded. It was not a

waste of life, however, for the action, though small and hardly recorded, was really a very essential one in the

But Lord Roberts's energy had infused itself into his divisional commanders, his brigadiers, his colonels, and

so down to the humblest Tommy who tramped and stumbled through the darkness with a devout faith that

'Bobs' was going to catch 'old Cronje' this time. The mounted infantry had galloped round from the north to

the south of the river, crossing at Klip Drift and securing the southern end of Klipkraal. Thither also came

Stephenson's brigade from KellyKenny's Division, while Knox, finding in the morning that Cronje was

gone, marched along the northern bank to the same spot. As Klipkraal was safe, the mounted infantry pushed

on at once and secured the southern end of the Paardeberg Drift, whither they were followed the same

evening by Stephenson and Knox. There remained only the Wolveskraal Drift to block, and this had already

been done by as smart a piece of work as any in the war. Wherever French has gone he has done well, but his

The exertions which the mounted men had made in the relief of Kimberley have been already recorded. They

arrived there on Thursday with their horses dead beat. They were afoot at three o'clock on Friday morning,

and two brigades out of three were hard at work all day in an endeavour to capture the Dronfield position. Yet

when on the same evening an order came that French should start again instantly from Kimberley and

endeavour to head Cronje's army off, he did not plead inability, as many a commander might, but taking

every man whose horse was still fit to carry him (something under two thousand out of a column which had

been at least five thousand strong), he started within a few hours and pushed on through the whole night.

Horses died under their riders, but still the column marched over the shadowy veldt under the brilliant stars.

By happy chance or splendid calculation they were heading straight for the one drift which was still open to

Cronje. It was a close thing. At midday on Saturday the Boer advance guard was already near to the kopjes

which command it. But French's men, still full of fight after their march of thirty miles, threw themselves in

front and seized the position before their very eyes. The last of the drifts was closed. If Cronje was to get

across now, he must crawl out of his trench and fight under Roberts's conditions, or he might remain under

his own conditions until Roberts's forces closed round him. With him lay the alternative. In the meantime,

still ignorant of the forces about him, but finding himself headed off by French, he made his way down to the

river and occupied a long stretch of it between Paardeberg Drift and Wolveskraal Drift, hoping to force his

In the course of that night the British brigades, staggering with fatigue but indomitably resolute to crush their

evasive enemy, were converging upon Paardeberg. The Highland Brigade, exhausted by a heavy march over

soft sand from Jacobsdal to Klip Drift, were nerved to fresh exertions by the word 'Magersfontein,' which

flew from lip to lip along the ranks, and pushed on for another twelve miles to Paardeberg. Close at their

heels came SmithDorrien's 19th Brigade, comprising the Shropshires, the Cornwalls, the Gordons, and the

Canadians, probably the very finest brigade in the whole army. They pushed across the river and took up their

position upon the north bank. The old wolf was now fairly surrounded. On the west the Highianders were

south of the river, and SmithDorrien on the north. On the east KellyKenny's Division was to the south of

the river, and French with his cavalry and mounted infantry were to the north of it. Never was a general in a

more hopeless plight. Do what he would, there was no possible loophole for escape.

There was only one thing which apparently should not have been done, and that was to attack him. His

position was a formidable one. Not only were the banks of the river fringed with his riflemen under excellent

cover, but from these banks there extended on each side a number of dongas, which made admirable natural

trenches. The only possible attack from either side must be across a level plain at least a thousand or fifteen

hundred yards in width, where our numbers would only swell our losses. It must be a bold soldier and a far

bolder civilian, who would venture to question an operation carried out under the immediate personal

direction of Lord Kitchener; but the general consensus of opinion among critics may justify that which might

be temerity in the individual. Had Cronje not been tightly surrounded, the action with its heavy losses might

have been justified as an attempt to hold him until his investment should be complete. There seems, however,

to be no doubt that he was already entirely surrounded, and that, as experience proved, we had only to sit

round him to insure his surrender. It is not given to the greatest man to have every soldierly gift equally

developed, and it may be said without offence that Lord Kitchener's cool judgment upon the actual field of

battle has not yet been proved as conclusively as his longheaded power of organisation and his iron

Putting aside the question of responsibility, what happened on the morning of Sunday, February 18th, was

that from every quarter an assault was urged across the level plains, to the north and to the south, upon the

lines of desperate and invisible men who lay in the dongas and behind the banks of the river. Everywhere

there was a terrible monotony about the experiences of the various regiments which learned once again the

grim lessons of Colenso and Modder River. We surely did not need to prove once more what had already

been so amply proved, that bravery can be of no avail against concealed riflemen well entrenched, and that

the more hardy is the attack the heavier must be the repulse. Over the long circle of our attack Knox's

brigade, Stephenson's brigade, the Highland brigade, SmithDorrien's brigade all fared alike. In each case

there was the advance until they were within the thousandyard fire zone, then the resistless sleet of bullets

which compelled them to get down and to keep down. Had they even then recognised that they were

attempting the impossible, no great harm might have been done, but with generous emulation the men of the

various regiments made little rushes, company by company, towards the river bed, and found themselves ever

exposed to a more withering fire. On the northern bank SmithDorrien's brigade, and especially the Canadian

regiment, distinguished themselves by the magnificent tenacity with which they persevered in their attack.

The Cornwalls of the same brigade swept up almost to the river bank in a charge which was the admiration of

all who saw it. If the miners of Johannesburg had given the impression that the Cornishman is not a fighter,

the record of the county regiment in the war has for ever exploded the calumny. Men who were not fighters

could have found no place in SmithDorrien's brigade or in the charge of Paardeberg.

While the infantry had been severely handled by the Boer riflemen, our guns, the 76th, 81st, and 82nd field

batteries, with the 65th howitzer battery, had been shelling the river bed, though our artillery fire proved as

usual to have little effect against scattered and hidden riflemen. At least, however, it distracted their attention,

and made their fire upon the exposed infantry in front of them less deadly. Now, as in Napoleon's time, the

effect of the guns is moral rather than material. About midday French's horseartillery guns came into action

from the north. Smoke and flames from the dongas told that some of our shells bad fallen among the wagons

The Boer line had proved itself to be unshakable on each face, but at its ends the result of the action was to

push them up, and to shorten the stretch of the river which was held by them. On the north bank Smith.

Dorrien's brigade gained a considerable amount of ground. At the other end of the position the Welsh,

Yorkshire, and Essex regiments of Stephenson's brigade did some splendid work, and pushed the Boers for

some distance down the river bank. A most gallant but impossible charge was made by Colonel Hannay and a

number of mounted infantry against the northern bank. He was shot with the majority of his followers.

General Knox of the 12th Brigade and General Macdonald of the Highlanders were among the wounded.

Colonel Aldworth of the Cornwalls died at the head of his men. A bullet struck him dead as he whooped his

West Countrymen on to the charge. Eleven hundred killed and wounded testified to the fire of our attack and

the grimness of the Boer resistance. The distribution of the losses among the various battalions eighty

among the Canadians, ninety in the West Riding Regiment, one hundred and twenty in the Seaforths, ninety

in the Yorkshires, seventysix in the Argyll and Sutherlands, ninetysix in the Black Watch, thirtyone in the

Oxfordshires, fiftysix in the Coruwnlls, fortysix in the Shropshires shows how universal was the

gallantry, and especially how well the Highland Brigade carried itself. It is to be feared that they had to face,

not only the fire of the enemy, but also that of their own comrades on the further side of the river. A great

military authority has stated that it takes many years for a regiment to recover its spirit and steadiness if it has

been heavily punished, and yet within two months of Magersfontein we find the indomitable Highlanders

taking without flinching the very bloodiest share of this bloody day and this after a march of thirty miles

with no pause before going into action. A repulse it may have been, but they hear no name of which they may

What had we got in return for our eleven hundred casualties? We had contracted the Boer position from about

three miles to less than two. So much was to the good, as the closer they lay the more effective our artillery

fire might be expected to be. But it is probable that our shrapnel alone, without any loss of life, might have

effected the same thing. It is easy to be wise after the event, but it does certainly appear that with our present

knowledge the action at Paardeberg was as unnecessary as it was expensive. The sun descended on Sunday,

February 18th, upon a bloody field and crowded field hospitals, but also upon an unbroken circle of British

troops still hemming in the desperate men who lurked among the willows and mimosas which drape the

There was evidence during the action of the presence of an active Boer force to the south of us, probably the

same wellhandled and enterprising body which had captured our convoy at Waterval. A small party of

Kitchener's Horse was surprised by this body, and thirty men with four officers were taken prisoners. Much

has been said of the superiority of South African scouting to that of the British regulars, but it must be

confessed that a good many instances might be quoted in which the colonials, though second to none in

gallantry, have been defective in that very quality in which they were expected to excel.

This surprise of our cavalry post had more serious consequences than can be measured by the loss of men, for

by it the Boers obtained possession of a strong kopje called Kitchener's Hill, lying about two miles distant on

the southeast of our position. The movement was an admirable one strategically upon their part, for it gave

their beleaguered comrades a first station on the line of their retreat. Could they only win their way to that

kopje, a rearguard action might be fought from there which would cover the escape of at least a portion of the

force. De Wet, if he was indeed responsible for the manoeuvres of these Southern Boers, certainly handled

his small force with a discreet audacity which marks him as the born leader which he afterwards proved

If the position of the Boers was desperate on Sunday, it was hopeless on Monday, for in the course of the

morning Lord Roberts came up, closely followed by the whole of Tucker's Division (7th) from Jacobsdal.

Our artillery also was strongly reinforced. The 18th, 62nd, and 75th field batteries came up with three naval

4.7 guns and two naval 12pounders. Thirtyfive thousand men with sixty guns were gathered round the

little Boer army. It is a poor spirit which will not applaud the supreme resolution with which the gallant

farmers held out, and award to Cronje the title of one of the most grimly resolute leaders of whom we have

For a moment it seemed as if his courage was giving way. On Monday morning a message was transmitted

by him to Lord Kitchener asking for a twentyfour hours' armistice. The answer was of course a curt refusal.

To this he replied that if we were so inhuman as to prevent him from burying his dead there was nothing for

him save surrender. An answer was given that a messenger with power to treat should be sent out, but in the

interval Cronje had changed his mind, and disappeared with a snarl of contempt into his burrows. It had

become known that women and children were in the laager, and a message was sent offering them a place of

safety, but even to this a refusal was given. The reasons for this last decision are inconceivable.

Lord Roberts's dispositions were simple, efficacious, and above all bloodless. SmithDorrien's brigade, who

were winning in the Western army something of the reputation which Hart's Irishmen had won in Natal, were

placed astride of the river to the west, with orders to push gradually up, as occasion served, using trenches for

their approach. Chermside's brigade occupied the same position on the east. Two other divisions and the

cavalry stood round, alert and eager, like terriers round a rathole, while all day the pitiless guns crashed

their common shell, their shrapnel, and their lyddite into the riverbed. Already down there, amid slaughtered

oxen and dead horses under a burning sun, a horrible pesthole had been formed which sent its mephitic

vapours over the countryside. Occasionally the sentries down the river saw amid the brown eddies of the

rushing water the floating body of a Boer which had been washed away from the Golgotha above. Dark

Cronje, betrayer of Potchefstroom, ironhanded ruler of natives, reviler of the British, stern victor of

On Wednesday, the 21st, the British, being now sure of their grip of Cronje, turned upon the Boer force

which had occupied the hill to the southeast of the drift. It was clear that this force, unless driven away,

would be the vanguard of the relieving army which might be expected to assemble from Ladysmith,

Bloemfontein, Colesberg, or wherever else the Boers could detach men. Already it was known that

reinforcements who had left Natal whenever they heard that the Free State was invaded were drawing near. It

was necessary to crush the force upon the hill before it became too powerful. For this purpose the cavalry set

forth, Broadwood with the 10th Hussars, 12th Lancers, and two batteries going round on one side, while

French with the 9th and 16th Lancers, the Household Cavalry, and two other batteries skirted the other. A

force of Boers was met and defeated, while the defenders of the hill were driven off with considerable loss. In

this wellmanaged affair the enemy lost at least a hundred, of whom fifty were prisoners. On Friday,

February 23rd, another attempt at rescue was made from the south, but again it ended disastrously for the

Boers. A party attacked a kopje held by the Yorkshire regiment and were blown back by a volley, upon which

they made for a second kopje, where the Buffs gave them an even rougher reception. Eighty prisoners were

marched in. Meantime hardly a night passed that some of the Boers did not escape from their laager and give

themselves up to our pickets. At the end of the week we had taken six hundred in all.

In the meantime the cordon was being drawn ever tighter, and the fire became heavier and more deadly,

while the conditions of life in that fearful place were such that the stench alone might have compelled

surrender. Amid the crash of tropical thunderstorms, the glare of lightning, and the furious thrashing of rain

there was no relaxation of British vigilance. A balloon floating overhead directed the fire, which from day to

day became more furious, culminating on the 26th with the arrival of four 5inch howitzers. But still there

came no sign from the fierce Boer and his gallant followers. Buried deep within burrows in the river bank the

greater part of them lay safe from the shells, but the rattle of their musketry when the outposts moved showed

that the trenches were as alert as ever. The thing could only have one end, however, and Lord Roberts, with

admirable judgment and patience, refused to hurry it at the expense of the lives of his soldiers.

The two brigades at either end of the Boer lines had lost no chance of pushing in, and now they had come

within striking distance. On the night of February 26th it was determined that SmithDorrien's men should

try their luck. The front trenches of the British were at that time seven hundred yards from the Boer lines.

They were held by the Gordons and by the Canadians, the latter being the nearer to the river. It is worth while

entering into details as to the arrangement of the attack, as the success of the campaign was at least

accelerated by it. The orders were that the Canadians were to advance, the Gordons to support, and the

Shropshires to take such a position on the left as would outflank any counter attack upon the part of the

Boers. The Canadians advanced in the darkness of the early morning before the rise of the moon. The front

rank held their rifles in the left hand and each extended right hand grasped the sleeve of the man next it. The

rear rank had their rifles slung and carried spades. Nearest the river bank were two companies (G and H.)

who were followed by the 7th company of Royal Engineers carrying picks and empty sand bags. The long

line stole through a pitchy darkness, knowing that at any instant a blaze of fire such as flamed before the

Highlanders at Magersfontein might crash out in front of them. A hundred, two, three, four, five hundred

paces were taken. They knew that they must be close upon the trenches. If they could only creep silently

enough, they might spring upon the defenders unannounced. On and on they stole, step by step, praying for

silence. Would the gentle shuffle of feet be heard by the men who lay within stonethrow of them? Their

hopes had begun to rise when there broke upon the silence of the night a resonant metallic rattle, the thud of a

falling man, an empty clatter! They had walked into a line of meatcans slung upon a wire. By measurement

it was only ninety yards from the trench. At that instant a single rifle sounded, and the Canadians hurled

themselves down upon the ground. Their bodies had hardly touched it when from a line six hundred yards

long there came one furious glare of rifle fire, with a hiss like water on a redhot plate, of speeding bullets. In

that terrible red light the men as they lay and scraped desperately for cover could see the heads of the Boers

pop up and down, and the fringe of rifle barrels quiver and gleam. How the regiment, lying helpless under

this fire, escaped destruction is extraordinary. To rush the trench in the face of such a continuous blast of lead

seemed impossible, and it was equally impossible to remain where they were. In a short time the moon would

be up, and they would be picked off to a man. The outer companies upon the plain were ordered to retire.

Breaking up into loose order, they made their way back with surprisingly little loss; but a strange contretemps

occurred, for, leaping suddenly into a trench held by the Gordons, they transfixed themselves upon the

bayonets of the men. A subaltern and twelve men received bayonet thrusts none of them fortunately of a

While these events had been taking place upon the left of the line, the right was hardly in better plight. All

firing had ceased for the moment the Boers being evidently under the impression that the whole attack had

recoiled. Uncertain whether the front of the small party on the right of the second line (now consisting of

some sixtyfive Sappers and Canadians lying in one mingled line) was clear for firing should the Boers leave

their trenches, Captain Boileau, of the Sappers, crawled forward along the bank of the river, and discovered

Captain Stairs and ten men of the Canadians, the survivors of the firing line, firmly ensconced in a crevice of

the river bank overlooking the laager, quite happy on being reassured as to the proximity of support. This

brought the total number of the daring band up to seventyfive rifles. Meanwhile, the Gordons, somewhat

perplexed by the flying phantoms who had been flitting into and over their trenches for the past few minutes,

sent a messenger along the river bank to ascertain, in their turn, if their own front was clear to fire, and if not,

what state the survivors were in. To this message Colonel Kincaid, R.E., now in command of the remains of

the assaulting party, replied that his men would be well entrenched by daylight. The little party had been

distributed for digging as well as the darkness and their ignorance of their exact position to the Boers would

permit. Twice the sound of the picks brought angry volleys from the darkness, but the work was never

stopped, and in the early dawn the workers found not only that they were secure themselves, but that they

were in a position to enfilade over half a mile of Boer trenches. Before daybreak the British crouched low in

their shelter, so that with the morning light the Boers did not realise the change which the night had wrought.

It was only when a burgher was shot as he filled his pannikin at the river that they understood how their

position was overlooked. For half an hour a brisk fire was maintained, at the end of which time a white flag

went up from the trench. Kincaid stood up on his parapet, and a single haggard figure emerged from the Boer

warren. 'The burghers have had enough; what are they to do?' said he. As he spoke his comrades scrambled

out behind him and came walking and running over to the British lines. It was not a moment likely to be

forgotten by the parched and grimy warriors who stood up and cheered until the cry came crashing back to

them again from the distant British camps. No doubt Cronje had already realised that the extreme limit of his

resistance was come, but it was to that handful of Sappers and Canadians that the credit is immediately due

for that white flag which fluttered on the morning of Majuba Day over the lines of Paardeberg.

It was six o'clock in the morning when General Pretyman rode up to Lord Roberts's headquarters. Behind him

upon a white horse was a darkbearded man, with the quick. restless eyes of a hunter, middlesized, thickly

built, with grizzled hair flowing from under a tall brown felt hat. He wore the black broadcloth of the burgher

with a green summer overcoat, and carried a small whip in his hands. His appearance was that of a

respectable London vestryman rather than of a most redoubtable soldier with a particularly sinister career

The Generals shook hands, and it was briefly intimated to Cronje that his surrender must be unconditional, to

which, after a short silence, he agreed. His only stipulations were personal, that his wife, his grandson, his

secretary, his adjutant, and his servant might accompany him. The same evening he was despatched to Cape

Town, receiving those honourable attentions which were due to his valour rather than to his character. His

men, a pallid ragged crew, emerged from their holes and burrows, and delivered up their rifles. It is pleasant

to add that, with much in their memories to exasperate them, the British privates treated their enemies with as

largehearted a courtesy as Lord Roberts had shown to their leader. Our total capture numbered some three

thousand of the Transvaal and eleven hundred of the Free State. That the latter were not far more numerous

was due to the fact that many had already shredded off to their farms. Besides Cronje, Wolverans of the

Transvaal, and the German artillerist Albrecht, with fortyfour other fieldcornets and commandants, fell

into our hands. Six small guns were also secured. The same afternoon saw the long column of the prisoners

on its way to Modder River, there to be entrained for Cape Town, the most singular lot of people to be seen at

that moment upon earth ragged, patched, grotesque, some with goloshes, some with umbrellas,

coffeepots, and Bibles, their favourite baggage. So they passed out of their ten days of glorious history.

A visit to the laager showed that the horrible smells which had been carried across to the British lines, and the

swollen carcasses which had swirled down the muddy river were true portents of its condition. Strongnerved

men came back white and sick from a contemplation of the place in which women and children had for ten

days been living. From end to end it was a festering mass of corruption, overshadowed by incredible swarms

of flies. Yet the engineer who could face evil sights and nauseous smells was repaid by an inspection of the

deep narrow trenches in which a rifleman could crouch with the minimum danger from shells, and the caves

in which the noncombatants remained in absolute safety. Of their dead we have no accurate knowledge, but

two hundred wounded in a donga represented their losses, not only during a bombardment of ten days, but

also in that Paardeberg engagement which had cost us eleven hundred casualties. No more convincing

example could be adduced both of the advantage of the defence over the attack, and of the harmlessness of

the fiercest shell fire if those who are exposed to it bave space and time to make preparations.

A fortnight had elapsed since Lord Roberts had launched his forces from Ramdam, and that fortnight had

wrought a complete revolution in the campaign. It is hard to recall any instance in the history of war where a

single movement has created such a change over so many different operations. On February 14th Kimberley

was in danger of capture, a victorious Boer army was facing Methuen, the lines of Magersfontein appeared

impregnable, Clements was being pressed at Colesberg, Gatacre was stopped at Stormberg, Buller could not

pass the Tugela, and Ladysmith was in a perilous condition. On the 28th Kimberley had been relieved, the

Boer army was scattered or taken, the lines of Magersfontein were in our possession, Clements found his

assailants retiring before him, Gatacre was able to advance at Stormberg, Buller had a weakening army in

front of him, and Ladysmith was on the eve of relief. And all this had been done at the cost of a very

moderate loss of life, for most of which Lord Roberts was in no sense answerable. Here at last was a

reputation so well founded that even South African warfare could only confirm and increase it. A single

master hand had in an instant turned England's night to day, and had brought us out of that nightmare of

miscalculation and disaster which had weighed so long upon our spirits. His was the master hand, but there

were others at his side without whom that hand might have been paralysed: Kitchener the organiser, French

the cavalry leader to these two men, second only to their chief, are the results of the operations due.

Henderson, the most capable head of Intelligence, and Richardson, who under all difficulties fed the army,

The surrender of Cronje had taken place on February 27th, obliterating for ever the triumphant memories

which the Boers had for twenty years associated with that date. A halt was necessary to provide food for the

hungry troops, and above all to enable the cavalry horses to pick up. The supply of forage had been most

inadequate, and the beasts had not yet learned to find a living from the dry withered herbage of the

veldt.[Footnote: A battery which turned out its horses to graze found that the puzzled creatures simply

galloped about the plain, and could only be reassembled by blowing the call which they associated with

feeding, when they rushed back and waited in lines for their nosebags to be put on.] In addition to this, they

had been worked most desperately during the fortnight which had elapsed. Lord Roberts waited therefore at

Osfontein, which is a farmhouse close to Paardeberg, until his cavalry were fit for an advance. On March 6th

The force which had been hovering to the south and east of him during the Paardeberg operations had

meanwhile been reinforced from Colesberg and from Ladysmith until it had attained considerable

proportions. This army, under the leadership of De Wet, had taken up a strong position a few miles to the

east, covering a considerable range of kopjes. On March 3rd a reconnaissance was made of it, in which some

of our guns were engaged; but it was not until three days later that the army advanced with the intention of

turning or forcing it. In the meantime reinforcements had been arriving in the British camp, derived partly

from the regiments which had been employed at other points during these operations, and partly from

newcomers from the outer Empire. The Guards came up from Klip Drift, the City Imperial Volunteers, the

Australian Mounted Infantry, the Burmese Mounted Infantry and a detachment of light horse from Ceylon

helped to form this strange invading army which was drawn from five continents and yet had no alien in its

The position which the enemy had taken up at Poplars Grove (so called from a group of poplars round a

farmhouse in the centre of their position) extended across the Modder River and was buttressed on either side

by wellmarked hills, with intermittent kopjes between. With guns, trenches, rifle pits, and barbed wire a

bullheaded general might have found it another Magersfontein. But it is only just to Lord Roberts's

predecessors in command to say that it is easy to do things with three cavalry brigades which it is dilficult to

do with two regiments. The ultimate blame does not rest with the man who failed with the two regiments, but

with those who gave him inadequate means for the work which he had to do. And in this estimate of means

our military authorities, our politicians, and our public were all in the first instance equally mistaken.

Lord Roberts's plan was absolutely simple, and yet, had it been carried out as conceived, absolutely effective.

It was not his intention to go near any of that entanglement of ditch and wire which had been so carefully

erected for his undoing. The weaker party, if it be wise, atones for its weakness by entrenchments. The

stronger party, if it be wise, leaves the entrenchments alone and uses its strength to go round them. Lord

Roberts meant to go round. With his immense preponderance of men and guns the capture or dispersal of the

enemy's army might be reduced to a certainty. Once surrounded, they must either come out into the open or

On March 6th the cavalry were brought across the river, and in the early morning of March 7th they were sent

off in the darkness to sweep round the left wing of the Boers and to establish themselves on the line of their

retreat. KellyKenny's Division (6th) had orders to follow and support this movement. Meanwhile Tucker

was to push straight along the southern bank of the river, though we may surmise that his instructions were,

in case of resistance, not to push his attack home. Colvile's 9th Division, with part of the naval brigade, were

north of the river, the latter to shell the drifts in case the Boers tried to cross, and the infantry to execute a

turning movement which would correspond with that of the cavalry on the other flank.

The plan of action was based, however, upon one supposition which proved to be fallacious. It was that after

having prepared so elaborate a position the enemy would stop at least a little time to defend it. Nothing of the

sort occurred, however, and on the instant that they realised that the cavalry was on their flank they made off.

The result of this very decisive flight was to derange all calculations entirly. The cavalry was not yet in its

place when the Boer army streamed off between the kopjes. One would have thought, however, that they

would have had a dash for the wagons and the guns, even if they were past them. It is unfair to criticise a

movement until one is certain as to the positive orders which the leader may have received; but on the face of

it it is clear that the sweep of our cavalry was not wide enough, and that they erred by edging to the left

instead of to the right, so leaving the flying enemies always to the outside of them.

As it was, however, there seemed every possibility of their getting the guns, but De Wet very cleverly

coveved them by his skirmishers. Taking possession of a farmhouse on the right flank they kept up a spirited

fire upon the 16th Lancers and upon P battery R.H.A. When at last the latter drove them out of their shelter,

they again formed upon a low kopje and poured so galling a fire upon the right wing that the whole

movement was interrupted until we had driven this little body of fifty men from their position. When, after a

delay of an hour, the cavalry at last succeeded in dislodging them or possibly it may be fairer to say when,

having accomplished their purpose, they retired the guns and wagons were out of reach, and, what is more

important, the two Presidents, both Steyn and Kruger, who had come to stiffen the resistance of the burghers,

Making every allowance for the weary state of the horses, it is impossible to say that our cavalry were

handled with energy or judgment on this occasion. That such a force of men and guns should be held off from

an object of such importance by so small a resistance reflects no credit upon us. It would have been better to

repeat the Kimberley tactics and to sweep the regiments in extended order past the obstacle if we could not

pass over it. At the other side of that little illdefended kopje lay a possible termination of the war, and our

crack cavalry regiments manoeuvred for hours and let it pass out of their reach. However, as Lord Roberts

goodhumouredly remarked at the end of the action, 'In war you can't expect everything to come out right.'

General French can afford to shed one leaf from his laurel wreath. On the other hand, no words can be too

high for the gallant little band of Boers who had the courage to face that overwhelming mass of horsemen,

and to bluff them into regarding this handful as a force fighting a serious rearguard action. When the stories

of the war are told round the fires in the lonely veldt farmhouses, as they will be for a century to come, this

The victory, if such a word can apply to such an action, had cost some fifty or sixty of the cavalry killed and

wounded, while it is doubtful if the Boers lost as many. The finest military display on the British side had

been the magnificent marching of KellyKenny's 6th Division, who had gone for ten hours with hardly a halt.

One 9 lb. Krupp gun was the only trophy. On he other hand, Roberts had turned them out of their strong

position, had gained twelve or fifteen miles on he road to Bloemfontein, and for the first time shown how

helpless a Boer army was in country which gave our numbers a chance. From now onwards it was only in

surprise and ambuscade that they could hope for a success. We had learned and they had learned that they

The action of Poplars Grove was fought on March 7th. On the 9th the army was again on its way, and on the

10th it attacked the new position which the Boers had occupied at a place called Driefontein, or Abram's

Kraal. They covered a front of some seven miles in such a formation that their wings were protected, the

northern by the river and the southern by flanking bastions of hill extending for some distance to the rear. If

the position had been defended as well as it had been chosen, the task would have been a severe one.

Since the Modder covered the enemy's right the turning movement could only be developed on their left, and

Tucker's Division was thrown out very wide on that side for the purpose. But in the meanwhile a contretemps

had occurred which threw out and seriously hampered the whole British line of battle. General French was in

command of the left wing, which included KellyKenny's Division, the first cavalry brigade, and Alderson's

Mounted Infantry. His orders had been to keep in touch with the centre, and to avoid pushing his attack

home. In endeavouring to carry out these instructions French moved his men more and more to the right, until

he had really squeezed in between the Boers and Lord Roberts's central column, and so masked the latter. The

essence of the whole operation was that the frontal attack should not be delivered until Tucker had worked

round to the rear of the position. It is for military critics to decide whether it was that the flankers were too

slow or the frontal assailants were too fast, but it is certain that KellyKenny's Division attacked before the

cavalry and the 7th Division were in their place. KellyKenny was informed that the position in front of him

had been abandoned, and four regiments, the Buffs, the Essex, the Welsh, and the Yorkshires, were advanced

against it. They were passing over the open when the crash of the Mauser fire burst out in front of them, and

the bullets hissed and thudded among the ranks. The ordeal was a very severe one. The Yorkshires were

swung round wide upon the right, but the rest of the brigade, the Welsh Regiment leading, made a frontal

attack upon the ridge. It was done coolly and deliberately, the men taking advantage of every possible cover.

Boers could be seen leaving their position in small bodies as the crackling, swaying line of the British surged

ever higher upon the hillside. At last, with a cheer, the Welshmen with their Kent and Essex comrades swept

over the crest into the ranks of that cosmopolitan crew of sturdy adventurers who are known as the

Johannesburg Police. For once the loss of the defence was greater than that of the attack. These mercenaries

had not the instinct which teaches the Boer the right instant for flight, and they held their position too long to

get away. The British had left four hundred men on the track of that gallant advance, but the vast majority of

them were wounded too often by those explosive or expansive missiles which make war more hideous. Of

the Boers we actually buried over a hundred on the ridge, and their total casualties must have been

The action was strategically well conceived; all that Lord Roberts could do for complete success had been

done; but tactically it was a poor affair, considering his enormous preponderance in men and guns. There was

no glory in it, save for the four regiments who set their faces against that sleet of lead. The artillery did not do

well, and were browbeaten by guns which they should have smothered under their fire. The cavalry cannot be

said to have done well either. And yet, when all is said, the action is an important one, for the enemy were

badly shaken by the result. The Johannesburg Police, who had been among their CORPS D'ELITE, had been

badly mauled, and the burghers were impressed by one more example of the impossibility of standing in

anything approaching to open country against disciplined troops, Roberts had not captured the guns, but the

road had been cleared for him to Bloemfontein and, what is more singular, to Pretoria; for though hundreds of

miles intervene between the field of Driefontein and the Transvaal capital, he never again met a force which

was willing to look his infantry in the eyes in a pitched battle. Surprises and skirmishes were many, but it was

the last time, save only at Doornkop, that a chosen position was ever held for an effective rifle fire to say

And now the army flowed swiftly onwards to the capital. The indefatigable 6th Division, which had done

march after march, one more brilliant than another, since they had crossed the Riet River, reached Asvogel

Kop on the evening of Sunday, March 11th, the day after the battle. On Monday the army was still pressing

onwards, disregarding all else and striking straight for the heart as Blucher struck at Paris in 1814. At midday

they halted at the farm of Gregorowski, he who had tried the Reform prisoners after the Raid. The cavalry

pushed on down Kaal Spruit, and in the evening crossed the Southern railway line which connects

Bloemfontein with the colony, cutting it at a point some five miles from the town. In spite of some not very

strenuous opposition from a Boer force a hill was seized by a squadron of Greys with some mounted infantry

and Rimington's Guides, aided by U battery R.H.A., and was held by them all that night.

On the same evening Major HunterWeston, an officer who had already performed at least one brilliant feat

in the war, was sent with Lieutenant Charles and a handful of Mounted Sappers and Hussars to cut the line to

the north. After a difficult journey on a very dark night he reached his object and succeeded in finding and

blowing up a culvert. There is a Victona Cross gallantry which leads to nothing save personal decoration, and

there is another and far higher gallantry of calculation, which springs from a cool brain as well as a hot heart,

and it is from the men who possess this rare quality that great warriors arise. Such feats as the cutting of this

railway or the subsequent saving of the Bethulie Bridge by Grant and Popham are of more service to the

country than any degree of mere valour untempered by judgment. Among other results the cutting of the line

secured for us twentyeight locomotives, two hundred and fifty trucks, and one thousand tons of coal, all of

which were standing ready to leave Bloemfontein station. The gallant little band were nearly cut off on their

return, but fought their way through with the loss of two horses, and so got back in triumph.

The action of Driefontein was fought on the 10th. The advance began on the morning of the 11th. On the

morning of the 13th the British were practically masters of Bloemfontein. The distance is forty miles. No one

Some trenches had been dug and sangars erected to the northwest of the town; but Lord Roberts, with his

usual perverseness, took the wrong turning and appeared upon the broad open plain to the south, where

resistance would have been absurd. Already Steyn and the irreconcilables had fled from the town, and the

General was met by a deputation of the Mayor, the Landdrost, and Mr. Fraser to tender the submission of the

capital. Fraser, a sturdy clearheaded Highlander, had been the one politician in the Free State who combined

a perfect loyalty to his adopted country with a just appreciation of what a quarrel A L'OUTRANCE with the

British Empire would mean. Had Fraser's views prevailed, the Orange Free State would still exist as a happy

and independent State. As it is, he may help her to happiness and prosperity as the prime minister of the

It was at halfpast one on Tuesday, March 13th, that General Roberts and his troops entered Bloemfontein,

amid the acclamations of many of the inhabitants, who, either to propitiate the victor, or as a sign of their real

sympathies, had hoisted union jacks upon their houses. Spectators have left it upon record how from all that

interminable column of yellowclad weary men, worn with half rations and wholeday marches, there came

never one jeer, never one taunting or exultant word, as they tramped into the capital of their enemies. The

bearing of the troops was chivalrous in its gentleness, and not the least astonishing sight to the inhabitants

was the passing of the Guards, the dandy troops of England, the bodyservants of the great Queen. Black

with sun and dust, staggering after a march of thirtyeight miles, gaunt and haggard, with their clothes in

such a state that decency demanded that some of the men should be discreetly packed away in the heart of the

dense column, they still swung into the town with the aspect of Kentish hoppickers and the bearing of

heroes. She, the venerable mother, could remember the bearded ranks who marched past her when they came

with sadly thinned files back from the Crimean winter; even those gallant men could not have endured more

sturdily, nor have served her more loyally, than these their worthy descendants.

It was just a month after the start from Ramdam that Lord Roberts and his army rode into the enemy's capital.

Up to that period we had in Africa Generals who were hampered for want of troops, and troops who were

hampered for want of Generals. Only when the CommanderinChief took over the main army had we

soldiers enough, and a man who knew how to handle them. The result was one which has not only solved the

question of the future of South Africa, but has given an illustration of strategy which will become classical to

the military student. How brisk was the course of events, how incessant the marching and fighting, may be

shown by a brief recapitulation. On February 13th cavalry and infantry were marching to the utmost capacity

of men and horses. On the 14th the cavalry were halted, but the infantry were marching hard. On the 15th the

cavalry covered forty miles, fought an action, and relieved Kimberley. On the 16th the cavalry were in

pursuit of the Boer guns all day, and were off on a thirtymile march to the Modder at night, while the

infantry were fighting Cronje's rearguard action, and closing up all day. On the 17th the infantry were

marching hard. On the 18th was the battle of Paardeberg. From the 19th to the 27th was incessant fighting

with Cronje inside the laager and with De Wet outside. From the 28th to March 6th was rest. On March 7th

was the action of Poplars Grove with heavy marching; on March 10th the battle of Driefontein. On the 11th

and 12th the infantry covered forty miles, and on the 13th were in Bloemfontein. All this was accomplished

by men on halfrations, with horses which could hardly be urged beyond a walk, in a land where water is

scarce and the sun semitropical, each infantryman carrying a weight of nearly forty pounds. There are few

more brilliant achievements in the history of British arms. The tactics were occasionally faulty, and the battle

of Paardeberg was a blot upon the operations; but the strategy of the General and the spirit of the soldier were

>From the moment that Lord Roberts with his army advanced from Ramdam all the other British forces in

South Africa, the Colesberg force, the Stormberg force, Brabant's force, and the Natal force, had the pressure

relieved in front of them, a tendency which increased with every fresh success of the main body. A short

chapter must be devoted to following rapidly the fortunes of these various armies, and tracing the effect of

Lord Roberts's strategy upon their movements. They may be taken in turn from west to east.

The force under General Clements (formerly French's) had, as has already been told, been denuded of nearly

all its cavalry and horse artillery, and so left in the presence of a very superior body of the enemy. Under

these circumstances Clements had to withdraw his immensely extended line, and to concentrate at Arundel,

closely followed by the elated enemy. The situation was a more critical one than has been appreciated by the

public, for if the force had been defeated the Boers would have been in a position to cut Lord Roberts's line of

communications, and the main army would have been in the air. Much credit is due, not only to General

Clements, but to Carter of the Wiltshires, Hacket Pain of the Worcesters, Butcher of the 4th R.F.A., the

admirable Australians, and all the other good men and true who did their best to hold the gap for the Empire.

The Boer idea of a strong attack upon this point was strategically admirable, but tactically there was not

sufficient energy in pushing home the advance. The British wings succeeded in withdrawing, and the

concentrated force at Arundel was too strong for attack Yet there was a time of suspense, a time when every

man had become of such importance that even fifty Indian syces were for the first and last time in the war, to

their own supreme gratification, permitted for twentyfour hours to play their natural part as

soldiers.[Footnote: There was something piteous in the chagrin of these fine Sikhs at being held back from

their natural work as soldiers. A deputation of them waited upon Lord Roberts at Bloemfontein to ask, with

msny salaams, whether 'his children were not to see one little fight before they returned.'] But then with the

rapid strokes in front the hour of danger passed, and the Boer advance became first a halt and then a retreat.

On February 27th, Major Butcher, supported by the Inniskillings and Australians, attacked Rensburg and

shelled the enemy out of it. Next morning Clements's whole force had advanced from Arundel and took up its

old position. The same afternoon it was clear that the Boers were retiring, and the British, following them up,

marched into Colesherg, around which they had manoeuvred so long. A telegram from Steyn to De Wet

found in the town told the whole story of the retirement: 'As long as you are able to hold the positions you are

in with the men you have, do so. If not, come here as quickly as circumstances will allow, as matters here are

taking a serious turn.' The whole force passed over the Orange River unimpeded, and blew up the Norval's

Pont railway bridge behind it. Clements's brigade followed on March 4th, and succeeded in the course of a

week in throwing a pontoon bridge over the river and crossing into the Orange Free State. Roberts having in

the meanwhile seized Bloemfontein, communication was restored by railway between the forces, and

Clements was despatched to Philippolis, Fauresmith, and the other towns in the southwest to receive the

submission of the inhabitants and to enforce their disarmament. In the meantime the Engineers worked

furiously at the restoration of the railway bridge over the Orange River, which was not, however,

During the long period which had elapsed since the repulse at Stormberg, General Gatacre had held his own

at Sterkstroom, under orders not to attack the enemy, repulsing them easily upon the only occasion when they

ventured to attack him. Now it was his turn also to profit by the success which Lord Roberts had won. On

February 23rd he reoccupied Molteno, and on the same day sent out a force to reconnoitre the enemy's

position at Stormberg. The incident is memorable as having been the cause of the death of Captain de

Montmorency,[Footnote: De Montmorency had established a remarkable influence over his rough followers.

To the end of the war they could not speak of him without tears in their eyes. When I asked Sergeant Howe

why his captain went almost alone up the hill, his answer was, 'Because the captain knew no fear.' Byrne, his

soldier servant (an Omdurman V.C. like his master), galloped madly off next morning with a saddled horse to

bring back his captain alive or dead, and had to be forcibly seized and restrained by our cavalry.] one of the

most promising of the younger officers of the British army. He had formed a corps of scouts, consisting

originally of four men, but soon expanding to seventy or eighty. At the head of these men he confirmed the

reputation for desperate valour which he bad won in the Soudan, and added to it proofs of the enterprise and

judgment which go to make a leader of light cavalry. In the course of the reconnaissance he ascended a small

kopje accompanied by three companions, Colonel Hoskier, a London Volunteer soldier, Vice, a civilian, and

Sergeant Howe. 'They are right on the top of us,' he cried to his comrades, as he reached the summit, and

dropped next instant with a bullet through his heart. Hoskier was shot in five places, and Vice was mortally

wounded, only Howe escaping. The rest of the scouts, being farther back, were able to get cover and to keep

up a fight until they were extricated by the remainder of the force. Altogether our loss was formidable rather

in quality than in quantity, for not more than a dozen were hit, while the Boers suffered considerably from the

On March 5th General Gatacre found that the Boers were retreating in front of him in response, no doubt,

to messages similar to those which had already been received at Colesberg. Moving forward he occupied the

position which had confronted him so long. Thence, having spent some days in drawing in his scattered

detachments and in mending the railway, he pushed forward on March 12th to Burghersdorp, and thence on

There are two bridges which span the broad muddy Orange River, thick with the washings of the Basutoland

mountains. One of these is the magnificent high railway bridge, already blown to ruins by the retreating

Boers. Dead men or shattered horses do not give a more vivid impression of the unrelenting brutality of war

than the sight of a structure, so graceful and so essential, blown into a huge heap of twisted girders and

broken piers. Half a mile to the west is the road bridge, broad and oldfashioned. The only hope of

preserving some mode of crossing the difficult river lay in the chance that the troops might anticipate the

In this they were singularly favoured by fortune. On the arrival of a small party of scouts and of the Cape

Police under Major NolanNeylan at the end of the bridge it was found that all was ready to blow it up, the

mine sunk, the detonator fixed, and the wire laid. Only the connection between the wire and the charge had

not been made. To make sure, the Boers had also laid several boxes of dynamite under the last span, in case

the mine should fail in its effect. The advance guard of the Police, only six in number, with NolanNeylan at

their head, threw themselves into a building which commanded the approaches of the bridge, and this handful

of men opened so spirited and wellaimed a fire that the Boers were unable to approach it. As fresh scouts

and policemen came up they were thrown into the firing line, and for a whole long day they kept the

destroyers from the bridge. Had the enemy known how weak they were and how far from supports, they

could have easily destroyed them, but the game of bluff was admirably played, and a fire kept up which held

The Boers were in a trench commanding the bridge, and their brisk fire made it impossible to cross. On the

other hand, our rifle fire commanded the mine and prevented any one from exploding it. But at the approach

of darkness it was certain that this would be done. The situation was saved by the gallantry of young Popham

of the Derbyshires, who crept across with two men and removed the detonators. There still remained the

dynamite under the further span, and this also they removed, carrying it off across the bridge under a heavy

fire. The work was made absolutely complete a little later by the exploit of Captain Grant of the Sappers, who

drew the charges from the holes in which they had been sunk, and dropped them into the river, thus avoiding

the chance that they might be exploded next morning by shell fire. The feat of Popham and of Grant was not

only most gallant but of extraordinary service to the country; but the highest credit belongs to NolanNeylan,

of the Police, for the great promptitude and galantry of his attack, and to McNeill for his support. On that

road bridge and on the pontoon bridge at Norval's Pont Lord Roberts's army was for a whole month

On March 15th Gatacre's force passed over into the Orange Free State, took possession of Bethulie, and sent

on the cavalry to Springfontein, which is the junction where the railways from Gape Town and from East

London meet. Here they came in contact with two battalions of Guards under PoleCarew, who had been

sent down by train from Lord Roberts's force in the north. With Roberts at Bloemfontein, Gatacre at

Springfontein, Clements in the southwest, and Brabant at Aliwal, the pacification of the southern portion of

the Free State appeared to be complete. Warlike operations seemed for the moment to be at an end, and

scattered parties traversed the country, 'billsticking,' as the troops called it that is, carrying Lord

In the meantime the colonial division of that fine old African fighter, General Brabant, had begun to play its

part in the campaign. Among the many judicious arrangements which Lord Roberts made immediately after

his arrival at the Cape was the assembling of the greater part of the scattered colonial bands into one division,

and placing over it a General of their own, a man who had defended the cause of the Empire both in the

legislative assembly and the field. To this force was entrusted the defence of the country lying to the east of

Gatacre's position, and on February 15th they advanced from Penhoek upon Dordrecht. Their Imperial troops

consisted of the Royal Scots and a section of the 79th R.F.A., the Colonial of Brabant's Horse, the Kaffrarian

Mounted Rifles, the Cape Mounted Rifles and Cape Police, with Queenstown and East London Volunteers.

The force moved upon Dordrecht, and on February 18th occupied the town after a spirited action, in which

Brabant's Horse played a distinguished part. On March 4th the division advanced once more with the object

Aided by the accurate fire of the 79th R.F.A., the colonials succeeded, after a long day of desultory fighting,

in driving the enemy from his position. Leaving a garrison in Dordrecht Brabant followed up his victory and

pushed forward with two thousand men and eight guns (six of them light 7pounders) to occupy Jamestown,

which was done without resistance. On March 10th the colonial force approached Aliwal, the frontier town,

and so rapid was the advance of Major Henderson with Brabant's Horse that the bridge at Aliwal was seized

before the enemy could blow it up. At the other side of the bridge there was a strong stand made by the

enemy, who had several Krupp guns in position; but the light horse, in spite of a loss of some twentyfive

men killed and wounded, held on to the heights which command the river. A week or ten days were spent in

pacifying the large northeastern portion of Cape Colony, to which Aliwal acts as a centre. Barkly East,

Herschel, Lady Grey, and other villages were visited by small detachments of the colonial horsemen, who

pushed forward also into the southeastern portion of the Free State, passing through Rouxville, and so along

the Basutoland border as far as Wepener. The rebellion in the Colony was now absolutely dead in the

northeast, while in the northwest in the Prieska and Carnarvon districts it was only kept alive by the fact that

the distances were so great and the rebel forces so scattered that it was very difficult for our flying columns to

reach them. Lord Kitchener had returned from Paardeberg to attend to this danger upon our line of

communications, and by his exertions all chance of its becoming serious soon passed. With a considerable

force of Yeomanry and Cavalry he passed swiftly over the country, stamping out the smouldering embers.

So much for the movements into the Free State of Clements, of Gatacre, and of Brabant. It only remains to

trace the not very eventful history of the Natal campaign after the relief of Ladysmith.

General Buller made no attempt to harass the retreat of the Boers, although in two days no fewer than two

thousand wagons were counted upon the roads to Newcastle and Dundee. The guns had been removed by

train, the railway being afterwards destroyed. Across the north of Natal lies the chain of the Biggarsberg

mountains, and to this the Transvaal Boers had retired, while the Freestaters had hurried through the passes of

the Drakensberg in time to make the fruitless opposition to Roberts's march upon their capital. No accurate

information had come in as to the strength of the Transvaalers, the estimates ranging from five to ten

thousand, but it was known that their position was formidable and their guns mounted in such a way as to

General Lyttelton's Division had camped as far out as Elandslaagte with Burn Murdoch's cavalry, while

Dundonald's brigade covered the space between Burn Murdoch's western outposts and the Drakensberg

passes. Few Boers were seen, hut it was known that the passes were held in some strength. Meanwhile the

line was being restored in the rear, and on March 9th the gallant White was enabled to take train for Durban,

though it was not until ten days later that the Colenso bridge was restored. The Ladysmith garrison had been

sent down to Colenso to recruit their health. There they were formed into a new division, the 4th, the brigades

being given to Howard and Knox, and the command to Lyttelton, who had returned his former division, the

second, to Clery. The 5th and 6th brigades were also formed into one division, the 10th, which was placed

under the capable command of Hunter, who had confirmed in the south the reputation which he had won in

the north of Africa. In the first week of April Hunter's Division was sent down to Durban and transferred to

the western side, where they were moved up to Kimberley, whence they advanced northwards. The man on

the horse has had in this war an immense advantage over the man on foot, but there have been times when the

man on the ship has restored the balance. Captain Mahan might find some fresh texts in the transference of

On April 10th the Boers descended from their mountains and woke up our sleepy army corps by a brisk

artillery fire. Our own guns silenced it, and the troops instantly relapsed into their slumber. There was no

movement for a fortnight afterwards upon either side, save that of Sir Charles Warren, who left the army in

order to take up the governorship of British Bechuanaland, a district which was still in a disturbed state, and

in which his presence had a peculiar significance, since he had rescued portions of it from Boer dornination in

the early days of the Transvaal Republic. Hildyard took over the command of the 5th Division. In this state of

inertia the Natal force remained until Lord Roberts, after a six weeks' halt in Bloenifontein, necessitated by

the insecurity of his railway communication and his want of every sort of military supply, more especially

horses for his cavalry and boots for his infantry, was at last able on May 2nd to start upon his famous march

to Pretoria. Before accompanying him, however, upon this victorious progress, it is necessary to devote a

chapter to the series of incidents and operations which had taken place to the east and southeast of

One incident must be recorded in this place, though it was political rather than military. This was the

interchange of notes concerning peace between Paul Kruger and Lord Salisbury. There is an old English

jingle about 'the fault of the Dutch, giving too little and asking too much,' but surely there was never a more

singular example of it than this. The united Presidents prepare for war for years, spring an insulting

ultimatum upon us, invade our unfortunate Colonies, solemnly annex all the portions invaded, and then, when

at last driven back, propose a peace which shall secure for them the whole point originally at issue. It is

difficult to believe that the proposals could have been seriously meant, but more probable that the plan may

have been to strengthen the hands of the Peace deputation who were being sent to endeavour to secure

European intervention. Could they point to a proposal from the Transvaal and a refusal from England, it

might, if not too curiously examined, excite the sympathy of those who follow emotions rather than facts.

`The Prsidents of the Orange Free State and of the South African Republic to the Marquess of Salisbury.

`The blood and the tears of the thousands who have suffered by this war, and the prospect of all the moral and

economic ruin with which South Africa is now threatened, make it necessary for both belligerents to ask

themselves dispassionately and as in the sight of the Triune God for what they are fighting and whether the

`With this object, and in view of the assertions of various British statesmen to the effect that this war was

begun and is carried on with the set purpose of undermining Her Majesty's authority in South Africa, and of

setting up an administration over all South Africa independent of Her Majesty's Government, we consider it

our duty to solemnly declare that this war was undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the

threatened independence of the South African Republic, and is only continued in order to secure and

safeguard the incontestable independence of both Republics as sovereign international States, and to obtain

the assurance that those of Her Majesty's subjects who have taken part with us in this war shall suffer no

`On these conditions, but on these conditions alone, are we now as in the past desirous of seeing peace

reestablished in South Africa, and of putting an end to the evils now reigning over South Africa; while, if

Her Majesty's Government is determined to destroy the independence of the Republics, there is nothing left

to us and to our people but to persevere to the end in the course already begun, in spite of the overwhelming

preeminence of the British Empire, conscious that that God who lighted the inextinguishable fire of the love

of freedom in our hearts and those of our fathers will not forsake us, but will accomplish His work in us and

`We hesitated to make this declaration earlier to your Excellency as we feared that, as long as the advantage

was always on our side, and as long as our forces held defensive positions far in Her Majesty's Colonies, such

a declaration might hurt the feelings of honour of the British people. But now that the prestige of the British

Empire may be considered to be assured by the capture of one of our forces, and that we are thereby forced to

evacuate other positions which we had occupied, that difficulty is over and we can no longer hesitate to

inform your Government and people in the sight of the whole civilised world why we are fighting and on

Such was the message, deep in its simplicity and cunning in its candour, which was sent by the old President,

for it is Kruger's style which we read in every line of it. One has to get back to facts after reading it, to the

enormous war preparations of the Republics, to the unprepared state of the British Colonies, to the ultimatum,

to the annexations, to the stirring up of rebeflion, to the silence about peace in the days of success, to the fact

that by 'inextinguishable love of freedom' is meant inextinguishable determination to hold other white men as

helots only then can we form a just opinion of the worth of his message. One must remember also, behind

the homely and pious phraseology, that one is dealing with a man who has been too cunning for us again and

again a man who is as wily as the savages with whom he has treated and fought. This Paul Kruger with

the simple words of peace is the same Paul Kruger who with gentle sayings insured the disarmament of

Johannesburg, and then instantly arrested his enemies the man whose name was a byword for 'slimness'

throughout South Africa. With such a man the best weapon is absolute naked truth with which Lord Salisbury

`I have the honour to acknowledge your Honours' telegram dated March 5th from Bloemfontein, of which the

purport was principally to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall recognise the "incontestable

independence" of the South African Republic and Orange Free State as "sovereign international States," and

`In the beginning of October last peace existed between Her Majesty and the two Republics under the

conventions which then were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some months between Her

Majesty's Government and the South African Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for certain

very serious grievances under which British residents in the. Republic were suffering. In the course of those

negotiations the Republic had, to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, made considerable

armaments, and the latter had consequently taken steps to provide corresponding reinforcements to the British

garrisons of Cape Town and Natal. No infringement of the rights guaranteed by the conventions had up to

that time taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two days' notice, the South African Republic, after

issuing an insulting ultimatum, declared war, and the Orange Free State with whom there had not even been

any discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were immediately invaded by the two

Republics, siege was laid to three towns within the British frontier, a large portion of the two Colonies was

overrun with great destruction to property and life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants as if

those dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In anticipation of these operations the South

African Republic had been accumulating for many years past military stores upon an enormous scale, which

`Your Honours make some observations of a negative character upon the object with which these

preparations were made. I do not think it necessary to discuss the questions which you have raised. But the

result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy, has been that the British Empire has been

compelled to confront an invasion which has entailed a costly war and the loss of thousands of precious lives.

This great calamity has been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in recent years

`In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the position which was given to them, and the

calamities which their unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions, Her Majesty's

Government can only answer your Honours' telegram by saying that they are not prepared to assent to the

With this frank and uncompromising reply the Empire, with the exception of a small party of dupes and

doctrin aires, heartily agreed. The pens were dropped, and the Mauser and the LeeMetford once more took

On March 13th Lord Roberts occupied the capital of the Orange Free State. On May 1st, more than six weeks

later, the advance was resumed. This long delay was absolutely necessary in order to supply the place of the

ten thousand horses and mules which are said to have been used up in the severe work of the preceding

month. It was not merely that a large number of the cavalry chargers had died or been abandoned, but it was

that of those which remained the majority were in a state wbich made them useless for immediate service.

How far this might have been avoided is open to question, for it is notorious that General French's reputation

as a horsemaster does not stand so high as his fame as a cavalry leader. But besides the horses there was

urgent need of every sort of supply, from boots to hospitals, and the only way by which they could come was

by two singleline railways which unite into one singleline railway, with the alternative of passing over a

precarious pontoon bridge at Norval's Pont, or truck by truck over the road bridge at Bethulie. To support an

army of fifty thousand men under these circumstances, eight hundred miles from a base, is no light matter,

and a premature advance which could not be thrust home would be the greatest of misfortunes. The public at

home and the army in Africa became restless under the inaction, but it was one more example of the absolute

soundness of Lord Roberts's judgment and the quiet resolution with which he adheres to it. He issued a

proclamation to the inhabitants of the Free State promising protection to all who should bring in their arms

and settle down upon their farms. The most stringent orders were issued against looting or personal violence,

but nothing could exceed the gentleness and good humour of the troops. Indeed there seemed more need for

an order which should protect them against the extortion of their conquered enemies. It is strange to think that

we are separated by only ninety years from the savage soldiery of Badajoz and San Sebastian.

The streets of the little Dutch town formed during this interval a curious objectlesson in the resources of the

Empire. All the scattered AngloCeltic races had sent their best blood to fight for the common cause. Peace

is the great solvent, as war is the powerful unifier. For the British as for the German Empire much virtue had

come from the stress and strain of battle. To stand in the market square of Bloemfontein and to see the

warrior types around you was to be assured of the future of the race. The middlesized, squareset,

weathertanned, strawbearded British regulars crowded the footpaths. There also one might see the

hardfaced Canadians, the looselimbed dashing Australians, fireblooded and keen, the dark

NewZealanders, with a Maori touch here and there in their features, the gallant men of Tasmania, the

gentlemen troopers of India and Ceylon, and everywhere the wild South African irregulars with their

bandoliers and unkempt wiry horses, Rimington's men with the racoon bands, Roberts's Horse with the black

plumes, some with pink puggarees, some with birdseye, but all of the same type, hard, rugged, and alert. The

man who could look at these splendid soldiers, and, remembering the sacrifices of time, money, and comfort

which most of them had made before they found themselves fighting in the heart of Africa, doubt that the

spirit of the race burned now as brightly as ever, must be devoid of judgment and sympathy. The real glories

of the British race lie in the future, not in the past. The Empire walks, and may still walk, with an uncertain

step, but with every year its tread will be firmer, for its weakness is that of waxing youth and not of waning

The greatest misfortune of the campaign, one which it was obviously impolitic to insist upon at the time,

began with the occupation of Bloemfontein. This was the great outbreak of enteric among the troops. For

more than two months the hospitals were choked with sick. One general hospital with five hundred beds held

seventeen hundred sick, nearly all enterics. A half field hospital with fifty beds held three hundred and

seventy cases. The total number of cases could not have been less than six or seven thousand and this not

of an evanescent and easily treated complaint, but of the most persistent and debilitating of continued fevers,

the one too which requires the most assiduous attention and careful nursing. How great was the strain only

those who had to meet it can tell. The exertions of the military hospitals and of those others which were fitted

out by private benevolence sufficed, after a long struggle, to meet the crisis. At Bloemfontein alone, as many

as fifty men died in one day, and more than 1,000 new graves in the cemetery testify to the severity of the

epidemic. No men in the campaign served their country more truly than the officers and men of the medical

service, nor can any one who went through the epidemic forget the bravery and unselfishness of those

admirable nursing sisters who set the men around them a higher standard of devotion to duty.

Enteric fever is always endemic in the country, and especially at Bloemfontein, but there can be no doubt that

this severe outbreak had its origin in the Paardeberg water. All through the campaign, while the machinery

for curing disease was excellent, that for preventing it was elementary or absent. If bad water can cost us

more than all the bullets of the enemy, then surely it is worth our while to make the drinking of unboiled

water a stringent military offence, and to attach to every company and squadron the most rapid and efficient

means for boiling it for filtering alone is useless. An incessant trouble it would be, but it would have saved

a division for the army. It is heartrending for the medical man who has emerged from a hospital full of

waterborn pestilence to see a regimental watercart being filled, without protest, at some polluted wayside

pool. With precautions and with inoculation all those lives might have been saved. The fever died down with

To return to the military operations: these, although they were stagnant so far as the main army was

concerned, were exceedingly and inconveniently active in other quarters. Three small actions, two of which

were disastrous to our arms, and one successful defence marked the period of the pause at Bloemfontein.

To the north of the town, some twelve miles distant lies the ubiquitous Modder River, which is crossed by a

railway bridge at a place named Glen. The saving of the bridge was of considerable importance, and might by

the universal testimony of the farmers of that district have been effected any time within the first few days of

our occupation. We appear, however, to have imperfectly appreciated how great was the demoralisation of

the Boers. In a week or so they took heart, returned, and blew up the bridge. Roving parties of the enemy,

composed mainly of the redoubtable Johannesburg police, reappeared even to the south of the river. Young

Lygon was killed, and Colonels Crabbe and Codrington with Captain Trotter, all of the Guards, were severely

wounded by such a body, whom they gallantly but injudiciously attempted to arrest when armed only with

These wandering patrols who kept the country unsettled, and harassed the farmers who had taken advantage

of Lord Roberts's proclamation, were found to have their centre at a point some six miles to the north of Glen,

named Karee. At Karee a formidable line of hills cut the British advance, and these had been occupied by a

strong body of the enemy with guns. Lord Roberts determined to drive them off, and on March 28th Tucker's

7th Division, consisting of Chermside's brigade (Lincolns, Norfolks, Hampshires, and Scottish Borderers),

and Wavell's brigade (Cheshires, East Lancashires, North Staffords, and South Wales Borderers), were

assembled at Glen. The artillery consisted of the veteran 18th, 62nd, and 75th R.F.A. Three attenuated

The movement was to be upon the old model, and in result it proved to be only too truly so. French's cavalry

were to get round one flank, Le Gallais's mounted infantry round the other, and Tucker's Division to attack in

front. Nothing could be more perfect in theory and nothing apparently more defective in practice. Since on

this as on other occasions the mere fact that the cavalry were demonstrating in the rear caused the complete

abandonment of the position, it is difficult to see what the object of the infantry attack could be. The ground

was irregular and unexplored, and it was late before the horsemen on their weary steeds found themselves

behind the flank of the enemy. Some of them, Le Gallais's mounted infantry and Davidson's guns, had come

from Bloemfontein during the night, and the horses were exhausted by the long march, and by the absurd

weight which the British troophorse is asked to carry. Tucker advanced his infantry exactly as KellyKenny

had done at Driefontein, and with a precisely similar result. The eight regiments going forward in echelon of

battalions imagined from the silence of the enemy that the position had been abandoned. They were

undeceived by a cruel fire which beat upon two companies of the Scottish Borderers from a range of two

hundred yards. They were driven back, but reformed in a donga. About halfpast two a Boer gun burst

shrapnel over the Lincolnshires and Scottish Borderers with some effect, for a single shell killed five of the

latter regiment. Chermside's brigade was now all involved in the fight, and Wavell's came up in support, but

the ground was too open and the position too strong to push the attack home. Fortunately, about four o'clock,

the horse batteries with French began to make their presence felt from behind, and the Boers instantly quitted

their position and made off through the broad gap which still remained between French and Le Gallais. The

Brandfort plain appears to be ideal ground for cavalry, but in spite of that the enemy with his guns got safely

away. The loss of the infantry amounted to one hundred and sixty killed and wounded, the larger share of the

casualties and of the honour falling to the Scottish Borderers and the East Lancashires. The infantry was not

well handled, the cavalry was slow, and the guns were inefficientaltogether an inglorious day. Yet

strategically it was of importance, for the ridge captured was the last before one came to the great plain which

stretched, with a few intermissions, to the north. From March 29th until May 2nd Karee remained the

In the meanwhile there had been a series of operations in the east which had ended in a serious disaster.

Immediately after the occupation of Bloemfontein (on March 18th) Lord Roberts despatched to the east a

small column consisting of the 10th Hussars, the composite regiment, two batteries (Q and U) of the Horse

Artillery, some mounted infantry, Roberts's Horse, and Rimington's Guides. On the eastern horizon forty

miles from the capital, but in that clear atmosphere looking only half the distance, there stands the impressive

mountain named Thabanchu (the black mountain). To all Boers it is an historical spot, for it was at its base

that the wagons of the Voortrekkers, coming by devious ways from various parts, assembled. On the further

side of Thabanchu, to the north and east of it, lies the richest graingrowing portion of the Free State, the

centre of which is Ladybrand. The forty miles which intervene between Bloemfontein and Thabanchu are

intersected midway by the Modder River. At this point are the waterworks, erected recently with modern

machinery, to take the place of the insanitary wells on which the town had been dependent. The force met

Colonel Pilcher, the leader of the Douglas raid, was inclined to explore a little further, and with three

squadrons of mounted men he rode on to the eastward. Two commandos, supposed to be Grobler's and

Olivier's, were seen by them, moving on a line which suggested that they were going to join Steyn, who was

known to be rallying his forces at Kroonstad, his new seat of government in the north of the Free State.

Pilcher, with great daring, pushed onwards until with his little band on their tired horses he found himself in

Ladybrand, thirty miles from his nearest supports. Entering the town he seized the landdrost and the

fieldcornet, but found that strong bodies of the enemy were moving upon him and that it was impossible for

him to hold the place. He retired, therefore, holding grimly on to his prisoners, and got back with small loss

to the place from which he started. It was a dashing piece of bluff, and, when taken with the Douglas exploit,

leads one to hope that Pilcher may have a chance of showing what he can do witb larger means at his

disposal. Finding that the enemy was following him in force, he pushed on the same night for Thabanchu. His

horsemen must have covered between fifty and sixty miles in the twentyfour hours.

Apparently the effect of Pilcher's exploit was to halt the march of those commandos which had been seen

trekking to the northwest, and to cause them to swing round upon Thabanchu. Broadwood, a young cavalry

commander who had won a name in Egypt, considered that his position was unnecessarily exposed and fell

back upon Bloemfontein. He halted on the first night near the waterworks, halfway upon his journey.

The Boers are great masters in the ambuscade. Never has any race shown such aptitude for this form of

warfare a legacy from a long succession of contests with cunning savages. But never also have they done

anything so clever and so audacious as De Wet's dispositions in this action. One cannot go over the ground

without being amazed at the ingenuity of their attack, and also at the luck which favoured them, for the trap

which they had laid for others might easily have proved an absolutely fatal one for themselves.

The position beside the Modder at which the British camped had numerous broken hills to the north and east

of it. A force of Boers, supposed to number about two thousand men, came down in the night, bringing with

them several heavy guns, and with the early morning opened a brisk fire upon the camp. The surprise was

complete. But the refinement of the Boer tactics lay in the fact that they had a surprise within a surprise

The force which Broadwood had with him consisted of the 10th Hussars and the composite regiment,

Rimington's Scouts, Roberts's Horse, the New Zealand and Burmah Mounted Infantry, with Q and U batteries

of Horse Artillery. With such a force, consisting entirely of mounted men, he could not storm the hills upon

which the Boer guns were placed, and his twelvepounders were unable to reach the heavier cannon of the

enemy. His best game was obviously to continue his march to Bloemfontein. He sent on the considerable

convoy of wagons and the guns, while he with the cavalry covered the rear, upon which the longrange

Broadwood's retreating column now found itself on a huge plain which stretches all the way to Bloemfontein,

broken only by two hills, both of which were known to be in our possession. The plain was one which was

continually traversed from end to end by our troops and convoys, so that once out upon its surface all danger

seemed at an end. Broadwood had additional reasons for feeling secure, for he knew that, in answer to his

own wise request, Colvile's Division had been sent out before daybreak that morning from Bloemfontein to

meet him. In a very few miles their vanguard and his must come together. There were obviously no Boers

upon the plain, but if there were they would find themselves between two fires. He gave no thought to his

front therefore, but rode behind, where the Boer guns were roaring, and whence the Boer riflemen might ride.

But in spite of the obvious there WERE Boers upon the plain, so placed that they must either bring off a

remarkable surprise or be themselves cut off to a man. Across the veldt, some miles from the waterworks,

there runs a deep donga or watercourse one of many, but the largest. It cuts the rough road at right angles.

Its depth and breadth are such that a wagon would dip down the incline, and disappear for about two minutes

before it would become visible again at the crown of the other side. In appearance it was a huge curving ditch

with a stagnant stream at the bottom. The sloping sides of the ditch were fringed with Boers, who had ridden

thither before dawn and were now waiting for the unsuspecting column. There were not more than three

hundred of them, and four times their number were approaching; but no odds can represent the difference

There were two dangers, however, which the Boers ran, and, skilful as their dispositions were, their luck was

equally great, for the risks were enormous. One was that a force coming the other way (Colvile's was only a

few miles off) would arrive, and that they would be ground between the upper and the lower millstone. The

other was that for once the British scouts might give the alarm and that Broadwood's mounted men would

wheel swiftly to right and left and secure the ends of the long donga. Should that happen, not a man of them

could possibly escape. But they took their chances like brave men, and fortune was their friend. The wagons

came on without any scouts. Behind them was U battery, then Q, with Roberts's Horse abreast of them and

As the wagons, occupied for the most part only by unarmed sick soldiers and black transport drivers, came

down into the drift, the Boers quickly but quietly took possession of them, and drove them on up the further

slope. Thus the troops behind saw their wagons dip down, reappear, and continue on their course. The idea of

an ambush could not suggest itself. Only one thing could avert an absolute catastrophe, and that was the

appearance of a hero who would accept certain death in order to warn his comrades. Such a man rode by the

wagons though, unhappily, in the stress and rush of the moment there is no certainty as to his name or

rank. We only know that one was found brave enough to fire his revolver in the face of certain death. The

outburst of firing which answered his shot was the sequel which saved the column. Not often is it given to a

But the detachment was already so placed that nothing could save it from heavy loss. The wagons had all

passed but nine, and the leading battery of artillery was at the very edge of the donga. Nothing is so helpless

as a limberedup battery. In an instant the teams were shot down and the gunners were made prisoners. A

terrific fire burst at the same instant upon Roberts's Horse, who were abreast of the guns. 'Files a bout!

gallop!' yelled Colonel Dawson, and by his exertions and those of Major PackBeresford the corps was

extricated and reformed some hundreds of yards further off. But the loss of horses and men was heavy. Major

PackBeresford and other officers were shot down, and every unhorsed man remained necessarily as a

As Roberts's Horse turned and galloped for dear life across the flat, four out of the six guns [Footnote:Of the

other two one overturned and could not be righted, the other had the wheelers shot and could not be

extricated from the tumult. It was officially stated that the guns of Q battery were halted a thousand yards off

the donga, but my impression was, from examining the ground, that it was not more than six hundred.] of Q

battery and one gun (the rearmost) of U battery swung round nd dashed frantically for a place of safety. At

the same instant every Boer along the line of the donga sprang up and emptied his magazine into the mass of

rushing, shouting soldiers, plunging horses, and screaming Kaffirs. It was for a few moments a

SAUVEQUIPEUT. SerjeantMajor Martin of U, with a single driver on a wheeler, got away the last gun

of his battery. The four guns which were extricated of Q, under Major PhippsHornby, whirled across the

plain, pulled up, unlimbered, and opened a brisk fire of shrapnel from about a thousand yards upon the donga.

Had the battery gone on for double the distance, its action would have been more effective, for it would have

been under a less deadly rifle fire, but in any case its sudden change from flight to discipline and order

steadied the whole force. Roberts's men sprang from their horses, and with the Burmese and NewZealanders

flung themselves down in a skirmish line. The cavalry moved to the left to find some drift by which the

donga could be passed, and out of chaos there came in a few minutes calm and a settled purpose.

It was for Q battery to cover the retreat of the force, and most nobly it did it. A fortnight later a pile of horses,

visible many hundreds of yards off across the plain, showed where the guns had stood. It was the Colenso of

the horse gunners. In a devilish sleet of lead they stood to their work, loading and firing while a man was left.

Some of the guns were left with two men to work them, one was loaded and fired by a single officer. When at

last the order for retirement came, only ten men, several of them wounded, were left upon their feet. With

scratch teams from the limbers, driven by single gunners, the twelvepounders staggered out of action, and

the skirmish line of mounted infantry sprang to their feet amid the hail of bullets to cheer them as they

It was no slight task to extricate that sorely stricken force from the close contact of an exultant enemy, and to

lead it across that terrible donga. Yet, thanks to the coolness of Broadwood and the steadiness of his

rearguard, the thing was done. A practicable passage had been found two miles to the south by Captain

ChesterMaster of Rimington's. This corps, with Roberts's, the NewZealanders, and the 3rd Mounted

Infantry, covered the withdrawal in turn. It was one of those actions in which the horseman who is trained to

fight upon foot did very much better than the regular cavalry. In two hours' time the drift had been passed and

The losses in this disastrous but not dishonourable engagement were severe. About thirty officers and five

hundred men were killed, wounded, or missing. The prisoners came to more than three hundred. They lost a

hundred wagons, a considerable quantity of stores, and seven twelvepounder guns five from U battery

and two from Q. Of U battery only Major Taylor and SergeantMajor Martin seem to have escaped, the rest

being captured EN BLOC. Of Q battery nearly every man was killed or wounded. Roberts's Horse, the

NewZealanders, and the mounted infantry were the other corps which suffered most heavily. Among many

brave men who died, none was a greater loss to the service than Major Booth of the Northumberland

Fusiliers, serving in the mounted infantry. With four comrades he held a position to cover the retreat, and

refused to leave it. Such men are inspired by the traditions of the past, and pass on the story of their own

Broadwood, the instant that he had disentangled himself, faced about, and brought his guns into action. He

was not strong enough, however, nor were his men in a condition, to seriously attack the enemy. Martyr's

mounted infantry had come up, led by the Queenslanders, and at the cost of some loss to themselves helped to

extricate the disordered force. Colvile's Division was behind Bushman's Kop, only a few miles off, and there

were hopes that it might push on and prevent the guns and wagons from being removed. Colvile did make an

advance, but slowly and in a flanking direction instead of dashing swiftly forward to retrieve the situation. It

must be acknowledged, however, that the problem which faced this General was one of great difficulty. It

was almost certain that before he could throw his men into the action the captured guns would be beyond his

reach, and it was possible that he might swell the disaster. With all charity, however, one cannot but feel that

his return next morning, after a reinforcement during the night, without any attempt to force the Boer

position, was lacking in enterprise.[Footnote: It may be urged in General Colvile's defence that his division

had already done a long march from Bloemfontein. A division, however, which contains two such brigades as

Macdonald's and SmithDorrien's may safely be called upon for any exertions. The gunner officers in

Colvile's division heard their comrades' guns in 'sectionfire' and knew it to be the sign of a desperate

situation.] The victory left the Boers in possession of the waterworks, and Bloemfontein had to fall back upon

her wells a change which reacted most disastrously upon the enteric which was already decimating the

The effect of the Sanna's Post defeat was increased by the fact that only four days later (on April 4th) a

second even more deplorable disaster befell our troops. This was the surrender of five companies of infantry,

two of them mounted, at Reddersberg. So many surrenders of small bodies of troops had occurred during the

course of the war that the public, remembering how seldom the word 'surrender' had ever been heard in our

endless succession of European wars, had become very restive upon the subject, and were sometimes inclined

to question whether this new and humiliating fact did not imply some deterioration of our spirit. The fear was

natural, and yet nothing could be more unjust to this the most splendid army which has ever marched under

the redcrossed flag. The fact was new because the conditions were new, and it was inherent in those

conditions. In that country of huge distances small bodies must be detached, for the amount of space covered

by the large bodies was not sufficient for all military purposes. In reconnoitring, in distributing

proclamations, in collecting arms, in overawing outlying districts, weak columns must be used. Very often

these columns must contain infantry soldiers, as the demands upon the cavalry were excessive. Such bodies,

moving through a hilly country with which they were unfamiliar, were always liable to be surrounded by a

mobile enemy. Once surrounded the length of their resistance was limited by three things: their cartridges,

their water, and their food. When they had all three, as at Wepener or Mafeking, they could hold out

indefinitely. When one or other was wanting, as at Reddersberg or Nicholson's Nek, their position was

impossible. They could not break away, for how can men on foot break away from horsemen? Hence those

repeated humiliations, which did little or nothing to impede the course of the war, and which were really to be

accepted as one of the inevitable prices which we had to pay for the conditions under which the war was

fought. Numbers, discipline, and resources were with us. Mobility, distances, nature of the country, insecurity

of supplies, were with them. We need not take it to heart therefore if it happened, with all these forces acting

against them, that our soldiers found themselves sometimes in a position whence neither wisdom nor valour

could rescue them. To travel through that country, fashioned above all others for defensive warfare, with

trench and fort of superhuman size and strength, barring every path, one marvels how it was that such

incidents were not more frequent and more serious. It is deplorable that the white flag should ever have

waved over a company of British troops, but the man who is censorious upon the subject has never travelled

In the disaster at Reddersberg three of the companies were of the Irish Rifles, and two of the 2nd

Northumberland Fusiliers the same unfortunate regiments which had already been cut up at Stormberg.

They had been detached from Gatacre's 3rd Division, the headquarters of which was at Springfontein. On the

abandonment of Thabanchu and the disaster of Sanna's Post, it was obvious that we should draw in our

detached parties to the east; so the five companies were ordered to leave Dewetsdorp, which they were

garrisoning, and to get back to the railway line. Either the order was issued too late, or they were too slow in

obeying it, for they were only halfway upon their journey, near the town of Reddersberg, when the enemy

came down upon them with five guns. Without artillery they were powerless, but, having seized a kopje, they

took such shelter as they could find, and waited in the hope of succour. Their assailants seem to have been

detached from De Wet's force in the north, and contained among them many of the victors of Sanna's Post.

The attack began at 11 A.M. of April 3rd, and all day the men lay among the stones, subjected to the pelt of

shell and bullet. The cover was good, however, and the casualties were not heavy. The total losses were under

fifty killed and wounded. More serious than the enemy's fire was the absence of water, save a very limited

supply in a cart. A message was passed through of the dire straits in which they found themselves, and by the

late afternoon the news had reached headquarters. Lord Roberts instantly despatched the Camerons, just

arrived from Egypt, to Bethany, which is the nearest point upon the line, and telegraphed to Gatacre at

Springfontein to take measures to save his compromised detachment. The telegram should have reached

Gatacre early on the evening of the 3rd, and he had collected a force of fifteen hundred men, entrained it,

journeyed forty miles up the line, detrained it, and reached Reddersberg, which is ten or twelve miles from

the line, by 10.30 next morning. Already, however, it was too late, and the besieged force, unable to face a

second day without water under that burning sun, had laid down their arms. No doubt the stress of thirst was

dreadful, and yet one cannot say that the defence rose to the highest point of resolution. Knowing that help

could not be far off, the garrison should have held on while they could lift a rifle. If the ammunition was

running low, it was bad management which caused it to be shot away too fast. Captain McWhinnie, who was

in command, behaved with the utmost personal gallantry. Not only the troops but General Gatacre also was

involved in the disaster. Blame may have attached to him for leaving a detachment at Dewetsdorp, and not

having a supporting body at Reddersberg upon which it might fall back; but it must be remembered that his

total foree was small and that he had to cover a long stretch of the lines of communication. As to General

Gatacre's energy and gallantry it is a byword in the army; but coming after the Stormberg disaster this fresh

mishap to his force made the continuance of his command impossible. Much sympathy was felt with him in

the army, where he was universally liked and respected by officers and men. He returned to England, and his

In a single week, at a time when the back of the war had seemed to be broken, we had lost nearly twelve

hundred men with seven guns. The men of the Free State for the fighting was mainly done by commandos

from the Ladybrand, Winburg, Bethlehem, and Harrismith districts deserve great credit for this fine effort,

and their leader De Wet confirmed the reputation which he had already gained as a dashing and indefatigable

leader. His force was so weak that when Lord Roberts was able to really direct his own against it, he brushed

it away before him; but the manner in which De Wet took advantage of Roberts's enforced immobility, and

dared to get behind so mighty an enemy, was a fine exhibition of courage and enterprise. The public at home

chafed at this sudden and unexpected turn of affairs; but the General, constant to his own fixed purpose, did

not permit his strength to be wasted, aud his cavalry to be again disorganised, by flying excursions, but

In this short period of depression there came one gleam of light from the west. This was the capture of a

commando of sixty Boers, or rather of sixty foreigners fighting for the Boers, and the death of the gallant

Frenchman, De VilleboisMareuil, who appears to have had the ambition of playing Lafayette in South

Africa to Kruger's Washington. From the time that Kimberley had been reoccupied the British had been

accumulating their force there so as to make a strong movement which should coincide with that of Roberts

from Bloemfontein. Hunter's Division from Natal was being moved round to Kimberley, and Methuen

already commanded a considerable body of troops, which included a number of the newly arrived Imperial

Yeomanry. With these Methuen pacified the surrounding country, and extended his outposts to Barkly West

on the one side, to Boshof on the other, and to Warrenton upon the Vaal River in the centre. On April 4th

news reached Boshof that a Boer commando had been seen some ten miles to the east of the town, and a

force, consisting of Yeomanry, Kimberley Light Horse, and half of Butcher's veteran 4th battery, was sent to

attack them. They were found to have taken up their position upon a kopje which, contrary to all Boer

custom, had no other kopjes to support it. French generalship was certainly not so astute as Boer cunning.

The kopje was instantly surrounded, and the small force upon the summit being without artillery in the face

of our guns found itself in exactly the same position which our men had been in twentyfour hours before at

Reddersberg. Again was shown the advantage which the mounted rifleman has over the cavalry, for the

Yeomanry and Light Horsemen left their horses and ascended the hill with the bayonet. In three hours all was

over and the Boers had laid down their arms. Villebois was shot with seven of his companions, and there

were nearly sixty prisoners. It speaks well for the skirmishing of the Yeomanry and the way in which they

were handled by Lord Chesham that though they worked their way up the hill under fire they only lost four

killed and a few wounded. The affair was a small one, but it was complete, and it came at a time when a

success was very welcome. One bustling week had seen the expensive victory of Karee, the disasters of

Sanna's Post and Reddersberg, and the successful skirmish of Boshof. Another chapter must be devoted to the

movement towards the south of the Boer forces and the dispositions which Lord Roberts made to meet it.

Lord Roberts never showed his selfcommand and fixed purpose more clearly than during his six weeks' halt

at Bloemfontein. De Wet, the most enterprising and aggressive of the Boer commanders, was attacking his

eastern posts and menacing his line of communications. A fussy or nervous general would have harassed his

men and worn out his horses by endeavouring to pursue a number of willofthewisp commandos. Roberts

contented himself by building up his strength at the capital, and by spreading nearly twenty thousand men

along his line of rail from Bloemfontein to Bethulie. When the time came he would strike, but until then he

rested. His army was not only being rehorsed and reshod, but in some respects was being reorganised. One

powerful weapon which was forged during those weeks was the collection of the mounted infantry of the

central army into one division, which was placed under the command of Ian Hamilton, with Hutton and

Ridley as brigadiers. Hutton's brigade contained the Canadians, New South Wales men, West Australians,

Queenslanders, NewZealanders, Victorians, South Australians, and Tasmanians, with four battalions of

Imperial Mounted Infantry, and several light batteries. Ridley's brigade contained the South African irregular

regiments of cavalry, with some imperial troops. The strength of the whole division came to over ten

thousand rifles, and in its ranks there rode the hardiest and best from every corner of the earth over which the

A word as to the general distribution of the troops at this instant while Roberts was gathering himself for his

spring. Eleven divisions of infantry were in the field. Of these the 1st (Methuen's) and half the 10th (Hunter's)

were at Kimberley, forming really the hundredmiledistant left wing of Lord Roberts's army. On that side

also was a considerable force of Yeomanry, as General Villebois discovered. In the centre with Roberts was

the 6th division (KellyKenny's) at Bloemfontein, the 7th (Tucker's) at Karee, twenty miles north, the 9th

(Colvile's) and the 11th (PoleCarew's) near Bloemfontein. French's cavalry division was also in the centre.

As one descended the line towards the Cape one came on the 3rd division (Chermside's, late Gatacre's),

which had now moved up to Reddersberg, and then, further south, the 8th (Rundle's), near Rouxville. To the

south and east was the other half of Hunter's division (Hart's brigade), and Brabant's Colonial division, half of

which was shut up in Wepener and the rest at Aliwal. These were the troops operating in the Free State, with

There remained the three divisions in Natal, the 2nd (Clery's), the 4th (Lyttelton's), and the 5th (Hildyard's,

late Warren's), with the cavalry brigades of BurnMurdoch, Dundonald, and Brocklehurst. These, with

numerous militia and unbrigaded regiments along the lines of communication, formed the British army in

South Africa. At Mafeking some 900 irregulars stood at bay, with another force about as large under Plumer

a little to the north, endeavouring to relieve them. At Beira, a Portuguese port through which we have treaty

rights by which we may pass troops, a curious mixed force of Australians, NewZealanders and others was

being disembarked and pushed through to Rhodesia, so as to cut off any trek which the Boers might make in

tbat direction. Carrington, a fierce old soldier with a large experience of South African warfare, was in

command of this picturesque force, which moved amid tropical forests over crocodilehaunted streams,

while their comrades were shivering in the cold southerly winds of a Cape winter. Neither our Government,

our people, nor the world understood at the beginning of this campaign how grave was the task which we had

undertaken, but, having once realised it, it must be acknowledged that it was carried through in no

halfhearted way. So vast was the scene of operations that the Canadian might almost find his native climate

To follow in close detail the movements of the Boers and the counter movements of the British in the

southeast portion of the Free State during this period would tax the industry of the historian and the patience

of the reader. Let it be told with as much general truth and as little geographical detail as possible. The

narrative which is interrupted by an eternal reference to the map is a narrative spoiled.

The main force of the Freestaters had assembled in the northeastern corner of their State, and from this they

made their sally southwards, attacking or avoiding at their pleasure the eastern line of British outposts. Their

first engagement, that of Sanna's Post, was a great and deserved success. Three days later they secured the

five companies at Reddersberg. Warned in time, the other small British bodies closed in upon their supports,

and the railway line, that nourishing artery which was necessary for the very existence of the army, was held

too strongly for attack. The Bethulie Bridge was a particularly important point; but though the Boers

approached it, and even went the length of announcing officially that they had destroyed it, it was not actually

attacked. At Wepener, however, on the Basutoland border, they found an isolated force, and proceeded at

once, according to their custom, to hem it in and to bombard it, until one of their three great allies, want of

On this occasion, however, the Boers had undertaken a task which was beyond their strength. The troops at

Wepener were one thousand seven hundred in number, and formidable in quality. The place had been

occupied by part of Brabant's Colonial division, consisting of hardy irregulars, men of the stuff of the

defenders of Mafeking. Such men are too shrewd to be herded into an untenable position and too valiant to

surrender a tenable one. The force was commanded by a dashing soldier, Colonel Dalgety, of the Cape

Mounted Rifles, as tough a fighter as his famous namesake. There were with him nearly a thousand men of

Brabant's Horse, four hundred of the Cape Mounted Rifles, four hundred Kaffrarian Horse, with some scouts,

and one hundred regulars, including twenty invaluable Sappers. They were strong in guns two

sevenpounders, two naval twelvepounders, two fifteenpounders and several machine guns. The position

which they had taken up, Jammersberg, three miles north of Wepener, was a very strong one, and it would

have taken a larger force than De Wet had at his disposal to turn them out of it. The defence had been

arranged by Major Cedric Maxwell, of the Sappers; and though the huge perimeter, nearly eight miles, made

its defence by so small a force a most difficult matter, the result proved how good his dispositions were.

At the same time, the Boers came on with every confidence of victory, for they had a superiority in guns and

an immense superiority in men. But after a day or two of fierce struggle their attack dwindled down into a

mere blockade. On April 9th they attacked furiously, both by day and by night, and on the 10th the pressure

was equally severe. In these two days occurred the vast majority of the casualties. But the defenders took

cover in a way to which British regulars have not yet attained, and they outshot their opponents both with

their rifles and their cannon. Captain Lukin's management of the artillery was particularly skilful. The

weather was vile and the hastily dug trenches turned into ditches half full of water, but neither discomfort nor

danger shook the courage of the gallant colonials. Assault after assault was repulsed, and the scourging of the

cannon was met with stolid endurance. The Boers excelled all their previous feats in the handling of artillery

by dragging two guns up to the summit of the lofty Jammersberg, whence they fired down upon the camp.

Nearly all the horses were killed and three hundred of the troopers were hit, a number which is double that of

the official return, for the simple reason that the spirit of the force was so high that only those who were very

severely wounded reported themselves as wounded at all. None but the serious cases ever reached the hands

of Dr. Faskally, who did admirable work with very slender resources. How many the enemy lost can never be

certainly known, but as they pushed home several attacks it is impossible to imagine that their losses were

less than those of the victorious defenders. At the end of seventeen days of mud and blood the brave

irregulars saw an empty laager and abandoned trenches. Their own resistance and the advance of Brabant to

their rescue had caused a hasty retreat of the enemy. Wepener, Mafeking, Kimberley, the taking of the first

guns at Ladysmith, the deeds of the Imperial Light Horse it cannot be denied that our irregular South

African forces have a brilliant record for the war. They are associated with many successes and with few

disasters. Their fine record cannot, I think, be fairly ascribed to any greater hardihood which one portion of

our race has when compared with another, for a South African must admit that in the best colonial corps at

least half the men were Britons of Britain. In the Imperial Light Horse the proportion was very much higher.

But what may fairly be argued is that their exploits have proved, what the American war proved long ago,

that the German conception of discipline is an obsolete fetish, and that the spirit of free men, whose

individualism has been encouraged rather than crushed, is equal to any feat of arms. The clerks and miners

and engineers who went up Elandslaagte Hill without bayonets, shoulder to shoulder with the Gordons, and

who, according to Sir George White, saved Ladysmith on January 6th, have shown for ever that with men of

our race it is the spirit witbin, and not the drill or the discipline, that makes a formidable soldier. An intligent

appreciation of the fact might in the course of the next few years save us as much money as would go far to

It may well be asked how for so long a period as seventeen days the British could tolerate a force to the rear

of them when with their great superiority of numbers they could have readily sent an army to drive it away.

The answer must be that Lord Roberts had despatched his trusty lieutenant, Kitchener, to Aliwal, whence he

had been in heliographic communication with Wepener, that he was sure that the place could hold out, and

that he was using it, as he did Kimberley, to hold the enemy while he was making his plans for their

destruction. This was the bait to tempt them to their ruin. Had the trap not been a little slow in closing, the

war in the Free State might have ended then and there. From the 9th to the 25th the Boers were held in front

of Wepener. Let us trace the movements of the other British detachments during that time.

Brabant's force, with Hart's brigade, which had been diverted on its way to Kimberley, where it was to form

part of Hunter's division, was moving on the south towards Wepener, advancing through Rouxville, but going

slowly for fear of scaring the Boers away before they were sufficiently compromised. Chermside's 3rd

division approached from the northwest, moving out from the railway at Bethany, and passing through

Reddersberg towards Dewetsdorp, from which it would directly threaten the Boer line of retreat. The

movement was made with reassuring slowness and gentleness, as when the curved hand approaches the

unconscious fly. And then suddenly, on April 21st, Lord Roberts let everything go. Had the action of the

agents been as swift and as energetic as the mind of the planner, De Wet could not have escaped us.

What held Lord Roberts's hand for some few days after he was ready to strike was the abominable weather.

Rain was falling in sheets, and those who know South African roads, South African mud, and South African

drifts will understand how impossible swift military movements are under those circumstances. But with the

first clearing of the clouds the hills to the south and east of Bloemfontein were dotted with our scouts. Rundle

with his 8th division was brought swiftly up from. the south, united with Chermside to the east of

Reddersberg, and the whole force, numbering 13,000 rifles with thirty guns, advanced upon Dewetsdorp,

Rundle, as senior officer, being in command. As they marched the blue hills of Wepener lined the sky some

twenty miles to the south, eloquent to every man of the aim and object of their march.

On April 20th, Rundle as he advanced found a force with artillery across his path to Dewetsdorp. It is always

difficult to calculate the number of hidden men and lurking guns which go to make up a Boer army, but with

some knowledge of their total at Wepener it was certain that the force opposed to him must be very inferior to

his own. At Constantia Farm, where he found them in position, it is difficult to imagine that there were more

than three thousand men. Their left flank was their weak point, as a movement on that side would cut them

off from Wepener and drive them up towards our main force in the north. One would have thought that a

containing force of three thousand men, and a flanking movement from eight thousand, would have turned

them out, as it has turned them out so often before and since. Yet a longrange action began on Friday, April

20th, and lasted the whole of the 21st, the 22nd, and the 23rd, in which we sustained few losses, but made no

impression upon the enemy. Thirty of the 1st Worcesters wandered at night into the wrong line, and were

made prisoners, but with this exception the four days of noisy fighting does not appear to have cost either

side fifty casualties. It is probable that the deliberation with which the operations were conducted was due to

Rundle's instructions to wait until the other forces were in position. His subsequent movements showed that

On Sunday night (April 22nd) PoleCarew sallied out from Bloemfontein on a line which would take him

round the right flank of the Boers who were facing Rundle. The Boers had, however, occupied a strong

position at Leeuw Kop, which barred his path, so that the Dewetsdorp Boers were covering the Wepener

Boers, and being in turn covered by the Boers of Leeuw Kop. Before anything could be done, they must be

swept out of the way. PoleCarew is one of those finds which help to compensate us for the war. Handsome,

dashing, debonnaire, he approaches a field of battle as a lighthearted schoolboy approaches a football field.

On this occasion he acted with energy and discretion. His cavalry threatened the flanks of the enemy, and

Stephenson's brigade carried the position in front at a small cost. On the same evening General French arrived

and took over the force, which consisted now of Stephenson's and the Guards brigades (making up the 11th

division), with two brigades of cavalry and one corps of mounted infantry. The next day, the 23rd, the

advance was resumed, the cavalry bearing the brunt of the fighting. That gallant corps, Roberts's Horse,

whose behaviour at Sanna's Post had been admirable, again distinguished itself, losing among others its

Colonel, Brazier Creagh. On the 24th again it was to the horsemen that the honour and the casualties fell. The

9th Lancers, the regular cavalry regiment which bears away the honours of the war, lost several men and

officers, and the 8th Hussars also suffered, but the Boers were driven from their position, and lost more

heavily in this skirmish than in some of the larger battles of the campaign. The 'pompoms,' which had been

supplied to us by the belated energy of the Ordnance Department, were used with some effect in this

engagement, and the Boers learned for the first time how unnerving are those noisy but not particularly

deadly fireworks which they had so often crackled round the ears of our gunners.

On the Wednesday morning Rundle, with the addition cf PoleCarew's division, was strong enough for any

attack, while French was in a position upon the flank. Every requisite for a great victory was there except the

presence of an enemy. The Wepener siege had been raised and the force in front of Rundle had disappeared

as only Boer armies can disappear. The combined movement was an admirable piece of work on the part of

the enemy. Finding no force in front of them, the combined troops of French, Rundle, and Chermside

occupied Dewetsdorp, where the latter remained, while the others pushed on to Thabanchu, the storm centre

from which all our troubles had begun nearly a month before. All the way they knew that De Wet's retreating

army was just in front of them, and they knew also that a force had been sent out from Bloemfontein to

Thabanchu to head off the Boers. Lord Roberts might naturally suppose, when he had formed two cordons

through which De Wet must pass, that one or other must hold him. But with extraordinary skill and mobility

De Wet, aided by the fact that every inhabitant was a member of his intelligence department, slipped through

the double net which had been laid for him. The first net was not in its place in time, and the second was too

While Rundle and French had advanced on Dewets dorp as described, the other force which was intended to

head off De Wet had gone direct to Thabanchu. The advance began by a movement of Ian Hamilton on April

22nd with eight hundred mounted infantry upon the waterworks. The enemy, who held the hills beyond,

allowed Hamilton's force to come right down to the Modder before they opened fire from three guns. The

mounted infantry fell back, and encamped for the night out of range.[Footnote: This was a remarkable

exhibition of the harmlessness of shellfire against troops in open formation. I myself saw at least forty

shells, all of which burst, fall among the ranks of the mounted infantry, who retired at a contemptuos walk.

There were no casualties.] Before morning they were reinforced by SmithDorrien's brigade (Gordons,

Canadians, and Shropshires the Cornwalls had been left behind) and some more mounted Infantry. With

daylight a fine advance was begun, the brigade moving up in very extended order and the mounted men

turning the right flank of the defence. By evening we had regained the waterworks, a most important point for

Bloemfontein, and we held all the line of hills which command it. This strong position would not have been

gained so easily if it had not been for PoleCarew's and French's actions two days before, on their way to join

Ian Hamilton, who had already done good service in the war, having commanded the infantry at Elandslaagte,

and been one of the most prominent leaders in the defence of Ladysmith, takes from this time onwards a

more important and a more independent position. A thin, aquiline man, of soft voice and gentle manners, he

had already proved more than once during his adventurous career that he not only possessed in a high degree

the courage of the soldier, but also the equanimity and decision of the born leader. A languid elegance in his

bearing covered a shrewd brain and a soul of fire. A distorted and halfparalysed hand reminded the observer

that Hamilton, as a young lieutenant, had known at Majuba what it was to face the Boer rifles. Now, in his

fortyseventh year, he had returned, matured and formidable, to reverse the results of that first deplorable

campaign. This was the man to whom Lord Roberts had entrusted the command of that powerful flanking

column which was eventually to form the right wing of his main advance. Being reinforced upon the morning

after the capture of the Waterworks by the Highland Brigade, the Cornwalls, and two heavy naval guns, his

whole force amounted to not less than seven thousand men. From these he detached a garrison for the

Waterworks, and with the rest he continued his march over the hilly country which lies between them and

One position, Israel's Poort, a nek between two hills, was held against them on April 25th, but was gained

without much trouble, the Canadians losing one killed and two wonuded. Colonel Otter, their gallant leader,

was one of the latter, while Marshall's Horse, a colonial corps raised in Grahamstown, had no fewer than

seven of their officers and several men killed or wounded. Next morning the town of Thabanchu was seized,

and Hamilton found himself upon the direct line of the Boer retreat. He seized the pass which commands the

road, and all next day he waited eagerly, and the hearts of his men beat high when at last they saw a long trail

of dust winding up to them from the south. At last the wily De Wet had been headed off! Deep and earnest

were the curses when out of the dust there emerged a khaki column of horsemen, and it was realised that this

was French's pursuing force, closely followed by Rundle's infantry from Dewetsdorp. The Boers had slipped

It is impossible to withhold our admiration for the way in which the boer force was manoeuvred thoughout

this portion of the campaign. The mixture of circumspection and audacity, the way in which French and

Rundle were hindered until the Wepener force had disengaged itself, the manner in which these covering

forces were then withdrawn, and finally the clever way in which they all slipped past Hamilton, make a

brilliant bit of strategy. Louis Botha, the generalissimo, held all the strings in his hand, and the way in which

he pulled them showed that his countrymen had chosen the right man for that high office, and that his was a

master spirit even among those fine natural warriors who led the separate commandos.

Having got to the north of the British forces Botha made no effort to get away, and refused to be hustled by a

reconnaissance developing into an attack, which French made upon April 27th. In a skirmish the night before

Kitchener's Horse had lost fourteen men, and the action of the 27th cost us about as many casualties. It served

to show that the Boer force was a compact body some six or seven thousand strong, which withdrew in a

leisurely fashion, and took up a defensive position at Houtnek, some miles further on. French remained at

Thabanchu, from which he afterwards joined Lord Roberts' advance, while Hamilton now assumed complete

command of the flanking column, with which he proceeded to march north upon Winburg.

The Houtnek position is dominated upon the left of the advancing British force by Thoba Mountain, and it

was this point which was the centre of Hamilton's attack. It was most gallantly seized by Kitchener's Horse,

who were quickly supported by SmithDorrien's men. The mountain became the scene of a brisk action, and

night fell before the crest was cleared. At dawn upon May 1st the fighting was resumed, and the position was

carried by a determined advance of the Shropshires, the Canadians, and the Gordons: the Boers escaping

down the reverse slope of the hill came under a heavy fire of our infantry, and fifty of them were wounded or

taken. It was in this action, during the fighting on the hill, that Captain Towse, of the Gordons, though shot

through the eyes and totally blind, encouraged his men to charge through a group of the enemy who had

gathered round them. After this victory Hamilton's men, who had fought for seven days out of ten, halted for

a rest at Jacobsrust, where they were joined by Broadwood's cavalry and Bruce Hamilton's infantry brigade.

Ian Hamilton's column now contained two infantry brigades (Smith.Dorrien's and Bruce Hamilton's), Ridley's

Mounted Infantry, Broadwood's Cavalry Brigade, five batteries of artillery, two heavy guns, altogether

13,000 men. With this force in constant touch with Botha's rearguard, Ian Hamilton pushed on once more on

May 4th. On May 5th he fought a brisk cavalry skirmish, in which Kitchener's Horse and the 12th Lancers

distinguished themselves, and on the same day he took possession of Winburg, thus covering the right of

The distribution of the troops on the eastern side of the Free State was, at the time of this the final advance of

the main army, as follows Ian Hamilton with his mounted infantry, SmithDorrien's brigade, Macdonald's

brigade, Bruce Hamilton's brigade, and Broadwood's cavalry were at Winburg. Rundle was at Thabanchu,

and Brabant's colonial division was moving up to the same point. Chermside was at Dewetsdorp, and had

detached a force under Lord Castletown to garrison Wepener. Hart occupied Smithfield, whence he and his

brigade were shortly to be transferred to the Kimberley force. Altogether there could not have been fewer

than thirty thousand men engaged in clearing and holding down this part of the country. French's cavalry and

Before entering upon a description of that great and decisive movement, one small action calls for comment.

This was the cutting off of twenty men of Lumsden's Horse in a reconnaissance at Karee. The small post

under Lieutenant Crane found themselves by some misunderstanding isolated in the midst of the enemy.

Befusing to hoist the flag of shame, they fought their way out, losing half their number, while of the other

half it is said that there was not one who could not show bullet marks upon his clothes or person. The men of

this corps, volunteer AngloIndians, had abandoned the ease and even luxury of Eastern life for the hard fare

and rough fighting of this most trying campaign. In coming they had set the whole empire an objectlesson in

spirit, and now on their first field they set the army an example of military virtue. The proud traditions of

Outram's Volunteers have been upheld by the men of Lumsden's Horse. Another minor action which cannot

be ignored is the defence of a convoy on April 29th by the Derbyshire Yeomanry (Major Dugdale) and a

company of the Scots Guards. The wagons were on their way to Rundle when they were attacked at a point

about ten miles west of Thabanchu. The small guard beat off their assailants in the most gallant fashion, and

This phase of the war was marked by a certain change in the temper of the British. Nothing could have been

milder than the original intentions and proclamations of Lord Roberts, and he was most ably seconded in his

attempts at conciliation by General Pretyman, who had been made civil administrator of the State. There was

evidence, however, that this kindness had been construed as weakness by some of the burghers, and during

the Boer incursion to Wepener many who had surrendered a worthless firearm reappeared with the Mauser

which had been concealed in some crafty hidingplace. Troops were fired at from farmhouses which flew the

white flag, and the good housewife remained behind to charge the 'rooinek' extortionate prices for milk and

fodder while her husband shot at him from the hills. It was felt that the burghers might have peace or might

have war, but could not have both simultaneously. Some examples were made therefore of offending

farmhouses, and stock was confiscated where there was evidence of double dealing upon the part of the

owner. In a country where property is a more serious thing than life, these measures, together with more

stringent rules about the possession of horses and arms, did much to stamp out the chances of an insurrection

in our rear. The worst sort of peace is an enforced peace, but if that can be established time and justice may

The operations which have been here described may be finally summed up in one short paragraph. A Boer

army came south of the British line and besieged a British garrison. Three British forces, those of French,

Rundle, and Ian Hamilton, were despatched to cut it off. It successfully threaded its way among them and

escaped. It was followed to the northward as far as the town of Winburg, which remained in the British

possession. Lord Roberts had failed in his plan of cutting off De Wet's army, but, at the expense of many

This small place, which sprang in the course of a few weeks from obscurity to fame, is situated upon the long

line of railway which connects Kimberley in the south with Rhodesia in the north. In character it resembles

one of those western American townlets which possess small present assets but immense aspirations. In its

litter of corrugatediron roofs, and in the church and the racecourse, which are the firstfruits everywhere of

AngloCeltic civilisation, one sees the seeds of the great city of the future. It is the obvious dep�t for the

western Transvaal upon one side, and the startingpoint for all attempts upon the Kalahari Desert upon the

It is not clear why the imperial authorities should desire to hold this place, since it has no natural advantages

to help the defence, but lies exposed in a widespread plain. A glance at the map must show that the railway

line would surely be cut both to the north and south of the town, and the garrison isolated at a point some two

hundred and fifty miles from any reinforcements. Considering that the Boers could throw any strength of men

or guns against the place, it seemed certain that if they seriously desired to take possession of it they could do

so. Under ordinary circumstances any force shut up there was doomed to capture. But what may have seemed

shortsighted policy became the highest wisdom, owing to the extraordinary tenacity and resource of

BadenPowell, the officer in command. Through his exertions the town acted as a bait to the Boers, and

occupied a considerable force in a useless siege at a time when their presence at other seats of war might have

Colonel BadenPowell is a soldier of a type which is exceedingly popular with the British public. A skilled

hunter and an expert at many games, there was always something of the sportsman in his keen appreciation of

war. In the Matabele campaign he had outscouted the savage scouts and found his pleasure in tracking them

among their native mountains, often alone and at night, trusting to his skill in springing from rock to rock in

his rubbersoled shoes to save him from their pursuit. There was a brain quality in his bravery which is rare

among our officers. Full of veldt craft and resource, it was as difficult to outwit as it was to outfight him. But

there was another curious side to his complex nature. The French have said of one of their heroes, 'Il avait

cette graine de folie dans sa bravoure que les Francais aiment,' and the words might have been written of

Powell. An impish humour broke out in him, and the mischievous schoolboy alternated with the warrior and

the administrator. He met the Boer commandos with chaff and jokes which were as disconcerting as his wire

entanglements and his riflepits The amazing variety of his personal accomplishments was one of his most

striking characteristics. From drawing caricatures with both hands simultaneously, or skirt dancing to leading

a forlorn hope, nothing came amiss to him; and he had that magnetic quality by which the leader imparts

something of his virtues to his men. Such was the man who held Mafeking for the Queen.

In a very early stage, before the formal declaration of war, the enemy had massed several commandos upon

the western border, the men being drawn from Zeerust, Rustenburg, and Lichtenburg. BadenPowell, with

the aid of an excellent group of special officers, who included Colonel Gould Adams, Lord Edward Cecil, the

soldier son of England's Premier, and Colonel Hore, had done all that was possible to put the place into a

state of defence. In this he had immense assistance from Benjamin Weil, a well known South African

contractor, who had shown great energy in provisioning the town. On the other hand, the South African

Government displayed the same stupidity or treason which had been exhibited in the case of Kimberley, and

had met all demands for guns and reinforcements with foolish doubts as to the need of such precautions. In

the endeavour to supply these pressing wants the first small disaster of the campaign was encountered. On

October 12th, the day after the declaration of war, an armoured train conveying two 7pounders for the

Mafeking defences was derailed and captured by a Boer raiding party at Kraaipan, a place forty miles south

of their destination. The enemy shelled the shattered train until after five hours Captain Nesbitt, who was in

command, and his men, some twenty in number, surrendered. It was a small affair, but it derived importance

The garrison of the town, whose fame will certainly live in the history of South Africa, contained no regular

soldiers at all with the exception of the small group of excellent officers. They consisted of irregular troops,

three hundred and forty of the Protectorate Regiment, one hundred and seventy Police, and two hundred

volunteers, made up of that singular mixture of adventurers, younger sons, broken gentlemen, and

irresponsible sportsmen who have always been the voortrekkers of the British Empire. These men were of the

same stamp as those other admirable bodies of natural fighters who did so well in Rhodesia, in Natal, and in

the Cape. With them there was associated in the defence the Town Guard, who included the ablebodied

shopkeepers, business men, and residents, the whole amounting to about nine hundred men. Their artillery

was feeble in the extreme, two 7pounder toy guns and six machine guns, but the spirit of the men and the

resource of their leaders made up for every disadvantage. Colonel Vyvyan and Major Panzera planned the

defences, and the little trading town soon began to take on the appearance of a fortress.

On October 13th the Boers appeared before Mafeking. On the same day Colonel BadenPowell sent two

truckloads of dynamite out of the place. They were fired into by the invaders, with the result that they

exploded. On October 14th the pickets around the town were driven in by the Boers. On this the armoured

train and a squadron of the Protectorate Regiment went out to support the pickets and drove the Boers before

them. A body of the latter doubled back and interposed between the British and Mafeking, but two fresh

troops with a 7pounder throwing shrapnel drove them off. In this spirited little action the garrison lost two

killed and fourteen wounded, but they inflicted considerable damage on the enemy. To Captain Williams,

Captain FitzClarence, and Lord Charles Bentinck great credit is due for the way in which they handled their

men; but the whole affair was ill advised, for if a disaster had occurred Mafeking must have fallen, being left

without a garrison. No possible results which could come from such a sortie could justify the risk which was

On October 16th the siege began in earnest. On that date the Boers brought up two 12pounder guns, and the

first of that interminable flight of shells fell into the town. The enemy got possession of the water supply, but

the garrison had already dug wells. Before October 20th five thousand Boers, under the formidable Cronje,

had gathered round the town. 'Surrender to avoid bloodshed' was his message. 'When is the bloodshed going

to begin?' asked Powell. When the Boers had been shelling the town for some weeks the lighthearted Colonel

sent out to say that if they went on any longer he should be compelled to regard it as equivalent to a

declaration of war. It is to be hoped that Cronje also possessed some sense of humour, or else he must have

been as sorely puzzled by his eccentric opponent as the Spanish generals were by the vagaries of Lord

Among the many difficulties which had to be met by the defenders of the town the most serious was the fact

that the position had a circumference of five or six miles to be held by about one thousand men against a

force who at their own time and their own place could at any moment attempt to gain a footing. An ingenious

system of small forts was devised to meet the situation. Each of these held from ten to forty riflemen, and was

furnished with bombproofs and covered ways. The central bombproof was connected by telephone with all

the outlying ones, so as to save the use of orderlies. A system of bells was arranged by which each quarter of

the town was warned when a shell was coming in time to enable the inhabitants to scuttle off to shelter. Every

detail showed the ingenuity of the controlling mind. The armoured train, painted green and tied round with

On October 24th a savage bombardment commenced, which lasted with intermissions for seven months. The

Boers had brought an enormous gun across from Pretoria, throwing a 96lb. shell, and this, with many

smaller pieces, played upon the town. The result was as futile as our own artillery fire has so often been when

As the Mafeking guns were too weak to answer the enemy's fire, the only possible reply lay in a sortie, and

upon this Colonel Powell decided. It was carried out with great gallantry on the evening of October 27th,

when about a hundred men under Captain FitzClarence moved out against the Boer trenches with instructions

to use the bayonet only. The position was carried with a rush, and many of the Boers bayoneted before they

could disengage themselves from the tarpaulins which covered them. The trenches behind fired wildly in the

darkness, and it is probable that as many of their own men as of ours were hit by their rifle fire. The total loss

in this gallant affair was six killed, eleven wounded, and two prisoners. The loss of the enemy, though

On October 31st the Boers ventured upon an attack on Cannon Kopje, which is a small fort and eminence to

the south of the town. It was defended by Colonel Walford, of the British South African Police, with

fiftyseven of his men and three small guns. The attack was repelled with heavy loss to the Boers. The

Their experience in this attack seems to have determined the Boers to make no further expensive attempts to

rush the town, and for some weeks the siege degenerated into a blockade. Cronje had been recalled for more

important work, and Commandant Snyman had taken over the uncompleted task. From time to time the great

gun tossed its huge shells into the town, but boardwood walls and corrugatediron roofs minimise the

dangers of a bombardment. On November 3rd the garrison rushed the Brickfields, which had been held by the

enemy's sharpshooters, and on the 7th another small sally kept the game going. On the 18th Powell sent a

message to Snyman that he could not take the town by sitting and looking at it. At the same time he

despatched a message to the Boer forces generally, advising them to return to their homes and their families.

Some of the commandos had gone south to assist Cronje in his stand against Methuen, and the siege

languished more and more, until it was woken up by a desperate sortie on December 26th, which caused the

greatest loss which the garrison had sustained. Once more the lesson was to be enforced that with modern

On this date a vigorous attack was made upon one of the Boer forts on the north. There seems to be little

doubt that the enemy had some inkling of our intention, as the fort was found to have been so strengthened as

to be impregnable without scaling ladders. The attacking force consisted of two squadrons of the Protectorate

Regiment and one of the Bechuanaland Rifles, backed up by three guns. So desperate was the onslaught that

of the actual attacking party a forlorn hope, if ever there was one fiftythree out of eighty were killed

and wounded, twentyfive of the former and twentyeight of the latter. Several of that gallant band of

officers who had been the soul of the defence were among the injured. Captain FitzClarence was wounded,

Vernon, Sandford, and Paton were killed, all at the very muzzles of the enemy's guns. It must have been one

of the bitterest moments of BadenPowell's life when he shut his fieldglass and said, 'Let the ambulance go

Even this heavy blow did not damp the spirits nor diminish the energies of the defence, though it must have

warned BadenPowell that he could not afford to drain his small force by any more expensive attempts at the

offensive, and that from then onwards he must content himself by holding grimly on until Plumer from the

north or Methuen from the south should at last be able to stretch out to him a helping hand. Vigilant and

indomitable, throwing away no possible point in the game which he was playing, the new year found him and

January and February offer in their records that monotony of excitement which is the fate of every besieged

town. On one day the shelling was a little more, on another a little less. Sometimes they escaped scatheless,

sometimes the garrison found itself the poorer by the loss of Captain Girdwood or Trooper Webb or some

other gallant soldier. Occasionally they had their little triumph when a too curious Dutchman, peering for an

instant from his cover to see the effect of his shot, was carried back in the ambulance to the laager. On

Sunday a truce was usually observed, and the snipers who had exchanged rifleshots all the week met

occasionally on that day with goodhumoured chaff. Snyman, the Boer General, showed none of that

chivalry at Mafeking which distinguished the gallant old Joubert at Ladysmith. Not only was there no neutral

camp for women or sick, but it is beyond all doubt or question that the Boer guns were deliberately turned

upon the women's quarters inside Mafeking in order to bring pressure upon the inhabitants. Many women and

children were sacrificed to this brutal policy, which must in fairness be set to the account of the savage

leader, and not of the rough but kindly folk with whom we were fighting. In every race there are individual

ruffians, and it would be a political mistake to allow our action to be influenced or our feelings permanently

embittered by their crimes. It is from the man himself, and not from his country, that an account should be

The garrison, in the face of increasing losses and decreasing food, lost none of the high spirits which it

reflected from its commander. The programme of a single day of jubilee Heaven only knows what they had

to hold jubilee over shows a cricket match in the morning, sports in the afternoon, a concert in the

evening, and a dance, given by the bachelor officers, to wind up. BadenPowell himself seems to have

descended from the eyrie from which, like a captain on the bridge, he rang bells and telephoned orders, to

bring the house down with a comic song and a humorous recitation. The ball went admirably, save that there

was an interval to repel an attack which disarranged the programme. Sports were zealously cultivated, and the

grimy inhabitants of casemates and trenches were pitted against each other at cricket or football.[Footnote:

Sunday cricket so shocked Snyman that he threatened to fire upon it if it were continued.] The monotony was

broken by the occasional visits of a postman, who appeared or vanished from the vast barren lands to the west

of the town, which could not all be guarded by the besiegers. Sometimes a few words from home came to

cheer the hearts of the exiles, and could be returned by the same uncertain and expensive means. The

documents which found their way up were not always of an essential or even of a welcome character. At least

In one particular Mafeking had, with much smaller resources, rivalled Kimberley. An ordnance factory had

been started, formed in the railway workshops, and conducted by Connely and Cloughlan, of the Locomotive

Department. Daniels, of the police, supplemented their efforts by making both powder and fuses. The factory

turned out shells, and eventually constructed a 5�5in. smoothbore gun, which threw a round shell with

great accuracy to a considerable range. April found the garrison, in spite of all losses, as efficient and as

resolute as it had been in October. So close were the advanced trenches upon either side that both parties had

recourse to the oldfashioned hand grenades, thrown by the Boers, and cast on a fishingline by ingenious

Sergeant Page, of the Protectorate Regiment. Sometimes the besiegers and the number of guns diminished,

forces being detached to prevent the advance of Plumer's relieving column from the north; but as those who

remained held their forts, which it was beyond the power of the British to storm, the garrison was now much

the better for the alleviation. Putting Mafeking for Ladysmith and Plumer for Buller, the situation was not

At this point some account might be given of the doings of that northern force whose situation was so remote

that even the ubiquitous correspondent hardly appears to have reached it. No doubt the book will eventually

make up for the neglect of the journal, but some short facts may be given here of the Rhodesian column.

Their action did not affect the course of the war, but they clung like bulldogs to a most difficult task, and

eventually, when strengthened by the relieving column, made their way to Mafeking.

The force was originally raised for the purpose of defending Rhodesia, and it consisted of fine material

pioneers, farmers, and miners from the great new land which had been added through the energy of Mr.

Rhodes to the British Empire. Many of the men were veterans of the native wars, and all were imbued with a

hardy and adventurous spirit. On the other hand, the men of the northern and western Transvaal, whom they

were called upon to face, the burghers of Watersberg and Zoutpansberg, were tough frontiersmen living in a

land where a dinner was shot, not bought. Shaggy, hairy, halfsavage men, handling a rifle as a medi�val

Englishman handled a bow, and skilled in every wile of veldt craft, they were as formidable opponents as the

On the war breaking out the first thought of the leaders in Rhodesia was to save as much of the line which

was their connection through Mafeking with the south as was possible. For this purpose an armoured train

was despatched only three days after the expiration of the ultimatum to the point four hundred miles south of

Bulawayo, where the frontiers of the Transvaal and of Bechuanaland join. Colonel Holdsworth commanded

the small British force. The Boers, a thousand or so in number, had descended upon the railway, and an

action followed in which the train appears to have had better luck than has usually attended these illfated

contrivances. The Boer commando was driven back and a number were killed. It was probably news of this

affair, and not anything which had occurred at Mafeking, which caused those rumours of gloom at Pretoria

very shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. An agency telegraphed that women were weeping in the streets

of the Boer capital. We had not then realised how soon and how often we should see the same sight in Pall

The adventurous armoured train pressed on as far as Lobatsi, where it found the bridges destroyed; so it

returned to its original position, having another brush with the Boer commandos, and again, in some

marvellous way, escaping its obvious fate. From then until the new year the line was kept open by an

admirable system of patrolling to within a hundred miles or so of Mafeking. An aggressive spirit and a power

of dashing initiative were shown in the British operations at this side of the scene of war such as have too

often been absent elsewhere. At Sekwani, on November 24th, a considerable success was gained by a surprise

planned and carried out by Colonel Holdsworth. The Boer laager was approached and attacked in the early

morning by a force of one hundred and twenty frontiersmen, and so effective was their fire that the Boers

estimated their numbers at several thousand. Thirty Boers were killed or wounded, and the rest scattered.

While the railway line was held in this way there had been some skirmishing also on the northern frontier of

the Transvaal. Shortly after the outbreak of the war the gallant Blackburn, scouting with six comrades in thick

bush, found himself in the presence of a considerable commando. The British concealed themselves by the

path, but Blackburn's foot was seen by a keeneyed Kaffir, who pointed it out to his masters. A sudden volley

riddled Blackburn with bullets; but his men stayed by him and drove off the enemy. Blackburn dictated an

In the same region a small force under Captain Hare was cut off by a body of Boers. Of the twenty men most

got away, but the chaplain J. W. Leary, Lieutenant Haserick (who behaved with admirable gallantry), and six

men were taken.[Footnote: Mr. Leary was wounded in the foot by a shell. The German artillerist entered the

hut in which he lay. 'Here's a bit of your work!' said Leary good~humouredly. 'I wish it had been woise,' said

the amiable German gunner.] The commando which attacked this party, and on the same day Colonel

Spreckley's force, was a powerful one, with several guns. No doubt it was organised because there were fears

among the Boers that they would be invaded from the north. When it was understood that the British intended

no large aggressive movement in that quarter, these burghers joined other commandos. Sarel Eloff, who was

Colonel Plumer had taken command of the small army which was now operating from the north along the

railway line with Mafeking for its objective. Plumer is an officer of considerable experience in African

warfare, a small, quiet, resolute man, with a knack of gently enforcing discipline upon the very rough

material with which he had to deal. With his weak force which never exceeded a thousand men, and was

usually from six to seven hundred he had to keep the long line behind him open, build up the ruined railway

in front of him, and gradually creep onwards in face of a formidable and enterprising enemy. For a long time

Gaberones, which is eighty miles north of Mafeking, remained his headquarters, and thence he kept up

precarious communications with the besieged garrison. In the middle of March he advanced as far south as

Lobatsi, which is less than fifty miles from Mafeking; but the enemy proved to be too strong, and Plumer had

to drop back again with some loss to his original position at Gaberones. Sticking doggedly to his task, Plumer

again came south, and this time made his way as far as Ramathlabama, within a day's march of Mafeking. He

had with him, however, only three hundred and fifty men, and had he pushed through the effect mighit have

been an addition of hungry men to the garrison. The relieving force was fiercely attacked, however, by the

Boers and driven back on to their camp with a loss of twelve killed, twentysix wounded, and fourteen

missing. Some of the British were dismounted men, and it says much for Plumer's conduct of the fight that he

was able to extricate these safely from the midst of an aggressive mounted enemy. Personally he set an

admirable example, sending away his own horse, and walking with his rearmost soldiers. Captain Crewe

Robertson and Lieutenant Milligan, the famous Yorkshire cricketer, were killed, and Rolt, Jarvis, Maclaren,

and Plumer himself were wounded. The Rhodesian force withdrew again to near Lobatsi, and collected itself

In the meantime Mafeking abandoned, as it seemed, to its fate was still as formidable as a wounded

lion. Far from weakening in its defence it became more aggressive, and so persistent and skilful were its

riflemen that the big Boer gun had again and again to be moved further from the town. Six months of

trenches and riflepits had turned every inhabitant into a veteran. Now and then words of praise and

encouragement came to them from without. Once it was a special message from the Queen, once a promise of

relief from Lord Roberts. But the rails which led to England were overgrown with grass, and their brave

hearts yearned for the sight of their countrymen and for the sound of their voices. 'How long, 0 Lord, how

long?' was the cry which was wrung from them in their solitude. But the flag was still held high.

April was a trying month for the defence. They knew that Methuen, who had advanced as far as Fourteen

Streams upon the Vaal River, had retired again upon Kimberley. They knew also that Plumer's force had been

weakened by the repulse at Ramathlabama, and that many of his men were down with fever. Six weary

months had this village withstood the pitiless pelt of rifle bullet and shell. Help seemed as far away from

them as ever. But if troubles may be allayed by sympathy, then theirs should have lain lightly. The attention

of the whole empire had centred upon them, and even the advance of Roberts's army became secondary to the

fate of this gallant struggling handful of men who had upheld the flag so long. On the Continent also their

resistance attracted the utmost interest, and the numerous journals there who find the imaginative writer

cheaper than the war correspondent announced their capture periodically as they had once done that of

Ladysmith. From a mere tinroofed village Mafeking had become a prize of victory, a stake which should be

the visible sign of the predominating manhood of one or other of the great white races of South Africa.

Unconscious of the keenness of the emotions which they had aroused, the garrison manufactured brawn from

horsehide, and captured locusts as a relish for their luncheons, while in the shottorn billiardroom of the

club an open tournament was started to fill in their hours off duty. But their vigilance, and that of the

hawkeyed man up in the Conning Tower, never relaxed. The besiegers had increased in number, and their

guns were more numerous than before. A less acute man than BadenPowell might have reasoned that at

least one desperate effort would be made by them to carry the town before relief could come.

On Saturday, May 12th, the attack was made at the favourite hour of the Boer the first grey of the

morning. It was gallantly delivered by about three hundred volunteers under the command of Eloff, who had

crept round to the west of the town the side furthest from the lines of the besiegers. At the first rush they

penetrated into the native quarter, which was at once set on fire by them. The first building of any size upon

that side is the barracks of the Protectorate Regiment, which was held by Colonel Hore and about twenty of

his officers and men. This was carried by the enemy, who sent an exultant message along the telephone to

BadenPowell to tell him that they had got it. Two other positions within the lines, one a stone kraal and the

other a hill, were held by the Boers, but their supports were slow in coming on, and the movements of the

defenders were so prompt and energetic that all three found themselves isolated and cut off from their own

lines. They had penetrated the town, but they were as far as ever from having taken it. All day the British

forces drew their cordon closer and closer round the Boer positions, making no attempt to rush them, but

ringing them round in such a way that there could be no escape for them. A few burghers slipped away in

twos and threes, but the main body found that they had rushed into a prison from which the only egress was

swept with rifle fire. At seven o'clock in the evening they recognised that their position was hopeless, and

Eloff with 117 men laid down their arms. Their losses had been ten killed and nineteen wounded. For some

reason, either of lethargy, cowardice, or treachery, Snyman had not brought up the supports which might

conceivably have altered the result. It was a gallant attack gallantly met, and for once the greater wiliness in

fight was shown by the British. The end was characteristic. 'Good evening, Commandant,' said Powell to

Eloff; 'won't you come in and have some dinner?' The prisoners burghers, Hollanders, Germans, and

Frenchmen were treated to as good a supper as the destitute larders of the town could furnish.

So in a small blaze of glory ended the historic siege of Mafeking, for Eloff's attack was the last, though by no

means the worst of the trials which the garrison had to face. Six killed and ten wounded were the British

losses in this admirably managed affair. On May 17th, five days after the fight, the relieving force arrived, the

besiegers were scattered, and the longimprisoned garrison were free men once more. Many who had looked

at their maps and saw this post isolated in the very heart of Africa had despaired of ever reaching their heroic

fellowcountrymen, and now one universal outbreak of joybells and bonfires from Toronto to Melbourne

proclaimed that there is no spot so inaccessible that the long arm of the empire cannot reach it when her

Colonel Mahon, a young Irish officer who had made his reputation as a cavalry leader in Egypt, had started

early in May from Kimberley with a small but mobile force consisting of the Imperial Light Horse (brought

round from Natal for the purpose), the Kimberley Mounted Corps, the Diamond Fields Horse, some Imperial

Yeomanry, a detachment of the Cape Police, and 100 volunteers from the Fusilier brigade, with M battery

R.H.A. and pompoms, twelve hundred men in all. Whilst Hunter was fighting his action at Rooidam on May

4th, Mahon with his men struck round the western flank of the Boers and moved rapidly to the northwards.

On May 11th they bad left Vryburg, the halfway house, behind them, having done one hundred and twenty

miles in five days. They pushed on, encountering no opposition save that of nature, though they knew that

they were being closely watched by the enemy. At Koodoosrand it was found that a Boer force was in

position in front, but Mahon avoided them by turning somewhat to the westward. His detour took him,

however, into a bushy country, and here the enemy headed him off, opening fire at short range upon the

ubiquitous Imperial Light Horse, who led the column. A short engagement ensued, in which the casualties

amounted to thirty killed and wounded, but which ended in the defeat and dispersal of the Boers, whose force

was certainly very much weaker than the British. On May 15th the relieving column arrived without further

In the meantime Plumer's force upon the north had been strengthened by the addition of C battery of four

12pounder guns of the Canadian Artillery under Major Eudon and a body of Queenslanders. These forces

had been part of the small army which had come with General Carrington through Beira, and after a detour of

thousands of miles, through their own wonderful energy they had arrived in time to form portion of the

relieving column. Foreign military critics, whose experience of warfare is to move troops across a frontier,

should think of what the Empire has to do before her men go into battle. These contingents had been

assembled by long railway journeys, conveyed across thousands of miles of ocean to Cape Town, brought

round another two thousand or so to Beira, transferred by a narrowgauge railway to Bamboo Creek,

changed to a broader gauge to Marandellas, sent on in coaches for hundreds of miles to Bulawayo, transferred

to trains for another four or five hundred miles to Ootsi, and had finally a forced march of a hundred miles,

which brought them up a few hours before their presence was urgently needed upon the field. Their advance,

which averaged twentyfive miles a day on foot for four consecutive days over deplorable roads, was one of

the finest performances of the war. With these highspirited reinforcements and with his own hardy

Rhodesians Plumer pushed on, and the two columns reached the hamlet of Masibi Stadt within an hour of

each other. Their united strength was far superior to anything which Snyman's force could place against them.

But the gallant and tenacious Boers would not abandon their prey without a last effort. As the little army

advanced upon Mafeking they found the enemy waiting in a strong position. For some hours the Boers

gallantly held their ground, and their artillery fire was, as usual, most accurate. But our own guns were more

numerous and equally well served, and the position was soon made untenable. The Boers retired past

Mafeking and took refuge in the trenches upon the eastern side, but BadenPowell with his warhardened

garrison sallied out, and, supported by the artillery fire of the relieving column, drove them from their shelter.

With their usual admirable tactics their larger guns had been removed, but one small cannon was secured as a

souvenir by the townsfolk, together with a number of wagons and a considerable quantity of supplies. A long

rolling trail of dust upon the eastern horizon told that the famous siege of Mafeking had at last come to an

So ended a singular incident, the defence of an open town which contained no regular soldiers and a most

inadequate artillery against a numerous and enterprising enemy with very heavy guns. All honour to the

towns folk who bore their trial so long and so bravely and to the indomitable men who lined the trenches

for seven weary months. Their constancy was of enormous value to the empire. In the allimportant early

month at least four or five thousand Boers were detained by them when their presence elsewhere would have

been fatal. During all the rest of the war, two thousand men and eight guns (including one of the four big

Creusots) had been held there. It prevented the invasion of Rhodesia, and it gave a rallyingpoint for loyal

whites and natives in the huge stretch of country from Kimberley to Bulawayo. All this had, at a cost of two

hundred lives, been done by this one devoted band of men, who killed, wounded, or took no fewer than one

thousand of their opponents. Critics may say that the enthusiasm in the empire was excessive, but at least it

IN the early days of May, when the season of the rains was past and the veldt was green, Lord Roberts's six

weeks of enforced inaction came to an end. He had gathered himself once more for one of those tiger springs

which should be as sure and as irresistible as that which had brought him from Belmont to Bloemfontein, or

that other in olden days which had carried him from Cabul to Candahar. His army had been decimated by

sickness, and eight thousand men had passed into the hospitals; but those who were with the colours were of

high heart, longing eagerly for action. Any change which would carry them away from the pestridden,

evilsmelling capital which had revenged itself so terribly upon the invader must be a change for the better.

Therefore it was with glad faces and brisk feet that the centre column left Bloemfontein on May 1st, and

On May 3rd the main force was assembled at Karee, twenty miles upon their way. Two hundred and twenty

separated them from Pretoria, but in little more than a month from the day of starting, in spite of broken

railway, a succession of rivers, and the opposition of the enemy, this army was marching into the main street

of the Transvaal capital. Had there been no enemy there at all, it would still have been a fine performance, the

more so when one remembers that the army was moving upon a front of twenty miles or more, each part of

which had to be coordinated to the rest. It is with the story of this great march that the present chapter deals.

Roberts had prepared the way by clearing out the southeastern corner of the State, and at the moment of his

advance his forces covered a semicircular front of about forty miles, the right under Ian Hamilton near

Thabanchu, and the left at Karee. This was the broad net which was to be swept from south to north across

the Free State, gradually narrowing as it went. The conception was admirable, and appears to have been an

adoption of the Boers' own strategy, which had in turn been borrowed from the Zulus. The solid centre could

hold any force which faced it, while the mobile flanks, Hutton upon the left and Hamilton upon the right,

could lap round and pin it, as Cronje was pinned at Paardeberg. It seems admirably simple when done upon a

small scale. But when the scale is one of forty miles, since your front must be broad enough to envelop the

front which is opposed to it, and when the scattered wings have to be fed with no railway line to help, it takes

such a master of administrative detail as Lord Kitchener to bring the operations to complete success.

On May 3rd, the day of the advance from our most northern post, Karee, the disposition uf Lord Roberts's

army was briefly as follows. On his left was Hutton, with his mixed force of mounted infantry drawn from

every quarter of the empire. This formidable and mobile body, with some batteries of horse artillery and of

pompoms, kept a line a few miles to the west of the railroad, moving northwards parallel with it. Roberts's

main column kept on the railroad, which was mended with extraordinary speed by the Railway Pioneer

regiment and the Engineers, under Girouard and the illfated Seymour. It was amazing to note the shattered

culverts as one passed, and yet to be overtaken by trains within a day. This main column consisted of

PoleCarew's 11th Division, which contained the Guards, and Stephenson's Brigade (Warwicks, Essex,

Welsh, and Yorkshires). With them were the 83rd, 84th, and 85th R.F.A., with the heavy guns, and a small

force of mounted infantry. Passing along the widespread British line one would then, after an interval of

seven or eight miles, come upon Tucker's Division (the 7th), which consisted of Maxwell's Brigade (formerly

Chermside's the Norfoiks, Lincolns, Hampshires, and Scottish Borderers) and Wavel's Brigade (North

Staffords, Cheshires, East Lancashires, South Wales Borderers). To the right of these was Ridley's mounted

infantry. Beyond them, extending over very many miles of country and with considerable spaces between,

there came Broadwood's cavalry, Bruce Hamilton's Brigade (Derbyshires, Sussex, Camerons, and C.I.V.),

and finally on the extreme right of all Ian Hamilton's force of Highlanders, Canadians, Shropshires, and

Cornwalls, with cavalry and mounted infantry, starting forty miles from Lord Roberts, but edging westwards

all the way, to merge with the troops next to it, and to occupy Winburg in the way already described. This

was the army, between forty and fifty thousand strong, with which Lord Roberts advanced upon the

In the meantime he had anticipated that his mobile and enterprising opponents would work round and strike

at our rear. Ample means had been provided for dealing with any attempt of the kind. Rundle with the 8th

Division aud Brabant's Colonial Division remained in rear of the right flank to confront any force which

might turn it. At Bloemfontein were KellyKenny's Division (the 6th) and Chermside's (the 3rd), with a force

of cavalry and guns. Methuen, working from Kimberley towards Boshof, formed the extreme left wing of the

main advance, though distant a hundred miles from it. With excellent judgment Lord Roberts saw that it was

on our right flank that danger was to be feared, and here it was that every precaution had been taken to meet

The objective of the first day's march was the little town of Brandfort, ten miles north of Karee. The head of

the main column faced it, while the left arm swept round and drove the Boer force from their position.

Tucker's Division upon the right encountered some opposition, but overbore it with artillery. May 4th was a

day of rest for the infantry, but on the 5th they advanced, in the same order as before, for twenty miles, and

found themselves to the south of the Vet River, where the enemy had prepared for an energetic resistance. A

vigorous artillery duel ensued, the British guns in the open as usual against an invisible enemy. After three

hours of a very hot fire the mounted infantry got across the river upon the left and turned the Boer flank, on

which they hastily withdrew. The first lodgment was effected by two bodies of Canadians and

NewZealanders, who were energetically supported by Captain Anley's 3rd Mounted Infantry. The rushing

of a kopje by twentythree West Australians was another gallant incident which marked this engagement, in

which our losses were insignificant. A maxim and twenty or thirty prisoners were taken by Hutton's men. The

next day (May 6th) the army moved across the difficult drift of the Vet River, and halted that night at

Smaldeel, some five miles to the north of it. At the same time Ian Hamilton had been able to advance to

Winburg, so that the army had contracted its front by about half, but had preserved its relative positions.

Hamilton, after his junction with his reinforcements at Jacobsrust, had under him so powerful a force that he

overbore all resistance. His actions between Thabanchu and Winburg had cost the Boers heavy loss, and in

one action the German legion had been overthrown. The informal warfare which was made upon us by

citizens of many nations without rebuke from their own Governments is a matter of which pride, and possibly

policy, have forbidden us to complain, but it will be surprising if it does not prove that their laxity has

established a very dangerous precedent, and they will find it difficult to object when, in the next little war in

which either France or Germany is engaged, they find a few hundred British adventurers carrying a rifle

The record of the army's advance is now rather geographical than military, for it rolled northwards with never

a check save that which was caused by the construction of the railway diversions which atoned for the

destruction of the larger bridges. The infantry now, as always in the campaign, marched excellently; for

though twenty miles in the day may seem a moderate allowance to a healthy man upon an English road, it is a

considerable performance under an African sun with a weight of between thirty and forty pounds to be

carried. The good humour of the men was admirable, and they eagerly longed to close with the elusive enemy

who flitted ever in front of them. Huge clouds of smoke veiled the northern sky, for the Boers had set fire to

the dry grass, partly to cover their own retreat, and partly to show up our khaki upon the blackened surface.

Far on the flanks the twinkling heliographs revealed the position of the widespread wings.

On May 10th Lord Roberts's force, which had halted for three days at Smaldeel, moved onwards to

Welgelegen. French's cavalry had come up by road, and quickly strengthened the centre and left wing of the

army. On the morning of the 10th the invaders found themselves confronted by a formidable position which

the Boers had taken up on the northern bank of the Sand River. Their army extended over twenty miles of

country, the two Bothas were in command, and everything pointed to a pitched battle. Had the position been

rushed from the front, there was every material for a second Colenso, but the British had learned that it was

by brains rather than by blood that such battles may be won. French's cavalry turned the Boers on one side,

and Bruce Hamilton's infantry on the other. Theoretically we never passed the Boer flanks, but practically

their line was so over extended that we were able to pierce it at any point. There was never any severe

fighting, but rather a steady advance upon the British side and a steady retirement upon that of the Boers. On

the left the Sussex regiment distinguished itself by the dash with which it stormed an important kopje. The

losses were slight, save among a detached body of cavalry which found itself suddenly cut off by a strong

force of the enemy and lost Captain Elworthy killed, and Haig of the Inniskillings, Wilkinson of the

Australian Horse, and twenty men prisoners. We also secured forty or fifty prisoners, and the enemy's

casualties amounted to about as many more. The whole straggling action fought over a front as broad as from

London to Woking cost the British at the most a couple of hundred casualties, and carried their army over the

most formidable defensive position which they were to encounter. The war in its later phases certainly has the

pleasing characteristic of being the most bloodless, considering the number of men engaged and the amount

of powder burned, that has been known in history. It was at the expense of their boots and not of their lives

On May 11th Lord Roberts's army advanced twenty miles to Geneva Siding, and every preparation was made

for a battle next day, as it was thought certain that the Boers would defend their new capital, Kroonstad. It

proved, however, that even here they would not make a stand, and on May 12th, at one o'clock, Lord Roberts

rode into the town. Steyn, Botha, and De Wet escaped, and it was announced that the village of Lindley had

become the new seat of government. The British had now accomplished half their journey to Pretoria, and it

was obvious that on the south side of the Vaal no serious resistance awaited them. Burghers were freely

surrendering themselves with their arms, and returning to their farms. In the southeast Rundle and Brabant

were slowly advancing, while the Boers who faced them fell back towards Lindley. On the west, Hunter had

crossed the Vaal at Windsorton, and Barton's Fusiller Brigade had fought a sharp action at Rooidam, while

Mahon's Mafeking relief column had slipped past their flank, escaping the observation of the British public,

but certainly not that of the Boers. The casualties in the Rooidam action were nine killed and thirty wounded,

but the advance of the Fusiliers was irresistible, and for once the Boer loss, as they were hustled from kopje

to kopje, appears to have been greater than that of the British. The Yeomanry had an opportunity of showing

once more that there are few more highmettled troops in South Africa than these good sportsmen of the

shires, who only showed a trace of their origin in their irresistible inclination to burst into a 'tallyho!' when

ordered to attack. The Boer forces fell back after the action along the line of the Vaal, making for Christiana

and Bloemhof. Hunter entered into the Transvaal in pursuit of them, being the first to cross the border, with

the exception of raiding Rhodesians early in the war. Methuen, in the meanwhile, was following a course

parallel to Hunter but south of him, Hoopstad being his immediate objective. The little union jacks which

were stuck in the war maps in so many British households were now moving swiftly upwards.

Buller's force was also sweeping northwards, and the time had come when the Ladysmith garrison, restored at

last to health and strength, should have a chance of striking back at those who had tormented them so long.

Many of the best troops had been drafted away to other portions of the seat of war. Hart's Brigade and

Barton's Fusilier Brigade had gone with Hunter to form the 10th Division upon the Kimberley side, and the

Imperial Light Horse had been brought over for the relief of Mafeking. There remained, however, a

formidable force, the regiments in which had been strengthened by the addition of drafts and volunteers from

home. Not less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets were ready and eager for the passage of the

This line of rugged hills is pierced by only three passes, each of which was held in strength by the enemy.

Considerable losses must have ensued from any direct attempt to force them. Buller, however, with excellent

judgment, demonstrated in front of them with Hildyard's men, while the rest of the army, marching round,

outflanked the line of resistance, and on May 15th pounced upon Dundee. Much had happened since that

October day when Penn Symons led his three gallant regiments up Talana Hill, but now at last, after seven

weary months, the ground was reoccupied which he had gained. His old soldiers visited his grave, and the

national flag was raised over the remains of as gallant a man as ever died for the sake of it.

The Boers, whose force did not exceed a few thousands, were now rolled swiftly back through Northern

Natal into their own country. The long strain at Ladysmith had told upon them, and the men whom we had to

meet were very different from the warriors of Spion Kop and Nicholson's Nek. They had done magnificently,

but there is a limit to human endurance, and no longer would these peasants face the bursting lyddite and the

bayonets of angry soldiers. There is little enough for us to boast of in this. Some pride might be taken in the

campaign when at a disadvantage we were facing superior numbers, but now we could but deplore the

situation in which these poor valiant burghers found themselves, the victims of a rotten government and of

their own delusions. Hofer's Tyrolese, Charette's Vendeans, or Bruce's Scotchmen never fought a finer fight

than these children of the veldt, but in each case they combated a real and not an imaginary tyrant. It is

heartsickening to think of the butchery, the misery, the irreparable losses, the blood of men, and the bitter

tears of women, all of which might have been spared had one obstinate and ignorant man been persuaded to

allow the State which he ruled to conform to the customs of every other civilised State upon the earth.

Buller was now moving with a rapidity and decision which contrast pleasantly with some of his earlier

operations. Although Dundee was only occupied on May 15th, on May 18th his vanguard was in Newcastle,

fifty miles to the north. In nine days he had covered 138 miles. On the 19th the army lay under the loom of

that Majuba which had cast its sinister shadow for so long over South African politics. In front was the

historical Laing's Nek, the pass which leads from Natal into the Transvaal, while through it runs the famous

railway tunnel. Here the Boers had taken up that position which had proved nineteen years before to be too

strong for British troops. The Rooineks had come back after many days to try again. A halt was called, for the

ten days' supplies which had been taken with the troops were exhausted, and it was necessary to wait until the

railway should be repaired. This gave time for Hildyard's 5th Division and Lyttelton's 4th Division to close

up on Clery's 2nd Division, which with Dundonald's cavalry had formed our vanguard throughout. The only

losses of any consequence during this fine march fell upon a single squadron of Bethune's mounted infantry,

which being thrown out in the direction of Vryheid, in order to make sure that our flank was clear, fell into an

ambuscade and was almost annihilated by a closerange fire. Sixtysix casualties, of which nearly half were

killed, were the result of this action, which seems to have depended, like most of our reverses, upon defective

scouting. Buller, having called up his two remaining divisions and having mended the railway behind him,

proceeded now to manoeuvre the Boers out of Laing's Nek exactly as he had manceuvred them out of the

Biggarsberg. At the end of May Hildyard and Lyttelton were despatched in an eastern direction, as if there

It was on May 12th that Lord Roberts occupied Kroonstad, and he halted there for eight days before he

resumed his advance. At the end of that time his railway had been repaired, and enough supplies brought up

to enable him to advance again without anxiety. The country through which he passed swarmed with herds

and flocks, but, with as scrupulous a regard for the rights of property as Wellington showed in the south of

France, no hungry soldier was allowed to take so much as a chicken as he passed. The punishment for looting

was prompt and stern. It is true that farms were burned occasionally and the stock confiscated, but this was as

a punishment for some particular offence and not part of a system. The limping Tommy looked askance at the

fat geese which covered the dam by the roadside, but it was as much as his life was worth to allow his fingers

to close round those tempting white necks. On foul water and bully beef he tramped through a land of plenty.

Lord Roberts's eight days' halt was spent in consolidating the general military situation. We have already

shown how Buller had crept upwards to the Natal Border. On the west Methuen reached Hoopstad and

Hunter Christiana, settling the country and collecting arms as they went. Rundle in the southeast took

possession of the rich grain lands, and on May 21st entered Ladybrand. In front of him lay that difilcult hilly

country about Senekal, Ficksburg, and Bethlehem which was to delay him so long. Ian Hamilton was feeling

his way northwards to the right of the railway line, and for the moment cleared the district between Lindley

and Heilbron, passing through both towns and causing Steyn to again change his capital, which became

Vrede, in the extreme northeast of the State. During these operations Hamilton had the two formidable De

Wet brothers in front of him, and suffered nearly a hundred casualties in the continual skirmishing which

accompanied his advance. His right flank and rear were continually attacked, and these signs of forces

On May 22nd the main army resumed its advance, moving forward fifteen miles to Honing's Spruit. On the

23rd another march of twenty miles over a fine roiling prairie brought them to Rhenoster River. The enemy

had made some preparations for a stand, but Hamilton was near Heilbron upon their left and French was upon

their right flank. The river was crossed without opposition. On the 24th the army was at Vredefort Road, and

on the 26th the vanguard crossed the Vaal River at Viljoen's Drift, the whole army following on the 27th.

Hamilton's force had been cleverly swung across from the right to the left flank of the British, so that the

Preparations for resistance had been made on the line of the railway, but the wide turning movements on the

flanks by the indefatigable French and Hamilton rendered all opposition of no avail. The British columns

flowed over and onwards without a pause, tramping steadily northwards to their destination. The bulk of the

Free State forces refused to leave their own country, and moved away to the eastern and northern portion of

the State, where the British Generals thought incorrectly, as the future was to prove that no further

harm would come from them. The State which they were in arms to defend had really ceased to exist, for

already it had been publicly proclaimed at Bloemfontein in the Queen's name that the country had been

annexed to the Empire, and that its style henceforth was that of 'The Orange River Colony.' Those who think

this measure unduly harsh must remember that every mile of land which the Freestaters had conquered in the

early part of the war had been solemnly annexed by them. At the same time, those Englishmen who knew the

history of this State, which had once been the model of all that a State should be, were saddened by the

thought that it should have deliberately committed suicide for the sake of one of the most corrupt

governments which have ever been known. Had the Transvaal been governed as the Orange Free State was,

Lord Roberts's tremendous march was now drawing to a close. On May 28th the troops advanced twenty

miles, and passed Klip River without fighting. It was observed with surprise that the Transvaalers were very

much more careful of their own property than they had been of that of their allies, and that the railway was

not damaged at all by the retreating forces. The country had become more populous, and far away upon the

low curves of the hills were seen high chimneys and gaunt iron pumps which struck the north of England

soldier with a pang of homesickness. This long distant hill was the famous Rand, and under its faded grasses

lay such riches as Solomon never took from Ophir. It was the prize of victory; and yet the prize is not to the

victor, for the dustgrimed officers and men looked with little personal interest at this treasurehouse of the

world. Not one penny the richer would they be for the fact that their blood and their energy had brought

justice and freedom to the gold fields. They had opened up an industry for the world, men of all nations

would be the better for their labours, the miner and the financier or the trader would equally profit by them,

but the men in khaki would tramp on, unrewarded and uncomplaining, to India, to China, to any spot where

The infantry, streaming up from the Vaal River to the famous ridge of gold, had met with no resistance upon

the way, but great mist banks of cloud by day and huge twinkling areas of flame by night showed the

handiwork of the enemy. Hamilton and French, moving upon the left flank, found Boers thick upon the hills,

but cleared them off in a wellmanaged skirmish which cost us a dozen casualties. On May 29th, pushing

swiftly along, French found the enemy posted very strongly with several guns at Doornkop, a point west of

Klip River Berg. The cavalry leader had with him at this stage three horse batteries, four pompoms, and

3,000 mounted men. The position being too strong for him to force, Hamilton's infantry (19th and 21st

Brigades) were called up, and the Boers were driven out. That splendid corps, the Gordons, lost nearly a

hundred men in their advance over the open, and the C.I.V.s on the other flank fought like a regiment of

veterans. There had been an inclination to smile at these citizen soldiers when they first came out, but no one

smiled now save the General who felt that he had them at his back. Hamilton's attack was assisted by the

menace rather than the pressure of French's turning movement on the Boer right, but the actual advance was

as purely frontal as any of those which had been carried through at the beginning of the war. The open

formation of the troops, the powerful artillery behind them, and perhaps also the lowered morale of the

enemy combined to make such a movement less dangerous than of old. In any case it was inevitable, as the

state of Hamilton's commisariat rendered it necessary that at all hazards he should force his way through.

Whilst this action of Doornkop was fought by the British left flank, Henry's mounted infantry in the centre

moved straight upon the important junction of Germiston, which lies amid the huge white heaps of tailings

from the mines. At this point, or near it, the lines from Johannesburg and from Natal join the line to Pretoria.

Colonel Henry's advance was an extremely daring one, for the infantry were some distance behind; but after

an irregular scrambling skirmish, in which the Boer snipers had to be driven off the mine heaps and from

among the houses, the 8th mounted infantry got their grip of the railway and held it. The exploit was a very

fine one, and stands out the more brilliantly as the conduct of the campaign cannot be said to afford many

examples of that wellconsidered audacity which deliberately runs the risk of the minor loss for the sake of

the greater gain. Henry was much assisted by J battery R.H.A., which was handled with energy and judgment.

French was now on the west of the town, Henry had cut the railway on the east, and Roberts was coming up

from the south. His infantry had covered 130 miles in seven days, but the thought that every step brought

them nearer to Pretoria was as exhilarating as their fifes and drums. On May 30th the victorious troops

camped outside the city while Botha retired with his army, abandoning without a battle the treasurehouse of

his country. Inside the town were chaos and confusion. The richest mines in the world lay for a day or more

at the mercy of a lawless rabble drawn from all nations. The Boer officials were themselves divided in

opinion, Krause standing for law and order while Judge Koch advocated violence. A spark would have set the

town blazing, and the worst was feared when a crowd of mercenaries assembled in front of the Robinson

mine with threats of violence. By the firmness and tact of Mr. Tucker, the manager, and by the strong attitude

of Commissioner Krause, the situation was saved and the danger passed. Upon May 31st, without violence to

life or destruction to property, that great town which British hands have done so much to build found itself at

last under the British flag. May it wave there so long as it covers just laws, honest officials, and cleanhanded

And now the last stage of the great journey had been reached. Two days were spent at Johannesburg while

supplies were brought up, and then a move was made upon Pretoria thirty miles to the north. Here was the

Boer capital, the seat of government, the home of Kruger, the centre of all that was antiBritish, crouching

amid its hills, with costly forts guarding every face of it. Surely at last the place had been found where that

great battle should be fought which should decide for all time whether it was with the Briton or with the

On the last day of May two hundred Lancers under the command of Major Hunter Weston, with Charles of

the Sappers and. Burnham the scout, a man who has played the part of a hero throughout the campaign,

struck off from the main army and endeavoured to descend upon the PretoriaDelagoa railway line with the

intention of blowing up a bridge and cutting the Boer line of retreat. It was a most dashing attempt; but the

small party had the misfortune to come into contact with a strong Boer commando, who headed them off.

After a skirmish they were compelled to make their way back with a loss of five killed and fourteen

The cavalry under French had waited for the issue of this enterprise at a point nine miles north of

Johannesburg. On June 2nd it began its advance with orders to make a wide sweep round to the westward,

and so skirt the capital, cutting the Pietersburg railway to the north of it. The country in the direct line

between Johannesburg and Pretoria consists of a series of rolling downs which are admirably adapted for

cavalry work, but the detour which French had to make carried him into the wild and broken district which

lies to the north of the Little Crocodile River. Here he was fiercely attacked on ground where his troops could

not deploy, but with extreme coolness and judgment beat off the enemy. To cover thirtytwo miles in a day

and fight a way out of an ambuscade in the evening is an ordeal for any leader and for any troops. Two killed

and seven wounded were our trivial losses in a situation which might have been a serious one. The Boers

appear to have been the escort of a strong convoy which had passed along the road some miles in front. Next

morning both convoy and opposition had disappeared. The cavalry rode on amid a country of orange groves,

the troopers standing up in their stirrups to pluck the golden fruit. There was no further fighting, and on June

4th French had establisbed himself upon the north of the town, where he learned that all resistance had

Whilst the cavalry had performed this enveloping movement the main army had moved swiftly upon its

objective, leaving one brigade behind to secure Johannesburg. Ian Hamilton advanced upon the left, while

Lord Roberts's column kept the line of the railway, Colonel Henry's mounted infantry scouting in front. As

the army topped the low curves of the veldt they saw in front of them two wellmarked hills, each crowned

by a low squat building. They were the famous southern forts of Pretoria. Between the hills was a narrow

For a time it appeared that the entry was to be an absolutely bloodless one, but the booming of cannon and

the crash of Mauser fire soon showed that the enemy was in force upon the ridge. Botha had left a strong

rearguard to hold off the British while his own stores and valuables were being withdrawn from the town.

The silence of the forts showed that the guns had been removed and that no prolonged resistance was

intended; but in the meanwhile fringes of determined riflemen, supported by cannon, held the approaches,

and must be driven off before an entry could be effected. Each fresh corps as it came up reinforced the firing

line. Henry's mounted infantrymen supported by the horseguns of J battery and the guns of Tucker's division

began the action. So hot was the answer, both from cannon and from rifle, that it seemed for a time as if a real

battle were at last about to take place. The Guards' Brigade, Stephenson's Brigade, and Maxwell's Brigade

streamed up and waited until Hamilton, who was on the enemy's right flank, should be able to make his

presence felt. The heavy guns had also arrived, and a huge cloud of DEBRIS rising from the Pretorian forts

But either the burghers were halfhearted or there was no real intention to make a stand. About halfpast two

their fire slackened and PoleCarew was directed to push on. That debonnaire soldier with his two veteran

brigades obeyed the order with alacrity, and the infantry swept over the ridge, with some thirty or forty

casualties, the majority of which fell to the Warwicks. The position was taken, and Hamilton, who came up

late, was only able to send on De Lisle's mounted infantry, chiefly Australians, who ran down one of the Boer

maxims in the open. The action had cost us altogether about seventy men. Among the injured was the Duke

of Norfolk, who had shown a high sense of civic virtue in laying aside the duties and dignity of a Cabinet

Minister in order to serve as a simple captain of volunteers. At the end of this one fight the capital lay at the

mercy of Lord Roberts. Consider the fight which they made for their chief city, compare it with that which

the British made for the village of Mafeking, and say on which side is that stern spirit of selfsacrifice and

In the early morning of June 5th, the Coldstream Guards were mounting the hills which commanded the

town. Beneath them in the clear African air lay the famous city, embowered in green, the fine central

buildings rising grandly out of the wide circle of villas. Through the Nek part of the Guards' Brigade and

Maxwell's Brigade had passed, and had taken over the station, from which at least one train laden with horses

had steamed that morning. Two others, both ready to start, were only just stopped in time.

The first thought was for the British prisoners, and a small party headed by the Duke of Marlborough rode to

their rescue. Let it be said once for all that their treatment by the Boers was excellent and that their

appearance would alone have proved it. One hundred and twentynine officers and thirtynine soldiers were

found in the Model Schools, which had been converted into a prison. A day later our cavalry arrived at

Waterval, which is fourteen miles to the north of Pretoria. Here were confined three thousand soldiers, whose

fare had certainly been of the scantiest, though in other respects they appear to have been well

treated.[Footnote: Further information unfortunately shows that in the case of the sick and of the Colonial

prisoners the treatment was by no meanu good.] Nine hundred of their comrades had been removed by the

Boers, but Porter's cavalry was in time to release the others, under a brisk shell fire from a Boer gun upon the

ridge. Many pieces of good luck we had in the campaign, but this recovery of our prisoners, which left the

enemy without a dangerous lever for exacting conditions of peace, was the most fortunate of all.

In the centre of the town there is a wide square decorated or disfigured by a bare pedestal upon which a statue

of the President was to have been placed. Hard by is the bleak barnlike church in which he preached, and on

either side are the Government offices and the Law Courts, buildings which would grace any European

capital. Here, at two o'clock on the afternoon of June 5th, Lord Roberts sat his horse and saw pass in front of

him the men who had followed him so far and so faithfully the Guards, the Essex, the Welsh, the Yorks,

the Warwicks, the guns, the mounted infantry, the dashing irregulars, the Gordons, the Canadians, the

Shropshires, the Cornwalls, the Camerons, the Derbys, the Sussex, and the London Volunteers. For over two

hours the khaki waves with their crests of steel went sweeping by. High above their heads from the summit of

the Raadsaal the broad Union Jack streamed for the first time. Through months of darkness we had

struggled onwards to the light. Now at last the strange drama seemed to be drawing to its close. The God of

battles had given the longwithheld verdict. But of all the hearts which throbbed high at that supreme

moment there were few who felt one touch of bitterness towards the brave men who had been overborne.

They had fought and died for their ideal. We had fought and died for ours. The hope for the future of South

Africa is that they or their descendants may learn that that banner which has come to wave above Pretoria

means no racial intolerance, no greed for gold, no paltering with injustice or corruption, but that it means one

law for all and one freedom for all, as it does in every other continent in the whole broad earth. When that is

learned it may happen that even they will come to date a happier life and a wider liberty from that 5th of June

which saw the symbol of their nation pass for ever from among the ensigns of the world.

THE military situation at the time of the occupation of Pretoria was roughly as follows. Lord Roberts with

some thirty thousand men was in possession of the capital, but had left his long line of communications very

imperfectly guarded behind him. On the flank of this line of communications, in the eastern and northeastern

corner of the Free State, was an energetic force of unconquered Freestaters who had rallied round President

Steyn. They were some eight or ten thousand in number, well horsed, with a fair number of guns, under the

able leadership of De Wet, Prinsloo, and Olivier. Above all, they had a splendid position, mountainous and

broken, from which, as from a fortress, they could make excursions to the south or west. This army included

the commandos of Ficksburg, Senekal, and Harrismith, with all the broken and desperate men from other

districts who had left their farms and fled to the mountains. It was held in check as a united force by Rundle's

Division and the Colonial Division on the south, while Colvile, and afterwards Methuen, endeavoured to pen

them in on the west. The task was a hard one, however, and though Rundle succeeded in holding his line

intact, it appeared to be impossible in that wide country to coop up altogether an enemy so mobile. A strange

game of hideandseek ensued, in which De Wet, who led the Boer raids, was able again and again to strike

our line of rails and to get back without serious loss. The story of these instructive and humiliating episodes

will be told in their order. The energy and skill of the guerilla chief challenge our admiration, and the score of

his successes would be amusing were it not that the points of the game are marked by the lives of British

General Buller had spent the latter half of May in making his way from Ladysmith to Laing's Nek, and the

beginning of June found him with twenty thousand men in front of that difficult position. Some talk of a

surrender had arisen, and Christian Botha, who commanded the Boers, succeeded in gaining several days'

armistice, which ended in nothing. The Transvaal forces at this point were not more than a few thousand in

number, but their position was so formidable that it was a serious task to turn them out. Van Wyk's Hill,

however, had been left unguarded, and as its possession would give the British the command of Botha's Pass,

its unopposed capture by the South African Light Horse was an event of great importance. With guns upon

this eminence the infantry were able, on June 8th, to attack and to carry with little loss the rest of the high

ground, and so to get the Pass into their complete possession. Botha fired the grass behind him, and withdrew

sullenly to the north. On the 9th and 10th the convoys were passed over the Pass, and on the 11th the main

The operations were now being conducted in that extremely acute angle of Natal which runs up between the

Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In crossing Botha's Pass the army had really entered what was now the

Orange River Colony. But it was only for a very short time, as the object of the movement was to turn the

Laing's Nek position, and then come back into the Transvaal through Alleman's Pass. The gallant South

African Light Horse led the way, and fought hard at one point to clear a path for the army, losing six killed

and eight wounded in a sharp skirmish. On the morning of the 12th the flanking movement was far advanced,

and it only remained for the army to force Alleman's Nek, which would place it to the rear of Laing's Nek,

Had the Boers been the men of Colenso and of Spion Kop, this stonuing of Alleman's Nek would have been a

bloody business. The position was strong, the cover was slight, and there was no way round. But the infantry

came on with the old dash without the old stubborn resolution being opposed to them. The guns prepared the

way, and then the Dorsets, the Dublins, the Middlesex, the Queen's, and the East Surrey did the rest. The door

was open and the Transvaal lay before us. The next day Volksrust was in our hands.

The whole series of operations were excellently conceived and carried out. Putting Colenso on one side, it

cannot be denied that General Buller showed considerable power of manoeuvring large bodies of troops. The

withdrawal of the compromised army after Spion Kop, the change of the line of attack at Pieter's Hill, and the

flanking marches in this campaign of Northern Natal, were all very workmanlike achievements. In this case a

position which the Boers had been preparing for months, scored with trenches and topped by heavy artillery,

had been rendered untenable by a clever flank movement, the total casualties in the whole affair being less

than two hundred killed and wounded. Natal was cleared of the invader, Buller's foot was on the high plateau

of the Transvaal, and Roberts could count on twenty thousand good men coming up to him from the

southeast. More important than all, the Natal railway was being brought up, and soon the central British

Army would depend upon Durban instead of Cape Town for its supplies a saving of nearly twothirds of

the distance. The fugitive Boers made northwards in the Middelburg direction, while Buller advanced to

Standerton, which town he continued to occupy until Lord Roberts could send a force down through

Heidelberg to join hands with him. Such was the position of the Natal Field Force at the end of June. From

the west and the southwest British forces were also converging upon the capital. The indomitable

BadenPowell sought for rest and change of scene after his prolonged trial by harrying the Boers out of

Zeerust and Rustenburg. The forces of Hunter and of Mahon converged upon Potchefstroom, from which,

after settling that district, they could be conveyed by rail to Krugersdorp and Johannesburg.

Before briefly recounting the series of events which took place upon the line of communications, the

narrative must return to Lord Roberts at Pretoria, and describe the operations which followed his occupation

of that city. In leaving the undefeated forces of the Free State behind him, the British General had

unquestionably run a grave risk, and was well aware that his railway communication was in danger of being

cut. By the rapidity of his movements he succeeded in gaining the enemy's capital before that which he had

foreseen came to pass; but if Botha had held him at Pretoria while De Wet struck at him behind, the situation

would have been a serious one. Having once attained his main object, Roberts could receive with equanimity

the expected news that De Wet with a mobile force of less than two thousand men had, on June 7th, cut the

line at Roodeval to the north of Kroonstad. Both rail and telegraph were destroyed, and for a few days the

army was isolated. Fortunately there were enough supplies to go on with, and immediate steps were taken to

drive away the intruder, though, like a mosquito, he was brushed from one place only to settle upon another.

Leaving others to restore his broken communications, Lord Roberts turned his attention once more to Botha,

who still retained ten or fifteen thousand men under his command. The President had fled from Pretoria with

a large sum of money, estimated at over two millions sterling, and was known to be living in a saloon railway

carriage, which had been transformed into a seat of government even more mobile than that of President

Steyn. From WatervalBoven, a point beyond Middelburg, he was in a position either to continue his journey

to Delagoa Bay, and so escape out of the country, or to trave] north into that wild Lydenburg country which

had always been proclaimed as the last ditch of the defence. Here he remained with his goldbags waiting the

Botha and his stalwarts had not gone far from the capital. Fifteen miles out to the east the railway line runs

through a gap in the hills called Pienaars Poort, and here was such a position as the Boer loves to hold. It was

very strong in front, and it had widely spread formidable flanking hills to hamper those turning movements

which had so often been fatal to the Boer generals. Behind was the uncut railway line along which the guns

could in case of need be removed. The whole position was over fifteen miles from wing to wing, and it was

well known to the Boer general that Lord Roberts had no longer that preponderance of force which would

enable him to execute wide turning movements, as he had done in his advance from the south. His army had

decreased seriously in numbers. The mounted men, the most essential branch of all, were so ill horsed that

brigades were not larger than regiments. One brigade of infantry (the 14th) had been left to garrison

Johannesburg, and another (the 18th) had been chosen for special duty in Pretoria. SmithDorrien's Brigade

had been detached for duty upon the line of communications. With all these deductions and the wastage

caused by wounds and disease, the force was in no state to assume a vigorous offensive. So hard pressed were

they for men that the three thousand released prisoners from Waterval were hurriedly armed with Boer

Had Botha withdrawn to a safe distance, Lord Roberts would certainly have halted, as he had done at

Bloemfontein, and waited for remounts and reinforcements. But the war could not be allowed to languish

when an active enemy lay only fifteen miles off, within striking distance of two cities and of the line of rail.

Taking all the troops that he could muster, the British General moved out once more on Monday, June 11th,

to drive Botha from his position. He had with him PoleCarew's 11th Division, which numbered about six

thousand men with twenty guns, Ian Hamilton's force, which included one infantry brigade (Bruce

Hamilton's), one cavalry brigade, and a corps of mounted infantry, say, six thousand in all, with thirty guns.

There remained French's Cavalry Division, with Hutton's Mounted Infantry, which could not have exceeded

two thousand sabres and rifles. The total force was, therefore, not more than sixteen or seventeen thousand

men, with about seventy guns. Their task was to carry a carefully prepared position held by at least ten

thousand burghers with a strong artillery. Had the Boer of June been the Boer of December, the odds would

There had been some negotiations for peace between Lord Roberts and Botha, but the news of De Wet's

success from the south had hardened the Boer general's heart, and on June 9th the cavalry had their orders to

advance. Hamilton was to work round the left wing of the Boers, and French round their right, while the

infantry came up in the centre. So wide was the scene of action that the attack and the resistance in each flank

and in the centre constituted, on June 11th, three separate actions. Of these the latter was of least importance,

as it merely entailed the advance of the infantry to a spot whence they could take advantage of the success of

the flanking forces when they had made their presence felt. The centre did not on this as on several other

occasions in the campaign make the mistake of advancing before the way had been prepared for it.

French with his attenuated force found so vigorous a resistance on Monday and Tuesday that he was hard put

to it to hold his own. Fortunately he had with him three excellent Horse Artillery batteries, G, 0, and T, who

worked until, at the end of the engagement, they had only twenty rounds in their limbers. The country was an

impossible one for cavalry, and the troopers fought dismounted, with intervals of twenty or thirty paces

between the men. Exposed all day to rifle and shell fire, unable to advance and unwilling to retreat, it was

only owing to their open formation that they escaped with about thirty casualties. With Boers on his front, his

flank, and even on his rear, French held grimly on, realising that a retreat upon his part would mean a greater

pressure at all other points of the British advance. At night his weary men slept upon the ground which they

had held. All Monday and all Tuesday French kept his grip at Kameelsdrift, stolidly indifferent to the attempt

of the enemy to cut his line of communications. On Wednesday, Hamilton, upon the other flank, had gained

the upper hand, and the pressure was relaxed. French then pushed forward, but the horses were so utterly

During the two days that French had been held up by the Boer right wing Hamilton had also been seriously

engaged upon the left so seriously that at one time the action appeared to have gone against him. The fight

presented some distinctive features, which made it welcome to soldiers who were weary of the invisible man

with his smokeless gun upon the eternal kopje. It is true that man, gun, and kopje were all present upon this

occasion, but in the endeavours to drive him off some new developments took place, which formed for one

brisk hour a reversion to picturesque warfare. Perceiving a gap in the enemy's line, Hamilton pushed up the

famous Q battery the guns which had plucked glory out of disaster at Sanna's Post. For the second time in

one campaign they were exposed and in imminent danger of capture. A body of mounted Boers with great

dash and hardihood galloped down within close range and opened fire. Instantly the 12th Lancers were let

loose upon them. How they must have longed for their bigboned longstriding English troop horses as they

strove to raise a gallop out of their spiritless overworked Argentines! For once, however, the lance meant

more than five pounds dead weight and an encumbrance to the rider. The guns were saved, the Boers fled,

and a dozen were left upon the ground. But a cavalry charge has to end in a reformation, and that is the

instant of danger if any unbroken enemy remains within range. Now a sleet of bullets hissed through their

ranks as they retired, and the gallant Lord Airlie, as modest and brave a soldier as ever drew sword, was

struck through the heart. 'Pray moderate your language!' was his last characteristic remark, made to a

battledrunken sergeant. Two officers, seventeen men, and thirty horses went down with their Colonel, the

great majority only slightly injured. In the meantime the increasing pressure upon his right caused

Broadwood to order a second charge, of the Life Guards this time, to drive off the assailants. The appearance

rather than the swords of the Guards prevailed, and cavalry as cavalry had vindicated their existence more

than they had ever done during the campaign. The guns were saved, the flank attack was rolled back, but one

other danger had still to be met, for the Heidelberg commando a corps D'ELITE of the Boers had made

its way outside Hamilton's flank and threatened to get past him. With cool judgment the British General

detached a battalion and a section of a battery, which pushed the Boers back into a less menacing position.

The rest of Bruce Hamilton's Brigade were ordered to advance upon the hills in front, and, aided by a heavy

artillery fire, they had succeeded, before the closing in of the winter night, in getting possession of this first

line of the enemy's defences. Night fell upon an undecided fight, which, after swaying this way and that, had

finally inclined to the side of the British. The Sussex and the City Imperial Volunteers were clinging to the

enemy's left flank, while the 11th Division were holding them in front. All promised well for the morrow.

By order of Lord Roberts the Guards were sent round early on Tuesday, the 12th, to support the flank attack

of Bruce Hamilton's infantry. It was afternoon before all was ready for the advance, and then the Sussex, the

London Volunteers, and the Derbyshires won a position upon the ridge, followed later by the three regiments

of Guards. But the ridge was the edge of a considerable plateau, swept by Boer fire, and no advance could be

made over its bare expanse save at a considerable loss. The infantry clung in a long fringe to the edge of the

position, but for two hours no guns could be brought up to their support, as the steepness of the slope was

insurmountable. It was all that the stormers could do to hold their ground, as they were enfiladed by a

VickersMaxim, and exposed to showers of shrapnel as well as to an incessant rifle fire. Never were guns so

welcome as those of the 82nd battery, brought by Major Connolly into the firing line. The enemy's riflemen

were only a thousand yards away, and the action of the artillery might have seemed as foolhardy as that of

Long at Colenso. Ten horses went down on the instant, and a quarter of the gunners were hit; but the guns

roared one by one into action, and their shrapnel soon decided the day. Undoubtedly it is with Connolly and

At four o'clock, as the sun sank towards the west, the tide of fight had set in favour of the attack. Two more

batteries had come up, every rifle was thrown into the firing line, and the Boer reply was decreasing in

volume. The temptation to an assault was great, but even now it might mean heavy loss of life, and Hamilton

shrank from the sacrifice. In the morning his judgment was justified, for Botha had abandoned the position,

and his army was in full retreat. The mounted men followed as far as Elands River Station, which is

twentyfive miles from Pretoria, but the enemy was not overtaken, save by a small party of De Lisle's

Australians and Regular Mounted Infantry. This force, less than a hundred in number, gained a kopje which

overlooked a portion of the Boer army. Had they been more numerous, the effect would have been

incalculable. As it was, the Australians fired every cartridge which they possessed into the throng, and killed

many horses and men. It would bear examination why it was that only this small corps was present at so vital

a point, and why, if they could push the pursuit to such purpose, others should not be able to do the same.

Time was bringing some curious revenges. Already Paardeberg had come upon Majuba Day. Buller's

vietorious soldiers had taken Laing's Nek. Now, the Spruit at which the retreating Boers were so mishandled

by the Australians was that same Bronkers Spruit at which, nineteen years before, a regiment had been shot

down. Many might have prophesied that the deed would be avenged; but who could ever have guessed the

Such was the battle of Diamond Hill, as it was called from the name of the ridge which was opposite to

Hamilton's attack. The prolonged two days' struggle showed that there was still plenty of fight in the

burghers. Lord Roberts had not routed them, nor had he captured their guns; but he had cleared the vicinity of

the capital, he had inflicted a loss upon them which was certainly as great as his own, and he had again

proved to them that it was vain for them to attempt to stand. A long pause followed at Pretoria, broken by

occasional small alarms and excursions, which served no end save to keep the army from ENNUI. In spite of

occasional breaks in his line of communications, horses and supplies were coming up rapidly, and, by the

middle of July, Roberts was ready for the field again. At the same time Hunter had come up from

Potchefstroom, and Hamilton had taken Heidelberg, and his force was about to join hands with Buller at

Standerton. Sporadic warfare broke out here and there in the west, and in the course of it Snyman of

Mafeking had reappeared, with two guns, which were promptly taken from him by the Canadian Mounted

Rifles. On all sides it was felt that if the redoubtable De Wet could be captured there was every hope that the

burghers might discontinue a struggle which was disagreeable to the British and fatal to themselves. As a

point of honour it was impossible for Botha to give in while his ally held out. We will turn, therefore, to this

famous guerilla chief, and give some account of his exploits. To understand them some description must be

When Lord Roberts had swept past to the north he had brushed aside the flower of the Orange Free State

army, who occupied the considerable quadrilateral which is formed by the northeast of that State. The

function of Rundle's 8th Division and of Brabant's Colonial Division was to separate the sheep from the goats

by preventing the fighting burghers from coming south and disturbing those districts which had been settled.

For this purpose Rundle formed a long line which should serve as a cordon. Moving up through Trommel and

Clocolan, Ficksburg was occupied on May 25th by the Colonial Division, while Rundle seized Senekal, forty

miles to the northwest. A small force of forty Yeomanry, who entered the town some time in advance of the

main body, was suddenly attacked by the Boers, and the gallant Dalbiac, famous rider and sportsman, was

killed, with four of his men. He was a victim, as so many have been in this campaign, to his own proud

The Boers were in full retreat, but now, as always, they were dangerous. One cannot take them for granted,

for the very moment of defeat is that at which they are capable of some surprising effort. Rundle, following

them up from Senekal, found them in strong possession of the kopjes at Biddulphsberg, and received a check

in his endeavour to drive them off. It was an action fought amid great grass fires, where the possible fate of

the wounded was horrible to contemplate. The 2nd Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, the East Yorkshires, and the

West Kents were all engaged, with the 2nd and 79th Field Batteries and a force of Yeomanry. Our losses

incurred in the open from unseen rifles were thirty killed and 130 wounded, including Colonel Lloyd of the

Grenadiers. Two days later Rundle, from Seneka], joined hands with Brabant from Ficksburg, and a

defensive line was formed between those two places, which was held unbroken for two months, when the

operations ended in the capture of the greater part of the force opposed to him. Clements's Brigade, consisting

of the 1st Royal Irish, the 2nd Bedfords, the 2nd Worcesters, and the 2nd Wiltshires, had come to strengthen

Rundle, and altogether he may have had as many as twelve thousand men under his orders. It was not a large

force with which to hold a mobile adversary at least eight thousand strong, who might attack him at any point

of his extended line. So well, however, did he select his positions that every attempt of the enemy, and there

were many, ended in failure. Badly supplied with food, he and his halfstarved men held bravely to their

At the end of May, then, the Colonial Division, Rundle's Division, and Clements's Brigade held the Boers

from Ficksburg on the Basuto border to Senekal. This prevented them from coming south. But what was

there to prevent them from coming west, and falling upon the railway line? There was the weak point of the

British position. Lord Methuen had been brought across from Boshof, and was available with six thousand

men. Colvile was on that side also, with the Highland Brigade. A few details were scattered up and down the

line, waiting to be gathered up by an enterprising enemy. Kroonstad was held by a single militia battalion;

each separate force had to be nourished by convoys with weak escorts. Never was there such a field for a

mobile and competent guerilla leader. And, as luck would have it, such a man was at hand, ready to take full

Christian de Wet, the elder of two brothers of that name, was at this time in the prime of life, a little over

forty years of age. He was a burly middlesized bearded man, poorly educated, but endowed with much

energy and commonsense. His military experience dated back to Majuba Hill, and he had a large share of

that curious race hatred which is intelligible in the case of the Transvaal, but inexplicable in a Freestater who

has received no injury from the British Empire. Some weakness of his sight compels the use of tinted

spectacles, and he had now turned these, with a pair of particularly observant eyes behind them, upon the

De Wet's force was an offshoot from the army of Freestaters under De Villiers, Olivier, and Prinsloo, which

lay in the mountainous northeast of the State. To him were committed five guns, fifteen hundred men, and

the best of the horses. Well armed, well mounted, and operating in a country which consisted of rolling plains

with occasional fortress kopjes, his little force had everything in its favour. There were so many tempting

objects of attack lying before him that he must have had some difficulty in knowing where to begin. The

Colvile with the Highland Brigade had come up from Ventersburg with instructions to move onward to

Heilbron, pacifying the country as he passed. The country, however, refused to be pacified, and his march

from Ventersburg to Lindley was harassed by snipers every mile of the way. Finding that De Wet and his

men were close upon him, he did not linger at Lindley, but passed on to his destination, his entire march of

126 miles costing him sixtythree casualties, of which nine were fatal. It was a difficult and dangerous

march, especially for the handful of Eastern Province Horse, upon whom fell all the mounted work. By evil

fortune a force of five hundred Yeomanry, the 18th battalion, including the Duke of Cambridge's Own and

the Irish companies, had been sent from Kroonstad to join Colvile at Lindley. Colonel Spragge was in

command. On May 27th this body of horsemen reached their destination only to find that Colvile had already

abandoned it. They appear to have determined to halt for a day in Lindley, and then follow Colvile to

Heilbron. Within a few hours of their entering the town they were fiercely attacked by De Wet.

Colonel Spragge seems to have acted for the best. Under a heavy fire he caused his troopers to fall back upon

his transport, which had been left at a point a few miles out upon the Kroonstad Road, where three defensible

kopjes sheltered a valley in which the cattle and horses could be herded. A stream ran through it. There were

all the materials there for a stand which would have brought glory to the British arms. The men were of

peculiarly fine quality, many of them from the public schools and from the universities, and if any would

fight to the death these with their sporting spirit and their high sense of honour might have been expected to

They had the stronger motive for holding out, as they had taken steps to convey word of their difficulty to

Colvile and to Methuen. The former continued his march to Heilbron, and it is hard to blame him for doing

so, but Methuen on hearing the message, which was conveyed to him at great personal peril by Corporal

Hankey of the Yeomanry, pushed on instantly with the utmost energy, though he arrived too late to prevent,

or even to repair, a disaster. It must be remembered that Colvile was under orders to reach Heilbron on a

certain date, that he was himself fighting his way, and that the force which he was asked to relieve was much

more mobile than his own. His cavalry at that date consisted of 100 men of the Eastern Province Horse.

Colonel Spragge's men had held their own for the first three days of their investment, during which they had

been simply exposed to a longrange rifle fire which inflicted no very serious loss upon them. Their principal

defence consisted of a stone kraal about twenty yards square, which sheltered them from rifle bullets, but

must obviously be a perfect deathtrap in the not improbable event of the Boers sending for artillery. The

spirit of the troopers was admirable. Several dashing sorties were carried out under the leadership of Captain

Humby and Lord Longford. The latter was a particularly dashing business, ending in a bayonet charge which

cleared a neighbouring ridge. Early in the siege the gallant Keith met his end. On the fourth day the Boers

brought up five guns. One would have thought that during so long a time as three days it would have been

possible for the officer in command to make such preparations against this obvious possibility as were so

successfully taken at a later stage of the war by the handful who garrisoned Ladybrand. Surely in this period,

even without engineers, it would not have been hard to construct such trenches as the Boers have again and

again opposed to our own artillery. But the preparations which were made proved to be quite inadequate. One

of the two smaller kopjes was carried, and the garrison fled to the other. This also was compelled to

surrender, and finally the main kopje also hoisted the white flag. No blame can rest upon the men, for their

presence there at all is a sufficient proof of their public spirit and their gallantry. But the lessons of the war

seem to have been imperfectly learned, especially that very certain lesson that shell fire in a close formation

is insupportable, while in an open formation with a little cover it can never compel surrender. The casualty

lists (80 killed and wounded out of a force of 470) show that the Yeomanry took considerable punishment

before surrendering, but do not permit us to call the defence desperate or heroic. It is only fair to add that

Colonel Spragge was acquitted of all blame by a court of inquiry, which agreed, however, that the surrender

was premature, and attributed it to the unauthorised hoisting of a white flag upon one of the detached kopjes.

With regard to the subsequent controversy as to whether General Colvile might have returned to the relief of

the Yeomanry, it is impossible to see how that General could have acted in any other way than he did.

Some explanation is needed of Lord Methuen's appearance upon the central scene of warfare, his division

having, when last described, been at Boshof, not far from Kimberley, where early in April he fought the

successful action which led to the death of Villebois. Thence he proceeded along the Vaal and then south to

Kroonstad, arriving there on May 28th. He had with him the 9th Brigade (Douglas's), which contained the

troops which had started with him for the relief of Kimberley six months before. These were the

Northumberland Fusiliers, Loyal North Lancashires, Northamptons, and Yorkshire Light Infantry. With him

also were the Munsters, Lord Chesham's Yeomanry (five companies), with the 4th and 37th batteries, two

howitzers and two pompoms. His total force was about 6,000 men. On arriving at Kroonstad he was given

the task of relieving Heilbron, where Colvile, with the Highland Brigade, some Colonial horse, Lovat's

Scouts, two naval guns, and the 5th battery, were short of food and ammunition. The more urgent message

from the Yeomen at Lindley, however, took him on a fruitless journey to that town on June 1st. So vigorous

was the pursuit of the Yeomanry that the leading squadrons, consisting of South Notts Hussars and Sherwood

Rangers, actually cut into the Boer convoy and might have rescued the prisoners had they been supported. As

it was they were recalled, and had to fight their way back to Lindley with some loss, including Colonel

Rolleston, the commander, who was badly wounded. A garrison was left under Paget, and the rest of the

force pursued its original mission to Heilbron, arriving there on June 7th, when the Highlanders had been

reduced to quarter rations. 'The Salvation Army' was the nickname by which they expressed their gratitude to

A previous convoy sent to the same destination had less good fortune. On June 1st fiftyfive wagons started

from the railway line to reach Heilbron. The escort consisted of one hundred and sixty details belonging to

Highland regiments without any guns, Captain Corballis in command. But the gentleman with the tinted

glasses was waiting on the way. 'I have twelve hundred men and five guns. Surrender at once!' Such was the

message which reached the escort, and in their defenceless condition there was nothing for it but to comply.

Thus one disaster leads to another, for, had the Yeomanry held out at Lindley, De Wet would not on June 4th

have laid hands upon our wagons; and had he not recruited his supplies from our wagons it is doubtful if he

could have made his attack upon Roodeval. This was the next point upon which he turned his attention.

Two miles beyond Roodeval station there is a wellmarked kopje by the railway line, with other hills some

distance to the right and the left.. A militia regiment, the 4th Derbyshire, had been sent up to occupy this post.

There were rumours of Boers on the line, and Major Haig, who with one thousand details of various

regiments commanded at railhead, had been attacked on June 6th but had beaten off his assailants. De Wet,

acting sometimes in company with, and sometimes independcntly of, his lieutenant Nel, passed down the line

looking fur some easier prey, and on the night of June 7th came upon the militia regiment, which was

encamped in a position which could be complet~y commanded by artillery. It is not true that they had

neglected to occupy the kopje under which they lay, for two companies had been posted upon it. But there

seems to have been no thought of imminent danger, and the regiment had pitched its tents and gone very

comfortably to sleep without a thought of the gentleman in the tinted glasses. In the middle of the night he

was upon them with a hissing sleet of bullets. At the first dawn the guns opened and the shells began to burst

among them. It was a horrible ordeal for raw troops. The men were miners and agricultural labourers,who

had never seen more bloodshed than a cut finger in their lives. They had been four months in the country, but

their life had been a picnic, as the luxury of their baggage shows. Now in an instant the picnic was ended, and

in the grey cold dawn war was upon them grim war with the whine of bullets, the screams of pain, the

crash of shell, the horrible rending and riving of body and limb. In desperate straits, which would have tried

the oldest soldiers, the brave miners did well. They never from the beginning had a chance save to show how

gamely they could take punishment, but that at least they did. Bullets were coming from all sides at once and

yet no enemy was visible. They lined one side of the embankment, and they were shot in the back. They lined

the other, and were again shot in the back. BairdDouglas, the Colonel, vowed to shoot the man who should

raise the white flag, and he fell dead himself before he saw the hated emblem. But it had to come. A hundred

and forty of the men were down, many of them suffering from the horrible wounds which shell inflicts. The

place was a shambles. Then the flag went up and the Boers at last became visible. Outnumbered,

outgeneralled, and without guns, there is no shadow of stain upon the good name of the one militia regiment

which was ever seriously engaged during the war. Their position was hopeless from the first, and they came

Two miles south of the Rhenoster kopje stands Roodeval station, in which, on that June morning, there stood

a train containing the mails for the army, a supply of greatcoats, and a truck full of enormous shells. A

number of details of various sorts, a hundred or more, had alighted from the train, twenty of them Postoffice

volunteers, some of the Pioneer Railway corps, a few Shropshires, and other waifs and strays. To them in the

early morning came the gentleman with the tinted glasses, his hands still red with the blood of the Derbies. 'I

have fourteen hundred men and four guns. Surrender!' said the messenger. But it is not in nature for a

postman to give up his postbag without a struggle. 'Never!' cried the valiant postmen. But shell after shell

battered the corrugatediron buildings about their ears, and it was not possible for them to answer the guns

which were smashing the life out of them. There was no help for it but to surrender. De Wet added samples of

the British volunteer and of the British regular to his bag of militia. The station and train were burned down,

the greatcoats looted, the big shells exploded, and the mails burned. The latter was the one unsportsmanlike

action which can up to that date be laid to De Wet's charge. Forty thousand men to the north of him could

forego their coats and their food, but they yearned greatly for those home letters, charred fragments of which

are still blowing about the veldt. [Footnote: Fragments continually met the eye which must have afforded

curious reading for the victors. 'I hope you have killed all those Boers by now,' was the beginning of one

For three days De Wet held the line, and during all that time he worked his wicked will upon it. For miles and

miles it was wrecked with most scientific completeness. The Rhenoster bridge was destroyed. So, for the

second time, was the Roodeval bridge. The rails were blown upwards with dynamite until they looked like an

unfinished line to heaven. De Wet's heavy hand was everywhere. Not a telegraphpost remained standing

On June 10th two British forces were converging upon the point of danger. One was Methuen's, from

Heilbron. The other was a small force consisting of the Shropshires, the South Wales Borderers, and a battery

which had come south with Lord Kitchener. The energetic Chief of the Staff was always sent by Lord

Roberts to the point where a strong man was needed, and it was seldom that he failed to justify his mission.

Lord Methuen, however, was the first to arrive, and at once attacked De Wet, who moved swiftly away to the

eastward. With a tendency to exaggeration, which has been too common during the war, the affair was

described as a victory. It was really a strategic and almost bloodless move upon the part of the Boers. It is not

the business of guerillas to fight pitched battles. Methuen pushed for the south, having been informed that

Kroonstad had been captured. Finding this to be untrue, he turned again to the eastward in search of De Wet.

That wily and indefatigable man was not long out of our ken. On June 14th he appeared once more at

Rhenoster, where the construction trains, under the famous Girouard, were working furiously at the repair of

the damage which he had already done. This time the guard was sufficient to beat him off, and he vanished

again to the eastward. He succeeded, however, in doing some harm, and very nearly captured Lord Kitchener

himself. A permanent post had been established at Rhenoster under the charge of Colonel Spens of the

Shropshires, with his own regiment and several guns. SmithDorrien, one of the youngest and most energetic

of the divisional commanders, had at the same time undertaken the supervision and patrolling of the line.

An attack had at this period been made by a cormmando of some hundred Boers at the Sand River to the

south of Kroonstad, where there is a most important bridge. The attempt was frustrated by the Royal

Lancaster regiment and the Railway Pioneer regiment, helped by some mounted infantry and Yeomanry. The

fight was for a time a brisk one, and the Pioneers, upon whom the brunt of it fell, behaved with great

steadiness. The skirmish is principally remarkable for the death of Major Seymour of the Pioneers, a noble

American, who gave his services and at last his life for what, in the face of all slander and misrepresentation,

It was hoped now, after all these precautions, that the last had been seen of the gentleman with the tinted

glasses, but on June 21st he was back in his old haunts once more. Honing Spruit Station, about midway

between Kroonstad and Roodeval, was the scene of his new raid. On that date his men appeared suddenly as a

train waited in the station, and ripped up the rails on either side of it. There were no guns at this point, and the

only available troops were three hundred of the prisoners from Pretoria, armed with MartiniHenry rifles and

obsolete ammunition. A good man was in command, however the same Colonel Bullock of the Devons

who had distinguished himself at Colenso and every tattered, halfstarved wastrel was nerved by a

recollection of the humiliations which he had already endured. For seven hours they lay helpless under the

shellfire, but their constancy was rewarded by the arrival of Colonel Brookfield with 300 Yeomanry and

four guns of the 17th R.F.A., followed in the evening by a larger force from the south. The Boers fled, but left

some of their number behind them; while of the British, Major Hobbs and four men were killed and nineteen

wounded. This defence of three hundred halfarmed men against seven hundred Boer riflemen, with three

guns firing shell and shrapnel, was a very good performance. The same body of burghers immediately

afterwards attacked a post held by Colonel Evans with two companies of the Shropshires and fifty Canadians.

They were again beaten back with loss, the Canadians under Inglis especially distinguishing themselves by

All these attacks, irritating and destructive as they were, were not able to hinder the general progress of the

war. After the battle of Diamond Hill the captured position was occupied by the mounted infantry, while the

rest of the forces returned to their camps round Pretoria, there to await the muchneeded remounts. At other

parts of the seat of war the British cordon was being drawn more tightly round the Boer forces. Buller had

come as far as Standerton, and Ian Hamilton, in the last week of June, had occupied Heidelberg. A week

afterwards the two forces were able to join hands, and so to completely cut off the Free State from the

Transvaal armies. Hamilton in these operations had the misfortune to break his collarbone, and for a time

the command of his division passed to Hunter the one man, perhaps, whom the army would regard as an

It was evident now to the British commanders that there would be no peace and no safety for their

communications while an undefeated army of seven or eight thousand men, under such leaders as De Wet

and Olivier, was lurking amid the hills which flanked their railroad. A determined effort was made, therefore,

to clear up that corner of the country. Having closed the only line of escape by the junction of Ian Hamilton

and of Buller, the attention of six separate bodies of troops was concentrated upon the stalwart Freestaters.

These were the divisions of Rundle and of Brabant from the south, the brigade of Clements on their extreme

left, the garrison of Lindley under Paget, the garrison of Heilbron under Macdonald, and, most formidable of

all, a detachment under Hunter which was moving from the north. A crisis was evidently approaching.

The nearest Free State town of importance still untaken was Bethlehem a singular name to connect with

the operations of war. The country on the south of it forbade an advance by Rundle or Brabant, but it was

more accessible from the west. The first operation of the British consisted, therefore, in massing sufficient

troops to be able to advance from this side. This was done by effecting a junction between Clements from

Senekal, and Paget who commanded at Lindley, which was carried out upon July 1st near the latter place.

Clements encountered some opposition, but besides his excellent infantry regiments, the Royal Irish,

Worcesters, Wiltshires, and Bedfords, he had with him the 2nd Brabant's Horse, with yeomanry, mounted

infantry, two 5in. guns, and the 8th B.F.A. Aided by a demonstration on the part of Grenfell and of Brabant,

On getting into touch with Clements, Paget sallied out from Lindley, leaving the Buffs behind to garrison the

town. He had with him Brookfield's mounted brigade one thousand strong, eight guns, and two fine battalions

of infantry, the Munster Fusiliers and the Yorkshire Light Infantry. On July 3rd he found near Leeuw Kop a

considerable force of Boers with three guns opposed to him, Clements being at that time too far off upon the

flank to assist him. Four guns of the 38th R.F.A. (Major Oldfield) and two belonging to the City Volunteers

came into action. The Royal Artillery guns appear to have been exposed to a very severe fire, and the losses

were so heavy that for a time they could not be served. The escort was inadequate, insufficiently advanced,

and badly handled, for the Boer riflemen were able, by creeping up a donga, to get right into the 38th battery,

and the gallant major, with Lieutenant Belcher, was killed in the defence of the guns. Captain FitzGerald, the

only other officer present, was wounded in two places, and twenty men were struck down, with nearly all the

horses of one section. Captain Marks, who was brigademajor of Colonel Brookfield's Yeomanry, with the

help of Lieut. Keevil Davis and the 15th I.Y. came to the rescue of the disorganised and almost annihilated

section. At the same time the C.I.V. guns were in imminent danger, but were energetically covered by

Captain Budworth, adjutant of the battery. Soon, however, the infantry, Munster Fusiliers, and Yorkshire

Light Infantry, which had been carrying out a turning movement, came into action, and the position was

taken. The force moved onwards, and on July 6th they were in front of Bethlehem.

The place is surrounded by hills, and the enemy was found strongly posted. Clements's force was now on the

left and Paget's on the right. >From both sides an attempt was made to turn the Boer flanks, but they were

found to be very wide and strong. All day a longrange action was kept up while Clements felt his way in the

hope of coming upon some weak spot in the position, but in the evening a direct attack was made by Paget's

two infantry regiments upon the right, which gave the British a footing on the Boer position. The Munster

Fusiliers and the Yorkshire Light Infantry lost forty killed and wounded, including four officers, in this

gallant affair, the heavier loss and the greater honour going to the men of Munster.

The centre of the position was still held, and on the morning of July 7th Clements gave instructions to the

colonel of the Royal Irish to storm it if the occasion should seem favourable. Such an order to such a

regiment means that the occasion will seem favourable. Up they went in three extended lines, dropping forty

or fifty on the way, but arriving breathless and enthusiastic upon the crest of the ridge. Below them, upon the

further side, lay the village of Bethlehem. On the slopes beyond hundreds of horsemen were retreating, and a

gun was being hurriedly dragged into the town. For a moment it seemed as if nothing had been left as a

trophy, but suddenly a keeneyed sergeant raised a cheer, which was taken up again and again until it

resounded over the veldt. Under the crest, lying on its side with a broken wheel, was a gun one of the

15pounders of Stormberg which it was a point of honour to regain once more. Many a time had the gunners

been friends in need to the infantry. Now it was the turn of the infantry to do something in exchange. That

evening Clements had occupied Bethlehem, and one more of their towns had passed out of the hands of the

A word now as to that force under General Hunter which was closing in from the north. The gallant and

energetic Hamilton, lean, aquiline, and tireless, had, as already stated, broken his collarbone at Heidelberg,

and it was as his lieutenant that Hunter was leading these troops out of the Transvaal into the Orange River

Colony. Most of his infantry was left behind at Heidelberg, but he took with him Broadwood's cavalry (two

brigades) and Bruce Hamilton's 21st infantry brigade, with Ridley's mounted infantry, some seven thousand

men in all. On the 2nd of July this force reached Frankfort in the north of the Free State without resistance,

and on July 3rd they were joined there by Macdonald's force from Heilbron, so that Hunter found himself

with over eleven thousand men under his command. Here was an instrument with which surely the COUP DE

GRACE could be given to the dying State. Passing south, still without meeting serious resistance, Hunter

occupied Reitz, and finally sent on Broadwood's cavalry to Bethlehem, where on July 8th they joined Paget

The net was now in position, and about to be drawn tight, but at this last moment the biggest fish of all

dashed furiously out from it. Leaving the main Free State force in a hopeless position behind him, De Wet,

with fifteen hundred wellmounted men and five guns, broke through Slabbert's Nek between Bethlehem and

Ficksburg, and made swiftly for the northwest, closely followed by Paget's and Broadwood's cavalry. It was

on July 16th that he made his dash for freedom. On the 19th Little, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, had come

into touch with him near Lindley. De Wet shook himself clear, and with splendid audacity cut the railway

once more to the north of Honing Spruit, gathering up a train as he passed, and taking two hundred details

prisoners. On July 22nd De Wet was at Vredefort, still closely followed by Broadwood, Ridley, and Little,

who gleaned his wagons and his stragglers. Thence he threw himself into the hilly country some miles to the

south of the Vaal River, where he lurked for a week or more while Lord Kitchener came south to direct the

Leaving the indomitable guerilla in his hidingplace, the narrative must return to that drawing of the net

which still continued in spite of the escape of this one important fish. On all sides the British forces had

drawn closer, and they were both more numerous and more formidable in quality. It was evident now that by

a rapid advance from Bethlehem in the direction of the Basuto border all Boers to the north of Ficksburg

would be hemmed in. On July 22nd the columns were moving. On that date Paget moved out of Bethlehem,

and Rundle took a step forward from Ficksburg. Bruce Hamilton had already, at the cost of twenty Cameron

Highlanders, got a grip upon a bastion of that rocky country in which the enemy lurked. On the 23rd Hunter's

force was held by the Boers at the strong pass of Retief's Nek, but on the 24th they were compelled to

abandon it, as the capture of Slabbert's Nek by Clements threatened their rear. This latter pass was fortified

most elaborately. It was attacked upon the 23rd by Brabant's Horse and the Royal Irish without success. Later

in the day two companies of the Wiltshire Regiment were also brought to a standstill, but retained a position

until nightfall within stonethrow of the Boer lines, though a single company had lost 17 killed and wounded.

Part of the Royal Irish remained also close to the enemy's trenches. Under cover of darkness, Clements sent

four companies of the Royal Irish and two of the Wiltshires under Colonel Guinness to make a flanking

movement along the crest of the heights. These six companies completely surprised the enemy, and caused

them to hurriedly evacuate the position. Their night march was performed under great difficulties, the men

crawling on hands and knees along a rocky path with a drop of 400 feet upon one side. But their exertions

were greatly rewarded. Upon the success of their turning movement depended the fall of Slabbert's Nek.

Betief's Nek was untenable if we held Slabbert's Nek, and if both were in our hands the retreat of Prinsloo

At every opening of the hills the British guns were thundering, and the heads of British columns were

appearing on every height. The Highland Brigade had fairly established themselves over the Boer position,

though not without hard fighting, in which a hundred men of the Highland Light Infantry had been killed and

wounded. The Seaforths and the Sussex had also gripped the positions in front of them, and taken some

punishment in doing so. The outworks of the great mountain fortress were all taken, and on July 26th the

British columns were converging on Fouriesburg, while Naauwpoort on the line of retreat was held by

On the 28th Clements was still advancing, and contracting still further the space which was occupied by our

stubborn foe. He found himself faced by the stiff position of Slaapkrantz, and a hot little action was needed

before the Boers could be dislodged. The fighting fell upon Brabant's Horse, the Royal Irish, and the

Wiltshires. Three companies of the latter seized a farm upon the enemy's left, but lost ten men in doing so,

while their gallant colonel, Carter, was severely wounded in two places. The Wiltshires, who were excellently

handled by Captain Bolton, held on to the farm and were reinforced there by a handful of the Scots Guards.

In the night the position was abandoned by the Boers, and the advance swept onwards. On all sides the

pressure was becoming unendurable. The burghers in the valley below could see all day the twinkle of British

heliographs from every hill, while at night the constant flash of signals told of the sleepless vigilance which

hemmed them in. Upon July 29th, Prinsloo sent in a request for an armistice, which was refused. Later in the

day he despatched a messenger with the white flag to Hunter, with an announcement of his unconditional

On July 30th the motley army which had held the British off so long emerged from among the mountains.

But it soon became evident that in speaking for all Prinsloo had gone beyond his powers. Discipline was low

and individualism high in the Boer army. Every man might repudiate the decision of his commandant, as

every man might repudiate the white flag of his comrade. On the first day no more than eleven hundred men

of the Ficksburg and Ladybrand commandos, with fifteen hundred horses and two guns, were surrendered.

next day seven hundred and fifty more men came in with eight hundred horses, and by August 6th the total of

the prisoners had mounted to four thousand one hundred and fifty with three guns, two of which were our

own. But Olivier, with fifteen hundred men and several guns, broke away from the captured force and

escaped through the hills. Of this incident General Hunter, an honourable soldier, remarks in his official

report: 'I regard it as a dishonourable breach of faith upon the part of General Olivier, for which I hold him

personally responsible. He admitted that he knew that General Prinsloo had included him in the unconditional

surrender.' It is strange that, on Olivier's capture shortly afterwards, he was not courtmartialled for this

breach of the rules of war, but that goodnatured giant, the Empire, is quick too quick, perhaps to let

byegones be byegones. On August 4th Harrismith surrendered to Macdonald, and thus was secured the

opening of the Van Reenen's Pass and the end of the Natal system of railways. This was of the very first

importance, as the utmost difficulty had been found in supplying so large a body of troops so far from the

Cape base. In a day the base was shifted to Durban, and the distance shortened by twothirds, while the army

came to be on the railway instead of a hundred miles from it. This great success assured Lord Roberts's

communications from serious attack, and was of the utmost importance in enabling him to consolidate his

Lord Roberts had now been six weeks in the capital, and British troops had overrun the greater part of the

south and west of the Transvaal, but in spite of this there was continued Boer resistance, which flared

suddenly up in places which had been nominally pacified and disarmed. It was found, as has often been

shown in history, that it is easier to defeat a republican army than to conquer it. From Klerksdorp, from

Ventersdorp, from Rustenburg, came news of risings against the newly imposed British authority. The

concealed Mauser and the bandolier were dug up once more from the trampled corner of the cattle kraal, and

the farmer was a warrior once again. Vague news of the exploits of De Wet stimulated the fighting burghers

and shamed those who had submitted. A letter was intercepted from the guerilla chief to Cronje's son, who

had surrendered near Rustenburg. De Wet stated that he had gained two great victories and had fifteen

hundred captured rifles with which to replace those which the burghers had given up. Not only were the

outlying districts in a state of revolt, but even round Pretoria the Boers were inclined to take the offensive,

while both that town and Johannesburg were filled with malcontents who were ready to fly to their arms once

Already at the end of June there were signs that the Boers realised how helpless Lord Roberts was until his

remounts should arrive. The mosquitoes buzzed round the crippled lion. On June 29th there was an attack

upon Springs near Johannesburg, which was easily beaten off by the Canadians. Early in July some of the

cavalry and mounted infantry patrols were snapped up in the neighbourhood of the capital. Lord Roberts gave

orders accordingly that Hutton and Mahon should sweep the Boers back upon his right, and push them as far

as Bronkhorst Spruit. This was done on July 6th and 7th, the British advance meeting with considerable

resistance from artillery as well as rifles. By this movement the pressure upon the right was relieved, which

might have created a dangerous unrest in Johannesburg, and it was done at the moderate cost of thirtyfour

killed and wounded, half of whom belonged to the Imperial Light Horse. This famous corps, which had come

across with Mahon from the relief of Mafeking, had, a few days before, ridden with mixed feelings through

the streets of Johannesburg and past, in many instances, the deserted houses which had once been their

homes. Many weary months were to pass before the survivors might occupy them. On July 9th the Boers

It is probable that all these demonstrations of the enemy upon the right of Lord Roberts's extended position

were really feints in order to cover the farreaching plans which Botha had in his mind. The disposition of

the Boer forces at this time appears to have been as follows: Botha with his army occupied a position along

Delagoa railway line, further east than Diamond Hill, whence he detached the bodies which attacked Hutton

upon the extreme right of the British position to the southeast of Pretoria. To the north of Pretoria a second

force was acting under Grobler, while a third under Delarey had been despatched secretly across to the left

wing of the British, northwest of Pretoria. While Botha engaged the attention of Lord Roberts by energetic

demonstrations on his right, Grobler and Delarey were to make a sudden attack upon his centre and his left,

each point being twelve or fifteen miles from the other. It was well devised and very well carried out; but the

inherent defect of it was that, when subdivided in this way, the Boer force was no longer strong enough to

De la Rey's attack was delivered at break of day on July 11th at Uitval's Nek, a post some eighteen miles west

of the capital. This position could not be said to be part of Lord Roberts's line, but rather to be a link to

connect his army with Rustenburg. It was weakly held by three companies of the Lincolns with two others in

support, one squadron of the Scots Greys, and two guns of 0 battery R.H.A. The attack came with the first

grey light of dawn, and for many hours the small garrison bore up against a deadly fire, waiting for the help

which never came. All day they held their assailants at bay, and it was not until evening that their

ammunition ran short and they were forced to surrender. Nothing could have been better than the behaviour

of the men, both infantry, cavalry, and gunners, but their position was a hopeless one. The casualties

amounted to eighty killed and wounded. Nearly two hundred were made prisoners and the two guns were

On the same day that De la Rey made his COUP at Uitval's Nek, Grobler had shown his presence on the

north side of the town by treating very roughly a couple of squadrons of the 7th Dragoon Guards which had

attacked him. By the help of a section of the ubiquitous 0 battery and of the 14th Hussars, Colonel Lowe was

able to disengage his cavalry from the trap into which they had fallen, but it was at the cost of between thirty

and forty officers and men killed, wounded, or taken. The old 'Black Horse' sustained their historical

reputation, and fought their way bravely out of an almost desperate situation, where they were exposed to the

On this same day of skirmishes, July 11th, the Gordons had seen some hot work twenty miles or so to the

south of Uitval's Nek. Orders had been given to the 19th Brigade (SmithDorrien's) to proceed to

Krugersdorp, and thence to make their way north. The Scottish Yeomanry and a section of the 78th B.F.A.

accompanied them. The idea seems to have been that they would be able to drive north any Boers in that

district, who would then find the garrison of Uitval's Nek at their rear. The advance was checked, however, at

a place called Dolverkrantz, which was strongly held by Boer riflemen. The two guns were insufficiently

protected, and the enemy got within short range of them, killing or wounding many of the gunners. The

lieutenant in charge, Mr. A. J. Turner, the famous Essex cricketer, worked the gun with his own hands until

he also fell wounded in three places. The situation was now very serious, and became more so when news

was flashed of the disaster at Uitval's Nek, and they were ordered to retire. They could not retire and abandon

the guns, yet the fire was so hot that it was impossible to remove them. Gallant attempts were made by

volunteers from the Gordons Captain Younger and other brave men throwing away their lives in the vain

effort to reach and to limber up the guns. At last, under the cover of night, the teams were harnessed and the

two fieldpieces successfully removed, while the Boers who rushed in to seize them were scattered by a

volley. The losses in the action were thirtysix and the gain nothing. Decidedly July 11th was not a lucky day

It was well known to Botha that every train from the south was bringing horses for Lord Roberts's army, and

that it had become increasingly difficult for De Wet and his men to hinder their arrival. The last horse must

win, and the Empire had the world on which to draw. Any movement which the Boers would make must be

made at once, for already both the cavalry and the mounted infantry were rapidly coming back to their full

strength once more. This consideration must have urged Botha to deliver an attack on July 16th, which had

some success at first, but was afterwards beaten off with heavy loss to the enemy. The fighting fell

principally upon PoleCarew and Hutton, the corps chiefly engaged being the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the

NewZealanders, the Shropshires, and the Canadian Mounted Infantry. The enemy tried repeatedly to assault

the position, but were beaten back each time with a loss of nearly a hundred killed and wounded. The British

loss was about sixty, and included two gallant young Canadian officers, Borden and Birch, the former being

the only son of the minister of militia. So ended the last attempt made by Botha upon the British positions

round Pretoria. The end of the war was not yet, but already its futility was abundantly evident. This had

become more apparent since the junction of Hamilton and of Buller had cut off the Transvaal army from that

of the Free State. Unable to send their prisoners away, and also unable to feed them, the Freestaters were

compelled to deliver up in Natal the prisoners whom they had taken at Lindley and Roodeval. These men, a

ragged and starving battalion, emerged at Ladysmith, having made their way through Van Reenen's Pass. It is

a singular fact that no parole appears on these and similar occasions to have been exacted by the Boers.

Lord Roberts, having remounted a large part of his cavalry, was ready now to advance eastward and give

Botha battle. The first town of any consequence along the Delagoa Railway is Middelburg, some seventy

miles from the capital. This became the British objective, and the forces of Mahon and Hamilton on the north,

of. PoleCarew in the centre, and of French and Hutton to the south, all converged upon There was no

serious resistance, though the weather was abominable, and on July 27th the town was in the hands of the

invaders. From that date until the final advance to the eastward French held this advanced post, while

PoleCarew guarded the railway line. Rumours of trouble in the west had convinced Roberts that it was not

yet time to push his advantage to the east, and he recalled Ian Hamilton's force to act for a time upon the

other side of the seat of the war. This excellent little army, consisting of Mahon's and Pilcher's mounted

infantry, M battery R.H.A., the Elswick battery, two 5in. and two 4.7 guns, with the Berkshires, the Border

Regiment, the Argyle and Sutherlands, and the Scottish Borderers, put in as much hard work in marching and

The renewal of the war in the west had begun some weeks before, but was much accelerated by the

transference of De la Rey and his burghers to that side. There is no district in the Transvaal which is better

worth fighting for, for it is a fair country side, studded with farmhouses and green with orangegroves, with

many clear streams running through it. The first sign of activity appears to have been on July 7th, when a

commando with guns appeared upon the hills above Rustenburg. Hanbury Tracy, commandant of

Rustenburg, was suddenly confronted with a summons to surrender. He had only 120 men and one gun, but

he showed a bold front. Colonel Houldsworth, at the first whisper of danger, had started from Zeerust with a

small force of Australian bushmen, and arrived at Rustenburg in time to drive the enemy away in a very

spirited action. On the evening of July 8th BadenPowell took over the command, the garrison being

The Boer commando was still in existence, however, and it was reinforced and reinvigorated by Delarey's

success at Uitval's Nek. On July 18th they began to close in upon Rustenburg again, and a small skirmish

took place between them and the Australians. Methuen's division, which had been doing very arduous service

in the north of the Free State during the last six weeks, now received orders to proceed into the Transvaal and

to pass northwards through the disturbed districts en route for Rustenburg, which appeared to be the storm

centre. The division was transported by train from Kroonstad to Krugersdorp, and advanced on the evening of

July 18th upon its mission, through a bare and fireblackened country. On the 19th Lord Methuen

manoeuvred the Boers out of a strong position, with little loss to either side. On the 21st he forced his way

through Olifant's Nek, in the Magaliesberg range, and so established communication with BadenPowell,

whose valiant bushmen, under Colonel Airey, had held their own in a severe conflict near Magato Pass, in

which they lost six killed, nineteen wounded, and nearly two hundred horses. The fortunate arrival of Captain

FitzClarence with the Protectorate Regiment helped on this occasion to avert a disaster. The force, only 300

strong, without guns, had walked into an ugly ambuscade, and only the tenacity and resource of the men

Although Methuen came within reach of Rustenburg, he did not actually join hands with BadenPowell. No

doubt he saw and heard enough to convince him that that astute soldier was very well able to take care of

himself. Learning of the existence of a Boer force in his rear, Methuen turned, and on July 29th he was back

at Frederickstad on the PotchefstroomKrugersdorp railway. The sudden change in his plans was caused

doubtless by the desire to head off De Wet in case he should cross the Vaal River. Lord Roberts was still

anxious to clear the neighbourhood of Rustenburg entirely of the enemy; and he therefore, since Methuen was

needed to complete the cordon round De Wet, recalled Hamilton's force from the east and despatched it, as

Before going into the details of the great De Wet hunt, in which Methuen's force was to be engaged, I shall

follow Hamilton's division across, and give some account of their services. On August 1st he set out from

Pretoria for Rustenburg. On that day and on the next he had brisk skirmishes which brought him successfully

through the Magaliesberg range with a loss of forty wounded, mostly of the Berkshires. On the 5th of August

he had made his way to Rustenburg and drove off the investing force. A smaller siege had been going on to

westward, where at Elands River another Mafeking man, Colonel Hore, had been held up by the burghers.

For some days it was feared, and even officially announced, that the garrison had surrendered. It was known

that an attempt by Carrington to relieve the place on August 5th had been beaten back, and that the state of

the country appeared so threatening that he had been compelled, or had imagined himself to be compelled, to

retreat as far as Mafeking, evacuating Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, abandoning the considerable stores which

were collected at those places. In spite of all these sinister indications the garrison was still holding its own,

This stand at Brakfontein on the Elands River appears to have been one of the very finest deeds of arms of the

war. The Australians have been so split up during the campaign, that though their valour and efficiency were

universally recognised, they had no single exploit which they could call their own. But now they can point to

Elands River as proudly as the Canadians can to Paardeberg. They were 500 in number, Victorians, New

South Welshmen, and Queenslanders, the latter the larger unit, with a corps of Rhodesians. Under Hore were

Major Hopper of the Rhodesians, and Major Toubridge of the Queenslanders. Two thousand five hundred

Boers surrounded them, and most favourable terms of surrender were offered and scouted. Six guns were

trained upon them, and during 11 days 1,800 shells fell within their lines. The river was half a mile off, and

every drop of water for man or beast had to come from there. Nearly all their horses and 75 of the men were

killed or wounded. With extraordinary energy and ingenuity the little band dug shelters which are said to

have exceeded in depth and efficiency any which the Boers have devised. Neither the repulse of Carrington,

nor the jamming of their only gun, nor the death of the gallant Annett, was sufficient to dishearten them.

They were sworn to die before the white flag should wave above them. And so fortune yielded, as fortune

will when brave men set their teeth, and Broadwood's troopers, filled with wonder and admiration, rode into

the lines of the reduced and emaciated but indomitable garrison. When the balladmakers of Australia seek

for a subject, let them turn to Elands River, for there was no finer resistance in the war. They will not grudge

a place in their record to the 130 gallant Rhodesians who shared with them the honours and the dangers of the

On August 7th Ian Hamilton abandoned Rustenburg, taking BadenPowell and his men with him. It was

obviously unwise to scatter the British forces too widely by attempting to garrison every single town. For the

instant the whole interest of the war centred upon De Wet and his dash into the Transvaal. One or two minor

events, however, which cannot be fitted into any continuous narrative may be here introduced.

One of these was the action at Faber's Put, by which Sir Charles Warren crushed the rebellion in Griqualand.

In that sparsely inhabited country of vast distances it was a most difficult task to bring the revolt to a decisive

ending. This Sir Charles Warren, with his special local knowledge and interest, was able to do, aud the

success is doubly welcome as bringing additional honour to a man who, whatever view one may take of his

action at Spion Kop, has grown grey in the service of the Empire. With a column consisting mainly of

colonials and of yeomanry he had followed the rebels up to a point within twelve miles of Douglas. Here at

the end of May they turned upon him and delivered a fierce night attack, so sudden and so strongly pressed

that much credit is due both to General and to troops for having repelled it. The camp was attacked on all

sides in the early dawn. The greater part of the horses were stampeded by the firing, and the enemy's riflemen

were found to be at very close quarters. For an hour the action was warm, but at the end of that time the Boers

fled, leaving a number of dead behind them. The troops engaged in this very creditable action, which might

have tried the steadiness of veterans, were four hundred of the Duke of Edinburgh's volunteers, some of

Paget's horse and of the 8th Regiment Imperial Yeomanry, four Canadian guns, and twentyfive of Warren's

Scouts. Their losses were eighteen killed and thirty wounded. Colonel Spence, of the volunteers, died at the

head of his regiment. A few days before, on May 27th, Colonel Adye had won a small engagement at Kheis,

some distance to the westward, and the effect of the two actions was to put an end to open resistance. On June

20th De Villiers, the Boer leader, finally surrendered to Sir Charles Warren, handing over two hundred and

twenty men with stores, rifles, and ammunition. The last sparks had for the time been stamped out in the

There remain to be mentioned those attacks upon trains and upon the railway which had spread from the Free

State to the Transvaal. On July 19th a train was wrecked on the way from Potchefstroom to Krugersdorp

without serious injury to the passengers. On July 31st, however, the same thing occurred with more

murderous effect, the train running at full speed off the metals. Thirteen of the Shropshires were killed and

thirtyseven injured in this deplorable affair, which cost us more than many an important engagement. On

August 2nd a train coming up from Bloemfontein was derailed by Sarel Theron and his gang some miles

south of Kroonstad. Thirtyfive trucks of stores were burned, and six of the passengers (unarmed

convalescent soldiers) were killed or wounded. A body of mounted infantry followed up the Boers, who

On July 21st the Boers made a determined attack upon the railhead at a point thirteen miles east of

Heidelberg, where over a hundred Royal Engineers were engaged upon a bridge. They were protected by

three hundred Dublin Fusiliers under Major English. For some hours the little party was hard pressed by the

burghers, who had two fieldpieces and a pompom. They could make no impression, however, upon the

steady Irish infantry, and after some hours the arrival of General Hart with reinforcements scattered the

At the beginning of August it must be confessed that the general situation in the Transvaal was not

reassuring. Springs near Johannesburg had in some inexplicable way, without fighting, fallen into the hands

of the enemy. Klerksdorp, an important place in the southwest, had also been reoccupied, and a handful of

men who garrisoned it had been made prisoners without resistance. Rustenburg was about to be abandoned,

and the British were known to be falling back from Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, concentrating upon Mafeking.

The sequel proved however, that there was no cause for uneasiness in all this. Lord Roberts was

concentrating his strength upon those objects which were vital, and letting the others drift for a time. At

present the two obviously important things were to hunt down De Wet and to scatter the main Boer army

under Botha. The latter enterprise must wait upon the former, so for a fortnight all operations were in

abeyance while the flying columns of the British endeavoured to run down their extremely active and

At the end of July De Wet had taken refuge in some exceedingly difficult country near Reitzburg, seven miles

south of the Vaal River. The operations were proceeding vigorously at that time against the main army at

Fouriesberg, and sufficient troops could not be spared to attack him, but he was closely observed by

Kitchener and Broadwood with a force of cavalry and mounted infantry. With the surrender of Prinsloo a

large army was disengaged, and it was obvious that if De Wet remained where he was he must soon be

surrounded. On the other hand, there was no place of refuge to the south of him. With great audacity he

determined to make a dash for the Transvaal, in the hope of joining hands with De la Rey's force, or else of

making his way across the north of Pretoria, and so reaching Botha's army. President Steyn went with him,

and a most singular experience it must have been for him to be harried like a mad dog through the country in

which he had once been an honoured guest. De Wet's force was exceedingly mobile, each man having a led

In the first week of August the British began to thicken round his lurkingplace, and De Wet knew that it was

time for him to go. He made a great show of fortifying a position, but it was only a ruse to deceive those who

watched him. Travelling as lightly as possible, he made a dash on August 7th at the drift which bears his own

name, and so won his way across the Vaal River, Kitchener thundering at his heels with his cavalry and

mounted infantry. Methuen's force was at that time at Potchefstroom, and instant orders had been sent to him

to block the drifts upon the northern side. It was found as he approached the river that the vanguard of the

enemy was already across and that it was holding the spurs of the hills which would cover the crossing of

their comrades. By the dash of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the exertions of the artillery ridge after ridge

was carried, but before evening De Wet with supreme skill had got his convoy across, and had broken away,

first to the eastward and then to the north. On the 9th Methuen was in touch with him again, and the two

savage little armies, Methuen worrying at the haunch, and De Wet snapping back over his shoulder, swept

northward over the huge plains. Wherever there was ridge or kopje the Boer riflemen staved off the eager

pursuers. Where the ground lay flat and clear the British guns thundered onwards and fired into the lines of

wagons. Mile after mile the running fight was sustained, but the other British columns, Broadwood's men and

Kitchener's men, had for some reason not come up. Methuen alone was numerically inferior to the men he

was chasing, but he held on with admirable energy and spirit. The Boers were hustled off the kopjes from

which they tried to cover their rear. Twenty men of the Yorkshire Yeomanry carried one hill with the

De Wet trekked onwards during the night of the 9th, shedding wagons and stores as he went. He was able to

replace some .of his exhausted beasts from the farmhouses which he passed. Methuen on the morning of the

10th struck away to the west, sending messages back to Broadwood and Kitchener in the rear that they should

bear to the east, and so nurse the Boer column between them. At the same time he sent on a messenger, who

unfortunately never arrived, to warn SmithDorrien at Bank Station to throw himself across De Wet's path.

On the 11th it was realised that De Wet had succeeded, in spite of great exertions upon the part of

SmithDorrien's infantry, in crossing the railway line, and that he had left all his pursuers to the south of him.

But across his front lay the Magaliesberg range. There are only three passes, the Magato Pass, Olifant's Nek,

and Commando Nek. It was understood that all three were held by British troops. It was obvious, therefore,

that if Methuen could advance in such a way as to cut De Wet off from slipping through to the west he would

be unable to get away. Broadwood and Kitchener would be behind him, and Pretoria, with the main British

Methuen continued to act with great energy and judgment. At three A.M. on the 12th be started from

Fredericstadt, and by 5 P.M. on Tuesday he had done eighty miles in sixty hours. The force which

accompanied him was all mounted, 1,200 of the Colonial Division (1st Brabant's, Cape Mounted Rifles,

Kaifrarian Rifles, and Border Horse), and the Yeomanry with ten guns. Douglas with the infantry was to

follow behind, and these brave fellows covered sixtysix miles in seventysix hours in their eagerness to be

in time. No men could have made greater efforts than did those of Methuen, for there was not one who did

not appreciate the importance of the issue and long to come to close quarters with the wily leader who had

On the 12th Methuen's van again overtook De Wet's rear, and the old game of rearguard riflemen on one side,

and a pushing artillery on the other, was once more resumed. All day the Boers streamed over the veldt with

the guns and the horsemen at their heels. A shot from the 78th battery struck one of De Wet's guns, which

was abandoned and captured. Many stores were taken and much more, with the wagons which contained

them, burned by the Boers. Fighting incessantly, both armies traversed thirtyfive miles of ground that day.

It was fully understood that Olifant's Nek was held by the British, so Methuen felt that if he could block the

Magato Pass all would be well. He therefore left De Wet's direct track, knowing that other British forces were

behind him, and he continued his swift advance until he had reached the desired position. It really appeared

that at last the elusive raider was in a corner. But, alas for fallen hopes, and alas for the wasted efforts of

gallant men! Olifant's Nek had been abandoned and De Wet had passed safely through it into the plains

beyond, where De la Rey's force was still in possession. In vain Methuen's weary column forced the Magato

Pass and descended into Rustenburg. The enemy was in a safe country once more. Whose the fault, or

whether there was a fault at all, it is for the future to determine. At least unalloyed praise can be given to the

Boer leader for the admirable way in which he had extricated himself from so many dangers. On the 17th,.

moving along the northern side of the mountains, he appeared at Commando Nek on the Little Crocodile

River, where he summoned BadenPowell to surrender, and received some chaff in reply from that

lighthearted commander. Then, swinging to the eastward, he endeavoured to cross to the north of Pretoria.

On the 19th he was heard of at Hebron. BadenPowell and Paget had, however, already barred this path, and

De Wet, having sent Steyn on with a small escort, turned back to the Free State. On the 22nd it was reported

that, with only a handful of his followers, he had crossed the Magaliesberg range by a bridlepath and was

riding southwards. Lord Roberts was at last free to turn his undivided attention upon Botha.

Two Boer plots had been discovered during the first half of August, the one in Pretoria and the other in

Johannesburg, each having for its object a rising against the British in the town. Of these the former, which

was the more serious, involving as it did the kidnapping of Lord Roberts, was broken up by the arrest of the

deviser, Hans Cordua, a German lieutenant in the Transvaal Artillery. On its merits it is unlikely that the

crime would have been met by the extreme penalty, especially as it was a question whether the AGENT

PROVOCATEUR had not played a part. But the repeated breaches of parole, by which our prisoners of one

day were in the field against us on the next, called imperatively for an example, and it was probably rather for

his broken faith than for his harebrained scheme that Cordua died. At the same time it is impossible not to

feel sorrow for this idealist of twentythree who died for a cause which was not his own. He was shot in the

garden of Pretoria Gaol upon August 24th. A fresh and more stringent proclamation from Lord Roberts

showed that the British Commander was losing his patience in the face of the wholesale return of paroled

men to the field, and announced that such perfidy would in future be severely punished. It was notorious that

the same men had been taken and released more than once. One man killed in action was found to have nine

signed passes in his pocket. It was against such abuses that the extra severity of the British was aimed.

The time had now come for the great combined movement which was to sweep the main Boer army off the

line of the Delagoa railway, Cut its source of supplies, and fllow it into that remote and mountainous

Lydenburg district which had always been proclaimed as the last refuge of the burghers. Before entering upon

this most difficult of all his advances Lord Roberts waited until the cavalry and mounted infantry were well

mounted again. Then, when all was ready, the first step in this last stage of the regular campaign was taken by

General Buller, who moved his army of Natal veterans off the railway line and advanced to a position from

which he could threaten the flank and rear of Botha if he held his ground against Lord Roberts. Buller's

cavalry had been reinforced by the arrival of Strathcona's Horse, a fine body of Canadian troopers, whose

services had been presented to the nation by the publicspirited nobleman whose name they bore. They were

distinguished by their fine physique, and by the lassoes, cowboy stirrups, and large spurs of the

It was in the first week of July that Clery joined hands with the Heidelberg garrison, while Coke with the

10th Brigade cleared the right flank of the railway by an expedition as far as Amersfoort. On July 6th the

Natal communications were restored, and on the 7th Buller was able to come through to Pretoria and confer

with the CommanderinChief. A Boer force with heavy guns still hung about the line, and several small

skirmishes were fought between Vlakfontein and Greylingstad in order to drive it away. By the middle of

July the immediate vicinity of the railway was clear save for some small marauding parties who endeavoured

to tamper with the rails and the bridges. Up to the end of the month the whole of the Natal army remained

strung along the line of communications from Heidelberg to Standerton, waiting for the collection of forage

On August 8th Buller's troops advanced to the northeast from Paardekop, pushing a weak Boer force with

five guns in front of them. At the cost of twentyfive wounded, principally of the 60th Rifles, the enemy was

cleared off, and the town of Amersfoort was occupied. On the 13th, moving on the same line, and meeting

with very slight opposition, Buller took possession of Ermelo. His advance was having a good effect upon the

district, for on the 12th the Standerton commando, which numbered 182 men, surrendered to Clery. On the

15th, st~l skirmishing, Buller's men were at Twyfelaar, and had taken possession of Carolina. Here and there

a distant horseman riding over the olivecoloured hills showed how closely and incessan~y be was watched;

but, save for a little sniping upon his flanks, there was no fighting. He was coming now within touch of

French's cavalry, operating from Middelburg, and on the 14th heliographic communication was established

Buller's column had come nearer to its friends, but it was also nearer to the main body of Boers who were

waiting in that very rugged piece of country which lies between Belfast in the west and Machadodorp in the

east. From this rocky stronghold they had thrown out mobile bodies to harass the British advance from the

south, and every day brought Buller into closer touch with these advance guards of the enemy. On August

21st he had moved eight miles nearer to Belfast, French operating upon his left flank. Here he found the

Boers in considerable numbers, but he pushed them northward with his cavalry, mounted infantry, and

artillery, losing between thirty and forty killed and wounded, the greater part from the ranks of the 18th

Hussars and the Gordon Highlanders. This march brought him within fifteen miles of Belfast, which lay due

north of him. At the same time PoleCarew with the central column of Lord Roberts's force had advanced

along the railway line, and on August 24th he occupied Belfast with little resistance. He found, however, that

the enemy were holding the formidable ridges which lie between that place and Dalmanutha, and that they

showed every sign of giving battle, presenting a firm front to Buller on the south as well as to Roberts's army

On the 23rd some successes attended their efforts to check the advance from the south. During the day Buller

had advanced steadily, though under incessant fire. The evening found him only six miles to the south of

Dalmanutha, the centre of the Boer position. By some misfortune, however, after dark two companies of the

Liverpool Regiment found themselves isolated from their comrades and exposed to a very heavy fire. They

had pushed forward too far, and were very near to being surrounded and destroyed. There were fiftysix

casualties in their ranks, and thirtytwo, including their wounded captain, were taken. The total losses in the

On August 25th it was evident that important events were at hand, for on that date Lord Roberts arrived at

Belfast and held a conference with Buller, French, and PoleCarew. The general communicated his plans to

his three lieutenants, and on the 26th and following days the fruits of the interview were seen in a succession

of rapid manoeuvres which drove the Boers out of this, the strongest position which they had held since they

The advance of Lord Roberts was made, as his wont is, with two widespread wings, and a central body to

connect them. Such a movement leaves the enemy in doubt as to which flank will really be attacked, while if

he denudes his centre in order to strengthen both flanks there is the chance of a frontal advance which might

cut him in two. French with two cavalry brigades formed the left advance, PoleCarew the centre, and Buller

the right, the whole operations extending over thirty miles of infamous country. It is probable that Lord

Roberts had reckoned that the Boer right was likely to be their strongest position, since if it were turned it

would cut off their retreat upon Lydenburg, so his own main attack was directed upon their left. This was

On the first day the movement upon Buller's part consisted in a very deliberate reconnaissance of and closing

in upon the enemy's position, his troops bivouacking upon the ground which they had won. On the second,

finding that all further progress was barred by the strong ridge of Bergendal, he prepared his attack carefully

with artillery and then let loose his infantry upon it. It was a gallant feat of arms upon either side. The Boer

position was held by a detachment of the Johannesburg Police, who may have been bullies in peace, but were

certainly heroes in war. The fire of sixty guns was concentrated for a couple of hours upon a position only a

few hundred yards in diameter. In this infernal fire, which left the rocks yellow with lyddite, the survivors

still waited grimly for the advance of the infantry. No finer defence was made in the war. The attack was

carried out across an open glacis by the 2nd Rifle Brigade and by the Inniskilling Fusiliers, the men of

Pieter's Hill. Through a deadly fire the gallant infantry swept over the position, though Metcalfe, the brave

colonel of the Rifles, with eight other officers, and seventy men were killed or wounded. Lysley, Steward,

and Campbell were all killed in leading their companies, but they could not have met their deaths upon an

occasion more honourable to their battalion. Great credit must also be given to A and B companies of the

Inniskilling Fusiliers, who were actually the first over the Boer position. The cessation of the artillery fire was

admirably timed. It was sustained up to the last possible instant. 'As it was,' said the captain of the leading

company, 'a 94lb. shell burst about thirty yards in front of the right of our lot. The smell of the lyddite was

awful.' A pompom and twenty prisoners, including the commander of the police, were the trophies of the

day. An outwork of the Boer position had been carried, and the rumour of defeat and disaster had already

spread through their ranks. Braver men than the burghers have never lived, but they had reached the limits of

human endurance, and a long experience of defeat in the field had weakened their nerve and lessened their

morale. They were no longer men of the same fibre as those who had crept up to the trenches of Spion Kop,

or faced the lean warriors of Ladysmith on that grim January morning at Caesar's Camp. Dutch tenacity

would not allow them to surrender, and yet they realised how hopeless was the fight in which they were

engaged. Nearly fifteen thousand of their best men were prisoners, ten thousand at the least had returned to

their farms and taken the oath. Another ten had been killed, wounded, or incapacitated. Most of the European

mercenaries had left; they held only the ultimate corner of their own country, they had lost their grip upon the

railway line, and their supply of stores and of ammunition was dwindling. To such a pass had eleven months

of war reduced that formidable army who had so confidently advanced to the conquest of South Africa.

While Buller had established himself firmly upon the left of the Boer position, PoleCarew had moved

forward to the north of the railway line, and French had advanced as far as Swart Kopjes upon the Boer right.

These operations on August 26th and 27th were met with some resistance, and entailed a loss of forty or fifty

killed and wounded; but it soon became evident that the punishment which they had received at Bergendal

had taken the fight out of the Boers, and that this formidable position was to be abandoned as the others had

been. On the 28th the burghers were retreating, and Machadodorp, where Kruger had sat so long in his

railway carriage, protesting that he would eventually move west and not east, was occupied by Buller.

French, moving on a more northerly route, entered Watervalonder with his cavalry upon the same date,

driving a small Boer force before him. Amid rain and mist the British columns were pushing rapidly

forwards, but still the burghers held together, and still their artillery was uncaptured. The retirement was

On the 30th the British cavalry were within touch of Nooitgedacht, and saw a glad sight in a long trail of

ragged men who were hurrying in their direction along the railway line. They were the British prisoners,

eighteen hundred in number, half of whom had been brought from Waterval when Pretoria was captured,

while the other half represented the men who had been sent from the south by De Wet, or from the west by

De la Rey. Much allowance must be made for the treatment of prisoners by a belligerent who is himself short

of food, but nothing can excuse the harshness which the Boers showed to the Colonials who fell into their

power, or the callous neglect of the sick prisoners at Waterval. It is a humiliating but an interesting fact that

from first to last no fewer than seven thousand of our men passed into their power, all of whom were now

recovered save some sixty officers, who had been carried off by them in their flight.

On September 1st Lord Roberts showed his sense of the decisive nature of these recent operations by

publishing the proclamation which had been issued as early as July 4th, by which the Transvaal became a

portion of the British Empire. On the same day General Buller, who had ceased to advance to the east and

retraced his steps as far as Helvetia, began his northerly movement in the direction of Lydenburg, which is

nearly fifty miles to the north of the railway line. On that date his force made a march of fourteen miles,

which brought them over the Crocodile River to Badfontein. Here, on September 2nd, Buller found that the

indomitable Botha was still turning back upon him, for he was faced by so heavy a shell fire, coming from so

formidable a position, that he had to be content to wait in front of it until some other column should outflank

it. The days of unnecessary frontal attacks were for ever over, and his force, though ready for anything which

might be asked of it, had gone through a good deal in the recent operations. Since August 21st they had been

under fire almost every day, and their losses, though never great on any one occasion, amounted in the

aggregate during that time to 365. They had crossed the Tugela, they had relieved Ladysmith, they had forced

Laing's Nek, and now it was to them that the honour had fallen of following the enemy into this last fastness.

Whatever criticism may be directed against some episodes in the Natal campaign, it must never be forgotten

that to Buller and to his men have fallen some of the hardest tasks of the war, and that these tasks have

always in the end been successfully carried out. The controversy about the unfortunate message to White, and

the memory of the abandoned guns at Colenso, must not lead us to the injustice of ignoring all that is to be set

On September 3rd Lord Roberts, finding how strong a position faced Buller, despatched Ian Hamilton with a

force to turn it upon the right. Brocklehurst's brigade of cavalry joined Hamilton in his advance. On the 4th

he was within signalling distance of Buller, and on the right rear of the Boer position. The occupation of a

mountain called Zwaggenhoek would establish Hamilton firmly, and the difficult task of seizing it at night

was committed to Colonel Douglas and his fine regiment of Royal Scots. It was Spion Kop over again, but

with a happier ending. At break of day the Boers discovered that their position had been rendered untenable

and withdrew, leaving the road to Lydenburg clear to Buller. Hamilton and he occupied the town upon the

6th. The Boers had split into two parties, the larger one with the guns falling back upon Kruger's Post, and the

others retiring to Pilgrim's Rest. Amid cloudgirt peaks and hardly passable ravines the two longenduring

To the northeast of Lydenburg, between that town and Spitzkop, there is a formidable ridge called the

Mauchberg, and here again the enemy were found to be standing at bay. They were even better than their

word, for they had always said that they would make their last stand at Lydenburg, and now they were

making one beyond it. But the resistance was weakening. Even this fine position could not be held against the

rush of the three regiments, the Devons, the Royal Irisb, and the Royal Scots, who were let loose upon it. The

artillery supported the attack admirably. 'They did nobly,' said one who led the advance. 'It is impossible to

overrate the value of their support. They ceased also exactly at the right moment. One more shell would have

hit us.' Mountain mists saved the defeated burghers from a close pursuit, but the hills were carried. The

British losses on this day, September 8th, were thirteen killed and twentyfive wounded; but of these

thirtyeight no less than half were accounted for by one of those strange malignant freaks which can neither

be foreseen nor prevented. A shrapnel shell, fired at an incredible distance, burst right over the Volunteer

Company of the Gordons who were marching in column. Nineteen men fell, but it is worth recording that,

smitten so suddenly and so terribly, the gallant Volunteers continued to advance as steadily as before this

misfortune befell them. On the 9th Buller was still pushing forward to Spitzkop, his guns and the 1st Rifles

overpowering a weak rearguard resistance of the Boers. On the 10th he had reached Klipgat, which is

halfway between the Mauchberg and Spitzkop. So close was the pursuit that the Boers, as they streamed

through the passes, flung thirteen of their ammunition wagons over the cliffs to prevent them from falling

into the hands of the British horsemen. At one period it looked as if the gallant Boer guns had waited too long

in covering the retreat of the burghers. Strathcona's Horse pressed closely upon them. The situation was saved

by the extreme coolness and audacity of the Boer gunners. 'When the cavalry were barely half a mile behind

the rear gun' says an eyewitness 'and we regarded its capture as certain, the LEADING Long Tom

deliberately turned to bay and opened with case shot at the pursuers streaming down the hill in single file

over the head of his brother gun. It was a magnificent coup, and perfectly successful. The cavalry had to

retire, leaving a few men wounded, and by the time our heavy guns had arrived both Long Toms had got

clean away.' But the Boer riflemen would no longer stand. Demoralised after their magnificent struggle of

eleven months the burghers were now a beaten and disorderly rabble flying wildly to the eastward, and only

held together by the knowledge that in their desperate situation there was more comfort and safety in

numbers. The war seemed to be swiftly approaching its close. On the 15th Buller occupied Spitzkop in the

north, capturing a quantity of stores, while on the 14th French took Barberton in the south, releasing all the

remaining British prisoners and taking possession of forty locomotives, which do not appear to have been

injured by the enemy. Meanwhile PoleCarew had worked along the railway line, and had occupied

Kaapmuiden, which was the junction where the Barberton line joins that to Louren o Marques. Ian

Hamilton's force, after the taking of Lydenburg and the action which followed, turned back, leaving Buller to

go his own way, and reached Komatipoort on September 24th, having marched since September 9th without

On September 11th an incident had occurred which must have shown the most credulous believer in Boer

prowess that their cause was indeed lost. On that date Paul Kruger, a refugee from the country which he had

ruined, arrived at Louren o Marques, abandoning his beaten commandos and his deluded burghers. How

much had happened since those distant days when as a little herdsboy he had walked behind the bullocks on

the great northward trek. How piteous this ending to all his strivings and his plottings! A life which might

have closed amid the reverence of a nation and the admiration of the world was destined to finish in exile,

impotent and undignified. Strange thoughts must have come to him during those hours of flight, memories of

his virile and turbulent youth, of the first settlement of those great lands, of wild wars where his hand was

heavy upon the natives, of the triumphant days of the war of independence, when England seemed to recoil

from the rifles of the burghers. And then the years of prosperity, the years when the simple farmer found

himself among the great ones of the earth, his name a household word in Europe, his State rich and powerful,

his coffers filled with the spoil of the poor drudges who worked so hard and paid taxes so readily. Those were

his great days, the days when he hardened his heart against their appeals for justice and looked beyond his

own borders to his kinsmen in the hope of a South Africa which should be all his own. And now what had

come of it all? A handful of faithful attendants, and a fugitive old man, clutching in his flight at his papers

and his moneybags. The last of the oldworld Puritans, he departed poring over his wellthumbed Bible, and

proclaiming that the troubles of his country arose, not from his own narrow and corrupt administration, but

from some departure on the part of his fellow burghers from the stricter tenets of the dopper sect. So Paul

Whilst the main army of Botha had been hustled out of their position at Machadodorp and scattered at

Lydenburg and at Barberton, a number of other isolated events had occurred at different points of the seat of

war, each of which deserves some mention. The chief of these was a sudden revival of the war in the Orange

River Colony, where the band of Olivier was still wandering in the northeastern districts. Hunter, moving

northwards after the capitulation of Prinsloo at Fouriesburg, came into contact on August 15th with this force

near Heilbron, and had forty casualties, mainly of the Highland Light Infantry, in a brisk engagement. For a

time the British seemed to have completely lost touch with Olivier, who suddenly on August 24th struck at a

small detachment consisting almost entirely of Queenstown Rifle Volunteers under Colonel Ridley, who

were reconnoitring near Winburg. The Colonial troopers made a gallant defence. Throwing themselves into

the farmhouse of Helpmakaar, and occupying every post of vantage around it, they held off more than a

thousand assailants, in spite of the three guns which the latter brought to bear upon them. A hundred and

thirtytwo rounds were fired at the house, but the garrison still refused to surrender. Troopers who had been

present at Wepener declared that the smaller action was the warmer of the two. Finally on the morning of the

third day a relief force arrived upon the scene, and the enemy dispersed. The British losses were thirtytwo

killed and wounded. Nothing daunted by his failure, Olivier turned upon the town of Winburg and attempted

to regain it, but was defeated again and scattered, he and his three sons being taken. The result was due to the

gallantry and craft of a handful of the Queenstown Volunteers, who laid an ambuscade in a donga, and

disarmed the Boers as they passed, after the pattern of Sanna's Post. By this action one of the most daring and

resourceful of the Dutch leaders fell into the hands of the British. It is a pity that his record is stained by his

dishonourable conduct in breaking the compact made on the occasion of the capture of Prinsloo. But for

British magnanimity a drumhead courtmartial should have taken the place of the hospitality of the Ceylon

On September 2nd another commando of Free State Boers under Fourie emerged from the mountain country

on the Basuto border, and fell upon Ladybrand, which was held by a feeble garrison consisting of one

company of the Worcester regiment and fortythree men of the Wiltshire Yeomanry. The Boers, who had

several guns with them, appear to have been the same force which had been repulsed at Winburg. Major

White, a gallant marine, whose fighting qualities do not seem to have deteriorated with his distance from salt

water, had arranged his defences upon a hill, after the Wepener model, and held his own most stoutly. So

great was the disparity of the forces that for days acute anxiety was felt lest another of those humiliating

surrenders should interrupt the record of victories, and encourage the Boers to further resistance. The point

was distant, and it was some time before relief could reach them. But the dusky chiefs, who from their native

mountains looked down on the military drama which was played so close to their frontier, were again, as on

the Jammersberg, to see the Boer attack beaten back by the constancy of the British defence. The thin line of

soldiers, 150 of them covering a mile and a half of ground, endured a heavy shell and rifle fire with unshaken

resolution, repulsed every attempt of the burghers, and held the flag flying until relieved by the forces under

White and Bruce Hamilton. In this march to the relief Hamilton's infantry covered eighty miles in four and a

half days. Lean and hard, inured to warfare, and far from every temptation of wine or women, the British

troops at this stage of the campaign were in such training, and marched so splendidly, that the infantry was

often very little slower than the cavalry. Methuen's fine performance in pursuit of De Wet, where Douglas's

infantry did sixtysix miles in seventyfive hours, the City Imperial Volunteers covering 224 miles in

fourteen days, with a single forced march of thirty miles in seventeen hours, the Shropshires fortythree

miles in thirtytwo hours, the fortyfive miles in twentyfive hours of the Essex Regiment, Bruce Hamilton's

march recorded above, and many other fine efforts serve to show the spirit and endurance of the troops.

In spite of the defeat at Winburg and the repulse at Ladybrand, there still remained a fair number of broken

and desperate men in the Free State who held out among the difficult country of the east. A party of these

came across in the middle of September and endeavoured to cut the railway near Brandfort. They were

pursued and broken up by Macdonald, who, much aided in his operations by the band of scouts which Lord

Lovat had brought with him from Scotland, took several prisoners and a large number of wagons and of oxen.

A party of these Boers attacked a small post of sixteen Yeomanry under Lieutenant Slater at Buitfontein, but

At two other points the Boer and British forces were in contact during these operations. One was to the

immediate north of Pretoria1 where Grobler's commando was faced by Paget's brigade. On August 18th the

Boers were forced with some loss out of Hornies Nek, which is ten miles to the north of the capital. On the

22nd a more important skirmish took place at Pienaar's River, in the same direction, between BadenPowell's

men, who had come thither in pursuit of De Wet, and Grobler's band. The advance guards of the two forces

galloped into each other, and for once Boer and Briton looked down the muzzles of each other's rifles. The

gallant Rhodesian Regiment, which had done such splendid service during the war, suffered most heavily.

Colonel Spreckley and four others were killed, and six or seven wounded. The Boers were broken, however,

and fled, leaving twentyfive prisoners to the victors. BadenPowell and Paget pushed forwards as far as

Nylstroom, but finding themselves in wild and profitless country they returned towards Pretoria, and

established the British northern posts at a place called Warm Baths. Here Paget commanded, while

BadenPowell shortly afterwards went down to Cape Town to make arrangements for taking over the police

force of the conquered countries, and to receive the enthusiastic welcome of his colonial fellowcountrymen.

Plumer, with a small force operating from Warm Baths, scattered a Boer cornmando on September 1st,

capturing a few prisoners and a considerable quantity of munitions of war. On the 5th there was another

skirmish in the same neighbourhood, during which the enemy attacked a kopje held by a company of Munster

Fusiliers, and was driven off with loss. Many thousands of cattle were captured by the British in this part of

the field of operations, and were sent into Pretoria, whence they helped to supply the army in the east.

There was still considerable effervescence in the western districts of the Transvaal, and a mounted

detachment met with fierce opposition at the end of August on their journey from Zeerust to Krugersdorp.

Methuen, after his unsuccessful chase of De Wet, had gone as far as Zeerust, and had then taken his force on

to Mafeking to refit. Before leaving Zeerust, however, he had despatched Colonel Little to Pretoria with a

column which consisted of his own third cavalry brigade, 1st Brabant's, the Kaffrarian Rifles, R battery of

Horse Artillery, and four Colonial guns. They were acting as guard to a very large convoy of 'returned

empties.' The district which they had to traverse is one of the most fertile in the Transvaal, a land of clear

streams and of orange groves. But the farmers are numerous and aggressive, and the column, which was 900

strong, could clear all resistance from its front, but found it impossible to brush off the snipers upon its flanks

and rear. Shortly after their start the column was deprived of the services of its gallant leader, Colonel Little,

who was shot while riding with his advance scouts. Colonel Dalgety took over the command. Numerous

desultory attacks culminated in a fierce skirmish at Quaggafontein on August 31st, in which the column had

sixty casualties. The event might have been serious, as De la Rey's main force appears to have been

concentrated upon the British detachment, the brunt of the action falling upon the Kaffrarian Rifles. By a

rapid movement the column was able to extricate itself and win its way safely to Krugersdorp, but it narrowly

escaped out of the wolf's jaws, and as it emerged into the open country De la Rey's guns were seen galloping

for the pass which they had just come through. This force was sent south to Kroonstad to refit.

Lord Methuen's army, after its long marches and arduous work, arrived at Mafeking on August 28th for the

purpose of refitting. Since his departure from Boshof on May 14th his men had been marching with hardly a

rest, and he had during that time fought fourteen engagements. He was off upon the warpath once more,

with fresh horses and renewed energy, on September 8th, and on the 9th, with the cooperation of General

Douglas, he scattered a Boer force at Malopo, capturing thirty prisoners and a great. quantity of stores. On the

14th he ran down a convoy and regained one of the Colenso guns and much ammunition. On the 20th he

again made large captures. If in the early phases of the war the Boers had given Paul Methuen some evil

hours, he was certainly getting his own back again. At the same time Clements was despatched from Pretoria

with a small mobile force for the purpose of clearing the Rustenburg and Krugersdorp districts, which had

always been storm centres. These two forces, of Methuen and of Clements, moved through the country,

sweeping the scattered Boer bands before them, and hunting them down until they dispersed. At Kekepoort

and at Hekspoort Clements fought successful skirmishes, losing at the latter action Lieutenant Stanley of the

Yeomanry, the Somersetshire cricketer, who showed, as so many have done, how close is the connection

between the good sportsman and the good soldier. On the 12th Douglas took thirtynine prisoners near

Lichtenburg. On the 18th Rundle captured a gun at Bronkhorstfontein. Hart at Potchefstroom, Hildyard in the

Utrecht district, Macdonald in the Orange River Colony, everywhere the British Generals were busily

Much trouble but no great damage was inflicted upon the British during this last stage of the war by the

incessant attacks upon the lines of railway by roving bands of Boers. The actual interruption of traffic was of

little consequence, for the assiduous Sappers with their gangs of Basuto labourers were always at hand to

repair the break. But the loss of stores, and occasionally of lives, was more serious. Hardly a day passed that

the stokers and drivers were not made targets of by snipers among the kopjes,[Footnote: It is to be earnestly

hoped that those in authority will see that these men obtain the medal and any other reward which can mark

our sense of their faithful service. One of them in the Orange River Colony, after narrating to me his many

hairbreadth escapes, prophesied bitterly that the memory of his services would pass with the need for them.]

and occasionally a train was entirely destroyed. Chief among these raiders was the wild Theron, who led a

band which contained men of all nations the same gang who had already, as narrated, held up a train in

the Orange River Colony. On August 31st he derailed another at Flip River to the south of Johannesburg,

blowing up the engine and burning thirteen trucks. Almost at the same time a train was captured near

Kroonstad, which appeared to indicate that the great De Wet was back in his old huntinggrounds. On the

same day the line was cut at Standerton. A few days later, however, the impunity with which these feats had

been performed was broken, for in a similar venture near Krugersdorp the dashing Theron and several of his

Two other small actions performed at this period of the war demand a passing notice. One was a smart

engagement near Kraai Railway Station, in which Major Broke of the Sappers with a hundred men attacked a

superior Boer force upon a kopje and drove them off with loss a feat which it is safe to say he could not

have accomplished six months earlier. The other was the fine defence made by 125 of the Canadian Mounted

Rifles, who, while guarding the railway, were attacked by a considerable Boer force with two guns. They

proved once more, as Ladybrand and Elands River had shown, that with provisions, cartridges, and brains,

the smallest force can successfully hold its own if it confines itself to the defensive.

And now the Boer cause appeared to be visibly tottering to its fall. The flight of the President had accelerated

that process of disintegration which had already set in. Schalk Burger had assumed the office of

VicePresident, and the notorious Ben Viljoen bad become first lieutenant of Louis Botha in maintaining the

struggle. Lord Roberts had issued an extremely judicious proclamation, in which he pointed out the

uselessness of further resistance, declared that guerilla warfare would be ruthlessly suppressed, and informed

the burghers that no fewer than fifteen thousand of their fellowcountrymen were in his hands as prisoners,

and that none of these could he released until the last rifle had been laid down. From all sides in the third

week of September the British forces were converging on Komatipoort, the frontier town. Already wild

figures, stained and tattered after nearly a year of warfare, were walking the streets of Louren o Marques,

gazed at with wonder and some distrust by the Portuguese inhabitants. The exiled burghers moodily pacing

the streets saw their exiled President seated in his corner of the Governor's verandah, the wellknown curved

pipe still dangling from his mouth, the Bible by his chair. Day by day the number of these refugees increased.

On September 17th special trains were arriving crammed with the homeless burghers, and with the

mercenaries of many nations French, German, IrishAmerican, and Russian all anxious to make their

At dawn on September 22nd a halfhearted attempt was made by the commando of Erasmus to attack Elands

River Station, but it was beaten back by the garrison. While it was going on Paget fell upon the camp which

Erasmus had left behind him, and captured his stores. From all over the country, from Plumer's Bushmen,

from Barton at Krugersdorp, from the Colonials at Heilbron, from Clements on the west, came the same

reports of dwindling resistance and of the abandoning of cattle, arms, and ammunition.

On September 24th came the last chapter in this phase of the campaign in the Eastern Transvaal, when at

eight in the morning PoleCarew and his Guardsmen occupied Komatipoort. They had made desperate

marches, one of them through thick bush, where they went for nineteen miles without water, but nothing

could shake the cheery gallantry of the men. To them fell the honour, an honour well deserved by their

splendid work throughout the whole campaign, of entering and occupying the ultimate eastern point which

the Boers could hold. Resistance had been threatened and prepared for, but the grim silent advance of that

veteran infantry took the heart out of the defence. With hardly a shot fired the town was occupied. The bridge

which would enable the troops to receive their supplies from Louren o Marques was still intact. General

Pienaar and the greater part of his force, amounting to over two thousand men, had crossed the frontier and

had been taken down to Delagoa Bay, where they met the respect and attention which brave men in

misfortune deserve. Small bands had slipped away to the north and the south, but they were insignificant in

numbers and depressed in spirit. For the time it seemed that the campaign was over, but the result showed

that there was greater vitality in the resistance of the burghers and less validity in their oaths than any one had

One find of the utmost importance was made at Komatipoort, and at Hector Spruit on the Crocodile River.

That excellent artillery which had fought so gallant a fight against our own more numerous guns, was found

destroyed and abandoned. PoleCarew at Komatipoort got one Long Tom (96 lb.) Creusot, and one smaller

gun. Ian Hamilton at Hector Spruit found the remains of many guns, which included two of our horse artillery

twelvepounders, two large Creusot guns, two Krupps, one VickersMaxim quick firer, two pompoms and

IT had been hoped that the dispersal of the main Boer army, the capture of its guns and the expulsion of many

both of the burghers and of the foreign mercenaries, would have marked the end of the war. These

expectations were, however, disappointed, and South Africa was destined to be afflicted and the British

Empire disturbed by a useless guerilla campaign. After the great and dramatic events which characterised the

earlier phases of the struggle between the Briton and the Boer for the mastery of South Africa it is somewhat

of the nature of an anticlimax to turn one's attention to those scattered operations which prolonged the

resistance for a turbulent year at the expense of the lives of many brave men on either side. These raids and

skirmishes, which had their origin rather in the hope of vengeance than of victory, inflicted much loss and

misery upon the country, but, although we may deplore the desperate resolution which bids brave men prefer

death to subjugation, it is not for us, the countrymen of Hereward or Wallace, to condemn it.

In one important respect these numerous, though trivial, conflicts differed from the battles in the earlier

stages of the war. The British had learned their lesson so thoroughly that they often turned the tables upon

their instructors. Again and again the surprise was effected, not by the nation of hunters, but by those roineks

whose want of cunning and of veldtcraft had for so long been a subject of derision and merriment. A year of

the kopje and the donga had altered all that. And in the proportion of casualties another very marked change

had occurred. Time was when in battle after battle a tenth would have been a liberal estimate for the losses of

the Boers compared with those of the Briton. So it was at Stormberg; so it was at Colenso; so it may have

been at Magersfontein. But in this last stage of the war the balance was rather in favour of the British. It may

have been because they were now frequently acting on the defensive, or it may have been from an

improvement in their fire, or it may have come from the more desperate mood of the burghers, but in any

case the fact remains that every encounter diminished the small reserves of the Boers rather than the ample

One other change had come over the war, which caused more distress and searchings of conscience among

some of the people of Great Britain than the darkest hours of their misfortunes. This lay in the increased

bitterness of the struggle, and in those more strenuous measures which the British commanders felt

themselves entitled and compelled to adopt. Nothing could exceed the lenity of Lord Roberts's early

proclainations in the Free State. But, as the months went on and the struggle still continued, the war assumed

a harsher aspect. Every farmhouse represented a possible fort, and a probable dep�t for the enemy. The

extreme measure of burning them down was only carried out after a definite offence, such as affording cover

for snipers, or as a deterrent to railway wreckers, but in either case it is evident tbat the women or children

who were usually the sole occupants of the farm could not by their own unaided exertions prevent the line

from being cut or the riflemen from firing. It is even probable that the Boers may have committed these deeds

in the vicinity of houses the destruction of which they would least regret. Thus, on humanitarian grounds

there were strong arguments against this policy of destruction being pushed too far, and the political reasons

were even stronger, since a homeless man is necessarily the last man to settle down, and a burnedout family

the last to become contented British citizens. On the other hand, the impatience of the army towards what

they regarded as the abuses of lenity was very great, and they argued that the war would be endless if the

women in the farm were allowed always to supply the sniper on the kopje. The irregular and brigandlike

fashion in which the struggle was carried out had exasperated the soldiers, and though there were few cases

of individual outrage or unauthorised destruction, the general orders were applied with some harshness, and

repressive measures were taken which warfare may justify but which civilisation must deplore.

After the dispersal of the main army at Komatipoort there remained a considerable number of men in arms,

some of them irreconcilable burghers, some of them foreign adventurers, and some of them Cape rebels, to

whom British arms were less terrible than British law. These men, who were still well armed and well

mounted, spread themselves over the country, and acted with such energy that they gave the impression of a

large force. They made their way into the settled districts, and brought fresh hope and fresh disaster to many

who had imagined that the war had passed for ever away from them. Under compulsion from their

irreconcilable countrymen, a large number of the farmers broke their parole, mounted the horses which

British leniency had left with them, and threw themselves once more into the struggle, adding their honour to

the other sacrifices which they had made for their country. In any account of the continual brushes between

these scattered bands and the British forces, there must be such a similarity in procedure and result, that it

would be hard for the writer and intolerable for the reader if they were set forth in detail. As a general

statement it may be said that during the months to come there was no British garrison in any one of the

numerous posts in the Transvaal, and in that portion of the Orange River Colony which lies east of the

railway, which was not surrounded by prowling riflemen, there was no convoy sent to supply those garrisons

which was not liable to be attacked upon the road, and there was no train upon any one of the three lines

which might not find a rail up and a hundred raiders covering it with their Mausers. With some two thousand

miles of railroad to guard, so many garrisons to provide, and an escort to be furnished to every convoy, there

remained out of the large body of British troops in the country only a moderate force who were available for

actual operations. This force was distributed in different districts scattered over a wide extent of country, and

it was evident that while each was strong enough to suppress local resistance, still at any moment a

concentration of the Boer scattered forces upon a single British column might place the latter in a serious

position. The distribution of the British in October and November was roughly as follows. Methuen was in

the Rustenburg district, Barton at Krugersdorp and operating down the line to Klerksdorp, Settle was in the

West, Paget at Pienaar's River, Clements in the Magaliesberg, Hart at Potchefstroom, Lyttelton at

Middelburg, SmithDorrien at Belfast, W. Kitchener at Lydenburg, French in the Eastern Transvaal, Hunter,

Rundle, Brabant, and Bruce Hamilton in the Orange River Colony. Each of these forces was occupied in the

same sort of work, breaking up small bodies of the enemy, hunting for arms, bringing in refugees, collecting

supplies, and rounding up cattle. Some, however, were confronted with organised resistance and some were

I would treat first the operations of General Barton, because they form the best introduction to that narrative

The most severe operations during the month of October fell to the lot of this British General, who, with

some of the faithful fusiliers whom he had led from the first days in Natal, was covering the line from

Krugersdorp to Klerksdorp. It is a long stretch, and one which, as the result shows, is as much within striking

distance of the Orange Free Staters as of the men of the Transvaal. Upon October 5th Barton left Krugersdorp

with a force which consisted of the Scots and Welsh Fusiliers, five hundred mounted men, the 78th R.F.A.,

three pompoms, and a 4.7 naval gun. For a fortnight, as the small army moved slowly down the line of the

railroad, their progress was one continual skirmish. On October 6th they brushed the enemy aside in an action

in which the volunteer company of the Scots Fusiliers gained the applause of their veteran comrades. On the

8th and 9th there was sharp skirmishing, the brunt of which on the latter date fell upon the Welsh Fusiliers,

who had three officers and eleven men injured. The commandos of Douthwaite, Liebenberg, and Van der

Merve seem to have been occupied in harassing the column during their progress through the Gatsrand range.

On the 15th the desultory sniping freshened again into a skirmish in which the honours and the victory

belonged mainly to the Welshmen and to that very keen and efficient body, the Scottish Yeomanry. Six Boers

were left dead upon the ground. On October 17th the column reached Frederickstad, where it halted. On that

date six of Marshall's Horse were cut off while collecting supplies. The same evening three hundred of the

Up to this date the Boer forces which dogged the column had been annoying but not seriously aggressive. On

the 19th, however, affairs took an unexpected turn. The British scouts rode in to report a huge dust cloud

whirling swiftly northwards from the direction of the Vaal River soon plainly visible to all, and showing

as it drew nearer the hazy outline of a long column of mounted men. The dark coats of the riders, and

possibly the speed of their advance, showed tbat they were Boers, and soon it was rumoured that it was no

other than Christian De Wet with his merry men, who, with characteristic audacity, had ridden back into the

It is some time since we have seen anything of this energetic gentleman with the tinted glasses, but as the

narrative will be much occupied with him in the future a few words are needed to connect him with the past.

It has been already told how he escaped through the net which caught so many of his countrymen at the time

of the surrender of Prinsloo, and how he was chased at furious speed from the Vaal River to the mountains of

Magaliesberg. Here he eluded his pursuers, separated from Steyn, who desired to go east to confer with

Kruger, and by the end of August was back again in his favourite recruiting ground in the north of the Orange

River Colony. Here for nearly two months he had lain very quiet, refitting and reassembling his scattered

force, until now, ready for action once more, and fired by the hope of cutting off an isolated British force, he

rode swiftly northwards with two thousand men under that rolling cloud which had been spied by the

The problem before him was a more serious one, however, than any which he had ever undertaken, for this

was no isolated regiment or illmanned post, but a complete little field force very ready to do battle with him.

De Wet's burghers, as they arrived, sprang from their ponies and went into action in their usual invisible but

effective fashion, covered by the fire of several guns. The soldiers had thrown up lines of sangars, however,

and were able, though exposed to a very heavy fire coming from several directions, to hold their own until

nightfall, when the defences were made more secure. On the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the cordon of

the attack was drawn gradually closer, the Boers entirely surrounding the British force, and it was evident that

The position of the defenders upon the morning of October 25th was as follows. The Scots Fusiliers were

holding a ridge to the south. General Barton with the rest of his forces occupied a hill some distance off.

Between the two was a valley down which ran the line, and also the spruit upon which the British depended

for their water supply. On each side of the line were ditches, and at dawn on this seventh day of the

investment it was found that these had been occupied by snipers during the night, and that it was impossible

to water the animals. One of two things must follow. Either the force must shift its position or it must drive

these men out of their cover. No fire could do it, as they lay in perfect safety. They must be turned out at the

About noon several companies of Scots and Welsh Fusiliers advanced from different directions in very

extended order upon the ditcbes. Captain Baillie's company of the former regiment first attracted the fire of

the burghers. Wounded twice the brave officer staggered on until a third bullet struck him dead. Six of his

men were found lying beside him. The other companies were exposed in their turn to a severe fire, but

rushing onwards they closed rapidly in upon the ditches. There have been few finer infantry advances during

the war, for the veldt was perfectly flat and the fire terrific. A mile of ground was crossed by the fusiliers.

Three gallant officers Dick, Elliot, and Best went down; but the rush of the men was irresistible. At the

edge of the ditches the supports overtook the firing line, and they all surged into the trenches together. Then it

was seen how perilous was the situation of the Boer snipers. They had placed themselves between the upper

and the nether millstone. There was no escape for them save across the open. It says much for their courage

that they took that perilous choice rather than wave the white flag, which would have ensured their safety.

The scene which followed has not often been paralleled. About a hundred and fifty burghers rushed out of the

ditches, streaming across the veldt upon foot to the spot where their horses had been secreted. Rifles,

pompoms, and shrapnel played upon them during this terrible race. 'A black running mob carrying coats,

blankets, boots, rifles, was seen to rise as if from nowhere and rush as fast as they could, dropping the various

things they carried as they ran.' One of their survivors has described how awful was that wild blind flight,

through a dustcloud thrown up by the shells. For a mile the veldt was dotted with those who had fallen.

Thirtysix were found dead, thirty were wounded, and thirty more gave themselves up as prisoners. Some

were so demoralised that they rushed into the hospital and surrendered to the British doctor. The Imperial

Light Horse were for some reason slow to charge. Had they done so at once, many eyewitnesses agree that

not a fugitive should have escaped. On the other hand, the officer in command may have feared that in doing

One incident in the action caused some comment at he time. A small party of Imperial Light Horse, gallantly

led by Captain Yockney of B Squadron, came to close quarters with a group of Boers. Five of the enemy

having held up their hands Yockney passed them and pushed on against their comrades. On this the prisoners

seized their rifles once more and fired upon their captors. A fierce fight ensued with only a few feet between

the muzzles of the rifles. Three Boers were shot dead, five wounded, and eight taken. Of these eight three

were shot next day by order of courtmartial for having resumed their weapons after surrender, while two

others were acquitted. The death of these men in cold blood is to be deplored, but it is difficult to see how any

rules of civilised warfare can be maintained if a flagrant breach of them is not promptly and sternly punished.

On receiving this severe blow De Wet promptly raised the investment and hastencd to regain his favourite

haunts. Considerable reinforcements had reached Barton upon the same day, including the Dublins, the

Essex, Strathcona's Horse, and the Elswick Battery, with some very welcome supplies of ammunition. As

Barton had now more than a thousand mounted men of most excellent quality it is difficult to imagine why he

did not pursue his defeated enemy. He seems to have underrated the effect which he had produced, for

instead of instantly assuming the offensive he busied himself in strengthening his defences. Yet the British

losses in the whole operations had not exceeded one hundred, so that there does not appear to have been any

reason why the force should be crippled. As Barton was in direct and constant telegraphic communication

with Pretoria, it is possible that he was acting under superior orders in the course which he adopted.

It was not destined, however, that De Wet should be allowed to escape with his usual impunity. On the 27th,

two days after his retreat from Frederickstad he was overtaken stumbled upon by pure chance apparently

by the mounted infantry and cavalry of Charles Knox and De Lisle. The Boers, a great disorganised cloud

of horsemen, swept swiftly along the northern bank of the Vaal, seeking for a place to cross, while the British

rode furiously after them, spraying them with shrapnel at every opportunity. Darkness and a violent storm

gave De Wet his opportunity to cross, but the closeness of the pursuit compelled him to abandon two of his

guns, one of them a Krupp and the other one of the British twelvepounders of Sanna's Post, which, to the

delight of the gunners, was regained by that very U battery to which it belonged.

Once across the river and back in his own country De Wet, having placed seventy miles between himself and

his pursuers, took it for granted that he was out of their reach, and halted near the village of Bothaville to

refit. But the British were hard upon his track, and for once they were able to catch this indefatigable man

unawares. Yet their knowledge of his position seems to have been most hazy, and on the very day before that

on which they found him, General Charles Knox, with the main body of the force, turned north, and was out

of the subsequent action. De Lisle's mounted troops also turned north, but fortunately not entirely out of call.

To the third and smallest body of mounted men, that under Le Gallais, fell the honour of the action which I

It is possible that the move northwards of Charles Knox and of De Lisle had the effect of a most elaborate

stratagem, since it persuaded the Boer scouts that the British were retiring. So indeed they were, save only the

small force of Le Gallais, which seems to have taken one last cast round to the south before giving up the

pursuit. In the grey of the morning of November 6th, Major Lean with forty men of the 5th Mounted Infantry

came upon three weary Boers sleeping upon the veldt. Having secured the men, and realising that they were

an outpost, Lean pushed on, and topping a rise some hundreds of yards further, he and his men saw a

remarkable scene. There before them stretched the camp of the Boers, the men sleeping, the horses grazing,

There was little time for consideration. The Kaffir drivers were already afoot and strolling out for their

horses, or lighting the fires for their masters' coffee. With splendid decision, although he had but forty men to

oppose to over a thousand, Lean sent back for reinforcements and opened fire upon the camp. In an instant it

was buzzing like an overturned hive. Up sprang the sleepers, rushed for their horses, and galloped away

across the veldt, leaving their guns and wagons behind. A few stalwarts remained, however, and their

numbers were increased by those whose horses had stampeded, and who were, therefore, unable to get away.

They occupied an enclosed kraal and a farmhouse in front of the British, whence they opened a sharp fire. At

the same time a number of the Boers who had ridden away came back again, having realised how weak their

Le Gallais, with his men, had come up, but the British force was still far inferior to that which it was

attacking. A section of U battery was able to unlimber, and open fire at four hundred yards from the Boer

position. The British made no attempt to attack, but contented themselves with holding on to the position

from which they could prevent the Boer guns from being removed. The burghers tried desperately to drive off

the stubborn fringe of riflemen. A small stone shed in the possession of the British was the centre of the Boer

fire, and it was within its walls that Ross of the Durhams was horribly wounded by an explosive ball, and that

the brave Jerseyman, Le Gallais, was killed. Before his fall he had despatched his staff officer, Major Hickie,

On the fall of Ross and Le Gallais the command fell upon Major Taylor of U battery. The position at that

time was sufficiently alarming. The Boers were working round each flank in considerable numbers, and they

maintained a heavy fire from a stone enclosure in the centre. The British forces actually engaged were

insignificant, consisting of forty men of the 5th Mounted Infantry, and two guns in the centre, fortysix men

of the 17th and 18th Imperial Yeomanry upon the right, and 105 of the 8th Mounted Infantry on the left or

191 rifles in all. The flanks of this tiny force had to extend to half a mile to hold off the Boer flank attack, but

they were heartened in their resistance by the knowledge that their comrades were hastening to their

assistance. Taylor, realising that a great effort must be made to tide over the crisis, sent a messenger back

with orders that the convoy should be parked, and every available man sent up to strengthen the right flank,

which was the weakest. The enemy got close on to one of the guns, and swept down the whole detachmcnt,

but a handful of the Suffolk Mounted Infantry under Lieutenant Peebles most galtantly held them off from it.

For an hour the pressure was extreme. Then two companies of the 7th Mounted Infantry came up, and were

thrown on to each flank. Shortly afterwards Major Welch, with two more companies of the same corps,

arrived, and the tide began slowly to turn. The Boers were themselves outflanked by the extension of the

British line and were forced to fall back. At halfpast eight De Lisle, whose force had trotted and galloped

for twelve miles, arrived with several companies of Australians, and the success of the day was assured. The

smoke of the Prussian guns at Waterloo was not a more welcome sight than the dust of De Lisle's horsemen.

But the question now was whether the Boers, who were in the walled inclosure and farm which formed their

centre, would manage to escape. The place was shelled, but here, as often before, it was found how useless a

weapon is shrapnel against buildings. There was nothing for it but to storm it, and a grim little storming party

of fifty men, half British, half Australian, was actually waiting with fixed bayonets for the whistle which was

to be their signal, when the white flag flew out from the farm, and all was over. Warned by many a tragic

experience the British still lay low in spite of the flag. 'Come out! come out!' they shouted. Eightytwo

unwounded Boers filed out of the enclosure, and the total number of prisoners came to 114, while between

twenty and thirty Boers were killed. Six guns, a pompom, and 1,000 head of cattle were the prizes of the

This excellent little action showed that the British mounted infantry had reached a point of efficiency at

which they were quite able to match the Boers at their own game. For hours they held them with an inferior

force, and finally, when the numbers became equal, were able to drive them off and capture their guns. The

credit is largely due to Major Lean for his prompt initiative on discovering their laager, and to Major Taylor

for his handling of the force during a very critical time. Above all, it was due to the dead leader, Le Gallais,

who had infected every man under him with his own spirit of reckless daring. 'If I die, tell my mother that I

die happy, as we got the guns,' said he, with his failing breath. The British total losses were twelve killed

(four officers) and thirtythree wounded (seven officers). Major Welch, a soldier of great promise, much

beloved by his men, was one of the slain. Following closely after the repulse at Frederickstad this action was

a heavy blow to De Wet. At last, the British were beginning to take something off the score which they owed

the bold raider, but there was to be many an item on either side before the long reckoning should be closed.

The Boers, with De Wet, fled south, where it was not long before they showed that they were still a military

In defiance of chronology it may perhaps make a clearer narrative if I continue at once with the movements

of De Wet from the time that he lost his guns at Bothaville, and then come back to the consideration of the

campaign in the Transvaal, and to a short account of those scattered and disconnected actions which break the

continuity of the story. Before following De Wet, however, it is necessary to say something of the general

state of the Orange River Colony and of some military developments which had occurred there. Under the

wise and conciliatory rule of General Pretyman the farmers in the south and west were settling down, and for

the time it looked as if a large district was finally pacified. The mild taxation was cheerfully paid, schools

were reopened, and a peace party made itself apparent, with Fraser and Piet de Wet, the brother of Christian,

Apart from the operations of De Wet there appeared to be no large force in the field in the Orange River

Colony, but early in October of 1900 a small but very mobile and efficient Boer force skirted the eastern

outposts of the British, struck the southern line of communications, and then came up the western flank,

attacking, where an attack was possible, each of the isolated and weakly garrisoned townlets to which it

came, and recruiting its strength from a district which had been hardly touched by the ravages of war, and

which by its prosperity alone might have proved the amenity of British military rule. This force seems to

have skirted Wepener without attacking a place of such evil omen to their cause. Their subsequent

On October 1st Rouxville was threatened. On the 9th an outpost of the Cheshire Militia was taken and the

railway cut for a few hours in the neighbourhood of Bethulie. A week later the Boer riders were dotting the

country round Phillipolis, Springfontein and Jagersfontein, the latter town being occupied upon October 16th,

while the garrison held out upon the nearest kopje. The town was retaken from the enemy by King Hall and

his men, who were Seaforth Highlanders and police. There was fierce fighting in the streets, and from twenty

to thirty of each side were killed or wounded. Fauresmith was attacked on October 19th, but was also in the

very safe hands of the Seaforths, who held it against a severe assault. Phillipolis was continually attacked

between the 18th and the 24th, but made a most notable defence, which was conducted by Gostling, the

resident magistrate, with forty civilians. For a week this band of stalwarts held their own against 600 Boers,

and were finally relieved by a force from the railway. All the operations were not, however, as successful as

these three defences. On October 24th a party of cavalry details belonging to many regiments were snapped

up in an ambuscade. On the next day Jacobadal was attacked, with considerable loss to the British. The place

was entered in the night, and the enemy occupied the houses which surrounded the square. The garrison,

consisting of about sixty men of the Capetown Highlanders, bad encamped in the square, and were helpless

when fire was opened upon them in the morning. There was practically no resistance, and yet for hours a

murderous fire was kept up upon the tents in which they cowered, so that the affair seems not to have been

far removed from murder. Twothirds of the little force were killed or wounded. The number of the

assailants does not appear to have been great, and they vanished upon the appearance of a relieving force

After the disaster at Jacobsdal the enemy appeared on November 1st near Kimberley and captured a small

convoy. The country round was disturbed, and Settle was sent south with a column to pacify it. In this way

we can trace this small cyclone from its origin in the old storm centre in the northeast of the Orange River

Colony, sweeping round the whole country, striking one post after another, and finally blowing out at the

We have last seen De Wet upon November 6th, when he fled south from Bothaville, leaving his guns but not

his courage behind him. Trekking across the line, and for a wonder gathering up no train as he passed, he

made for that part of the eastern Orange River Colony which had been reoccupied by his countrymen. Here,

in the neighbourhood of Thabanchu, he was able to join other forces, probably the commandos of Haasbroek

and Fourie, which still retained some guns. At the head of a considerable force he attacked the British

garrison of Dewetsdorp, a town some forty miles to the southeast of Bloemfontein.

It was on November 18th that De Wet assailed the place, and it fell upon the 24th, after a defence which

appears to have been a very creditable one. Several small British columns were moving in the southeast of

the Colony, but none of them arrived in time to avert the disaster, which is the more inexplicable as the town

is within one day's ride of Bloemfontein. The place is a village hemmed in upon its western side by a

semicircle of steep rocky hills broken in the centre by a gully. The position was a very extended one, and had

the fatal weakness that the loss of any portion of it meant the loss of it all. The garrison consisted of one

company of Highland Light Infantry on the southern horn of the semicircle, three companies of the 2nd

Gloucester Regiment on the northern and central part, with two guns of the 68th battery. Some of the Royal

Irish Mounted Infantry and a handful of police made up the total of the defenders to something over four

The attack developed at that end of the ridge which was held by the company of Highlanders. Every night the

Boer riflemen drew in closer, and every morning found the position more desperate. On the 20th the water

supply of the garrison was cut, though a little was still brought up by volunteers during the night. The thirst in

the sultry trenches was terrible, but the garrison still, with black lips and parched tongues, held on to their

lines. On the 22nd the attack had made such progress that the post had by the Highlanders became untenable,

and had to be withdrawn. It was occupied next morning by the Boers, and the whole ridge was at their mercy.

Out of eighteen men who served one of the British guns sixteen were killed or wounded, and the last rounds

were fired by the sergeantfarrier, who carried, loaded, and fired all by himself. All day the soldiers held out,

but the thirst was in itself enough to justify if not to compel a surrender. At halfpast five the garrison laid

down their arms, having lost about sixty killed or wounded. There does not, as far as one can learn, seem to

have been any attempt to injure the two guns which fell into the hands of the enemy. De Wet himself was one

of the first to ride into the British trenches, and the prisoners gazed with interest at the short strong figure,

with the dark tail coat and the squaretopped bowler hat, of the most famous of the Boer leaders.

British columns were converging, however, from several quarters, and De Wet had to be at once on the move.

On the 26th Dewetsdorp was reoccupied by General Charles Knox with fifteen hundred men. De Wet had

two days' start, but so swift was Knox that on the 27th he had run him down at Vaalbank, where he shelled

his camp. De Wet broke away, however, and trekking south for eighteen hours without a halt, shook off the

pursuit. He had with him at this time nearly 8,000 men with several guns under Haasbroek, Fourie, Philip

Botha, and Steyn. It was his declared intention to invade Cape Colony with his train of weary footsore

prisoners, and the laurels of Dewetsdorp still green upon him. He was much aided in all his plans by that

mistaken leniency which had refused to recognise that a borse is in that country as much a weapon as a rifle,

and had left great numbers upon the farms with which he could replace his useless animals. So numerous

were they that many of the Boers had two or three for their own use. It is not too much to say that our weak

treatment of the question of horses will come to be recognised as the one great blot upon the conduct of the

war, and that our undue and fantastic scruples have prolonged hostilities for months, and cost the country

De Wet's plan for the invasion of the Colony was not yet destined to be realised, for a tenacious man had set

himself to frustrate it. Several small but mobile British columns, those of Pilcher, of Barker, and of Herbert,

under the supreme direction of Charles Knox, were working desperately to head him off. In torrents of rain

which turned every spruit into a river and every road into a quagmire, the British horsemen stuck manfully to

their work. De Wet had hurried south, crossed the Caledon River, and made for Odendaal's Drift. But Knox,

after the skirmish at Vaalbank, had trekked swiftly south to Bethulie, and was now ready with three mobile

columns and a network of scouts and patrols to strike in any direction. For a few days he had lost touch, but

his arrangements were such that he must recover it if the Boers either crossed the railroad or approached the

river. On December 2nd he had authentic information that De Wet was crossing the Caledon, and in an

instant the British columns were all off at full cry once more, sweeping over the country with a front of

fifteen miles. On the 3rd and 4th, in spite of frightful weather, the two little armies of horsemen struggled on,

fetlockdeep in mud, with the rain lashing their faces. At night without cover, drenched and bitterly cold, the

troopers threw themselves down on the sodden veldt to snatch a few hours' sleep before renewing the

interminable pursuit. The drift over the Caledon flowed deep and strong, but the Boer had passed and the

Briton must pass also. Thirty guns took to the water, diving completely under the coffeecoloured surface, to

reappear glistening upon the southern bank. Everywhere there were signs of the passage of the enemy. A

litter of crippled or dying horses marked their track, and a Krupp gun was found abandoned by the drift. The

Dewetsdorp prisoners, too, had been set loose, and began to stumble and stagger back to their countrymen,

their boots worn off, and their putties wrapped round their bleeding feet. It is painful to add that they had

been treated with a personal violence and a brutality in marked contrast to the elaborate hospitality shown by

On December 6th De Wet had at last reached the Orange River a clear day in front of his pursuers. But it was

only to find that his labours had been in vain. At Odendaal, where he had hoped to cross, the river was in

spate, the British flag waved from a post upon the further side, and a strong force of expectant Guardsmen

eagerly awaited him there. Instantly recognising that the game was up, the Boer leader doubled back for the

north and safety. At Rouxvilie he hesitated as to whether he should snap up the small garrison, but the

commandant, Rundle, showed a bold face, and De Wet passed on to the Coomassie Bridge over the Caledon.

The small post there refused to be bluffed into a surrender, and the Boers, still dropping their horses fast,

passed on, and got over the drift at Amsterdam, their rearguard being hardly across before Knox had also

On the 10th the British were in touch again near Helvetia, where there was a rearguard skirmish. On the 11th

both parties rode through Reddersberg, a few hours separating them. The Boers in their crosscountry

trekking go, as one of their prisoners observed, 'slapbang at everything,' and as they are pastmasters in the

art of ox and mule driving, and have such a knowledge of the country that they can trek as well by night as by

day, it says much for the energy of Knox and his men that he was able for a fortnight to keep in close touch

It became evident now that there was not much chance of overtaking the main body of the burghers, and an

attempt was therefore made to interpose a fresh force who might head them off. A line of posts existed

between Thabanchu and Ladybrand, and Colonel Thorneycroft was stationed there with a movable column. It

was Knox's plan therefore to prevent the Boers from breaking to the west and to head them towards the

Basuto border. A small column under Parsons had been sent by Hunter from Bloemfontein, and pushed in

upon the flank of De Wet, who had on the 12th got back to Dewetsdorp. Again the pursuit became warm, but

De Wet's time was not yet come. He headed for Springhaan Nek, about fifteen miles east of Thabanchu. This

pass is about four miles broad, with a British fort upon either side of it. There was only one way to safety, for

Knox's mounted infantrymen and lancers were already dotting the southern skyline. Without hesitation the

whole Boer force, now some 2,500 strong, galloped at full speed in open order through the Nek, braving the

long range fire of riflemen and guns. The tactics were those of French in his ride to Kimberley, and the

success was as complete. De Wet's force passed through the last barrier which had been held against him, and

vanished into the mountainous country round Ficksburg, where it could safely rest and refit.

The result then of these bustling operations had been that De Wet and his force survived, but that he had

failed in his purpose of invading the Colony, and had dropped some five hundred horses, two guns, and about

a hundred of his men. Haasbroek's commando had been detached by De Wet to make a feint at another pass

while he made his way through the Springhaan. Parsons's force followed Haasbroek up and engaged him, but

under cover of night he was able to get away and to join his leader to the north of Thabanchu. On December

Leaving De Wet in the Ficksburg mountains, where he lurked until after the opening of the New Year, the

story of the scattered operations in the Transvaal may now be carried down to the same point a story

comprising many skirmishes and one considerable engagement, but so devoid of any central thread that it is

difficult to know how to approach it. From Lichtenburg to Komati, a distance of four hundred miles, there

was sporadic warfare everywhere, attacks upon scattered posts, usually beaten off but occasionally

successful, attacks upon convoys, attacks upon railway trains, attacks upon anything and everything which

could harass the invaders. Each General in his own district had his own work of repression to perform, and so

Lord Methuen after his pursuit of De Wet in August had gone to Mafeking to refit. From that point, with a

force which contained a large proportion of yeomanry and of Australian bushmen, he conducted a long series

of operations in the difficult and important district which lies between Rustenburg, Lichtenburg, and Zeerust.

Several strong and mobile Boer commandos with guns moved about in it, and an energetic though not very

deadly warfare raged between Lemmer, Snyman, and De la Rey on the one side, and the troops of Methuen,

Douglas, Broadwood, and Lord Errol upon the other. Methuen moved about incessantly through the broken

country, winning small skirmishes and suffering the indignity of continual sniping. From time to time he

captured stores, wagons, and small bodies of prisoners. Early in October he and Douglas had successes. On

the 15th Broadwood was engaged. On the 20th there was a convoy action. On the 25th Methuen had a

success and twentyeight prisoners. On November 9th he surprised Snyman and took thirty prisoners. On the

10th he got a pompom. Early in this month Douglas separated from Methuen, and marched south from

Zeerust through Ventersdorp to Klerksdorp, passing over a country which had been hardly touched before,

and arriving at his goal with much cattle and some prisoners. Towards the end of the month a considerable

stock of provisions were conveyed to Zeerust, and a garrison left to hold that town so as to release Methuen's

Hart's sphere of action was originaUy round Potchefstroom. On September 9th he made a fine forced march

to surprise this town, which bad been left some time before with an entirely inadequate garrison to fall into

the hands of the enemy. His infantry covered thirtysix and his cavalry fiftyfour miles in fifteen hours. The

operation was a complete success, the town with eighty Boers falling into his hands with little opposition. On

September 30th Hart returned to Krugersdorp, where, save for one skirmish upon the Gatsrand on November

22nd, he appears to have had no actual fighting to do during the remainder of the year.

After the clearing of the eastern border of the Transvaal by the movement of PoleCarew along the railway

line, and of Buller aided by Ian Hamilton in the mountainous country to the north of it, there were no

operations of importance in this district. A guard was kept upon the frontier to prevent the return of refugees

and the smuggling of ammunition, while General Kitchener, the brother of the Sirdar, broke up a few small

Boer laagers in the neighbourhood of Lydenburg. SmithDorrien guarded the line at Belfast, and on two

occasions, November 1st and November 6th, he made aggressive movements against the enemy. The first,

which was a surprise executed in concert with Colonel Spens of the Shropshires, was frustrated by a severe

blizzard, which prevented the troops from pushing home their success. The second was a two days'

This was made from Belfast, and the force, which consisted of about fourteen hundred men, advanced south

to the Komati River. The infantry were Suffolks and Shropshires, the cavalry Canadians and 5th Lancers,

with two Canadian guns and four of the 84th battery. All day the Boer snipers clung to the column, as they

had done to French's cavalry in the same district. Mere route marches without a very definite and adequate

objective appear to be rather exasperating than overawing, for so long as the column is moving onwards the

most timid farmer may be tempted into longrange fire from the flanks or rear. The river was reached and the

Boers driven from a position which they had taken up, but their signal fires brought mounted riflemen from

every farm, and the retreat of the troops was pressed as they returned to Belfast. There was all the material for

a South African Lexington. The most difficult of military operations, the covering of a detachment from a

numerous and aggressive enemy, was admirably carried out by the Canadian gunners and dragoons under the

command of Colonel Lessard. So severe was the pressure that sixteen of the latter were for a time in the

hands of the enemy, who attempted something in the nature of a charge upon the steadfast rearguard. The

movement was repulsed, and the total Boer loss would appear to have been considerable, since two of their

leaders, Commandant Henry Prinsloo and General Joachim Fourie, were killed, while General Johann

Grobler was wounded. If the rank and file suffered in proportion the losses must have been severe. The

British casualties in the two days amounted to eight killed and thirty wounded, a small total when the arduous

nature of the service is considered. The Canadians and the Shropshires seem to have borne off the honours of

In the second week of October, General French, with three brigades of cavalry (Dickson's, Gordon's, and

Mahon's), started for a crosscountry ride from Machadodorp. Three brigades may seem an imposing force,

but the actual numbers did not exceed two strong regiments, or about 1,500 sabres in all. A wing of the

Suffolk Regiment went with them. On October 13th Mahon's brigade met with a sharp resistance, and lost ten

killed and twentynine wounded. On the 14th the force entered Carolina. On the 16th they lost six killed and

twenty wounded, and from the day that they started until they reached Heidelberg on the 27th there was never

a day that they could shake themselves clear of their attendant snipers. The total losses of the force were

about ninety killed and wounded, but they brought in sixty prisoners and a large quantity of cattle and stores.

The march had at least the effect of making it clear that the passage of a column of troops encumbered with

baggage through a hostile country is an inefficient means for quelling a popular resistance. Light and mobile

parties acting from a central dep�t were in future to be employed, with greater hopes of success.

Some appreciable proportion of the British losses during this phase of the war arose from railway accidents

caused by the persistent tampering with the lines. In the first ten days of October there were four such

mishaps, in which two Sappers, twentythree of the Guards (Coldstreams), and eighteen of the 66th battery

were killed or wounded. On the last occasion, which occurred on October 10th near Vlakfontein, the

reinforcements who came to aid the sufferers were themselves waylaid, and lost twenty, mostly of the Rifle

Brigade, killed, wounded, or prisoners. Hardly a day elapsed that the line was not cut at some point. The

bringing of supplies was complicated by the fact that the Boer women and children were coming more and

more into refugee camps, where they had to be fed by the British, and the strange spectacle was frequently

seen of Boer snipers killing or wounding the drivers and stokers of the very trains which were bringing up

food upon which Boer families were dependent for their lives. Considering that these tactics were continued

for over a year, and that they resulted in the death or mutilation of many hundreds of British officers and

men, it is really inexplicable that the British authorities did not employ the means used by all armies under

such circumstances which is to place hostages upon the trains. A truckload of Boers behind every engine

would have stopped the practice for ever. Again and again in this war the British have fought with the gloves

We will pass now to a consideration of the doings of General Paget, who was operating to the north and

northeast of Pretoria with a force which consisted of two regiments of infantry, about a thousand horsemen,

and twelve guns. His mounted men were under the command of Plumer. In the early part of November this

force had been withdrawn from Warm Baths and had fllen back upon Pienaar's River, where it had continual

skirmishes with the enemy. Towards the end of November, news having reached Pretoria that the enemy

under Erasmus and Viljoen were present in force at a place called Rhenoster Kop, which is about twenty

miles north of the Delagoa Railway line and fifty miles northeast of the capital, it was arranged that Paget

should attack them from the south, while Lyttelton from Middelburg should endeavour to get behind them.

The force with which Paget started upon this enterprise was not a very formidable one. He had for mounted

troops some Queensland, South Australian, New Zealand, and Tasmanian Bushmen, together with the York,

Montgomery, and Warwick Yeomanry. His infantry were the 1st West Riding regiment and four companies

of the Munsters. His guns were the 7th and 38th batteries, with two naval quickfiring twelvepounders and

some smaller pieces. The total could not have exceeded some two thousand men. Here, as at other times, it is

noticeable that in spite of the two hundred thousand soldiers whom the British kept in the field, the lines of

communication absorbed so many that at the actual point of contact they were seldom superior and often

inferior in numbers to the enemy. The opening of the Natal and Delagoa lines though valuable in many ways,

had been an additional drain. Where every culvert needs its picket and every bridge its company, the

In the early morning of November 29th Paget's men came in contact with the enemy, who were in some force

upon an admirable position. A ridge for their centre, a flanking kopje for their cross fire, and a grass glacis for

the approachit was an ideal Boer battlefield. The colonials and the yeomanry under Plumer on the left, and

Hickman on the right, pushed in upon them, until it was evident that they meant to hold their ground. Their

advance being checked by a very severe fire, the horsemen dismounted and took such cover as they could.

Paget's original idea had been a turning movement, but the Boers were the more numerous body, and it was

impossible for the smaller British force to find their flanks, for they extended over at least seven miles. The

infantry were moved up into the centre, therefore, between the wings of dismounted horsemen, and the guns

were brought up to cover the advance. The country was illsuited, however, to the use of artillery, and it was

only possible to use an indirect fire from under a curve of the grass land. The guns made good practice,

however, one section of the 38th battery being in action all day within 800 yards of the Boer line, and putting

themselves out of action after 300 rounds by the destruction of their own rifling. Once over the curve every

yard of the veldt was commanded by the hidden riflemen. The infantry advanced, but could make no

headway against the deadly fire which met them. By short rushes the attack managed to get within 300 yards

of the enemy, and there it stuck. On the right the Munsters carried a detached kopje which was in front of

them, but could do little to aid the main attack. Nothing could have exceeded the tenacity of the

Yorkshiremen and the NewZealanders, who were immediately to their left. Though unable to advance they

refused to retire, and indeed they were in a position from which a retirement would have been a serious

operation. Colonel Lloyd of the West Ridings was hit in three places and killed. Five out of six officers of the

New Zealand corps were struck down. There were no reserves to give a fresh impetus to the attack, and the

thin scattered line, behind bulletspotted stones or anthills, could but hold its own while the sun sank slowly

upon a day which will not be forgotten by those who endured it. The Boers were reinforced in the afternoon,

and the pressure became so severe that the field guns were retired with much difficulty. Many of the infantry

had shot away all their cartridges and were helpless. Just one year before British soldiers had lain under

similar circumstances on the plain which leads to Modder River, and now on a smaller scale the very same

drama was being enacted. Gradually the violet haze of evening deepened into darkness, and the incessant

rattle of the rifle fire died away on either side. Again, as at Modder River, the British infantry still lay in their

position, determined to take no backward step, and again the Boers stole away in the night, leaving the ridge

which they had defended so well. A hundred killed and wounded was the price paid by the British for that

line of rock studded hills a heavier proportion of losses than had befallen Lord Methuen in the

corresponding action. Of the Boer losses there was as usual no means of judging, but several grave.mounds,

newly dug, showed that they also had something to deplore. Their retreat, however, was not due to

exhaustion, but to the demonstration which Lyttelton had been able to make in their rear. The gunners and the

infantry had all done well in a most trying action, but by common consent it was with the men from New

Zealand that the honours lay. It was no empty compliment when Sir Alfred Milner telegraphed to the Premier

of New Zealand his congratulations upon the distinguished behaviour of his fellow countrymen.

>From this time onwards there was nothing of importance in this part of the seat of war.

It is necessary now to turn from the northeast to the northwest of Pretoria, where the presence of De la Rey

and the cover afforded by the Magaliesberg mountains had kept alive the Boer resistance. Very rugged lines

of hill, alternating with fertile valleys, afforded a succession of forts and of granaries to the army which held

them. To General Clements' column had been committed the task of clearing this difficult piece of country.

His force fluctuated in numbers, but does not appear at any time to have consisted of more than three

thousand men, which comprised the Border Regiment, the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the second

Northumberland Fusiliers, mounted infantry, yeomanry, the 8th R.F.A., P battery R.H.A., and one heavy gun.

With this small army he moved about the district, breaking up Boer bands, capturing supplies, and bringing in

refugees. On November 13th he was at Krugersdorp, the southern extremity of his beat. On the 24th he was

moving north again, and found himself as he approached the hills in the presence of a force of Boers with

cannon. This was the redoubtable De la Rey, who sometimes operated in Methuen's country to the north of

the Magaliesberg, and sometimes to the south. He had now apparently fixed upon Clements as his definite

opponent. De la Rey was numerically inferior, and Clements had no difficulty in this first encounter in

forcing him back with some loss. On November 26th Clements was back at Krugersdorp again with cattle

and prisoners. In the early days of December he was moving northwards once more, where a serious disaster

awaited him. Before narrating the circumstances connected with the Battle of Nooitgedacht there is one

This consists of the determined attack made by a party of De la Rey's men, upon December 3rd, on a convoy

which was proceeding from Pretoria to Rustenburg, and had got as far as Buffel's Hoek. The convoy was a

very large one, consisting of 150 wagons, which covered about three miles upon the march. It was guarded by

two companies of the West Yorkshires, two guns of the 75th battery, and a handful of the Victoria Mounted

Rifles. The escort appears entirely inadequate when it is remembered that these stores, which were of great

value, were being taken through a country which was known to be infested by the enemy. What might have

been foreseen occurred. Five hundred Boers suddenly rode down upon the helpless line of wagons and took

possession of them. The escort rallied, however, upon a kopje, and, though attacked all day, succeeded in

holding their own until help arrived. They prevented the Boers from destroying or carrying off as much of the

convoy as was under their guns, but the rest was looted and burned. The incident was a most unfortunate one,

as it supplied the enemy with a large quantity of stores, of which they were badly in need. It was the more

irritating as it was freely rumoured that a Boer attack was pending; and there is evidence that a remonstrance

was addressed from the convoy before it left Rietfontein to the General of the district, pointing out the danger

to which it was exposed. The result was the loss of 120 wagons and of more than half the escort. The severity

of the little action and the hardihood of the defence are indicated by the fact that the small body who held the

kopje lost fifteen killed and twentytwo wounded, the gunners losing nine out of fifteen. A relieving force

appeared at the close of the action, but no vigorous pursuit was attempted, although the weather was wet and

the Boers had actually carried away sixty loaded wagons, which could only go very slowly. It must be

confessed that from its feckless start to its spiritless finish the story of the Buffel's Hoek convoy is not a

Clements, having made his way once more to the Magaliesberg range, had pitched his camp at a place called

Nooitgedacht not to be confused with the post upon the Delagoa Railway at which the British prisoners

had been confined. Here, in the very shadow of the mountain, he halted for five days, during which, with the

usual insouciance of British commanders, he does not seem to have troubled himself with any entrenching.

He knew, no doubt, that he was too strong for his opponent De la Rey, but what he did not know, but might

have feared, was that a second Boer force might appear suddenly upon the scene and join with De la Rey in

order to crush him. This second Boer force was that of Commandant Beyers from Warm Baths. By a sudden

and skilful movement the two united, and fell like a thunderbolt upon the British column, which was

weakened by the absence of the Border Regiment. The result was such a reverse as the British bad not

sustained since Sanna's Post a reverse which showed that, though no regular Boer army might exist, still a

sudden coalition of scattered bands could at any time produce a force which would be dangerous to any

British column which might be taken at a disadvantage. We had thought that the days of battles in this war

were over, but an action which showed a missing and casualty roll of 550 proved that in this, as in so many

As already stated, the camp of Clements lay under a precipitous cliff, upon the summit of which he had

placed four companies of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers. This strong post was a thousand feet higher than

the camp. Below lay the main body of the force, two more companies of fusiliers, four of Yorkshire Light

Infantry, the 2nd Mounted Infantry, Kitchener's Horse, yeomanry, and the artillery. The latter consisted of

one heavy naval gun, four guns of the 8th R.F.A., and P battery R.H.A. The whole force amounted to about

It was just at the first break of dawn the hour of fate in South African warfare that the battle began.

The mounted infantry post between the camp and the mountains were aware of moving figures in front of

them. In the dim light they could discern that they were clothed in grey, and that they wore the

broadbrimmed hats and feathers of some of our own irregular corps. They challenged, and the answer was a

shattering volley, instantly returned by the survivors of the picket. So hot was the Boer attack that before help

could come every man save one of the picket was on the ground. The sole survivor, Daley of the Dublins,

took no backward step, but continued to steadily load and fire until help came from the awakened camp.

There followed a savage conflict at point blankrange. The mounted infantry men, rushing half clad to the

support of their comrades, were confronted by an everthickening swarm of Boer riflemen, who had already,

by working round on the flank, established their favourite cross fire. Legge, the leader of the mounted

infantry, a hard little Egyptian veteran, was shot through the head, and his men lay thick around him. For

some minutes it was as hot a corner as any in the war. But Clements himself had appeared upon the scene,

and his cool gallantry turned the tide of fight. An extension of the line checked the cross fire, and gave the

British in turn a flanking position. Gradually the Boer riflemen were pushed back, until at last they broke and

fled for their horses in the rear. A small body were cut off, many of whom were killed and wounded, while a

This stiff fight of an hour had ended in a complete repulse of the attack, though at a considerable cost. Both

Boers and British had lost heavily. Nearly all the staff were killed or wounded, though General Clements had

come through untouched. Fifty or sixty of both sides had fallen. But it was noted as an ominous fact that in

spite of shell fire the Boers still lingered upon the western flank. Were they coming on again? They showed

no signs of it. And yet they waited in groups, and looked up towards the beetling crags above them. What

were they waiting for? The sudden crash of a murderous Mauser fire upon the summit, with the rolling

Only now must it have been clear to Clements that he was not dealing merely with some spasmodic attack

from his old enemy De la Rey, but that this was a largely conceived movement, in which a force at least

double the strength of his own had suddenly been concentrated upon him. His camp was still menaced by the

men whom he had repulsed, and he could not weaken it by sending reinforcements up the hill. But the roar of

the musketry was rising louder and louder. It was becoming clearer that there was the main attack. It was a

MajubaHill action up yonder, a thick swarm of skirmishers closing in from many sides upon a central band

of soldiers. But the fusiliers were hopelessly outnumbered, and this rock fighting is that above all others in

which the Boer has an advantage over the regular. A helio on the hill cried for help. The losses were heavy, it

said, and the assailants numerous. The Boers closed swiftly in upon the flanks, and the fusiliers were no

match for their assailants. Till the very climax the helio still cried that they were being overpowered, and it is

said that even while working it the soldier in charge was hurled over the cliff by the onrush of the victorious

The fight of the mounted infantry men had been at halfpast four. At six the attack upon the hill had

developed, and Clements in response to those frantic flashes of light had sent up a hundred men of the

yeomanry, from the Fife and Devon squadrons, as a reinforcement. To climb a precipitous thousand feet with

rifle, bandolier, and spurs, is no easy feat, yet that roar of battle above them heartened them upon their way.

But in spite of all their efforts they were only in time to share the general disaster. The head of the line of

hardbreathing yeomen reached the plateau just as the Boers, sweeping over the remnants of the

Northumberland Fusiliers, reached the brink of the cliff. One by one the yeomen darted over the edge, and

endeavoured to find some cover in the face of an infernal pointblank fire. Captain Mudie of the staff, who

went first, was shot down. So was Purvis of the Fifes, who followed him. The others, springing over their

bodies, rushed for a small trench, and tried to restore the fight. Lieutenant Campbell, a gallant young fellow,

was shot dead as he rallied his men. Of twentyseven of the Fifeshires upon the hill six were killed and

eleven wounded. The statistics of the Devons are equally heroic. Those yeomen who had not yet reached the

crest were in a perfectly impossible position, as the Boers were firing from complete cover right down upon

them. There was no alternative for them but surrender. By seven o'clock every British soldier upon the hill,

yeoman or fusilier, had been killed, wounded, or taken. It is not true that the supply of csrtridges ran out, and

the fusiliers, with the illluck which has pursued the 2nd battalion, were outnumbered and outfought by

Seldom has a General found himself in a more trying position than Clements, or extricated himself more

honourably. Not only had he lost nearly half his force, but his camp was no longer tenable, and his whole

army was commanded by the fringe of deadly rifles upon the cliff. From the berg to the camp was from 800

to 1,000 yards, and a sleet of bullets whistled down upon it. How severe was the fire may be gauged from the

fact that the little pet monkey belonging to the yeomanry a small enough object was hit three times,

though he lived to survive as a battlescarred veteran. Those wounded in the early action found themselves in

a terrible position, laid out in the open under a withering fire, 'like helpless Aunt Sallies,' as one of them

described it. 'We must get a red flag up, or we shall be blown off the face of the earth,' says the same

correspondent, a corporal of the Ceylon Mounted Infantry. 'We had a pillowcase, but no red paint. Then we

saw what would do instead, so they made the upright with my blood, and the horizontal with Paul's.' It is

pleasant to add that this grim flag was respected by the Boers. Bullocks and mules fell in heaps, and it was

evident that the question was not whether the battle could be restored, but whether the guns could be saved.

Leaving a fringe of yeomen, mounted infantry, and Kitchener's Horse to stave off the Boers, who were

already descending by the same steep kloof up which the yeomen had climbed, the General bent all his efforts

to getting the big naval gun out of danger. Only six oxen were left out of a team of forty, and so desperate did

the situation appear that twice dynamite was placed beneath the gun to destroy it. Each time, however, the

General intervened, and at last, under a stimulating rain of pompom shells, the great cannon lurched slowly

forward, quickening its pace as the men pulled on the dragropes, and the six oxen broke into a wheezy

canter. Its retreat was covered by the smaller guns which rained shrapnel upon the crest of the hill, and upon

the Boers who were descending to the camp. Once the big gun was out of danger, the others limbered up and

followed, their rear still covered by the staunch mounted infantry, with whom rest all the honours of the

battle. Cookson and Brooks with 250 men stood for hours between Clements and absolute disaster. The camp

was abandoned as it stood, and all the stores, four hundred picketed horses, and, most serious of all, two

wagons of ammunition, fell into the hands of the victors. To have saved all his guns, however, after the

destruction of half his force by an active enemy far superior to him in numbers and in mobility, was a feat

which goes far to condone the disaster, and to increase rather than to impair the confidence which his troops

feel in General Clements. Having retreated for a couple of miles he turned his big gun round upon the hill,

which is called Yeomanry Hill, and opened fire upon the camp, which was being looted by swarms of Boers.

So bold a face did he present that he was able to remain with his crippled force upon Yeomanry Hill from

about nine until four in the afternoon, and no attack was pressed home, though he lay under both shell and

rifle fire all day. At four in the afternoon he began his retreat, which did not cease till he had reached

Rietfontein, twenty miles off, at six o'clock upon the following morning. His weary men had been working

for twentysix hours, and actually fighting for fourteen, but the bitterness of defeat was alleviated by the

feeling that every man, from the General downwards, had done all that was possible, and that there was every

The British losses at the battle of Nooitgedacht amounted to 60 killed, 180 wounded, and 315 prisoners, all of

whom were delivered up a few days later at Rustenburg. Of the Boer losses it is, as usual, impossible to speak

with confidence, but all the evidence points to their actual casualties being as heavy as those of the British.

There was the long struggle at the camp in which they were heavily punished, the fight on the mountain,

where they exposed themselves with unusual recklessness, and the final shelling from shrapnel and from

lyddite. All accounts agree that their attack was more open than usual. 'They were mowed down in twenties

that day, but it had no effect. They stood like fanatics,' says one who fought against them. From first to last

their conduct was most gallant, and great credit is due to their leaders for the skilful sudden concentration by

which they threw their whole strength upon the exposed force. Some eighty miles separate Warm Baths from

Nooitgedacht, and it seems strange that our Intelligence Department should have remained in ignorance of so

General Broadwood's 2nd Cavalry Brigade had been stationed to the north of Magaliesberg, some twelve

miles westward of Clements, and formed the next link in the long chain of British forces. Broadwood does

not appear, however, to have appreciated the importance of the engagement, and made no energetic

movement to take part in it. If Colvile is open to the charge of having been slow to 'march upon the cannon' at

Sanna's Post, it might be urged that Broadwood in turn showed some want of energy and judgment upon this

occasion. On the morning of the 13th his force could hear the heavy firing to the eastward, and could even

see the shells bursting on the top of the Magaliesberg. It was but ten or twelve miles distant, and, as his

Elswick guns have a range of nearly five, a very small advance would have enabled him to make a

demonstration against the flank of the Boers, and so to relieve the pressure upon Clements. It is true that his

force was not large, but it was exceptionally mobile. Whatever the reasons, no effective advance was made

by Broadwood. On hearing the result he fell back upon Rustenburg, the nearest British post, his small force

Those who expected that General Clements would get his own back had not long to wait. In a few days he

was in the field again. The remains of his former force had, however, been sent into Pretoria to refit, and

nothing remained of it save the 8th R.F.A. and the indomitable cowgun still pocked with the bullets of

Nooitgedacht. He had also F battery R.H.A., the Inniskillings, the Border regiment, and a force of mounted

infantry under Alderson. More important than all, however, was the cooperation of General French, who

came out from Pretoria to assist in the operations. On the 19th, only six days after his defeat, Clements found

himself on the very same spot fighting some at least of the very same men. This time, however, there was no

element of surprise, and the British were able to approach the task with deliberation and method. The result

was that both upon the 19th and 20th the Boers were shelled out of successive positions with considerable

loss, and driven altogether away from that part of the Magaliesberg. Shortly afterwards General Clements

was recalled to Pretoria, to take over the command of the 7th Division, General Tucker having been

appointed to the military command of Bloemfontein in the place of the gallant Hunter, who, to the regret of

the whole army, was invalided home. General Cunningham henceforward commanded the column which

Upon November 13th the first of a series of attacks was made upon the posts along the Delagoa Railway line.

These were the work of Viljoen's commando, who, moving swiftly from the north, threw themselves upon the

small garrisons of Balmoral and of Wilge River, stations which are about six miles apart. At the former was a

detachment of the Buffs, and at the latter of the Royal Fusiliers. The attack was well delivered, but in each

instance was beaten back with heavy loss to the assailants. A picket of the Buffs was captured at the first

rush, and the detachment lost six killed and nine wounded. No impression was made upon the position,

however, and the double attack seems to have cost the Boers a large number of casualties.

Another incident calling for some mention was the determined attack made by the Boers upon the town of

Vryheid, in the extreme southeast of the Transvaal near the Natal border. Throughout November this district

had been much disturbed, and the small British garrison had evacuated the town and taken up a position on

the adjacent hills. Upon December 11th the Boers attempted to carry the trenches. The garrison of the town

appears to have consisted of the 2nd Royal Lancaster regiment, some five hundred strong, a party of the

Lancashire Fusiliers, 150 strong, and fifty men of the Royal Garrison Artillery, with a small body of mounted

infantry. They held a hill about half a mile north of the town, and commanding it. The attack, which was a

surprise in the middle of the night, broke upon the pickets of the British, who held their own in a way which

may have been injudicious but was certainly heroic. Instead of falling back when seriously attacked, the

young officers in charge of these outposts refused to move, and were speedily under such a fire that it was

impossible to reinforce them. There were four outposts, under Woodgate, Theobald, Lippert, and Mangles.

The attack at 2.15 on a cold dark morning began at the post held by Woodgate, the Boers coming

handtohand before they were detected. Woodgate, who was unarmed at the instant, seized a hammer, and

rushed at the nearest Boer, but was struck by two bullets and killed. His post was dispersed or taken.

Theobald and Lippert, warned by the firing, held on behind their sangars, and were ready for the storm which

burst over them. Lippert was unhappily killed, and his ten men all hit or taken, but young Theobald held his

own under a heavy fire for twelve hours. Mangles also, the gallant son of a gallant father, held his post all day

with the utmost tenacity. The troops in the trenches behind were never seriously pressed, thanks to the

desperate resistance of the outposts, but Colonel Gawne of the Lancasters was unfortunately killed. Towards

evening the Boers abandoned the attack, leaving fourteen of their number dead upon the ground, from which

it may be guessed that their total casualties were not less than a hundred. The British losses were three

officers and five men killed, twentytwo men wounded, and thirty men with one officer missing the latter

being the survivors of those outposts which were overwhelmed by the Boer advance.

A few incidents stand out among the daily bulletins of snipings, skirmishes, and endless marchings which

make the dull chronicle of these, the last months of the year 1900. These must be enumerated without any

attempt at connecting them. The first is the longdrawnout siege or investment of SchweizerRenecke. This

small village stands upon the Harts River, on the western border of the Transvaal. It is not easy to understand

why the one party should desire to hold, or the other to attack, a position so insignificant. >From August 19th

onwards it was defended by a garrison of 250 men, under the very capable command of Colonel Chamier,

who handled a small business in a way which marks him as a leader. The Boer force, which varied in

numbers from five hundred to a thousand, never ventured to push home an attack, for Chamier, fresh from the

experience of Kimberley, had taken such precautions that his defences were formidable, if not impregnable.

Late in September a relieving force under Colonel Settle threw fresh supplies into the town, but when he

passed on upon his endless march the enemy closed in once more, and the siege was renewed. It lasted for

several months, until a column withdrew the garrison and abandoned the position.

Of all the British detachments, the two which worked hardest and marched furthest during this period of the

war was the 21st Brigade (Derbysbires, Sussex, and Camerons) under General Bruce Hamilton, and the

column under Settle, which operated down the western border of the Orange River Colony, and worked

round and round with such pertinacity that it was familiarly known as Settle's Imperial Circus. Much hard and

disagreeable work, far more repugnant to the soldier than the actual dangers of war, fell to the lot of Bruce

Hamilton and his men. With Kroonstad as their centre they were continually working through the dangerous

Lindley and Heilbron districts, returning to the railway line only to start again immediately upon a fresh

quest. It was work for mounted police, not for infantry soldiers, but what they were given to do they did to

the best of their ability. Settle's men had a similar thankless task. From the neighbourhood of Kimberley he

marched in November with his small column down the border of the Orange River Colony, capturing

supplies and bringing in refugees. He fought one brisk action with Hertzog's commando at Kloof, and then,

making his way across the colony, struck the railway line again at Edenburg on December 7th, with a train of

Rundle also had put in much hard work in his efforts to control the difficult district in the northeast of the

Colony which had been committed to his care. He traversed in November from north to south the same

country which he had already so painfully traversed from south to north. With occasional small actions he

moved about from Vrede to Reitz, and so to Bethlehem and Harrismith. On him, as on all other commanders,

the vicious system of placing small garrisons in the various towns imposed a constant responsibility lest they

The year and the century ended by a small reverse to the British arms in the Transvaal. This consisted in the

capture of a post at Helvetia defended by a detachment of the Liverpool Regiment and by a 4.7 gun.

Lydenburg, being seventy miles off the railway line, had a chain of posts connecting it with the junction at

Machadodorp. These posts were seven in number, ten miles apart, each defended by 250 men. Of these

Helvetia was the second. The key of the position was a strongly fortified hill about threequarters of a mile

from the headquarter camp, and commanding it. This post was held by Captain Kirke with forty garrison

artillery to work the big gun, and seventy Liverpool infantry. In spite of the barbedwire entanglements, the

Boers most gallantly rushed this position, and their advance was so rapid, or the garrison so slow, that the

place was carried with hardly a shot fired. Major Cotton, who commanded the main lines, found himself

deprived in an instant of nearly half his force and fiercely attacked by a victorious and exultant enemy. His

position was much too extended for the small force at his disposal, and the line of trenches was pierced and

enfiladed at many points. It must be acknowledged that the defences were badly devised little barbed

wire, frail walls, large loopholes, and the outposts so near the trenches that the assailants could reach them as

quickly as the supports. With the dawn Cotton's position was serious, if not desperate. He was not only

surrounded, but was commanded from Gun Hill. Perhaps it would have been wiser if, after being wounded,

he had handed over the command to Jones, his junior officer. A stricken man's judgement can never be so

sound as that of the hale. However that may be, he came to the conclusion that the position w~s untenable,

and that it was best to prevent further loss of life. Fifty of the Liverpools were killed and wounded, 200 taken.

No ammunition of the gun was captured, but the Boers were able to get safely away with this humiliating

evidence of their victory. One post, under Captain Wilkinson with forty men, held out with success, and

harassed the enemy in their retreat. As at Dewetsdorp and at Nooitgedacht. the Boers were unable to retain

their prisoners, so that the substantial fruits of their enterprise were small, but it forms none the less one more

of those incidents which may cause us to respect our enemy and to be critical towards ourselves.[Footnote:

Considering that Major Stapelton Cotton was himself wounded in three places during the action (one of these

wounds being in the head), he has had hard measure in being deprived of his commission by a courtmartial

which sat eight months after the event. It is to be earnestly hoped that there may be sowe revision of this

In the last few months of the year some of those corps which had served their time or which were needed

elsewhere were allowed to leave the seat of war. By the middle of November the three different corps of the

City Imperial Volunteers, the two Canadian contingents, Lumsden's Horse, the Composite Regiment of

Guards, six hundred Australians, A battery R.H.A., and the volunteer companies of the regular regiments,

were all homeward bound. This loss of several thousand veteran troops before the war was over was to be

deplored, and though unavoidable in the case of volunteer contingents, it is difficult to explain where regular

troops are concerned. Early in the new year the Government was compelled to send out strong reinforcements

Early in December Lord Roberts also left the country, to take over the duties of CommanderinChief. High

as his reputation stood when, in January, he landed at Cape Town, it is safe to say that it had been immensely

enhanced when, ten months later, he saw from the quarterdeck of the 'Canada' the Table Mountain growing

dimmer in the distance. He found a series of disconnected operations, in which we were uniformly worsted.

He speedily converted them into a series of connected operations in which we were almost uniformly

successful. Proceeding to the front at the beginiung of February, within a fortnight he had relieved

Kimberley, within a month he had destroyed Cronje's force, and within six weeks he was in Bloemfontein.

Then, after a six weeks' halt which could not possibly have been shortened, he made another of his tiger

leaps, and within a month had occupied Johannesburg and Pretoria. From that moment the issue of the

campaign was finally settled, and though a third leap was needed, which carried him to Komatipoort, and

though brave and obstinate men might still struggle against their destiny, he had done what was essential, and

the rest, however difficult, was only the detail of the campaign. A kindly gentleman, as well as a great

soldier, his nature revolted from all harshness, and a worse man might. have been a better leader in the last

hopeless phases of the war. He remembered, no doubt, how Grant had given Lee's army their horses, but Lee

at the time had been thoroughly beaten, and his men had laid down their arms. A similar boon to the partially

conquered Boers led to very different results, and the prolongation of the war is largely due to this act of

clemency. At the same time political and military considerations were opposed to each other upon the point,

and his moral position in the use of harsher measures is the stronger since a policy of conciliation had been

tried and failed. Lord Roberts returned to London with the respect and love of his soldiers and of his

fellowcountrymen. A passage from his farewell address to his troops may show the qualities which

'The service which the South African Force has performed is, I venture to think, unique in the annals of war,

inasmuch as it has been absolutely almost incessant for a whole year, in some cases for more than a year.

There has been no rest, no days off to recruit, no going into winter quarters, as in other campaigns which have

extended over a long period. For months together, in fierce heat, in biting cold, in pouring rain, you, my

comrades, have marched and fought without halt, and bivouacked without shelter from the elements. You

frequently have had to continue marching with your clothes in rags and your boots without soles, time being

of such consequence that it was impossible for you to remain long enough in one place to refit. When not

engaged in actual battle you have been continually shot at from behind kopjes by invisible enemies to whom

every inch of the country was familiar, and who, from the peculiar nature of the country, were able to inflict

severe punishment while perfectly safe themselves. You have forced your way through dense jungles, over

precipitous mountains, through and over which with infinite manual labour you have had to drag heavy guns

and oxwagons. You have covered with almost incredible speed enormous distances, and that often on very

short supplies of food. You have endured the sufferings inevitable in war to sick and wounded men far from

The words reflect honour both upon the troops addressed and upon the man who addressed them. From the

During the whole war the task of the British had been made very much more difficult by the openly expressed

sympathy with the Boers from the political association known as the Afrikander Bond, which either inspired

or represented the views which prevailed among the great majority of the Dutch inhabitants of Cape Colony.

How strong was this rebel impulse may be gauged by the fact that in some of the border districts no less than

ninety per cent. of the voters joined the Boer invaders upon the occasion of their first entrance into the

Colony. It is not pretended that these men suffered from any political grievances whatever, and their action is

to be ascribed partly to a natural sympathy with their northern kinsmen, and partly to racial ambition and to

personal dislike to their British neighbours. The liberal British policy towards the natives had especially

alienated the Dutch, and had made as wellmarked a line of cleavage in South Africa as the slave question

With the turn of the war the discontent in Cape Colony became less obtrusive, if not less acute, but in the

later months of the year 1900 it increased to a degree which became dangerous. The fact of the farmburning

in the conquered countries, and the fiction of outrages by the Brjtish troops, raised a storm of indignation.

The annexation of the Republics, meaning the final disappearance of any Dutch flag from South Africa, was a

racial humiliation which was bitterly resented. The Dutch papers became very violent, and the farmers much

excited. The agitation culminated in a conference at Worcester upon December 6th, at which some thousands

of delegates were present. It is suggestive of the Imperial nature of the struggle that the assembly of Dutch

Afrikanders was carried out under the muzzles of Canadian artillery, and closely watched by Australian

cavalry. Had violent words transformed themselves into deeds, all was ready for the crisis.

Fortunately the good sense of the assembly prevailed, and the agitation, though bitter, remained within those

wide limits which a British constitution permits. Three resolutions were passed, one asking that the war be

ended, a second that the independence of the Republics be restored, and a third protesting against the actions

of Sir Alfred Milner. A deputation which carried these to the Governor received a courteous but an

uncompromising reply. Sir Alfred Milner pointed out that the Home Government, all the great Colonies, and

half the Cape were unanimous in their policy, and that it was folly to imagine that it could be reversed on

account of a local agitation. All were agreed in the desire to end the war, but the last way of bringing this

aboutwas by encouraging desperate men to go on fighting in a hopeless cause. Such was the general nature of

the Governor's reply, which was, as might be expected, entirely endorsed by the British Government and

Had De Wet, in the operations which have already been described, evaded Charles Kiox and crossed the

Orange River, his entrance into the Colony would have been synchronous with the congress at Worcester,

and the situation would have become more acute. This peril was fortunately averted. The agitation in the

Colony suggested to the Boer leaders, however, that here was an untouched recruiting ground, and that small

mobile invading parties might gather strength and become formidable. It was obvious, also, that by enlarging

the field of operations the difficulties of the British Commanderinchief would be very much increased, and

the pressure upon the Boer guerillas in the Republics relaxed. Therefore, in spite of De Wet's failure to

penetrate the Colony, several smaller bands under lessknown leaders were despatched over the Orange

River. With the help of the information and the supplies furnished by the local farmers, these bands wandered

for many months over the great expanse of the Colony, taking refuge, when hard pressed, among the

mountain ranges. They moved swiftly about, obtaining remounts from their friends, and avoiding everything

in the nature of an action, save when the odds were overwhelmingly in their favour. Numerous small posts or

patrols cut off, many skirmishes, and one or two railway smashes were the fruits of this invasion, which

lasted till the end of the war, and kept the Colony in an extreme state of unrest during that period. A short

account must be given here of the movement and exploits of these hostile bands, avoiding, as far as possible,

The invasion was conducted by two main bodies, which shed off numerous small raiding parties. Of these

two, one operated on the western side of the Colony, reaching the seacoast in the Clanwilliam district, and

attaining a point which is less than a hundred miles from Cape Town. The other penetrated even more deeply

down the centre of the Colony, reaching almost to the sea in the Mossel Bay direction. Yet the incursion,

although so farreaching, had small effect, since the invaders held nothing save the ground on which they

stood, and won their way, not by victory, but by the avoidance of danger. Some recruits were won to their

cause, but they do not seem at that time to have been more than a few hundreds in number, and to have been

drawn for the most part from the classes of the community which had least to lose and least to offer.

The Western Boers were commanded by Judge Hertzog of the Free State, having with him Brand, the son of

the former president, and about twelve hundred wellmounted men. Crossing the Orange Biver at Sand Drift,

north of Colesberg, upon December 16th, they paused at Kameelfontein to gather up a small post of thirty

yeomen and guardsmen under Lieutenant Fletcher, the wellknown oar. Meeting with a stout resistance, and

learning that British forces were already converging upon them, they abandoned the attack, and turning away

from Colesberg they headed west, cutting the railway line twenty miles to the north of De Aar. On the 22nd

they occupied Britstown, which is eighty miles inside the border, and on the same day they captured a small

body of yeomanry who had been following them. These prisoners were released again some days later.

Taking a sweep round towards Prieska and Strydenburg, they pushed south again. At the end of the year

Hertzog's column was 150 miles deep in the Colony, sweeping through the barren and thinlyinhabited

The second column was commanded by Kritzinger, a burgher of Zastron, in the Orange River Colony. His

force was about 800 strong. Crossing the border at Rhenoster Hoek upon December 16th, they pushed for

Burghersdorp, but were headed off by a British column. Passing through Venterstad, they made for

Steynsberg, fighting two indecisive skirmishes with small British forces. The end of the year saw them

crossing the rail road at Sherburne, north of Rosmead Junction, where they captured a train as they passed,

containing some Colonial troops. At this time they were a hundred miles inside the Colony, and nearly three

In the meantime Lord Kitchener, who had descended for a few days to De Aar, had shown great energy in

organising small mobile columns which should follow and, if possible, destroy the invaders. Martial law was

proclaimed in the parts of the Colony affected, and as the invaders came further south the utmost enthusiasm

was shown by the loyalists, who formed themselves everywhere into town guards. The existing Colonial

regiments, such as Brabant's, the Imperial and South African Light Horse Thorneycroft's, Rimington's, and

the others had already been brought up to strength again, and now two new regiments were added,

Kitchener's Bodyguard and Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, the latter being raised by Johann Colenbrander, who

had made a name for himself in the Rhodesian wars. At this period of the war between twenty and thirty

thousand Cape colonists were under arms. Many of these were untrained levies, but they possessed the

martial spirit of the race, and they set free more seasoned troops for other duties.

It will be most convenient and least obscure to follow the movements of the western force (Hertzog's), and

afterwards to consider those of the eastern (Kritzinger's). The opening of the year saw the mobile column of

Free Staters 150 miles over the border, pushing swiftly south over the barren surface of the Karoo. It is a

country of scattered farms and scanty population; desolate plains curving upwards until they rise into still

more desolate mountain ranges. Moving in a very loose formation over a wide front, the Boers swept

southwards. On or about January 4th they took possession of the small town of Calvinia, which remained

their headquarters for more than a month. From this point their roving bands made their way as far as the

seacoast in the Clanwilliam direction, for they expected at Lanmbert's Bay to meet with a vessel with

mercenaries and guns from Europe. They pushed their outposts also as far as Sutherland and Beaufort West

in the south. On January 15th strange horsemen were seen hovering about the line at Touws River, and the

citizens of Cape Town learned with amazement that the war had been carried to within a hundred miles of

Whilst the Boers were making this daring raid a force consisting of several mobile columns was being

organised by General Settle to arrest and finally to repel the western invasion. The larger body was under the

command of Colonel De Lisle, an oficer who brought to the operations of war the same energy and

thoroughness with which he had made the polo team of an infantry regiment the champions of the whole

British Army. His troops consisted of the 6th Mounted Infantry, the New South Wales Mounted Infantry, the

Irish Yeomanry, a section of R battery R.H.A., and a pompom. With this small but mobile and hardy force

he threw himself in front of Hertzog's line of advance. On January 13th be occupied Piquetburg, eighty miles

south of the Boer headquarters. On the 23rd he was at Clanwilliam, fifty miles south~vest of them. To his

right were three other small British columns under Bethune, Thorneycroft, and Henniker, the latter resting

upon the railway at Matjesfontein, and the whole line extending over 120 miles barring the southern path

Though Hertzog at Calvinia and De Lisle at Clanwilliam were only fifty miles apart, the intervening country

is among the most broken and mountainous in South Africa. Between the two points, and nearer to De Lisle

than to Hertzog, flows the Doorn River. The Boers advancing from Calvinia came into touch with the British

scouts at this point, and drove them in upon January 21st. On the 28th De Lisle, having been reinforced by

Bethune's column, was able at last to take the initiative. Bethune's force consisted mainly of Colonials, and

included Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, the Cape Mounted Police, Cape Mounted Rifles, Brabant's Horse, and

the Diamond Field Horse. At the end of January the united forces of Bethune and of De Lisle advanced upon

Calvinia. The difficulties lay rather in the impassable country than in the resistance of an enemy who was

determined to refuse battle. On February 6th, after a fine march, De Lisle and his men took possession of

Calvinia, which had been abandoned by the Boers. It is painful to add that during the month that they had

held the town they appear to have behaved with great harshness, especially to the kaffirs. The flogging and

shooting of a coloured man named Esan forms one more incident in the dark story of the Boer and his

The British were now sweeping north on a very extended front. Colenbrander had occupied Van Rhyns Dorp,

to the east of Calvinia, while Bethune's force was operating to the west of it. De Lisle hardly halted at

Calvinia, but pushed onwards to Williston, covering seventytwo miles of broken country in fortyeight

hours, one of the most amazing performances of the war. Quick as he was, the Boers were quicker still, and

during his northward march he does not appear to have actually come into contact with them. Their line of

retreat lay through Carnarvon, and upon February 22nd they crossed the railway line to the north of De Aar,

and joined upon February 26th the new invading force under De Wet, who had now crossed the Orange

River. De Lisle, who had passed over five hundred miles of barren country since he advanced from

Piquetburg, made for the railway at Victoria West, and was despatched from that place on February 22nd to

the scene of action in the north. From all parts Boer and Briton were concentrating in their effort to aid or to

Before describing this attempt it would be well to trace the progress of the eastern invasion (Kritzinger's), a

movement which may be treated rapidly, since it led to no particular military result at that time, though it

lasted long after Hertzog's force had been finally dissipated. Several small columns, those of Williams, Byng,

Grenfell, and Lowe, all under the direction of Haig, were organised to drive back these commandos; but so

nimble were the invaders, so vast the distances and so broken the country, that it was seldom that the forces

came into contact. The operations were conducted over a portion of the Colony which is strongly Dutch in

sympathy, and the enemy, though they do not appear to have obtained any large number of recruits, were able

When last mentioned Kritzinger's men had crossed the railway north of Rosmead on December 30th, and

held up a train containing some Colonial troops. From then onwards a part of them remained in the

Middelburg and GraafReinet districts, while part moved towards the south. On January 11th there was a

sharp skirmish near Murraysburg, in which Byng's column was engaged, at the cost of twenty casualties, all

of Brabant's or the South African Light Horse. On the 16th a very rapid movement towards the south began.

On that date Boers appeared at Aberdeen, and on the 18th at Willowmore, having covered seventy miles in

two days. Their long, thin line was shredded out over 150 miles, and from Maraisburg, in the north, to

Uniondale, which is only thirty miles from the coast, there was rumour of their presence. In this wild district

and in that of Oudtshoorn the Boer vanguard flitted in and out of the hills, Haig's column striving hard to

bring them to an action. So wellinformed were the invaders that they were always able to avoid the British

concentrations, while if a British outpost or patrol was left exposed it was fortunate if it escaped disaster. On

February 6th a small body of twentyfive of the 7th King's Dragoon Guards and of the West Australians,

under Captain Oliver, were overwhelmed at Klipplaat, after a very fine defence, in which they held their own

against 200 Boers for eight hours, and lost nearly fifty per cent. of their number. On the 12th a patrol of

The coming of De Wet had evidently been the signal for all the Boer raiders to concentrate, for in the second

week of February Kritzinger also began to fall back, as Hertzog had done in the west, followed closely by the

British columns. He did not, however, actually join De Wet, and his evacuation of the country was never

complete, as was the case with Hertzog's force. On the 19th Kritzinger was at Bethesda, with Gorringe and

Lowe at his heels. On the 23rd an important railway bridge at Fish River, north of Cradock, was attacked, but

the attempt was foiled by the resistance of a handful of Cape Police and Lancasters. On March 6th a party of

Boers occupied the village of Pearston, capturing a few rifles and some ammunition. On the same date there

was a skirmish between Colonel Parsons's column and a party of the enemy to the north of Aberdeen. The

main body of the invading force appears to have been lurking in this neighbourhood, as they were able upon

April 7th to cut off a strong British patrol, consisting of a hundred Lancers and Yeomanry, seventyfive of

whom remained as temporary prisoners in the hands of the enemy. With this success we may for the time

leave Kritzinger and his lieutenant, Scheepers, who commanded that portion of his force which had

The two invasions which have been here described, that of Hertzog in the west and of Kritzinger in the

midlands, would appear in themselves to be unimportant military operations, since they were carried out by

small bodies of men whose policy was rather to avoid than to overcome resistance. Their importance,

however, is due to the fact that they were really the forerunners of a more important incursion upon the part

of De Wet. The object of these two bands of raiders was to spy out the land, so that on the arival of the main

body all might be ready for that general rising of their kinsmen in the Colony which was the last chance, not

of winning, but of prolonging the war. It must be confessed that, however much their reason might approve of

the Government under which they lived, the sentiment of the Cape Dutch had been cruelly, though

unavoidably, hurt in the course of the war. The appearance of so popular a leader as De Wet with a few

thousand veterans in the very heart of their country might have stretched their patience to the breakingpoint.

Inflamed, as they were, by that racial hatred which had always smouldered, and had now been fanned into a

blaze by the speeches of their leaders and by the fictions of their newspapers, they were ripe for mischief,

while they had before their eyes an objectlesson of the impotence of our military system in those small

bands who had kept the country in a ferment for so long. All was propitious, therefore, for the attempt which

We last saw De Wet when, after a long chase, he had been headed back from the Orange River, and,

winnining clear from Knox's pursuit, had in the third week of December passed successfully through the

British cordon between Thabanchu and Ladybrand. Thence he made his way to Senekal, and proceeded, in

spite of the shaking which he had had, to recruit and recuperate in the amazing way which a Boer army has.

There is no force so easy to drive and so difficult to destroy. The British columns still kept in touch with De

Wet, but found it impossible to bring him to an action in the difficult district to which he had withdrawn. His

force had split up into numerous smaller bodies, capable of reuniting at a signal from their leader. These

scattered bodies, mobile as ever, vanished if seriously attacked, while keenly on the alert to pounce upon any

British force which might be overpowered before assistance could arrive. Such an opportunity came to the

commando led by Philip Botha, and the result was another petty reverse to the British arms.

Upon January 3rd Colonel White's small column was pushing north, in cooperation with those of Knox,

Pilcher, and the others. Upon that date it had reached a point just north of Lindley, a district which has never

been a fortunate one for the invaders. A patrol of Kitchener' s newly raised bodyguard, under Colonel Laing,

120 strong, was sent forward to reconnoitre upon the road from Lindley to Reitz.

The scouting appears to have been negligently done, there being only two men out upon each flank. The little

force walked into one of those horseshoe positions which the Boers love, and learned by a sudden volley

from a kraal upon their right that the enemy was present in strength. On attempting to withdraw it was

instantly evident that the Boers were on all sides and in the rear with a force which numbered at least five to

one. The camp of the main column was only four miles away, however, and the bodyguard, having sent

messages of their precarious position, did all they could to make a defence until help could reach them.

Colonel Laing had fallen, shot through the heart, but found a gallant successor in young Nairne, the adjutant.

Part of the force had thrown themselves, under Nairne and Milne, into a donga, which gave some shelter from

the sleet of bullets. The others, under Captain Butters, held on to a ruined kraal. The Boers pushed the attack

very rapidly, however, and were soon able with their superior numbers to send a raking fire down the donga,

which made it a perfect deathtrap. Still hoping that the laggard reinforcements would come up, the survivors

held desperately on; but both in the kraal and in the donga their numbers were from minute to minute

diminishing. There was no formal surrender and no white flag, for, when fifty per cent. of the British were

down, the Boers closed in swiftly and rushed the position. Philip Botha, the brother of the commandant, who

led the Boers, behaved with courtesy and humanity to the survivors; but many of the wounds were inflicted

with those horrible explosive and expansive missiles, the use of which among civilised combatants should

now and always be a capital offence. To disable one's adversary is a painful necessity of warfare, but nothing

can excuse the wilful mutilation and torture which is inflicted by these brutal devices.

'How many of you are there?' asked Botha. 'A hundred,' said an officer. 'It is not true. There are one hundred

and twenty. I counted you as you came along.' The answer of the Boer leader shows how carefully the small

force had been nursed until it was in an impossible position. The margin was a narrow one, however, for

within fifteen minutes of the disaster White's guns were at work. There may be some question as to whether

the rescuing force could have come sooner, but there can be none as to the resistance of the bodyguard. They

held out to the last cartridge. Colonel Laing and three officers with sixteen men were killed, four officers and

twentytwo men were wounded. The high proportion of fatal casualties can only be explained by the deadly

character of the Boer bullets. Hardly a single horse of the bodyguard was left unwounded, and the profit to

the victors, since they were unable to carry away their prisoners, lay entirely in the captured rifles. It is

worthy of record that the British wounded were despatched to Heilbron without guard through the Boer

forces. That they arrived there unmolested is due to the forbearance of the enemy and to the tact and energy

Encouraged by this small success, and stimulated by the news that Hertzog and Kritzinger had succeeded in

penetrating the Colony without disaster, De Wet now prepared to follow them. British scouts to the north of

Kroonstad reported horsemen riding south and east, sometimes alone, sometimes in small parties They were

recruits going to swell the forces of De Wet. On January 23rd five hundred men crossed the line, journeying

in the same direction. Before the end of the month, having gathered together about 2,500 men with fresh

horses at the Doornberg, twenty miles north of Winburg, the Boer leader was ready for one of his lightning

treks once more. On January 28th he broke south through the British net, which appears to have had more

meshes than cord. Passing the BloemfonteinLadybrand line at Israel Poort he swept southwards, with

British columns still wearily trailing behind him, like honest bulldogs panting after a greyhound.

Before following him upon this new venture it is necessary to say a few words about that peace movement in

the Boer States to which some allusion has already been made. On December 20th Lord Kitchener had issued

a proclamation which was intended to have the effect of affording protection to those burghers who desired to

cease fighting, but who were unable to do so without incurring the enmity of their irreconcilable brethren. 'It

is hereby notified,' said the document, 'to all burghers that if after this date they voluntarily surrender they

will be allowed to live with their families in Government laagers until such time as the guerilla warfare now

being carried on will admit of their returning safely to their homes. All stock and property brought in at the

time of the surrender of such burghers will be respected and paid for if requisitioned.' This wise and liberal

offer was sedulously concealed from their men by the leaders of the fighting commandos, but was largely

taken advantage of by those Boers to whom it was conveyed. Boer refugee camps were formed at Pretoria,

Johannesburg, Kroonstad, Bloemfontein, Warrenton; and other points, to which by degrees the whole civil

population came to be transferred. It was the reconcentrado system of Cuba over again, with the essential

difference that the guests of the British Government were well fed and well treated during their detention.

It was natural that some of these people, having experienced the amenity of British rule, and being convinced

of the hopelessness of the struggle, should desire to convey their feelings to their friends and relations in the

field. Both in the Transvaal and in the Orange River Colony Peace Committees were formed, which

endeavoured to persuade their countrymen to bow to the inevitable. A remarkable letter was published from

Piet de Wet, a man who had fought bravely for the Boer cause, to his brother, the famous general. 'Which is

better for the Republics,' he asked, 'to continue the struggle and run the risk of total ruin as a nation, or to

submit? Could we for a moment think of taking back the country if it were offered to us, with thousands of

people to be supported by a Government which has not a farthing?... Put passionate feeling aside for a

moment and use commonsense, and you will then agree with me that the best thing for the people and the

country is to give in, to be loyal to the new government, and to get responsible government... Should the war

continue a few months longer the nation will become so poor that they will be the working class in the

country, and disappear as a nation in the future... The British are convinced that they have conquered the land

and its people, and consider the matter ended, and they only try to treat magnanimously those who are

Such were the sentiments of those of the burghers who were in favour of peace. Their eyes had been opened

and their bitterness was transferred from the British Government to those individual Britons who, partly from

idealism and partly from party passion, had encouraged them to their undoing. But their attempt to convey

their feelings to their countrymen in the field ended in tragedy. Two of their number, Morgendaal and

Wessels, who had journeyed to De Wet's camp, were condemned to death by order of that leader. In the case

of Morgendaal the execution actually took place, and seems to have been attended by brutal circumstances,

the man having been thrashed with a sjambok before being put to death. The circumstances are still

surrounded by such obscurity that it is impossible to say whether the message of the peace envoys was to the

General himself or to the men under his command. In the former case the man was murdered. In the latter the

Boer leader was within his rights, though the rights may have been harshly construed and brutally enforced.

On January 29th, in the act of breaking south, De Wet's force, or a portion of it, had a sharp brush with a

small British column (Crewe's) at Tabaksberg, which lies about forty miles northeast of Bloemfontein; This

small force, seven hundred strong, found itself suddenly in the presence of a very superior body of the enemy,

and had some difficulty in extricating itself. A pompom was lost in this affair. Crewe fell back upon Knox,

and the combined columns made for Bloemfontein, whence they could use the rails for their transport. De

Wet meanwhile moved south as far as Smithfield, and then, detaching several small bodies to divert the

attention of the British, he struck due west, and crossed the track between Springfontein and Jagersfontein

road, capturing the usual supply train as he passed. On February 9th he had reached Philippolis, well ahead of

the British pursuit, and spent a day or two in making his final arrangements before carrying the war over the

border. His force consisted at this time of nearly 8,000 men, with two 15pounders, one pompom, and one

maxim. The garrisons of all the towns in the southwest of the Orange River Colony had been removed in

accordance with the policy of concentration, so De Wet found himself for the moment in a friendly country.

The British, realising how serious a situation might arise should De Wet succeed in penetrating the Colony

and in joining Hertzog and Kritzinger, made every effort both to head him off and to bar his return. General

Lyttelton at Naauwpoort directed the operations, and the possession of the railway line enabled him to

concentrate his columns rapidly at the point of danger. On February 11th De Wet forded the Orange River at

Zand Drift, and found himself once more upon British territory. Lyttelton's plan of campaign appears to have

been to allow De Wet to come some distance south, and then to hold him in front by De Lisle's force, while a

number of small mobile columns under Plumer, Crabbe, Henniker, Bethune, Haig, and Thorneycroft should

shepherd him behind. On crossing, De Wet at once moved westwards, where, upon February 12th, Plumer's

column, consisting of the Queensland Mounted Infantry, the Imperial Bushmen, and part of the King's

Dragoon Guards, came into touch with his rearguard. All day upon the 13th and 14th, amid terrific rain,

Plumer's hardy troopers followed close upon the enemy, gleaning a few ammunition wagons, a maxim, and

some prisoners. The invaders crossed the railway line near Houtnek, to the north of De Aar, in the early hours

of the 15th, moving upon a front of six or eight miles. Two armoured trains from the north and the south

closed in upon him as he passed, Plumer still thundered in his rear, and a small column under Crabbe came

pressing from the south. This sturdy Colonel of Grenadiers had already been wounded four times in the war,

so that he might be excused if he felt some personal as well as patriotic reasons for pushing a relentless

pursuit. On crossing the railroad De Wet turned furiously upon his pursuers, and, taking an excellent position

upon a line of kopjes rising out of the huge expanse of the Karoo, he fought a stubborn rearguard action in

order to give time for his convoy to get ahead. He was hustled off the hills, however, the Australian Bushmen

with great dash carrying the central kopje, and the guns driving the invaders to the westward. Leaving all his

wagons and his reserve ammunition behind him, the guerilla chief struck northwest, moving with great

swiftness, but never succeeding in shaking off Plumer's pursuit. The weather continued, however, to be

atrocious, rain and hail falling with such violence that the horses could hardly be induced to face it. For a

week the two sodden, sleepless, mudsplashed little armies swept onwards over the Karoo. De Wet passed

northwards through Strydenburg, past Hopetown, and so to the Orange River, which was found to be too

swollen with the rains to permit of his crossing. Here upon the 23rd, after a march of fortyfive miles on end,

Plumer ran into him once more, and captured with very little fighting a fifteenpounder, a pompom, and

close on to a hundred prisoners. Slipping away to the east, De Wet upon February 24th crossed the railroad

again between Krankuil and Orange River Station, with Thorneycroft's column hard upon his heels. The Boer

leader was now more anxious to escape from the Colony than ever he had been to enter it, and he rushed

distractedly from point to point, endeavouring to find a ford over the great turbid river which cut him off

from his own country. Here he was joined by Hertzog's commando with a number of invaluable spare horses.

It is said also that he had been able to get remounts in the Hopetown district, which had not been cleared

an omission for which, it is to be hoped, someone has been held responsible. The Boer ponies, used to the

succulent grasses of the veldt, could make nothing of the rank Karoo, and had so fallen away that an

enormous advantage should have rested with the pursuers had ill luck and bad management not combined to

enable the invaders to renew their mobility at the very moment when Plumer's horses were dropping dead

The Boer force was now so scattered that, in spite of the advent of Hertzog, De Wet had fewer men with him

than when he entered the Colony. Several hundreds had been taken prisoners, many had deserted, and a few

had been killed. It was hoped now that the whole force might be captured, and Thorneycroft's, Crabbe's,

Henniker's, and other columns were closing swiftly in upon him, while the swollen river still barred his

retreat. There was a sudden drop in the flood, however; one ford became passable, and over it, upon the last

day of February, De Wet and his bedraggled, dispirited commando escaped to their own country. There was

still a sting in his tail, however; for upon that very day a portion of his force succeeded in capturing sixty and

killing or wounding twenty of Colenbrander's new regiment, Kitchener's Fighting Scouts. On the other hand,

De Wet was finally relieved upon the same day of all care upon the score of his guns, as the last of them was

most gallantly captured by Captain Dallimore and fifteen Victorians, who at the same time brought in

thirtythree Boer prisoners. The net result of De Wet's invasion was that he gained nothing, and that he lost

about four thousand horses, all his guns, all his convoy, and some three hundred of his men.

Once safely in his own country again, the guerilla chief pursued his way northwards with his usual celerity

and success. The moment that it was certain that De Wet had escaped, the indefatigable Plumer, wiry,

tenacious man, had been sent off by train to Springfontein, while Bethune's column followed direct. This

latter force crossed the Orange River bridge and marched upon Luckhoff and Fauresmith. At the latter town

they overtook Plumer, who was again hard upon the heels of De Wet. Together they ran him across the Riet

River and north to Petrusburg, until they gave it up as hopeless upon finding that, with only fifty followers,

he had crossed the Modder River at Abram's Kraal. There they abandoned the chase and fell back upon

Bloemfontein to refit and prepare for a fresh effort to run down their elusive enemy.

While Plumer and Bethune were following upon the track of De Wet until he left them behind at the Modder,

Lyttelton was using the numerous columns which were ready to his hand in effecting a drive up the

southeastern section of the Orange Biver Colony. It was disheartening to remember that all this large stretch

of country had from April to November been as peaceful and almost as prosperous as Kent or Yorkshire.

Now the intrusion of the guerilla bands, and the pressure put by them upon the farmers, had raised the whole

country once again, and the work of pacification had to be set about once more, with harsher measures than

before. A continuous barrier of barbedwire fencing had been erected from Bloemfontein to the Basuto

border, a distance of eighty miles, and this was now strongly held by British posts. From the south Bruce

Hamilton, Hickman, Thorneycroft, and Haig swept upwards, stripping the country as they went in the same

way that French had done in the Eastern Transvaal, while Pilcher's column waited to the north of the

barbedwire barrier. It was known that Fourie, with a considerable commando, was lurking in this district,

but he and his men slipped at night between the British columns and escaped. Pilcher, Bethune, and Byng

were able, however, to send in 200 prisoners and very great numbers of cattle. On April 10th Monro, with

Bethune's Mounted Infantry, captured eighty fighting Boers near Dewetsdorp, and sixty more were taken by a

night attack at Boschberg. There is no striking victory to record in these operations, but they were an

important part of that process of attrition which was wearing the Boers out and helping to bring the war to an

end. Terrible it is to see that barren countryside, and to think of the depths of misery to which the once

flourishing and happy Orange Free State had fallen, through joining in a quarrel with a nation which bore it

nothing but sincere friendship and goodwill. With nothing to gain and everything to lose, the part played by

the Orange Free State in this South African drama is one of the most inconceivable things in history. Never

Three consecutive chapters have now given some account of the campaign of De Wet, of the operations in the

Transvaal up to the end of the year 1900, and of the invasion of Cape Colony up to April 1901. The present

chapter will deal with the events in the Transvaal from the beginning of the new century. The military

operations in that country, though extending over a very large area, may be roughly divided into two

categories: the attacks by the Boers upon British posts, and the aggressive sweeping movements of British

columns. Under the first heading come the attacks on Belfast, on Zuurfontein, on Kaalfontein, on Zeerust, on

Modderfontein, and on Lichtenburg, besides many minor affairs. The latter comprises the operations of

Babington and of Cunningham to the west and southwest of Pretoria, those of Methuen still further to the

southwest, and the large movement of French in the southeast. In no direction did the British forces in the

field meet with much active resistance. So long as they moved the gnats did not settle; it was only when quiet

The early days of January 1901 were not fortunate for the British arms, as the check in which Kitchener's

Bodyguard was so roughly handled, near Lindley, was closely followed by a brisk action at Naauwpoort or

Zandfontein, near the Magaliesberg, in which De la Rey left his mark upon the Imperial Light Horse. The

Boer commandos, having been driven into the mountains by French and Clements in the latter part of

December, were still on the lookout to strike a blow at any British force which might expose itself. Several

mounted columns had been formed to scour the country, one under Kekewich, one under Gordon, and one

under Babington. The two latter, meeting in a mist upon the morning of January 5th, actually turned their

rifles upon each other, but fortunately without any casualties resulting. A more deadly rencontre was,

A force of Boers were observed, as the mist cleared, making for a ridge which would command the road

along which the convoy and guns were moving. Two squadrons (B and C) of the Light Horse were instantly

detached to seize the point. They do not appear to have realised that they were in the immediate presence of

the enemy, and they imagined that the ground over which they were passing had been already reconnoitred

by a troop of the 14th Hussars. It is true that four scouts were thrown forward, but as both squadrons were

cantering there was no time for these to get ahead. Presently C squadron, which was behind, was ordered to

close up upon the left of B squadron, and the 150 horsemen in one long line swept over a low grassy ridge.

Some hundreds of De la Rey's men were lying in the long grass upon the further side, and their first volley,

fired at a fiftyyard range, emptied a score of saddles. It would have been wiser, if less gallant, to retire at

once in the presence of a numerous and invisible enemy, but the survivors were ordered to dismount and

return the fire. This was done, but the hail of bullets was terrific and the casualties were numerous. Captain

Norman, of C squadron, then retired his men, who withdrew in good order. B squadron having lost Yockney,

its brave leader, heard no order, so they held their ground until few of them had escaped the driving sleet of

lead. Many of the men were struck three and four times. There was no surrender, and the extermination of B

company added another laurel, even at a moment of defeat, to the regiment whose reputation was so grimly

upheld. The Boer victors walked in among the litter of stricken men and horses. 'Practically all of them were

dressed in khaki and had the waterbottles and haversacks of our soldiers. One of them snatched a bayonet

from a dead man, and was about to despatch one of our wounded when he was stopped in the nick of time by

a man in a black suit, who, I afterwards heard, was De la Rey himself... The feature of the action was the

incomparable heroism of our dear old Colonel WoolsSampson.' So wrote a survivor of B company, himself

shot through the body. It was four hours before a fresh British advance reoccupied the ridge, and by that time

the Boers had disappeared. Some seventy killed and wounded, many of them terribly mutilated, were found

on the scene of the disaster. It is certainly a singular coincidence that at distant points of the seat of war two

of the crack irregular corps should have suffered so severely within three days of each other. In each case,

however, their prestige was enhanced rather than lowered by the result. These incidents tend, however, to

shake the belief that scouting is better performed in the Colonial than in the regular forces.

Of the Boer attacks upon British posts to which allusion has been made, that upon Belfast, in the early

morning of January 7th, appears to have been very gallantly and even desperately pushed. On the same date a

number of smaller attacks, which may have been meant simply as diversions, were made upon

Wonderfontein, Nooitgedacht, Wildfontein, Pan, Dalmanutha, and Machadodorp. These seven separate

attacks, occurring simultaneously over sixty miles, show that the Boer forces were still organised and under

one effective control. The general object of the operations was undoubtedly to cut Lord Roberts's

communications upon that side and to destroy a considerable section of the railway.

The town of Belfast was strongly held by SmithDorrien, with 1,750 men, of which 1,300 were infantry

belonging to the Royal Irish, the Shropshires, and the Gordons. The perimeter of defence, however, was

fifteen miles, and each little fort too far from its neighbour for mutual support, though connected with

headquarters by telephone. It is probable that the leaders and burghers engaged in this very gallant attack

were in part the same as those concerned in the successful attempt at Helvetia upon December 29th, for the

assault was delivered in the same way, at the same hour, and apparently with the same primary object. This

was to gain possession of the big 5inch gun, which is as helpless by night as it is formidable by day. At

Helvetia they attained their object and even succeeded not merely in destroying, but in removing their

gigantic trophy. At Belfast they would have performed the same feat had it not been for the foresight of

General SmithDorrien, who had the heavy gun trundled back into the town every night.

The attack broke first upon Monument Hill, a post held by Captain Fosbery with eightythree Royal Irish.

Chance or treason guided the Boers to the weak point of the wire entanglement and they surged into the fort,

where the garrison fought desperately to hold its own. There was thick mist and driving rain; and the rush of

vague and shadowy figures amid the gloom was the first warning of the onslaught. The Irishmen were

overborne by a swarm of assailants, but they nobly upheld their traditional reputation. Fosbery met his death

like a gallant gentleman, but not more heroically than Barry, the humble private, who, surrounded by Boers,

thought neither of himself nor of them, but smashed at the maxim gun with a pickaxe until he fell riddled

A second post upon the other side of the town was defended by Lieutenant Marshall with twenty men, mostly

Shropshires. For an hour they held out until Marshall and nine out of his twelve Shropshires had been hit.

The Gordon Highlanders held two posts to the southeast and to the southwest of the town, and these also

were vigorously attacked. Here, however, the advance spent itself without result. In vain the Ermelo and

Carolina commandos stormed up to the Gordon pickets. They were blown back by the steady fire of the

infantry. One small post manned by twelve Highlanders was taken, but the rest defied all attack. Seeing

therefore that his attempt at a COUPDEMAIN was a failure, Viljoen withdrew his men before daybreak.

The Boer casualties have not been ascertained, but twentyfour of their dead were actually picked up within

the British lines. The British lost sixty killed and wounded, while about as many were taken prisoners.

Altogether the action was a brisk and a gallant one, of which neither side has cause to be ashamed. The

simultaneous attacks upon six other stations were none of them pressed home, and were demonstrations

The attempts upon Kaalfontein and on Zuurfontein were both made in the early morning of January 12th.

These two places are small stations upon the line between Johannesburg and Pretoria. It is clear that the Boers

were very certain of their own superior mobility before they ventured to intrude into the very heart of the

British position, and the result showed that they were right in supposing that even if their attempt were

repulsed, they would still be able to make good their escape. Better horsed, better riders, with better

intelligence and a better knowledge of the country, their ventures were always attended by a limited liability.

The attacks seem to have been delivered by a strong commando, said to have been under the command of

Beyers, upon its way to join the Boer concentration in the Eastern Transvaal. They had not the satisfaction,

however, of carrying the garrison of a British post with them, for at each point they were met by a stout

resistance and beaten off. Kaalfontein was garrisoned by 120 men of Cheshire under WilliamsFreeman,

Zuurfontein by as many Norfolks and a small body of Lincolns under Cordeaux and Atkinson. For six hours

the pressure was considerable, the assailants of Kaalfontein keeping up a brisk shell and rifle fire, while those

of Zuurfontein were without artillery. At the end of that time two armoured trains came up with

reinforcements and the enemy continued his trek to the eastward. Knox 's 2nd cavalry brigade followed them

Zeerust and Lichtenburg had each been garrisoned and provisioned by Lord Methuen before he carried his

column away to the southwest, where much rough and useful work awaited him. The two towns were at

once invested by the enemy, who made an attack upon each of them. That upon Zeerust, on January 7th, was

a small matter and easily repulsed. A more formidable one was made on Lichtenburg, on March 3rd. The

attack was delivered by De la Rey, Smuts, and Celliers, with 1,500 men, who galloped up to the pickets in the

early morning. The defenders were 600 in number, consisting of Paget's Horse and three companies of the 1st

battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers, a veteran regiment with a long record of foreign service, not to be

confused with that 2nd battalion which was so severely handled upon several occasions. It was well that it

was so, for less sturdy material might have been overborne by the vigour of the attack. As it was, the garrison

were driven to their last trench, but held out under a very heavy fire all day, and next morning the Boers

abandoned the attack. Their losses appear to have been over fifty in number, and included Commandant

Celliers, who was badly wounded and afterwards taken prisoner at Warm Baths. The brave garrison lost

fourteen killed, including two officers of the Northumberlands, and twenty wounded.

In each of these instances the attacks by the Boers upon British posts had ended in a repulse to themselves.

They were more fortunate, however, in their attempt upon Modderfontein on the Gatsrand at the end of

January. The post was held by 200 of the South Wales Borderers, reinforced by the 59th Imperial Yeomanry,

who had come in as escort to a convoy from Krugersdorp. The attack, which lasted all day, was carried out by

a commando of 2,000 Boers under Smuts, who rushed the position upon the following morning. As usual, the

Boers, who were unable to retain their prisoners, had little to show for their success. The British casualties,

On January 22nd General Cunninghame left Oliphant's Nek with a small force consisting of the Border and

Worcester Regiments, the 6th Mounted Infantry, Kitchener's Horse, 7th Imperial Yeomanry, 8th R.F.A., and

P battery R.H.A. It had instructions to move south upon the enemy known to be gathering there. By midday

this force was warmly engaged, and found itself surrounded by considerable bodies of De la Rey's burghers.

That night they camped at Middelfontein, and were strongly attacked in the early morning. So menacing was

the Boer attitude, and so formidable the position, that the force was in some danger. Fortunately they were in

heliographic communication with Oliphant's Nek, and learned upon the 23rd that Babington had been ordered

to their relief. All day Cunninghame's men were under a longrange fire, but on the 24th Babington appeared,

and the British force was successfully extricated, having seventyfive casualties. This action of

Middelfontein is interesting as having been begun in Queen Victoria's reign, and ended in that of Edward VII.

Cunninghame's force moved on to Krugersdorp, and there, having heard of the fall of the Modderfontein post

as already described, a part of his command moved out to the Gatsrand in pursuit of Smuts. It was found,

however, that the Boers had taken up a strong defensive position, and the British were not numerous enough

to push the attack. On February 3rd Cunninghame endeavoured to outflank the enemy with his small cavalry

force while pushing his infantry up in front, but in neither attempt did he succeed, the cavalry failing to find

the flank, while the infantry were met with a fire which made further advance impossible. One company of

the Border Regiment found itself in such a position that the greater part of it was killed, wounded, or taken.

This check constituted the action of Modderfontein. On the 4th, however, Cunningham, assisted by some of

the South African Constabulary, made his way round the flank, and dislodged the enemy, who retreated to the

south. A few days later some of Smuts's men made an attempt upon the railway near Bank, but were driven

off with twentysix casualties. It was after this that Smuts moved west and joined De la Rey's commando to

make the attack already described upon Lichtenburg. These six attempts represent the chief aggressive

movements which the Boers made against British posts in the Transvaal during these months. Attacks upon

trains were still common, and every variety of sniping appears to have been rife, from the legitimate

It has been described in a previous chapter how Lord Kitchener made an offer to the burghers which

amounted to an amnesty, and how a number of those Boers who had come under the influence of the British

formed themselves into peace committees, and endeavoured to convey to the fighting commandos some

information as to the hopelessness of the struggle, and the lenient mood of the British. Unfortunately these

wellmeant offers appear to have been mistaken for signs of weakness by the Boer leaders, and encouraged

them to harden their hearts. Of the delegates who conveyed the terms to their fellow countrymen two at least

were shot, several were condemned to death, and few returned without illusage. In no case did they bear

back a favourable answer. The only result of the proclamation was to burden the British resources by an

enormous crowd of women and children who were kept and fed in refugee camps, while their fathers and

This allusion to the peace movement among the burghers may serve as an introduction to the attempt made

by Lord Kitchener, at the end of February 1901, to bring the war to a close by negotiation. Throughout its

course the fortitude of Great Britain and of the Empire had never for an instant weakened, but her conscience

had always been sensitive at the sight of the ruin which had befallen so large a portion of South Africa, and

any settlement would have been eagerly hailed which would insure that the work done had not been wasted,

and would not need to be done again. A peace on any other terms would simply shift upon the shoulders of

our descendants those burdens which we were not manly enough to bear ourselves. There had arisen, as has

been said, a considerable peace movement among the burghers of the refugee camps and also among the

prisoners of war. It was hoped that some reflection of this might be found among the leaders of the people.

To find out if this were so Lord Kitchener, at the end of February, sent a verbal message to Louis Botha, and

on the 27th of that month the Boer general rode with an escort of Hussars into Middelburg. 'Sunburned, with

a pleasant, fattish face of a German type, and wearing an imperial,' says one who rode beside him. Judging

from the sounds of mirth heard by those without, the two leaders seem to have soon got upon amiable terms,

and there was hope that a definite settlement might spring from their interview. From the beginning Lord

Kitchener explained that the continued independence of the two republics was an impossibility. But on every

other point the British Government was prepared to go great lengths in order to satisfy and conciliate the

On March 7th Lord Kitchener wrote to Botha from Pretoria, recapitulating the points which he had advanced.

The terms offered were certainly as far as, and indeed rather further than, the general sentiment of the Empire

would have gone. If the Boers laid down their arms there was to be a complete amnesty, which was

apparently to extend to rebels also so long as they did not return to Cape Colony or Natal. Selfgovernment

was promised after a necessary interval, during which the two States should be administered as Crown

colonies. Law courts should be independent of the Executive from the beginning, and both languages be

official. A million pounds of compensation would be paid to the burghers a most remarkable example of a

war indemnity being paid by the victors. Loans were promised to the farmers to restart them in business, and

a pledge was made that farms should not be taxed. The Kaffirs were not to have the franchise, but were to

have the protection of law. Such were the generous terms offered by the British Government. Public opinion

at home, strong]y supported by that of the colonies, and especially of the army, felt that the extreme step had

been taken in the direction of conciliation, and that to do more would seem not to offer peace, but to implore

it. Unfortunately, however, the one thing which the British could not offer was the one thing which the Boers

would insist upon having, and the leniency of the proposals in all other directions may have suggested

weakness to their minds. On March 15th an answer was returned by General Botha to the effect that nothing

short of total independence would satisfy them, and the negotiations were accordingiy broken off.

There was a disposition, however, upon the Boer side to renew them, and upon May 10th General Botha

applied to Lord Kitchener for permission to cable to President Kruger, and to take his advice as to the making

of peace. The stern old man at The Hague was still, however, in an unbending mood. His reply was to the

effect that there were great hopes of a successful issue of the war, and that he had taken steps to make proper

provision for the Boer prisoners and for the refugee women. These steps, and very efficient ones too, were to

leave them entirely to the generosity of that Government which he was so fond of reviling.

On the same day upon which Botha applied for leave to use the British cable, a letter was written by Reitz,

State Secretary of the Transvaal, to Steyn, in which the desperate condition of the Boers was clearly set forth.

This document explained that the burghers were continually surrendering, that the ammunition was nearly

exhausted, the food running low, and the nation in danger of extinction. 'The time has come to take the final

step,' said the Secretary of State. Steyn wrote back a reply in which, like his brother president, he showed a

dour resolution to continue the struggle, prompted by a fatalist conviction that some outside interference

would reverse the result of his appeal to arms. His attitude and that of Kruger determined the Boer leaders to

hold out for a few more months, a resolution which may have been injudicious, but was certainly heroic. 'It's

a fight to a finish this time,' said the two combatants in the' Punch' cartoon which marked the beginning of the

war. It was indeed so, as far as the Boers were concerned. As the victors we can afford to acknowledge that

no nation in history has ever made a more desperate and prolonged resistance against a vastly superior

antagonist. A Briton may well pray that his own people may be as staunch when their hour of adversity

The British position at this stage of the war was strengthened by a greater centralisation. Garrisons of

outlying towns were withdrawn so that fewer convoys became necessary. The population was removed also

and placed near the railway lines, where they could be more easily fed. In this way the scene of action was

cleared and the Boer and British forces left face to face. Convinced of the failure of the peace policy, and

morally strengthened by having tried it, Lord Kitchener set himself to finish the war by a series of vigorous

operations which should sweep the country from end to end. For this purpose mounted troops were essential,

and an appeal from him for reinforcements was most nobly answered. Five thousand horsemen were

despatched from the colonies, and twenty thousand cavalry, mounted infantry, and Yeomanry were sent from

home. Ten thousand mounted men had already been raised in Great Britain, South Africa, and Canada for the

Constabulary force which was being organised by BadenPowell. Altogether the reinforcements of horsemen

amounted to more than thirtyfive thousand men, all of whom had arrived in South Africa before the end of

April. With the remains of his old regiments Lord Kitchener had under him at this final period of the war

between fifty and sixty thousand cavalrysuch a force as no British General in his happiest dream had ever

thought of commanding, and no British war minister in his darkest nightmare had ever imagined himself

Long before his reinforcements had come to hand, while his Yeomanry was still gathering in long queues

upon the London pavement to wait their turn at the recruiting office, Lord Kitchener had dealt the enemy

several shrewd blows which materially weakened their resources in men and material. The chief of these was

the great drive down the Eastern Transvaal undertaken by seven columns under the command of French.

Before considering this, however, a few words must be devoted to the doings of Methuen in the southwest.

This hardworking General, having garrisoned Zeerust and Lichtenburg, had left his old district and

journeyed with a force which consisted largely of Bushmen and Yeomanry to the disturbed parts of

Bechuanaland which had been invaded by De Villiers. Here he cleared the country as far as Vryburg, which

he had reached in the middle of January, working round to Kuruman and thence to Taungs. From Taungs his

force crossed the Transvaal border and made for Klerksdorp, working through an area which had never been

traversed and which contained the difficult Masakani hills. He left Taungs upon February 2nd, fighting

skirmishes at Uitval's Kop, Paardefontein and Lilliefontein, in each of which the enemy was brushed aside.

Passing through Wolmaranstad, Methuen turned to the north, where at Haartebeestefontein, on February 19th,

he fought a brisk engagement with a considerable force of Boers under De Villiers and Liebenberg. On the

day before the fight he successfully outwitted the Boers, for, learning that they had left their laager in order to

take up a position for battle, he pounced upon the laager and captured 10,000 head of cattle, fortythree

wagons, and forty prisoners. Stimulated by this success, he attacked the Boers next day, and after five hours

of hard fighting forced the pass which they were holding against him. As Methuen had but 1,500 men, and

was attacking a force which was as large as his own in a formidable position, the success was a very

creditable one. The Yeomanry all did well, especially the 5th and 10th battalions. So also did the Australians

and tho Loyal North Lancashires. The British casualties amounted to sixteen killed and thirtyfour wounded,

while the Boers left eighteen of their dead upon the position which they had abandoned. Lord Methuen's little

force ret urnedto Klerksdorp, having deserved right well of their country. From Klerksdorp Methuen struck

back westwards to the south of his former route, and on March 14th he was reported at Warrenton. Here also

in April came Erroll's small column, bringing with it the garrison and inhabitants of Hoopstad, a post which it

had been determined, in accordance with Lord Kitchener's policy of centralisation, to abandon.

In the month of January, 1901, there had been a considerable concentration of the Transvaal Boers into that

large triangle which is bounded by the Delagoa railway line upon the north, the Natal railway line upon the

south, and the Swazi and Zulu frontiers upon the east. The buschveldt is at this season of the year unhealthy

both for man and beast, so that for the sake of their herds, their families, and themselves the burghers were

constrained to descend into the open veldt. There seemed the less objection to their doing so since this tract of

country, though traversed once both by Buller and by French, has still remained a stronghold of the Boers and

a storehouse of supplies. Within its borders are to be found Carolina, Ermelo, Vryheid, and other storm

centres. Its possession offers peculiar strategical advantages, as a force lying there can always attack either

railway, and might even make, as was indeed intended, a descent into Natal. For these mingled reasons of

health and of strategy a considerable number of burghers united in this district under the command of the

Their concentration had not escaped the notice of the British military authorities, who welcomed any

movement which might bring to a focus that resistance which had been so nebulous and elusive. Lord

Kitchener having once seen the enemy fairly gathered into this huge cover, undertook the difficult task of

driving it from end to end. For this enterprise General French was given the chief command, and had under

his orders no fewer than seven columns, which started from different points of the Delagoa and of the Natal

railway lines, keeping in touch with each other and all trending south and east. A glance at the map would

show, however, that it was a very large field for seven guns, and that it would need all their alertness to

prevent the driven game from breaking back. Three columns started from the Delagoa line, namely,

SmithDorrien's from Wonderfontein (the most easterly), Campbell's from Middelburg, and Alderson's from

Eerstefabrieken, close to Pretoria. Four columns came from the western railway line: General Knox's from

Kaalfontein, Major Allenby's from Zuurfontein (both stations between Pretoria and Johannesburg), General

Dartnell's from Springs, close to Johannesburg, and finally General Colville (not to be confused with Colvile)

from Greylingstad in the south. The whole movement resembled a huge drag net, of which Wonderfontein

and Greylingstad formed the ends, exactly one hundred miles apart. On January 27th the net began to be

drawn. Some thousands of Boers with a considerable number of guns were known to be within the enclosure,

and it was hoped that even if their own extreme mobility enabled them to escape it would be impossible for

Each of the British columns was about 2,000 strong, making a total of 14,000 men with about fifty guns

engaged in the operations. A front of not less than ten miles was to be maintained by each force. The first

decided move was on the part of the extreme left wing, SmithDorrien's column, which moved south on

Carolina, and thence on Bothwell near Lake Chrissie. The arduous duty of passing supplies down from the

line fell mainly upon him, and his force was in consequence larger than the others, consisting of 8,500 men

with thirteen guns. On the arrival of SmithDorrien at Carolina the other columns started, their centre of

advance being Ermelo. Over seventy miles of veldt the gleam of the helio by day and the flash of the signal

lamps at night marked the steady flow of the British tide. Here and there the columns came in touch with the

enemy and swept him before them. French had a skirmish at Wilge River at the end of January, and Campbell

another south of Middelburg, in which he had twenty casualties. On February 4th SmithDorrien was at Lake

Chrissie; French had passed through Bethel and the enemy was retiring on Amsterdam. The hundredmile

ends of the drag net were already contracted to a third of that distance, and the game was still known to be

within it. On the 5th Ermelo was occupied, and the fresh deep ruts upon the veldt told the British horsemen of

the huge Boer convoy that was ahead of them. For days enormous herds, endless flocks, and lines of wagons

which stretched from horizon to horizon had been trekking eastward. Cavalry and mounted infantry were all

Botha, however, was a leader of spirit, not to be hustled with impunity. Having several thousand burghers

with him, it was evident that if he threw himself suddenly upon any part of the British line he might hope for

a time to make an equal fight, and possibly to overwhelm it. Were SmithDorrien out of the way there would

be a clear road of escape for his whole convoy to the north, while a defeat of any of the other columns would

not help him much. It was on SmithDorrien, therefore, that he threw himself with great impetuosity. That

General's force was, however, formidable, consisting of the Suffolks, West Yorks and Camerons, 5th

Lancers, 2nd Imperial Light Horse, and 3rd Mounted Infantry, with eight field guns and three heavy pieces.

Such a force could hardly be defeated in the open, but no one can foresee the effect of a night surprise well

pushed home, and such was the attack delivered by Botha at 3 A.M. upon February 6th, when his opponent

The night was favourable to the attempt, as it was dark and misty. Fortunately, however, the British

commander had fortified himself and was ready for an assault. The Boer forlorn hope came on with a gallant

dash, driving a troop of loose horses in upon the outposts, and charging forward into the camp. The West

Yorkshires, however, who bore the brunt of the attack, were veterans of the Tugela, who were no more to be

flurried at three in the morning than at three in the afternoon. The attack was blown backwards, and twenty

dead Boers, with their brave leader Spruyt, were left within the British lines. The main body of the Boers

contented themselves with a heavy fusillade out of the darkness, which was answered and crushed by the

return fire of the infantry. In the morning no trace, save their dead, was to be seen of the enemy, but twenty

killed and fifty wounded in SmithDorrien's column showed how heavy had been the fire which had swept

through the sleeping camp. The Carolina attack, which was to have cooperated with that of the

Heidelbergers, was never delivered, through difficulties of the ground, and considerable recriminations

Beyond a series of skirmishes and rearguard actions this attack of Botha's was the one effort made to stay the

course of French's columns. It did not succeed, however, in arresting them for an hour. From that day began a

record of captures of men, herds, guns, and wagons, as the fugitives were rounded up from the north, the

west, and the south. The operation was a very thorough one, for the towns and districts occupied were

denuded of their inhabitants, who were sent into the refugee camps while the country was laid waste to

prevent its furnishing the commandos with supplies in the future. Still moving southeast, General French's

columns made their way to Piet Betief upon the Swazi frontier, pushing a disorganised array which he

computed at 5,000 in front of them. A party of the enemy, including the Carolina commando, had broken

back in the middle of February and Louis Botha had got away at the same time, but so successful were his

main operations that French was able to report his total results at the end of the month as being 292 Boers

killed or wounded, 500 surrendered, 3 guns and one maxim taken, with 600 rifles, 4,000 horses, 4,500 trek

oxen, 1,300 wagons and carts, 24,000 cattle, and 165,000 sheep. The whole vast expanse of the eastern veldt

Tremendous rains were falling and the country was one huge quagmire, which crippled although it did not

entirely prevent the further operations. All the columns continued to report captures. On March 3rd Dartnell

got a maxim and 50 prisoners, while French reported 50 more, and SmithDorrien 80. On March 6th French

captured two more guns, and on the 14th he reported 46 more Boer casualties and 146 surrenders, with 500

more wagons, and another great haul of sheep and oxen. By the end of March French had moved as far south

as Vryheid, his troops having endured the greatest hardships from the continual heavy rains, and the difficulty

of bringing up any supplies. On the 27th he reported seventeen more Boer casualties and 140 surrenders,

while on the last day of the month he took another gun and two pompoms. The enemy at that date were still

retiring eastward, with Alderson and Dartnell pressing upon their rear. On April 4th French announced the

capture of the last piece of artillery which the enemy possessed in that region. The rest of the Boer forces

doubled back at night between the columns and escaped over the Zululand border, where 200 of them

surrendered. The total trophies of French's drive down the Eastern Transvaal amounted to eleven hundred of

the enemy killed, wounded, or taken, the largest number in any operation since the surrender of Prinsloo.

There is no doubt that the movement would have been even more successful had the weather been less

boisterous, but this considerable loss of men, together with the capture of all the guns in that region, and of

such enormous quantities of wagons, munitions, and stock, inflicted a blow upon the Boers from which they

never wholly recovered. On April 20th French was back in Johannesburg once more.

While French had run to earth the last Boer gun in the south.eastern corner of the Transvaal, De la Rey, upon

the western side, had still managed to preserve a considerable artillery with which he flitted about the passes

of the Magaliesberg or took refuge in the safe districts to the southwest of it. This part of the country had

been several times traversed, but had never been subdued by British columns. The Boers, like their own veldt

grass, need but a few sparks to be left behind to ensure a conflagration breaking out again. It was into this

inflammable country that Babington moved in March with Klerksdorp for his base. On March 21st he had

reached Haartebeestefontein, the scene not long before of a successful action by Methuen. Here he was joined

by Shekleton's Mounted Infantry, and his whole force consisted of these, with the 1st Imperial Light Horse,

the 6th Imperial Bushmen, the NewZealanders, a squadron of the 14th Hussars, a wing each of the Somerset

Light Infantry and of the Welsh Fusiliers, with Carter's guns and four pompoms. With this mobile and

formidable little force Babington pushed on in search of Smuts and De la Rey, who were known to be in the

As a matter of fact the Boers were not only there, but were nearer and in greater force than had been

anticipated. On the 22nd three squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse under Major Briggs rode into 1,500 of

them, and it was only by virtue of their steadiness and gallantry that they succeeded in withdrawing

themselves and their pompom without a disaster. With Boers in their front and Boers on either flank they

fought an admirable rearguard action. So hot was the fire that A squadron alone had twentytwo casualties.

They faced it out, however, until their gun had reached a place of safety, when they made an orderly

retirement towards Babington's camp, having inflicted as heavy a loss as they had sustained. With

Elandslaagte, Waggon Hill, the relief of Mafeking, Naauwpoort, and Haartebeestefontein upon their

standards, the Imperial Light Horse, should they take a permanent place in the Army List, will start with a

If the Light Horse had a few bad hours on March 22nd at the hands of the Boers, they and their colonial

comrades were soon able to return the same with interest. On March 23rd Babington moved forward through

Kafir Kraal, the enemy falling back before him. Next morning the British again advanced, and as the

NewZealanders and Bushmen, who formed the vanguard under Colonel Gray, emerged from a pass they

saw upon the plain in front of them the Boer force with all its guns moving towards them. Whether this was

done of set purpose or whether the Boers imagined that the British had turned and were intending to pursue

them cannot now be determined, but whatever the cause it is certain that for almost the first time in the

campaign a considerable force of each side found themselves in the open and face to face.

It was a glorious moment. Setting spurs to their horses, officers and men with a yell dashed forward at the

enemy. One of the Boer guns unlimbered and attempted to open fire, but was overwhelmed by the wave of

horsemen. The Boer riders broke and fled, leaving their artillery to escape as best it might. The guns dashed

over the veldt in a mad gallop, but wilder still was the rush of the fiery cavalry behind them. For once the

brave and coolheaded Dutchmen were fairly panicstricken. Hardly a shot was fired at the pursuers, and the

riflemen seem to have been only too happy to save their own skins. Two field guns, one pompom, six

maxims, fiftysix wagons and 140 prisoners were the fruits of that one magnificent charge, while fiftyfour

stricken Boers were picked up after the action. The pursuit was reluctantly abandoned when the spent horses

While the vanguard had thus scattered the main body of the enemy a detachment of riflemen had ridden

round to attack the British rear and convoy. A few volleys from the escort drove them off, however, with

some loss. Altogether, what with the loss of nine guns and of at least 200 men, the rout of

Haartebeestefontein was a severe blow to the Boer cause. A week or two later Sir H. Rawlinson's column,

acting with Babington, rushed Smuts's laager at daylight and effected a further capture of two guns and thirty

prisoners. Taken in conjunction with French's successes in the east and Plumer's in the north, these successive

blows might have seemed fatal to the Boer cause, but the weary struggle was still destined to go on until it

seemed that it must be annihilation rather than incorporation which would at last bring a tragic peace to those

All over the country small British columns had been operating during these months operations which were

destined to increase in scope and energy as the cold weather drew in. The weekly tale of prisoners and

captures, though small for any one column, gave the aggregate result of a considerable victory. In these

scattered and obscure actions there was much good work which can have no reward save the knowledge of

duty done. Among many successful raids and skirmishes may be mentioned two by Colonel Park from

Lydenburg, which resulted between them in the capture of nearly 100 of the enemy, including Abel Erasmus

of sinister reputation. Nor would any summary of these events be complete without a reference to the very

gallant defence of Mahlabatini in Zululand, which was successfully held by a handful of police and civilians

against an irruption of the Boers. With the advent of winter and of reinforcements the British operations

became very energetic in every part of the country, and some account of them will now be added.

The African winter extends roughly from April to September, and as the grass during that period would be

withered on the veldt, the mobility of the Boer commandos must be very much impaired. It was recognised

therefore that if the British would avoid another year of war it could only be done by making good use of the

months which lay before them. For this reason Lord Kitchener had called for the considerable reinforcements

which have been already mentioned, but on the other hand he was forced to lose many thousands of his

veteran Yeomanry, Australians, and Canadians, whose term of service was at an end. The volunteer

companies of the infantry returned also to England, and so did nine militia battalions, whose place was taken

The British position was very much strengthened during the winter by the adoption of the blockhouse

system. These were small square or hexagonal buildings, made of stone up to nine feet with corrugated iron

above it. They were loopholed for musketry fire and held from six to thirty men. These little forts were dotted

along the railways at points not more than 2,000 yards apart, and when supplemented by a system of

armoured trains they made it no easy matter for the Boers to tamper with or to cross the lines. So effective did

these prove that their use was extended to the more dangerous portions of the country, and lines were pushed

through the Magaliesberg district to form a chain of posts between Krugersdorp and Rustenburg. In the

Orange River Colony and on the northern lines of the Cape Colony the same system was extensively applied.

I will now attempt to describe the more important operations of the winter, beginning with the incursion of

At this period of the war the British forces had overrun, if they had not subdued, the whole of the Orange

River Colony and every part of the Transvaal which is south of the MafekingPretoriaKomati line. Through

this great tract of country there was not a vilage and hardly a farmhouse which had not seen the invaders. But

in the north there remained a vast district, two hundred miles long and three hundred broad, which had hardly

been touched by the war. It is a wild country, scrubcovered, antelopehaunted plains rising into desolate

hills, but there are many kloofs and valleys with rich water meadows and lush grazings, which formed natural

granaries and depots for the enemy. Here the Boer government continued to exist, and here, screened by their

mountains, they were able to organise the continuation of the struggle. It was evident that there could be no

The british forces had advanced as far north as Rustenburg in the west, Pienaar in the centre, and Lydenburg

in the east, but here they had halted, unwilling to go farther until their conquests had been made good behind

them. A General might well pause before plunging his troops into that vast and rugged district, when an

active foe and an exposed line of communication lay for many hundreds of miles to the south of them. But

Lord Kitchener with characteristic patience waited for the right hour to come, and then with equally

characteristic audacity played swiftly and boldly for his stake. De Wet, impotent for the moment, had been

hunted back over the Orange River. French had harried the burghers in the Southeast Transvaal, and the

main force of the enemy was known to be on that side of the seat of war. The north was exposed, and with

There could only be one direction for the advance, and that must be along the PretoriaPietersburg railroad.

This is the only line of rails which leads to the north, and as it was known to be in working order (the Boers

were running a biweekly service from Pietersburg to Warm Baths), it was hoped that a swift advance might

seize it before any extensive damage could be done. With this object a small but very mobile force rapidly

assembled at the end of March at Pienaar River, which was the British railhead forty miles north of Pretoria

and a hundred and thirty from Pietersburg. This column consisted of the Bushveldt Carbineers, the 4th

Imperial Bushmen's Corps, and the 6th New Zealand contingent. With them were the 18th battery R.F.A., and

three pompoms. A detachment of the invaluable mounted Sappers rode with the force, and two infantry

regiments, the 2nd Gordons and the Northamptons, were detached to garrison the more vulnerable places

Upon March 29th the untiring Plumer, called off from the chase of De Wet, was loosed upon this fresh line,

and broke swiftly away to the north. The complete success of his undertaking has obscured our estimate of its

danger, but it was no light task to advance so great a distance into a bitterly hostile country with a fighting

force of 2,000 rifles. As an enterprise it was in many ways not unlike Mahon's dash on Mafeking, but without

any friendly force with which to join hands at the end. However from the beginning all went well. On the

30th the force had reached Warm Baths, where a great isolated hotel already marks the site of what will be a

rich and fashionable spa. On April 1st the Australian scouts rode into Nylstroom, fifty more miles upon their

way. There had been sufficient sniping to enliven the journey, but nothing which could be caled an action.

Gleaning up prisoners and refugees as they went, with the railway engineers working like bees behind them,

the force still swept unchecked upon its way. On April 5th Piet Potgeitersrust was entered, another fiftymile

stage, and on the morning of the 8th the British vanguard rode into Pietersburg. Kitchener's judgment and

The Boer commando had evacuated the town and no serious opposition was made to the British entry. The

most effective resistance came from a single schoolmaster, who, in a moment of irrational frenzy or of

patriotic exaltation, shot down three of the invaders before he met his own death. Some rolling stock, one

small gun, and something under a hundred prisoners were the trophies of the capture, but the Boer arsenal

and the printing press were destroyed, and the Government sped off in a couple of Cape carts in search of

some new capital. Pietersburg was principally valuable as a base from which a sweeping movement might be

made from the north at the same moment as one from the southeast. A glance at the map will show that a

force moving from this point in conjunction with another from Lydenburg might form the two crooked claws

of a crab to enclose a great space of country, in which smaller columns might collect whatever was to be

found. Without an instant of unnecessary delay the dispositions were made, and no fewer than eight columns

slipped upon the chase. It will be best to continue to follow the movements of Plumer's force, and then to give

some account of the little armies which were operating from the south, with the results of their enterprise.

It was known that Viljoen and a number of Boers were within the district which lies north of the line in the

Middelburg district. An impenetrable bushveldt had offered them a shelter from which they made their

constant sallies to wreck a train or to attack a post. This area was now to be systematically cleared up. The

first thing was to stop the northern line of retreat. The Oliphant River forms a loop in that direction, and as it

is a considerable stream, it would, if securely held, prevent any escape upon that side. With this object

Plumer, on April 14th, the sixth day after his occupation of Pietersburg, struck east from that town and

trekked over the veldt, through the formidable Chunies Pass, and so to the north bank of the Oliphant, picking

up thirty or forty Boer prisoners upom the way. His route lay through a fertile country dotted with native

kraals. Having reached the river which marked the line which he was to hold, Plumer, upon April 17th,

spread his force over many miles, so as to block the principal drifts. The flashes of his helio were answered

by flash after flash from many points upon the southern horizon. What these other forces were, and whence

General Bindon Blood, a successful soldier, had confirmed in the Transvaal a reputation which he had won

on the northern frontier of India. He and General Elliot were two of the late comers who had been spared

from the great Eastern dependency to take the places of some of those Generals who had returned to England

for a wellearned rest. He had distinguished himself by his systematic and effective guardianship of the

Delagoa railway line, and he was now selected for the supreme control of the columns which were to advance

from the south and sweep the RoosSenekal district. There were seven of them, which were arranged as

Two columns started from Middelburg under Beatson and Benson, which might be called the left wings of

the movement. The object of Beatson's column was to hold the drifts of the Crocodile River, while Benson's

was to seize the neighbouring hills called the Bothasberg. This it was hoped would pin the Boers from the

west, while Kitchener from Lydenburg advanced from the east in three separate columns. Pulteney and

Douglas would move up from Belfast in the centre, with Dulstoom for their objective. It was the familiar drag

On April 13th the southern columns were started, but already the British preparations had alarmed the Boers,

and Botha, with his main commandos, had slipped south across the line into that very district from which he

had been so recently driven. Viljoen's commando still remained to the north, and the British troops, pouring

in from every side, converged rapidly upon it. The success of the operations was considerable, though not

complete. The Tantesberg, which had been the rallyingpoint of the Boers, was occupied, and RoosSenekal,

their latest capital, was taken, with their State papers and treasure. Viljoen, with a number of followers,

slipped through between the columns, but the greater part of the burghers, dashing furiously about like a

shoal of fish when they become conscious of the net, were taken by one or other of the columns. A hundred

of the Boksburg commando surrendered en masae, fifty more were taken at RoosSenekal; fortyone of the

formidable Zarps with Schroeder, their leader, were captured in the north by the gallantry and wit of a young

Australian officer named Reid; sixty more were hunted down by the indefatigable Vialls, leader of the

Bushmen. From all parts of the district came the same story of captures and surrenders.

Knowing, however, that Botha and Viljoen had slipped through to the south of the railway line, Lord

Kitchener determined to rapidly transfer the scene of the operations to that side. At the end of April, after a

fortnight's work, during which this large district was cropped, but by no means shaved, the troops turned

south again. The results of the operation had been eleven hundred prisoners, almost the same number as

French had taken in the southeast, together with a broken Krupp, a pompom, and the remains of the big

It was determined that Plumer's advance upon Pietersburg should not be a mere raid, but that steps should be

taken to secure all that he had gained, and to hold the lines of communication. With this object the 2nd

Gordon Highianders and the 2nd Wiltshires were pushed up along the railroad, followed by Kitchener's

Fighting Scouts. These troops garrisoned Pietersburg and took possession of Chunies Poort, and other

strategic positions. They also furnished escorts for the convoys which supplied Plumer on the Oliphant River,

and they carried out some spirited operations themselves in the neighbourhood of Pietersburg. Grenfell, who

commanded the force, broke up several laagers, and captured a number of prisoners, operations in which he

was much assisted by Colenbrander and his men. Finally the last of the great Creusot guns, the formidable

Long Toms, was found mounted near Haenertsburg. It was the same piece which had in succession scourged

Mafeking and Kimberley. The huge gun, driven to bay, showed its powers by opening an effective fire at ten

thousand yards. The British galloped in upon it, the Boer riflemen were driven off, and the gun was blown up

by its faithful gunners. So by suicide died the last of that iron brood, the four sinister brothers who had

wrought much mischief in South Africa. They and their lesson will live in the history of modern artillery.

The sweeping of the RoosSenekal district being over, Plumer left his post upon the River of the Elephants, a

name which, like Rhenoster, Zeekoe, Kameelfontein, Leeuw Kop, Tigerfontein, Elands River, and so many

more, serves as a memorial to the great mammals which once covered the land. On April 28th the force

turned south, and on May 4th they had reached the railroad at Eerstefabrieken close to Pretoria. They had

come in touch with a small Boer force upon the way, and the indefatigable Vialls hounded them for eighty

miles, and tore away the tail of their convoy with thirty prisoners. The main force had left Pretoria on

horseback on March 28th, and found themselves back once again upon foot on May 5th. They had something

to show, however, for the loss of their horses, since they had covered a circular march of 400 miles, had

captured some hundreds of the enemy, and had broken up their last organised capital. From first to last it was

It is the more to be regretted that General Blood was recalled from his northern trek before it had attained its

full results, because those operations to which he turned did not offer him any great opportunities for success.

Withdrawing from the north of the railway with his columns, he at once started upon a sweep of that portion

of the country which forms an angle between the Delagoa line and the Swazi frontier the Barberton

district. But again the two big fish, Viljoen and Botha, had slipped away, and the usual collection of sprats

was left in the net. The sprats count also, however, and every week now telegrams were reaching England

from Lord Kitchener which showed that from three to five hundred more burghers had fallen into our hands.

Although the public might begin to look upon the war as interminable, it had become evident to the

thoughtful observer that it was now a mathematical question, and that a date could already be predicted by

which the whole Boer population would have passed into the power of the British.

Among the numerous small British columns which were at work in different parts of the country, in the latter

half of May, there was one under General Dixon which was operating in the neighbourhood of the

Magaliesberg Range. This locality has never been a fortunate one for the British arms. The country is

peculiarly mountainous and broken, and it was held by the veteran De la Rey and a numerous body of

irreconcilable Boers. Here in July we had encountered a check at Uitval's Nek, in December Clements had

met a more severe one at Nooitgedacht, while shortly afterwards Cunningham had been repulsed at

Middelfontein, and the Light Horse cut up at Naauwpoort. After such experiences one would have thought

that no column which was not of overmastering strength would have been sent into this dangerous region, but

General Dixon had as a matter of fact by no means a strong force with him. With 1,600 men and a battery he

was despatched upon a quest after some hidden guns which were said to have been buried in those parts.

On May 26th Dixon's force, consisting of Derbyshires, King's Own Scottish Borderers, Imperial Yeomanry,

Scottish Horse, and six guns (four of 8th R.F.A. and two of 28th R.F.A.), broke camp at Naauwpoort and

moved to the west. On the 28th they found themselves at a place called Vlakfontein, immediately south of

Oliphant's Nek. On that day there were indications that there were a good many Boers in the neighbourhood.

Dixon left a guard over his canip and then sallied out in search of the buried guns. His force was divided into

three parts, the left column under Major Chance consisting of two guns of the 28th R.F.A., 230 of the

Yeomanry, and one company of the Derbys. The centre comprised two guns (8th R.F.A.), one howitzer, two

companies of the Scottish Borderers and one of the Derbys; while the right was made up of two guns (8th

R.F.A.), 200 Scottish Horse, and two companies of Borderers. Having ascertained that the guns were not

there, the force about midday was returning to the camp, when the storm broke suddenly and fiercely upon

There had been some sniping during the whole morning, but no indications of the determined attack which

was about to be delivered. The force in retiring upon the camp had become divided, and the rearguard

consisted of the small column under Major Chance which had originally formed the left wing. A veldt fire

was raging on one flank of this rearguard, and through the veil of smoke a body of five hundred Boers

charged suddenly home with magnificent gallantry upon the guns. We have few records of a more dashing or

of a more successful action in the whole course of the war. So rapid was it that hardly any time elapsed

between the glimpse of the first dark figures galloping through the haze and the thunder of their hoofs as they

dashed in among the gunners. The Yeomanry were driven back and many of them shot down. The charge of

the mounted Boers was supported by a very heavy fire from a covermg party, and the gundetachments were

killed or wounded almost to a man. The lieutenant in charge and the sergeant were both upon the ground. So

far as it is possible to reconstruct the action from the confused accounts of excited eyewitnesses and from

the exceedingly obscure official report of General Dixon, there was no longer any resistance round the guns,

The company of infantry which had helped to escort the guns proved however to be worthy representatives of

that historic branch of the British service. They were northerners, men of Derbyshire and Nottingham, the

same counties which had furnished the brave militia who had taken their punishment so gamely at Roodeval.

Though hustled and broken they reformed and clung doggedly to their task, firing at the groups of Boers

who surrounded the guns. At the same time word had been sent of their pressing need to the Scotch Borderers

and the Scottish Horse, who came swarming across the valley to the succour of their comrades. Dixon had

brought two guns and a howitzer into action, which subdued the fire of the two captured pieces, and the

infantry, Derbys and Borderers, swept over the position, retaking the two guns and shooting down those of

the enemy who tried to stand. The greater number vanished into the smoke, which veiled their retreat as it had

their advance. Fortyone of them were left dead upon the ground. Six officers and fifty men killed with about

a hundred and twenty wounded made up the British losses, to which two guns would certainly have been

added but for the gallant counterattack of the infantry. With Dargai and Vlakfontein to their credit the

Derbys have green laurels upon their warworn colours. They share them on this occasion with the Scottish

How is such an action to be summed up? To Kemp, the young Boer leader, and his men belongs the credit of

the capture of the guns; to the British that of their recapture and of the final possession of the field. The

British loss was probably somewhat higher than that of the Boers, but upon the other hand there could be no

question as to which side could afford loss the better. The Briton could be replaced, but there were no

There is one subject which cannot be ignored in discussing this battle, however repugnant it may be. That is

the shooting of some of the British wounded who lay round the guns. There is no question at all about the

fact, which is attested by many independent witnesses. There is reason to hope that some of the murderers

paid for their crimes with their lives before the battle was over. It is pleasant to add that there is at least one

witness to the fact that Boer officers interfered with threats to prevent some of these outrages. It is unfair to

tarnish the whole Boer nation and cause on account of a few irresponsible villains, who would be disowned

by their own decent comrades. Very many too many British soldiers have known by experience what it

is to fall into the hands of the enemy, and it must be confessed that on the whole they have been dealt with in

no ungenerous spirit, while the British treatment of the Boers has been unexampled in all military history for

its generosity and humanity. That so fair a tale should be darkened by such ruffianly outrages is indeed

deplorable, but the incident is too well authenticated to be left unrecorded in any detailed account of the

campaign. General Dixon, finding the Boers very numerous all round him, and being hampered by his

In May, Sir Bindon Blood, having returned to the line to refit, made yet another cast through that

thriceharried belt of country which contains Ermelo, Bethel, and Carolina, in which Botha, Viljoen, and the

fighting Boers had now concentrated. Working over the blackened veldt he swung round in the Barberton

direction, and afterwards made a westerly drive in conjunction with small columns commanded by Walter

Kitchener, Douglas, and Campbell of the Rifles, while Colville, Garnett, and Bullock cooperated from the

Natal line. Again the results were disappointing when compared with the power of the instrument employed.

On July 5th he reached Springs, near Johannesburg, with a considerable amount of stock, but with no great

number of prisoners. The elusive Botha had slipped away to the south and was reported upon the Zululand

border, while Viljoen had succeeded in crossing the Delagoa line and winning back to his old lair in the

district north of Middelburg, from which he had been evicted in April. The commandos were like those

pertinacious flies which buzz upwards when a hand approaches them, but only to settle again in the same

Before Vujoen's force made its way over the line it had its revenge for the long harrying it had undergone by

a wellmanaged night attack, in which it surprised and defeated a portion of Colonel Beatson's column at a

place called Wilmansrust, due south of Middelburg, and between that town and Bethel. Beatson had divided

his force, and this section consisted of 850 of the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles, with thirty gunners and two

pompoms, the whole under the command of Major Morris. Viljoen's force trekking north towards the line

came upon this detachment upon June 12th. The British were aware of the presence of the enemy, but do not

appear to have posted any extra outposts or taken any special precautions. Long months of commando

chasing had imbued them too much with the idea that these were fugitive sheep, and not fierce and wily

wolves, whom they were endeavouring to catch. It is said that 700 yards separated the four pickets. With that

fine eye for detail which the Boer leaders possess, they had started a veldt fire upon the west of the camp and

then attacked from the east, so that they were themselves invisible while their enemies were silhouetted

against the light. Creeping up between the pickets, the Boers were not seen until they opened fire at

pointblank range upon the sleeping men. The rifles were stacked another noxious military tradition

and many of the troopers were shot down while they rushed for their weapons. Surprised out of their sleep

and unable to distinguish their antagonists, the brave Australians did as well as any troops could have done

who were placed in so impossible a position. Captain Watson, the officer in charge of the pompoms, was

shot down, and it proved to be impossible to bring the guns into action. Within five minutes the Victorians

had lost twenty killed and forty wounded, when the survivors surrendered. It is pleasant to add that they were

very well treated by the victors, but the highspirited colonials felt their reverse most bitterly. 'It is the worst

thing that ever happened to Australia!' says one in the letter in which he describes it. The actual number of

Boers who rushed the camp was only 180, but 400 more had formed a cordon round it. To Viljoen and his

lieutenant Muller great credit must be given for this wellmanaged affair, which gave them a fresh supply of

stores and clothing at a time when they were hard pressed for both. These same Boer officers had led the

attack upon Helvetia where the 4.7 gun was taken. The victors succeeded in getting away with all their

trophies, and having temporarily taken one of the blockhouses on the railway near Brugspruit, they crossed

the line in safety and returned, as already said, to their old quarters in the north, which had been harried but

It would take a volume to catalogue, and a library to entirely describe the movements and doings of the very

large number of British columns which operated over the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony during this

coldweather campaign. If the same columns and the same leaders were consistently working in the same

districts, some system of narrative might enable the reader to follow their fortunes, but they were, as a matter

of fact, rapidly transferred from one side of the field of action to another in accordance with the

concentrations of the enemy. The total number of columns amounted to at least sixty, which varied in number

from two hundred to two thousand, and seldom hunted alone. Could their movements be marked in red upon

a chart, the whole of that huge district would be crisscrossed, from Taungs to Komati and from Touws River

Without attempting to enter into details which would be unbecoming to the modesty of a single volume, one

may indicate what the other more important groupings were during the course of these months, and which

were the columns that took part in them. Of French's drive in the southeast, and of Blood's incursion into the

RoosSenekal district some account has been given, and of his subsequent sweeping of the south. At the

same period Babington, Dixon, and Rawlinson were cooperating in the Klerksdorp district, though the

former officer transferred his services suddenly to Blood's combination, and afterwards to Elliot's column in

the north of Orange River Colony. Williams and Fetherstonhaugh came later to strengthen this Klerksdorp

district, in which, after the clearing of the Magaliesberg, De la Rey had united his forces to those of Smuts.

This very important work of getting a firm hold upon the Magaliesberg was accomplished in July by Barton,

Allenby, Kekewich, and Lord Basing, who penetrated into the wild country and established blockhouses and

small forts in very much the same way as Cumberland and Wade in 1746 held down the Highlands. The

British position was much strengthened by the firm grip obtained of this formidable stronghold of the enemy,

which was dangerous not only on account of its extreme strength, but also of its proximity to the centres of

De la Rey, as already stated, had gone down to the Klerksdorp district, whence, for a time at least, he seems

to have passed over into the north of the Orange River Colony. The British pressure at Klerksdorp had

become severe, and thither in May came the indefatigable Methuen, whom we last traced to Warrenton. From

this point on May 1st he railed his troops to Mafeking, whence he trekked to Lichtenburg, and south as far as

his old fighting ground of Haartebeestefontein, having one skirmish upon the way and capturing a Boer gun.

Thence he returned to Mafeking, where he had to bid adieu to those veteran Yeomanry who had been his

comrades on so many a weary march. It was not their fortune to be present at any of the larger battles of the

war, but few bodies of troops have returned to England with a finer record of hard and useful service.

No sooner, however, had Methuen laid down one weapon than he snatched up another. Having refitted his

men and collected some of the more efficient of the new Yeomanry, he was off once more for a three weeks'

circular tour in the direction of Zeerust. It is difficult to believe that the oldest inhabitant could have known

more of the western side of the Transvaal, for there was hardly a track which he had not traversed or a kopje

from which he had not been sniped. Early in August he had made a fresh start from Mafeking, dividing his

force into two columns, the command of the second being given to Von Donop. Having joined hands with

Fetherstonhaugh, he moved through the southwest and finally halted at Klerksdorp. The harried Boers

moved a hundred miles north to Rustenburg, followed by Methuen, Fetherstonhaugh, Hamilton, Kekewich,

and Allenby, who found the commandos of De la Rey and Kemp to be scattering in front of them and hiding

in the kloofs and dongas, whence in the early days of September no less than two hundred were extracted. On

September 6th and 8th Methuen engaged the main body of De la Rey in the valley of the Great Marico River

which lies to the northwest of Rustenburg. In these two actions he pushed the Boers in front of him with a

loss of eighteen killed and fortyone prisoners, but the fighting was severe, and fifteen of his men were killed

and thirty wounded before the position had been carried. The losses were almost entirely among the newly

raised Yeomanry, who had already shown on several occasions that, having shed their weaker members and

had some experience of the field, they were now worthy to take their place beside their veteran comrades.

The only other important operation undertaken by the British columns in the Transvaal during this period was

in the north, where Beyers and his men were still harried by Grenfell, Colenbrander, and Wilson. A

considerable proportion of the prisoners which figured in the weekly lists came from this quarter. On May

30th there was a notable action, the truth of which was much debated but finally established, in which

Kitchener's Scouts under Wilson surprised and defeated a Boer force under Pretorius, killing and wounding

several, and taking forty prisoners. On July 1st Grenfell took nearly a hundred of Beyers' men with a

considerable convoy. North, south, east, and west the tale was ever the same, but so long as Botha, De la Rey,

Steyn, and De Wet remained uncaptured, the embers might still at any instant leap into a flame.

It only remains to complete this synopsis of the movements of columns within the Transvaal that I should add

that after the conclusion of Blood's movement in July, several of his columns continued to clear the country

and to harass Viljoen in the Lydenburg and Dulstroom districts. Park, Kitchener, Spens, Beatson, and Benson

were all busy at this work, never succeeding in forcing more than a skirmish, but continually whittling away

wagons, horses, and men from that nucleus of resistance which the Boer leaders still held together.

Though much hampered by the want of forage for their horses, the Boers were ever watchful for an

opportunity to strike back, and the long list of minor successes gained by the British was occasionally

interrupted by a petty reverse. Such a one befell the small body of South African Constabulary stationed near

Vereeniging, who encountered upon July 13th a strong force of Boers supposed to be the main commando of

De Wet. The Constabulary behaved with great gallantry but were hopelessly outnumbered, and lost their

sevenpounder gun, four killed, six wounded, and twentyfour prisoners. Another small reverse occurred at a

far distant point of the seat of war, for the irregular corps known as Steinacker's Horse was driven from its

position at Bremersdorp in Swaziland upon July 24th, and had to fall back sixteen miles, with a loss of ten

casualties and thirty prisoners. Thus in the heart of a native state the two great white races of South Africa

were to be seen locked in a desperate conflict. However unavoidable, the sight was certainly one to be

To the Boer credit, or discredit, are also to be placed those repeated train wreckings, which cost the British

during this campaign the lives and limbs of many brave soldiers who were worthy of some less ignoble fate.

It is true that the laws of war sanction such enterprises, but there is something indiscriminate in the results

which is repelent to humanity, and which appears to justify the most energetic measures to prevent them.

Women, children, and sick must all travel by these trains and are exposed to a common danger, while the

assailants enjoy a safety which renders their exploit a peculiarly inglorious one. Two Boers, Trichardt and

Hindon, the one a youth of twentytwo, the other a man of British birth, distinguished, or disgraced,

themselves by this unsavoury work upon the Delagoa line, but with the extension of the blockhouse system

the attempts became less successful. There was one, however, upon the northern line near Naboomspruit

which cost the lives of Lieutenant Best and eight Gordon Highlanders, while ten were wounded. The party of

Gordons continued to resist after the smash, and were killed or wounded to a man. The painful incident is

brightened by such an example of military virtue, and by the naive reply of the last survivor, who on being

questioned why he continued to fight until he was shot down, answered with fine simplicity, 'Because I am a

Another train disaster of an even more tragic character occurred near Waterval, fifteen miles north of

Pretoria, upon the last day of August. The explosion of a mine wrecked the train, and a hundred Boers who

lined the banks of the cutting opened fire upon the derailed carriages. Colonel Vandeleur, an officer of great

promise, was killed and twenty men, chiefly of the West Riding regiment, were shot. Nurse Page was also

among the wounded. It was after this fatal affair that the regulation of carrying Boer hostages upon the trains

It has been already stated that part of Lord Kitchener's policy of concentration lay in his scheme for gathering

the civil population into camps along the lines of communication. The reasons for this, both military and

humanitarian, were overwhelming. Experience had proved that the men if left at liberty were liable to be

persuaded or coerced by the fighting Boers into breaking their parole and rejoining the commandos. As to the

women and children, they could not be left upon the farms in a denuded country. That the Boers in the field

had no doubts as to the good treatment of these people was shown by the fact that they repeatedly left their

families in the way of the columns so that they might be conveyed to the camps. Some consternation was

caused in England by a report of Miss Hobhouse, which called public attention to the very high rate of

mortality in some of these camps, but examination showed that this was not due to anything insanitary in

their situation or arrangement, but to a severe epidemic of measles which had swept away a large number of

the children. A fund was started in London to give additional comforts to these people, though there is reason

to believe that their general condition was superior to that of the Uitlander refugees, who still waited

permission to return to their homes. By the end of July there were no fewer than sixty thousand inmates of the

camps in the Transvaal alone, and half as many in the Orange River Colony. So great was the difficulty in

providing the supplies for so large a number that it became more and more evident that some at least of the

Passing to the Orange River Colony we find that during this winter period the same British tactics had been

met by the same constant evasions on the part of the dwindling commandos. The Colony had been divided

into four military districts: that of Bloemfontein, which was given to Charles Knox, that of Lyttelton at

Springfontein, that of Rundle at Harrismith, and that of Elliot in the north. The latter was infinitely the most

important, and Elliot, the warden of the northern marches, had under him during the greater part of the winter

a mobile force of about 6,000 men, Commanded by such experienced officers as Broadwood, De Lisle, and

Bethune. Later in the year Spens, Bullock, Plumer, and Rimington were all sent into the Orange River

Colony to help to stamp out the resistance. Numerous skirmishes and snipings were reported from all parts of

the country, but a constant stream of prisoners and of surrenders assured the soldiers that, in spite of the

difficulty of the country and the obstinacy of the enemy, the term of their labours was rapidly approaching.

In all the petty and yet necessary operations of these columns, two incidents demand more than a mere

mention. The first was a hardfought skirmish in which some of Elliot's horsemen were engaged upon June

6th. His column had trekked during the month of May from Kroonstad to Harrismith, and then turning north

found itself upon that date near the hamlet of Reitz. Major Sladen with 200 Mounted Infantry, when detached

from the main body, came upon the track of a Boer convoy and ran it down. Over a hundred vehicles with

fortyfive prisoners were the fruits of their enterprise. Well satisfied with his morning's work, the British

leader despatched a party of his men to convey the news to De Lisle, who was behind, while he established

himself with his loot and his prisoners in a convenient kraal. Thence they had an excellent view of a large

body of horsemen approaching them with scouts, flankers, and all military precautions. One warmhearted

officer seems actually to have sallied out to meet his comrades, and it was not till his greeting of them took

the extreme form of handing over his rifle that the suspicion of danger entered the heads of his companions.

But if there was some lack of wit there was none of heart in Sladen and his men. With fortyfive Boers to

hold down, and 500 under Fourie, De Wet, and De la Rey around them, the little band made rapid preparation

for a desperate resistance: the prisoners were laid upon their faces, the men knocked loopholes in the mud

walls of the kraal, and a blunt soldierly answer was returned to the demand for surrender.

But it was a desperate business. The attackers were five to one, and the five were soldiers of De Wet, the

hardbitten veterans of a hundred encounters. The captured wagons in a long double row stretched out over

the plain, and under this cover the Dutchmen swarmed up to the kraal. But the men who faced them were

veterans also, and the defence made up for the disparity of numbers. With fine courage the Boers made their

way up to the village, and established themselves in the outlying huts, but the Mounted Infantry clung

desperately to their position. Out of the few officers present Findlay was shot through the head, Moir and

Cameron through the heart, and Strong through the stomach. It was a Waggon Hill upon a small scale, two

dour lines of skirmishers emptying their rifles into each other at pointblank range. Once more, as at

Bothaville, the British Mounted Infantry proved that when it came to a dogged pelting match they could stand

punishment longer than their enemy. They suffered terribly. Fiftyone out of the little force were on the

ground, and the survivors were not much more numerous than their prisoners. To the 1st Gordons, the 2nd

Bedfords, the South Australians, and the New South Welsh men belongs the honour of this magnificent

defence. For four hours the fierce battle raged, until at last the parched and powderstained survivors

breathed a prayer of thanks as they saw on the southern horizon the vanguard of De Lisle riding furiously to

the rescue. For the last hour, since they had despaired of carrying the kraal, the Boers had busied themselves

in removing their convoy; but now, for the second time in one day, the drivers found British rifles pointed at

their heads, and the oxen were turned once more and brought back to those who had fought so hard to hold

them. Twentyeight killed and twentysix wounded were the losses in this desperate affair. Of the Boers

seventeen were left dead in front of the kraal, and the fortyfive had not escaped from the bulldog grip which

held them. There seems for some reason to have been no effective pursuit of the Boers, and the British

The second incident which stands out amid the dreary chronicle of hustlings and snipings is the surprise visit

paid by Broadwood with a small British column to the town of Reitz upon July 11th, which resulted in the

capture of nearly every member of the late government of the Free State, save only the one man whom they

particularly wanted. The column consisted of 200 yeomen, 200 of the 7th Dragoon Guards, and two guns.

Starting at 11 P.M., the raiders rode hard all night and broke with the dawn upon the sleeping village. Racing

into the main street, they secured the startled Boers as they rushed from the houses. It is easy to criticise such

an operation from a distance, and to overlook the practical difficulties in the way, but on the face of it it

seems a pity that the holes had not been stopped before the ferret was sent in. A picket at the farther end of

the street would have barred Steyn's escape. As it was, he flung himself upon his horse and galloped

halfclad out of the town. Sergeant Cobb of the Dragoons snapped a rifle at close quarters upon him, but the

cold of the night had frozen the oil on the striker and the Cartridge hung fire. On such trifles do the large

events of history turn! Two Boer generals, two commandants, Steyn's brother, his secretary, and several other

officials were among the nineandtwenty prisoners. The treasury was also captured, but it is feared that the

Yeomen and Dragoons will not be much the richer from their share of the contents.

Save these two incidents, the fight at Reitz and the capture of a portion of Steyn's government at the same

place, the winter's campaign furnished little which was of importance, though a great deal of very hard and

very useful work was done by the various columns under the direction of the governors of the four military

districts. In the south General Bruce Hamilton made two sweeps, one from the railway line to the western

frontier, and the second from the south and east in the direction of Petrusburg. The result of the two

operations was about 300 prisoners. At the same time Monro and Hickman recleared the already

twicecleared districts of Rouxville and Smithfield. The country in the east of the Colony was verging now

upon the state which Grant described in the Shenandoah Valley: 'A crow,' said he, 'must carry his own rations

In the middle district General Charles Knox, with the columns of PineCoffin, Thorneycroft, Pilcher, and

The most vigorous operations fell to the lot of Generak Elliot, who worked over the northern and

northeastern district, which still contained a large number of fighting burghers. In May and June Elliot

moved across to Vrede and afterwards down the eastern frontier of the Colony, joining hands at last with

Rundle at Harrismith. He then worked his way back to Kroonstad through Reitz and Lindley. It was on this

journey that Sladen's Mounted Infantry had the sharp experience which has been already narrated. Western's

column, working independently, cooperated with Elliot in this clearing of the northeast. In August there

were very large captures by Broadwood's force, which had attained considerable mobility, ninety miles being

Of General Rundle there is little to be said, as he was kept busy in exploring the rough country in his own

district the same district which had been the scene of the operations against Prinsloo and the Fouriesburg

surrender. Into this district Kritzinger and his men trekked after they were driven from the Colony in July,

and many small skirmishes and snipings among the mountains showed that the Boer resistance was still alive.

July and August were occupied in the Orange River Colony by energetic operations of Spens' and

Rimington's columns in the midland districts, and by a considerable drive to the northeastern corner, which

was shared by three columns under Elliot and two under Plumer, with one under Henry and several smaller

bodies. A considerable number of prisoners and a large amount of stock were the result of the movement, but

it was very evident that there was a waste of energy in the employment of such forces for such an end. The

time appeared to be approaching when a strong force of military police stationed permanently in each district

might prove a more efficient instrument. One interesting development of this phase of the war was the

enrolment of a burgher police among the Boers who had surrendered. These men well paid, well mounted,

and well armed were an efficient addition to the British forces. The movement spread until before the end

of the war there were several thousand burghers under such wellknown officers as Celliers, Villonel, and

young Cronje, fighting against their own guerilla countrymen. Who, in 1899, could have prophesied such a

Lord Kitchener's proclamation issued upon August 9th marked one more turn in the screw upon the part of

the British authorities. By it the burghers were warned that those who had not laid down their arms by

September 15th would in the case of the leaders be banished, and in the case of the burghers be compelled to

support their families in the refugee camps. As many of the fighting burghers were men of no substance, the

latter threat did not affect them much, but the other, though it had little result at the time, may be useful for

the exclusion of firebrands during the period of reconstruction. Some increase was noticeable in the number

of surrenders after the proclamation, but on the whole it had not the result which was expected, and its

expediency is very open to question. This date may be said to mark the conclusion of the winter campaign

In the account which has been given in a preceding chapter of the invasion of Cape Colony by the Boer

forces, it was shown that the Western bands were almost entirely expelled, or at least that they withdrew, at

the time when De Wet was driven across the Orange River. This was at the beginning of March 1901. It was

also mentioned that though the Boers evacuated the barren and unprofitable desert of the Karoo, the Eastern

bands which had come with Kritzinger did not follow the same course, but continued to infest the

mountainous districts of the Central Colony, whence they struck again and again at the railway ljiies, the

small towns, British patrols, or any other quarry which was within their reach and strength. From the

surrounding country they gathered a fair number of recruits, and they were able through the sympathy and

help of the Dutch farmers to keep themselves well mounted and supplied. In small wandering bands they

spread themselves over a vast extent of country, and there were few isolated farmhouses from the Orange

River to the Oudtshoorn Mountains, and from the Cape Town railroad in the west to the Fish River in the

east, which were not visited by their active and enterprising scouts. The object of the whole movement was,

no doubt, to stimulate a general revolt in the Colony; and it must be acknowledged that if the powder did not

It might at first sight seem the simplest of military operations to hunt down these scattered and insignificant

bands; but as a matter of fact nothing could be more difficult. Operating in a country which was both vast and

difficult, with excellent horses, the best of information and supplies ready for them everywhere, it was

impossible for the slowmoving British columns with their guns and their wagons to overtake them.

Formidable even in flight, the Boers were always ready to turn upon any force which exposed itself too rashly

to retaliation, and so amid the mountain passes the British chiefs had to use an amount of caution which was

incompatible with extreme speed. Only when a commando was exactly localised so that two or three

converging British forces could be brought to bear upon it, was there a reasonable chance of forcing a fight.

Still, with all these heavy odds against them, the various little columns continued month after month to play

hideandseek with the commandos, and the game was by no means always on the one side. The varied

fortunes of this scrambling campaign can only be briefly indicated in these pages.

It has already been shown that Kritzinger's original force broke into many bands, which were recruited partly

from the Cape rebels and partly from fresh bodies which passed over from the Orange River Colony. The

more severe the pressure in the north, the greater reason was there for a trek to this land of plenty. The total

number of Boers who were wandering over the eastern and midland districts may have been about two

thousand, who were divided into bands which varied from .fifty to three hundred. The chief leaders of

separate commandos were Kritzinger, Scheepers, Malan, Myburgh, Fouch , Lotter, Smuts, Van Reenen,

Lategan, Maritz, and Conroy, the two latter operating on the western side of the country. To hunt down these

numerous and active bodies the British were compelled to put many similar detachments into the field,

known as the columns of Gorringe, Crabbe, Henniker, Scobell, Doran, Kavanagh, Alexander, and others.

These two sets of miniature armies performed an intricate devil's dance over the Colony, the main lines of

which are indicated by the red lines upon the map. The Zuurberg mountains to the north of Steynsburg, the

Sneeuwberg range to the south of Middelburg, the Oudtshoorn Mountains in the south, the Cradock district,

the Murraysburg district, and the GraafReinet districtthese were the chief centres of Boer activity.

In April Kritzinger made his way north to the Orange River Colony, for the purpose of consulting with De

Wet, but he returned with a following of 200 men about the end of May. Continual brushes occurred during

this month between the various columns, and much hard marching was done upon either side, but there was

Early in May two passengers sailed for Europe, the journey of each being in its way historical. The first was

the weary and overworked ProConsul who had the foresight to distinguish the danger and the courage to

meet it. Milner's worn face and prematurely grizzled hair told of the crushing weight which had rested upon

him during three eventful years. A gentle scholar, he might have seemed more fitted for a life of academic

calm than for the stormy part which the discernment of Mr. Chamberlain had assigned to him. The fine

flower of an English university, lowvoiced and urbane, it was difficult to imagine what impression he would

produce upon those rugged types of which South. Africa is so peculiarly prolific. But behind the reserve of a

gentleman there lay within him a lofty sense of duty, a singular clearness of vision, and a moral courage

which would brace him to follow whither his reason pointed. His visit to England for three months' rest was

the occasion for a striking manifestation of loyalty and regard from his fellowcountrymen. He returned in

August as Lord Milner to the scene of his labours, with the construction of a united and loyal commonwealth

The second traveller who sailed within a few days of the Governor was Mrs. Botha, the wife of the Boer

General, who visited Europe for private as well as political reasons. She bore to Kruger an exact account of

the state of the country and of the desperate condition of the burghers. Her mission had no immediate or

visible effect, and the weary war, exhausting for the British but fatal for the Boers, went steadily on.

To continue the survey of the operations in the Cape, the first point scored was by the invaders, for Malan's

commando succeeded upon May 13th in overwhelming a strong patrol of the Midland Mounted Rifles, the

local colonial corps, to the south of Maraisburg. Six killed, eleven wounded, and forty~one prisoners were

the fruits of his little victory, which furnished him also with a fresh supply of rifles and ammunition. On May

21st Crabbe's column was in touch with Lotter and with Lategan, but no very positive result came from the

The end of May showed considerable Boer activity in the Cape Colony, that date corresponding with the

return of Kritzinger from the north. Haig had for the moment driven Scheepers back from the extreme

southerly point which he had reached, and he was now in the GraafReinet district; but on the other side of

the colony Conroy had appeared near Kenhart, and upon May 23rd he fought a sharp skirmish with a party of

Border Scouts. The main Boer force under Kritzinger was in the midlands, however, and had concentrated to

such an extent in the Cradock district that it was clear that some larger enterprise was on foot. This soon took

shape, for on June 2nd, after a long and rapid march, the Boer leader threw himself upon Jamestown,

overwhelmed the sixty townsmen who formed the guard, and looted the town, from which he drew some

welcome supplies and 100 horses. British columns were full cry upon his heels, however, and the Boers after

a few hours left the gutted town and vanished into the hills once more. On June 6th the British had a little

luck at last, for on that date Scobell and Lukin in the Barkly East district surprised a laager and took twenty

prisoners, 166 horses, and much of the Jamestown loot. On the same day Windham treated Van Reenen in a

On June 8th the supreme command of the operations in Cape Colony was undertaken by General French,

who from this time forward manoeuvred his numerous columns upon a connected plan with the main idea of

pushing the enemy northwards. It was some time, however, before his disposition bore fruit, for the

commandos were still better mounted and lighter than their pursuers. On Tune 13th the youthful and dashing

Scheepers, who commanded his own little force at an age when he would have been a junior lieutenant of the

British army, raided Murraysburg and captured a patrol. On Tune 17th Monro with Lovat's Scouts and

Bethune's Mounted Infantry had some slight success near Tarkastad, but three days later the illfated

Midland Mounted Rifles were surprised in the early morning by Kritzinger at Waterkloof, which is thirty

miles west of Cradock, and were badly mauled by him. They lost ten killed, eleven wounded, and sixtysix

prisoners in this unfort unate affair. Again the myth that colonial alertness is greater than that of regular

At the end of Tune, Fouch , one of the most enterprising of the guerilla chiefs, made a dash from Barkly East

into the native reserves of the Transkei in order to obtain horses and supplies. It was a desperate measure, as

it was vain to suppose that the warlike Kaffirs would permit their property to be looted without resistance,

and if once the assegais were reddened no man could say how far the mischief might go. With great loyalty

the British Government, even in the darkest days, had held back those martial races Zulus, Swazis, and

Basutos who all had old grudges against the Amaboon. Fouch 's raid was stopped, however, before it led

to serious trouble. A handful of Griqualand Mounted Rifles held it in front, while Dalgety and his colonial

Though baulked, Fouch was still formidable, and on July 14th he made a strong attack in the neighbourhood

of Jamestown upon a column of Connaught Rangers who were escorting a convoy. Major Moore offered a

determined resistance, and eventually after some hours of fighting drove the enemy away and captured their

laager. Seven killed and seventeen wounded were the British losses in this spirited engagement.

On July 10th General French, surveying from a lofty mountain peak the vast expanse of the field of

operations, with his heliograph calling up responsive twinkles over one hundred miles of country, gave the

order for the convergence of four columns upon the valley in which he knew Scheepers to be lurking. We

have it from one of his own letters that his commando at the time consisted of 240 men, of whom forty were

Free Staters and the rest colonial rebels. Crewe, Windham, Doran, and Scobell each answered to the call, but

the young leader was a man of resource, and a long kloof up the precipitous side of the hill gave him a road to

safety. Yet the operations showed a new mobility in the British columns, which shed their guns and their

baggage in order to travel faster. The main commando escaped, but twentyfive laggards were taken. The

On July 21st Crabbe and Kritzinger had a skirmish in the mountains near Cradock, in which the Boers were

strong enough to hold their own; but on the same date near Murraysburg, Lukin, the gallant colonial gunner,

with ninety men rode into 150 of Lategan's band and captured ten of them, with a hundred horses. On July

27th a small party of twentyone Imperial Yeomanry was captured, after a gallant resistance, by a large force

of Boers at the Doorn River on the other side of the Colony. The Kaffir scouts of the British were shot dead

in cold blood by their captors after the action. There seems to be no possible excuse for the repeated murders

of coloured men by the Boers, as they had themselves from the beginning of the war used their Kaffirs for

every purpose short of actually fighting. The war had lost much of the good humour which marked its outset.

A fiercer feeling had been engendered on both sides by the long strain, but the execution of rebels by the

British, though much to be deplored, is still recognised as one of the rights of a belligerent. When one

remembers the condonation upon the part of the British of the use of their own uniforms by the Boers, of the

wholesale breaking of paroles, of the continual use of expansive bullets, of the abuse of the pass system and

of the red cross, it is impossible to blame them for showing some severity in the stamping out of armed

rebellion within their own Colony. If stern measures were eventually adopted it was only after extreme

leniency had been tried and failed. The loss of five years' franchise as a penalty for firing upon their own flag

is surely the most gentle correction which an Empire ever laid upon a rebellious people.

At the beginning of August the connected systematic work of French's columns began to tell. In a huge

semicircle the British were pushing north, driving the guerillas in front of them. Scheepers in his usual

wayward fashion had broken away to the south, but the others had been unable to penetrate the cordon and

were herded over the StormbergNaauwport line. The main body of the Boers was hustled swiftly along from

August 7th to August 10th, from GraafReinet to Thebus, and thrust over the railway line at that point with

some loss of men and a great shedding of horses. It was hoped that the blockhouses on the railroad would

have held the enemy, but they slipped across by night and got into the Steynsburg district, where Gorringe's

colonials took up the running. On August 18th he followed the commandos from Steynsburg to Venterstad,

killing twenty of them and taking several prisoners. On the 15th, Kritzinger with the main body of the

invaders passed the Orange River near Bethulie, and made his way to the Wepener district of the Orange

River Colony. Scheepers, Lotter, Lategan, and a few small wandering bands were the only Boers left in the

Colony, and to these the British columns now turned their attention, with the result that Lategan, towards the

end of the month, was also driven over the river. For the time, at least, the situation seemed to have very

much improved, but there was a drift of Boers over the northwestern frontier, and the longcontinued

warfare at their own doors was undoubtedly having a dangerous effect upon the Dutch farmers. Small

successes from time to time, such as the taking of sixty of French's Scouts by Theron's commando on August

10th, served to keep them from despair. Of the guerilla bands which remained, the most important was that of

Scheepers, which now numbered 300 men, well mounted and supplied. He had broken back through the

cordon, and made for his old haunts in the southwest. Theron, with a smaller band, was also in the

Uniondale and Willowmore district, approaching close to the sea in the Mossel Bay direction, but being

headed off by Kavanagh. Scheepers turned in the direction of Cape Town, but swerved aside at Montagu, and

So far the British had succeeded in driving and injuring, but never in destroying, the Boer bands. It was a new

departure therefore when, upon September 4th, the commando of Lotter was entirely destroyed by the column

of Scobell. This column consisted of some of the Cape Mounted Rifles and of the indefatigable 9th Lancers.

It marked the enemy down in a valley to the west of Cradock and attacked them in the morning, after having

secured all the approaches, The result was a complete success. The Boers threw themselves into a building

and held out valiantly, but their position was impossible, aud after enduring considerable punishment they

were forced to hoist the white flag. Eleven had been killed, fortysix wounded, and fiftysix surrendered

figures which are in themselves a proof of the tenacity of their defence. Lotter was among the prisoners, 260

horses were taken, and a good supply of ammunition, with some dynamite. A few days later, on September

10th, a similar blow, less final in its character, was dealt by Colonel Crabbe to the commando of Van der

Merve, which was an offshoot of that of Scheepers. The action was fought near Laingsburg, which is on the

main line, just north of Matjesfontein, and it ended in the scattering of the Boer band, the death of their boy

leader (he was only eighteen years of age), and the capture of thirtyseven prisoners. Seventy of the Beers

escaped by a hidden road. To Colonials and Yeomanry belongs the honour of the action, which cost the

British force seven casualties. Colonel Crabbe pushed on after the success, and on September 14th he was in

touch with Scheepers's commando near Ladismith (not to he confused with the historical town of Natal), and

endured and inflicted some losses. On the 17th a patrol of Grenadier Guards was captured in the north of the

Colony, Rebow, the young lieutenant in charge of them, meeting with a soldier's death.

On the same day a more serious engagement occurred near Tarkastad, a place ~hich lies to the east of

Cradock, a notorious centre of disaffection in the midland Smuts's commando, some hundreds strong, was

marked down in this part, and several forces converged upon it. One of the outlets, Elands River Poort, was

guarded by a single squadron of the 17th Lancers. Upon this the Boers made a sudden and very fierce attack,

their approach being facilitated partly by the mist and partly by the use of khaki, a trick which seems never to

have grown too stale for successful use. The result was that they were able to ride up to the British camp

before any preparations had been made for resistance, and to shoot down a number of the Lancers before they

could reach their horses. So terrible was the fire that the single squadron lost thirtyfour killed and thirtysix

wounded. But the regiment may console itself for the disaster by the fact that the sorely stricken detachment

remained true to the spirited motto of the corps, and that no prisoners appear to have been lost.

After this one sharp engagement there ensued several weeks during which the absence of historical events, or

the presence of the military censor, caused a singular lull in the account of the operations. With so many

small commandos and so many pursuing columns it is extraordinary that there should not have been a

constant succession of actions. That there was not must indicate a sluggishness upon the part of the pursuers,

and this sluggishness can only be explained by the condition of their horses. Every train of thought brings the

critic back always to the great horse question, and encourages the conclusion that there, at all seasons of the

war and in all scenes of it, is to be found the most damning indictment against British foresight,

commonsense, and power of organisation. That the third year of the war should dawn without the British

forces having yet got the legs of the Boers, after having penetrated every portion of their country and having

the horses of the world on which to draw, is the most amazingly inexplicable point in the whole of this

strange campaign. From the telegram 'Infantry preferred' addressed to a nation of roughriders, down to the

failure to secure the excellent horses on the spot, while importing them unfit for use from the ends of the

earth, there has been nothing but one long series of blunders in this, the most vital question of all. Even up to

the end, in the Colony the obvious lesson had not yet been learnt that it is better to give 1,000 men two horses

each, and EO let them reach the enemy, than give 2,000 men one horse each, with which they can never

attain their object. The chase during two years of the man with two horses by the man with one horse, has

In connection with this account of operations within the Colony, there is one episode which occurred in the

extreme northwest which will not fit in with this connected narrative, but which will justify the distraction

of the reader's intelligence, for few finer deeds of arms are recorded in the war. This was the heroic defence

of a convoy by the 14th Company of Irish Imperial Yeomanry. The convoy was taking food to Griquatown,

on the Kimberley side of the seat of war. The town had been long invested by Conroy, and the inhabitants

were in such straits that it was highly necessary to relieve them. To this end a convoy, two miles long, was

despatched under Major Humby of the Irish Yeomanry. The escort consisted of seventyfive

Northumberland Fusiliers, twentyfour local troops, and 100 of the 74th Irish Yeomanry. Fifteen miles from

Griquatown, at a place called Rooikopjes, the convoy was attacked by the enemy several hundred in number.

Two companies of the Irishmen seized the ridge, however, which commanded the wagons, and held it until

they were almost exterminated. The position was covered with bush, and the two parties came to the closest

of quarters, the Yeomen refusing to take a backward step, though it was clear that they were vastly

outnumbered. Encouraged by the example of Madan and Ford, their gallant young leaders, they deliberately

sacrificed their lives in order to give time for the guns to come up and for the convoy to pass. Oliffe,

Bonynge, and Maclean, who had been children together, were shot side by side on the ridge, and afterwards

buried in one grave. Of fortythree men in action, fourteen were killed and twenty severely wounded. Their

sacrifice was not in vain, however. The Boers were beaten back, and the convoy, as well as Griquatown, was

saved. Some thirty or forty Boers were killed or wounded in the skirmish, and Conroy, their leader, declared

In the autumn and winter of 1901 General French had steadily pursued the system of clearing certain districts,

one at a time, and endeavouring by his blockhouses and by the arrangement of his forces to hold in strict

quarantine those sections of the country which were still infested by the commandos. In this manner he

succeeded by the November of this year in confining the active forces of the enemy to the extreme northeast

and to the southwest of the peninsula. It is doubtful if the whole Boer force, threequarters of whom were

colonial rebels, amounted to more than fifteen hundred men. When we learn that at this period of the war they

were indifferently armed, and that many of them were mounted upon donkeys, it is impossible, after making

every allowance for the passive assistance of the farmers, and the difficulties of the country, to believe that

In the northeast, Myburgh, Wessels, and the truculent Fouch were allowed almost a free hand for some

months, while the roving bands were rounded up in the' midlands and driven along until they were west of the

main railroad. Here, in the Calvinia district, several commandos united in October 1901 under Maritz, Louw,

Smit, and Theron. Their united bands rode down into the rich graingrowing country round Piquetberg and

Malmesbury, pushing south until it seemed as if their academic supporters at Paarl were actually to have a

sight of the rebellion which they had fanned to a flame. At one period their patrols were within forty miles of

Cape Town. The movement was checked, however, by a small force of Lancers and district troops, and

towards the end of October, Maritz, who was chief in this quarter, turned northwards, and on the 29th

captured a small British convoy which crossed his line of march. Early in November he doubled back and

attacked Piquetberg, but was beaten off with some loss. From that time a steady pressure from the south and

east drove these bands farther and farther into the great barren lands of the west, until, in the following April,

Upon October 9th, the second anniversary of the Ultimatum, the hands of the military were strengthened by

the proclamation of Cape Town and all the seaport towns as being in a state of martial law. By this means a

possible source of supplies and recruits for the enemy was effectually blocked. That it had not been done two

years before is a proof of how far local political considerations can be allowed to override the essentials of

Imperial policy. Meanwhile treason courts were sitting, and sentences, increasing rapidly from the most

trivial to the most tragic, were teaching the rebel that his danger did not end upon the field of battle. The

execution of Lotter and his lieutenants was a sign that the patience of a longsuffering Empire had at last

The young Boer leader, Scheepers, had long been a thorn in the side of the British. He had infested the

southern districts for some months, and he had distinguished himself both by the activity of his movements

and by the ruthless vigour of some of his actions. Early in October a serious illness and consequent

confinement to his bed brought him at last within the range of British mobility. On his recovery he was tried

for repeated breaches of the laws of war, including the murder of several natives. He was condemned to

death, and was executed in December. Much sympathy was excited by his gallantry and his youth he was

only twentythree. On the other hand, our word was pledged to protect the natives, and if he whose hand had

been so heavy upon them escaped, all confidence would have been lost in our promises and our justice. That

British vengeance was not indiscriminate was shown soon afterwards in the case of a more irnportant

commander, Kritzinger, who was the chief leader of the Boers within Cape Colony. Kritzinger was wounded

and captured while endeavouring to cross the line near Hanover Road upon December 15th. He was put upon

his trial, and his fate turned upon how far he was responsible for the misdeeds of some of his subordinates. It

was clearly shown that he had endeavoured to hold them within the bounds of civilised warfare, and with

In the last two months of the year 1901, a new system was introduced into the Cape Colony campaign by

placing the Colonial and district troops immediately under the command of Colonial officers and of the

Colonial Government. It had long been felt that some devolution was necessary, and the change was justified

by the result. Without any dramatic incident, an inexorable process of attrition, caused by continual pursuit

and hardship, wore out the commandos. Large bands had become small ones, and small ones had vanished.

Only by the union of several bodies could any enterprise higher than the looting of a farmhouse be

Such a union occurred, however, in the early days of February 1902, when Smuts, Malan, and several other

Boer leaders showed great activity in the country round Calvinia. Their commandos seem to have included a

proportion of veteran Republicans from the north, who were more formidable fighting material than the raw

Colonial rebels. It happened that several dangerously weak British columns were operating within reach at

that time, and it was only owing to the really admirable conduct of the troops that a serious disaster was

averted. Two separate actions, each of them severe, were fought on the same date, and in each case the Boers

The first of these was the fight in which Colonel Doran's column extricated itself with severe loss from a

most perilous plight. The whole force under Doran consisted of 350 men with two guns, and this handful was

divided by an expedition which he, with 150 men, undertook in order to search a distant farm. The remaining

two hundred men, under Captain Saunders, were left upon February 5th with the guns and the convoy at a

place called Middlepost, which lies about fifty miles southwest of Calvinia. These men were of the 11th,

23rd, and 24th Imperial Yeomanry, with a troop of Cape Police. The Boer Intelligence was excellent, as

might be expected in a country which is dotted with farms. The weakened force at Middlepost was instantly

attacked by Smuts's commando. Saunders evacuated the camp and abandoned the convoy, which was the

only thing he could do, but he concentrated all his efforts upon preserving his guns. The night was

illuminated by the blazing wagons, and made hideous by the whoops of the drunken rebels who caroused

among the captured stores. With the first light of dawn the small British force was fiercely assailed on all

sides, but held its own in a manner which would have done credit to any troops. The much criticised Yeomen

fought like veterans. A considerable position had to be covered, and only a handful of men were available at

the most important points. One ridge, from which the guns would be enfiladed, was committed to the charge

of Lieutenants Tabor and Chichester with eleven men of the 11th Imperial Yeomanry, their instructions being

'to hold it to the death.' The order was obeyed with the utmost heroism. After a desperate defence the ridge

was only taken by the Boers when both officers had been killed and nine out of eleven men were on the

ground. In spite of the loss of this position the fight was still sustained until shortly after midday, when Doran

with the patrol returned. The position was still most dangerous, the losses had been severe, and the Boers

were increasing in strength. An immediate retreat was ordered, and the small column, af~er ten days of

hardship and anxiety, reached the railway line in safety. The wounded were left to the care of Smuts, who

At about the same date a convoy proceeding from Beaufort West to Fraserburg was attacked by Malan's

commando. The escort, which consisted of sixty Colonial Mounted Rifles and 100 of the West Yorkshire

militia, was overwhelmed after a good defence, in which Major Crofton, their commander, was killed. The

wagons were destroyed, but the Boers were driven off by the arrival of Crabbe's column, followed by those of

Capper and Lund. The total losses of the British in these two actions amounted to twentythree killed and

The reestablishment of settled law and order was becoming more marked every week in those southwestern

districts, which had long been most disturbed. Colonel Crewe in this region, and Colonel Lukin upon the

other side of the line, acting entirely with Colonial troops, were pushing back the rebels, and holding, by a

welldevised system of district defence, all that they had gained. By the end of February there were none of

the enemy south of the Beaufort West and Clanwilliam line. These results were not obtained without much

hard marching and a little hard fighting. Small columns under Crabbe, Capper, Wyndham, Nickall, and Lund,

were continually on the move, with little to show for it save an everwidening area of settled country in their

rear. In a skirmish on February 20th ludge Hugo, a wellknown Boer leader, was killed, and Vanheerden, a

notorious rebel, was captured. At the end of this month Fouch 's tranquil occupation of the northeast was at

last disturbed, and he was driven out of it into the midlands, where he took refuge with the remains of his

commando in the Camdeboo Mountains. Malan's men had already sought shelter in the same natural fortresB.

Malan was wounded and taken in a skirmish near Somerset East a few days before the general Boer

The last incident of this scattered, scrambling, unsatisfactory campaign in the Cape peninsula was the raid

made by Smuts, the Transvaal leader, into the Port Nolloth district of Namaqualand, best known for its

copper mines. A small railroad has been constructed from the coast at this point, the terminus being the

township of Ookiep. The length of the line is about seventy miles. It is difficult to imagine what the Boers

expected to gain in this remote corner of the seat of war, unless they had conceived the idea that they might

actually obtain possession of Port Nolloth itself, and so restore the communications with their sympathisers

and allies. At the end of March the Boer horsemen appeared suddenly out of the desert, drove in the British

outposts, and summoned Ookiep to surrender. Colonel Shelton, who commanded the small garrison, sent an

uncompromising reply, but he was unable to protect the railway in his rear, which was wrecked, together with

some of the blockhouses which had been erected to guard it. The loyal population of the surrounding country

had flocked into Ookiep, and the Commandant found himself burdened with the care of six thousand people.

The enemy had succeeded in taking the small post of Springbok, and Concordia, the mining centre, was

surrendered into their hands without resistance, giving them welcome suplies of arms, ammunition, and

dynamite. The latter was used by the Boers in the shape of handbombs, and proved to be a very efficient

weapon when employed against blockhouses. Several of the British defences were wrecked by them, with

considerable loss to the garrison; but in the course of a month's siege, in spite of several attacks, the Boers

were never able to carry the frail works which guarded the town. Once more, at the end of the war as at the

beginning of it, there was shown the impotence of the Dutch riflemen against a British defence. A relief

column, under Colonel Cooper, was quickly organised at Port Nolloth, and advanced along the railway line,

forcing Smuts to raise the siege in the first week of May. Immediately afterwards came the news of the

negotiations for peace, and the Boer general presented himself at Port Nolloth, whence he was conveyed by

ship to Cape Town, and so north again to take part in the deliberations of his fellowcountrymen. Throughout

the war he had played a manly and honourable part. It may be hoped that with youth and remarkable

experience, both of diplomacy and of war, he may now find a long and briliant career awaiting him in a wider

The history of the war during the African winter of 1901 has now been sketched, and some account given of

the course of events in the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and the Cape Colony. The hope of the British

tbat they might stamp out resistance before the grass should restore mobility to the larger bodies of Boers was

destined to be disappointed. By the middle of September the veldt had turned from drab to green, and the

great drama was fated to last for one more act, however anxious all the British and the majority of the Boers

might be to ring down the curtain. Exasperating as this senseless prolongation of a hopeless struggle might

be, there was still some consolation in the reflection that those who drank this bitter cup to the very lees

September 15th was the date which brought into force the British Proclamation announcing the banishment

of those Boer leaders who continued in arms. It must be confessed that this step may appear harsh and

unchivalrous to the impartial observer, so long as those leaders were guilty of no practices which are foreign

to the laws of civilised warfare. The imposition of personal penalties upon the officers of an opposing army is

a step for which it is difficult to quote a precedent, nor is it wise to officially rule your enemy outside the pale

of ordinary warfare, since it is equally open to him to take the same step against you. The only justification

for such a course would be its complete success, as this would suggest that the Intelligence Department were

aware that the leaders desired some strong excuse for coming in such an excuse as the Proclamation

would afford. The result proved that nothing of the kind was needed, and the whole proceeding must appear

to be injudicious and highhanded. In honourable war you conquer your adversary by superior courage,

strength, or wit, but you do not terrorise him by particular penalties aimed at individuals. The burghers of the

Transvaal and of the late Orange Free State were legitimate belligerents, and to be treated as such a

statement which does not, of course, extend to the Afrikander rebels who were their allies.

The tendency of the British had been to treat their antagonists as a broken and disorganised banditti, but with

the breaking of the spring they were sharply reminded that the burghers were still capable of a formidable and

coherent effort. The very date which put them beyond the pale as belligerents was that which they seem to

have chosen in order to prove what active and valiant soldiers they still remained. A quick succession of

encounters occurred at various parts of the seat of war, the general tendency of which was not entirely in

favour of the British arms, though the weekly export of prisoners reassured all who noted it as to the sapping

and decay of the Boer strength. These incidents must now be set down in the order of their occurrence, with

General Louis Botha, with the double intention of making an offensive move and of distracting the wavering

burghers from a close examination of Lord Kitchener's proclamation, assembled his forces in the second

week of September in the Ermelo district. Thence he moved them rapidly towards Natal, with the result that

the volunteers of that colony had once more to grasp their rifles and hasten to the frontier. The whole

situation bore for an instant an absurd resemblance to that of two years before Botha playing the part of

Joubert, and Lyttelton, who commanded on the frontier, that of White. It only remained, to make the parallel

complete, that some one should represent Penn Symons, and this perilous role fell to a gallant officer, Major

Gough, commanding a detached force which thought itself strong enough to hold its own, and only learned

This officer, with a small force consisting of three companies of Mounted Infantry with two guns of the 69th

R.F.A., was operating in the neighbourhood of Utrecht in the southeastern corner of the Transvaal, on the

very path along which Botha must descend. On September 17th he had crossed De Jagers Drift on the Blood

River, not very far from Dundee, when he found himself in touch with the enemy. His mission was to open a

path for an empty convoy returning from Vryheid, and in order to do so it was necessary that Blood River

Poort, where the Boers were now seen, should be cleared. With admirable zeal Gough pushed rapidly

forward, supported by a force of 350 Johannesburg Mounted Rifles under Stewart. Such a proceeding must

have seemed natural to any British officer at this stage of the war, when a swift advance was the only chance

of closing with the small bodies of Boers; but it is strange that the Intelligence Department had not warned

the patrols upon the frontier tbat a considerable force was coming down upon them, and that they should be

careful to avoid action against impossible odds. If Gough had known that Botha's main commando was

coming down upon him, it is inconceivable that he would have pushed his advance until he could neither

extricate his men nor his guns. A small body of the enemy, said to have been the personal escort of Louis

Botha, led him on, until a large force was able to ride down upon him from the flank and rear. Surrounded at

Scheepers Nek by many hundreds of riflemen in a difficult country, there was no alternative but a surrender,

and so sharp and sudden was the Boer advance that the whole action was over in a very short time. The new

tactics of the Boers, already used at Vlakfontein, and afterwards to be successful at Brakenlaagte and at

Tweebosch, were put in force. A large body of mounted men, galloping swiftly in open order and firing from

the saddle, rode into and over the British. Such temerity should in theory have met with severe punishment,

but as a matter of fact the losses of the enemy seem to have been very small. The soldiers were not able to

return an effective fire from their horses, and had no time to dismount. The sights and breechblocks of the

two guns are said to have been destroyed, but the former statement seems more credible than the latter. A

Colt gun was also captured. Of the small force twenty were killed, forty wounded, and over two hundred

taken. Stewart's force was able to extricate itself with some difficulty, and to fall back on the Drift. Gough

managed to escape that night and to report that it was Botha himself, with over a thousand men, wJio had

eaten up his detachment. The prisoners and wounded were sent in a few days later to Vryheid, a town which

appeared to be in some danger of capture had not Walter Kitchener hastened to carry reinforcements to the

garrison. Bruce Hamilton was at the same time despatched to head Botha off, and every step taken to prevent

his southern advance. So many columns from all parts converged upon the danger spot that Lyttelton, who

Botha's plans appear to have been to work through Zululand and then strike at Natal, an operation which

would be the more easy as it would be conducted a considerable distance from the railway line. Pushing on a

few days after his successful action with Gough, he crossed the Zulu frontier, and had in front of him an

almost unimpeded march as far as the Tugela. Crossing this far from the British base of power, his force

could raid the Greytown district and raise recruits among the Dutch farmers, laying waste one of the few

spots in South Africa which had been untouched by the blight of war. All this lay before him, and in his path

nothing save only two small British posts which might be either disregarded or gathered up as he passed. In

an evil moment for himself, tempted by the thought of the supplies which they might contain, he stopped to

gather them up, and the force of the wave of invasion broke itself as upon two granite rocks.

These two socalled forts were posts of very modest strength, a chain of which had been erected at the time

of the old Zulu war. Fort Itala, the larger, was garrisoned by 300 men of the 5th Mounted Infantry, drawn

from the Dublin Fusiliers, Middlesex, Dorsets, South Lancashires, and Lancashire Fusiliers most of them

old soldiers of many battles. They had two guns of the 69th R.F.A., the same battery which had lost a section

Upon September 25th the small garrison heard that the main force of the Boers was sweeping towards them,

and prepared to give them a soldiers' welcome. The fort is situated upon the flank of a hill, on the summit of

which, a mile from the main trenches, a strong outpost was stationed. It was upon this that the first force of

the attack broke at midnight of September 25th. The garrison, eighty strong, was fiercely beset by several

hundred Boers, and the post was eventually carried after a sharp and bloody contest. Kane, of the South

Lancashires, died with the words 'No surrender' upon his lips, and Potgieter, a Boer leader, was pistolled by

Kane's fellow officer, Lefroy. Twenty of the small garrison fell, and the remainder were overpowered and

With this vantageground in their possession the Boers settled down to the task of overwhelming the main

position. They attacked upon three sides, and until morning the force was raked from end to end by unseen

riflemen. The two British guns were put out of action and the maxim was made unserviceable by a bullet. At

dawn there was a pause in the attack, but it recommenced and continued without intermission until sunset.

The span betwixt the rising of the sun and its last red glow in the west is a long one for the man who spends it

at his ease, but how neverending must have seemed the hours to this handful of men, outnumbered,

surrounded, pelted by bullets, parched with thirst, torn with anxiety, holding desperately on with dwindling

numbers to their frail defences! To them it may have seemed a hard thing to endure so much for a tiny fort in

a savage land. The larger view of its vital importance could have scarcely come to console the regimental

officer, far less the private. But duty carried them through, and they wrought better than they knew, for the

brave Dutchmen, exasperated by so disproportionate a resistance, stormed up to the very trenches and

suffered as they had not suffered for many a long month. There have been battles with 10,000 British troops

hotly engaged in which the Boer losses have not been so great as in this obscure conflict against an isolated

post. When at last, baffled and disheartened, they drew off with the waning light, it is said that no fewer than

a hundred of their dead and two hundred of their wounded attested the severity of the fight. So strange are the

conditions of South African warfare that this loss, which would have hardly made a skirmish memorable in

the slogging days of the Peninsula, was one of the most severe blows which the burghers had sustained in the

course of a two years' warfare against a large and aggressive army. There is a conflict of evidence as to the

exact figures, but at least they were sufficient to beat the Boer army back and to change their plan of

Whilst this prolonged contest had raged round Fort Itala, a similar attack upon a smaller scale was being

made upon Fort Prospect, some fifteen miles to the eastward. This small post was held by a handful of

Durham Artillery Militia and of Dorsets. The attack was delivered by Grobler with several hundred burghers,

but it made no advance although it was pushed with great vigour, and repeated many times in the course of

the day. Captain Rowley, who was in command, handled his men with such judgment that one killed and

eight wounded represented his casualties during a long day's fighting. Here again the Boer losses were in

proportion to the resolution of their attack, and are said to have amounted to sixty killed and wounded.

Considering the impossibility of replacing the men, and the fruitless waste of valuable ammunition,

September 26th was an evil day for the Boer cause. The British casualties amounted to seventythree.

The water of the garrison of Fort Itala had been cut off early in the attack, and their ammunition had run low

by evening. Chapman withdrew his men and his guns therefore to Nkandhla, where the survivors of his

gallant garrison received the special thanks of Lord Kitchener. The country around was still swarming with

Boers, and on the last day of September a convoy from Melmoth fell into their hands and provided them with

But the check which he had received was sufficient to prevent any important advance upon the part of Botha,

while the swollen state of the rivers put an additional obstacle in his way. Already the British commanders,

delighted to have at last discovered a definite objective, were hurrying to the scene of action. Bruce Hamuton

had reached Fort Itala upon September 28th and Walter Kitchener had been despatched to Vryheid. Two

British forces, aided by smaller columns, were endeavouring to surround the Boer leader. On October 6th

Botha had fallen back to the northeast of Vryheid, whither the British forces had followed him. Like De

Wet's invasion of the Cape, Botha's advance upon Natal had ended in placing himself and his army in a

critical position. On October 9th he had succeeded in crossing the Privaan River, a branch of the Pongolo,

and was pushing north in the direction of Piet Retief, much helped by misty weather and incessant rain. Some

of his force escaped between the British columns, and some remained in the kloofs and forests of that

Walter Kitchener, who had followed up the Boer retreat, had a brisk engagement with the rearguard upon

October 6th. The Boers shook themselves clear with some loss, both to themselves and to their pursuers. On

the 10th those of the burghers who held together had reached Luneburg, and shortly afterwards they had got

completely away from the British columns. The weather was atrocious, and the lumbering wagons, axledeep

in mud, made it impossible for troops who were attached to them to keep in touch with the light riders who

sped before them. For some weeks there was no word of the main Boer force, but at the end of that time they

reappeared in a manner which showed that both in numbers and in spirit they were still a formidable body.

Of all the sixty odd British columns which were traversing the Boer states there was not one which had a

better record than that commanded by Colonel Benson. During seven months of continuous service this small

force, consisting at that time of the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, the 2nd Scottish Horse, the 18th and

19th Mounted Infantry, and two guns, had acted with great energy, and had reduced its work to a complete

and highly effective system. Leaving the infantry as a camp guard, Benson operated with mounted troops

alone, and no Boer laager within fifty miles was safe from his nocturnal visits. So skilful had he and his men

become at these night attacks in a strange, and often difficult country, that out of twentyeight attempts

twentyone resulted in complete success. In each case the rule was simply to gallop headlong into the Boer

laager, and to go on chasing as far as the horses could go. The furious and reckless pace may be judged by the

fact that the casualties of the force were far greater from falls than from bullets. In seven months fortyseven

Boers were killed and six hundred captured, to say nothing of enormous quantities of munitions and stock.

The success of these operations was due, not only to the energy of Benson and his men, but to the untiring

exertions of Colonel WoolsSampson, who acted as intelligence officer. If, during his long persecution by

President Kruger, WoolsSampson in the bitterness of his heart had vowed a feud against the Boer cause, it

must be acknowledged that he has most amply fulfilled it, for it would be difficult to point to any single man

In October Colonel Benson's force was reorganised, and it then consisted of the 2nd Buffs, the 2nd Scottish

Horse, the 3rd and 25th Mounted Infantry, and four guns of the 84th battery. With this force, numbering

nineteen hundred men, he left Middelburg upon the Delagoa line on October 20th and proceeded south,

crossing the course along which the Boers, who were retiring from their abortive raid into Natal, might be

expected to come. For several days the column performed its familiar work, and gathered up forty or fifty

prisoners. On the 26th came news that the Boer commandos under Grobler were concentrating against it, and

that an attack in force might be expected. For two days there was continuous sniping, and the column as it

moved through the country saw Boer horsemen keeping pace with it on the far flanks and in the rear. The

weather had been very bad, and it was in a deluge of cold driving rain that the British set forth upon October

30th, moving towards Brakenlaagte, which is a point about forty mi~s due south of Middelburg. It was

About midday the column, still escorted by large bodies of aggressive Boers, came to a difficult spruit

swollen by the rain. Here the wagons stuck, and it took some hours to get them all across. The Boer fire was

continually becoming more severe, and had broken out at the head of the column as well as the rear. The

situation was rendered more difficult by the violence of the rain, which raised a thick steam from the ground

and made it impossible to see for any distance. Major Anley, in command of the rearguard, peering back, saw

through a rift of the clouds a large body of horsemen in extended order sweeping after them. 'There's miles of

them, begob! ' cried an excited Irish trooper. Next instant the curtain had closed once more, but all who had

At this moment two guns of the 84th battery under Major Guinness were in action against Boer riflemen. As

a rear screen on the farther side of the guns was a body of the Scottish Horse and of the Yorkshire Mounted

Infantry. Near the guns themselves were thirty men of the Buffs. The rest of the Buffs and of the Mounted

Infantry were out upon the flanks or else were with the advance guard, which was now engaged, under the

direction of Colonel WoolsSampson, in parking the convoy and in forming the camp. These troops played a

small part in the day's fighting, the whole force of which broke with irresistible violence upon the few

hundred men who were in front of or around the rear guns. Colonel Benson seems to have just ridden back to

Louis Botba with his commando is said to have ridden sixty miles in order to join the forces of Grobler and

Oppermann, and overwhelm the British column. It may have been the presence of their commander or a

desire to have vengeance for the harrying which they had undergone upon the Natal border, but whatever the

reason, the Boer attack was made with a spirit and dash which earned the enthusiastic applause of every

soldier who survived to describe it. With the low roar of a great torrent, several hundred horsemen burst

through the curtain of mist, riding at a furious pace for the British guns. The rear screen of Mounted Infantry

fell back before this terrific rush, and the two bodies of horsemen came pellmell down upon the handful of

Buffs and the guns. The infantry were ridden into and surrounded by the Boers, who found nothing to stop

them from galloping on to the low ridge upon which the guns were stationed. This ridge was held by eighty

of the Scottish Horse and forty of the Yorkshire M.I., with a few riflemen from the 25th Mounted Infantry.

The latter were the escort of the guns, but the former were the rear screen who had fallen back rapidly

because it was the game to do so, but who were in no way shaken, and who instantly dismounted and formed

These men had hardly time to take up their ground when the Boers were on them. With that extraordinary

quickness to adapt their tactics to circumstances which is the chief military virtue of the Boers, the horsemen

did not gallop over the crest, but lined the edge of it, and poured a withering fire on to the guns and the men

beside them. The heroic nature of the defence can be best shown by the plain figures of the casualties. No

rhetoric is needed to adorn that simple record. There were thirtytwo gunners round the guns, and

twentynine fell where they stood. Major Guinness was mortaly wounded while endeavouring with his own

hands to fire a round of case. There were sixtytwo casualties out of eighty among the Scottish Horse, and

the Yorkshires were practically annihilated. Altogether 123 men fell, out of about 160 on the ridge. 'Hard

pounding, gentlemen,' as Wellington remarked at Waterloo, and British troops seemed as ready as ever to

The gunners were, as usual, magnificent. Of the two little bulletpelted groups of men around the guns there

was not one who did not stand to his duty without flinching. Corporal Atkin was shot down with all his

comrades, but still endeavoured with his failing strength to twist the breechblock out of the gun. Another

bullet passed through his upraised hands as he did it. Sergant Hayes, badly wounded, and the last survivor of

the crew, seized the lanyard, crawled up the trail, and fired a last round before he fainted. Sergeant Mathews,

with three bullets through him, kept steadily to his duty. Five drivers tried to bring up a limber and remove

the gun, but all of them, with all the horses, were hit. There have been incidents in this war which have not

increased our military reputation, but you might search the classical records of valour and fail to find

Colonel Benson was hit in the knee and again in the stomach, but wounded as he was he despatched a

message back to WoolsSampson, asking him to burst shrapnel over the ridge so as to prevent the Boers

from carrying off the guns. The burghers had ridden in among the litter of dead and wounded men which

marked the British position, and some of the baser of them, much against the will of their commanders,

handled the injured soldiers with great brutality. The shellfire drove them back, however, and the two guns

were left standing alone, with no one near them save their prostrate gunners and escort.

There has been some misunderstanding as to the part played by the Buffs in this action, and words have been

used which seem to imply that they had in some way failed their mounted companions. It is due to the honour

of one of the finest regiments in the British army to clear this up. As a matter of fact, the greater part of the

regiment under Major Dauglish was engaged in defending the camp. Near the guns there were four separate

small bodies of Buffs, none of which appears to have been detailed as an escort. One of these parties,

consisting of thirty men under Lieutenant Greatwood, was ridden over by the horsemen, and the same fate

befell a party of twenty who were far out upon the flank. Another small body under Lieutenant Lynch was

over taken by the same charge, and was practically destroyed, losing nineteen killed and wounded out of

thirty. In the rear of the guns was a larger body of Buffs, 130 in number, under Major Eales. When the guns

were taken this handful attempted a counterattack, but Eales soon saw that it was a hopeless effort, and he

lost thirty of his men before he could extricate himself. Had these men been with the others on the gun ridge

they might have restored the fight, but they had not reached it when the position was taken, and to persevere

in the attempt to retake it would have led to certain disaster. The only just criticism to which the regiment is

open is that, having just come off blockhouse duty, they were much out of condition, which caused the men

It was fortunate that the command of the column devolved upon so experienced and coolheaded a soldier as

WoolsSampson. To attempt a counterattack for the purpose of recapturing the guns would, in case of

disaster, have risked the camp and the convoy. The latter was the prize which the Boers had particularly in

view, and to expose it would be to play their game. Very wisely, therefore, WoolsSampson held the

attacking Boers off with his guns and his riflemen, while every spare pair of hands was set to work

entrenching the position and making it impregnable against attack. Outposts were stationed upon all those

surrounding points which might command the camp, and a summons to surrender from the Boer leader was

treated with contempt. All day a longrange fire, occasionally very severe, rained upon the camp. Colonel

Benson was brought in by the ambulance, and used his dying breath in exhorting his subordinate to hold out.

'No more night marches' are said to have been the last words spoken by this gallant soldier as he passed away

in the early morning after the action. On October 31st the force remained on the defensive, but early on

November 1st the gleaming of two heliographs, one to the northeast and one to the southwest, told that two

British columns, those of De Lisle and of Barter, were hastening to the rescue. But the Boers had passed as

the storm does, and nothing but their swathe of destruction was left to show where they had been. They had

taken away the guns during the night, and were already beyond the reach of pursuit.

Such was the action at Brakenlaagte, which cost the British sixty men killed and 170 wounded, together with

two guns. Colonel Benson, Colonel Guinness, Captain Eyre Lloyd of the Guards, Major Murray and Captain

Lindsay of the Scottish Horse, with seven other officers were among the dead, while sixteen officers were

wounded. The net result of the action was that the British rearguard had been annihilated, but that the main

body and the convoy, which was the chief object of the attack, was saved. The Boer loss was considerable,

being about one hundred and fifty. In spite of the Boer success nothing could suit the British better than hard

fighting of the sort, since whatever the immediate result of it might be, it must necessarily cause a wastage

among the enemy which could never be replaced. The gallantry of the Boer charge was only equalled by that

of the resistance offered round the guns, and it is an action to which both sides can look back without shame

or regret. It was feared that the captured guns would soon be used to break the blockhouse line, but nothing of

the kind was attempted, and within a few weeks they were both recovered by British columns.

In order to make a consecutive and intelligible narrative, I will continue with an account of the operations in

this southeastern portion of the Transvaal from the action of Brakenlaagte down to the end of the year 1901.

These were placed in the early part of November. under the supreme command of General Bruce Hamilton,

and that energetic commander set in motion a number of small columns, which effected numerous captures.

He was much helped in his work by the new lines of blockhouses, one of which extended from Standerton to

Ermelo, while another connected Brugspruit with Greylingstad. The huge country was thus cut into

manageable districts, and the fruits were soon seen by the large returns of prisoners which came from this

Upon December 3rd Bruce Hamilton, who had the valuable assistance of WoolsSampson to direct his

intelligcnce, struck swiftly out from Ermelo and fell upon a Boer laager in the early morning, capturing

ninetysix prisoners. On the 10th he overwhelmed the Bethel commando by a similar march, kiling seven

and capturing 131. Williams and Wing commanded separate columns in this operation, and their energy may

be judged from the fact that they covered fiftyone miles during the twentyfour hours. On the 12th

Hamilton's columns were on the warpath once more, and another commando was wiped out. Sixteen killed

and seventy prisoners were the fruits of this expedition. For the second time in a week the columns had done

their fifty miles a day, and it was no surprise to hear from their commander that they were in need of a rest.

Nearly four hundred prisoners had been taken from the most warlike portion of the Transvaal in ten days by

one energetic commander, with a list of twentyfive casualties to ourselves. The thanks of the Secretary of

War were specially sent to him for his brilliant work. From then until the end of the year 1901, numbers of

smaller captures continued to be reported from the same region, where Plumer, Spens, Mackenzie,

Rawlinson, and others were working. On the other hand there was one small setback which occurred to a

body of two hundred Mounted Infantry under Major Bridgford, who had been detached from Spens's column

to search some farmhouses at a place called Holland, to the south of Ermelo. The expedition set forth upon

The British force became divided in doing this work, and were suddenly attacked by several hundred of

Britz's commando, who came to close quarters through their khaki dress, which enabled them to pass as

Plumer's vanguard. The brunt of the fight fell upon an outlying body of fifty men, nearly all of whom were

killed, wounded or taken. A second body of fifty men were overpowered in the same way, after a creditable

defence. Fifteen of the British were killed and thirty wounded, while Bridgford the commander was also

taken. Spens came up shortly afterwards with the column, and the Boers were driven off. There seems every

reason to think that upon this occasion the plans of the British had leaked out, and that a deliberate ambush

had been laid for them round the farms, but in such operations these are chances against which it is not

always possible to guard. Considering the number of the Boers, and the cleverness of their dispositions, the

British were fortunate in being able to extricate their force without greater loss, a feat which was largely due

Leaving the Eastern Transvaal, the narrative must now return to several incidents of importance which had

On September 19th, two days after Gough's disaster, a misfortune occurred near Bloemfontein by which two

guns and a hundred and forty men fell temporarily into the hands of the enemy. These guns, belonging to U

battery, were moving south under an escort of Mounted Infantry, from that very Sanna's Post which had been

so fatal to the same battery eighteen months before. When fifteen miles south of the Waterworks, at a place

called Vlakfontein (another Vlakfontein from that of General Dixon's engagement), the small force was

surrounded and captured by Ackermann'n commando. The gunner officer, Lieutenant Barry, died beside his

guns in the way that gunner officers have. Guns and men were taken, however, the latter to be released, and

the former to be recovered a week or two later by the British columns. It is certainly a credit to the Boers that

the spring campaign should have opened by four British guns falling into their hands, and it is impossible to

withhold our admiration for those gallant farmers who, after two years of exhausting warfare, were still able

to turn upon a formidable and victorious enemy, and to renovate their supplies at his expense.

Two days later, hard on the heels of Gough's mishap, of the Vlakfontein incident, and of the annihilation of

the squadron of Lancers in the Cape, there was a serious affair at Elands Kloof, near Zastron, in the extreme

south of the Orange River Colony. In this a detachment of the Highland Scouts raised by the public spirit of

Lord Lovat was surprised at night and very severely handled by Kritzinger's commando. The loss of Colonel

Murray, their commander, of the adjutant of the same name, and of fortytwo out of eighty of the Scouts,

shows how fell was the attack, which broke as sudden and as strong as a South African thunderstorm upon

the unconscious camp. The Boers appear to have eluded the outposts and crept right among the sleeping

troops, as they did in the case of the Victorians at Wilmansrust. Twelve gunners were also hit, and the only

field gun taken. The retiring Boers were swiftly followed up by Thorneycroft's column, however, and the gun

was retaken, together with twenty of Kritzinger's men. It must be confessed that there seems some irony in

the fact that, within five days of the British ruling by which the Boers were no longer a military force, these

nonbelligerents had inflicted a loss of nearly six hundred men killed, wounded, or taken. Two small

commandos, that of Koch in the Orange River Colony, and that of Carolina, had been captured by Williams

and Benson. Combined they only numbered a hundred and nine men, but here, as always, they were men who

Those who had followed the war with care, and had speculated upon the future, were prepared on hearing of

Botha's movement upon Natal to learn that De la Rey had also made some energetic attack in the western

quarter of the Transvaal. Those who had formed this expectation were not disappointed, for upon the last day

of September the Boer chief struck fiercely at Kekewich's column in a vigorous night attack, which led to as

stern an encounter as any in the campaign. This was the action at Moedwill, near Magato Nek, in the

When last mentioned De la Rey was in the Marico district, near Zeerust, where he fought two actions with

Methuen in the early part of September. Thence he made his way to Rustenburg and into the Magaliesberg

country, where he joined Kemp. The Boer force was followed up by two British columns under Kekewich

and Fetherstonhaugh. The former commander had camped upon the night of Sunday, September 30th, at the

farm of Moedwill, in a strong position within a triangle formed by the Selous River on the west, a donga on

the east, and the ZeerustRustenburg road as a base. The apex of the triangle pointed north, with a ridge on

The men with Kekewich were for the most part the same as those who had fought in the Vlakfontein

engagement the Derbys, the 1st Scottish Horse, the Yeomanry, and the 28th R.F.A. Every precaution

appears to have been taken by the leader, and his pickets were thrown out so far that ample warning was

assured of an attack. The Boer onslaught came so suddenly and fiercely, however, in the early morning, that

the posts upon the river bank were driven in or destroyed and the riflemen from the ridge on the farther side

were able to sweep the camp with their fire. In numbers the two forces were not unequal, but the Boers had

already obtained the tactical advantage, and were playing a game in which they are the schoolmasters of the

world. Never has the British spirit flamed up more fiercely, and from the commander to the latest yeoman

recruit there was not a man who flinched from a difficult and almost a desperate task. The Boers must at all

hazard be driven from the position which enabled them to command the camp. No retreat was possible

without such an abandonment of stores as would amount to a disaster. In the confusion and the uncertain light

of early dawn there was no chance of a concerted movement, though Kekewich made such dispositions as

were possible with admirable coolness and promptness. Squadrons and companies closed in upon the river

bank with the one thought of coming to close quarters and driving the enemy from their commanding

position. Already more than half the horses and a very large number of officers and men had gone down

before the pelting bullets. Scottish Horse, Yeomanry, and Derbys pushed on, the young soldiers of the two

former corps keeping pace with the veteran regiment. 'All the men bebaved simply splendidly,' said a

spectator, 'taking what little cover there was and advancing yard by yard. An order was given to try and

saddle up a squadron, with the idea of getting round their flank. I had the saddle almost on one of my ponies

when he was hit in two places. Two men trying to saddle alongside of me were both shot dead, and

Lieutenant Wortley was shot through the knee. I ran back to where I had been firing from and found the

Colonel slightly hit, the Adjutant wounded and dying, and men dead and wounded all round.' But the

counterattack soon began to make way. At first the advance was slow, but soon it quickened into a

magnificent rush, the wounded Kekewich whooping on his men, and the guns coming into action as the

enemy began to fall back before the fierce charge of the British riflemen. At six o'clock De la Rey's burghers

had seen that their attempt was hopeless, and were in full retreat a retreat which could not be harassed by

the victors, whose cavalry had been converted by that hail of bullets into footmen. The repulse had been

absolute and complete, for not a man or a cartridge had been taken from the British, but the price paid in

killed and wounded was a heavy one. No fewer than 161 had been hit, including the gallant leader, whose

hurt did not prevent him from resuming his duties within a few days. The heaviest losses fell upon the

Scottish Horse, and upon the Derbys; but the Yeomanry also proved on this, as on some other occasions, how

ungenerous were the criticisms to which they had been exposed. There are few actions in the war which

Though repulsed at Moedwill, De la Rey, the grim, longbearded fighting man, was by no means

discouraged. From the earliest days of the campaign, when he first faced Methuen upon the road to

Kimberley, he had shown that he was a most dangerous antagonist, tenacious, ingenious, and indomitable.

With him were a body of irreconcilable burghers, who were the veterans of many engagements, and in Kemp

he had an excellent fighting subordinate. His command extended over a wide stretch of populous country,

and at any time he could bring considerable reinforcements to his aid, who would separate again to their

farms and hidingplaces when their venture was accomplished. For some weeks after the fight at Moedwill

the Boer forces remained quiet in that district. Two British columns had left Zeerust on October 17th, under

Methuen and Von Donop, in order to sweep the surrounding country, the one working in the direction of

Elands River and the other in that of Rustenburg. They returned to Zeerust twelve days later, after a

successful foray, which had been attended with much sniping and skirmishing, but only one action which is

This was fought on October 24th at a spot near Kleinfontein, upon the Great Marico River, which runs to the

northeast of Zeerust. Von Donop's column was straggling through very broken and bushcovered country

when it was furiously charged in the flank and rear by two separate bodies of burghers. Kemp, who

commanded the flank attack, cut into the line of wagons and destroyed eight of them, killing many of the

Kaffir drivers, before he could be driven off. De la Rey and Steenkamp, who rushed the rearguard, had a

more desperate contest. The Boer horsemen got among the two guns of the 4th R.F.A., and held temporary

possession of them, but the small escort were veterans of the 'Fighting Fifth,' who lived up to the traditions of

their famous northcountry regiment. Of the gun crews of the section, amounting to about twentysix men,

the young officer, Hill, and sixteen men were hit. Of the escort of Northumberland Fusiliers hardly a man was

left standing, and fortyone of the supporting Yeomanry were killed and wounded. It was for some little time

a fierce and concentrated struggle at the shortest of ranges. The British horsemen came galloping to the

rescue, however, and the attack was finally driven back into tbat broken country from which it had come.

Forty dead Boers upon the ground, with their brave chieftain, Ouisterhuisen, amongst them, showed how

manfully the attack had been driven home. The British losses were twentyeight killed and fiftysix

wounded. Somewhat mauled, and with eight missing wagons, the small column made its way back to

>From this incident until the end of the year nothing of importance occurred in this part of the seat of war,

save for a sharp and wellmanaged action at Beestekraal upon October 29th, in which seventy~nine Boers

were surrounded and captured by Kekewich's horsemen. The process of attrition went very steadily forwards,

and each of the British columns returned its constant tale of prisoners. The blockhouse system had now been

extended to such an extent that the Magaliesberg was securely held, and a line had been pushed through from

Klerksdorp and Fredericstad to Ventersdorp. One of Colonel Hickie's Yeomanry patrols was roughly handled

near Brakspruit upon November 13th, but with this exception the points scored were all upon one side.

Methuen and Kekewich came across early in November from Zeerust to Klerksdorp, and operated from the

railway line. The end of the year saw them both in the Wolmaranstad district, where they were gathering up

Of the events in the other parts of the Transvaal, during the last three months of the year 1901, there is not

much to be said. In all parts the lines of blockhouses and of constabulary posts were neutralising the Boer

mobility, and bringing them more and more within reach of the British. The only fighting forces left in the

Transvaal were those under Botha in the southeast and those under De la Rey in the west. The others

attempted nothing save to escape from their pursuers, and when overtaken they usually gave in without

serious opposition. Among the larger hauls may be mentioned that of Dawkins in the Nylstrom district

(seventysix prisoners), Kekewich (seventyeight), Colenbrander in the north (fiftyseven), Dawkins and

Colenbrander (104), Colenbrander (sixtytwo); but the great majority of the captures were in smaller bodies,

Only two small actions during these months appear to call for any separate notice. The first was an attack

made by Buys' commando, upon November 20th, on the Railway Pioneers when at work near Villiersdorp, in

the extreme northeast of the Orange River Colony. This corps, consisting mainly of miners from

Johannesburg, had done invaluable service during the war. On this occasion a working party of them was

suddenly attacked, and most of them taken prisoners. Major Fisher, who commanded the pioneers, was killed,

and three other officers with several men were wounded. Colonel Rimington's column appeared upon the

scene, however, and drove off the Boers, who left their leader, Buys, a wounded prisoner in our hands.

The second action was a sharp attack delivered by Muller's Boers upon Colonel Park's column on the night of

December 19th, at Elandspruit. The fight was sharp while it lasted, but it ended in the repulse of the

assailants. The British casualties were six killed and twentyfour wounded. The Boers, who left eight dead

Already the most striking and pleasing feature in the Transvaal was the tranquillity of its central provinces,

and the way in which the population was settling down to its old avocations. Pretoria had resumed its normal

quiet life, while its larger and more energetic neighbour was rapidly recovering from its two years of

paralysis. Every week more stamps were dropped in the mines, and from month to month a steady increase in

the output showed that the great staple industry of the place would soon be as vigorous as ever. Most pleasing

of all was the restoration of safety upon the railway lines, which, save for some precautions at night, had

resumed their normal traffic. When the observer took his eyes from the dark clouds which shadowed every

horizon, he could not but rejoice at the everwidening central stretch of peaceful blue which told that the

Having now dealt with the campaign in the Transvaal down to the end of 1901, it only remains to bring the

chronicle of the events in the Orange River Colony down to the same date. Reference has already been made

to two small British reverses which occurred in September, the loss of two guns to the south of the

Waterworks near Bloemfontein, and the surprise of the camp of Lord Lovat's Scouts. There were some

indications at this time that a movement had been planned through the passes of the Drakensberg by a small

Free State force which should aid Louis Botha's invasion of Natal. The main movement was checked,

The blockhouse system had been developed to a very complete extent in the Orange River Colony, and the

small bands of Boers found it increasingly difficult to escape from the British columns who were for ever at

their heels. The southern portion of the country had been cut off from the northern by a line which extended

through Bloemfontein on the east to the Basuto frontier, and on the west to Jacobsdal. To the south of this

line the Boer resistance had practically ceased, althougb several columns moved continually through it, and

gleaned up the broken fragments of the commandos. The northwest had also settled down to a large extent,

and during the last three months of 1901 no action of importance occurred in that region. Even in the

turbulent northeast, which had always been the centre of resistance, there was little opposition to the British

columns, which continued every week to send in their tale of prisoners. Of the column commanders,

Williams, Damant, Du Moulin, Lowry Cole, and Wilson were the most successful. In their operations they

were much aided by the South African Constabulary. One young officer of this force, Major PackBeresford,

especially distinguished himself by his gallantry and ability. His premature death from enteric was a grave

loss to the British army. Save for one skirmish of Colonel Wilson's early in October, and another of Byng's

on November 14th, there can hardly be said to have been any actual fighting until the events late in December

In the meanwhile the peaceful organisation of the country was being pushed forward as rapidly as in the

Transvaal, although here the problems presented were of a different order, and the population an exclusively

Dutch one. The schools already showed a higher attendance than in the days before the war, while a continual

stream of burghers presented themselves to take the oath of allegiance, and even to join the ranks against their

own irreconcilable countrymen, whom they looked upon with justice as the real authors of their troubles.

Towards the end of November there were signs that the word had gone forth for a fresh concentration of the

fighting Boers in their old haunts in the Heilbron district, and early in December it was known that the

indefatigable De Wet was again in the field. He had remained quiet so long that there bad been persistent

rumours of his injury and even of his death, but he was soon to show that he was as alive as ever. President

Steyn was ill of a most serious complaint, caused possibly by the mental and physical sufferings which he

had undergone; but with an indomitable resolution which makes one forget and forgive the fatuous policy

which brought him and his State to such a pass, be still appeared in his Cape cart at the laager of the faithful

remnant of his commandos. To those who remembered how widespread was our conviction of the

halfheartedness of the Free Staters at the outbreak of the war, it was indeed a revelation to see them after

It had been long evident that the present British tactics of scouring the country and capturing the isolated

burghers must in time bring the war to a conclusion. From the Boer point of view the only hope, or at least

the only glory, lay in reassembling once more in larger bodies and trying conclusions with some of the

British columns. It was with this purpose that De Wet early in December assembled Wessels, Manie Botha,

and others of his lieutenants, together with a force of about two thousand men, in the Heilbron district. Small

as this force was, it was admirably mobile, and every man in it was a veteran, toughened and seasoned by two

years of constant fighting. De Wet's first operations were directed against an isolated column of Colonel

Wilson's, which was surrounded within twenty miles of Heilbron. Rimington, in response to a heliographic

call for assistance, hurried with admirable promptitude to the scene of action, and joined hands with Wilson.

De Wet's men were as numerous, however, as the two columns combined, and they harassed the return march

into Heilbron. A determined attack was made on the convoy and on the rearguard, but it was beaten off. That

night Rimington's camp was fired into by a large body of Boers, but he had cleverly moved his men away

from the fires, so that no harm was done. The losses in these operations were small, but with troops which

bad not been trained in this method of fighting the situation would have been a serious one. For a fortnight or

more after this the burghers contented themselves by skirmishing with British columns and avoiding a drive

which Elliot's forces made against them. On December 18th they took the offensive, however, and within a

News had come to British headquarters that Kaffir's Kop, to the northwest of Bethlehem, was a centre of

Boer activity. Three columns were therefore turned in that direction, Elliot's, Barker's, and Dartnell's. Some

desultory skirmishing ensued, which was only remarkable for the death of Haasbroek, a wellknown Boer

leader. As the columns separated again, unable to find an objective, De Wet suddenly showed one of them

that their failure was not due to his absence. Dartnell bad retraced his steps nearly as far as Eland's River

Bridge, when the Boer leader sprang out of his lair in the Langberg and threw himself upon him. The

burghers attempted to ride in, as they had successfully done at Brakenlaagte, but they were opposed by the

steady old troopers of the two regiments of Imperial Horse, and by a General who was familiar with every

Boer ruse. The horsemen never got nearer than 150 yards to the British line, and were beaten back by the

steady fire which met them. Finding that he made no headway, and learning that Campbell's column was

coming up from Bethlehem, De Wet withdrew his men after four hours' fighting. Fifteen were hit upon the

British side, and the Boer loss seems to have been certainly as great or greater.

De Wet's general aim in his operations seems to have been to check the British blockhouse building. With his

main force in the Langberg he could threaten the line which was now being erected between Bethlehem and

Harrismith, a line against which his main commando was destined, only two months later, to beat itself in

vain. Sixty miles to the north a second line was being run across country from Frankfort to Standerton, and

had reached a place called Tafelkop. A covering party of East Lancashires and Yeomanry watched over the

workers, but De Wet had left a portion of his force in that neighbourhood, and they harassed the blockhouse

builders to such an extent that General Hamilton, who was in command, found it necessary to send in to

Frankfort for support. The British columns there had just returned exhausted from a drive, but three bodies

under Damant, Rimington, and Wilson were at once despatched to clear away the enemy.

The weather was so atrocious that the veldt resembled an inland sea, with the kopjes as islands rising out of

it. By this stage of the war the troops were hardened to all weathers, and they pushed swiftly on to the scene

of action. As they approached the spot where the Boers had been reported, the line had been extended over

many miles, with the result that it had become very attenuated and dangerously weak in the centre. At this

point Colonel Damant and his small staff were alone with the two guns and the maxim, save for a handful of

Imperial Yeomanry (91st), who acted as escort to the guns. Across the face of this small force there rode a

body of men in khaki uniforms, keeping British formation, and actually firing bogus volleys from time to

time in the direction of some distant Boers. Damant and his staff seem to have taken it for granted that these

were Rimington's men, and the clever ruse succeeded to perfection. Nearer and nearer came the strangers,

and suddenly throwing off all disguise, they made a dash for the guns. Four rounds of case failed to stop

them, and in a few minutes they were over the kopje on which the guns stood and had ridden among the

gunners, supported in their attack by a flank fire from a number of dismounted riflemen.

The instant that the danger was realised Damant, his staff, and the forty Yeomen who formed the escort

dashed for the crest in the hope of anticipating the Boers. So rapid was the charge of the others that they had

overwhelmed the gunners before the supports could reach the hill, and the latter found themselves under the

deadly fire of the Boer rifles from above. Damant was hit in four places, all of his staff were wounded, and

hardly a man of the small body of Yeomanry was left standing. Nothing could exceed their gallantry.

Gaussen their captain fell at their head. On the ridge the men about the guns were nearly all killed or

wounded. Of the gun detachment only two men remained, both of them hit, and Jeffcoat their dyLng captain

bequeathed them fifty pounds each in a will drawn upon the spot. In half an hour the centre of the British line

had been absolutely annihilated. Modern warfare is on the whole much less bloody than of old, but when one

party has gained the tactical mastery it is a choice between speedy surrender and total destruction.

The widespread British wings had begun to understand that there was something amiss, and to ride in

towards the centre. An officer on the far right peering through his glasses saw those telltale puffs at the very

muzzles of the British guns, which showed that they were firing case at close quarters. He turned his

squadron inwards and soon gathered up Scott's squadron of Damant's Horse, and both rode for the kopje.

Rimington's men were appearing on the other side, and the Boers rode off. They were unable to remove the

guns which they had taken, because all the horses had perished. 'I actually thought,' says one officer who saw

them ride away, 'that I had made a mistake and been fighting our own men. They were dressed in our

uniforms and some of them wore the tigerskin, the badge of Damant's Horse, round their hats.' The same

officer gives an account of the scene on the gunkopje. 'The result when we got to the guns was this, gunners

all killed except two (both wounded), pompom officers and men all killed, maxim all killed, 91st (the gun

escort) one officer and one man not hit, all the rest killed or wounded; staff, every officer hit.' That is what it

means to those who are caught in the vortex of the cyclone. The total loss was about seventyfive.

In this action the Boers, who were under the command of Wessels, delivered their attack with a cleverness

and dash which deserved success. Their stratagem, however, depending as it did upon the use of British

uniforms and methods, was illegitimate by all the laws of war, and one can but marvel at the longsuffering

patience of officers and men who endured such things without any attempt at retaliation. There is too much

reason to believe also, that considerable brutality was shown by those Boers who carried the kopje, and the

very high proportion of killed to wounded among the British who lay there corroborates the statement of the

survivors that several were shot at close quarters after all resistance had ceased.

This rough encounter of Tafelkop was followed only four days later by a very much more serious one at

Tweefontein, which proved that even after two years of experience we had not yet sufficiently understood the

courage and the cunning of our antagonist. The blockhouse line was being gradually extended from

Harrismith to Bethlehem, so as to hold down this turbulent portion of the country. The Harrismith section had

been pushed as far as Tweefontein, which is nine miles west of Elands River Bridge, and here a small force

was stationed to cover the workers. This column consisted of four squadrons of the 4th Imperial Yeomanry,

one gun of the 79th battery, and one pompom, the whole under the temporary command of Major Williams

Knowing that De Wet and his men were in the neighbourhood, the camp of the Yeomen had been pitched in a

position which seemed to secure it against attack. A solitary kopje presented a long slope to the north, while

the southern end was precipitous. The outposts were pushed well out upon the plain, and a line of sentries

was placed along the crest. The only precaution which seems to have been neglected was to have other

outposts at the base of the southern declivity. It appears to have been taken for granted, however, that no

attack was to be apprehended from that side, and that in any esse it would be impossible to evade the

Of all the daring and skilful attacks delivered by the Boers during the war there is certainly none more

remarkable than this one. At two o'clock in the morning of a moonlight night De Wet's forlorn hope

assembled at the base of the hill and clambered up to the summit. The fact that it was Christmas Eve may

conceivably have had something to do with the want of vigilance upon the part of the sentries. In a season of

good will and conviviality the rigour of military discipline may insensibly relax. Little did the sleeping

Yeomen in the tents, or the drowsy outposts upon the crest, think of the terrible Christmas visitors who were

The Boers, stealing up in their stockinged feet, poured under the crest until they were numerous enough to

make a rush. It is almost inconceivable how they could have got so far without their presence being suspected

by the sentries but so it was. At last, feeling strong enough to advance, they sprang over the crest and fired

into the pickets, and past them into the sleeping camp. The top of the hill being once gained, there was

nothing to prevent their comrades from swarming up, and in a very few minutes nearly a thousand Boers

were in a position to command the camp. The British were not only completely outnumbered, but were

hurried from their sleep into the fight without any clear idea as to the danger or how to meet it, while the

hissing sleet of bullets struck many of them down as they rushed out of their tents. Considering how terrible

the ordeal was to which they were exposed, these untried Yeomen seem to have behaved very well. 'Some

brave gentlemen ran away at the first shot, but I am thankful to say they were not many,' says one of their

number. The most veteran troops would have been tried very high had they been placed in such a position.

'The noise and the clamour,' says one spectator, 'were awful. The yells of the Dutch, the screams and shrieks

of dying men and horses, the cries of natives, howls of dogs, the firing, the galloping of horses, the whistling

of bullets, and the whirr volleys make in the air, made up such a compound of awful and diabolical sounds as

I never heard before nor hope to hear again. In the confusion some of the men killed each other and some

killed themselves. Two Boers who put on helmets were killed by their own people. The men were given no

time to rally or to collect their thoughts, for the gallant Boers barged right into them, shooting them down,

and occasionally being shot down, at a range of a few yards. Harwich and Watney, who had charge of the

maxim, died nobly with all the men of their gun section round them. Reed, the sergeantmajor, rushed at the

enemy with his clubbed rifle, but was riddled with bullets. Major Williams, the commander, was shot through

the stomach as he rallied his men. The gunners had time to fire two rounds before they were overpowered and

shot down to a man. For half an hour the resistance was maintained, but at the end of that time the Boers had

the whole camp in their possession, and were already hastening to get their prisoners away before the

The casualties are in themselves enough to show how creditable was the resistance of the Yeomanry. Out of a

force of under four hundred men they bad six officers and fiftyone men killed, eight officers and eighty men

wounded. There have been very few surrenders during the war in which there has been such evidence as this

of a determined stand. Nor was it a bloodless victory upon the part of the Boers, for there was evidence that

The prisoners, over two hundred in number, were hurried away by the Boers, who seemed under the

immediate eye of De Wet to have behaved with exemplary humanity to the wounded. The captives were

taken by forced marches to the Basuto border, where they were turned adrift, half clad and without food. By

devious ways and after many adventures, they all made their way back again to the British lines. It was well

for De Wet that he had shown such promptness in getting away, for within three hours of the end of the

action the two regiments of Imperial Horse appeared upon the scene, having travelled seventeen miles in the

time. Already, however, the rearguard of the Boers was disappearing into the fastness of the Langberg, where

Such was the short but vigorous campaign of De Wet in the last part of December of the year 1901. It had

been a briliant one, but none the less his bolt was shot, and Tweefontein was the last encounter in which

British troops should feel his heavy hand. His operations, bold as they had been, had not delayed by a day the

building of that iron cage which was gradually enclosing him. Already it was nearly completed, and in a few

more weeks he was destined to find himself and his commando struggling against bars.

At the opening of the year 1902 it was evident to every observer that the Boer resistance, spirited as it was,

must be nearing its close. By a long succession of captures their forces were much reduced in numbers. They

were isolated from the world, and had no means save precarious smuggling of renewing their supplies of

ammunition. It was known also that their mobility, which had been their great strength, was decreasing, and

that in spite of their admirable horsemastership their supply of remounts was becoming exhausted. An

increasing number of the burghers were volunteering for service against their own people, and it was found

that all fears as to this delicate experiment were misplaced, and that in the whole army there were no keener

The chief factor, however, in bringing the Boers to their knees was the elaborate and wonderful blockhouse

system, which had been strung across the whole of the enemy's country. The original blockhouses had been

far apart, and were a hindrance and an annoyance rather than an absolute barrier to the burghers. The new

models, however, were only six hundred yards apart, and were connected by such impenetrable strands of

wire that a Boer pithily described it by saying that if one's hat blew over the line anywhere between Ermelo

and Standerton one had to walk round Ermelo to fetch it. Use was made of such barriers by the Spaniards in

Cuba, but an application of them on such a scale over such an enormous tract of country is one of the

curiosities of warfare, and will remain one of several novelties which will make the South African campaign

The spines of this great system were always the railway lines, which were guarded on either side, and down

which, as down a road, went flocks, herds, pedestrians, and everything which wished to travel in safety. From

these long central cords the lines branched out to right and left, cutting up the great country into manageable

districts. A category of them would but weary the reader, but suffice it that by the beginning of the year the

southeast of the Transvaal and the northeast of the Orange River Colony, the haunts of Botha and De Wet,

bad been so intersected that it was obvious that the situation must soon be impossible for both of them. Only

on the west of the Transvaal was there a clear run for De la Rey and Kemp. Hence it was expected, as actualy

occurred, that in this quarter the most stirring events of the close of the campaign would happen.

General Bruce Hamilton in the Eastern Transvaal had continued the energetic tactics which had given such

good results in the past. With the new year his number of prisoners fell, but he had taken so many, and had

hustled the remainder to such an extent, that the fight seemed to have gone out of the Boers in this district.

On January 1st be presented the firstfruits of the year in the shape of.twentytwo of Grobler's burghers. On

the 3rd he captured fortynine, while Wing, cooperating with him, took twenty more. Among these was

General Erasmus, who had helped, or failed to help, General Lucas Meyer at Talana Hill. On the 10th

Colonel Wing's column, which was part of Hamilton's force, struck out again and took fortytwo prisoners,

including the two Wolmarans. Only two days later Hamilton returned to the same spot, and was rewarded

with thirtytwo more captures. On the 18th he took twentyseven, on the 24th twelve, and on the 26th no

fewer than ninety. So severe were these blows, and so difficult was it for the Boers to know how to get away

from an antagonist who was ready to ride thirty miles in a night in order to fall upon their laager, that the

enemy became much scattered and too demoralised for offensive operations. Finding that they had grown too

shy in this much shot over district, Hamilton moved farther south, and early in March took a cast round the

Vryheid district, where he made some captures, notably General Cherry Emmett, a descendant of the famous

Irish rebel, and brotherinlaw of Louis Botha. For all these repeated successes it was to the Intelligence

Department, so admirably controlled by Colonel WoolsSampson, that thanks are mainly due.

Whilst Bruce Hamilton was operating so successfully in the Ermelo district, several British columns under

Plumer, Spens, and Colville were stationed some fifty miles south to prevent the fugitives from getting away

into the mountainous country which lies to the north of Wakkerstroom. On January 3rd a small force of

Plumer's NewZealanders had a brisk skirmish with a party of Boers, whose cattle they captured, though at

some loss to themselves. These Boers were strongly reinforced, however, and when on the following day

Major Vallentin pursued them with fifty men he found himself at Onverwacht in the presence of several

hundred of the enemy, led by Oppermann and Christian Botha. Vallentin was killed and almost all of his

small force were hit before British reinforcements, under Colonel Pulteney, drove the Boers off. Nineteen

killed and twentythree wounded were our losses in this most sanguinary little skirmish. Nine dead Boers,

with Oppermaun himself, were left upon the field of battle. His loss was a serious one to the enemy, as he

>From that time until the end these columns, together with Mackenzie's column to the north of Ermelo,

continued to break up all combinations, and to send in their share of prisoners to swell Lord Kitchener's

weekly list. A final drive, organised on April 11th against the Standerton line, resulted in 134 prisoners.

In spite of the very large army in South Africa, so many men were absorbed by the huge lines of

communications and the blockhouse system that the number available for active operations was never more

than forty or fifty thousand men. With another fifty thousand there is no doubt that at least six months would

have been taken from the duration of the war. On account of this shorthandedness Lord Kitchener had to

leave certain districts alone, while he directed his attention to those which were more essential. Thus to the

north of the Delagoa Railway line there was only one town, Lydenburg, which was occupied by the British.

They had, however, an energetic commander in Park of the Devons. This leader, striking out from his

stronghold among the mountains, and aided by Urmston from Belfast, kept the commando of Ben Viljoen

and the peripatetic Government of Schalk Burger continually upon the move. As already narrated, Park

fought a sharp night action upon December 19th, after which, in combination with Urmston, he occupied

Dulstroom, only missing the government by a few hours. In January Park and Urmston were again upon the

warpath, though the incessant winds, fogs, and rains of that most inclement portion of the Transvaal

seriously hampered their operations. Several skirmishes with the commandos of Muller and Trichardt gave no

very decisive result, but a piece of luck befell the British on January 25th in the capture of General Viljoen by

an ambuscade cleverly arranged by Major Orr in the neighbourhood of Lydenburg. Though a great firebrand

before the war, Viljoen had fought bravely and honourably throughout the contest, and he had won the

Colonel Park had had no great success in his last two expeditions, but on February 20th he made an

admirable march, and fell upon a Boer laager which lay in placid security in the heart of the hills. One

hundred and sixtyfour prisoners, including many Boer officers, were the fruits of this success, in which the

National Scouts, or 'tame Boers,' as they were familiarly called, played a prominent part. This commando was

that of Middelburg, which was acting as escort to the government, who again escaped dissolution. Early in

March Park was again out on trek, upon one occasion covering seventy miles in a single day. Nothing further

of importance came from this portion of the seat of war until March 23rd, when the news reached England

that Schalk Burger, Reitz, Lucas Meyer, and others of the Transvaal Government had come into Middelburg,

and that they were anxious to proceed to Pretoria to treat. On the Eastern horizon had appeared the first

Having indicated the course of events in the Eastern Transvaal, north and south of the railway line, I will now

treat one or two incidents which occurred in the more central and northern portions of the country. I will then

give some account of De Wet's doings in the Orange River Colony, and finally describe that brilliant effort of

In the latter days of December, Colenbrander and Dawkins operating together had put in a great deal of useful

work in the northern district, and from Nylstrom to Pietersburg the burghers were continually harried by the

activity of these leaders. Late in the month Dawkins was sent down into the Orange River Colony in order to

reinforce the troops who were opposed to De Wet. Colenbrander alone, with his hardy colonial forces, swept

through the Magaliesburg, and had the double satisfaction of capturing a number of the enemy and of heading

off and sending back a war party of Linchwe's Kaffirs who, incensed by a cattle raid of Kemp's, were moving

down in a direction which would have brought them dangerously near to the Dutch women and children. This

instance and several similar ones in the campaign show how vile are the lies which have been told of the use,

save under certain welldefined conditions, of armed natives by the British during the war. It would have

been a perfectly easy thing at any time for the Government to have raised all the fighting native races of

South Africa, but it is not probable that we, who held back our admirable and highly disciplined Sikhs and

Ghoorkas, would break our selfimposed restrictions in order to enrol the inferior but more savage races of

Africa. Yet no charge has been more often repeated and has caused more piteous protests among the

The absence of Colenbrander in the Rustenburg country gave Beyers a chance of which he was not slow to

avail himself. On January 24th, in the early morning, he delivered an attack upon Pietersburg itself, but he

was easily driven off by the small garrison. It is probable, however, that the attack was a mere feint in order

to enable a number of the inmates of the refugee camp to escape. About a hundred and fifty made off, and

rejoined the commandos. There were three thousand Boers in all in this camp, which was shortly afterwards

Colenbrander, having returned to Pietersburg once more, determined to return Beyers's visit, and upon April

8th he moved out with a small force to surprise the Boer laager. The Inniskilling Fusiliers seized the ground

which commanded the enemy's position. The latter retreated, but were followed up, and altogether about one

hundred and fifty were killed, wounded, and taken. On May 3rd a fresh operation against Beyers was

undertaken, and resulted in about the same loss to the Boers. On the other hand, the Boers had a small success

There is one incident, however, in connection with the war in this region which one would desire to pass over

in silence if such a course were permissible. Some eighty miles to the east of Pietersburg is a wild part of the

country called the Spelonken. In this region an irregular corps, named the Bushveld Carbineers, had been

operating. It was raised in South Africa, but contained both Colonials and British in its ranks. Its wild duties,

its mixed composition, and its isolated situation must have all militated against discipline and restraint, and it

appears to have degenerated into a band not unlike those Southern 'bushwhackers' in the American war to

whom the Federals showed little mercy. They had given short shrift to tho Boer prisoners who had fallen into

their hands, the excuse offered for their barbarous conduct being that an officer who had served in the corps

had himself been murdered by the Boers. Such a reason, even if it were true, could of course offer no

justification for indiscriminate revenge. The crimes were committed in July and August 1901, but it was not

until January 1902 that five of the officers were put upon their trial and were found to be guilty as principals

or accessories of twelve murders. The corps was disbanded, and three of the accused officers, Handcock,

Wilton, and Morant, were sentenced to death, while another, Picton, was cashiered. Handcock and Morant

were actually executed. This stern measure shows more clearly than volumes of argument could do how high

was the standard of discipline in the British Army, and how heavy was the punishment, and how vain all

excuses, where it had been infringed. In the face of this actual outrage and its prompt punishment how absurd

becomes that crusade against imaginary outrages preached by an ignorant press abroad, and by renegade

To the south of Johannesburg, halfway between that town and the frontier, there is a range of hills called the

Zuikerboschrand, which extends across from one railway system to the other. A number of Boers were

known to have sought refuge in this country, so upon February 12th a small British force left Klip River Post

in order to clear them out. There were 320 men in all, composing the 28th Mounted Infantry, drawn from the

Lancashire Fusiliers, Warwicks, and Derbys, most of whom had just arrived from Malta, which one would

certainly imagine to be the last place where mounted infantry could be effectively trained. Major Dowell was

in command. An advance was made into the hilly country, but it was found that the enemy was in much

greater force than had been imagined. The familiar Boer tactics were used with the customary success. The

British line was held by a sharp fire in front, while strong flanking parties galloped round each of the wings.

It was with great difficulty that any of the British extricated themselves from their perilous position, and the

safety of a portion of the force was only secured by the devotion of a handful of officers and men, who gave

their lives in order to gain time for their comrades to get away. Twelve killed and fifty wounded were our

losses in this unfortunate skirmish, and about one hundred prisoners supplied the victors with a useful

addition to their rifles and ammunition. A stronger British force came up next day, and the enemy were

A week later, upon February 18th, there occurred another skirmish at Klippan, near Springs, between a

squadron of the Scots Greys and a party of Boers who had broken into this central reserve which Lord

Kitchener had long kept clear of the enemy. In this action the cavalry were treated as roughly as the mounted

infantry had been the week before, losing three officers killed, eight men killed or wounded, and fortysix

taken. They had formed a flanking party to General Gilbert Hamilton's column, but were attacked and

overwhelmed so rapidly that the blow had fallen before their comrades could come to their assistance.

One of the consequences of the successful drives about to be described in the Orange River Colony wns that a

number of the Free Staters came north of the Vaal in order to get away from the extreme pressure upon the

south. At the end of March a considerable number had reinforced the local commandos in that district to the

east of Springs, no very great distance from Johannesburg, which had always been a storm centre. A cavalry

force was stationed at this spot which consisted at that time of the 2nd Queen's Bays, the 7th Hussars, and

some National Scouts, all under Colonel Lawley of the Hussars. After a series of minor engagements east of

Springs, Lawley had possessed himself of Boschman's Kop, eighteen miles from that town, close to the

district which was the chief scene of Boer activity. From this base he despatched upon the morningg of April

1st three squadrons of the Bays under Colonel Fanshawe, for the purpose of surprising a small force of the

enemy which was reported at one of the farms. Fanshawe's strength was about three hundred men.

The British cavalry found themselves, however, in the position of the hunter who, when he is out for a snipe,

puts up a tiger. All went well with the expedition as far as Holspruit, the farm which they had started to

search. Commandant Pretorius, to whom it belonged, was taken by the energy of Major Vaughan, who

pursued and overtook his Cape cart. It was found, however, that Alberts's commando was camped at the

farm, and that the Bays were in the presence of a very superior force of the enemy. The night was dark, and

when firing began it was almost muzzle to muzzle, with the greatest possible difficulty in telling friend from

foe. The three squadrons fell back upon some rising ground, keeping admirable order under most difficult

circumstances. In spite of the darkness the attack was pressed fiercely home, and with their favourite tactics

the burghers rapidly outflanked the position taken up by the cavalry. The British moved by alternate

squadrons on to a higher rocky kopje on the east, which could be vaguely distinguished looming in the

darkness against the skyline. B squadron, the last to retire, was actually charged and ridden through by the

brave assailants, firing from their saddles as they broke through the ranks. The British had hardly time to

reach the kopje and to dismount and line its edge when the Boers, yelling loudly, charged with their horses up

the steep flanks. Twice they were beaten back, but the third time they seized one corner of the hill and opened

a hot fire upon the rear of the line of men who were defending the other side. Dawn was now breaking, and

the situation most serious, for the Boers were in very superior numbers and were pushing their pursuit with

the utmost vigour and determination. A small party of officers and men whose horses had been shot covered

the retreat of their comrades, and continued to fire until all of them, two officers and twentythree men, were

killed or wounded, the whole of their desperate defence being conducted within from thirty to fifty yards of

the enemy. The remainder of the regiment was now retired to successive ridges, each of which was rapidly

outflanked by the Boers, whose whole method of conducting their attack was extraordinarily skilful. Nothing

but the excellent discipline of the overmatched troopers prevented the retreat from becoming a rout.

Fortunately, before the pressure became intolerable the 7th Hussars with some artillery came to the rescue,

and turned the tide. The Hussars galloped in with such dash that some of them actually got among the Boers

In this very sharp and sanguinary cavalry skirmish the Bays lost eighty killed and wounded out of a total

force of 270. To stand such losses under such circumstances, and to preserve absolute discipline and order, is

a fine test of soldierly virtue. The adjutant, the squadron leaders, and six out of ten officers were killed or

wounded. The Boers lost equally heavily. Two Prinsloos, one of them a commandant, and three fieldcornets

were among the slain, with seventy other casualties. The force under General Alberts was a considerable one,

not fewer than six hundred rifles, so that the action at Holspruit is one which adds another name of honour to

the battleroll of the Bays. It is pleasing to add that in this and the other actions which were fought at the end

We may now descend to the Orange River Colony and trace the course of those operations which were

destined to break the power of De Wet's commando. On these we may concentrate our attention, for the

marchings and gleanings and snipings of the numerous small columns in the other portions of the colony,

although they involved much arduous and useful work, do not claim a particular account.

After the heavy blow which he dealt Firmin's Yeomanry, De Wet retired, as has been told, into the Langberg,

whence he afterwards retreated towards Reitz. There he was energetically pushed by Elliot's columns, which

had attained such mobility that 150 miles were performed in three days within a single week. Our rough

schoolmasters had taught us our lesson, and the soldiering which accomplished the marches of Bruce

Hamilton, Elliot, Rimington, and the other leaders of the end of the war was very far removed from that

Moving rapidly, and covering himself by a succession of rearguard skirmishes, De Wet danced like a

willo'thewisp in front of and round the British columns. De Lisle, Fanshawe, Byng, Rimington, Dawkins,

and Rawlinson were all snatching at him and finding him just beyond their fingertips. The mastermind at

Pretoria had, however, thought out a scheme which was worthy of De Wet himself in its ingenuity. A glance

at the map will show that the little branch from Heilbron to Wolvehoek forms an acute angle with the main

line. Both these railways were strongly blockhoused and barbedwired, so that any force which was driven

into the angle, and held in it by a force behind it, would be in a perilous position. To attempt to round De

Wet's mobile burghers into this obvious pen would have been to show one's hand too clearly. In vain is the

net laid in sight of the bird. The drive was therefore made away from this point, with the confident

expectation that the guerilla chief would break back through the columns, and that they might then pivot

round upon him and hustle him so rapidly into the desired position that he would not realise his danger until it

was too late. Byng's column was left behind the driving line to be ready for the expected backward break.

All came off exactly as expected. De Wet doubled back through the columns, and one of his commandos

stumbled upon Byng's men, who were waiting on the Vlei River to the west of Reitz. The Boers seem to have

taken it for granted that, having passed the British driving line, they were out of danger, and for once it was

they who were surprised. The South African Light Horse, the NewZealanders, and the Queensland

Bushmen all rode in upon them. A fifteenpounder, the one taken at Tweefontein, and two pompoms were

This successful skirmish was a small matter, however, compared to the importance of being in close touch

with De Wet and having a definite objective for the drive. The columns behind expanded suddenly into a

spray of mounted men forming a continuous line for over sixty miles. On February 5th the line was

advancing, and on the 6th it was known that De Wet was actually within the angle, the mouth of which was

spanned by the British line. Hope ran high in Pretoria. The space into which the burgher chief had been

driven was bounded by sixtysix miles of blockhouse and wire on one side and thirty on the other, while the

third side of the triangle was crossed by fiftyfive miles of British horsemen, flanked by a blockhouse line

between Kroonstad and Lindley. The tension along the lines of defence was extreme. Infantry guarded every

yard of them, and armoured trains patrolled them, while at night searchlights at regular intervals shed their

vivid rays over the black expanse of the veldt and illuminated the mounted figures who flitted from time to

On the 6th De Wet realised his position, and with characteristic audacity and promptness he took means to

clear the formidable toils which had been woven round him. The greater part of his command scattered, with

orders to make their way as best they might out of the danger. Working in their own country, where every

crease and fold of the ground was familiar to them, it is not surprising that most of them managed to make

their way through gaps in the attenuated line of horsemen behind them. A few were killed, and a considerable

number taken, 270 being the respectable total of the prisoners. Three or four slipped through, however, for

every one who stuck in the meshes. De Wet himself was reported to have made his escape by driving cattle

against the wire fences which enclosed him. It seems, however, to have been nothing more romantic than a

wirecutter which cleared his path, though cattle no doubt made their way through the gap which he left.

With a loss of only three of his immediate followers be Wet won his way out of the most dangerous position

which even his adventurous career had ever known. Lord Kitchener had descended to Wolvehoek to be

present at the climax of the operations, but it was not fated that he was to receive the submission of the most

energetic of his opponents, and he returned to Pretoria to weave a fresh mesh around him.

This was not hard to do, as the Boer General had simply escaped from one pen into another, though a larger

one. After a short rest to restore the columns, the whole pack were full cry upon his heels once more. An

acute angle is formed by the Wilge Biver on one side and the line of blockhouses between Harrismith and

Van Reenen upon the other. This was strongly manned by troops and five columns; those of Rawlinson,

Nixon, Byng, Rimington, and Keir herded the broken cornmandos into the trap. From February 20th the

troops swept in an enormous skirmish line across the country, ascending hills, exploring kloofs, searching

river banks, and always keeping the enemy in front of them. At last, when the pressure was severely felt,

there came the usual breakback, which took the form of a most determined night attack upon the British line.

This was delivered shortly after midnight on February 23rd. It struck the British cordon at the point of

juncture between Byng's column and that of Rimington. So huge were the distances which had to be covered,

and so attenuated was the force which covered them, that the historical thin red line was a massive formation

compared to its khaki equivalent. The chain was frail and the links were not all carefully joined, but each

particular link was good metal, and the Boer impact came upon one of the best. This was the 7th New

Zealand Contingent, who proved themselves to be worthy comrades to their six gallant predecessors. Their

patrols were broken by the rush of wild, yelling, firing horsemen, but the troopers made a most gallant

resistance. Having pierced the line the Boers, who were led in their fiery rush by Manie Botha, turned to their

flank, and, charging down the line of weak patrols, overwhelmed one after another and threatened to roll up

the whole line. They had cleared a gap of half a mile, and it seemed as if the whole Boer force would

certainly escape through so long a gap in the defences. The desperate defence of the NewZealanders gave

time, however, for the further patrols, which consisted of Cox's New South Wales Mounted Infantry, to fall

back almost at right angles so as to present a fresh face to the attack. The pivot of the resistance was a maxim

gun, most gallantly handled by Captain Begbie and his men. The fight at this point was almost muzzle to

muzzle, fifty or sixty NewZealanders and Australians with the British gunners holding off a force of several

hundred of the best fighting men of the Boer forces. In this desperate duel many dropped on both sides.

Begbie died beside his gun, which fired eighty rounds before it jammed. It was run back by its crew in order

to save it from capture. But reinforcements were coming up, and the Boer attack was beaten back. A number

of them had escaped, however, through the opening which they had cleared, and it was conjectured that the

wonderful De Wet was among them. How fierce was the storm which had broken on the NewZealanders

may be shown by their roll of twenty killed and forty wounded, while thirty dead Boers were picked up in

front of their picket line. Of eight New Zealand officers seven are reported to have been hit, an even higher

proportion than that which the same gallant race endured at the battle of Rhenoster Kop more than a year

It was feared at first that the greater part of the Boers migbt have escaped upon this night of the 23rd, when

Manie Botha's storming party burst through the ranks of the NewZealanders. It was soon discovered that

this was not so, and the columns as they closed in had evidence from the numerous horsemen who scampered

aimlessly over the hills in front of them that the main body of the enemy was still in the toils. The advance

was in tempestuous weather and over rugged country, but the men were filled with eagerness, and no

This time their efforts were crowned with considerable success. A second attempt was made by the corraled

burghers to break out on the night of February 26th, but it was easily repulsed by Nixon. The task of the

troopers as the cordon drew south was more and more difficult, and there were places traversed upon the

Natal border where an alpen stock would have been a more useful adjunct than a horse. At six o'clock on the

morning of the 27th came the end. Two Boers appeared in front of the advancing line of the Imperial Light

Horse and held up a flag. They proved to be Truter and De Jager, ready to make terms for their commando.

The only terms offered were absolute surrender within the hour. The Boers had been swept into a very

confined space, which was closely hemmed in by troops, so that any resistance must have ended in a tragedy.

Fortunately there was no reason for desperate councils in their case, since they did not fight as Lotter had

done, with the shadow of judgment hanging over him. The burghers piled arms, and all was over.

The total number captured in this important drive was 780 men, including several leaders, one of whom was

De Wet's own son. It was found that De Wet himself had been among those who had got away through the

picket lines on the night of the 23rd. Most of the commando were Transvaalers, and it was typical of the wide

sweep of the net that many of them were the men who had been engaged against the 28th Mounted Infantry

in the district south of Johannesburg upon the 12th of the same month. The loss of 2,000 horses and 50,000

cartridges meant as much as that of the men to the Boer army. It was evident that a few more such blows

The wearied troopers were allowed little rest, for in a couple of days after their rendezvous at Harrismith they

were sweeping back again to pick up all that they had missed. This drive, which was over the same ground,

but sweeping backwards towards the HeilbronWolvehoek line, ended in the total capture of 147 of the

enemy, who were picked out of holes, retrieved from amid the reeds of the river, called down out of trees, or

otherwise collected. So thorough were the operations that it is recorded that the angle which formed the apex

of the drive was one drove of game upon the last day, all the many types of antelope, which form one of the

More important even than the results of the drive was the discovery of one of De Wet's arsenals in a cave in

the Vrede district. Halfway down a precipitous krantz, with its mouth covered by creepers, no writer of

romance could have imagined a more fitting headquarters for a guerilla chief. The find was made by Ross's

Canadian Scouts, who celebrated Dominion Day by this most useful achievement. Forty wagonloads of

ammunition and supplies were taken out of the cave De Wet was known to have left the northeast district,

and to have got across the railway, travelling towards the Vaal as if it were his intention to join De la Rey in

the Transvaal. The Boer resistance had suddenly become exceedingly energetic in that part, and several

Before doing so it would be as well to bring the chronicle of events in the Orange River Colony down to the

conclusion of peace. There were still a great number of wandering Boers in the northern districts and in the

frontier mountains, who were assiduously, but not always successfully, hunted down by the British troops.

Much arduous and useful work was done by several small columns, the Colonial Horse and the Artillery

Mounted Rifles especially distinguishing themselves. The latter corps, formed from the gunners whose

fieldpieces were no longer needed, proved themselves to be a most useful body of men; and the British

gunner, when he took to carrying his gun, vindicated the reputation which he had won when his gun had

>From the 1st to the 4th of May a successful drive was conducted by many columns in the often harried but

never deserted LindleyKroonstad district. The result was propitious, as no fewer than 321 prisoners were

brought in. Of these, 150 under Mentz were captured in one body as they attempted to break through the

Amid many small drives and many skirmishes, one stands out for its severity. It is remarkable as being the

last action of any importance in the campaign. This was the fight at Moolman's Spruit, near Ficksburg, upon

April 20th, 1902. A force of about one hundred Yeomanry and forty Mounted Infantry (South Staffords) was

despatched by night to attack an isolated farm in which a small body of Boers was supposed to be sleeping.

Colonel Perceval was in command. The farm was reached after a difficult march, but the enemy were found

to have been forewarned, and to be in much greater strength than was anticipated. A furious fire was opened

on the advancing troops, who were clearly visible ill the light of a full moon. Sir Thomas Fowler was killed

and several men of the Yeomanry were hit. The British charged up to the very walls, but were unable to

effect an entrance, as the place was barricaded and loopholed. Captain Blackwood, of the Staffords, was

killed in the attack. Finding that the place was impregnable, and that the enemy outnumbered him, Colonel

Perceval gave the order to retire, a movement which was only successfully carried out because the greater

part of the Boer horses had been shot. By morning the small British force had extricated itself, from its

perilous position with a total loss of six killed, nineteen wounded, and six missing. The whole affair was

undoubtedly a cleverly planned Boer ambush, and the small force was most fortunate in escaping destruction.

One other isolated incident may be mentioned here, though it occurred far away in the Vryheid district of the

Transvaal. This was the unfortunate encounter between Zulus and Boers by which the latter lost over fifty of

their numbers under deplorable circumstances. This portion of the Transvaal has only recently been annexed,

and is inhabited by warlike Zulus, who are very different from the debased Kaffirs of the rest of the country.

These men had a bloodfeud against the Boers, which was embittered by the fact that they had lost heavily

through Boer depredations. Knowing that a party of fiftynine men were sleeping in a farmhouse, the Zulus

crept on to it and slaughtered every man of the inmates. Such an incident is much to be regretted, and yet,

looking back upon the long course of the war, and remembering the turbulent tribes who surrounded the

combatants Swazis, Basutos, and Zulus we may well congratulate ourselves that we have been able to

restrain those black warriors, and to escape the brutalities and the bitter memories of a barbarian invasion.

IT will be remembered that at the close of 1901 Lord Methuen and Colonel Kekewich had both come across

to the eastern side of their district and made their base at the railway line in the Klerksdorp section. Their

position was strengthened by the fact that a blockhouse cordon now ran from Klerksdorp to Ventersdorp, and

from Ventersdorp to Potchefstroom, so that this triangle could be effectively controlled. There remained,

however, a huge tract of difficult country which was practically in the occupation of the enemy. Several

thousand stalwarts were known to be riding with De la Rey and his energetic lieutenant Kemp. The strenuous

operations of the British in the Eastern Transvaal and in the Orauge River Colony had caused this district to

be comparatively neglected, and so everything was in favour of an aggressive movement of the Boers. There

was a long lull after the unsuccessful attack upon Kekewich's camp at Moedwill, but close observers of the

The new year found the British connecting Ventersdorp with Tafelkop by a blockhouse line. The latter place

had been a centre of Boer activity. Colonel Hickie's column covered this operation. Meanwhile Methuen had

struck across through Wolmaranstad as far as Vryburg. In these operations, which resulted in constant small

captures, he was assisted by a column under Major Paris working from Kimberley. From Vryburg Lord

Methuen made his way in the middle of January to Lichtenburg, meeting with a small rebuff in the

neighbourhood of that town, for a detachment of Yeomanry was overwhelmed by General Celliers, who

killed eight, wounded fifteen, and captured forty. From Lichtenburg Lord Methuen continued his enormous

trek, and arrived on February 1st at Klerksdorp once more. Little rest was given to his hardworked troops,

and they were sent off again within the week under the command of Von Donop, with the result that on

February 8th, near Wolmaranstad, they captured Potgieter's laager with forty Boer prisoners. Von Donop

remained at Wolmaranstad until late in FebruaTy; On the 23rd he despatched an empty convoy back to

Kekewich and Hickie had combined their forces at the beginning of February. On February 4th an attempt

was made by them to surprise General De la Rey. The mounted troops who were despatched under Major

Leader failed in this enterprise, but they found and overwhelmed the laager of Sarel Alberts, capturing 132

prisoners. By stampeding the horses the Boer retreat was cut off, and the attack was so furiously driven home,

especialy by the admirable Scottish Horse, that few of the enemy got away. Alberts himself with all his

officers were among the prisoners. From this time until the end of February this column was not seriously

It has been stated above that on February 23rd Von Donop sent in an empty convoy from Wolmaranstad to

Klerksdorp, a distance of about fifty miles. Nothing bad been heard for some time of De la Rey, but he had

called together his men and was waiting to bring off some coup. The convoy gave him the very opportunity

The escort of the convoy consisted of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, sixty of Paget's Horse, three companies of

the ubiquitous Northumberland Fusiliers, two guns of the 4th R.F.A., and a pompom, amounting in all to

630 men. Colonel Anderson was in command. On the morning of Tuesday, February 25th, the convoy was

within ten miles of its destination, and the sentries on the kopjes round the town could see the gleam of the

long line of whitetilted wagons. Their hazardous voyage was nearly over, and yet they were destined to

most complete and fatal wreck within sight of port. So confident were they that the detachment of Paget's

Horse was permitted to ride on the night before into the town. It was as well, for such a handful would have

The night had been dark and wet, and the Boers under cover of it had crept between the sleeping convoy and

the town. Some bushes which afford excellent cover lie within a few hundred yards of the road, and here the

main ambush was laid. In the first grey of the morning the long line of the convoy, 130 wagons in all, came

trailing pastguns and Yeomanry in front, Fusiliers upon the flanks and rear. Suddenly the black bank of

scrub was outlined in flame, and a furious rifle fire was opened upon the head of the column. The troops

behaved admirably under most difficult circumstances. A counterattack by the Fusiliers and some of the

Yeomanry, under cover of shrapnel from the guns, drove the enemy out of the scrub and silenced his fire at

this point. It was evident, however, that he was present in force, for firing soon broke out along the whole left

flank, and the rearguard found itself as warmly attacked as the van. Again, bowever, the assailants were

driven off. It was now broad daylight, and the wagons, which had got into great confusion in the first turmoil

of battle, had been remarshalled and arranged. It was Colonel Anderson's hope that he might be able to send

them on into safety while he with the escort covered their retreat. His plan was certainly the best one, and if it

did not succeed it was due to nothing which he could avert, but to the nature of the ground and the gallantry

The physical obstacle consisted in a very deep and difficult spruit, the Jagd Spruit, which forms an ugly

passage in times of peace, but which when crowded and choked with stampeding mules and splintering

wagons, under their terrified conductors, soon became impassable. Here the head of the column was clubbed

and the whole line came to a stand. Meanwhile the enemy, adopting their new tactics, came galloping in on

the left flank I and on the rear. The first attack was repelled by the steady fire of the Fusiliers, but on the

second occasion the horsemen got up to the wagons, and galloping down them were able to overwhelm in

detail the little knots of soldiers who were scattered along the flank. The British, who were outnumbered by

at least three to one, made a stout resistance, and it was not until seven o'clock that the last shot was fired.

The result was a complete success to the burghers, but one which leaves no shadow of discredit on any

officer or man among those who were engaged. Eleven officers and 176 men fell out of about 550 actually

engaged. The Boers, so the teams were shot and the wagons burned before they withdrew. The prisoners too,

they were unable to retain, and their sole permanent trophies consisted of the two guns, the rifles, and the

A small force sallied out from Klerksdorp in the hope of helping Anderson, but on reaching the Jagd Drift it

was found that the fighting was over and that the field was in possession of the Boers. De la Rey was seen in

person among the burghers, and it is pleasant to add that he made himself conspicuous by his humanity to the

wounded. His force drew off in the course of the morning, and was soon out of reach of immediate pursuit,

though this was attempted by Kekewich, Von Donop, and Grenfell. It was important to regain the guns if

possible, as they were always a menace to the blockhouse system, and for this purpose Grenfell with sixteen

hundred horsemen was despatched to a point south of Lichtenburg, which was conjectured to be upon the

Boer line of retreat. At the same time Lord Methuen was ordered up from Vryburg in order to cooperate in

this movement, and to join his forces to those of Grenfell. It was obvious that with an energetic and resolute

adversary like De la Rey there was great danger of these two forces being taken in detail, but it was hoped

that each was strong enough to hold its own until the other could come to its aid. The result was to show that

It was on March 2nd that Methuen left Vryburg. The column was not his old one, consisting of veterans of

the trek, but was the Kimberley column under Major Paris, a body of men who bad seen much less service

and were in every way less reliable. It included a curious mixture of units, the most solid of which were four

guns (two of the 4th, and two of the 38th R.F.A.), 200 Northumberland Fusiliers, and 100 Loyal North

Lancashires. The mounted men included 5th Imperial Yeomanry (184), Cape Police (233), Cullinan's Horse

(64), 86th Imperial Yeomanry (110), Diamond Fields Horse (92), Dennison' s Scouts (58), Ashburner's Horse

(126), and British South African Police (24). Such a collection of samples would be more in place, one would

imagine, in a London procession than in an operation which called for discipline and cohesion. In warfare the

half is often greater than the whole, and the presence of a proportion of halfhearted and inexperienced men

Upon March 6th Methuen, marching east towards Lichtenburg, came in touch near Leeuwspruit with Van

Zyl's commando, and learned in the small skirmish which ensued that some of his Yeomanry were unreliable

and illinstructed. Having driven the enemy off by his artillery fire, Methuen moved to Tweebosch, where he

laagered until next morning. At 3 A.M. of the 7th the oxconvoy was sent on, under escort of half of his little

force. The other half followed at 4.20, 50 as to give the slowmoving oxen a chance of keeping ahead. It was

evident, however, immediately after the column had got started that the enemy were all round in great

numbers, and that an attack in force was to be expected. Lord Methuen gave orders therefore that the

oxwagons should be halted and that the muletransport should close upon them so as to form one solid

block, instead of a straggling line. At the same time he reinforced his rearguard with mounted men and with

two guns, for it was in that quarter that the enemy appeared to be most numerous and aggressive. An attack

was also developing upon the right flank, which was held off by the infantry and by the second section of the

It has been said that Methuen's horsemen were for the most part inexperienced irregulars. Such men become

in time excellent soldiers, as all this campaign bears witness, but it is too much to expose them to a severe

ordeal in the open field when they are still raw and untrained. As it happened, this particular ordeal was

exceedingly severe, but nothing can excuse the absolute failure of the troops concerned to rise to the

occasion. Had Methuen's rearguard consisted of Imperial Light Horse, or Scottish Horse, it is safe to say that

What happened was that a large body of Boers formed up in five lines and charged straight home at the rear

screen and rearguard, firing from their saddles as they had done at Brakenlaagte. The sight of those

wideflung lines of determined men galloping over the plain seems to have been too much for the nerves of

the unseasoned troopers. A panic spread through their ranks, and in an instant they had turned their horses'

heads and were thundering to their rear, leaving the two guns uncovered and streaming in wild confusion past

the left flank of the jeering infantry who were lying round the wagons. The limit of their flight seems to have

been the wind of their horses, and most of them never drew rein until they had placed many miles between

themselves and the comrades whom they had deserted. ' It was pitiable,' says an eyewitness, 'to see the

grand old General begging them to stop, but they would not; a large body of them arrived in Kraaipan

By this defection of the greater portion of the force the handful of brave men who remained were left in a

hopeless position. The two guns of the 38th battery were overwhelmed and ridden over by the Boer

horsemen, every man being killed or wounded, including Lieutenant Nesham, who acted up to the highest

The battle, however, was not yet over. The infantry were few in number, but they were experienced troops,

and they maintained the struggle for some hours in the face of overwhelming numbers. Two hundred of the

Northumberland Fusiliers lay round the wagons and held the Boers off from their prey. With them were the

two remaining guns, which were a mark for a thousand Boer riflemen. It was while encouraging by his

presence and example the muchtried gunners of this section that the gallant Methuen was wounded by a

bullet which broke the bone of his thigh. Lieutenant Venning and all the detachment fell with their General

An attempt had been made to rally some of the flying troopers at a neighbouring kraal, and a small body of

Cape Police and Yeomanry under the command of Major Paris held out there for some hours. A hundred of

the Lancashire Infantry aided them in their stout defence. But the guns taken by the Boers from Von Donop's

convoy had free play now that the British guns were out of action, and they were brought to bear with

crushing effect upon both the kraal and the wagons. Further resistance meant a useless slaughter, and orders

were given for a surrender. Convoy, ammunition, guns, horses nothing was saved except the honour of the

infantry and the gunners. The losses, 68 killed and 121 wounded, fell chiefly upon these two branches of the

This, the last Boer victory in the war, reflected equal credit upon their valour and humanity, qualities which

had not always gone hand in hand in our experience of them. Courtesy and attention were extended to the

British wounded, and Lord Methuen was sent under charge of his chief medical officer, Colonel Townsend

(the doctor as severely wounded as the patient), into Klerksdorp. In De la Rey we have always found an

opponent who was as chivalrous as he was formidable. The remainder of the force reached the

KimberleyMafeking railway line in the direction of Kraaipan, the spot where the first bloodshed of the war

On Lord Methuen himself no blame can rest for this unsuccessful action. If the workman's tool snaps in his

hand he cannot be held responsible for the failure of his task. The troops who misbehaved were none of his

training. 'If you hear anyone slang him,' says one of his men, 'you are to tell them that he is the finest General

and the truest gentleman that ever fought in this war.' Such was the tone of his own troopers, and such also

that of the spokesmen of the nation when they commented upon the disaster in the Houses of Parliament. It

was a fine example of British justice and sense of fair play, even in that bitter moment, that to hear his eulogy

one would have thought that the occasion had been one when thanks were being returned for a victory. It is a

generous public with fine instincts, and Paul Methuen, wounded and broken, still remained in their eyes the

The De Wet country had been pretty well cleared by the series of drives which have already been described,

and Louis Botha's force in the Eastern Transvaal had been much diminished by the tactics of Bruce Hamilton

and WoolsSampson. Lord Kitchener was able, therefore, to concentrate his troops and his attention upon

that widespread western area in which General De la Rey had dealt two such shrewd blows within a few

weeks of each other. Troops were rapidly concentrated at Klerksdorp. Kekewich, Walter Kitchener,

Rawlinson, and Rochfort, with a number of small columns, were ready in the third week of March to

The problem with which Lord Kitchener was confronted was a very difficult one, and he has never shown

more originality and audacity than in the fashion in which he handled it. De la Rey's force was scattered over

a long tract of country, capable of rapidly concentrating for a blow, but otherwise as intangible and elusive as

a phantom army. Were Lord Kitchener simply to launch ten thousand horsemen at him, the result would be a

weary ride over illimitable plains without sight of a Boer, unless it were a distant scout upon the extreme

horizon. Delarey and his men would have slipped away to his northern hidingplaces beyond the Marico

River. There was no solid obstacle here, as in the Orange River Colony, against which the flying enemy could

be rounded up. One line of blockhouses there was, it is true the one called the Schoonspruit cordon, which

flanked the De la Rey country. It flanked it, however, upon the same side as that on which the troops were

assembled. If the troops were only on the other side, and De la Rey was between them and the blockhouse

line, then, indeed, something might be done. But to place the troops there, and then bring them instantly back

again, was to put such a strain upon men and horses as had never yet been done upon a large scale in the

course of the war. Yet Lord Kitchener knew the mettle of the men whom he commanded, and he was aware

that there were no exertions of which the human frame is capable which he might not confidently demand.

The precise location of the Boer laagers does not appear to have been known, but it was certain that a

considerable number of them were scattered about thirty miles or so to the west of Klerksdorp and the

Shoonspruit line. The plan was to march a British force right through them, then spread out into a wide line

and come straight back, driving the burghers on to the cordon of blockhouses, which had been strengthened

by the arrival of three regiments of Highlanders. But to get to the o~her side of the Boers it was necessary to

march the columns through by night. It was a hazardous operation, but the secret was well kept, and the

movement was so well carried out that the enemy had no time to check it. On the night of Sunday, March

23rd, the British horsemen passed stealthily in column through the Delarey country, and then, spreading out

into a line, which from the left wing at Lichtenburg to the right wing at Commando Drift measured a good

eighty miles, they proceeded to sweep back upon their traces. In order to reach their positions the columns

had, of course, started at different points of the British blockhouse line, and some had a good deal farther to

go than others, while the southern extension of the line was formed by Bochfort's troops, who had moved up

from the Vaal. Above him from south to north came Walter Kitchener, Rawlinson, and Kekewich in the order

On the morning of Monday, March 24th, a line of eighty miles of horsemen, without guns or transport, was

sweeping back towards the blockhouses, while the country between was filled with scattered parties of Boers

who were seeking for gaps by which to escape. It was soon learned from the first prisoners that De la Rey

was not within the cordon. His laager had been some distance farther west. But the sight of fugitive horsemen

rising and dipping over the rolling veldt assured the British that they had something within their net. The

catch was, however, by no means as complete as might have been desired. Three hundred men in khaki

slipped through between the two columns in the early morning. Another large party escaped to the south

wards. Some of the Boers adopted extraordinary devices in order to escape from the evernarrowing cordon.

'Three, in charge of some cattle, buried themselves, and left a small hole to breathe through with a tube. Some

men began to probe with bayonets in the new.turned earth and got immediate and vociferous subterranean

yells. Another man tried the same game and a horse stepped on him. He writhed and reared the horse, and

practically the horse found the prisoner for us.' But the operations achieved one result, which must have lifted

a load of anxiety from Lord Kitchener's mind. Three fifteenpounders, two pompoms, and a large amount

of ammunition were taken. To Kekewich and the Scottish Horse fell the honour of the capture, Colonel

WoolsSampson and Captain Rice heading the charge and pursuit. By this means the constant menace to the

blockhouses was lessened, if not entirely removed. One hundred and seventyfive Boers were disposed of,

nearly all as prisoners, and a considerable quantity of transport was captured. In this operation the troops had

averaged from seventy to eighty miles in twentysix hours without change of horses. To such a point had the

slowmoving ponderous British Army attained after two years' training of that stern drillmaster, necessity.

The operations had attained some success, but nothing commensurate with the daring of the plan or the

exertions of the soldiers. Without an instant's delay, however, Lord Kitchener struck a second blow at his

enemy. Before the end of March Kekewich, Rawlinson, and Walter Kitchener were all upon the trek once

more. Their operations were pushed farther to the west than in the last drive, since it was known that on that

It was to one of Walter Kitchener's lieutenants that the honour fell to come in direct contact with the main

force of the burghers. This General had moved out to a point about forty miles west of Klerksdorp. Forming

his laager there, he despatched Cookson on March 30th with seventeen hundred men to work further

westward in the direction of the Harts River. Under Cookson's immediate command were the 2nd Canadian

Mounted Infantry, Damant's Horse, and four guns of the 7th R.F.A. His lieutenant, Keir, commanded the 28th

Mounted Infantry, the Artillery Mounted Rifles, and 2nd Kitchener's Fighting Scouts. The force was well

It was not long before this mobile force found itself within touch of the enemy. The broad weal made by the

passing of a convoy set them off at full cry, and they were soon encouraged by the distant cloud of dust

which shrouded the Boer wagons. The advance guard of the column galloped at the top of their speed for

eight miles, and closed in upon the convoy, but found themselves faced by an escort of five hundred Boers,

who fought a clever rearguard action, and covered their charge with great skill. At the same time Cookson

closed in upon his mounted infantry, while on the other side Delarey's main force fell back in order to

reinforce the escort. British and Boers were both riding furiously to help their own comrades. The two forces

Perceiving that he was in front of the whole Boer army, and knowing that he might expect reinforcements,

Cookson decided to act upon the defensive. A position was rapidly taken up along the Brakspruit, and

preparations made to resist the impending attack. The line of defence was roughly the line of the spruit, but

for some reason, probably to establish a cross fire, one advanced position was occupied upon either flank. On

the left flank was a farmhouse, which was held by two hundred men of the Artillery Rifles. On the extreme

right was another outpost of twentyfour Canadians and fortyfive Mounted Infantry. They occupied no

defensible position, and their situation was evidently a most dangerous one, only to be justified by some

The Boer guns had opened fire, and considerable bodies of the enemy appeared upon the flanks and in front.

Their first efforts were devoted towards getting possession of the farmhouse, which would give them a

POINT D'APPUI from which they could turn the whole line. Some five hundred of them charged on

horseback, but.were met by a very steady fire from the Artillery Rifles, while the guns raked them with

shrapnel. They reached a point within five hundred yards of the building, but the fire was too hot, and they

wheeled round in rapid retreat. Dismounting in a mealiepatch they skirmished up towards the farmhouse

once more, but they were again checked by the fire of the defenders and by a pompom which Colonel Keir

In the meantime the fate which might have been foretold had befallen the isolated detachment of Canadians

and 28th Mounted Infantry upon the extreme right. Bruce Carruthers, the Canadian officer in command,

behaved with the utmost gallantry, and was splendidly seconded by his men. Overwhelmed by vastly superior

numbers, amid a perfect hail of bullets they fought like heroes to the end. 'There have been few finer

instances of heroism in the course of the campaign,' says the reticent Kitchener in his official despatch. Of the

Canadians eighteen were hit out of twentyone, and the Mounted Infantry hard by lost thirty out of fortyfive

This advantage gained upon the right flank was of no assistance to the Boers in breaking the British line. The

fact that it was so makes it the more difficult to understand why this outpost was so exposed. The burghers

had practically surrounded Cookson's force, and De la Rey and Kemp urged on the attack; buL~ their artillery

fire was dominated by the British guns, and no weak point could be found in the defence. At 1 o'clock the

attack had been begun, and at 5.30 it was finally abandoned, and Delarey was in full retreat. That he was in

no sense routed is shown by the fact that Cookson did not attempt to follow him up or to capture his guns; but

at least he had failed in his purpose, and had lost more heavily than in any engagement which he had yet

fought. The moral effect of his previous victories had also been weakened, and his burghers had learned, if

they had illusions upon the subject, that the men who fled at Tweebosch were not typical troopers of the

British Army. Altogether, it was a wellfought and useful action, though it cost the British force some two

hundred casualties, of which thirtyfive were fatal. Cookson's force stood to arms all night mitil the arrival of

General Ian Hamilton, who had acted for some time as Chief of the Staff to Lord Kitchener, had arrived on

April 8th at Klerksdorp to take supreme command of the whole operations against De la Rey. Early in April

the three main British columns had made a rapid cast round without success. To the very end the better

intelligence and the higher mobility seem to have remained upon the side of the Boers, who could always

force a fight when Lhey wished and escape when they wished. Occasionally, however, they forced one at the

Hamilton had planned a drive to cover the southern portion of Delarey's country, and for this purpose, with

Hartebeestefontein for his centre, he was manoeuvring his columns so as to swing them into line and then

sweep back towards Klerksdorp. Kekewich, Rawlinson, and Walter Kitchener were all manoeuvring for this

purpose. The Boers, however, game to the last, although they were aware that their leaders had gone in to

treat, and that peace was probably due within a few days, determined to have one last gallant fall with a

British column. The forces of Kekewich were the farthest to the westward, and also, as the burghers thought,

the most isolated, and it was upon them, accordingly, that the attack was made. In the morning of April 11th,

at a place called Rooiwal, the enemy, who had moved up from Wolmaranstad, nineteen hundred strong,

under Kemp and Vermaas, fell with the utmost impetuosity upon the British column. There was no

preliminary skirmishing, and a single gallant charge by 1,500 Boers both opened and ended the engagement.

'I was just saying to the staff officer that there were no Boers within twenty miles,' says one who was present,

'when we heard a roar of musketry and saw a lot of men galloping down on us.' The British were surprised

but not shaken by this unexpected apparition. 'I never saw a more splendid attack. They kept a distinct line,'

says the eyewitness. Another spectator says, 'They came on in one long line four deep and knee to knee.' It

was an oldfashioned cavalry charge, and the fact that it got as far as it did shows that we have over rated the

stopping power of modern rifles. They came for a good five hundred yards under direct fire, and were only

turned within a hundred of the British line. The Yeomanry, the Scottish Horse, and the Constabulary poured a

steady fire upon the advancing wave of horsemen, and the guns opened with case at two hundred yards. The

Boers were stopped, staggered, and turned. Their fire, or rather the covering fire of those who had not joined

in the charge, had caused some fifty casualties, but their own losses were very much more severe. The fierce

Potgieter fell just in front of the British guns. 'Thank goodness he is dead! ' cried one of his wounded

burghers, 'for he sjamboked me into the firing line this morning.' Fifty dead and a great number of wounded

were left upon the field of battle. Rawlinson's column came up on Kekewich's left, and the Boer flight

became a rout, for they were chased for twenty miles, and their two guns were captured. It was a brisk and

decisive little engagement, and it closed the Western campaign, leaving the last trick, as well as the game, to

the credit of the British. From this time until the end there was a gleaning of prisoners but little fighting in De

la Rey's country, the most noteworthy event being a surprise visit to SchweizerRenecke by Rochfort, by

which some sixty prisoners were taken, and afterwards the drive of Ian Hamilton's forces against the

Mafeking railway line by which no fewer than 364 prisoners were secured. In this difficult and

wellmanaged operation the gaps between the British columns were concealed by the lighting of long

veldtfires and the discharge of rifles by scattered scouts. The newly arrived Australian Commonwealth

Regiments gave a brilliant start to the military history of their united country by the energy of their marching

Upon May 29th, only two days before the final declaration of peace, a raid was made by a few Boers upon

the native cattle reserves near Fredericstad. A handful of horsemen pursued them, and were ambushed by a

considerable body of the enemy in some hilly country ten miles from the British lines. Most of the pursuers

got away in safety, but young Sutherland, second lieutenant of the Seaforths, and only a few months from

Eton, found himself separated from his horse and in a hopeless position. Scorning to surrender, the lad

actually fought his way upon foot for over a mile before he was shot down by the horsemen who circled

round him. Well might the Boer commander declare that in the whole course of the war he had seen no finer

example of British courage. It is indeed sad that at this last instant a young life should be thrown away, but

Sutherland died in a noble fashion for a noble cause, and many inglorious years would be a poor substitute

It only remains in one short chapter to narrate the progress of the peace negotiations, the ultimate settlement,

and the final consequences of this longdrawn war. However disheartening the successive incidents may

have been in which the Boers were able to inflict heavy losses upon us and to renew their supplies of arms

and ammunition, it was none the less certain that their numbers were waning and that the inevitable end was

steadily approaching. With mathematical precision the scientific soldier in Pretoria, with his web of barbed

wire radiating out over the whole country, was week by week wearing them steadily down. And yet after the

recent victory of De la Rey and various braggadocio pronouncements from the refugees at The Hague, it was

somewhat of a surprise to the British public when it was announced upon March 22nd that the acting

Government of the Transvaal, consisting of Messrs. Schalk Burger, Lucas Meyer, Reitz, Jacoby, Krogh, and

Van Velden had come into Middelburg and requested to be forwarded by train to Pretoria for the purpose of

discussing terms of peace with Lord Kitchener. A thrill of hope ran through the Empire at the news, but so

doubtful did the issue seem that none of the preparations were relaxed which would ensure a vigorous

campaign in the immediate future. In the South African as in the Peninsular and in the Crimean wars, it may

truly be said that Great Britain was never so ready to fight as at the dawning of peace. At least two years of

failure and experience are needed to turn a civilian and commercial nation into a military power.

In spite of the optimistic pronouncements of Mr. Fischer and the absurd forecasts of Dr. Leyds the power of

the Boers was really broken, and they had come in with the genuine intention of surrender. In a race with

such individuality.it was not enough that the government should form its conclusion. It was necessary for

them to persuade their burghers that the game was really up, and that they had no choice but to throw down

their wellworn rifles and their illfilled bandoliers. For this purpose a long series of negotiations had to be

entered into which put a strain upon the complacency of the authorities in South Africa and upon the patience

of the attentive public at home. Their ultimate success shows that this complacency and this patience were

On March 23rd the Transvaal representatives were despatched to Kroonstad for the purpose of opening up the

matter with Steyn and De Wet. Messengers were sent to communicate with these two leaders, but had they

been British columns instead of fellowcountrymen they could not have found greater difficulty in running

them to earth. At last, however, at the end of the month the message was conveyed, and resulted in the

appearance of De Wet, De la Rey, and Steyn at the British outposts at Klerksdorp. The other delegates had

come north again from Kroonstad, and all were united in the same small town, which, by a whimsical fate,

had suddenly become the centre both for the making of peace and for the prosecution of the war, with the

eyes of the whole world fixed upon its insignificant litter of houses. On April 11th, after repeated

conferences, both parties moved on to Pretoria, and the most sceptical observers began to confess that there

was something in the negotiations after all. After conferring with Lord Kitchener the Boer leaders upon April

18th left Pretoria again and rode out to the commandos to explain the situation to them. The result of this

mission was that two delegates were chosen from each body in the field, who assembled at Vereeniging upon

May 15th for the purpose of settling the question by vote. Never was a high matter of state decided in so

Up to that period the Boer leaders had made a succession of tentative suggestions, each of which had been

put aside by the British Government. Their first had been that they should merely concede those points which

had been at issue at the beginning of the war. This was set aside. The second was that they should be allowed

to consult their friends in Europe. This also was refused. The next was that an armistice should be granted,

but again Lord Kitchener was obdurate. A definite period was suggested within which the burghers should

make their final choice between surrender and a war which must finally exterminate them as a people. It was

tacitly understood, if not definitely promised, that the conditions which the British Government would be

prepared to grant would not differ much in essentials from those which had been refused by the Boers a

On May 15th the Boer conference opened at Vereeniging. Sixtyfour delegates from the commandos met

with the military and political chiefs of the late republics, the whole amounting to 150 persons. A more

singular gathering has not met in our time. There was Botha, the young lawyer, who had found himself by a

strange turn of fate commanding a victorious army in a great war. De Wet was there, with his grim mouth and

sunbrowned face; De la Rey, also, with the grizzled beard and the strong aquiline features. There, too, were

the politicians, the greybearded, genial Reitz, a little graver than when he looked upon 'the whole matter as

an immense joke,' and the unfortunate Steyn, stumbling and groping, a broken and ruined man. The burly

Lucas Meyer, smart young Smuts fresh from the siege of Ookiep, Beyers from the north, Kemp the dashing

cavalry leader, Muller the hero of many fights all these with many others of their sunblackened, gaunt,

hardfeatured comrades were grouped within the great tent of Vereeniging. The discussions were heated and

prolonged. But the logic of facts was inexorable, and the cold still voice of commonsense had more power

than all the ravings of enthusiasts. The vote showed that the great majority of the delegates were in favour of

surrender upon the terms offered by the British Government. On May 81st this resolution was notified to

Lord Kitchener, and at halfpast ten of the same night the delegates arrived at Pretoria and set their names to

the treaty of peace. After two years seven and a half months of hostilities the Dutch republics had acquiesced

in their own destruction, and the whole of South Africa, from Cape Town to the Zambesi, had been added to

the British Empire. The great struggle had cost us twenty thousand lives and a hundred thousand stricken

men, with two hundred millions of money; but, apart from a peaceful South Africa, it had won for us a

national resuscitation of spirit and a closer union with our great Colonies which could in no other way have

been attained. We had hoped that we were a solid empire when we engaged in the struggle, hut we knew that

we were when we emerged from it. In that change lies an ample recompense for all the blood and treasure

1. That the burghers lay down their arms and acknowledge themselves subjects of Edward VII. 2. That all

prisoners taking the oath of allegiance be returned. 3. That their liberty and property be inviolate. 4. That an

amnesty be grantedsave in special cases. 5. That the Dutch language be allowed in schools and lawcourts.

6. That rifles be ~lowed if registered. 7. That selfgovernment be granted as soon as possible. 8. That no

fr~nchise be granted for natives until after selfgoverninent. 9. That no special ~nd tax be levied. 10. That the

people be helped to reoccupy the farms. 11. That �3,000,000 be given to help the farmers. 12. That the rebels

be disfranchised and their leaders tried, on condition that no death penalty be inflicted.

These terms were practically the same as those which had been refused by Botha in March 1901. Thirteen

It had been a war of surprises, but the surprises have unhappily been hitherto invariably unpleasant ones.

Now at last the balance swung the other way, for in all the long paradoxical history of South African strife

there is nothing more wonderful than the way in which these two sturdy and unemotional races clasped hands

the instant that the fight was done. The fact is in itself a final answer to the illnatured critics of the

Continent. Men do not so easily grasp a hand which is reddened with the blood of women and children. From

all parts as the commandos. came in there was welcome news of the fraternisation between them and the

soldiers; while the Boer leaders, as loyal to their new ties as they had been to their old ones, exerted

themselves to promote good feeling among their people. A few weeks seemed to do more to lessen racial

bitterness than some of us had hoped for in as many years. One can but pray that it will last.

The surrenders amounted in all to twenty thousand men, and showed that in all parts of the seat of war the

enemy had more men in the field than we had imagined, a fact which may take the sting out of several of our

later mishaps. About twelve thousand surrendered in the Transvaal, six thousand in the Orange River Colony,

and about two thousand in the Cape olony, showing that the movement in the rebel districts had always been

more vexatious than formidable. A computation of the prisoners of war, the surrenders, the mercenaries, and

the casualties, shows that the total forces to which we were opposed were certainly not fewer than

seventyfive thousand wellarmed mounted men, while they may have considerably exceeded that number.

No wonder that the Boer leaders showed great confidence at the outset of the war.

That the heavy losses caused us by the war were borne without a murmur is surely evidence enough how

deep was the conviction of the nation that the war was not only just but essential that the possession of

South Africa and the unity of the Empire were at stake. Could it be shown, or were it even remotely possible,

that ministers had incurred so immense a responsibility and entailed such tremendous sacrifices upon their

people without adequate cause, is it not certain that, the task once done, an explosion of rage from the

deceived and the bereaved would have driven them for ever from public life? Among high and low, in

England, in Scotland, in Ireland, in the great Colonies, how many high hopes had been crushed, how often the

soldier son had gone forth and never returned, or come back maimed and stricken in the pride of his youth.

Everywhere was the voice of pity and sorrow, but nowhere that of reproach. The deepest instincts of the

nation told it that it must fight and win, or for ever abdicate its position in the world. Through dark days

which brought out the virtues of our race as nothing has done in our generation, we struggled grimly on until

the light had fully broken once again. And of all gifts that God has given to Britain there is none to compare

with those days of sorrow, for it was in them that the nation was assured of its unity, and learned for all time

that blood is stronger to bind than salt water is to part. The only difference in the point of view of the Briton

from Britain and the Briton from the ends of the earth, was that the latter with the energy of youth was more

wholesouled in the Imperial cause. Who has seen that Army and can forget it its spirit, its

picturesqueness above all, what it stands for in the future history of the world? Cowboys from the vast

plains of the NorthWest, gentlemen who ride hard with the Quorn or the Belvoir, gillies from the Sutherland

deerforests, bushmen from the back blocks of Australia, exquisites of the Raleigh Club or the Bachelor's,

hard men from Ontario, dandy sportsmen from India and Ceylon, the horsemen of New Zealand, the wiry

South African irregulars these are the Reserves whose existence was chronicled in no Bluebook, and

whose appearance came as a shock to the pedant soldiers of the Continent who had sneered so long at our

little Army, since long years of peace have caused them to forget its exploits. On the plains of South Africa,

in common danger and in common privation, the blood brotherhood of the Empire was sealed.

So much for the Empire. But what of South Africa? There in the end we must reap as we sow. If we are

worthy of the trust, it will be left to us. If we are unworthy of it, it will be taken away. Kruger's downfall

should teach us that it is not rifles but Justice which is the titledeed of a nation. The British flag under our

best administrators will mean clean government, honest laws, liberty and equality to all men. So long as it

continues to do so, we shall hold South Africa. When, out of fear or out or greed, we fall from that ideal, we

may know that we are stricken with that disease which has killed every great empire before us.

35. CHAPTER XXXI. THE GUERILLA WARFARE IN THE TRANSVAAL: NOOITGEDACHT , page = 202

37. CHAPTER XXXIII. THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO APRIL, 1901 , page = 219