The Leviathan ......................................................................................................................................................1

Thomas Hobbes.......................................................................................................................................1

NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other

things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs,

the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that

move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a

spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole

body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent

work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE

(in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural,

for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving

life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial

joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is

moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all

the particular members are the strength; salus populi (the people's safety) its business; counsellors, by whom

all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason

and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which

the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make

To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider * First, the matter thereof, and the artificer; both

which is man. * Secondly, how, and by what covenants it is made; what are the rights and just power or

authority of a sovereign; and what it is that preserveth and dissolveth it. * Thirdly, what is a Christian

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of books,

but of men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being

wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one

another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly

to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce teipsum, Read thyself: which was not

meant, as it is now used, to countenance either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors, or

to encourage men of low degree to a saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us that for the

similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever

looketh into himself and considereth what he doth when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc., and

upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon

the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, etc.;

not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc.: for these the

constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our

knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying,

counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts. And though by men's

actions we do discover their design sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and

distinguishing all circumstances by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without a key, and

be for the most part deceived, by too much trust or by too much diffidence, as he that reads is himself a good

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance,

which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation must read in himself, not this, or that particular man;

but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet, when I shall

have set down my own reading orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another will be only to consider if he

also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.

CONCERNING the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train or dependence

upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality, or other

accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears,

and other parts of man's body, and by diversity of working produceth diversity of appearances.

The original of them all is that which we call sense, (for there is no conception in a man's mind which hath

not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense). The rest are derived from that

To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have elsewhere

written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the

The cause of sense is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either

immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling: which pressure, by

the mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and

heart, causeth there a resistance, or counterpressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself: which

endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which

men call sense; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light, or colour figured; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril,

in an odour; to the tongue and palate, in a savour; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness,

and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities called sensible are in the object that

causeth them but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in

us that are pressed are they anything else but diverse motions (for motion produceth nothing but motion). But

their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye

makes us fancy a light, and pressing the ear produceth a din; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce

the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies or

objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses and in echoes by reflection we

see they are: where we know the thing we see is in one place; the appearance, in another. And though at some

certain distance the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one

thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense in all cases is nothing else but original fancy caused (as I

have said) by the pressure that is, by the motion of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs,

But the philosophy schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of

Aristotle, teach another doctrine; and say, for the cause of vision, that the thing seen sendeth forth on every

side a visible species, (in English) a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof

into the eye is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard sendeth forth an audible species, that

is, an audible aspect, or audible being seen; which, entering at the ear, maketh hearing. Nay, for the cause of

understanding also, they say the thing understood sendeth forth an intelligible species, that is, an intelligible

being seen; which, coming into the understanding, makes us understand. I say not this, as disapproving the

use of universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Commonwealth, I must let you see

on all occasions by the way what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of

THAT when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man

doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it,

though the reason be the same (namely, that nothing can change itself), is not so easily assented to. For men

measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject

after motion to pain and lassitude, think everything else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own

accord; little considering whether it be not some other motion wherein that desire of rest they find in

themselves consisteth. From hence it is that the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards out of an appetite

to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and

knowledge of what is good for their conservation (which is more than man has), to things inanimate,

When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever

hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it: and as we see in the water,

though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that

motion which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the object is

removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.

And this is it the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though

improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper

to one sense as to another. Imagination, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men and

The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in

such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue

by which they are visible in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes which our eyes,

ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore the light of

the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object being removed

from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and

working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of

the day. From whence it followeth that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the

weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense

were moved: so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great

distance of place that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts, and as

voices grow weak and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak;

and we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets; and of actions, many particular

circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself (I mean fancy itself), we call

imagination, as I said before. But when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old,

and past, it is called memory. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. Again, imagination being only of those

things which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times; the

former (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is simple imagination, as

when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is compounded, when from the

sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a centaur. So when a man

compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man

imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with

reading of romances), it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also

other imaginations that rise in men, though waking, from the great impression made in sense: as from gazing

upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being

long and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark, though awake, have the images

of lines and angles before his eyes; which kind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth

The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams. And these also (as all other imaginations) have

been before, either totally or by parcels, in the sense. And because in sense, the brain and nerves, which are

the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external

objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what proceeds from the

agitation of the inward parts of man's body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain

and other organs, when they be distempered do keep the same in motion; whereby the imaginations there

formerly made, appear as if a man were waking; saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as

there is no new object which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must

needs be more clear, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass that it

is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my

part, when I consider that in dreams I do not often nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects,

and actions that I do waking, nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts dreaming as at other times;

and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking

thoughts, I am well satisfied that, being awake, I know I dream not; though when I dream, I think myself

And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body, diverse distempers

must needs cause different dreams. And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the

thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner

parts to the brain being reciprocal; and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are

awake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in the brain the

imagination of an enemy. In the same manner, as natural kindness when we are awake causeth desire, and

desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also too much heat in those parts, while we sleep,

raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking

imaginations; the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and when we dream, at another.

The most difficult discerning of a man's dream from his waking thoughts is, then, when by some accident we

observe not that we have slept: which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts; and whose

conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth without the circumstances of going to bed, or putting off his

clothes, as one that noddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays himself to sleep, in

case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of

Marcus Brutus (one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and

notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a

fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision, but, considering the circumstances,

one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the

horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted

him; which fear, as by degrees it made him wake, so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to

vanish: and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or anything but a

vision. And this is no very rare accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and

superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe

they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy only, or else the

knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they

From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise

the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the

like; and nowadays the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of

witches. For, as for witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power, but yet that they are justly

punished for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if

they can, their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And for fairies, and walking

ghosts, the opinion of them has, I think, been on purpose either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the

use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no

doubt but God can make unnatural apparitions: but that He does it so often as men need to fear such things

more than they fear the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no

point of Christian faith. But evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything

when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man to believe them no further

than right reason makes that which they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken

away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by

which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be would be much more fitted than they

And this ought to be the work of the schools, but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what

imagination, or the senses are) what they receive, they teach: some saying that imaginations rise of

themselves, and have no cause; others that they rise most commonly from the will; and that good thoughts are

blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts, by the Devil; or that good thoughts are poured

(infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive the species of things,

and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy

to the memory, and the memory to the judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many

The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining) by words,

or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call understanding, and is common to man and beast. For a dog

by custom will understand the call or the rating of his master; and so will many other beasts. That

understanding which is peculiar to man is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and

thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of

BY CONSEQUENCE, or train of thoughts, I understand that succession of one thought to another which is

When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to

be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof we

have not formerly had sense, in whole or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another,

whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within

us, relics of those made in the sense; and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense

continue also together after sense: in so much as the former coming again to take place and be predominant,

the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn

which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing

perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another, succeedeth, it comes to pass in time that in the

imagining of anything, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is certain, it shall be

This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and

inconstant; wherein there is no passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself as the end

and scope of some desire, or other passion; in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem

impertinent one to another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men that are not only without

company, but also without care of anything; though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but

without harmony; as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man; or in tune, to one that could

not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may ofttimes perceive the way of it, and the

dependence of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more

impertinent than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was

manifest enough. For the thought of the war introduced the thought of the delivering up the King to his

enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought

of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and

The second is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design. For the impression made by such

things as we desire, or fear, is strong and permanent, or (if it cease for a time) of quick return: so strong it is

sometimes as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire ariseth the thought of some means we have seen

produce the like of that which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and

so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the end, by the greatness

of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander they are quickly again reduced

into the way: which, observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now

worn out: respice finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing

The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds: one, when of an effect imagined we seek the causes or means

that produce it; and this is common to man and beast. The other is, when imagining anything whatsoever, we

seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it when

we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly

incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst,

lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or

the faculty of invention, which the Latins call sagacitas, and solertia; a hunting out of the causes of some

effect, present or past; or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath

lost; and from that place, and time, wherein he misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to

time, to find where and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain and limited time and place in

which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times to

find what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call remembrance, or calling to mind: the

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts

run over all the parts thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a jewel; or as a spaniel

ranges the field till he find a scent; or as a man should run over the alphabet to start a rhyme.

Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and

the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what

will become of a criminal recons what he has seen follow on the like crime before, having this order of

thoughts; the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts is called

foresight, and prudence, or providence, and sometimes wisdom; though such conjecture, through the

difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain: by how much one man has

more experience of things past than another; by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations the

seldomer fail him. The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but

things to come have no being at all, the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions

past to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but

not with certainty enough. And though it be called prudence when the event answereth our expectation; yet in

its own nature it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to

him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet

naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses

A sign is the event antecedent of the consequent; and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, when the

like consequences have been observed before: and the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is

the sign. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of business has most signs whereby to guess

at the future time, and consequently is the most prudent: and so much more prudent than he that is new in that

kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit, though perhaps

Nevertheless, it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be beasts that at a year old observe

more and pursue that which is for their good more prudently than a child can do at ten.

As prudence is a presumption of the future, contracted from the experience of time past: so there is a

presumption of things past taken from other things, not future, but past also. For he that hath seen by what

courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war, and then to ruin; upon the sight of the

ruins of any other state will guess the like war and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture

has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future, both being grounded only upon experience.

There is no other act of man's mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so as to need no other

thing to the exercise of it but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties,

of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are acquired and increased by study

and industry, and of most men learned by instruction and discipline, and proceed all from the invention of

words and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other

motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to

Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No

man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or

infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to

conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability.

And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive Him (for He is incomprehensible, and His

greatness and power are unconceivable), but that we may honour Him. Also because whatsoever, as I said

before, we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts, a man can have no

thought representing anything not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must

conceive it in some place; and endued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into

parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two or more

things can be in one and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have or can be incident to

sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers

THE INVENTION of printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters is no great matter.

But who was the first that found the use of letters is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men

say, was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, King of Phoenicia. A profitable invention for continuing the memory of

time past, and the conjunction of mankind dispersed into so many and distant regions of the earth; and withal

difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the diverse motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and

other organs of speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters to remember them. But the most

noble and profitable invention of all other was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their

connexion; whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to

another for mutual utility and conversation; without which there had been amongst men neither

Commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. The

first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as He presented to

his sight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more

names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner

by degrees as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten

as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of. For I do not find

anything in the Scripture out of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered that Adam was taught the

names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of words

and speech, as general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all which are useful;

and least of all, of entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other insignificant words of the school.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel,

when by the hand of God every man was stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language.

And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world, it must needs be that the

diversity of tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them in such manner as need, the mother of all

The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a

train of words, and that for two commodities; whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our

thoughts, which being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled by

such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for marks or notes of

remembrance. Another is when many use the same words to signify, by their connexion and order one to

another, what they conceive or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion

for. And for this use they are called signs. Special uses of speech are these: first, to register what by

cogitation we find to be the cause of anything, present or past; and what we find things present or past may

produce, or effect; which, in sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we

have attained; which is to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and

purposes that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves, and

To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong by the

inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions that which they

never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other

sense than that they are ordained for, and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to

be their will which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed

living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an

abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is

The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects consisteth in

Of names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing; as Peter, John, this man, this tree: and some are

common to many things; as man, horse, tree; every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name

of diverse particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called a universal, there being nothing in the

world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.

One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: and

whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.

And of names universal, some are of more and some of less extent, the larger comprehending the less large;

and some again of equal extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the name body is of

larger signification than the word man, and comprehendeth it; and the names man and rational are of equal

extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take notice that by a name is not always

understood, as in grammar, one only word, but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all

these words, He that in his actions observeth the laws of his country, make but one name, equivalent to this

By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the

consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For

example, a man that hath no use of speech at all, (such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if he

set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), he may by

meditation compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand

by it. But if another triangle be shown him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new

labour whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he

observes that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in

his triangle; but only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three, and that that was all, for which

he named it a triangle; will boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles is in all triangles

whatsoever, and register his invention in these general terms: Every triangle hath its three angles equal to two

right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as a

universal rule; and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place, and delivers us from all labour of the

mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places.

But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool that

could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as one, two, and three, may observe every stroke of

the clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems there was

a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both

hands to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded that now our numeral

words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if

he recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has done: much less will he be able to

add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility

of reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the reckonings

When two names are joined together into a consequence, or affirmation, as thus, A man is a living creature;

or thus, If he be a man, he is a living creature; if the latter name living creature signify all that the former

name man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence, is true; otherwise false. For true and false are

attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood. Error there

may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise

truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly; or else he will

find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And

therefore in geometry (which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind),

men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call definitions,

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of

former authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them himself. For

the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into

absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which

lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they that cast

up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not;

and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear

themselves, spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding

themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider

which way they came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the

acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and

senseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from

their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with true science are

above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and

imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err: and as men abound in copiousness of

language; so they become more wise, or more mad, than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any

man to become either excellently wise or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs)

excellently foolish. For words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of

fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever,

Subject to names is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to

make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money

rationes, and accounting, ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account call items, they called

nomina; that is, names: and thence it seems to proceed that they extended the word ratio to the faculty of

reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, logos, for both speech and reason; not that they

thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech; and the act of reasoning they

called syllogism; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because

the same things may enter into account for diverse accidents, their names are (to show that diversity)

diversely wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for matter, or body; as living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet;

with all which names the word matter, or body, is understood; all such being names of matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality which we conceive to be

in it; as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, etc.; and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a

little change or wresting, we make a name for that accident which we consider; and for living put into the

account life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the like: and all such names are the names

of the accidents and properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another. These are called

names abstract, because severed, not from matter, but from the account of matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction: as when

anything is seen by us, we reckon not the thing itself, but the sight, the colour, the idea of it in the fancy; and

when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the hearing or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to names themselves, and to speeches: for,

general, universal, special, equivocal, are names of names. And affirmation, interrogation, commandment,

narration, syllogism, sermon, oration, and many other such are names of speeches. And this is all the variety

of names positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned by the mind of

man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to

There be also other names, called negative; which are notes to signify that a word is not the name of the thing

in question; as these words: nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want four, and the like; which are

nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though

they be not names of anything; because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used.

All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their

meaning not explained by definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by Schoolmen and puzzled

Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as

this name, an incorporeal body, or, which is all one, an incorporeal substance, and a great number more. For

whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one,

signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round

quadrangle signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or

blown up and down, the words inpoured virtue, inblown virtue, are as absurd and insignificant as a round

quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word that is not made up

of some Latin or Greek names. Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the

name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more but that one is Latin, the other French.

When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech, and their

connexion, were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it: understanding being

nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for ought I

know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case

they be universal, there can be no understanding; though many think they understand then, when they do but

What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind, and of their use and

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike

affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of

inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections

are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of

them. For though the nature of that we conceive be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect

of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different

passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which, besides the signification of what

we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker;

such as are the names of virtues and vices: for one man calleth wisdom what another calleth fear; and one

cruelty what another justice; one prodigality what another magnanimity; and one gravity what another

stupidity, etc. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can

metaphors and tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous because they profess their inconstancy, which

WHEN man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a

remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another: which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the

consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one

part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting,

men name other operations, as multiplying and dividing; yet they are the same: for multiplication is but

adding together of things equal; and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These

operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken

one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers, so the geometricians teach the

same in lines, figures (solid and superficial), angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power,

and the like; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words, adding together two names to make an

affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllogisms to make a demonstration; and

from the sum, or conclusion of a syllogism, they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers of politics

add together pactions to find men's duties; and lawyers, laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the

actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is

place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do.

Out of all which we may define (that is to say determine) what that is which is meant by this word reason

when we reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind. For reason, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that

is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying

of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by ourselves; and signifying, when we demonstrate or

And as in arithmetic unpractised men must, and professors themselves may often, err, and cast up false; so

also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may deceive

themselves, and infer false conclusions; not but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic

is a certain and infallible art: but no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the

certainty; no more than an account is therefore well cast up because a great many men have unanimously

approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord

set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their

controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right reason constituted by Nature; so

is it also in all debates of what kind soever: and when men that think themselves wiser than all others clamour

and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more but that things should be determined by no other men's

reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned to use for

trump on every occasion that suit whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will

have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their

own controversies: bewraying their want of right reason by the claim they lay to it.

The use and end of reason is not the finding of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from

the first definitions and settled significations of names; but to begin at these, and proceed from one

consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last conclusion without a certainty of all those

affirmations and negations on which it was grounded and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an

account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is

summed up, by those that give them in account, nor what it is he pays for, he advantages himself no more

than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountant's skill and honesty: so also in

reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth not fetch them

from the first items in every reckoning (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, as when upon the

sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it; if that

which he thought likely to follow follows not, or that which he thought likely to have preceded it hath not

preceded it, this is called error; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in

words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false; though it be commonly called

error, it is indeed an absurdity, or senseless speech. For error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat

is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility

discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is

inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound are those we call absurd, insignificant,

and nonsense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle; or accidents of bread in

cheese; or immaterial substances; or of a free subject; a free will; or any free but free from being hindered by

opposition; I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning; that is to say,

I have said before, in the second chapter, that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty, that when he

conceived anything whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do

with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the

consequences he finds to general rules, called theorems, or aphorisms; that is, he can reason, or reckon, not

only in number, but in all other things whereof one may be added unto or subtracted from another.

But this privilege is allayed by another; and that is by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is

subject, but men only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it that profess philosophy. For it is most

true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books

of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the

definitions or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in

The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method; in that they begin not their ratiocination

from definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account without

knowing the value of the numeral words, one, two, and three. And whereas all bodies enter into account upon

diverse considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter, these considerations being diversely

named, diverse absurdities proceed from the confusion and unfit connexion of their names into assertions.

And therefore, The second cause of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of bodies to accidents;

or of accidents to bodies; as they do that say, faith is infused, or inspired; when nothing can be poured, or

breathed into anything, but body; and that extension is body; that phantasms are spirits, etc. The third I

ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us to the accidents of our own bodies; as

they do that say, the colour is in the body; the sound is in the air, etc. The fourth, to the giving of the names

of bodies to names, or speeches; as they do that say that there be things universal; that a living creature is

genus, or a general thing, etc. The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents to names and speeches; as

they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition; a man's command is his will; and the like. The sixth, to

the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to

say, for example, in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither; the proverb says this or that

(whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak); yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not

to be admitted. The seventh, to names that signify nothing, but are taken up and learned by rote from the

Schools, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternalnow, and the like canting of Schoolmen.

To him that can avoid these things, it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an

account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when

they have good principles. For who is so stupid as both to mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when

By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as

prudence is; but attained by industry: first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and

orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of

them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a

knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call

science. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable,

science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another; by which, out of that we

can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: because when

we see how anything comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into

Children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have attained the use of speech, but are called

reasonable creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And the most

part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves

them to little use in common life, in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to

their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends; but specially

according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for science, or certain rules of their

actions, they are so far from it that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring: but for

other sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progress in them, that they may see

how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children that, having no thought of generation, are

made believe by the women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no science are in better and nobler condition with their natural prudence than men that,

by misreasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For

ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so far out of their way as relying on false rules, and taking

for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, the light of humane minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and

purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end.

And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon

them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.

As much experience is prudence, so is much science sapience. For though we usually have one name of

wisdom for them both; yet the Latins did always distinguish between prudentia and sapientia; ascribing the

former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose

one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms; and another to have added

to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every

possible posture or guard: the ability of the former would be to the ability of the latter, as prudence to

sapience; both useful, but the latter infallible. But they that, trusting only to the authority of books, follow the

blind blindly, are like him that, trusting to the false rules of a master of fence, ventures presumptuously upon

The signs of science are some certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the

science of anything can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another:

uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he

says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all

circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible. But in any business, whereof a man has not infallible

science to proceed by, to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by general sentences read in

authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry.

And even of those men themselves that in councils of the Commonwealth love to show their reading of

politics and history, very few do it in their domestic affairs where their particular interest is concerned,

having prudence enough for their private affairs; but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit

THERE be in animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them: One called vital, begun in generation, and

continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the

breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc.; to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the

other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in

such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's

body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, etc., and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion,

remaining after sense, has been already said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking,

and the like voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, it

is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied

men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible, or the space it is

moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder but that such motions are. For let a

space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be

moved over that. These small beginnings of motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking,

This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire, the latter being the

general name, and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. And

when the endeavour is from ward something, it is generally called aversion. These words appetite and

aversion we have from the Latins; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of

retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme. For Nature itself does often

press upon men those truths which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at.

For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all; but because some motion they

must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion, which is but an absurd speech; for though words may be

That which men desire they are said to love, and to hate those things for which they have aversion. So that

desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we signify the absence of the object; by love, most

commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and

exoneration (which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their

bodies), and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from

experience and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or

believe not to be, we can have no further desire than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not

only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Those things which we neither desire nor hate, we are said to contemn: contempt being nothing else but an

immobility or contumacy of the heart in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the

heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects, or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things

should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions: much less can all men consent in the desire of

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good; and

the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of

good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing

simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects

themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no Commonwealth; or, in a Commonwealth, from

the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up

The Latin tongue has two words whose significations approach to those of good and evil, but are not

precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. Whereof the former signifies that which by some

apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so

general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, fair; in others, beautiful, or

handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable: and for turpe; foul, deformed, ugly, base,

nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing

else but the mien, or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds: good in

the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and

good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in promise is that they call

turpe; evil in effect and end is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means, inutile,

As in sense that which is really within us is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of

external objects but in appearance; to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, etc.:

so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real

effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite or aversion to or from the object

moving. But the appearance or sense of that motion is that we either call delight or trouble of mind.

This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it delight and pleasure, seemeth to be a

corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight were not

improperly called jucunda (a juvando), from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from

Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the appearance or sense of good; and molestation or displeasure, the

appearance or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied with some delight

more or less; and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offence.

Of pleasures, or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called pleasures of

sense (the word sensual, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws). Of

this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hearing,

smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from the expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end or

consequence of things, whether those things in the sense please or displease: and these are pleasures of the

mind of him that draweth in those consequences, and are generally called joy. In the like manner,

displeasures are some in the sense, and called pain; others, in the expectation of consequences, and are called

These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief have their names for diverse

considerations diversified. At first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion

men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly,

from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by injury, indignation.

Desire of good to another, benevolence, good will, charity. If to man generally, good nature.

Desire of riches, covetousness: a name used always in signification of blame, because men contending for

them are displeased with one another's attaining them; though the desire in itself be to be blamed, or allowed,

Desire of office, or precedence, ambition: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends, and fear of things that are but of little hindrance,

Pusillanimity in the same, wretchedness, miserableness, or parsimony, as it is liked, or disliked.

Love of the same acquired from rumination, that is, imagination of pleasure past, luxury.

Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, the passion of love. The same, with fear that the

Desire by doing hurt to another to make him condemn some fact of his own, revengefulness.

Desire to know why, and how, curiosity; such as is in no living creature but man: so that man is

distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the

appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes;

which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of

Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed,

superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, true religion.

Fear without the apprehension of why, or what, panic terror; called so from the fables that make Pan the

author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause,

though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this

Joy from apprehension of novelty, admiration; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the

Joy arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is called

glorying: which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with confidence: but

if grounded on the flattery of others, or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is

called vainglory: which name is properly given; because a wellgrounded confidence begetteth attempt;

The vainglory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not,

is most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons; and is corrected

Sudden glory is the passion which maketh those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some

sudden act of their own that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by

comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them that are conscious of

the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing the

imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity.

For of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others from scorn, and compare themselves

On the contrary, sudden dejection is the passion that causeth weeping; and is caused by such accidents as

suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to it that

rely principally on helps external, such as are women and children. Therefore, some weep for the loss of

friends; others for their unkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by

reconciliation. But in all cases, both laughter and weeping are sudden motions, custom taking them both

Grief for the discovery of some defect of ability is shame, or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing,

and consisteth in the apprehension of something dishonourable; and in young men is a sign of the love of

good reputation, and commendable: in old men it is a sign of the same; but because it comes too late, not

Grief for the calamity of another is pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall

himself; and therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a fellowfeeling: and

therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least pity; and for the same

calamity, those have least pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call cruelty; proceeding from security of

their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms, without other end of his

Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to

enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called emulation: but joined with endeavour to supplant

When in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise

alternately; and diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come

successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it;

sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of desires,

aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call

Therefore of things past there is no deliberation, because manifestly impossible to be changed; nor of things

known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know or think such deliberation vain. But of things

impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate, not knowing it is in vain. And it is called

deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own

This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears is no less in other living creatures than in

Every deliberation is then said to end when that whereof they deliberate is either done or thought impossible;

because till then we retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our appetite, or aversion.

In deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is

that we call the will; the act, not the faculty, of willing. And beasts that have deliberation must necessarily

also have will. The definition of the will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a rational appetite, is not

good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a voluntary act is that which

proceedeth from the will, and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting

from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, is the last

appetite in deliberating. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that

nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary;

because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite. For if the intervenient appetites

make any action voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient aversions should make the same action

involuntary; and so one and the same action should be both voluntary and involuntary.

By this it is manifest that, not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or

other appetites to the thing propounded, but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or fear of

The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same and partly different from those

by which we express our thoughts. And first generally all passions may be expressed indicatively; as, I love, I

fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves,

which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences besides that of

the passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signify

suppositions, with their consequences; as, If this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the

language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words, but deliberation for the most part is of

particulars. The language of desire, and aversion, is imperative; as, Do this, forbear that; which when the

party is obliged to do, or forbear, is command; otherwise prayer; or else counsel. The language of vainglory,

of indignation, pity and revengefulness, optative: but of the desire to know, there is a peculiar expression

called interrogative; as, What is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? Other language of the passions I

find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like do not signify as speech, but as the actions of a tongue

These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signs

they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them have such passions or not. The

best signs of passions present are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims,

And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil

consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate, the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on

the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for

so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which

writers call apparent or seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is

apparent or seeming evil: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of

consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual

prospering, is that men call felicity; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual

tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor

without fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly

honour him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy; being joys that now are as incomprehensible as the word

The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of anything is praise. That whereby

they signify the power and greatness of anything is magnifying. And that whereby they signify the opinion

they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue.

And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.

OF ALL discourse governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an end, either by attaining or by giving

over. And in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.

If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has

been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you

leave him in a presumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. All which is

opinion. And that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil, the same is alternate

opinion in the enquiry of the truth of past and future. And as the last appetite in deliberation is called the will,

so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called the judgement, or resolute and final

sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate in the question of good or bad

is called deliberation; so the whole chain of opinions alternate in the question of true or false is called doubt.

No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come. For, as for the knowledge of

fact, it is originally sense, and ever after memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said

before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this, or that, is,

has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but only that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has

been; if this shall be, that shall be; which is to know conditionally: and that not the consequence of one thing

And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds

by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is

called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge

of the consequence of words, which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse be

not definitions, or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion

is again opinion, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words,

without possibility of being understood. When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said

to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest

witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was and ever will be reputed a very evil act for any man

to speak against his conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience

has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word

metaphorically for the knowledge of their own secret facts and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically

said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new

opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that

reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them; and

so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so.

When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his

own, and then it is still called opinion, or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the

truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much

concerning the thing, as the person; and the resolution is called belief, and faith: faith, in the man; belief, both

of the man, and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man,

the other of his virtue. To have faith in, or trust to, or believe a man, signify the same thing; namely, an

opinion of the veracity of the man: but to believe what is said signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the

saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, I believe in; as also the Latin, credo in; and the Greek, piseno

eis, are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put: I believe him; I

trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him; and in Latin, credo illi; fido illi; and in Greek, piseno anto; and

that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the

But by believing in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the person, but confession and

acknowledgement of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God as to

hold all for truth they hear Him say, whether they understand it or not, which is all the faith and trust can

possibly be had in any person whatsoever; but they do not all believe the doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may infer that when we believe any saying, whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments

taken, not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority and good

opinion we have of him that hath said it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose

word we take, the object of our faith; and the honour done in believing is done to him only. And

consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from

God Himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And

they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God take the word of the prophet, do

honour to him, and in him trust and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true or a

false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if I should not believe all that is written by

historians of the glorious acts of Alexander or Caesar, I do not think the ghost of Alexander or Caesar had

any just cause to be offended, or anybody else but the historian. If Livy say the gods made once a cow speak,

and we believe it not, we distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident that whatsoever we believe,

upon no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings, whether they be sent

VIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in

comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by virtues intellectual are

always understood such abilities of the mind as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go

commonly under the name of a good wit; though the same word, wit, be used also to distinguish one certain

These virtues are of two sorts; natural and acquired. By natural, I mean not that which a man hath from his

birth: for that is nothing else but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts,

as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only, and experience,

without method, culture, or instruction. This natural wit consisteth principally in two things: celerity of

imagining (that is, swift succession of one thought to another); and steady direction to some approved end.

On the contrary, a slow imagination maketh that defect or fault of the mind which is commonly called

dullness, stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

And this difference of quickness is caused by the difference of men's passions; that love and dislike, some

one thing, some another: and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another, and are held to,

observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of men's

thoughts there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or

in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose; those that observe their

similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a good wit; by which,

in this occasion, is meant a good fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes, which is

called distinguishing, and discerning, and judging between thing and thing, in case such discerning be not

easy, are said to have a good judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation and business, wherein

times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this virtue is called discretion. The former, that is, fancy,

without the help of judgement, is not commended as a virtue; but the latter which is judgement, and

discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and

persons, necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end; that

is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done, he that hath this virtue will be easily fitted with

similitudes that will please, not only by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt

metaphors, but also, by the rarity of their invention. But without steadiness, and direction to some end, great

fancy is one kind of madness; such as they have that, entering into any discourse, are snatched from their

purpose by everything that comes in their thought, into so many and so long digressions and parentheses, that

they utterly lose themselves: which kind of folly I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is

sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare which doth not so to others:

sometimes pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is

new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his

In a good poem, whether it be epic or dramatic, as also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both

judgement and fancy are required: but the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the

In a good history, the judgement must be eminent; because the goodness consisteth in the choice of the

method, in the truth, and in the choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place,

In orations of praise, and in invectives, the fancy is predominant; because the design is not truth, but to

honour or dishonour; which is done by noble or by vile comparisons. The judgement does but suggest what

In hortatives and pleadings, as truth or disguise serveth best to the design in hand, so is the judgement or the

In demonstration, in council, and all rigorous search of truth, sometimes does all; except sometimes the

understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude, and then there is so much use of fancy. But for

metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly profess deceit, to admit them into

And in any discourse whatsoever, if the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy

be, the whole discourse will be taken for a sign of want of wit; and so will it never when the discretion is

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things holy, prophane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without

shame, or blame; which verbal discourse cannot do, farther than the judgement shall approve of the time,

place, and persons. An anatomist or physician may speak or write his judgement of unclean things; because it

is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant and pleasant fancies of the same is as

if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himself before good company. And it is

the want of discretion that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness of mind, and familiar

company, a man may play with the sounds and equivocal significations of words, and that many times with

encounters of extraordinary fancy; but in a sermon, or in public, or before persons unknown, or whom we

ought to reverence, there is no jingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is only in

the want of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is wanting, but discretion. Judgement,

When the thoughts of a man that has a design in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they

conduce to that design, or what design they may conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not easy, or

usual, this wit of his is called prudence, and dependeth on much experience, and memory of the like things

and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of men as there is in their fancies

and judgements; because the experience of men equal in age is not much unequal as to the quantity, but lies

in different occasions, every one having his private designs. To govern well a family and a kingdom are not

different degrees of prudence, but different sorts of business; no more than to draw a picture in little, or as

great or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A plain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his

To prudence, if you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear or

want, you have that crooked wisdom which is called craft; which is a sign of pusillanimity. For magnanimity

is contempt of unjust or dishonest helps. And that which the Latins call versutia (translated into English,

shifting), and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity by engaging into a greater, as when a man

robs one to pay another, is but a shortersighted craft; called versutia, from versura, which signifies taking

As for acquired wit (I mean acquired by method and instruction), there is none but reason; which is grounded

on the right use of speech, and produceth the sciences. But of reason and science, I have already spoken in the

The causes of this difference of wits are in the passions, and the difference of passions proceedeth partly from

the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if the difference proceeded

from the temper of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less

difference of men in their sight, hearing, or other senses than in their fancies and discretions. It proceeds,

therefore, from the passions; which are different, not only from the difference of men's complexions, but also

The passions that most of all cause the differences of wit are principally the more or less desire of power, of

riches, of knowledge, and of honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of power. For

And therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things, but is as men term it indifferent;

though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving offence, yet he cannot possibly have either a

great fancy or much judgement. For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies to range abroad and

find the way to the things desired, all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same,

proceeding from thence. For as to have no desire is to be dead; so to have weak passions is dullness; and to

have passions indifferently for everything, giddiness and distraction; and to have stronger and more vehement

passions for anything than is ordinarily seen in others is that which men call madness.

Whereof there be almost as may kinds as of the passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and

extravagant passion proceedeth from the evil constitution of the organs of the body, or harm done them; and

sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the vehemence or long continuance of the

The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is either great vainglory, which is commonly

Pride subjecteth a man to anger, the excess whereof is the madness called rage, and fury. And thus it comes to

pass that excessive desire of revenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage: that

excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also rage: excessive opinion of a man's own self, for divine

inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form, and the like, becomes distraction and giddiness: the same, joined

with envy, rage: vehement opinion of the truth of anything, contradicted by others, rage.

Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears, which is a madness commonly called melancholy apparent also

in diverse manners: as in haunting of solitudes and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some

one, some another, particular thing. In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour are

called by the general name of madness. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take the pains

might enrol a legion. And if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when

For example, though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not

visible always in one man by any very extravagant action that proceedeth from such passion, yet when many

of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of madness

can there be greater than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less

than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their

lifetime before they have been protected and secured from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it

is the same in every particular man. For as in the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that

part of the water next him, yet he is well assured that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as any

other part of the same quantity: so also, though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two men, yet we

may be well assured that their singular passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if

there were nothing else that bewrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves

is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should entertain you with sober discourse, and you desire in

taking leave to know what he were that you might another time requite his civility, and he should tell you he

were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madness.

This opinion of inspiration, called commonly, private spirit, begins very often from some lucky finding of an

error generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason they came to

so singular a truth, as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on, they presently admire

themselves as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally

Again, that madness is nothing else but too much appearing passion may be gathered out of the effects of

wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men

that have drunk too much is the same with that of madmen: some of them raging, others loving, others

laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their several domineering passions: for the effect of the wine

does but remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions. For, I believe,

the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the

vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen, which is a confession that

The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning the cause of madness have been two.

Some, deriving them from the passions; some, from demons or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought

might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such strange and uncouth manner as madmen

use to do. The former sort, therefore, called such men, madmen: but the latter called them sometimes

demoniacs (that is, possessed with spirits); sometimes energumeni (that is, agitated or moved with spirits);

and now in Italy they are called not only pazzi, madmen; but also spiritati, men possessed.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a city of the Greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of

Andromeda, upon an extreme hot day: whereupon a great many of the spectators, falling into fevers, had this

accident from the heat and from the tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce iambics, with the

names of Perseus and Andromeda; which, together with the fever, was cured by the coming on of winter: and

this madness was thought to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy. Likewise there reigned a fit

of madness in another Grecian city which seized only the young maidens, and caused many of them to hang

themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the devil. But one that suspected that contempt of life in

them might proceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemn also their honour,

gave counsel to the magistrates to strip such as so hanged themselves, and let them hang out naked. This, the

story says, cured that madness. But on the other side, the same Grecians did often ascribe madness to the

operation of the Eumenides, or Furies; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other gods: so much did men

attribute to phantasms as to think them aerial living bodies, and generally to call them spirits. And as the

Romans in this held the same opinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews; for they called madmen

prophets, or, according as they thought the spirits good or bad, demoniacs; and some of them called both

prophets and demoniacs madmen; and some called the same man both demoniac and madman. But for the

Gentiles, it is no wonder; because diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural accidents were

with them termed and worshipped as demons. So that a man was to understand by demon as well sometimes

an ague as a devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion is somewhat strange. For neither Moses nor

Abraham pretended to prophesy by possession of a spirit, but from the voice of God, or by a vision or dream:

nor is there anything in his law, moral or ceremonial, by which they were taught there was any such

enthusiasm, or any possession. When God is said to take from the spirit that was in Moses, and give to the

seventy elders, the spirit of God, taking it for the substance of God, is not divided. [Numbers, 11. 25] The

Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man mean a man's spirit, inclined to godliness. And where it is said,

"Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron," [Exodus, 28. 3] is not meant a

spirit put into them, that can make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the

like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so

other spirits, though not always, yet as often as the virtue or vice, so styled, is extraordinary and eminent.

Neither did the other prophets of the Old Testament pretend enthusiasm, or that God spoke in them, but to

them, by voice, vision, or dream; and the "burden of the Lord" was not possession, but command. How then

could the Jews fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason but that which is common to all

men; namely, the want of curiosity to search natural causes; and their placing felicity in the acquisition of the

gross pleasures of the senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any

strange and unusual ability or defect in a man's mind, unless they see withal from what cause it may probably

proceed, can hardly think it natural; and if not natural, they must needs think it supernatural; and then what

can it be, but that either God or the Devil is in him? And hence it came to pass, when our Saviour was

compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but

the Scribes said he had Beelzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out devils; as if the greater madman had

awed the lesser. [Mark, 3. 21] And that some said, "He hath a devil, and is mad"; whereas others, holding him

for a prophet, said, "These are not the words of one that hath a devil." [John, 10. 20] So in the Old Testament

he that came to anoint Jehu was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, "What came that madman

for?" [II Kings, 9. 11] So that, in sum, it is manifest that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary manner

was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good or evil spirit; except by the Sadducees, who erred

so far on the other hand as not to believe there were at all any spirits, which is very near to direct atheism;

and thereby perhaps the more provoked others to term such men demoniacs rather than madmen.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possessed, and not as it they

were mad? To which I can give no other kind of answer but that which is given to those that urge the

Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth. The Scripture was written to show

unto men the kingdom of God, and to prepare their minds to become His obedient subjects, leaving the

world, and the philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men for the exercising of their natural reason.

Whether the earth's or sun's motion make the day and night, or whether the exorbitant actions of men proceed

from passion or from the Devil, so we worship him not, it is all one, as to our obedience and subjection to

God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the

disease as to a person, it is the usual phrase of all that cure by words only, as Christ did, and enchanters

pretend to do, whether they speak to a devil or not. For is not Christ also said to have rebuked the winds?

[Matthew, 8. 26] Is not he said also to rebuke a fever? [Luke, 4. 39] Yet this does not argue that a fever is a

devil. And whereas many of those devils are said to confess Christ, it is not necessary to interpret those places

otherwise than that those madmen confessed Him. And whereas our Saviour speaketh of an unclean spirit

that, having gone out of a man, wandereth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none, and returning

into the same man with seven other spirits worse than himself; [Matthew, 12. 43] it is manifestly a parable,

alluding to a man that, after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them, and

becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture that requireth a belief that

There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men, which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of

madness; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter by the name of

absurdity. And that is when men speak such words as, put together, have in them no signification at all, but

are fallen upon, by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received and repeat by rote; by

others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those that converse in

questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoolmen; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The

common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other egregious persons,

counted idiots. But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind, there

would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoolman into his hands and see if he

can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point; as the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ,

transubstantiation, free will, etc., into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into

any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted withal that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar. What is

the meaning of these words: "The first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second, by force of

the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work?" They are the translation of

the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez's first book, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When men

write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the

question of transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken they that say, the whiteness, roundness,

magnitude, quality, corruptibility, all which are incorporeal, etc., go out of the wafer into the body of our

blessed Saviour, do they not make those nesses, tudes, and ties to be so many spirits possessing his body? For

by spirits they mean always things that, being incorporeal, are nevertheless movable from one place to

another. So that this kind of absurdity may rightly be numbered amongst the many sorts of madness; and all

the time that, guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing or writing thus, but lucid

THERE are of are of knowledge two kinds, whereof one is knowledge of fact; the other, knowledge of the

consequence of one affirmation to another. The former is nothing else but sense and memory, and is absolute

knowledge; as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done; and this is the knowledge required in a

witness. The latter is called science, and is conditional; as when we know that: if the figure shown be a circle,

then any straight line through the center shall divide it into two equal parts. And this is the knowledge

The register of knowledge of fact is called history, whereof there be two sorts: one called natural history;

which is the history of such facts, or effects of Nature, as have no dependence on man's will; such as are the

histories of metals, plants, animals, regions, and the like. The other is civil history, which is the history of the

The registers of science are such books as contain the demonstrations of consequences of one affirmation to

another; and are commonly called books of philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the

diversity of the matter; and may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following table.

THE POWER of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good, and

Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind; as extraordinary strength, form, prudence,

arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers which, acquired by these, or by fortune, are

means and instruments to acquire more; as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which

men call good luck. For the nature of power is, in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the

The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in

one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of

a Commonwealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction, or of

diverse. factions leagued. Therefore to have servants is power; to have friends is power: for they are strengths

Also, riches joined with liberality is power; because it procureth friends and servants: without liberality, not

Reputation of power is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection.

So is reputation of love of a man's country, called popularity, for the same reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved or feared of many, or the reputation of such quality, is

Good success is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either

Affability of men already in power is increase of power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power; because to prudent men we commit the

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those Commonwealths where it has privileges; for in such

Form is power; because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and

The sciences are small powers; because not eminent, and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at

all, but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to

Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war, because they confer to

defence and victory, are power; and though the true mother of them be science, namely, the mathematics yet,

because they are brought into the light by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed (the midwife passing

The value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for

the use of his power, and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of

another. An able conductor of soldiers is of great price in time of war present or imminent, but in peace not

so. A learned and uncorrupt judge is much worth in time of peace, but not so much in war. And as in other

things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate

themselves at the highest value they can, yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is commonly called honouring and

dishonouring. To value a man at a high rate is to honour him; at a low rate is to dishonour him. But high and

low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself.

The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Commonwealth, is that which men

commonly call dignity. And this value of him by the Commonwealth is understood by offices of command,

judicature, public employment; or by names and titles introduced for distinction of such value.

To pray to another for aid of any kind is to honour; because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help;

To obey s to honour; because no man obeys them who they think have no power to help or hurt them. And

To give great gifts to a man is to honour him; because it is buying of protection, and acknowledging of

power. To give little gifts is to dishonour; because it is but alms, and signifies an opinion of the need of small

To be sedulous in promoting another's good, also to flatter, is to honour; as a sign we seek his protection or

To give way or place to another, in any commodity, is to honour; being a confession of greater power. To

To show any sign of love or fear of another is honour; for both to love and to fear is to value. To contemn, or

To praise, magnify, or call happy is to honour; because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency and humility, is to honour him; as

signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently is

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him; sign of opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust,

To hearken to a man's counsel, or discourse of what kind soever, is to honour; as a sign we think him wise, or

To do those things to another which he takes for signs of honour, or which the law or custom makes so, is to

honour; because in approving the honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others

To agree with in opinion is to honour; as being a sign of approving his judgement and wisdom. To dissent is

dishonour, and an upbraiding of error, and, if the dissent be in many things, of folly.

To imitate is to honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate one's enemy is to dishonour.

To honour those another honours is to honour him; as a sign of approbation of his judgement. To honour his

To employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honour; as a sign of opinion of his wisdom or other

power. To deny employment in the same cases to those that seek it is to dishonour.

All these ways of honouring are natural, and as well within, as without Commonwealths. But in

Commonwealths where he or they that have the supreme authority can make whatsoever they please to stand

A sovereign doth honour a subject with whatsoever title, or office, or employment, or action that he himself

The king of Persia honoured Mordecai when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the

king's garment, upon one of the king's horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince before him,

proclaiming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour." And yet another king of Persia, or the

same another time, to one that demanded for some great service to wear one of the king's robes, gave him

leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should wear it as the king's fool; and then it was dishonour. So

that of civil honour, the fountain is in the person of the Commonwealth, and dependeth on the will of the

sovereign, and is therefore temporary and called civil honour; such as are magistracy, offices, titles, and in

some places coats and scutcheons painted: and men honour such as have them, as having so many signs of

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality is an argument and sign of power.

And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many is honourable, as arguments of power. To be

Dominion and victory is honourable because acquired by power; and servitude, for need or fear, is

Good fortune, if lasting, honourable; as a sign of the favour of God. Ill and losses, dishonourable. Riches are

honourable, for they are power. Poverty, dishonourable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence,

are honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence,

Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is honourable, as being the contempt of small

difficulties and dangers. And irresolution, dishonourable, as a sign of too much valuing of little impediments

and little advantages: for when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the

difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is

All actions and speeches that proceed, or seem to proceed, from much experience, science, discretion, or wit

are honourable; for all these are powers. Actions or words that proceed from error, ignorance, or folly,

Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on something else, is honourable; because

employment is a sign of power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonourable.

For the gravity of the former is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandise; but of the like the

To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good is

honourable; as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity is dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous parents is honourable; because they the more easily attain the aids and

friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage is dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are honourable; as signs of magnanimity: for magnanimity

is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity, is dishonourable.

Covetousness of great riches, and ambition of great honours, are honourable; as signs of power to obtain

them. Covetousness, and ambition of little gains, or preferments, is dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of honour whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of

much power) be just or unjust: for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore, the ancient

heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the gods, when they introduced them in their

poems committing rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust or unclean acts; in so much as nothing is so much

celebrated in Jupiter as his adulteries; nor in Mercury as his frauds and thefts; of whose praises, in a hymn of

Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented music at noon, and before night

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Commonwealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a

pirate, or a highway thief; but rather a lawful trade, not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other

nations; as is manifest by the of ancient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are, and

always will be, honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that

refuse, and ignominy for them that make the challenge. For duels also are many times effects of courage, and

the ground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power; though for the most part they be effects of

rash speaking, and of the fear of dishonour, in one or both the combatants; who, engaged by rashness, are

Scutcheons and coats of arms hereditary, where they have any their any eminent privileges, are honourable;

otherwise not for their power consisteth either in such privileges, or in riches, or some such thing as is equally

honoured in other men. This kind of honour, commonly called gentry, has been derived from the ancient

Germans. For there never was any such thing known where the German customs were unknown. Nor is it

now anywhere in use where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient Greek commanders, when they

went to war, had their shields painted with such devices as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted buckler

was a sign of poverty, and of a common soldier; but they transmitted not the inheritance of them. The

Romans transmitted the marks of their families; but they were the images, not the devices of their ancestors.

Amongst the people of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. Germans only

had that custom; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy, when in great

numbers they either aided the Romans or made their own conquests in these western parts of the world.

For Germany, being anciently, as all other countries in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number

of little lords, or masters of families, that continually had wars one with another, those masters, or lords,

principally to the end they might, when they were covered with arms, be known by their followers, and partly

for ornament, both painted their armor, or their scutcheon, or coat, with the picture of some beast, or other

thing, and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets. And this ornament both of

the arms and crest descended by inheritance to their children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some

note of diversity, such as the old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Herealt, thought fit. But when many

such families, joined together, made a greater monarchy, this duty of the herald to distinguish scutcheons was

made a private office apart. And the issue of these lords is the great and ancient gentry; which for the most

part bear living creatures noted for courage and rapine; or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars,

palisades, and other notes of war; nothing being then in honour, but virtue military. Afterwards, not only

kings, but popular Commonwealths, gave diverse manners of scutcheons to such as went forth to the war, or

returned from it, for encouragement or recompense to their service. All which, by an observing reader, may

be found in such ancient histories, Greek and Latin, as make mention of the German nation and manners in

Titles of honour, such as are duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honourable; as signifying the value set

upon them by the sovereign power of the Commonwealth: which titles were in old time titles of office and

command derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French. Dukes, in Latin, duces, being

generals in war; counts, comites, such as bore the general company out of friendship, and were left to govern

and defend places conquered and pacified; marquises, marchioness, were counts that governed the marches,

or bounds of the Empire. Which titles of duke, count, and marquis came into the Empire about the time of

Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German militia. But baron seems to have been a title of the

Gauls, and signifies a great man; such as were the kings' or princes' men whom they employed in war about

their persons; and seems to be derived from vir, to ber, and bar, that signified the same in the language of the

Gauls, that vir in Latin; and thence to bero and baro: so that such men were called berones, and after barones;

and (in Spanish) varones. But he that would know more, particularly the original of titles of honour, may find

it, as I have done this, in Mr. Selden's most excellent treatise of that subject. In process of time these offices

of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into mere

titles, serving, for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the

Commonwealth: and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places, wherein they had

neither possession nor command, and other titles also were devised to the same end.

Worthiness is a thing different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert, and

consisteth in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy; which particular ability is

For he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted with the

qualities required to the well discharging of it; and worthiest of riches, that has the qualities most requisite for

the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may nevertheless be a worthy man, and

valuable for something else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment that nevertheless

can plead no right to have it before another, and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For merit

presupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise, of which I shall say more hereafter when

BY MANNERS, I mean not here decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man

should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the small morals; but those

qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. To which end we are to consider

that the felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such finis ultimus

(utmost aim) nor summum bonum (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers.

Nor can a man any more live whose desires are at an end than he whose senses and imaginations are at a

stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former

being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once

only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire. And therefore the

voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a

contented life, and differ only in the way, which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions in diverse men,

and partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes which produce the

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power

after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more

intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but

because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of

more. And from hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at

home by laws, or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of fame

from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for

Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power inclineth to contention, enmity, and war, because

the way of one competitor to the attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other.

Particularly, competition of praise inclineth to a reverence of antiquity. For men contend with the living, not

with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a common power: because by such desires a man

doth abandon the protection that might be hoped for from his own industry and labour. Fear of death and

wounds disposeth to the same, and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men and hardy, not contented

with their present condition, as also all men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to continue

the causes of war and to stir up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour military but by war; nor any such

Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power: for such desire containeth a

desire of leisure, and consequently protection from some other power than their own.

Desire of praise disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of those

men whom we contemn, we contemn also the praises. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though

after death there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being joys that are either swallowed up in the

unspeakable joys of heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell: yet is not such fame vain;

because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound

thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and anything that is pleasure in

To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite,

disposeth to counterfeit love, but really secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor that,

in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there where he might never see him more. For

benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom; which is to one's

equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from one whom we acknowledge for superior inclines to love;

because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerful acceptation (which men call gratitude) is such an

honour done to the obliger as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an

equal, or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the

obligation is of aid and service mutual; from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in

benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with his victory,

To have done more hurt to a man than he can or is willing to expiate inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer.

Fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek aid by society: for there is no other way by which

Men that distrust their own subtlety are in tumult and sedition better disposed for victory than they that

suppose themselves wise or crafty. For these love to consult; the other, fearing to be circumvented to strike

first. And in sedition, men being always in the precincts of battle, to hold together and use all advantages of

Vainglorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing

themselves gallant men, are inclined only to ostentation, but not to attempt; because when danger or difficulty

Vain, glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some

precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to rash

engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of

safety they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse, than their lives, for which no

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of government are disposed to ambition.

Because without public employment in counsel or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost. And

therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition; for eloquence seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and

Pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions and fittest opportunities

of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest

what is best to be done, it is a sign the difference of motives the one way and the other are not great: therefore

not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles, which is pusillanimity.

Frugality, though in poor men a virtue, maketh a man unapt to achieve such actions as require the strength of

many men at once: for it weakeneth their endeavour, which to be nourished and kept in vigour by reward.

Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming

wisdom, the latter seeming kindness. Add to them military reputation and it disposeth men to adhere and

subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger

Want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advice and

authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the

opinion of some other whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

Ignorance of the signification of words, is want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not only the

truth they know not, but also the errors; and which is more, the nonsense of them they trust: for neither error

From the same it proceedeth that men give different names to one and the same thing from the difference of

their own passions: as they that approve a private opinion call it opinion; but they that mislike it, heresy: and

yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion; but has only a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding between

one action of many men and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the

senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of senators in killing Caesar; and

therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people that which is a multitude of actions done by a

Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposeth a man to make

custom and example the rule of his actions; in such manner as to think that unjust which it hath been the

custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an example or (as

the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it) a precedent; like little children

that have no other rule of good and evil manners but the correction they receive from their parents and

masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong and

stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn, receding from

custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them:

which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword:

whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so; because men care not, in that subject, what be truth, as a

thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any

man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle

should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning

Ignorance of remote causes disposeth men to attribute all events to the causes immediate and instrumental:

for these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to pass that in all places men that are grieved

with payments to the public discharge their anger upon the publicans, that is to say, farmers, collectors, and

other officers of the public revenue, and adhere to such as find fault with the public government; and thereby,

when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the supreme authority, for

Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to credulity, so as to believe many times impassibilities: for such

know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true, being unable to detect the impossibility. And

credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that ignorance

itself, without malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies and tell them, and sometimes also to invent

Anxiety for the future time disposeth men to inquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect to seek the cause;

and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some

cause whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to

make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God

eternal; though they cannot have any idea of Him in their mind answerable to His nature. For as a man that is

born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the

same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there which men call fire and is the cause

of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have

that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is

a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of Him in his mind.

And they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from

the ignorance itself of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm are inclined to suppose,

and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations,

and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks,

making the creatures of their own fancy their gods. By which means it hath come to pass that from the

innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of

things invisible is the natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that

And this seed of religion, having been observed by many, some of those that have observed it have been

inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws; and to add to it, of their own invention, any opinion

of the causes of future events by which they thought they should best be able to govern others and make unto

SEEING there are no signs nor fruit of religion but in man only, there is no cause to doubt but that the seed of

religion is also only in man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some

more, some less, but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil

Secondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause which determined the

Thirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts but the enjoying of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as

having little or no foresight of the time to come for want of observation and memory of the order,

consequence, and dependence of the things they see; man observeth how one event hath been produced by

another, and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself of the

true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible), he supposes

causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth, or trusteth to the authority of other men such as he

The two first make anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or

shall arrive hereafter, it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the

evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; so that

every man, especially those that are overprovident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as

Prometheus (which, interpreted, is the prudent man) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect,

where an eagle, feeding on his liver, devoured in the day as much as was repaired in the night: so that man,

which looks too far before him in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long gnawed on by fear of

death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must

needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse

either of their good or evil fortune but some power or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was that some

of the old poets said that the gods were at first created by human fear: which, spoken of the gods (that is to

say, of the many gods of the Gentiles), is very true. But the acknowledging of one God eternal, infinite, and

omnipotent may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and

their several virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he

that, from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from

thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to

this, that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a first and an

eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: and all this without thought of

their fortune, the solicitude whereof both inclines to fear and hinders them from the search of the causes of

other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods as there be men that feign them.

And for the matter, or substance, of the invisible agents, so fancied, they could not by natural cogitation fall

upon any other concept but that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man was of

the same substance with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth; or in a lookingglass to one

that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think

to be real and external substances, and therefore call them ghosts; as the Latins called them imagines and

umbrae and thought them spirits (that is, thin aerial bodies), and those invisible agents, which they feared, to

be like them, save that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were

incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may

put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit and incorporeal, yet they can never have the

imagination of anything answering to them: and therefore, men that by their own meditation arrive to the

acknowledgement of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God choose rather to confess He is

incomprehensible and above their understanding than to define His nature by spirit incorporeal, and then

confess their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with

intention to make the Divine Nature understood, but piously, to honour Him with attributes of significations

Then, for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought their effects; that is to say, what

immediate causes they used in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call causing (that

is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by but by observing and remembering what they have seen to

precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and

subsequent event any dependence or connexion at all: and therefore from the like things past, they expect the

like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the

causing of it: as the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction

for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in diverse other occasions since. In like manner

they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the

name of God be amongst them, as charming, and conjuring (the liturgy of witches); insomuch as to believe

they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into anything.

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers invisible, it can be no other but such

expressions of their reverence as they would use towards men; gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of body,

considerate addresses, sober behaviour, premeditated words, swearing (that is, assuring one another of their

promises), by invoking them. Beyond that, reason suggesteth nothing, but leaves them either to rest there, or

for further ceremonies to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to pass,

especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular

undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come by the time past,

they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics of the like

encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from other men of whom they have once

And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and

taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion; which, by reason of the

different fancies, judgements, and passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different that

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they that have nourished and

ordered them, according to their own invention. The other have done it by God's commandment and

direction. But both sorts have done it with a purpose to make those men that relied on them the more apt to

obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society. So that the religion of the former sort is a part of human

politics; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects. And the religion of the

latter sort is divine politics; and containeth precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the

kingdom of God. Of the former sort were all the founders of Commonwealths, and the lawgivers of the

Gentiles: of the latter sort were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Saviour, by whom have been derived unto

And for that part of religion which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible, there is

almost nothing that has a name that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a

god or devil; or by their poets feigned to be animated, inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.

The heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds, were so many gods.

Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a leek, were deified. Besides that, they

filled almost all places with spirits called demons: the plains, with Pan and Panises, or Satyrs; the woods,

with Fauns and Nymphs; the sea, with Tritons and other Nymphs; every river and fountain, with a ghost of

his name and with Nymphs; every house, with its Lares, or familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with

ghosts and spiritual officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with larvae,

lemures, ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of fairies and bugbears. They have also ascribed

divinity, and built temples, to mere accidents and qualities; such as are time, night, day, peace, concord, love,

contention, virtue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they

prayed to as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall or withholding that

good, or evil, for or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own wit, by the name of Muses; their

own ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own lust, by the name of Cupid; their own rage, by the name

Furies; their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions to incubi and

succubae: insomuch as there was nothing which a poet could introduce as a person in his poem which they

The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for religion, which is men's

ignorance of causes, and thereby their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes on which there was no

dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, instead of second causes, a kind of

second and ministerial gods; ascribing the cause of fecundity to Venus, the cause of arts to Apollo, of subtlety

and craft to Mercury, of tempests and storms to Aeolus, and of other effects to other gods; insomuch as there

And to the worship which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards their gods, namely, oblations,

prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly named, the same legislators of the Gentiles have added their images,

both in picture and sculpture, that the more ignorant sort (that is to say, the most part or generality of the

people), thinking the gods for whose representation they were made were really included and as it were

housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them: and endowed them with lands, and

houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses; that is, consecrated, made holy to

those their idols; as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole islands; and have attributed to them, not

only the shapes, some of men, some of beasts, some of monsters, but also the faculties and passions of men

and beasts; as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation, and this not only by mixing one with another to propagate

the kind of gods, but also by mixing with men and women to beget mongrel gods, and but inmates of heaven,

as Bacchus, Hercules, and others; besides, anger, revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the

actions proceeding from them, as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken for an effect

of power or a cause of pleasure; and all such vices as amongst men are taken to be against law rather than

Lastly, to the prognostics of time to come, which are naturally but conjectures upon the experience of time

past, and supernaturally, divine revelation, the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, partly upon

pretended experience, partly upon pretended revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious ways of

divination, and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless

answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous oracles; which answers were made

ambiguous by design, to own the event both ways; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which

is very frequent in sulphurous caverns: sometimes in the leaves of the Sibyls, of whose prophecies, like those

perhaps of Nostradamus (for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times), there were

some books in reputation in the time of the Roman republic: sometimes in the insignificant speeches of

madmen, supposed to be possessed with a divine spirit, which possession they called enthusiasm; and these

kinds of foretelling events were accounted theomancy, or prophecy: sometimes in the aspect of the stars at

their nativity, which was called horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology: sometimes in their

own hopes and fears, called and fears, called thumomancy, or presage: sometimes in the prediction of witches

that pretended conference with the dead, which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft, and is but

juggling and confederate knavery: sometimes in the casual flight or feeding of birds, called augury:

sometimes in the entrails of a sacrificed beast, which was haruspicy: sometimes in dreams: sometimes in

croaking of ravens, or chattering of birds: sometimes in the lineaments of the face, which was called

metoposcopy; or by palmistry in the lines of the hand, in casual words called omina: sometimes in monsters

or unusual accidents; as eclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the like,

which they called portenta, and ostenta, because they thought them to portend or foreshow some great

calamity to come: sometimes in mere lottery, as cross and pile; counting holes in a sieve; dipping of verses in

Homer and Virgil; and innumerable other such vain conceits. So easy are men to be drawn to believe

anything from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold of

And therefore the first founders and legislators of Commonwealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were

only to keep the people in obedience and peace, have in all places taken care: first, to imprint their minds a

belief that those precepts which they gave concerning religion might not be thought to proceed from their

own device, but from the dictates of some god or other spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher

nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily be received; so Numa Pompilius pretended to

receive the ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans from the nymph Egeria and the first king and

founder of the kingdom of Peru pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the sun; and Mahomet, to

set up his new religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost in form of a dove. Secondly, they

have had a care to make it believed that the same things were displeasing to the gods which were forbidden

by the laws. Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals by which they were to

believe the anger of the gods might be appeased; and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness,

earthquakes, and each man's private misery came from the anger of the gods; and their anger from the neglect

of their worship, or the forgetting or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. And though amongst

the ancient Romans men were not forbidden to deny that which in the poets is written of the pains and

pleasures after this life, which divers of great authority and gravity in that state have in their harangues

And by these, and such other institutions, they obtained in order to their end, which was the peace of the

Commonwealth, that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in their

ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to mutiny against their governors.

And being entertained with the pomp and pastime of festivals and public games made in honour of the gods,

needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the state.

And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no scruple of

tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome itself, unless it had something in it that could not

consist with their civil government; nor do we read that any religion was there forbidden but that of the Jews,

who (being the peculiar kingdom of God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king

or state whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.

But where God himself by supernatural revelation planted religion, there he also made to himself a peculiar

kingdom, and gave laws, not only of behaviour towards himself, but also towards one another; and thereby in

the kingdom of God, the policy and laws civil are a part of religion; and therefore the distinction of temporal

and spiritual domination hath there no place. It is true that God is king of all the earth; yet may He be king of

a peculiar and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity therein than that he that hath the general

command of the whole army should have withal a peculiar regiment or company of his own. God is king of

all the earth by His power, but of His chosen people, He is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the

kingdom of God, both by nature and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place.

From the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its

first seeds or principles; which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible and supernatural; that can

never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions may again be made to spring out of them

For seeing all formed religion is founded at first upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person,

whom they believe not only to be a wise man and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy

man to whom God Himself vouchsafeth to declare His will supernaturally, it followeth necessarily when they

that have the government of religion shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, or

their love suspected, or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of divine revelation, that the

religion which they desire to uphold must be suspected likewise and (without the fear of the civil sword)

That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth a religion, or addeth to it when it is

already formed, is the enjoining of a belief of contradictories: for both parts of a contradiction cannot

possibly be true, and therefore to enjoin the belief of them is an argument of ignorance, which detects the

author in that, and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernatural: which

revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against natural reason.

That which taketh away the reputation of sincerity is the doing or saying of such things as appear to be signs

that what they require other men to believe is not believed by themselves; all which doings or sayings are

therefore called scandalous because they be stumblingblocks that make men to fall in the way of religion: as

injustice, cruelty, profaneness, avarice, and luxury. For who can believe that he that doth ordinarily such

actions, as proceed from any of these roots, believeth there is any such invisible power to be feared as he

That which taketh away the reputation of love is the being detected of private ends: as when the belief they

require of others conduceth, or seemeth to conduce, to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure

pleasure to themselves only or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves they are thought to

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling can be no other than the operation of miracles, or

true prophecy (which also is a miracle), or extraordinary felicity. And therefore, to those points of religion

which have been received from them that did such miracles, those that are added by such as approve not their

calling by some miracle obtain no greater belief than what the custom and laws of the places in which they be

educated have wrought into them. For as in natural things men of judgement require natural signs and

arguments, so in supernatural things they require signs supernatural (which are miracles) before they consent

All which causes of the weakening of men's faith do manifestly appear in the examples following. First, we

have the example of the children of Israel, who, when Moses that had approved his calling to them by

miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but forty days, revolted from the

worship of the true God recommended to them by him, and, setting up[Exodus, 32. 1, 2] a golden calf for

their god, relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians from whom they had been so lately delivered. And

again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel were

dead, another generation arose and served Baal. [Judges, 2. 11] So that Miracles failing, faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, being constituted by their father judges in Beersheba, received bribes and

judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their king in other manner than He

was king of other people, and therefore cried out to Samuel to choose them a king after the manner of the

nations. I Samuel, 8. 3] So that justice failing, faith also failed, insomuch as they deposed their God from

And whereas in the planting of Christian religion the oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the

number of Christians increased wonderfully every day and in every place by the preaching of the Apostles

and Evangelists, a great part of that success may reasonably be attributed to the contempt into which the

priests of the Gentiles of that time had brought themselves by their uncleanness, avarice, and juggling

between princes. Also the religion of the Church of Rome was partly for the same cause abolished in England

and many other parts of Christendom, insomuch as the failing of virtue in the pastors maketh faith fail in the

people, and partly from bringing of the philosophy and doctrine of Aristotle into religion by the Schoolmen;

from whence there arose so many contradictions and absurdities as brought the clergy into a reputation both

of ignorance and of fraudulent intention, and inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for salvation, there be so many

manifestly to the advantage of the Pope so many of his spiritual subjects residing in the territories of other

Christian princes that, were it not for the mutual emulation of those princes, they might without war or

trouble exclude all foreign authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is there that does

not see to whose benefit it conduceth to have it believed that a king hath not his authority from Christ unless

a bishop crown him? That a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry? That whether a prince be born in lawful

marriage, or not, must be judged by authority from Rome? That subjects may be freed from their allegiance if

by the court of Rome the king be judged a heretic? That a king, as Childeric of France, may be deposed by a

Pope, as Pope Zachary, for no cause, and his kingdom given to one of his subjects? That the clergy, and

regulars, in what country soever, shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of their king in cases criminal? Or who

does not see to whose profit redound the fees of private Masses, and vales of purgatory, with other signs of

private interest enough to mortify the most lively faith, if, as I said, the civil magistrate and custom did not

more sustain it than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their teachers? So that I may

attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the same cause, and that is unpleasing priests; and

those not only amongst catholics, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of reformation.

NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man

sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the

difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any

benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has

strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in

And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of

proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science, which very few have and but in few things, as

being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find

yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal time

equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps

make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they

have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by

fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men that howsoever they

may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent or more learned, yet they will hardly

believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance.

But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign

of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two

men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way

to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to

destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to fear

than another man's single power, if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably

be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his

labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as

anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other

power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is

generally allowed. Also, because there be some that, taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the

acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others, that otherwise would be glad

to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long

time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over

Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no

power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate

he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he dares

(which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy

each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly,

The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use

violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to

defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue,

either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are

in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth

not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is

sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the

nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination

thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known

disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same

consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own

invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof

is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be

imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require

much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and

which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,

It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that Nature should thus dissociate

and render men apt to invade and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference,

made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider

with himself: when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to

sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws

and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow

subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and

servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my

words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves

no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions till they know a law that forbids them;

which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person

It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was

never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places where they live so now. For the savage

people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth

on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before.

Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to

fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to

But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against

another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in

continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes

fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and

continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the

industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions

of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no

law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are

none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the

world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is

consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but

only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill

condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it,

The passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to

commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of

peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the

laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following chapters.

THE right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own

power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and

consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest

By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external

impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot

hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him.

A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden

to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that

by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus

and lex, right and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to

forbear; whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much as

And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of

every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he

can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in

such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as

this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or

wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is

a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of

obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first

branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it.

The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves.

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this

second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he

shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against

other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing

anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right,

as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to

prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the gospel:

Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that law of all men, quod tibi

To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of

his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right

which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only

standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without

hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it, or by transferring it to another. By simply renouncing,

when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By transferring, when he intendeth the benefit

thereof to some certain person or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted away

his right, then is he said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those to whom such right is granted, or

abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is duty, not to make void that voluntary act of his

own: and that such hindrance is injustice, and injury, as being sine jure; the right being before renounced or

transferred. So that injury or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that which in the

disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what one

maintained in the beginning; so in the world it is called injustice, and injury voluntarily to undo that which

from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceth or

transferreth his right is a declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he

doth so renounce or transfer, or hath so renounced or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these

signs are either words only, or actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words and actions. And the

same are the bonds, by which men are bound and obliged: bonds that have their strength, not from their own

nature (for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word), but from fear of some evil consequence upon

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right

reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and

of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights

which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. As first a

man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life, because he

cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains,

and imprisonment, both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience, as there is to the patience of

suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned, as also because a man cannot tell when he seeth men proceed

against him by violence whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive and end for which this

renouncing and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life,

and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other

signs, seem to despoil himself of the end for which those signs were intended, he is not to be understood as if

he meant it, or that it was his will, but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be

There is difference between transferring of right to the thing, the thing, and transferring or tradition, that is,

delivery of the thing itself. For the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right, as in

buying and selling with ready money, or exchange of goods or lands, and it may be delivered some time after.

Again, one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform

his part at some determinate time after, and in the meantime be trusted; and then the contract on his part is

called pact, or covenant: or both parts may contract now to perform hereafter, in which cases he that is to

perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith, and the failing

When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties transferreth in hope to gain thereby

friendship or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of charity, or

magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; this is not

contract, but gift, free gift, grace: which words signify one and the same thing.

Signs of contract are either express or by inference. Express are words spoken with understanding of what

they signify: and such words are either of the time present or past; as, I give, I grant, I have given, I have

granted, I will that this be yours: or of the future; as, I will give, I will grant, which words of the future are

Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes the consequence of silence;

sometimes the consequence of actions; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a

sign by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor.

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free gift

and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to come, as, tomorrow I will give, they are a sign I

have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some

other act. But if the words be of the time present, or past, as, I have given, or do give to be delivered

tomorrow, then is my tomorrow's right given away today; and that by the virtue of the words, though there

were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, volo

hoc tuum esse cras, and cras dabo; that is, between I will that this be thine tomorrow, and, I will give it thee

tomorrow: for the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present; but in the

latter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come: and therefore the former words, being of the

present, transfer a future right; the latter, that be of the future, transfer nothing. But if there be other signs of

the will to transfer a right besides words; then, though the gift be free, yet may the right be understood to pass

by words of the future: as if a man propound a prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, the gift is

free; and though the words be of the future, yet the right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be

In contracts the right passeth, not only where the words are of the time present or past, but also where they

are of the future, because all contract is mutual translation, or change of right; and therefore he that promiseth

only, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he

intended the right should pass: for unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other

would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of contract,

He that performeth first in the case of a contract is said to merit that which he is to receive by the

performance of the other, and he hath it as due. Also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be

given to him only that winneth, or money is thrown amongst many to be enjoyed by them that catch it;

though this be a free gift, yet so to win, or so to catch, is to merit, and to have it as due. For the right is

transferred in the propounding of the prize, and in throwing down the money, though it be not determined to

whom, but by the event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of merit this difference, that in

contract I merit by virtue of my own power and the contractor's need, but in this case of free gift I am enabled

to merit only by the benignity of the giver: in contract I merit at the contractor's hand that he should depart

with his right; in this case of gift, I merit not that the giver should part with his right, but that when he has

parted with it, it should be mine rather than another's. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of

the Schools between meritum congrui and meritum condigni. For God Almighty, having promised paradise to

those men, hoodwinked with carnal desires, that can walk through this world according to the precepts and

limits prescribed by him, they say he that shall so walk shall merit paradise ex congruo. But because no man

can demand a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of God

only, they say no man can merit paradise ex condigno. This, I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction;

but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of art longer than it serves their

turn, I will not affirm anything of their meaning: only this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to

If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another, in the condition

of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion,

it is void: but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel

performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because

the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear

of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the

justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first does but

betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of

But in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith,

that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the

covenant made, as some new fact or other sign of the will not to perform, else it cannot make the covenant

void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of

He that transferreth any right transferreth the means of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power. As he that

selleth land is understood to transfer the herbage and whatsoever grows upon it; nor can he that sells a mill

turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty are

understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers, and of appointing magistrates for the

To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible, because not understanding our speech, they understand

not, nor accept of any translation of right, nor can translate any right to another: and without mutual

To make covenant with God is impossible but by mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation

supernatural or by His lieutenants that govern under Him and in His name: for otherwise we know not

whether our covenants be accepted or not. And therefore they that vow anything contrary to any law of

nature, vow in vain, as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law of

The matter or subject of a covenant is always something that falleth under deliberation, for to covenant is an

act of the will; that is to say, an act, and the last act, of deliberation; and is therefore always understood to be

something to come, and which judged possible for him that covenanteth to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible is no covenant. But if that prove impossible

afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid and bindeth, though not to the thing

itself, yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is

Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing, or by being forgiven. For performance is the

natural end of obligation, and forgiveness the restitution of liberty, as being a retransferring of that right in

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to

pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy, I am bound by it. For it is a contract, wherein one receiveth

the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it, and consequently, where no other law (as in

the condition of mere nature) forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if

trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it: and if a weaker prince make a

disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear, he is bound to keep it; unless (as hath been said before) there

ariseth some new and just cause of fear to renew the war. And even in Commonwealths, if I be forced to

redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the civil law discharge me.

For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear:

A former covenant makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away his right to one man today hath it not

to pass tomorrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null.

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For (as I have shown before) no man

can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, the avoiding

whereof is the only end of laying down any right; and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no

covenant transferreth any right, nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so,

kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you when you come to kill me. For

man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is

certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals

to execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law by

A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature

where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation: and in the civil state the accusation is followed

with punishment, which, being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true of the

accusation of those by whose condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a father, wife, or benefactor. For

the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature, and

therefore not to be received: and where a man's testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it.

Also accusations upon torture are not to be reputed as testimonies. For torture is to be used but as means of

conjecture, and light, in the further examination and search of truth: and what is in that case confessed

tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured, not to the informing of the torturers, and therefore ought not to

have the credit of a sufficient testimony: for whether he deliver himself by true or false accusation, he does it

The force of words being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their

covenants, there are in man's nature but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear of

the consequence of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a

generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual

pleasure, which are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned upon is fear; whereof there be

two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the power of those men they shall

therein offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly

the greater fear. The fear of the former is in every man his own religion, which hath place in the nature of

man before civil society. The latter hath not so; at least not place enough to keep men to their promises,

because in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of power is not discerned, but by the event of battle.

So that before the time of civil society, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing can strengthen a

covenant of peace agreed on against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the

fear of that invisible power which they every one worship as God, and fear as a revenger of their perfidy. All

therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civil power is to put one another to swear by the

God he feareth: which swearing, or oath, is a form of speech, added to a promise, by which he that promiseth

signifieth that unless he perform he renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on

himself. Such was the heathen form, Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this beast. So is our form, I shall do

thus, and thus, so help me God. And this, with the rites and ceremonies which every one useth in his own

By this it appears that an oath taken according to any other form, or rite, than his that sweareth is in vain and

no oath, and that there is no swearing by anything which the swearer thinks not God. For though men have

sometimes used to swear by their kings, for fear, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood they

attributed to them divine honour. And that swearing unnecessarily by God is but profaning of his name: and

swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by

It appears also that the oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of

God, without the oath, as much as with it; if unlawful, bindeth not at all, though it be confirmed with an oath.

FROM that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as, being retained, hinder

the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this: that men perform their covenants made; without

which covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are

And in this law of nature consisteth the fountain and original of justice. For where no covenant hath

preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything and consequently, no

action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust and the definition of injustice is

no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust is just.

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part (as hath been

said in the former chapter), are invalid, though the original of justice be the making of covenants, yet injustice

actually there can be none till the cause of such fear be taken away; which, while men are in the natural

condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be

some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some

punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that

propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such

power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the

ordinary definition of justice in the Schools, for they say that justice is the constant will of giving to every

man his own. And therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injustice; and where there

is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no Commonwealth, there is no propriety, all men having

right to all things: therefore where there is no Commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of

justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants, but the validity of covenants begins not but with the

constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins.

The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice, and sometimes also with his tongue, seriously

alleging that every man's conservation and contentment being committed to his own care, there could be no

reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not

make; keep, or not keep, covenants was not against reason when it conduced to one's benefit. He does not

therein deny that there be covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such

breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice: but he questioneth whether

injustice, taking away the fear of God (for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God), not sometimes

stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to

such a benefit as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise and revilings, but also the

power of other men. The kingdom of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust

violence? Were it against reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? And if it be not

against reason, it is not against justice: or else justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as

this, successful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue: and some that in all other things have

disallowed the violation of faith, yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdom. And the heathen

that believed that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter believed nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the

avenger of injustice, somewhat like to a piece of law in Coke's Commentaries on Littleton; where he says if

the right heir of the crown be attainted of treason, yet the crown shall descend to him, and eo instante the

attainder be void: from which instances a man will be very prone to infer that when the heir apparent of a

kingdom shall kill him that is in possession, though his father, you may call it injustice, or by what other

name you will; yet it can never be against reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit

of themselves; and those actions are most reasonable that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning

For the question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security of performance on either side, as when

there is no civil power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no covenants: but either

where one of the parties has performed already, or where there is a power to make him perform, there is the

question whether it be against reason; that is, against the benefit of the other to perform, or not. And I say it is

not against reason. For the manifestation whereof we are to consider; first, that when a man doth a thing,

which notwithstanding anything can be foreseen and reckoned on tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever

some accident, which he could not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it

reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of war, wherein every man to every man, for want of

a common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit,

to himself from destruction without the help of confederates; where every one expects the same defence by

the confederation that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those

that help him can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power.

He, therefore, that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so,

cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defence but by the error of them that

receive him; nor when he is received be retained in it without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a

man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of

society, he perisheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee nor

reckon upon, and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to

his destruction forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven by any way, it is frivolous; there

being but one way imaginable, and that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant.

And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion; it is manifest that, though the event follow,

yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so, others are

taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say,

keeping of covenant, is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and

There be some that proceed further and will not have the law of nature to be those rules which conduce to the

preservation of man's life on earth, but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to which they think

the breach of covenant may conduce, and consequently be just and reasonable; such are they that think it a

work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebel against the sovereign power constituted over them by their own

consent. But because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death, much less of the reward that is

then to be given to breach of faith, but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying that they know it

supernaturally or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally, breach of

Others, that allow for a law of nature the keeping of faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons;

as heretics, and such as use not to perform their covenant to others; and this also is against reason. For if any

fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our covenant made, the same ought in reason to have been sufficient

The names of just and unjust when they are attributed to men, signify one thing, and when they are attributed

to actions, another. When they are attributed to men, they signify conformity, or inconformity of manners, to

reason. But when they are attributed to action they signify the conformity, or inconformity to reason, not of

manners, or manner of life, but of particular actions. A just man therefore is he that taketh all the care he can

that his actions may be all just; and an unjust man is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our

language styled by the names of righteous and unrighteous than just and unjust though the meaning be the

same. Therefore a righteous man does not lose that title by one or a few unjust actions that proceed from

sudden passion, or mistake of things or persons, nor does an unrighteous man lose his character for such

actions as he does, or forbears to do, for fear: because his will is not framed by the justice, but by the apparent

benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to human actions the relish of justice is a certain nobleness or

gallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life to

fraud, or breach of promise. This justice of the manners is that which is meant where justice is called a virtue;

But the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but guiltless: and the injustice of the same (which is also

Again, the injustice of manners is the disposition or aptitude to do injury, and is injustice before it proceed to

act, and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action (that is to say, injury)

supposeth an individual person injured; namely him to whom the covenant was made: and therefore many

times the injury is received by one man when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the master

commandeth his servant to give money to stranger; if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom

he had before covenanted to obey; but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation,

and therefore could not injure him. And so also in Commonwealths private men may remit to one another

their debts, but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged; because the detaining of debt

is an injury to themselves, but robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the Commonwealth.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is not injury to him. For if he

that doeth it hath not passed away his original right to do what he please by some antecedent covenant, there

is no breach of covenant, and therefore no injury done him. And if he have, then his will to have it done,

being signified, is a release of that covenant, and so again there is no injury done him.

Justice of actions is by writers divided into commutative and distributive: and the former they say consisteth

in proportion arithmetical; the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative, therefore, they place in the

equality of value of the things contracted for; and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit to men of

equal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy, or to give more to a man than he merits. The

value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors, and therefore the just value is

that which they be contented to give. And merit (besides that which is by covenant, where the performance

on one part meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative, not distributive)

is not due by justice, but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it

useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice is the justice of a contractor; that

is, a performance of covenant in buying and selling, hiring and letting to hire, lending and borrowing,

And distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is just. Wherein,

being trusted by them that make him arbitrator, if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute to every man

his own: and this is indeed just distribution, and may be called, though improperly, distributive justice, but

more properly equity, which also is a law of nature, as shall be shown in due place.

As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace; that is to say,

antecedent free gift; and is the fourth law of nature, which may be conceived in this form: that a man which

receiveth benefit from another of mere grace endeavour that he which giveth it have no reasonable cause to

repent him of his good will. For no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is

voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall

be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of

reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war, which is

contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature which commandeth men to seek peace. The breach of this

law is called ingratitude, and hath the same relation to grace that injustice hath to obligation by covenant.

A fifth law of nature is complaisance; that is to say, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest.

For the understanding whereof we may consider that there is in men's aptness to society a diversity of nature,

rising from their diversity of affections, not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an

edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity and irregularity of figure takes more room from others than

itself fills, and for hardness cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders

cast away as unprofitable and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of nature will strive to retain those

things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary, and for the stubbornness of his passions

cannot be corrected, is to be left or cast out of society as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not

only by right, but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can to obtain that which is

necessary for his conservation, he that shall oppose himself against it for things superfluous is guilty of the

war that thereupon is to follow, and therefore doth that which is contrary to the fundamental law of nature,

which commandeth to seek peace. The observers of this law may be called sociable, (the Latins call them

A sixth law of nature is this: that upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of

them that, repenting, desire it. For pardon is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted to them that

persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time

A seventh is: that in revenges (that is, retribution of evil for evil), men look not at the greatness of the evil

past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other

design than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before

it, that commandeth pardon upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example

and profit to come is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end (for the end is always

somewhat to come); and glorying to no end is vainglory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason

tendeth to the introduction of war, which is against the law of nature, and is commonly styled by the name of

And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard

their life than not to be revenged, we may in the eighth place, for a law of nature, set down this precept: that

no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of which

The question who is the better man has no place in the condition of mere nature, where (as has been shown

before) all men are equal. The inequality that now is has been introduced by the laws civil. I know that

Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more

worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy; others to

serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he; as master and servant were not

introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit: which is not only against reason, but also against

experience. For there are very few so foolish that had not rather govern themselves than be governed by

others: nor when the wise, in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom,

do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that

equality is to be acknowledged: or if nature have made men unequal, yet because men that think themselves

equal will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And

therefore for the ninth law of nature, I put this: that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature.

On this law dependeth another: that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to

himself any right which he is not content should he reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all

men that seek peace to lay down certain rights of nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list,

so is it necessary for man's life to retain some: as right to govern their own bodies; enjoy air, water, motion,

ways to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this

case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves that which they would not have to be granted to

others, they do contrary to the precedent law that commandeth the acknowledgement of natural equality, and

therefore also against the law of nature. The observers of this law are those we call modest, and the breakers

arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share.

Also, if a man he trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal

equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He

therefore that is partial in judgement, doth what in him lies to deter men from the use of judges and

arbitrators, and consequently, against the fundamental law of nature, is the cause of war.

The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belonged to him,

is called equity, and (as I have said before) distributive justice: the violation, acception of persons,

And from this followeth another law: that such things as cannot he divided be enjoyed in common, if it can

be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that

But some things there be that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. Then, the law of nature which

prescribeth equity requireth: that the entire right, or else (making the use alternate) the first possession, be

determined by lot. For equal distribution is of the law of nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot

Of lots there be two sorts, arbitrary and natural. Arbitrary is that which is agreed on by the competitors;

natural is either primogeniture (which the Greek calls kleronomia, which signifies, given by lot), or first

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the first

It is also a law of nature: that all men that mediate peace he allowed safe conduct. For the law that

commandeth peace, as the end, commandeth intercession, as the means; and to intercession the means is safe

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these laws, there may nevertheless arise questions

concerning a man's action; first, whether it were done, or not done; secondly, if done, whether against the

law, or not against the law; the former whereof is called a question of fact, the latter a question of right;

therefore unless the parties to the question covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as

far from peace as ever. This other, to whose sentence they submit, is called an arbitrator. And therefore it is

of the law of nature that they that are at controversy submit their right to the judgement of an arbitrator.

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his

own cause: and if he were never so fit, yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be admitted to

be judge, the other is to be admitted also; and so the controversy, that is, the cause of war, remains, against

For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator to whom greater profit, or

honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party than of the other: for he hath taken,

though an unavoidable bribe, yet a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the

And in a controversy of fact, the judge being to give no more credit to one than to the other, if there be no

other arguments, must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: for else the question is

These are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and

which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular

men; as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance, which may therefore also be reckoned amongst

those things which the law of nature hath forbidden, but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be taken notice of by all men,

whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all

men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and

that is: Do not that to another which thou wouldest not have done to thyself, which showeth him that he has

no more to do in learning the laws of nature but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own they

seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own

passions and selflove may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will

The laws of nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in

foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not always. For he that should be modest and tractable, and

perform all he promises in such time and place where no man else should do so, should but make himself a

prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature which tend to

nature's preservation. And again, he that having sufficient security that others shall observe the same laws

towards him, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war, and consequently the destruction of his

And whatsoever laws bind in foro interno may be broken, not only by a fact contrary to the law, but also by a

fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his action in this case be according to the law,

yet his purpose was against the law; which, where the obligation is in foro interno, is a breach.

The laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception

of persons, and the rest can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace

The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire and endeavour, mean an unfeigned and constant

endeavour, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their

And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the

science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. Good and evil are names that

signify our appetites and aversions, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are different:

and diverse men differ not only in their judgement on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the

taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions

of common life. Nay, the same man, in diverse times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is,

calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes, controversies,

and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war,

private appetite is the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good,

and therefore also the way or means of peace, which (as I have shown before) are justice, gratitude, modesty,

equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary

vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws

of nature is the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the

same virtues and vices; yet, not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, nor that they come to be praised as

the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the

cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude; or not the cause, but the quantity of a gift, made liberality.

These dictates of reason men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly: for they are but conclusions or

theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law, properly,

is the word of him that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same theorems as

delivered in the word of God that by right commandeth all things, then are they properly called laws.

A PERSON is he whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or

actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.

When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person: and when they are considered as

representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.

The word person is Latin, instead whereof the Greeks have prosopon, which signifies the face, as persona in

Latin signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage; and sometimes more

particularly that part of it which disguiseth the face, as a mask or vizard: and from the stage hath been

translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals as theatres. So that a person is the same

that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate is to act or represent himself

or another; and he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act in his name (in which sense Cicero

useth it where he says, Unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, et judicis I bear three persons; my own,

my adversary's, and the judge's), and is called in diverse occasions, diversely; as a representer, or

representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like.

Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the

person is the actor, and he that owneth his words and actions is the author, in which case the actor acteth by

authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions is called an owner, and in Latin dominus in

Greek kurios; speaking of actions, is called author. And as the right of possession is called dominion so the

right of doing any action is called authority. So that by authority is always understood a right of doing any

act; and done by authority, done by commission or license from him whose right it is.

From hence it followeth that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author no

less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And

therefore all that hath been said formerly (Chapter XIV) of the nature of covenants between man and man in

their natural capacity is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have

And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath,

doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant whereof he is not author, nor consequently by a

When the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former

covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature: for though the action be against the

law of nature, yet it is not his; but, contrarily, to refuse to do it is against the law of nature that forbiddeth

And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he

hath, but only takes his word; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no

longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author is not valid without his counterassurance. But if he

that so covenanteth knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance than the actor's word, then is the

covenant valid, because the actor in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority

is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the

There are few things that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, a

hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate cannot be authors,

nor therefore give authority to their actors: yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance,

given them by those that are owners or governors of those things. And therefore such things cannot be

Likewise children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason may be personated by guardians, or

curators, but can be no authors during that time of any action done by them, longer than (when they shall

recover the use of reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the folly he that hath right of

governing them may give authority to the guardian. But this again has no place but in a state civil, because

An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated, as were the gods of the heathen, which, by such

officers as the state appointed, were personated, and held possessions, and other goods, and rights, which men

from time to time dedicated and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be authors: for an idol is nothing.

The authority proceeded from the state, and therefore before introduction of civil government the gods of the

The true God may be personated. As He was: first, Moses, who governed the Israelites, that were that were

not his, but God's people; not in his own name, with hoc dicit Moses, but in God's name, with hoc dicit

Dominus. Secondly, by the Son of Man, His own Son, our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce

the Jews and induce all nations into the kingdom of his Father; not as of himself, but as sent from his Father.

And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working in the Apostles; which Holy Ghost was

a Comforter that came not of himself, but was sent and proceeded from them both.

A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be

done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the

unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but

And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many, they cannot be understood for one, but in any

authors, of everything their representative saith or doth in their name; every man giving their common

representer authority from himself in particular, and owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they

give him authority without stint: otherwise, when they limit him in what and how far he shall represent them,

And if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the

voice of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in the

negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives, and thereby the excess of

And a representative of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory

voices are oftentimes equal, is therefore oftentimes mute and incapable of action. Yet in some cases

contradictory voices equal in number may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of

votes, even in that they condemn not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve not.

For when a cause is heard, not to condemn is to absolve; but on the contrary to say that not absolving is

condemning is not true. The like it is in deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time: for

Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or assemblies, whereof every one has, by a negative voice,

authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no representative; by

the diversity of opinions and interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest

consequence, a mute person and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a multitude,

Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called, which I have before defined to be him that owneth

the action of another simply. The second is he that owneth an action or covenant of another conditionally;

that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at or before a certain time. And these authors

conditional are generally called sureties, in Latin, fidejussores and sponsores; and particularly for debt,

THE final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in the

introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight

of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from

that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions

of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the

performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and

For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done

to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural

passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but

words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every

one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected,

or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for

caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one

another has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature that the greater spoils they

gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other laws therein but the laws of honour; that is,

to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did

then; so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families (for their own security), enlarge their

dominions upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders;

endeavour as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbours by open force, and secret arts, for want

Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security; because in small

numbers, small additions on the one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as is sufficient

to carry the victory, and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in

for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear; and is

then sufficient when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the

And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular

judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a

common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best

use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another, and reduce their strength by

mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together,

but also, when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other for their particular interests. For if

we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature,

without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and

then there neither would be, nor need to be, any civil government or Commonwealth at all, because there

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed

and directed by one judgement for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a

victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they have no

common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must

needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.

It is true that certain living creatures, as bees and ants, live sociably one with another (which are therefore by

Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures), and yet have no other direction than their particular

judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient

for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the

First, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures are not; and

consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy, and hatred, and finally war; but amongst these

Secondly, that amongst these creatures the common good differeth not from the private; and being by nature

inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see, any fault in

the administration of their common business: whereas amongst men there are very many that think

themselves wiser and abler to govern the public better than the rest, and these strive to reform and innovate,

one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making known to one another their

desires and other affections, yet they want that art of words by which some men can represent to others that

which is good in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment or diminish the apparent

greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage; and therefore as long as they be at

ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome when he is most at

ease; for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial: and

therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement

constant and lasting; which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners,

and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by

the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and

strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices,

unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and

every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall

act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit

their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements to his judgement. This is more than consent, or

concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every

man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give up my right of governing

myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and

authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a

COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to

speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence.

For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much

power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to

peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the

Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one

with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of

And he that carryeth this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides,

The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways. One, by natural force: as when a man maketh his

children to submit themselves, and their children, to his government, as being able to destroy them if they

refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is

when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence

to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political Commonwealth, or

Commonwealth by Institution; and the former, a Commonwealth by acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a

A COMMONWEALTH is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one

with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part the right to

present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative; every one, as well he that voted for it

as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements of that man, or assembly of men, in

the same manner as if they were his own, to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected

From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood they are not obliged by former covenant to anything

repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a Commonwealth, being thereby

bound by covenant to own the actions and judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst

themselves to be obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they

that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a

disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man, other assembly of men:

for they are bound, every man to every man, to own and be reputed author of all that already is their

sovereign shall do and judge fit to be done; so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their

covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him

that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so

again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for

such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall

do; and because it is injustice for a man to do anything for which he may be punished by his own authority,

he is also upon that title unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their

sovereign a new covenant, made, not with men but with God, this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with

God but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person, which none doth but God's lieutenant who

hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the

pretenders' own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition.

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make sovereign, by

covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no breach of covenant on

the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed

from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects before hand is

manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or he must

make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible, because as they are

not one person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the

sovereignty are void; because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof is the

act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in

particular. Besides, if any one or more of them pretend a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his

institution, and others or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is

in this case no judge to decide the controversy: it returns therefore to the sword again; and every man

recovereth the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the

institution. It is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant. The opinion that any

monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding

this easy truth: that covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or

protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or

assembly of men, that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by

the strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign, then no man

imagineth any such covenant to have passed in the institution: for no man is so dull as to say, for example,

the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions;

which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the reason to

be alike in a monarchy and in a popular government proceedeth from the ambition of some that are kinder to

the government of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy, which they despair

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that dissented must now

consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by

the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently

declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the major part should ordain: and

therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to

his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent

be asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war he was in before;

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgements of the sovereign

instituted, it follows that whatsoever he doth, can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by

any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by authority from another doth therein no injury

to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a Commonwealth every particular man is

author of all the sovereign doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign

complaineth of that whereof he himself is author, and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no,

nor himself of injury, because to do injury to oneself is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign

power may commit iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper signification.

Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that hath sovereign power can justly be put to

death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the actions

And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, and whosoever has right to the

end has right to the means, it belonged of right to whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty to be

judge both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same; and to

do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of peace and security,

by prevention of discord at home, and hostility from abroad; and when peace and security are lost, for the

Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what

conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal in

speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published.

For the actions of men proceed from their opinions, and in the well governing of opinions consisteth the well

governing of men's actions in order to their peace and concord. And though in matter of doctrine nothing to

be regarded but the truth, yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace. For doctrine repugnant

to peace can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. It is true that in a

Commonwealth, where by the negligence or unskillfulness of governors and teachers false doctrines are by

time generally received, the contrary truths may be generally offensive: yet the most sudden and rough

bustling in of a new truth that can be does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war. For

those men that are so remissly governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are still

in war; and their condition, not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another; and they live, as it

were, in the procincts of battle continually. It belonged therefore to him that hath the sovereign power to be

judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent

Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may

know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow

subjects: and this is it men call propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power, as hath already been

shown, all men had right to all things, which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this propriety, being

necessary to peace, and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public peace.

These rules of propriety (or meum and tuum) and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of

subjects are the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of

civil law be now restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome; which being the head of a great part

Eighthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all

controversies which may arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact. For without the

decision of controversies, there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another; the laws

concerning meum and tuum are in vain, and to every man remaineth, from the natural and necessary appetite

of his own conservation, the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war,

Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and

Commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be

assembled, armed, and paid for that end, and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof.

For the power by which the people are to be defended consisteth in their armies, and the strength of an army

in the union of their strength under one command; which command the sovereign instituted, therefore hath,

because the command of the militia, without other institution, maketh him that hath it sovereign. And

therefore, whosoever is made general of an army, he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.

Tenthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the choosing of all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers,

both in peace and war. For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and

defence, he is understood to have power to use such means as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

Eleventhly, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour; and of punishing

with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath

formerly made; or if there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of

men to serve the Commonwealth, or deterring of them from doing disservice to the same.

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves, what respect they look for from

others, and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation,

quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a

common enemy; it is necessary that there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men as

have deserved or are able to deserve well of the Commonwealth, and that there be force in the hands of some

or other to put those laws in execution. But it hath already been shown that not only the whole militia, or

forces of the Commonwealth, but also the judicature of all controversies, is annexed to the sovereignty. To

the sovereign therefore it belonged also to give titles of honour, and to appoint what order of place and

dignity each man shall hold, and what signs of respect in public or private meetings they shall give to one

These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty, and which are the marks whereby a man may

discern in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign power is placed and resideth. For these are

incommunicable and inseparable. The power to coin money, to dispose of the estate and persons of infant

heirs, to have preemption in markets, and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by the sovereign,

and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he transfer the militia, he retains the judicature in

vain, for want of execution of the laws; or if he grant away the power of raising money, the militia is in vain;

or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits.

And so if we consider any one of the said rights, we shall presently see that the holding of all the rest will

produce no effect in the conservation of peace and justice, the end for which all Commonwealths are

instituted. And this division is it whereof it is said, a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand: for unless this

division precede, division into opposite armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion

received of the greatest part of England that these powers were divided between the King and the Lords and

the House of Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this Civil War; first between those

that disagreed in politics, and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion, which have so

instructed men in this point of sovereign right that there be few now in England that do not see that these

rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace; and so continue, till

their miseries are forgotten, and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been.

And because they are essential and inseparable rights, it follows necessarily that in whatsoever words any of

them seem to be granted away, yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms renounced and the

name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them, the grant is void: for when he has

granted all he can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.

This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the sovereignty, there is little ground for

the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings, though they be singulis majores, of greater power than every

one of their subjects, yet they be universis minores, of less power than them all together. For if by all

together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then all together and every one signify the same;

and the speech is absurd. But if by all together, they understand them as one person (which person the

sovereign bears), then the power of all together is the same with the sovereign's power; and so again the

speech is absurd: which absurdity they see well enough when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people;

but in a monarch they see it not; and yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects.

For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creatures.

As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in

the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight;

But a man may here object that the condition of subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts

and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And commonly

they that live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy; and they that live under the government of

democracy, or other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of Commonwealth;

whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same: not considering that

the estate of man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest that in any form of

government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries and

horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men without

subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge: nor considering that the

greatest pressure of sovereign governors proceedeth, not from any delight or profit they can expect in the

damage weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour consisteth their own strength and glory, but in the

restiveness of themselves that, unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their

governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace that they may have means on any emergent

occasion, or sudden need, to resist or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by nature provided of

notable multiplying glasses (that is their passions and selflove) through which every little payment

appeareth a great grievance, but are destitute of those prospective glasses (namely moral and civil science) to

see afar off the miseries that hang over them and cannot without such payments be avoided.

THE difference of Commonwealths consisteth in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative

of all and every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an assembly of

more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men

distinguished from the rest; it is manifest there can be but three kinds of Commonwealth. For the

representative must needs be one man, or more; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part.

When the representative is one man, then is the Commonwealth a monarchy; when an assembly of all that

will come together, then it is a democracy, or popular Commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only, then

it is called an aristocracy. Other kind of Commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all,

There be other names of government in the histories and books of policy; as tyranny and oligarchy; but they

are not the names of other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are

discontented under monarchy call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy: so

also, they which find themselves grieved under a democracy call it anarchy, which signifies want of

government; and yet I think no man believes that want of government is any new kind of government: nor by

the same reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like it, and another when

It is manifest that men who are in absolute liberty may, if they please, give authority to one man to represent

them every one, as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may

subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch as absolutely as to other representative. Therefore, where

there is already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative of the same people, but only

to certain particular ends, by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man to

have his person represented by two actors that, by opposing one another, must needs divide that power, which

(if men will live in peace) is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war, contrary

to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd to think that a sovereign

assembly, inviting the people of their dominion to send up their deputies with power to make known their

advice or desires should therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representative

of the people; so it is absurd also to think the same in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a

truth should of late be so little observed: that in a monarchy he that had the sovereignty from a descent of six

hundred years was alone called sovereign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was

unquestionably taken by them for their king, was notwithstanding never considered as their representative;

that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men which at his command were sent up by the

people to carry their petitions and give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which may serve as an

admonition for those that are the true and absolute representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of

that office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any occasion

The difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consisteth, not in the difference of power, but in

the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people; for which end they

were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe: first, that whosoever beareth

the person of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person. And

though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest, yet he is more, or no less, careful to

procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the public

interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the passions of men are commonly more potent

than their reason. From whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united,

there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The

riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects.

For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak

through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies; whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy,

the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth

Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may

hear the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and

as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he will. But when a sovereign assembly has

need of counsel, none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most

part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge, and are to give

their advice in long discourses which may, and do commonly, excite men to action, but not govern them in it.

For the understanding is by the flame of the passions never enlightened, but dazzled: nor is there any place or

time wherein an assembly can receive counsel secrecy, because of their own multitude.

Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature; but

in assemblies, besides that of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. For the absence of a few

that would have the resolution, once taken, continue firm (which may happen by security, negligence, or

private impediments), or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today all that was

Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy or interest; but an assembly may; and that

Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject, by the power of one man, for the

enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great an

inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen where the sovereign power is in an assembly: for

their power is the same; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch by

flatterers; and becoming one another's flatterers, serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns. And

whereas the favourites of monarchs are few, and they have none else to advance but their own kindred; the

favourites of an assembly are many, and the kindred much more numerous than of any monarch. Besides,

there is no favourite of a monarch which cannot as well succour his friends as hurt his enemies: but orators,

that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For

to accuse requires less eloquence (such is man's nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution,

Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that

cannot discern between good and evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power must be in the hand of

another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by his right and in his name as curators and

protectors of his person and authority. But to say there is inconvenience in putting the use of the sovereign

power into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men, is to say that all government is more inconvenient than

confusion and civil war. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended must arise from the contention of

those that, for an office of so great honour and profit, may become competitors. To make it appear that this

inconvenience proceedeth not from that form of government we call monarchy, we are to consider that the

precedent monarch hath appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by

testament, or tacitly by not controlling the custom in that case received: and then such inconvenience, if it

happen, is to be attributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects, which in all

kinds of government, where the people are not well instructed in their duty and the rights of sovereignty, is

the same. Or else the precedent monarch hath not at all taken order for such tuition; and then the law of

nature hath provided this sufficient rule, that the tuition shall be in him that hath by nature most interest in the

preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death or diminution.

For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit and promotion, to put an infant into the power of

those that can promote themselves by his destruction or damage is not tuition, but treachery. So that sufficient

provision being taken against all just quarrel about the government under a child, if any contention arise to

the disturbance of the public peace, it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy, but to the ambition of

subjects and ignorance of their duty. On the other side, there is no great Commonwealth, the sovereignty

whereof is in a great assembly, which is not, as to consultations of peace, and war, and making of laws, in the

same condition as if the government were in a child. For as a child wants the judgement to dissent from

counsel given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom he is committed;

so an assembly wanteth the liberty to dissent from the counsel of the major part, be it good or bad. And as a

child has need of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority; so also in great Commonwealths

the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of custodes libertatis; that is, of dictators,

or protectors of their authority; which are as much as temporary monarchs to whom for a time they may

commit the entire exercise of their power; and have, at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof

Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three; that is to say, monarchy, where one man

has it; or democracy, where the general assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracy, where it is in an assembly

of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: yet he that shall consider the particular

Commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may

thereby be inclined to think there be other forms arising from these mingled together. As for example,

elective kingdoms; where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or kingdoms

wherein the king hath a power limited: which governments are nevertheless by most writers called monarchy.

Likewise if a popular or aristocratical Commonwealth subdue an enemy's country, and govern the same by a

president, procurator, or other magistrate, this may seem perhaps, at first sight, to be a democratical or

aristocratical government. But it is not so. For elective kings are not sovereigns, but ministers of the

sovereign; nor limited kings sovereigns, but ministers of them that have the sovereign power; nor are those

provinces which are in subjection to a democracy or aristocracy of another Commonwealth democratically or

And first, concerning an elective king, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of

Christendom at this day; or to certain years or months, as the dictator's power amongst the Romans; if he

have right to appoint his successor, he is no more elective but hereditary. But if he have no power to elect his

successor, then there is some other man, or assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new; or else

the Commonwealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of war. If it be known who

have the power to give the sovereignty after his death, it is known also that the sovereignty was in them

before: for none have right to give that which they have not right to possess, and keep to themselves, if they

think good. But if there be none that can give the sovereignty after the decease of him that was first elected,

then has he power, nay he is obliged by the law of nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep to

those that had trusted him with the government from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war. And

Secondly, that king whose power is limited is not superior to him, or them, that have the power to limit it; and

he that is not superior is not supreme; that is to say, not sovereign. The sovereignty therefore was always in

that assembly which had the right to limit him, and by consequence the government not monarchy, but either

democracy or aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta, where the kings had a privilege to lead their armies, but

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed the land of Judea, for example, by a president; yet

was not Judea therefore a democracy, because they were not governed by any assembly into which any of

them had right to enter; nor by an aristocracy, because they were not governed by any assembly into which

any man could enter by their election: but they were governed by one person, which though as to the people

of Rome was an assembly of the people, or democracy; yet as to the people of Judea, which had no right at all

of participating in the government, was a monarch. For though where the people are governed by an

assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a democracy, or

aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an assembly not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy; not of

Of all these forms of government, the matter being mortal, so that not only monarchs, but also whole

assemblies die, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men that as there was order taken for an

artificial man, so there be order also taken for an artificial eternity of life; without which men that are

governed by an assembly should return into the condition of war in every age; and they that are governed by

one man, as soon as their governor dieth. This artificial eternity is that which men call the right of succession.

There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign.

For if it be in any other particular man, or private assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by

the sovereign at his pleasure; and consequently the right is in himself. And if it be in no particular man, but

left to a new choice; then is the Commonwealth dissolved, and the right is in him that can get it, contrary to

the intention of them that did institute the Commonwealth for their perpetual, and not temporary, security.

In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail unless the multitude that are to be governed fail. And

therefore questions of the right of succession have in that form of government no place at all.

In an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the election of another into his room belonged to the

assembly, as the sovereign, to whom belonged the choosing of all counsellors and officers. For that which the

representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth, as author. And though the sovereign assembly

may give power to others to elect new men, for supply of their court, yet it is still by their authority that the

election is made; and by the same it may, when the public shall require it, be recalled.

The greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in monarchy: and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at

first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times who it is whom he hath

appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination than every man is accustomed

to use. As to the question who shall appoint the successor of a monarch that hath the sovereign authority; that

is to say, who shall determine of the right of inheritance (for elective kings and princes have not the sovereign

power in propriety, but in use only), we are to consider that either he that is in possession has right to dispose

of the succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude. For the death of him that hath the

sovereign power in property leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all; that is, without any

representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: and therefore

they are incapable of election of any new monarch, every man having equal right to submit himself to such as

he thinks best able to protect him; or, if he can, protect himself by his own sword; which is a return to

confusion and to the condition of a war of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which

monarchy had its first institution. Therefore it is manifest that by the institution of monarchy, the disposing of

the successor is always left to the judgement and will of the present possessor.

And for the question which may arise sometimes, who it is that the monarch in possession hath designed to

the succession and inheritance of his power, it is determined by his express words and testament; or by other

By express words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his lifetime, viva voce, or by writing; as the

first emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs. For the word heir does not of itself imply the

children or nearest kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare he would have to succeed

him in his estate. If therefore a monarch declare expressly that such a man shall be his heir, either by word or

writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his predecessor invested in the right of being

But where testament and express words are wanting, other natural signs of the will are to be followed:

whereof the one is custom. And therefore where the custom is that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth,

there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession; for that, if the will of him that was in possession

had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his lifetime. And likewise where the custom is

that the next of the male kindred succeedeth, there also the right of succession is in the next of the kindred

male, for the same reason. And so it is if the custom were to advance the female. For whatsoever custom a

man may by a word control, and does not, it is a natural sign he would have that custom stand.

But where neither custom nor testament hath preceded, there it is to he understood; first, that a monarch's will

is that the government remain monarchical, because he hath approved that government in himself. Secondly,

that a child of his own, male or female, be preferred before any other, because men are presumed to be more

inclined by nature to advance their own children than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a

male than a female, because men are naturally fitter than women for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly,

where his own issue faileth, rather a brother than a stranger, and so still the nearer in blood rather than the

more remote, because it is always presumed that the nearer of kin is the nearer in affection; and it is evident

that a man receives always, by reflection, the most honour from the greatness of his nearest kindred.

But if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words of contract, or testament, men may

perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell or give his right of governing to a stranger; which,

because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same government, nor speaking the same language)

do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects, which is indeed a great

inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's government, but from the

unskillfulness of the governors, ignorant of the true rules of politics. And therefore the Romans, when they

had subdued many nations, to make their government digestible were wont to take away that grievance as

much as they thought necessary by giving sometimes to whole nations, and sometimes to principal men of

every nation they conquered, not only the privileges, but also the name of Romans; and took many of them

into the Senate, and offices of charge, even in the Roman city. And this was it our most wise king, King

James, aimed at in endeavouring the union of his two realms of England and Scotland. Which, if he could

have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the civil wars which both those kingdoms, at this present,

miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will;

though by the fault of many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulness of it, this

also is an argument; that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive

also by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is

A COMMONWEALTH by acquisition is that where the sovereign power is acquired by force; and it is

acquired by force when men singly, or many together by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do

authorise all the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.

And this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this, that men

who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: but in this case,

they subject themselves to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by

them that hold all such covenants, as proceed from fear of death or violence, void: which, if it were true, no

man in any kind of Commonwealth could be obliged to obedience. It is true that in a Commonwealth once

instituted, or acquired, promises proceeding from fear of death or violence are no covenants, nor obliging,

when the thing promised is contrary to the laws; but the reason is not because it was made upon fear, but

because he that promiseth hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully perform, and doth

not, it is not the invalidity of the covenant that absolveth him, but the sentence of the sovereign. Otherwise,

whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: but when the sovereign, who is the actor,

acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the author of such absolution.

But the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both. His power cannot, without his consent,

be transferred to another: he cannot forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects of injury: he cannot

be punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary for peace, and judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator,

and supreme judge of controversies, and of the times and occasions of war and peace: to him it belonged to

choose magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all other officers and ministers; and to determine of

rewards and punishments, honour and order. The reasons whereof are the same which are alleged in the

precedent chapter for the same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution.

Dominion is acquired two ways: by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation is that

which the parent hath over his children, and is called paternal. And is not so derived from the generation, as if

therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him, but from the child's consent, either

express or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the generation, God hath ordained to man a

helper, and there be always two that are equally parents: the dominion therefore over the child should belong

equally to both, and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two masters.

And whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, as being of the more excellent sex, they

misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the

woman as that the right can be determined without war. In Commonwealths this controversy is decided by

the civil law: and for the most part, but not always, the sentence is in favour of the father, because for the

most part Commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families. But the question

lieth now in the state of mere nature where there are supposed no laws of matrimony, no laws for the

education of children, but the law of nature and the natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to

their children. In this condition of mere nature, either the parents between themselves dispose of the

dominion over the child by contract, or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth

according to the contract. We find in history that the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring

countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male should be sent back, but the female remain

If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no

matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by the mother; and therefore the

right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is

first in the power of the mother, so as she may either nourish or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to

the mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than any other; and by consequence the dominion over

it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it

ought to obey him by whom it is preserved, because preservation of life being the end for which one man

becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save

If the mother be the father's subject, the child is in the father's power; and if the father be the mother's subject

(as when a sovereign queen marrieth one of her subjects), the child is subject to the mother, because the

If a man and a woman, monarchs of two several kingdoms, have a child, and contract concerning who shall

have the dominion of him, the right of the dominion passeth by the contract. If they contract not, the

dominion followeth the dominion of the place of his residence. For the sovereign of each country hath

He that hath the dominion over the child hath dominion also over the children of the child, and over their

children's children. For he that hath dominion over the person of a man hath dominion over all that is his,

The right of succession to paternal dominion proceedeth in the same manner as doth the right of succession to

Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call despotical from Despotes,

which signifieth a lord or master, and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this dominion is

then acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth, either in

express words or by other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life and the liberty of his body is

allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the

vanquished is a servant, and not before: for by the word servant (whether it be derived from servire, to serve,

or from servare, to save, which I leave to grammarians to dispute) is not meant a captive, which is kept in

prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do

with him: for such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the

prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly: but one that, being taken, hath corporal liberty

allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him.

It is not therefore the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant.

Nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he

cometh in and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself, without

promise of life, to spare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer than in his

And that which men do when they demand, as it is now called, quarter (which the Greeks called Zogria,

taking alive) is to evade the present fury of the victor by submission, and to compound for their life with

ransom or service: and therefore he that hath quarter hath not his life given, but deferred till further

deliberation; for it is not a yielding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then only is his life in security,

and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty. For slaves that work in

prisons, or fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters.

The master of the servant is master also of all he hath, and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his

goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life

of his master by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning and authorising whatsoever the master shall do.

And in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his

disobedience, he is himself the author of the same, and cannot accuse him of injury.

In sum, the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion are the very same with those of

a sovereign by institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So

that for a man that is monarch of diverse nations, he hath in one the sovereignty by institution of the people

assembled, and in another by conquest; that is by the submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds;

to demand of one nation more than of the other, from the title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an

act of ignorance of the rights of sovereignty. For the sovereign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no

sovereignty at all, and so every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which is the

By this it appears that a great family, if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of

sovereignty, a little monarchy; whether that family consist of a man and his children, or of a man and his

servants, or of a man and his children and servants together; wherein the father or master is the sovereign. But

yet a family is not properly a Commonwealth, unless it be of that power by its own number, or by other

opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too

weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life,

either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small

company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms and demand quarter, or run away rather

than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction,

of sovereign rights, from the nature, need, and designs of men in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting

themselves under monarchs or assemblies entrusted with power enough for their protection.

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To Moses the children of Israel say thus:

"Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die." [Exodus, 20. 19] This is

absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God Himself, by the mouth of Samuel, saith,

"This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to

drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots, and gather in his harvest; and to

make his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to

be his cooks, and bakers. He shall take your fields, your vineyards, and your oliveyards, and give them to

his servants. He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his

other servants. He shall take your manservants, and your maidservants, and the choice of your youth, and

employ them in his business. He shall take the tithe of your flocks; and you shall be his servants." [I Samuel,

8. 1117] This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants. Again, when

the people heard what power their king was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, "We will be as

all other nations, and our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars." [Ibid., 8. 19,

20] Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have, both to the militia and to all judicature; in which is

contained as absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of King Solomon

to God was this: "Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and

evil." [I Kings, 3. 9] It belonged therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the rules of

discerning good and evil: which rules are laws; and therefore in him is the legislative power. Saul sought the

life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbade

them, saying, "God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anointed of God." [I Samuel, 24. 6]

For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, "Servants obey your masters in all things";[Colossians, 3. 22] and,

"Children obey your parents in all things." )[ Ibid., 3. 20] There is simple obedience in those that are subject

to paternal or despotical dominion. Again, "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair, and therefore all

that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do." [Matthew, 23. 2, 3] There again is simple obedience.

And St. Paul, "Warn them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in authority, and obey

them." [Titus, 3. 1] This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour Himself acknowledges that men ought

to pay such taxes as are by kings imposed, where He says, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesar's"; and paid

such taxes Himself. And that the king's word is sufficient to take anything from any subject, when there is

need; and that the king is judge of that need: for He Himself, as king of the Jews, commanded his Disciples to

take the ass and ass's colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, "Go into the village over against you, and you

shall find a she ass tied, and her colt with her; untie them, and bring them to me. And if any man ask you,

what you mean by it, say the Lord hath need of them: and they will let them go." [Matthew, 21. 2, 3] They

will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, "You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." [Genesis,

3. 5] And, "Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou

shouldest not eat?" [Ibid., 3. 11] For the cognizance or judicature of good and evil, being forbidden by the

name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience, the devil to inflame the ambition of

the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it they should be as gods,

knowing good and evil. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is

judicature of good and evil, but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is

said that, having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place as if they had been

formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain that it was then they first judged their

nakedness (wherein it was God's will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed did tacitly

censure God Himself. And thereupon God saith, "Hast thou eaten," etc., as if He should say, doest thou that

owest me obedience take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is clearly, though

allegorically, signified that the commands of them that have the right to command are not by their subjects to

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason and Scripture, that the sovereign power,

whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocratical

Commonwealths, is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a

power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual

war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be

without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no Commonwealth any great inconvenience but what

proceeds from the subjects' disobedience and breach of those covenants from which the Commonwealth hath

its being. And whosoever, thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself

The greatest objection is that of the practice; when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been

acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition

and civil war? In those nations whose Commonwealths have been longlived, and not been destroyed but by

foreign war, the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power. But howsoever, an argument from the

practice of men that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes and nature of

Commonwealths, and suffer daily those miseries that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For

though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not

thence be inferred that so it ought to be. The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths consisteth in

certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not, as tennis play, on practice only: which rules neither poor

men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure have hitherto had the curiosity or the method, to find

LIBERTY, or freedom, signifieth properly the absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean external

impediments of motion); and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For

whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined

by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living

creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained with walls or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in

by banks or vessels that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space; we use to say they are not at liberty

to move in such manner as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of

motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say it wants the liberty, but the power, to move;

And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a freeman is he that, in those things

which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to. But when the words

free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion is

not to subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example, the way is free, no liberty of the way

is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not meant any

liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we speak

freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak

otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the words free will, no liberty can be inferred of the will,

desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what

Fear and liberty are consistent: as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink,

he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will; it is therefore the action of one that

was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for fear of imprisonment, which, because no body hindered

him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all actions which men do in

Commonwealths, for fear of the law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit.

Liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending

by the channel; so, likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do, which, because they proceed their will,

proceed from liberty, and yet because every act of man's will and every desire and inclination proceedeth

from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the

first of all causes), proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the

necessity of all men's voluntary actions would appear manifest. And therefore God, that seeth and disposeth

all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will is accompanied with the necessity of doing

that which God will and no more, nor less. For though men may do many things which God does not

command, nor is therefore author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to anything, of which

appetite God's will is not the cause. And did not His will assure the necessity of man's will, and consequently

of all that on man's will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the

omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that natural liberty, which

But as men, for the attaining of peace and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man,

which we call a Commonwealth; so also have they made artificial chains, called civil laws, which they

themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they

have given the sovereign power, and at the other to their own ears. These bonds, in their own nature but

weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

In relation to these bonds only it is that I am to speak now of the liberty of subjects. For seeing there is no

Commonwealth in the world wherein there be rules enough set down for the regulating of all the actions and

words of men (as being a thing impossible): it followeth necessarily that in all kinds of actions, by the laws

pretermitted, men have the liberty of doing what their own reasons shall suggest for the most profitable to

themselves. For if we take liberty in the proper sense, for corporal liberty; that is to say, freedom from chains

and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamour as they do for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again,

if we take liberty for an exemption from laws, it is no less absurd for men to demand as they do that liberty

by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand, not

knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to

cause those laws to be put in execution. The liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those things which, in

regulating their actions, the sovereign hath pretermitted: such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise

contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their

Nevertheless we are not to understand that by such liberty the sovereign power of life and death is either

abolished or limited. For it has been already shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a

subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice or injury; because every subject is author of

every act the sovereign doth, so that he never wanteth right to any thing, otherwise than as he himself is the

subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature. And therefore it may and doth often happen

in Commonwealths that a subject may be put to death by the command of the sovereign power, and yet

neither do the other wrong; as when Jephthah caused his daughter to be sacrificed: in which, and the like

cases, he that so dieth had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless, without injury, put to death.

And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince that putteth to death an innocent subject. For though the

action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity (as was the killing of Uriah by David); yet it

was not an injury to Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him

by Uriah himself; and yet to God, because David was God's subject and prohibited all iniquity by the law of

nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee

only have I sinned." In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their

Commonwealth for ten years, thought they committed no injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime

he had done, but what hurt he would do: nay, they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and

every citizen bringing his oyster shell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should

be banished, without actually accusing him sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of justice; and

sometimes a scurrilous jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a jest of it. And yet a man cannot say the sovereign

people of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the liberty to jest, or to be just.

The liberty whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention in the histories and philosophy of the ancient

Greeks and Romans, and in the writings and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning

in the politics, is not the liberty of particular men, but the liberty of the Commonwealth: which is the same

with that which every man then should have, if there were no civil laws nor Commonwealth at all. And the

effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war of every man against his

neighbour; no inheritance to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods or lands;

no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every particular man: so in states and Commonwealths not

dependent on one another, every Commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty to do what it shall

judge, that is to say, what that man or assembly that representeth it shall judge, most conducing to their

benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their

frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round about. The Athenians and Romans were

free; that is, free Commonwealths: not that any particular men had the liberty to resist their own

representative, but that their representative had the liberty to resist, or invade, other people. There is written

on the turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence

infer that a particular man has more liberty or immunity from the service of the Commonwealth there than in

Constantinople. Whether a Commonwealth be monarchical or popular, the freedom is still the same.

But it is an easy thing for men to be deceived by the specious name of liberty; and, for want of judgement to

distinguish, mistake that for their private inheritance and birthright which is the right of the public only. And

when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings on this subject, it is

no wonder if it produce sedition and change of government. In these western parts of the world we are made

to receive our opinions concerning the institution and rights of Commonwealths from Aristotle, Cicero, and

other men, Greeks and Romans, that, living under popular states, derived those rights, not from the principles

of nature, but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, which were

popular; as the grammarians describe the rules of language out of the practice of the time; or the rules of

poetry out of the poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught (to keep them from

desire of changing their government) that they were freemen, and all that lived under monarchy were slaves;

therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politics "In democracy, liberty is to be supposed: for it is commonly

held that no man is free in any other government." [Aristotle, Politics, Bk VI] And as Aristotle, so Cicero and

other writers have grounded their civil doctrine on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate

monarchy: at first, by them that, having deposed their sovereign, shared amongst them the sovereignty of

Rome; and afterwards by their successors. And by reading of these Greek and Latin authors, men from their

childhood have gotten a habit, under a false show of liberty, of favouring tumults, and of licentious

controlling the actions of their sovereigns; and again of controlling those controllers; with the effusion of so

much blood, as I think I may truly say there was never anything so dearly bought as these western parts have

To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject; that is to say, what are the things which,

though commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless without injustice refuse to do; we are to consider

what rights we pass away when we make a Commonwealth; or, which is all one, what liberty we deny

ourselves by owning all the actions, without exception, of the man or assembly we make our sovereign. For

in the act of our submission consisteth both our obligation and our liberty; which must therefore be inferred

by arguments taken from thence; there being no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his

own; for all men equally are by nature free. And because such arguments must either be drawn from the

express words, "I authorise all his actions," or from the intention of him that submitteth himself to his power

(which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth), the obligation and liberty of the

subject is to be derived either from those words, or others equivalent, or else from the end of the institution of

sovereignty; namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy.

First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution is by covenant of every one to every one; and sovereignty by

acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest that every

subject has liberty in all those things the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred. I have shown

before, in the fourteenth Chapter, that covenants not to defend a man's own body are void. Therefore,

If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist

those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he

If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not

bound (without assurance of pardon) to confess it; because no man, as I have shown in the same chapter, can

Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words, "I authorise, or take upon me,

all his actions"; in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty: for by allowing him to

kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one thing to say, "Kill me, or my fellow, if

you please"; another thing to say, "I will kill myself, or my fellow." It followeth, therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself or any other man; and consequently, that the

obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute any dangerous or

dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission, but on the intention; which is to be

understood by the end thereof. When therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the

sovereignty was ordained, then there is no liberty to refuse; otherwise, there is.

Upon this ground a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have

right enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without injustice; as

when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the

Commonwealth. And there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness, not only to women (of whom

no such dangerous duty is expected), but also to men of feminine courage. When armies fight, there is on one

side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it

unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battle is not injustice, but cowardice. But he that

enrolleth himself a soldier, or taketh impressed money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature, and is

obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from it without his captain's leave. And when the

defence of the Commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is

obliged; because otherwise the institution of the Commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage

To resist the sword of the Commonwealth in defence of another man, guilty or innocent, no man hath liberty;

because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us, and is therefore destructive of

the very essence of government. But in case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign

power unjustly, or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have

they not the liberty then to join together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: for they but

defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first

breach of their duty: their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is

no new unjust act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon

taketh from them to whom it is offered the plea of selfdefence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting or

As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no

rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion. And therefore such

liberty is in some places more, and in some less; and in some times more, in other times less, according as

they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient. As for example, there was a time when in England

a man might enter into his own land, and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it, by force. But in after

times that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute made by the king in Parliament. And in some

places of the world men have the liberty of many wives: in other places, such liberty is not allowed.

If a subject have a controversy with his sovereign of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or

concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporal or pecuniary, grounded on a

precedent law, he hath the same liberty to sue for his right as if it were against a subject, and before such

judges as are appointed by the sovereign. For seeing the sovereign demandeth by force of a former law, and

not by virtue of his power, he declareth thereby that he requireth no more than shall appear to be due by that

law. The suit therefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign, and consequently the subject hath the

liberty to demand the hearing of his cause, and sentence according to that law. But if he demand or take

anything by pretence of his power, there lieth, in that case, no action of law: for all that is done by him in

virtue of his power is done by the authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings an action

If a monarch, or sovereign assembly, grant a liberty to all or any of his subjects, which grant standing, he is

disabled to provide for their safety; the grant is void, unless he directly renounce or transfer the sovereignty to

another. For in that he might openly (if it had been his will), and in plain terms, have renounced or transferred

it and did not, it is to be understood it was not his will, but that the grant proceeded from ignorance of the

repugnancy between such a liberty and the sovereign power: and therefore the sovereignty is still retained,

and consequently all those powers which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the power of war

and peace, of judicature, of appointing officers and counsellors, of levying money, and the rest named in the

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth

by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else

can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The sovereignty is the soul of the Commonwealth;

which, once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The end of

obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own or in another's sword, nature

applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention of

them that make it, be immortal; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death by foreign war,

but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a

If a subject be taken prisoner in war, or his person or his means of life be within the guards of the enemy, and

hath his life and corporal liberty given him on condition to be subject to the victor, he hath liberty to accept

the condition; and, having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to

preserve himself. The case is the same if he be detained on the same terms in a foreign country. But if a man

be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body, he cannot be understood to be bound

by covenant to subjection, and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for himself and his heirs, his subjects return to the absolute

liberty of nature; because, though nature may declare who are his sons, and who are the nearest of his kin, yet

it dependeth on his own will, as hath been said in the precedent chapter, who shall be his heir. If therefore he

will have no heir, there is no sovereignty, nor subjection. The case is the same if he die without known

kindred, and without declaration of his heir. For then there can no heir be known, and consequently no

If the sovereign banish his subject, during the banishment he is not subject. But he that is sent on a message,

or hath leave to travel, is still subject; but it is by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant

of subjection. For whosoever entereth into another's dominion is subject to all the laws thereof, unless he

If a monarch subdued by war render himself subject to the victor, his subjects are delivered from their former

obligation, and become obliged to the victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own

body, he is not understood to have given away the right of sovereignty; and therefore his subjects are obliged

to yield obedience to the magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his

right remaining, the question is only of the administration; that is to say, of the magistrates and officers;

which if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those which he himself had formerly

HAVING spoken of the generation, form, and power of a Commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the

parts thereof. And first of systems, which resemble the similar parts or muscles of a body natural. By

systems, I understand any numbers of men joined in one interest or one business. Of which some are regular,

and some irregular. Regular are those where one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the

Of regular, some are absolute and independent, subject to none but their own representative: such are only

Commonwealths, of which I have spoken already in the five last precedent chapters. Others are dependent;

that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which every one, as also their representative, is

Of systems subordinate, some are political, and some private. Political (otherwise called bodies politic and

persons in law) are those which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the Commonwealth.

Private are those which are constituted by subjects amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For

no authority derived from foreign power, within the dominion of another, is public there, but private.

And of private systems, some are lawful; some unlawful: lawful are those which are allowed by the

Commonwealth; all other are unlawful. Irregular systems are those which, having no representative, consist

only in concourse of people; which if not forbidden by the Commonwealth, nor made on evil design (such as

are conflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end), are lawful. But when the intention is

In bodies politic the power of the representative is always limited: and that which prescribeth the limits

thereof is the power sovereign. For power unlimited is absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign, in every

Commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects; and therefore no other can be representative

of any part of them, but so far forth as he shall give leave: and to give leave to a body politic of subjects to

have an absolute representative, to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of

the Commonwealth, and to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defence, which the sovereign

cannot be understood to do, by any grant that does not plainly and directly discharge them of their subjection.

For consequences of words are not the signs of his will, when other consequences are signs of the contrary;

The bounds of that power which is given to the representative of a body politic are to be taken notice of from

two things. One is their writ, or letters from the sovereign: the other is the law of the Commonwealth.

For though in the institution or acquisition of a Commonwealth, which is independent, there needs no

writing, because the power of the representative has there no other bounds but such as are set out by the

unwritten law of nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of limitation necessary,

concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembered without letters, nor taken notice

of, unless such letters be patent, that they may be read to them, and withal sealed, or testified, with the seals

And because such limitation is not always easy or perhaps possible to be described in writing, the ordinary

laws, common to all subjects, must determine what the representative may lawfully do in all cases where the

In a body politic, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the person of the body which is not

warranted in his letters, nor by the laws, is his own act, and not the act of the body, nor of any other member

thereof besides himself: because further than his letters or the laws limit, he representeth no man's person, but

his own. But what he does according to these is the act of every one: for of the act of the sovereign every one

is author, because he is their representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of

the sovereign is the act of the sovereign, and therefore every member of the body is author of it.

But if the representative be an assembly, whatsoever that assembly shall decree, not warranted by their letters

or the laws, is the act of the assembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose vote the decree was

made; but not the act of any man that being present voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unless he

voted it by procreation. It is the act of the assembly because voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the

assembly may be punished, as far forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their letters (which

is to such artificial and fictitious bodies, capital) or, if the assembly have a common stock, wherein none of

the innocent members have propriety, by pecuniary mulct. For from corporal penalties nature hath bodies

politic. But they that gave not their vote are therefore innocent, because the assembly cannot represent any

man in things unwarranted by their letters, and consequently are not involved in their votes.

If the person of the body politic, being in one man, borrow money of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of

the same body (for no letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men's own inclinations to limit lending),

the debt is the representative's. For if he should have authority from his letters to make the members pay what

he borroweth, he should have by consequence the sovereignty of them; and therefore the grant were either

void, as proceeding from error, commonly incident to human nature, and an insufficient sign of the will of the

granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the representer sovereign, and falleth not under the present

question, which is only of bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed,

but the representative himself: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the letters, and to the

qualification of the body, understandeth those only for his debtors that are engaged; and seeing the

representer can engage himself, and none else, has him only debtor, who must therefore pay him, out of the

But when the representative is an assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and only they, are responsible

for the debt that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that made it due, or to the fact for

which the mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himself for the payment: for

he that is author of the borrowing is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when paid by any

But if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly only is obliged to the payment, out of their common

stock, if they have any: for having liberty of vote, if he vote the money shall be borrowed, he votes it shall be

paid; if he vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending he voteth the borrowing, he

contradicteth his former vote, and is obliged by the latter, and becomes both borrower and lender, and

consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common treasury only; which

failing, he hath no remedy, nor complaint but against himself, that being privy to the acts of the assembly,

and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did nevertheless through his own folly lend his money.

It is manifest by this that in bodies politic subordinate, and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not

only lawful, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the

representative assembly, and cause their dissent to be registered, or to take witness of it; because otherwise

they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men. But in a

sovereign assembly that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there denies their sovereignty,

and also because whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power is as to the subject (though not so always

in the sight of God) justified by the command: for of such command every subject is the author.

The variety of bodies is almost infinite: for they are not only distinguished by the several affairs for which

they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversity; but also by the times, places, and numbers,

subject to many limitations. And as to their affairs, some are ordained for government; as first, the

government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on

the votes of the major part; and then this assembly is a body politic, and their power limited by commission.

This word province signifies a charge or care of business, which he whose it is committeth to another man to

be administered for and under him; and therefore when in one Commonwealth there be diverse countries that

have their laws distinct one from another, or are far distant in place, the administration of the government

being committed to diverse persons, those countries where the sovereign is not resident, but governs by

commission, are called provinces. But of the government of a province, by an assembly residing in the

province itself, there be few examples. The Romans, who had the sovereignty of many provinces, yet

governed them always by presidents and praetors; and not by assemblies, as they governed the city of Rome

and territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were colonies sent from England to plant Virginia, and

Summer Islands, though the government of them here were committed to assemblies in London, yet did those

assemblies never commit the government under them to any assembly there, but did to each plantation send

one governor: for though every man, where he can be present by nature, desires to participate of government;

yet where they cannot be present, they are by nature also inclined to commit the government of their common

interest rather to a monarchical, than a popular, form of government: which is also evident in those men that

have great private estates; who, when they are unwilling to take the pains of administering the business that

belongs to them, choose rather to trust one servant than an assembly either of their friends or servants. But

howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the government of a province or colony committed to an

assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I have to say is this: that whatsoever debt is by that

assembly contracted, or whatsoever unlawful act is decreed, is the act only of those that assented, and not of

any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alleged. Also that an assembly residing out of the

bounds of that colony whereof they have the government cannot execute any power over the persons or goods

of any of the colony, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the colony itself, as having

no jurisdiction nor authority elsewhere, but are left to the remedy which the law of the place alloweth them.

And though the assembly have right to impose mulct upon any of their members that shall break the laws

they make; yet out of the colony itself, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here of

the rights of an assembly for the government of a province, or a colony, is applicable also to an assembly for

the government of a town, a university, or a college, or a church, or for any other government over the

And generally, in all bodies politic, if any if any particular member conceive himself injured by the body

itself, the cognizance of his cause belonged to the sovereign, and those the sovereign hath ordained for judges

in such causes, or shall ordain for that particular cause; and not to the body itself. For the whole body is in

this case his fellow subject, which, in a sovereign assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the sovereign be not

In a body politic, for the well ordering of foreign traffic, the most commodious representative is an assembly

of all the members; that is to say, such a one as every one that adventureth his money may be present at all

the deliberations and resolutions of the body, if they will themselves. For proof whereof we are to consider

the end for which men that are merchants, and may buy and sell, export and import their merchandise,

according to their own discretions, do nevertheless bind themselves up in one corporation. It is true, there be

few merchants that with the merchandise they buy at home can freight a ship to export it; or with that they

buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to join together in one society, where every man may

either participate of the gain, according to the proportion of his adventure, or take his own, and sell what he

transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no body politic, there being no common

representative to oblige them to any other law than that which is common to all other subjects. The end of

their incorporating is to make their gain the greater; which is done two ways: by sole buying, and sole selling,

both at home and abroad. So that to grant to a company of merchants to be a corporation, or body politic, is to

grant them a double monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is

a company incorporate for any particular foreign country, they only export the commodities vendible in that

country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and

abroad but one that selleth; both which is gainful to the merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower,

and sell abroad at higher, rates: and abroad there is but one buyer of foreign merchandise, and but one that

Of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at

home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry and handiworks of the

people, and by the sole importation, what price they please on all foreign commodities the people have need

of, both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad,

and sole buying the foreign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of

these, to the disadvantage of the foreigner: for where but one selleth, the merchandise is the dearer; and

where but one buyeth, the cheaper: such corporations therefore are no other than monopolies, though they

would be very profitable for a Commonwealth, if, being bound up into one body in foreign markets, they

The end then of these bodies of merchants, being not a common benefit to the whole body (which have in this

case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling

and manning of ships), but the particular gain of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted

with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the assembly that shall have the power to order

the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an

assembly, where every member of the body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

If a body politic of merchants contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their representative assembly, every

member is liable by himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private laws, but

considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by

one dischargeth all the rest: but if the debt be to one of the company, the creditor is debtor for the whole to

himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.

If the Commonwealth impose a tax upon the body, it is understood to be laid upon every member

proportionably to his particular adventure in the company. For there is in this case no other common stock,

If a mulct be laid upon the body for some unlawful act, they only are liable by whose votes the act was

decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of

the body; which, if a crime, because the body was ordained by the authority of the Commonwealth, is not his.

If one of the members be indebted to the body, he may be sued by the body, but his goods cannot be taken,

nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the body; but only by authority of the Commonwealth: for they

can do it by their own authority, they can by their own authority give judgement that the debt is due; which is

These bodies made for the government of men, or of traffic, be either perpetual, or for a time prescribed by

writing. But there be bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business. For

example, if a sovereign monarch, or a sovereign assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns and

other several parts of their territory to send to him their deputies to inform him of the condition and

necessities of the subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good laws, or for any other cause, as with

one person representing the whole country, such deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them,

are there, and at that time, a body politic, representing every subject of that dominion; but it is only for such

matters as shall be propounded unto them by that man, or assembly, that by the sovereign authority sent for

them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the body is

dissolved. For if they were the absolute representative of the people, then were it the sovereign assembly; and

so there would be two sovereign assemblies, or two sovereigns, over the same people; which cannot consist

with their peace. And therefore where there is once a sovereignty, there can be no absolute representation of

the people, but by it. And for the limits of how far such a body shall represent the whole people, they are set

forth in the writing by which they were sent for. For the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent

Private bodies regular and lawful are those that are constituted without letters, or other written authority,

saving the laws common to all other subjects. And because they be united in one person representative, they

are held for regular; such as are all families, in which the father or master ordereth the whole family. For he

obligeth his children, and servants, as far as the law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are

bound to obedience in those actions which the law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the

time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their fathers and masters, as to their immediate

sovereigns. For the father and master being before the institution of Commonwealth absolute sovereigns in

their own families, they lose afterward no more of their authority than the law of the Commonwealth taketh

Private bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite themselves into one person representative, without

any public authority at all; such as are the corporations of beggars, thieves and gipsies, the better to order

their trade of begging and stealing; and the corporations of men that by authority from any foreign person

themselves in another's dominion, for the easier propagation of doctrines, and for making a party against the

Irregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or sometimes mere concourse of people without union to any

particular design, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of wills and

inclinations, become lawful, or unlawful, according to the lawfulness, or unlawfulness, of every particular

The leagues of subjects, because leagues are commonly made for mutual defence, are in a Commonwealth

(which is no more than a league of all the subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of

unlawful design; and are for that cause unlawful, and go commonly by the name of factions, or conspiracies.

For a league being a connexion of men by covenants, if there be no power given to any one man or assembly

(as in the condition of mere nature) to compel them to performance, is so long only valid as there ariseth no

just cause of distrust: and therefore leagues between Commonwealths, over whom there is no human power

established to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But leagues

of the subjects of one and the same Commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the

sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and, in case the design of them be

evil or unknown to the Commonwealth, unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men is, if for evil

intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly concealed.

If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority

consult a part to contrive the guidance of the rest, this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as being a

fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest. But if he whose private interest is to be

debated and judged in the assembly make as many friends as he can, in him it is no injustice, because in this

case he is no part of the assembly. And though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express

law against it, yet it is not injustice. For sometimes, as men's manners are, justice cannot be had without

In all Commonwealths, if a private man entertain more servants than the government of his estate and lawful

employment he has for them requires, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the

Commonwealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in nations not thoroughly civilized,

several numerous families have lived in continual hostility and invaded one another with private force, yet it

is evident enough that they have done unjustly, or else that they had no Commonwealth.

And as factions for kindred, so also factions for government of religion, as of Papists, Protestants, etc., or of

state, as patricians and plebeians of old time in Rome, and of aristocraticals and democraticals of old time in

Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out of

Concourse of people is an irregular system, the lawfulness or unlawfulness whereof dependeth on the

occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest, the

concourse is lawful; as the usual meeting of men at church, or at a public show, in usual numbers: for if the

numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a

particular and good account of his being amongst them is to be judged conscious of an unlawful and

tumultuous design. It may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to be delivered to a judge or

magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous assembly, because there needs but one

or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful,

but such a number as the present officers are not able to suppress and bring to justice.

When an unusual number of men assemble against a man whom they accuse, the assembly is an unlawful

tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the

case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of Paul's

companions before the magistrate, saying with one voice, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians"; which was their

way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine as was against their religion and

trade. The occasion here, considering the laws of that people, was just; yet was their assembly judged

unlawful, and the magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words, "If Demetrius and the other workmen

can accuse any man of any thing, there be pleas, and deputies; let them accuse one another. And if you have

any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called. For we are in danger to

be accused for this day's sedition, because there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this

concourse of people." [Acts, 19. 40] Where he calleth an assembly whereof men can give no just account, a

sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning systems, and assemblies

of people, which may be compared, as I said, to the similar parts of man's body: such as be lawful, to the

muscles; such as are unlawful, to wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil

IN THE last chapter I have spoken of the similar parts of a Commonwealth: in this I shall speak of the parts

A public minister is he that by the sovereign, whether a monarch or an assembly, is employed in any affairs,

with authority to represent in that employment the person of the Commonwealth. And whereas every man or

assembly that hath sovereignty representeth two persons, or, as the more common phrase is, has two

capacities, one natural and another politic; as a monarch hath the person not only of the Commonwealth, but

also of a man, and a sovereign assembly hath the person not only of the Commonwealth, but also of the

assembly: they that be servants to them in their natural capacity are not public ministers; but those only that

serve them in the administration of the public business. And therefore neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other

officers that wait on the assembly for no other purpose but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an

aristocracy or democracy; nor stewards, chamberlains, cofferers, or any other officers of the household of a

Of public ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general administration, either of the whole

dominion or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a protector, or regent, may be committed by the predecessor

of an infant king, during his minority, the whole administration of his kingdom. In which case, every subject

is so far obliged to obedience as the ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give, be in the

king's name, and not inconsistent with his sovereign power. Of a part, or province; as when either a monarch

or a sovereign assembly shall give the general charge thereof to a governor, lieutenant, prefect or viceroy: and

in this case also, every one of that province is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the sovereign, and that

not incompatible with the sovereign's right. For such protectors, viceroys, and governors have no other right

but what depends on the sovereigns will; and no commission that can be given them can be interpreted for a

declaration of the will to transfer the sovereignty, without express and perspicuous words to that purpose.

And this kind of public ministers resembleth the nerves and tendons that move the several limbs of a body

Others have special administration; that is to say, charges of some special business, either at home or abroad:

as at home, first, for the economy of a Commonwealth, they that have authority concerning the treasury, as

tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever public revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts

thereof, are public ministers: ministers, because they serve the person representative, and can do nothing

against his command, nor without his authority; public, because they serve him in his political capacity.

Secondly, they that have authority concerning the militia; to have the custody of arms, forts, ports; to levy,

pay, or conduct soldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or sea, are

public ministers. But a soldier without command, though he fight for the Commonwealth, does not therefore

represent the person of it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the sovereign

power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live

in godliness and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the public enemy, are public ministers: ministers, in

that they do it not by their own authority, but by another's; and public, because they do it, or should do it, by

no authority but that of the sovereign. The monarch or the sovereign assembly only hath immediate authority

from God to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the sovereign receiveth his power Dei gratia

simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God: all other receive theirs from the favour and

providence of God and their sovereigns; as in a monarchy Dei gratia et regis; or Dei providentia et voluntate

They also to whom jurisdiction is given are public ministers. For in their seats of justice they represent the

person of the sovereign; and their sentence is his sentence; for, as hath been before declared, all judicature is

essentially annexed to the sovereignty; and therefore all other judges are but ministers of him or them that

have the sovereign power. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely of fact and of law; so are

judgements, some of fact, some of law: and consequently in the same controversy, there may be two judges,

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversy between the party judged and the judge;

which, because they be both subjects to the sovereign, ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by

consent of both; for no man can be judge in his own cause. But the sovereign is already agreed on for judged

by them both, and is therefore either to hear the cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for judge such as

they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between them diverse ways; as

first, if the defendant be allowed to except against such of his judges whose interest maketh him suspect them

(for as to the complainant, he hath already chosen his own judge); those which he excepteth not against are

judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeal to any other judge, he can appeal no further; for his

appeal is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeal to the sovereign himself, and he by himself, or by delegates which

the parties shall agree on, give sentence; that sentence is final: for the defendant is judged by his own judges,

These properties of just and rational judicature considered, I cannot forbear to observe the excellent

constitution of the courts of justice established both for common and also for public pleas in England. By

common pleas, I mean those where both the complainant and defendant are subjects: and by public (which

are also called pleas of the crown) those where the complainant is the sovereign. For whereas there were two

orders of men, whereof one was lords, the other commons, the lords had this privilege, to have for judges in

all capital crimes none but lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged

as a privilege of favour, their judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all

controversies, every subject (as also in civil controversies the lords) had for judges men of the country where

the matter in controversy lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last twelve men without

exception being agreed on, they were judged by those twelve. So that having his own judges, there could be

nothing alleged by the party why the sentence should not be final. These public persons, with authority from

the sovereign power, either to instruct or judge the people, are such members of the Commonwealth as may

Public ministers are also all those that have authority from the sovereign to procure the execution of

judgements given; to publish the sovereigns commands; to suppress tumults; to apprehend and imprison

malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace. For every act they do by such authority

is the act of the Commonwealth; and their service answerable to that of the hands in a body natural.

Public ministers abroad are those that represent the person of their own sovereign to foreign states. Such are

ambassadors, messengers, agents, and heralds, sent by public authority, and on public business.

But such as are sent by authority only of some private party of a troubled state, though they be received, are

neither public nor private ministers of the Commonwealth, because none of their actions have the

Commonwealth for author. Likewise, an ambassador sent from a prince to congratulate, condole, or to assist

at a solemnity; though the authority be public, yet because the business is private, and belonging to him in his

natural capacity, is a private person. Also if a man be sent into another country, secretly to explore their

counsels and strength; though both the authority and the business be public, yet because there is none to take

notice of any person in him, but his own, he is but a private minister; but yet a minister of the

Commonwealth; and may be compared to an eye in the body natural. And those that are appointed to receive

the petitions or other informations of the people, and are, as it were, the public ear, are public ministers and

Neither a counsellor, nor a council of state, if we consider with no authority judicature or command, but only

of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a public

person. For the advice is addressed to the sovereign only, whose person cannot in his own presence be

represented to him by another. But a body of counsellors are never without some other authority, either of

judicature or of immediate administration: as in a monarchy, they represent the monarch in delivering his

commands to the public ministers: in a democracy, the council or senate propounds the result of their

deliberations to the people, as a council; but when they appoint judges, or hear causes, or give audience to

ambassadors, it is in the quality of a minister of the people: and in an aristocracy the council of state is the

THE NUTRITION of a Commonwealth consisteth in the plenty and distribution of materials conducing to

life: in concoction or preparation, and, when concocted, in the conveyance of it by convenient conduits to the

As for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by nature to those commodities which, from the two breasts of

our common mother, land and sea, God usually either freely giveth or for labour selleth to mankind.

For the matter of this nutriment consisting in animals, vegetables, and minerals, God hath freely laid them

before us, in or near to the face of the earth, so as there needeth no more but the labour and industry of

receiving them. Insomuch as plenty dependeth, next to God's favour, merely on the labour and industry of

This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly native and partly foreign: native, that which is to be had

within the territory of the Commonwealth; foreign, that which is imported from without. And because there is

no territory under the dominion of one Commonwealth, except it be of very vast extent, that produceth all

things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not something more

than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within become no more superfluous, but supply these

wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just war, or by

labour: for a man's labour also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: and there

have been Commonwealths that, having no more territory than hath served them for habitation, have

nevertheless not only maintained, but also increased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one

place to another, and partly by selling the manufactures, whereof the materials were brought in from other

The distribution of the materials of this nourishment is the constitution of mine, and thine, and his; that is to

say, in one word, propriety; and belonged in all kinds of Commonwealth to the sovereign power. For where

there is no Commonwealth, there is, as hath been already shown, a perpetual war of every man against his

neighbour; and therefore everything is his that getteth it and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety

nor community, but uncertainty. Which is so evident that even Cicero, a passionate defender of liberty, in a

public pleading attributeth all propriety to the law civil: "Let the civil law," saith he, "be once abandoned, or

but negligently guarded, not to say oppressed, and there is nothing that any man can be sure to receive from

his ancestor, or leave to his children." And again: "Take away the civil law, and no man knows what is his

own, and what another man's." Seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of Commonwealth,

which can do nothing but by the person that represents it, it is the act only of the sovereign; and consisteth in

the laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power. And this they well knew of old, who called

that Nomos (that is to say, distribution), which we call law; and defined justice by distributing to every man

In this distribution, the first law is for division of the land itself: wherein the sovereign assigneth to every

man a portion, according as he, and not according as any subject, or any number of them, shall judge

agreeable to equity and the common good. The children of Israel were a Commonwealth in the wilderness;

but wanted the commodities of the earth till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was

divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the priest, and Joshua

their general: who when there were twelve tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of Joseph,

made nevertheless but twelve portions of the land, and ordained for the tribe of Levi no land, but assigned

them the tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore arbitrary. And though a people coming

into possession of a land by war do not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants, as did the Jews, but leave

to many, or most, or all of them their estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the victor's

distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conqueror.

From whence we may collect that the propriety which a subject hath in his lands consisteth in a right to

exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their sovereign, be it an assembly or a

monarch. For seeing the sovereign, that is to say, the Commonwealth (whose person he representeth), is

understood to do nothing but in order to the common peace and security, this distribution of lands is to be

understood as done in order to the same: and consequently, whatsoever distribution he shall make in

prejudice thereof is contrary to the will of every subject that committed his peace and safety to his discretion

and conscience, and therefore by the will of every one of them is to be reputed void. It is true that a sovereign

monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their

passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust and of the law of nature; but this is not

enough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as to accuse of injustice, or any way to

speak evil of their sovereign; because they have authorized all his actions, and, in bestowing the sovereign

power, made them their own. But in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity and the

In the distribution of land, the Commonwealth itself may be conceived to have a portion, and possess and

improve the same by their representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient to sustain the whole

expense to the common peace and defence necessarily required: which were very true, if there could be any

representative conceived free from human passions and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the

setting forth of public land, or of any certain revenue for the Commonwealth, is in vain, and tendeth to the

dissolution of government, to the condition of mere nature, and war, as soon as ever the sovereign power

falleth into the hands of a monarch, or of an assembly, that are either too negligent of money or too hazardous

in engaging the public stock into long or costly war. Commonwealths can endure no diet: for seeing their

expense is not limited by their own appetite but by external accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours,

the public riches cannot be limited by other limits than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And

whereas in England, there were by the Conqueror diverse lands reserved to his own use (besides forests and

chases, either for his recreation or for preservation of woods), and diverse services reserved on the land he

gave his subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in his public, but in his natural

capacity: for he and his successors did, for all that, lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects' land when they judged it

necessary. Or if those public lands and services were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the

Commonwealth, it was contrary to the scope of the institution, being (as it appeared by those ensuing taxes)

insufficient and (as it appears by the late small revenue of the Crown) subject to alienation and diminution. It

is therefore in vain to assign a portion to the Commonwealth, which may sell or give it away, and does sell

As the distribution of lands at home, so also to assign in what places, and for what commodities, the subject

shall traffic abroad belonged to the sovereign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own

discretion therein, some of them would be drawn for gain, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the

Commonwealth, and hurt it themselves by importing such things as, pleasing men's appetites, be nevertheless

noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belonged to the Commonwealth (that is, to the

sovereign only) to approve or disapprove both of the places and matter of foreign traffic.

Further, seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a Commonwealth that every man have a propriety in a

portion of land, or in some few commodities, or a natural property in some useful art, and there is no art in

the world but is necessary either for the being or wellbeing almost of every particular man; it is necessary

that men distribute that which they can spare, and transfer their propriety therein mutually one to another by

exchange and mutual contract. And therefore it belonged to the Commonwealth (that is to say, to the

sovereign) to appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects (as buying, selling, exchanging,

borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire) are to be made, and by what words and words and sign they

shall be understood for valid. And for the matter and distribution of the nourishment to the several members

of the Commonwealth, thus much, considering the model of the whole work, is sufficient.

By concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities which are not presently consumed, but reserved

for nourishment in time to come, to something of equal value, and withal so portable as not to hinder the

motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever such nourishment as the

place affordeth. And this is nothing else but gold, and silver, and money. For gold and silver, being, as it

happens, almost in all countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all

things else between nations; and money, of what matter soever coined by the sovereign of a Commonwealth,

is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else between the subjects of that Commonwealth. By the

means of which measures all commodities, movable and immovable, are made to accompany a man to all

places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from man to

man within the Commonwealth, and goes round about, nourishing, as it passeth, every part thereof; in so

much as this concoction is, as it were, the sanguification of the Commonwealth: for natural blood is in like

manner made of the fruits of the earth; and, circulating, nourisheth by the way every member of the body of

And because silver and gold have their value from the matter itself, they have first this privilege; that the

value of them cannot be altered by the power of one nor of a few Commonwealths; as being a common

measure of the commodities of all places. But base money may easily be enhanced or abased. Secondly, they

have the privilege to make Commonwealths move and stretch out their arms, when need is, into foreign

countries; and supply, not only private subjects that travel, but also whole armies with provision. But that

coin, which is not considerable for the matter, but for the stamp of the place, being unable to endure change

of air, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of laws, and thereby to have the

The conduits and ways by which it is conveyed to the public use are of two sorts: one, that conveyeth it to the

public coffers; the other, that issueth the same out again for public payments. Of the first sort are collectors,

receivers, and treasurers; of the second are the treasurers again, and the officers appointed for payment of

several public or private ministers. And in this also the artificial man maintains his resemblance with the

natural; whose veins, receiving the blood from the several parts of the body, carry it to the heart; where, being

made vital, the heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven and enable for motion all the members of the

The procreation or children of a Commonwealth are those we call plantations, or colonies; which are numbers

of men sent out from the Commonwealth, under a conductor or governor, to inhabit a foreign country, either

formerly void of inhabitants, or made void then by war. And when a colony is settled, they are either a

Commonwealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their sovereign that sent them (as hath been

done by many Commonwealths of ancient time), in which case the Commonwealth from which they went

was called their metropolis, or mother, and requires no more of them than fathers require of the children

whom they emancipate and make free from their domestic government, which is honour and friendship; or

else they remain united to their metropolis, as were the colonies of the people of Rome; and then they are no

Commonwealths themselves, but provinces, and parts of the Commonwealth that sent them. So that the right

of colonies, saving honour and league with their metropolis, dependeth wholly on their license, or letters, by

HOW fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words appeareth in

nothing more than in the confusion of counsels and commands, arising from the imperative manner of

speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words do this are the words not only of

him that commandeth; but also of him that giveth counsel; and of him that exhorteth; and yet there are but

few that see not that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between when they when they

perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding

those phrases in men's writings, and being not able or not willing to enter into a consideration of the

circumstances, they mistake sometimes the precepts of counsellors for the precepts of them that command;

and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would infer, or the actions

they approve. To avoid which mistakes and render to those terms of commanding, counselling, and exhorting,

Command is where a man saith, "Do this," or "Do not this," without expecting other reason than the will of

him that says it. From this it followeth manifestly that he that commandeth pretendeth thereby his own

benefit: for the reason of his command is his own will only, and the proper object of every man's will is some

Counsel is where a man saith, "Do," or "Do not this," and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth

by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident that he that giveth counsel pretendeth only

Therefore between counsel and command, one great difference is that command is directed to a man's own

benefit, and counsel to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may

be obliged to do what he is commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: but he cannot be obliged to do

as he is counselled, because the hurt of not following it is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then

is the counsel turned into the nature of a command. A third difference between them is that no man can

pretend a right to be of another man's counsel; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himself: but to

demand right to counsel another argues a will to know his designs, or to gain some other good to himself;

This also is incident to the nature of counsel; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it cannot in equity accuse or

punish it: for to ask counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall think best; and

consequently, he that giveth counsel to his sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) when he asketh it,

cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it

be to the proposition in debate. For if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of, before the debate be

ended, they should neither ask nor take any further counsel; for sense of the assembly is the resolution of the

debate and end of all deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel is author of it, and therefore

cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot, no man else can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another

to do anything contrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from evil intention or from ignorance only,

it is punishable by the Commonwealth; because ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is

Exhortation, and dehortation is counsel, accompanied with signs in him that giveth it of vehement desire to

have it followed; or, to say it more briefly, counsel vehemently pressed. For he that exhorteth doth not deduce

the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie himself therein to the rigor of true reasoning, but

encourages him he counselleth to action: as he that dehorteth deterreth him from it. And therefore they have

in their speeches a regard to the common passions and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make

use of similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to persuade their hearers of the utility,

From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation is directed to the good of him that giveth

the counsel, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor; who, by the definition of

counsel, ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his counsel to

his own benefit is manifest enough by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which

being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his

own benefit, and but accidentally to the good of him that is counselled, or not at all.

Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only where a man is to speak to a multitude,

because when the speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more rigorously

than can be done in a multitude; which are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with him that speaketh

Thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required to give counsel, are corrupt counsellors and,

as it were, bribed by their own interest. For though the counsel they give be never so good, yet he that gives it

is no more a good counsellor than he that giveth a just sentence for a reward is a just judge. But where a man

may lawfully command, as a father in his family, or a leader in an army, his exhortations and dehortations are

not only lawful, but also necessary and laudable: but when they are no more counsels, but commands; which

when they are for execution of sour labour, sometimes necessity, and always humanity, requireth to be

sweetened in the delivery by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsel rather than in harsher

Examples of the difference between command and counsel we may take from the forms of speech that

express them in Holy Scripture. "Have no other Gods but me"; "Make to thyself no graven image"; "Take not

God's name in vain"; "Sanctify the Sabbath"; "Honour thy parents"; "Kill not"; "Steal not," etc. are

commands, because the reason for which we are to obey them is drawn from the will of God our King, whom

we are obliged to obey. But these words, "Sell all thou hast; give it to the poor; and follow me," are counsel,

because the reason for which we are to do so is drawn from our own benefit, which is this; that we shall have

"treasure in Heaven." These words, "Go into the village over against you, and you shall find an ass tied, and

her colt; loose her, and bring her to me," are a command; for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of

their master: but these words, "Repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus," are counsel; because the reason

why we should so do tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner

soever we rebel, but of ourselves, who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for

As the difference of counsel from command hath been now deduced from the nature of counsel, consisting in

a deducing of the benefit or hurt that may arise to him that is to be to be counselled, by the necessary or

probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt and inept

counsellors be derived from the same. For experience, being but memory of the consequences of like actions

formerly observed, and counsel but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another, the virtues

and defects of counsel are the same with the virtues and defects intellectual: and to the person of a

Commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in the place of memory and mental discourse. But with this

resemblance of the Commonwealth to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of great importance;

which is that a natural man receiveth his experience from the natural objects of sense, which work upon him

without passion or interest of their own; whereas they that give counsel to the representative person of a

Commonwealth may have, and have often, their particular ends and passions that render their counsels

always suspected, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a

good counsellor: that his ends and interest be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of him he

Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the

consequences of it in such manner as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed, he ought to

propound his advice in such form of speech as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with

as firm ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And

therefore rash and unevident inferences, such as are fetched only from examples, or authority of books, and

are not arguments of what is good or evil, but witnesses of fact or of opinion; obscure, confused, and

ambiguous expressions; also all metaphorical speeches tending to the stirring up of passion (because such

reasoning and such expressions are useful only to deceive or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than

Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience and long study, and no man is

presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great Commonwealth are

necessary to be known, no man is presumed to be a good counsellor but in such business as he hath not only

been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on and considered. For seeing the business of a

Commonwealth is this; to preserve the people in peace at home, and defend them against foreign invasion;

we shall find it requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of

the nature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without study; and of the strength,

commodities, places, both of their own country and their neighbours'; as also of the inclinations and designs

of all nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to without much experience. Of which

things, not only the whole sum, but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a man in

years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel, as I have said before (Chapter VIII), is

judgement. And the differences of men in that point come from different education; of some, to one kind of

study or business, and of others, to another. When for the doing of anything there be infallible rules (as in

engines and edifices, the rules of geometry), all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel that has

learned or found out the rule. And when there is no such rule, he that hath most experience in that particular

Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a Commonwealth, in a business that hath reference to another

Commonwealth, it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences and letters that come from thence, and

with all the records of treaties and other transactions of state between them; which none can do but such as

the representative shall think fit. By which we may see that they who are not called to counsel can have no

Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better counselled by hearing them apart than in

an assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in

an assembly many of them deliver their advice with aye or no, or with their hands or feet, not moved by their

own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole by

contradiction, or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension than those that have applauded the contrary

opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many there cannot choose but be some interests are contrary to that of

the public; and these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and eloquence draws others into

the same advice. For the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in assembly

are like many brands that inflame one another (especially when they blow one another with orations) to the

setting of the Commonwealth on fire, under pretence of counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart,

one may examine, when there is need, the truth or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advice

he gives, by frequent interruptions and objections; which cannot be done in an assembly, where in every

difficult question a man is rather astonied and dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of

the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many, called together for advice,

wherein there be not some that have the ambition the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the

politics; and give not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the applause of their motley

orations, made of the diverse colored threads or shreds of thread or shreds of authors; which is an

impertinence, at least, that takes away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of counselling

apart is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret, whereof there be many

occasions in public business, the counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are dangerous; and therefore

great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most

To conclude, who is there that so far approves far approves the taking of counsel from a great assembly of

counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his

children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private estate, especially if there

be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many prudent

counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best; as he that useth able seconds

at tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best that useth his own judgement only; as he that

has no second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed counsel, which cannot

move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly, out of envy or interest,

retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good

players, yet in a wheelbarrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded by the also by the inconcurrent

judgements and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands

to it; and most of all, when there is one or more amongst them that desire to have him lose. And though it be

true that many eyes see more than one, yet it is not to be understood of many counsellors, but then only when

the final resolution is in one in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in diverse lines,

and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to miss their mark, though they

look about with two eyes, yet they never aim but with one: and therefore no great popular Commonwealth

was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent

man amongst them; or by the secret counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of equal factions; and not by the

open consultations of the assembly. And as for very little Commonwealths, be they popular or monarchical,

there is no human wisdom can uphold them longer than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours.

BY civil laws, I understand the laws that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are members, not

of this or that Commonwealth in particular, but of a Commonwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws

belongeth to them that profess the study of the laws of their several countries; but the knowledge of civil law

in general, to any man. The ancient law of Rome was called their civil law, from the word civitas, which

signifies a Commonwealth: and those countries which, having been under the Roman Empire and governed

by that law, retain still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil law to distinguish it from the

rest of their own civil laws. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my design being not to show what is

law here and there, but what is law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and diverse others have done, without taking

And first it is manifest that law in general is not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any

man, but only of him whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for civil law,

it addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is persona civitatis, the person of the

Which considered, I define civil law in this manner. Civil law is to every subject those rules which the

Commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of

for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of that is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule.

In which definition there is nothing that is that is not at first sight evident. For every man seeth that some

laws are addressed to all the subjects in general; some to particular provinces; some to particular vocations;

and some to particular men; and are therefore laws to every of those to whom the command is directed, and to

none else. As also, that laws are the rules of just and unjust, nothing being reputed unjust that is not contrary

to some law. Likewise, that none can make laws but the Commonwealth, because our subjection is to the

Commonwealth only; and that commands are to be signified by sufficient signs, because a man knows not

otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence

be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

The legislator in all Commonwealths is only the sovereign, be he one man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly

of men, as in a democracy or aristocracy. For the legislator is he that maketh the law. And the

Commonwealth only prescribes and commandeth the observation of those rules which we call law: therefore

the Commonwealth is the legislator. But the Commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything but

by the representative, that is, the sovereign; and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislator. For the same

reason, none can abrogate a law made, but the sovereign, because a law is not abrogated but by another law

that forbiddeth it to be put in execution. The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is

not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleaseth, free

himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently

he was free before. For he is free that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound

to himself, because he that can bind can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not bound.

When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that maketh the authority, but the

will of the sovereign signified by his silence (for silence is sometimes an signified by his silence (for silence

is sometimes an argument of consent); and it is no longer law, than the sovereign shall be silent therein. And

therefore if the sovereign shall have a question of right grounded, not upon his present will, but upon the laws

formerly made, the length of time shall bring no prejudice to his right: but the question shall be judged by

equity. For many unjust actions and unjust sentences go uncontrolled a longer time than any man can

remember. And our lawyers account no customs law but such as reasonable, and that evil customs are to be

abolished: but the judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belonged to him that

maketh the law, which is the sovereign assembly or monarch. The law of nature and the civil law contain

each other and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other

moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature (as I have said before in the end of the

fifteenth Chapter), are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience. When a

Commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of

the Commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey

them. For the differences of private men, to declare what is equity, what is justice, and is moral virtue, and to

make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for

such as shall break them; which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature therefore is a

part of the civil law in all Commonwealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the

dictates of nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a

dictate of the law of nature. But every subject in a Commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law;

either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative

itself one by one when, subdued by the sword, they promise obedience that they may receive life; and

therefore obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of nature. Civil and natural law are not different

kinds, but different parts of law; whereof one part, being written, is called civil the other unwritten, natural.

But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged and restrained:

nay, the end of making laws is no other but such restraint, without which there cannot possibly be any peace.

And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men in such

manner as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy. If the

sovereign of one Commonwealth subdue a people that have lived under other written laws, and afterwards

govern them by the same laws by which they were governed before, yet those laws are the civil laws of the

victor, and not of the vanquished Commonwealth. For the legislator is he, not by whose authority the laws

were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be laws. And therefore where there be diverse

provinces within the dominion of a Commonwealth, and in those provinces diversity of laws, which

commonly are called the customs of each several province, we are not to understand that such customs have

their force only from length of time; but that they were anciently laws written, or otherwise made known, for

the constitutions and statutes of their sovereigns; and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of time,

but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an unwritten law, in all the provinces of a

dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof, that law can be no other but

a law of nature, equally obliging all mankind. Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority

and force from the will of the Commonwealth; that is to say, from the will of the representative, which in a

monarchy is the monarch, and in other Commonwealths the sovereign assembly; a man may wonder from

whence proceed such opinions as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in several Commonwealths,

directly or by consequence making the legislative power depend on private men or subordinate judges. As for

example, that the common law hath no controller but the Parliament; which is true only where a parliament

has the sovereign power, and cannot be assembled nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if there be a

right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to control them, and consequently to control their

controllings. And if there be no such right, then the controller of laws is not parlamentum, but rex in

parlamento. And where a parliament is sovereign, if it should assemble never so many or so wise men from

the countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause, yet there is no man will believe that such an assembly

hath thereby acquired to themselves a legislative power. Item, that the two arms of a Commonwealth are

force and justice; the first whereof is in the king, the other deposited in the hands of the Parliament. As if a

Commonwealth could consist where the force were in any hand which justice had not the authority to

command and govern. That law can never be against reason, our lawyers are agreed: and that not the letter

(that is, every construction of it), but that which is according to the intention of the legislator, is the law. And

it is true: but the doubt is of whose reason it is that shall be received for law. It is not meant of any private

reason; for then there would be as much contradiction in the laws as there is in the Schools; nor yet, as Sir

Edward Coke makes it, an "Artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and

experience," as his was. For it is possible long study may increase and confirm erroneous sentences: and

where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin: and of those that study and

observe with equal time and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain, discordant: and

therefore it is not that juris prudentia, or wisdom of subordinate judges, but the reason of this our artificial

man the Commonwealth, and his command, that maketh law: and the Commonwealth being in their

representative but one person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the laws; and when there doth,

the same reason is able, by interpretation or alteration, to take it away. In all courts of justice, the sovereign

(which is the person of the Commonwealth) is he that judgeth: the subordinate judge ought to have regard to

the reason which moved his sovereign to make such law, that his sentence may be according thereunto, which

then is his sovereigns sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one. From this, that the law is a

command, and a command consisteth in declaration or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by

voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand that the command of the

Commonwealth is law only to those that have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, children, or

madmen there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just or unjust,

because they had never power to make any covenant or to understand the consequences thereof, and

consequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as they must do that make to

themselves a Commonwealth. And as those from whom nature or accident hath taken away the notice of all

laws in general; so also every man, from whom any accident not proceeding from his own default, hath taken

away the means to take notice of any particular law, is excused if he observe it not; and to speak properly,

that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary to consider in this place what arguments and signs be

sufficient for the knowledge of what is the law; that is to say, what is the will of the sovereign, as well in

monarchies as in other forms of government. And first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without

exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a

law of nature. For whatever men are to take knowledge of for law, not upon other men's words, but every one

from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no law can be, but the law

of nature. The laws of nature therefore need not any publishing nor proclamation; as being contained in this

one sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done

Secondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and be not written,

nor published by word, then also it is a law of nature, and known by the same arguments and signs that

distinguish those in such a condition from other subjects. For whatsoever law is not written, or some way

published by him that makes it law, can be known no way but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is

therefore also a law not only civil, but natural. For example, if the sovereign employ a public minister,

without written instructions what to do, he is obliged to take for instructions the dictates of reason: as if he

make a judge, the judge is to take notice that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his

sovereign, which being always understood to be equity, he is bound to it by the law of nature: or if an

ambassador, he is, in all things not contained in his written instructions, to take for instruction that which

reason dictates to be most conducing to his sovereign's interest; and so of all other ministers of the

sovereignty, public and private. All which instructions of natural reason may be comprehended under one

The law of nature excepted, it belonged to the essence of all other laws to be made known to every man that

shall be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act known to proceed from the

sovereign authority. For the will of another cannot be understood but by his own word, or act, or by

conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the Commonwealth is to be supposed

always consonant to equity and reason. And in ancient time, before letters were in common use, the laws

were many times put into verse; that the rude people, taking pleasure in singing or reciting them, might the

more easily retain them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon adviseth a man to bind the Ten

Commandments upon his ten fingers. [Proverbs, 7. 3] And for the Law which Moses gave to the people of

Israel at the renewing of the Covenant, he biddeth them to teach it their children, by discoursing of it both at

home and upon the way, at going to bed and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts and doors of

their houses; [Deuteronomy, 11. 19] and to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.

Nor is it enough the law be written and published, but also that there be manifest signs that it proceedeth from

the will of the sovereign. For private men, when they have, or think they have, force enough to secure their

unjust designs, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for laws what they please,

without or against the legislative authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a declaration of the law, but

also sufficient signs of the author and authority. The author or legislator is supposed in every Commonwealth

to be evident, because he is the sovereign, who, having been constituted by the consent of every one, is

supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the ignorance and security of men be such, for

the most part, as that when the memory of the first constitution of their Commonwealth is worn out, they do

not consider by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry

protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers can make question

of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed. And it is a dictate of

natural reason, and consequently an evident law of nature, that no man ought to weaken that power the

protection whereof he hath himself demanded or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who is

sovereign, no man, but by his own fault (whatsoever evil men suggest), can make any doubt. The difficulty

cocsisteth in the evidence of the authority derived from him; the removing whereof dependeth on the

knowledge of the public registers, public counsels, public ministers, and public seals; by which all laws are

sufficiently verified; verified, I say, not authorized: for the verification is but the testimony and record; not

the authority of the law, which consisteth in the command of the sovereign only.

If therefore a man have a question of injury, depending on the law of nature; that is to say, on common

equity; the sentence of the judge, that by commission hath authority to take cognizance of such causes, is a

sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case. For though the advice of one that professeth

the study of the law be useful for the avoiding of contention, yet it is but advice: it is the judge must tell men

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written law, every man by recourse to the registers by

himself or others may, if he will, be sufficiently informed, before he do such injury, or commit the crime,

whether it be an injury or not; nay, he ought to do so: for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about

be just or unjust, and may inform himself if he will, the doing is unlawful. In like manner, he that supposeth

himself injured, in a case determined by the written law, which he may by himself or others see and consider;

if he complain before he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex

If the question be of obedience to a public officer, to have seen his commission with the public seal, and

heard it read, or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient verification of his

authority. For every man is obliged to do his best endeavour to inform himself of all written laws that may

The legislator known, and the laws either by writing or by the light of nature sufficiently published, there

wanteth yet another very material circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the letter, but the

intendment, or meaning; that is to say, the authentic interpretation of the law (which is the sense of the

legislator), in which the nature of the law consisteth; and therefore the interpretation of all laws dependeth on

the authority sovereign; and the interpreters can be none but those which the sovereign, to whom only the

subject oweth obedience, shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an interpreter, the law may be made to bear a

sense contrary to that of the sovereign, by which means the interpreter becomes the legislator.

All laws, written and unwritten, have need of interpretation. The unwritten law of nature, though it be easy to

such as without partiality and passion make use of their natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators

thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded

by selflove, or some other passion, it is now become of all laws the most obscure, and has consequently the

greatest need of able interpreters. The written laws, if laws, if they be short, are easily misinterpreted, for the

diverse significations of a word or two; if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many

words: in so much as no written law, delivered in few or many words, can be well understood without a

perfect understanding of the final causes for which the law was made; the knowledge of which final causes is

in the legislator. To him therefore there cannot be any knot in the law insoluble, either by finding out the ends

to undo it by, or else by making what ends he will (as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot) by

The interpretation of the laws of nature in a Commonwealth dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy.

The authority of writers, without the authority of the Commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be they

never so true. That which I have written in this treatise concerning the moral virtues, and of their necessity for

the procuring and maintaining peace, though it be evident truth, is not therefore presently law, but because in

all Commonwealths in the world it is part of the civil law. For though it be naturally reasonable, yet it is by

the sovereign power that it is law: otherwise, it were a great error to call the laws of nature unwritten law;

whereof we see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another and of

The interpretation of the law of nature is the sentence of the judge constituted by the sovereign authority to

hear and determine such controversies as depend thereon, and consisteth in the application of the law to the

present case. For in the act of judicature the judge doth no more but consider whether the demand of the party

be consonant to natural reason and equity; and the sentence he giveth is therefore the interpretation of the law

of nature; which interpretation is authentic, not because it is his private sentence, but because he giveth it by

authority of the sovereign, whereby it becomes the sovereign's sentence; which is law for that time to the

But because there is no judge subordinate, nor sovereign, but may err in a judgement equity; if afterward in

another like case he find it more consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it. No

man's error becomes his own law, nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither, for the same reason, becomes it a

law to other judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong sentence given by authority of the

sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such laws as are mutable, be a constitution of a new law in cases in

which every little circumstance is the same; yet in laws immutable, such as are the laws of nature, they are no

laws to the same or other judges in the like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one judge

passeth, another cometh; nay, heaven and earth shall pass; but not one tittle of the law of nature shall pass; for

it is the eternal law of God. Therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been cannot all

together make a law contrary to natural equity. Nor any examples of former judges can warrant an

unreasonable sentence, or discharge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity (in the case he

is to judge) from the principles of his own natural reason. For example sake, it is against the law of nature to

punish the innocent; and innocent is he that acquitteth himself judicially and is acknowledged for innocent by

the judge. Put the case now that a man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the power and malice of some

enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges, runneth away for fear of the event, and

afterwards is taken and brought to a legal trial, and maketh it sufficiently appear he was not guilty of the

crime, and being thereof acquitted is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest

condemnation of the innocent. I say therefore that there is no place in the world where this can be an

interpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of precedent judges that had done the

same. For he that judged it first judged unjustly; and no injustice can be a pattern of judgement to succeeding

judges. A written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: but that flying for

fear of injury should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime judicially,

is contrary to the nature of a presumption, which hath no place after judgement given. Yet this is set down by

a great lawyer for the common law of England: "If a man," saith he, "that is innocent be accused of felony,

and for fear flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himself of the felony; yet if it be found that he

fled for the felony, he shall, notwithstanding his innocency, forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties.

For as to the forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the presumption in law, grounded upon

his flight." Here you see an innocent man, judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his innocency (when no

written law forbade him to fly) after his acquittal, upon a presumption in law, condemned to lose all the

goods he hath. If the law ground upon his flight a presumption of the fact, which was capital, the sentence

ought to have been capital: the presumption were not of the fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods?

This therefore is no law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law, but upon

the presumption of the judges. It is also against law to say that no proof shall be admitted against a

presumption of law. For all judges, sovereign and subordinate, if they refuse to hear proof, refuse to do

justice: for though the sentence be just, yet the judges that condemn, without hearing the proofs offered, are

unjust judges; and their presumption is but prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the seat of

justice whatsoever precedent judgements or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this

nature, wherein men's judgements have been perverted by trusting to precedents: but this is enough to show

that though the sentence of the judge be a law to the party pleading, yet it is no law any judge that shall

In like manner, when question is of the meaning of written laws, he is not the interpreter of them that writeth

a commentary upon them. For commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil than the text, and therefore

need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such interpretation. And therefore unless there be an

interpreter authorized by the sovereign, from which the subordinate judges are not to recede, the interpreter

can be no other than the ordinary judges, in the same manner as they are in cases of the unwritten law; and

their sentences are to be taken by them that plead for laws in that particular case, but not to bind other judges

in like cases to give like judgements. For a judge may err in the interpretation even of written laws; but no

error of a subordinate judge can change the law, which is the general sentence of the sovereign.

In written laws men use to make a difference between the letter and the sentence of the law: and when by the

letter is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, it is well distinguished. For the significations

of almost all are either in themselves, or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in

argument to make many senses; but there is only one sense of the law. But if by the letter be meant the literal

sense, then the letter and the sentence or intention of the law is all one. For the literal sense is that which the

legislator intended should by the letter of the law be signified. Now the intention of the legislator is always

supposed to be equity: for it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign. He ought

therefore, if the word of the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of

nature; or if the case be difficult, to respite judgement till he have received more ample authority. For

example, a written law ordaineth that he which is thrust out of his house by force shall be restored by force. It

happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case

there is no special law ordained. It is evident that this case is contained in the same law; for else there is no

remedy for him at all, which is to be supposed against the intention of the legislator. Again, the word of the

law commandeth to judge according to the evidence. A man is accused falsely of a fact which the judge

himself saw done by another, and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the letter of the law be

followed to the condemnation of the innocent, nor shall the judge give sentence against the evidence of the

witnesses, because the letter of the law is to the contrary; but procure of the sovereign that another be made

judge, and himself witness. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written law may lead

him to the intention of the law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no incommodity can warrant

a sentence against the law. For every judge of right and wrong is not judge of what is commodious or

The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, that is to say, in a good judge, are not the same with

those of an advocate; namely, the study of the laws. For a judge, as he ought to take notice of the fact from

none but the witnesses, so also he ought to take notice of the law from nothing but the statutes and

constitutions of the sovereign, alleged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from

the sovereign power to declare them; and need not take care beforehand what he shall judge; for it shall be

given him what he shall say concerning the fact, by witnesses; and what he shall say in point of law, from

those that shall in their pleadings show it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of

Parliament in England were judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet

few of them were much versed in the study of the laws, and fewer had made profession of them; and though

they consulted with lawyers that were appointed to be present there for that purpose, yet they alone had the

authority of giving sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trials of right, twelve men of the common people

are the judges and give sentence, not only of the fact, but of the right; and pronounce simply for the

complainant or for the defendant; that is to say, are judges not only of the fact, but also of the right; and in a

question of crime, not only determine whether done or not done, but also whether it be murder, homicide,

felony, assault, and the like, which are determinations of law: but because they are not supposed to know the

law of themselves, there is one that hath authority to inform them of it in the particular case they are to judge

of. But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unless

it be made appear they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.

The things that make a good judge or good interpreter of the laws are, first, a right understanding of that

principal law of nature called equity; which, depending not on the reading of other men's writings, but on the

goodness of a man's own natural reason and meditation, is presumed to be in those most that had most

leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, contempt of unnecessary riches and

preferments. Thirdly, to be able in judgement to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and

compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, patience to hear, diligent attention in hearing, and memory to retain, digest,

The difference and division of the laws has been made in diverse manners, according to the different methods

of those men that have written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth on nature, but on the scope of the

writer, and is subservient to every man's proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of

The edicts, constitutions, and epistles of prince; that is, of the emperor, because the whole power of the

people was in him. Like these are the proclamations of the kings of England. > The decrees of the whole

people of Rome, comprehending the Senate, when they were put to the question by the Senate. These were

laws, at first, by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people; and such of them as by the emperors

were not abrogated remained laws by the authority imperial. For all laws that bind are understood to be laws

by his authority that has power to repeal them. Somewhat like to these laws are the Acts of Parliament in

England. The decrees of the common people, excluding the Senate, when they were put to the question by the

tribune of the people. For such of them as were not abrogated by the emperors, remained laws by the

authority imperial. Like to these were the orders of the House of Commons in England. Senatus consulta, the

orders of the Senate: because when the people of Rome grew so numerous as it was inconvenient to assemble

them, it was thought fit by the emperor that men should consult the Senate instead of the people: and these

have some resemblance with the Acts of Council. The edicts of praetors, and in some cases of the aediles:

such as are the chief justices in the courts of England. Responsa prudentum, which were the sentences and

opinions of those lawyers to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law, the law, and to give

answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice; which answers the judges in giving judgement

were obliged by the constitutions of the emperor to observe: and should be like the reports of cases judged, if

other judges be by the law of England bound to observe them. For the judges of the common law of England

are not properly judges, but juris consulti; of whom the judges, who are either the lords, or twelve men of the

country, are in point of law to ask advice. Also, unwritten customs, which in their own nature are an imitation

of law, by the tacit consent of the emperor, in case they be not contrary to the law of nature, are very laws.

Another division of laws is into natural and positive. Natural are those which have been laws from all

eternity, and are called not only natural, but also moral laws, consisting in the moral virtues; as justice,

equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace and charity, of which I have already spoken in the

Positive are those which have not been from eternity, but have been made laws by the will of those that have

had the sovereign power over others, and are either written or made known to men by some other argument

Again, of positive laws some are human, some divine: and of human positive laws, some are distributive,

some penal. Distributive are those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man what it is

by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands or goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these

speak to all the subjects. Penal are those which declare what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the

law; and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be

informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; nevertheless the command is not

addressed to the delinquent (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himself), but to public ministers

appointed to see the penalty executed. And these penal laws are for the most part written together with the

laws distributive, and are sometimes called judgements. For all laws are general judgements, or sentences of

the legislator; as also every particular judgement is a law to him whose case is judged.

Divine positive laws (for natural laws, being eternal and universal, are all divine) are those which, being the

commandments of God, not from all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but only to a certain

people or to certain persons, are declared for such by those whom God hath authorized to declare them. But

this authority of man to declare what be these positive of God, how can it be known? God may command a

man, by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But because it is of the essence of law that he who

is to be obliged be assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to

be from God, how can a man without supernatural revelations be assured of the revelation received by the

declarer? And how can he be bound to obey bound to obey them? For the first question, how a man can be

assured of the revelation of another without a revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible: for

though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the miracles they see him do, or from seeing

the extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary felicity of his

actions, all which are marks of God's extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidences of special

revelation. Miracles are marvellous works; but that which is marvellous to one may not be so to another.

Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and

ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another has had a

supernatural revelation of God's will but only a belief; every one, as the signs thereof shall appear greater or

But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them, it is not so hard. For if the law declared be not against

the law of nature, which is undoubtedly God's law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act;

bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for men's belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to

the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary or extraordinary. Faith of supernatural law is not a

fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God

freely giveth to whom He pleaseth; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of His laws, but a rejection of them

all, except the laws natural. But this that I say will be made yet clearer by, the examples and testimonies

concerning this point in Holy Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham in a supernatural manner was

thus, "This is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee." [Genesis,

17. 10] Abraham's seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant,

and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law; which they could not be but in virtue

of the obedience they owed to their parents, who (if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the

case of Abraham) have sovereign power over their children and servants. Again, where God saith to

Abraham, "In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed: for I know thou wilt command thy children and

thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and judgement," it is manifest

the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their

sovereign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on pain of

death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared to them for God's law. Upon what ground, but on

this submission of their own, "Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we

die"? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth that in a Commonwealth a subject that has no certain and

assured revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of God is to obey for such the command of the

Commonwealth: for if men were at liberty to take for God's commandments their own dreams and fancies, or

the dreams and fancies of private men, scarce two men would agree upon what is God's commandment; and

yet in respect of them every man would despise the commandments of the Commonwealth. I conclude,

therefore, that in all things not contrary to the moral law (that is to say, to the law of nature), all subjects are

bound to obey that for divine law which is declared to be so by the laws of the Commonwealth. Which also is

evident to any man's reason; for whatsoever is not against the law of nature may be made law in the name of

them that have the sovereign power; there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it when it is

propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend

other commandments of God than are declared for such by the Commonwealth. Christian states punish those

that revolt from Christian religion; and all other states, those that set up any religion by them forbidden. For

in whatsoever is not regulated by the Commonwealth, it is equity (which is the law of nature, and therefore an

There is also another distinction of laws into fundamental and not fundamental: but I could never see in any

author what a fundamental law signifieth. Nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that

For a fundamental law in every Commonwealth is that which, being taken away, the Commonwealth faileth

and is utterly dissolved, as a building whose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that

by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the sovereign, whether a monarch or a

sovereign assembly, without which the Commonwealth cannot stand; such as is the power of war and peace,

of judicature, of election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the public good.

Not fundamental is that, the abrogating whereof draweth not with it the dissolution of the Commonwealth;

such as are the laws concerning controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the division of

I find the words lex civilis and jus civile, that is to say, and law and right civil, promiscuously used for the

same thing, even in the most learned authors; which nevertheless ought not to be so. For right is liberty,

namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us: but civil law is an obligation, and takes from us the liberty

which the law of nature gave us. Nature gave a right to every man to secure himself by his own strength, and

to invade a suspected neighbour by way of prevention: but the civil law takes away that liberty, in all cases

where the protection of the law may be safely stayed for. Insomuch as lex and jus are as different as

Likewise laws and charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing. Yet charters are donations of the

sovereign; and not laws, but exemptions from law. The phrase of a law is jubeo, injungo; I command and

enjoin: the phrase of a charter is dedi, concessi; I have given, I have granted: but what is given or granted to a

man is not forced upon him by a law. A law may be made to bind all the subjects of a Commonwealth: a

liberty or charter is only to one man or some one part of the people. For to say all the people of a

Commonwealth have liberty in any case whatsoever is to say that, in such case, there hath been no law made;

A sin is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt is a

breach of all his laws at once, and therefore may consist, not only in the commission of a fact, or in the

speaking of words by the laws forbidden, or in the omission of what the law commandeth, but also in the

intention or purpose to transgress. For the purpose to break the law is some degree of contempt of him to

whom it belonged to see it executed. To be delighted in the imagination only of being possessed of another

man's goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of

the law, that saith, "Thou shalt not covet": nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining or dreaming of

the death of him from whose life he expecteth nothing but damage and displeasure, a sin; but the resolving to

put some act in execution that tendeth thereto. For to be pleased in the fiction of that which would please a

man if it were real is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man and every other living creature, as to

make it a sin were to make sin of being a man. Th consideration of this has made me think them too severe,

both to themselves and others, that maintain that the first motions of the mind, though checked with the fear

of God, be sins. But I confess it is safer to err on that hand than on the other.

A crime is a sin consisting in the committing by deed or word of that which the law forbiddeth, or the

omission of what it hath commanded. So that every crime is a sin; but not every sin a crime. To intend to

steal or kill is a sin, though it never appear in word or fact: for God that seeth the thought of man can lay it to

his charge: but till it appear by something done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a human

judge, it hath not the name of crime: which distinction the Greeks observed in the word amartema and

egklema or aitia; whereof the former (which is translated sin) signifieth any swerving from the law

whatsoever; but the two latter (which are translated crime) signify that sin only whereof one man may accuse

another. But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for human accusation. In

like manner the Latins by peccatum, which is sin, signify all manner of deviation from the law; but by crimen

(which word they derive from cerno, which signifies to perceive) they mean only such sins as may be made

From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, may be inferred, first, that where law

ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance,

and all facts contrary to any moral virtue can never cease to be sin. Secondly, that the civil law ceasing,

crimes cease: for there being no other law remaining but that of nature, there is no place for accusation; every

man being his own judge, and accused only by his own conscience, and cleared by the uprightness of his own

intention. When therefore his intention is right, his fact is no sin; if otherwise, his fact is sin, but not crime.

Thirdly, that when the sovereign power ceaseth, crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such power, there is

no protection to be had from the law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no

man in the institution of sovereign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his own body,

for the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood only of those that have not

themselves contributed to the taking away of the power that protected them: for that was a crime from the

The source of every crime is some defect of the understanding, or some error in reasoning, or some sudden

force of the passions. Defect in the understanding is ignorance; in reasoning, erroneous opinion. Again,

ignorance is of three sorts; of the law, and of the sovereign, and of the penalty. Ignorance of the law of nature

excuseth no man, because every man that hath attained to the use of reason is supposed to know he ought not

to do to another what he would not have done to himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come,

if he do anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and persuade men

here to receive a new religion, or teach them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country,

though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a crime, and may be justly

punished for the same, not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would

not approve in another; namely, that coming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the religion there. But

ignorance of the civil law shall excuse a man in a strange country till it be declared to him, because till then

In the like manner, if the civil law of a man's own country be not so sufficiently declared as he may know it if

he will; nor the action against the law of nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other cases ignorance of

Ignorance of the sovereign power the place of a man's ordinary residence excuseth him not, because he ought

Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man: for in breaking the law, which without

a fear of penalty to follow were not a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not

what it is; because whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but

punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the laws in every Commonwealth; which punishment,

if it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to arbitrary punishment.

For it is reason that he which does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will, should suffer

punishment without other limitation than that of his will whose law is thereby violated.

But when a penalty is either annexed to the crime in the law itself, or hath been usually inflicted in the like

cases, there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not great

enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their

injustice with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of nature they choose that which appeareth best for

themselves: and therefore when they are punished more than the law had formerly determined, or more than

others were punished for the same crime, it is the law that tempted and deceiveth them.

No law made after a fact done can make it a crime: because if the fact be against the law of nature, the law

was before the fact; and a positive law cannot be taken notice of before it be made, and therefore cannot be

obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact is made before the fact be done, yet he that doth the fact is

liable to the penalty ordained after, in case no lesser penalty were made known before, neither by writing nor

From defect in reasoning (that is to say, from error), men are prone to violate the laws three ways. First, by

presumption of false principles: as when men, from having observed how in all places and in all ages unjust

actions have been authorised by the force and victories of those who have committed them; and that, potent

men breaking through the cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort and those that have failed in their

enterprises have been esteemed the only criminals; have thereupon taken for principles and grounds of their

reasoning that justice is but a vain word: that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry and hazard is his

own: that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust: that examples of former times are good arguments of

doing the like again; and many more of that kind: which being granted, no act in itself can be a crime, but

must be made so, not by the law, but by the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be virtuous or

vicious fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caesar (the

same laws standing) turn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the Commonwealth.

Secondly, by false teachers that either misinterpret the law of nature, making it thereby repugnant to the law

civil, or by teaching for laws such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are inconsistent

Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty and

precipitate in concluding and resolving what to do; such as are they that have both a great opinion of their

own understanding and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but only common

experience and a good natural wit, whereof no man thinks himself unprovided: whereas the knowledge of

right and wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no man will pretend to without great and long study. And

of those defects in reasoning, there is none that can excuse, though some of them may extenuate, a crime in

any man that pretendeth to the administration of his own private business; much less in them that undertake a

public charge, because they pretend to the reason upon the want whereof they would ground their excuse.

Of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one is vainglory, or a foolish overrating of their

own worth; as if difference of worth were an effect of their wit, or riches, or blood, or some other natural

quality, not depending on the will of those that have the sovereign authority. From whence proceedeth a

presumption that the punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all subjects, ought not to

be inflicted on them with the same rigor they are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended

Therefore it happeneth commonly that such as value themselves by the greatness of their wealth adventure on

crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon by money or

And that such as have multitude of potent kindred, and popular men that have gained reputation amongst the

multitude, take courage to violate the laws from a hope of oppressing the power to whom it belonged to put

And that such as have a great and false opinion of their own wisdom take upon them to reprehend the actions

and call in question the authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the laws with their public discourse,

as that nothing shall be a crime but what their own designs require should be so. It happeneth also to the same

men to be prone to all such crimes as consist in craft, and in deceiving of their neighbours; because they think

their designs are too subtle to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own

wisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of Commonwealth (which can never happen

without a civil war), very few are left alive long enough to see their new designs established: so that the

benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity and such as would least have wished it: which argues they

were not so wise as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed do

commonly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they believe they lie hidden being nothing else but their

own blindness, and are no wiser than children that think all hid by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vainglorious men, unless they be withal timorous, are subject to anger; as being more prone

than others to interpret for contempt the ordinary liberty of conversation: and there are few crimes that may

As for the passions, of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, what crimes they are apt to produce is so

obvious to every man's experience and understanding as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that

they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man and all other living creatures, as that their effects

cannot be hindered but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those

things men hate, they find a continual and unavoidable molestation; whereby either a man's patience must be

everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him: the former is difficult;

the latter is many times impossible without some violation of the law. Ambition and covetousness are

passions also that are perpetually incumbent and pressing; whereas reason is not perpetually present to resist

them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for lust, what it

wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy or

Of all passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws is fear. Nay, excepting some generous

natures, it is the only thing (when there is appearance of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws) that makes

For not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear only of corporeal hurt, which we call bodily

fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears

present death, from which he sees not how to escape but by wounding him that assaulteth him; if he wound

him to death, this is no crime, because no man is supposed, at the making of a Commonwealth to have

abandoned the defence of his life or limbs, where the law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to

kill a man because from his actions or his threatenings I may argue he will kill me when he can (seeing I have

time and means to demand protection from the sovereign power) is a crime. Again, a man receives words of

disgrace, or some little injuries, for which they that made the laws had assigned no punishment, nor thought it

worthy of a man that hath the use of reason to take notice of, and is afraid unless he revenge it he shall fall

into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoid this, breaks the

law, and protects himself for the future by the terror of his private revenge. This is a crime: for the hurt is not

corporeal, but fantastical, and (though, in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custom not many years

since begun, amongst young and vain men) so light as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own

courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of spirits, either through his own superstition or

through too much credit given to other men that tell him of strange dreams and visions; and thereby be made

believe they will hurt him for doing or omitting diverse things which, nevertheless, to do or omit is contrary

to the laws; and that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be excused by this fear, but is a crime. For, as I

have shown before in the second Chapter, dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the

impressions our senses had formerly received waking; and, when men are by any accident unassured they

have slept, seem to be real visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own or another's

dream or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power of invisible spirits than is permitted by the

Commonwealth, leaveth the law of nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own

or another private man's brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth anything or nothing, nor

whether he that tells his dream say true or lie; which if every private man should have leave to do (as they

must, by the law of nature, if any one have it), there could no law be made to hold, and so all Commonwealth

From these different sources of crimes, it appears already that all crimes are not, as the Stoics of old time

maintained, of the same alloy. There is place, not only for excuse, by which that which seemed a crime is

proved to be none at all; but also for extenuation, by which the crime, that seemed great, is made less. For

though all crimes do equally deserve the name of injustice, as all deviation from a straight line is equally

crookedness, which the Stoics rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust, no

more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoics, not observing, held it as great a crime

That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of a crime, can be none but that which,

at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the law. For the fact committed once against the law, if he that

The want of means to know the law totally excuseth: for the law whereof a man has no means to inform

himself is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire shall not be considered as a want of means; nor

shall any man that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of his own affairs be supposed to want

means to know the laws of nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only children and

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy (and he is then in the power of the enemy when his

person, or his means of living, is so), if it be without his own fault, the obligation of the law ceaseth; because

he must obey the enemy, or die, and consequently such obedience is no crime: for no man is obliged (when

the protection of the law faileth) not to protect himself by the best means he can.

If a man by the terror of present death be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused;

because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law were

obligatory, yet a man would reason thus: "If I do it not, I die presently; if I do it, I die afterwards; therefore by

doing it, there is time of life gained." Nature therefore compels him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other

way but by some fact against the law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he

cannot obtain for money, nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another man's sword; he is totally

Again, facts done against the law, by the authority of another, are by that authority excused against the

author, because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another that is but his instrument: but it is not excused

against a third person thereby injured, because in the violation of the law both the author and actor are

criminals. From hence it followeth that when that man or assembly that hath the sovereign power

commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former law, the doing of it is totally excused: for he

ought not to condemn it himself, because he is the author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the

sovereign cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the sovereign commandeth anything to be

done against his own former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the law.

If that man or assembly that hath the sovereign power disclaim any right essential to the sovereignty,

whereby there accrueth to the subject any liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power; that is to say, with

the very being of a Commonwealth; if the subject shall refuse to obey the command in anything, contrary to

the liberty granted, this is nevertheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of the subject: for he to take notice of

what is inconsistent with the sovereignty, because it was erected by his own consent and for his own defence,

and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof.

But if he not only disobey, but also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then it is a crime, because he

The degrees of crime are taken on diverse scales, and measured, first, by the malignity of the source, or

cause: secondly, by the contagion of the example: thirdly, by the mischief of the effect: and fourthly, by the

The same fact done against the law, if it proceed from presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist

those that are to execute the law, is a greater crime than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of

escape by flight: for presumption of impunity by force is a root from whence springeth, at all times, and upon

all temptations, a contempt of all laws; whereas in the latter case the apprehension of danger that makes a

man fly renders him more obedient for the future. A crime which know to be so is greater than the same

crime proceeding from a false persuasion that it is lawful: for he that committeth it against his own

conscience presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again, but he

He whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher, or an interpreter of the law publicly authorised, is

not so faulty as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles and reasoning: for

what is taught by one that teacheth by public authority, the Commonwealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance

of law, till the same authority controlleth it; and in all crimes that contain not in them a denial of the

sovereign power, nor are against an evident law, excuseth totally; whereas he that groundeth his actions on

his private judgement ought, according to the rectitude or error thereof, to stand or fall.

The same fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a greater crime than if there have been

many precedent examples of impunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity, given by the

sovereign himself: and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope and presumption of mercy, as

encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence, he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the

A crime arising from a sudden passion is not so great as when the same ariseth from long meditation: for in

the former case there is a place for extenuation in the common infirmity of human nature; but he that doth it

with premeditation has used circumspection, and cast his eye on the law, on the punishment, and on the

consequence thereof to human society; all which in committing the crime he hath contemned and postponed

to his own appetite. But there is no suddenness of passion sufficient for a total excuse: for all the time

between the first knowing of the law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation,

because he ought, by meditation of the law, to rectify the irregularity of his passions.

Where the law is publicly, and with assiduity, before all the people read and interpreted, a fact done against it

is a greater crime than where men are left without such instruction to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty,

and interruption of their callings, and be informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is

discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former there is apparent negligence, which is not without some

Those facts which the law expressly condemneth, but the lawmaker by other manifest signs of his will tacitly

approveth, are less crimes than the same facts condemned both by the law and lawmaker. For seeing the will

of the lawmaker is a law, there appear in this case two contradictory laws; which would totally excuse, if men

were bound to take notice of the sovereigns approbation, by other arguments than are expressed by his

command. But because there are punishments consequent, not only to the transgression of his law, but also to

the observing of it he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole

crime to the delinquent. For example, the law condemneth duels; the punishment is made capital: on the

contrary part, he that refuseth duel is subject to contempt and scorn, without remedy; and sometimes by the

sovereign himself thought unworthy to have any charge or preferment in war: if thereupon he accept duel,

considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the sovereign power, he

ought not in reason to be rigorously punished, seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher:

which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience, but a care in

governors not to countenance anything obliquely which directly they forbid. The examples of princes, to

those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions than the laws themselves.

And though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed

till it please God to give men an extraordinary and supernatural grace to follow that precept.

Again, if we compare crimes by the mischief of their effects; first, the same fact when it redounds to the

damage of many is greater than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore when a fact hurteth, not

only in the present, but also by example in the future, it is a greater crime than if it hurt only in the present:

for the former is a fertile crime, and multiplies to the hurt of many; the latter is barren. To maintain doctrines

contrary to the religion established in the Commonwealth is a greater fault in an authorised preacher than in a

private person: so also is it to live profanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in

a professor of the law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the sovereign

power is a greater crime than in another man: also in a man that hath such reputation for wisdom as that his

counsels are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law is a greater crime than the

same fact in another: for such men not only commit crime, but teach it for law to all other men. And generally

all crimes are the greater by the scandal they give; that is to say, by becoming stumblingblocks to the weak,

that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them.

Also facts of hostility against the present state of the Commonwealth are greater crimes than the same acts

done to private men: for the damage extends itself to all: such are the betraying of the strengths or revealing

of the secrets of the Commonwealth to an enemy; also all attempts upon the representative of the

Commonwealth, be it a monarch or an assembly; and all endeavours by word or deed to diminish the

authority of the same, either in the present time or in succession: which crimes the Latins understand by

crimina laesae majestatis, and consist in design, or act, contrary to a fundamental law.

Likewise those crimes which render judgements of no effect are greater crimes than injuries done to one or a

few persons; as to receive money to give false judgement or testimony is a greater crime than otherwise to

deceive a man of the like or a greater sum; because not only he has wrong, that falls by such judgements, but

all judgements are rendered useless, and occasion ministered to force and private revenges.

Also robbery and depeculation of the public treasury or revenues is a greater crime than the robbing or

defrauding of a private man, because to rob the public is to rob many at once; also the counterfeit usurpation

of public ministry, the counterfeiting of public seals, or public coin, than counterfeiting of a private man's

Of facts against the law done to private men, the greater crime is that where the damage, in the common

To kill against the law is a greater crime than any other injury, life preserved.

And the spoiling a man of his goods by terror of death or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and some less, sensible of the same

offence. But the law regardeth not the particular, but the general inclination of mankind.

And therefore the offence men take from contumely, in words or gesture, when they produce no other harm

than the present grief of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the laws of the Greeks, Romans, and

other both ancient and modern Commonwealths; supposing the true cause of such grief to consist, not in the

contumely (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own virtue), but in the pusillanimity of him that

Also a crime against a private man is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. For to kill one's parent

is a greater crime than to kill another: for the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign (though he have

surrendered his power to the civil law), because he had it originally by nature. And to rob a poor man is a

greater crime than to rob a rich man, because it is to the poor a more sensible damage.

And a crime committed in the time or place appointed for devotion is greater than if committed at another

Many other cases of aggravation and extenuation might be added; but by these I have set down, it is obvious

Lastly, because in almost all crimes there is an injury done, not only to some private men, but also to the

Commonwealth, the same crime, when the accusation is in the name of the Commonwealth, is called public

crime; and when in the name of a private man, a private crime; and the pleas according thereupon called

public, judicia publica, pleas of the crown; or private pleas. As in an accusation of murder, if the accuser be a

private man, the plea is a private plea; if the accuser be the sovereign, the plea is a public plea.

A punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath done or omitted that which is judged by

the same authority to be a transgression of the law, to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be

Before I infer anything from this definition, there is a question to be answered of much importance; which is,

by what door the right or authority of punishing, in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before,

no man is supposed bound by covenant not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended that he

gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Commonwealth every man

giveth away the right of defending another, but not of defending himself. Also he obligeth himself to assist

him that hath the sovereignty in the punishing of another, but of himself not. But to covenant to assist the

sovereign in doing hurt to another, unless he that so covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to give

him a right to punish. It is manifest therefore that the right which the Commonwealth (that is, he or they that

represent it) hath to punish is not grounded on any concession or gift of the subjects. But I have also shown

formerly that before the institution of Commonwealth, every man had a right to everything, and to do

whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order

thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in every Commonwealth.

For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right; but only, in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use

his own as he should think fit for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to

him only; and, excepting the limits set him by natural law, as entire as in the condition of mere nature, and of

From the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private revenges nor injuries of private men can

Secondly, that to be neglected and unpreferred by the public favour is not a punishment, because no new evil

is thereby on any man inflicted; he is only left in the estate he was in before.

Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent public condemnation, is not to be styled

by the name of punishment, but of a hostile act, because the fact for which a man is punished ought first to be

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and judges without authority from the sovereign, is not

punishment, but an act of hostility, because the acts of power usurped have not for author the person

Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention or possibility of disposing the delinquent or, by his

example, other men to obey the laws is not punishment, but an act of hostility, because without such an end

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions there be annexed by nature diverse hurtful consequences; as when a man

in assaulting another is himself slain or wounded; or when he falleth into sickness by the doing of some

unlawful act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of nature, it may be said to be inflicted,

and therefore a punishment divine; yet it is not contained in the name of punishment in respect of men,

Seventhly, if the harm inflicted be less than the benefit of contentment that naturally followeth the crime

committed, that harm is not within the definition and is rather the price or redemption than the punishment of

a crime: because it is of the nature of punishment to have for end the disposing of men to obey the law; which

end (if it be less than the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Eighthly, if a punishment be determined and prescribed in the law itself, and after the crime committed there

be a greater punishment inflicted, the excess is not punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aim of

punishment is not a revenge, but terror; and the terror of a great punishment unknown is taken away by the

declaration of a less, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But where there is no punishment

at all determined by the law, there whatsoever is inflicted hath the nature of punishment. For he that goes

about the violation of a law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an

Ninthly, harm inflicted for a fact done before there was a law that forbade it is not punishment, but an act of

hostility: for before the law, there is no transgression of the law: but punishment supposeth a fact judged to

have been a transgression of the law; therefore harm inflicted before the law made is not punishment, but an

Tenthly, hurt inflicted on the representative of the Commonwealth is not punishment, but an act of hostility:

because it is of the nature of punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority only of the

Lastly, harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy falls not under the name of punishment: because

seeing they were either never subject to the law, and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been subject to

it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgress it, all the harms that can be

done them must be taken as acts of hostility. But in declared hostility all infliction of evil is lawful. From

whence it followeth that if a subject shall by fact or word wittingly and deliberately deny the authority of the

representative of the Commonwealth (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for treason), he may

lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the representative will: for in denying subjection, he denies such

punishment as by the law hath been ordained, and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Commonwealth; that

is, according to the will of the representative. For the punishments set down in the law are to subjects, not to

enemies; such as are they that, having been by their own act subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the

The first and most general distribution of punishments is into divine and human. Of the former I shall have

Human are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandment of man; and are either corporal, or

Corporal punishment is that which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that

inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body as were before

And of these, some be capital, some less than capital. Capital is the infliction of death; and that either simply

or with torment. Less than capital are stripes, wounds, chains, and any other corporal pain not in its own

nature mortal. For if upon the infliction of a punishment death follow, not in the intention of the inflicter, the

punishment is not to be esteemed capital, though the harm prove mortal by an accident not to be foreseen; in

Pecuniary punishment is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a sum of money, but also of

lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for money. And in case the law that ordaineth

such a punishment be made with design to gather money from such as shall transgress the same, it is not

properly a punishment, but the price of privilege and exemption from the law, which doth not absolutely

forbid the fact but only to those that are not able to pay the money: except where the law is natural, or part of

religion; for in that case it is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of it. As where a law exacteth

a pecuniary mulct of them that take the name of God in vain, the payment of the mulct is not the price of a

dispensation to swear, but the punishment of the transgression of a law indispensable. In like manner if the

law impose a sum of money to be paid to him that has been injured, this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done

him, and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy is the infliction of such evil as is made dishonourable; or the deprivation of such good as is made

honourable by the Commonwealth. For there be some things honourable by nature; as the effects of courage,

magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind: others made honourable by the

Commonwealth; as badges, titles, offices, or any other singular mark of the sovereigns favour. The former,

though they may fail by nature or accident, cannot be taken away by a law; and therefore the loss of them is

not punishment. But the latter may be taken away by the public authority that made them honourable, and are

properly punishments: such are, degrading men condemned, of their badges, titles, and offices; or declaring

Imprisonment is when a man is by public authority deprived of liberty, and may happen from two diverse

ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of pain on a man

condemned. The former is not punishment, because no man is supposed to be punished before he be

judicially heard and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds or

restraint before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the

law of nature. But the latter is punishment because evil, and inflicted by public authority for somewhat that

has by the same authority been judged a transgression of the law. Under this word imprisonment, I

comprehend all restraint of motion caused by an external obstacle, be it a house, which is called by the

general name of a prison; or an island, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set

to work, as in old time men have been condemned to quarries, and in these times to galleys; or be it a chain or

Exile (banishment) is when a man is for a crime condemned to depart out of the dominion of the

Commonwealth, or out of a certain part thereof, and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it;

and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a punishment, but rather an escape, or a

public commandment to avoid punishment by flight. And Cicero says there was never any such punishment

ordained in the city of Rome; but calls it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished be nevertheless

permitted to enjoy his goods, and the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no punishment; nor does

it tend to that benefit of the Commonwealth for which all punishments are ordained, that is to say, to the

forming of men's wills to the observation of the law; but many times to the damage of the Commonwealth.

For a banished man is a lawful enemy of the Commonwealth that banished him, as being no more a member

of the same. But if he be withal deprived of his lands, or goods, then the punishment lieth not in the exile, but

All punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the law of nature: for punishment is

only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is therefore a

violation, first, of that law of nature which forbiddeth all men, in their revenges, to look at anything but some

future good: for there can arrive no good to the Commonwealth by punishing the innocent. Secondly, of that

which forbiddeth ingratitude: for seeing all sovereign power is originally given by the consent of every one of

the subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient be protected thereby, the punishment of the

innocent is a rendering of evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is to say, an

But the infliction of what evil soever on an innocent man that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the

Commonwealth, and without violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men

that are not subjects are either enemies, or else they have ceased from being so by some precedent covenants.

But against enemies, whom the Commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by the original

right of nature to make war; wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent

and innocent as to the time past, nor has other respect of mercy than as it conduceth to the good of his own

people. And upon this ground it is that also in subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the

Commonwealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not only to the fathers, but also to the third

and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact for which they are afflicted:

because the nature of this offence consisteth in the renouncing of subjection, which is a relapse into the

condition of war commonly called rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies.

Reward is either of gift or by contract. When by contract, it is called salary and wages; which is benefit due

for service performed or promised. When of gift, it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow

it, to encourage or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the sovereign of a Commonwealth

appointeth a salary to any public office, he that receiveth it is bound in justice to perform his office;

otherwise, he is bound only in honour to acknowledgement and an endeavour of requital. For though men

have no lawful remedy when they be commanded to quit their private business to serve the public, without

reward or salary, yet they are not bound thereto by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the

Commonwealth, unless the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the sovereign may make

use of all their means, insomuch as the most common soldier may demand the wages of his warfare as a debt.

The benefits which a sovereign bestoweth on a subject, for fear of some power and ability he hath to do hurt

to the Commonwealth, are not properly rewards: for they are not salaries, because there is in this case no

contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Commonwealth disservice: nor are they

graces, because they be extorted by fear, which ought not to be incident to the sovereign power: but are rather

sacrifices, which the sovereign, considered in his natural person, and not in the person of the Commonwealth,

makes for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself; and encourage not to

obedience, but, on the contrary, to the continuance and increasing of further extortion.

And whereas some salaries are certain, and proceed from the public treasury; and others uncertain and casual,

proceeding from the execution of the office for which the salary is ordained; the latter is in some cases hurtful

to the Commonwealth, as in the case of judicature. For where the benefit of the judges, and ministers of a

court of justice, ariseth for the multitude of causes that are brought to their cognizance, there must needs

follow two inconveniences: one is the nourishing of suits; for the more suits, the greater benefit: and another

that depends on that, which is contention which is about jurisdiction; each court drawing to itself as many

causes as it can. But in offices of execution there are not those inconveniences, because their employment

cannot be increased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of punishment

and reward; which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons that move the limbs and joints of a Commonwealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit

himself to government; together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to LEVIATHAN,

taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the oneandfortieth of Job; where God, having set forth

the great power of Leviathan, calleth him king of the proud. "There is nothing," saith he, "on earth to be

compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all

the children of pride." But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are; and

because there is that in heaven, though not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought

to obey; I shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases and the causes of his mortality, and of

THOUGH nothing can be immortal which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to,

their Commonwealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of

their institution, they are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself,

which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine

disorder, the fault is not in men as they are the matter, but as they are the makers and orderers of them. For

men, as they become at last weary of irregular jostling and hewing one another, and desire with all their

hearts to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice; so for want both of the art of making fit laws

to square their actions by, and also of humility and patience to suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their

present greatness to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able architect be compiled into any

other than a crazy building, such as, hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of

Amongst the infirmities therefore of a Commonwealth, I will reckon in the first place those that arise from an

imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a defectuous

Of which this is one: that a man to obtain a kingdom is sometimes content with less power than to the peace

and defence of the Commonwealth is necessarily required. From whence it cometh to pass that when the

exercise of the power laid by is for the public safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act,

which disposeth great numbers of men, when occasion is presented, to rebel; in the same manner as the

bodies of children gotten by diseased parents are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality

derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabs. And when kings deny themselves

some such necessary power, it is not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the

office they undertake, but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: wherein they

reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises shall be maintained against them by foreign

Commonwealths; who in order to the good of their own subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of

their neighbours. So was Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second by

the Pope; the subjection of ecclesiastics to the Commonwealth having been dispensed with by William the

Conqueror at his reception, when he took an oath not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so were the

barons, whose power was by William Rufus, to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder

brother to himself, increased to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power, maintained in their rebellion

Nor does this happen in monarchy only. For whereas the style of the ancient Roman Commonwealth was,

"The Senate and People of Rome"; neither senate nor people pretended to the whole power; which first

caused the seditions of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus, and others; and afterwards the

wars between the senate and the people under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar to the

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one only action, which was that no man on pain of death

should propound the renewing of the war for the island of Salamis; and yet thereby, if Solon had not caused

to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a madman, and in verse, propounded it to

the people that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness, even at the gates of their

city: such damage, or shifts, are all Commonwealths forced to that have their power never so little limited.

In the second place, I observe the diseases of a Commonwealth that proceed from the poison of seditious

doctrines, whereof one is that every private man is judge of good and evil actions. This is true in the

condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government in such cases as are

not determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest that the measure of good and evil actions is the civil

law; and the judge the legislator, who is always representative of the Commonwealth. From this false

doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves and dispute the commands of the Commonwealth, and

afterwards to obey or disobey them as in their private judgments they shall think fit; whereby the

Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin; and it

dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience and his

judgement is the same thing; and as the judgement, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore,

though he that is subject to no civil law sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other

rule to follow but his own reason, yet it is not so with him that lives in a Commonwealth, because the law is

the public conscience by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity as there

is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and

no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

It hath been also commonly taught that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by

supernatural inspiration or infusion. Which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his

faith; or why every Christian should not be also a prophet; or why any man should take the law of his country

rather than his own inspiration for the rule of his action. And thus we fall again into the fault of taking upon

us to judge of good and evil; or to make judges of it such private men as pretend to be supernaturally

inspired, to the dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents

which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God

Almighty, and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to every effect,

unobservable. Faith and sanctity are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not miracles, but brought to

pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways by which God worketh them in His elect, at

such time as He thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part

of the world proceeded chiefly from tongues and pens of unlearned divines; who, joining the words of Holy

Scripture together otherwise is agreeable to reason, do what they can to make men think that sanctity and

A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a Commonwealth is this: that he that hath the sovereign power is

subject to the civil laws. It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws be

divine and divine and cannot by any man or Commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the

sovereign himself, that is, which the Commonwealth, maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to

be to be subject to the Commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself which is not

subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth

also a judge above him, and a power to punish him; which is to make a new sovereign; and again for the same

reason a third to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the

A fifth doctrine that tendeth to the dissolution of a Commonwealth is that every private man has an absolute

propriety in his goods, such as excludeth the right of the sovereign. Every man has indeed a propriety that

excludes the right of every other subject: and he has it only from the sovereign power, without the protection

whereof every other man should have right to the same. But the right of the sovereign also be excluded, he

cannot perform the office they have put him into, which is to defend them both from foreign enemies and

from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Commonwealth.

And if the propriety of subjects exclude not the right of the sovereign representative to their goods; much

less, to their offices of judicature or execution in which they represent the sovereign himself.

There is a sixth doctrine, plainly and directly against the essence of a Commonwealth, and it is this: that the

sovereign power may be divided. For what is it to divide the power of a Commonwealth, but to dissolve it;

for powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines men are chiefly beholding to some of

those that, making profession of the laws, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not

And as false doctrine, so also oftentimes the example of different government in a neighbouring nation

disposeth men to alteration of the form already settled. So the people of the Jews were stirred up to reject

God, and to call upon the prophet Samuel for a king after the manner of the nations: so also the lesser cities of

Greece were continually disturbed with seditions of the aristocratical and democratical factions; one part of

almost every Commonwealth desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt

not but many men have been contented to see the late troubles in England out of an imitation of the Low

Countries, supposing there needed no more to grow rich than to change, as they had done, the form of their

government. For the constitution of man's nature is of itself subject to desire novelty: when therefore they are

provoked to the same by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost

impossible to be content with those that solicit them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be

grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot bloods that, having gotten the itch, tear themselves with

And as to rebellion in particular against monarchy, one of the most frequent causes of it is the reading of the

books of policy and histories of the ancient Greeks and Romans; from which young men, and all others that

are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great

exploits of war achieved by the conductors of their armies, receive withal a pleasing idea of all they have

done besides; and imagine their great prosperity not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men,

but from the virtue of their popular form of government not considering the frequent seditions and civil wars

produced by the imperfection of their policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to

kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers in their books and discourses of policy make it lawful

and laudable for any man so to do, provided before he do it he call him tyrant. For they say not regicide, that

is, killing of a king, but tyrannicide, that is, killing of a tyrant, is lawful. From the same books they that live

under a monarch conceive an the opinion that the subjects in a popular Commonwealth enjoy liberty, but that

in a monarchy they are all slaves. I say, they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion; not that

they live under a popular government: for they find no such matter. In sum, I cannot imagine how anything

can be more prejudicial to a monarchy than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without present

applying such correctives of discreet masters as are fit to take away their venom: which venom I will not

doubt to compare to the biting of a mad dog, which is a disease that physicians call hydrophobia, or fear of

water. For as he that is so bitten has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an

estate as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a dog; so when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick

by those democratical writers that continually snarl at that estate, it wanteth nothing more than a strong

monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they

As there have been doctors that hold there be three souls in a man; so there be also that think there may be

more souls, that is, more sovereigns, than one in a Commonwealth; and set up a supremacy against the

sovereignty; canons against laws; and a ghostly authority against the civil; working on men's minds with

words and distinctions that of themselves signify nothing, but bewray, by their obscurity, that there walketh

(as some think invisibly) another kingdom, as it were a kingdom of fairies, in the dark. Now seeing it is

manifest that the civil power and the power of the Commonwealth is the same thing; and that supremacy, and

the power of making canons, and granting faculties, implieth a Commonwealth; it followeth that where one is

sovereign, another supreme; where one can make laws, and another make canons; there must needs be two

Commonwealths, of one and the same subjects; which is a kingdom divided in itself, and cannot stand. For

notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of temporal and ghostly, they are still two kingdoms, and every

subject is subject to two masters. For seeing the ghostly power challengeth the right to declare what is sin, it

challengeth by consequence to declare what is law, sin being nothing but the transgression of the law; and

again, the civil power challenging to declare what is law, every subject must obey two masters, who both will

have their commands be observed as law, which is impossible. Or, if it be but one kingdom, either the civil,

which is the power of the Commonwealth, must be subordinate to the ghostly, and then there is no

sovereignty but the ghostly; or the ghostly must be subordinate to the temporal, and then there is no

supremacy but the temporal. When therefore these two powers oppose one another, the Commonwealth

cannot but be in great danger of civil war and dissolution. For the civil authority being more visible, and

standing in the clearer light of natural reason, cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable

part of the people: and the spiritual, though it stand in the darkness of School distinctions and hard words;

yet, because the fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to

trouble, and sometimes to destroy, a Commonwealth. And this is a disease which not unfitly may be

compared to the epilepsy, or falling sickness (which the Jews took to be one kind of possession by spirits), in

the body natural. For as in this disease there is an unnatural spirit or wind in the head that obstructeth the

roots of the nerves and, moving them violently, taketh the motion which naturally they should have from the

power of the soul in the brain; thereby causeth violent and irregular motions, which men call convulsions, in

the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into

the fire, as a man deprived of his senses: so also in the body politic, when the spiritual power moveth the

members of a Commonwealth by the terror of punishments and hope of rewards, which are the nerves of it,

otherwise than by the civil power, which is the soul of the Commonwealth, they ought to be moved; and by

strange and hard words suffocates their understanding; it must needs thereby distract the people, and either

overwhelm the Commonwealth with oppression, or cast it into the fire of a civil war.

Sometimes also in the merely civil government there be more than one soul: as when the power of levying

money, which is the nutritive faculty, has depended on a general assembly; the power of conduct and

command, which is the motive faculty, on one man; and the power of making laws, which is the rational

faculty, on the accidental consent, not only of those two, but also of a third: this endangereth the

Commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to good laws, but most often for want of such nourishment as

is necessary to life and motion. For although few perceive that such government is not government, but

division of the Commonwealth into three factions, and call it mixed monarchy; yet the truth is that it is not

one independent Commonwealth, but three independent factions; nor one representative person, but three. In

the kingdom of God there may be three persons independent, without breach of unity in God that reigneth;

but where men reign, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the king bear

the person of the people, and the general assembly bear also the person of the people, and another assembly

bear the person of a part of the people, they are not one person, nor one sovereign; but three persons, and

To what disease in the natural body of man I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Commonwealth, I

know not. But I have seen a man that had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and

stomach of his own: if he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have

Hitherto I have named such diseases of a Commonwealth as are of the greatest and most present danger.

There be other, not so great, which nevertheless are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising

money for the necessary uses of the Commonwealth, especially in the approach of war. This difficulty ariseth

from the opinion that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods exclusive of the sovereign's

right to the use of the same. From whence it cometh to pass that the sovereign power, which foreseeth the

necessities and dangers of the Commonwealth, finding the passage of money to the public treasury obstructed

by the tenacity of the people, whereas it ought to extend itself, to encounter and prevent such dangers in their

beginnings, contracteth itself as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by

stratagems of law to obtain little sums, which, not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for

present supply or perish; and, being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due

temper, or else the Commonwealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an

ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed, the veins which by their

natural course empty themselves into the heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplied from the arteries,

whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction and trembling of the limbs; and afterwards a hot and

strong endeavour of the heart to force a passage for the blood; and before it can do that, contenteth itself with

the small refreshments of such things as cool for a time, till, if nature be strong enough, it break at last the

contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venom into sweat; or, if nature be too weak, the patient

Again, there is sometimes in a Commonwealth a disease which resembleth the pleurisy; and that is when the

treasury of the Commonwealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance in

one or a few private men, by monopolies or by farms of the public revenues; in the same manner as the blood

in a pleurisy, getting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth there an inflammation, accompanied with a

Also, the popularity of a potent subject, unless the Commonwealth have very good caution of his fidelity, is a

dangerous disease; because the people, which should receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign,

by the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the laws to

follow a man of whose virtues and designs they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in

a popular government than in a monarchy, because an army is of so great force and multitude as it may easily

be made believe they are the people. By this means it was that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the people

against the senate, having won to himself the affections of his army, made himself master both of senate and

people. And this proceeding of popular and ambitious men is plain rebellion, and may be resembled to the

Another infirmity of a Commonwealth is the immoderate greatness of a town, when it is able to furnish out of

its own circuit the number and expense of a great army; as also the great number of corporations, which are

as it were many lesser Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man.

To may be added, liberty of disputing against absolute power by pretenders to political prudence; which

though bred for the most part in the lees of the people, yet animated by false doctrines are perpetually

meddling with the fundamental laws, to the molestation of the Commonwealth, like the little worms which

We may further add the insatiable appetite, or bulimia, of enlarging dominion, with the incurable wounds

thereby many times received from the enemy; and the wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a

burden, and with less danger lost than kept; as also the lethargy of ease, and consumption of riot and vain

Lastly, when in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies get a final victory, so as, the forces of the

Commonwealth keeping the field no longer, there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty, then is

the Commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own

discretion shall suggest unto him. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the

Commonwealth, which expiring, the members are governed by it no more than the carcass of a man by his

departed, though immortal, soul. For though the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished by the

act of another, yet the obligation of the members may. For he that wants protection may seek it anywhere;

and, when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himself out of fear) to

protect his protection as long as he is able. But when the power of an assembly is once suppressed, the right

of the same perisheth utterly, because the assembly itself is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility

THE office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end for which he was trusted

with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the

law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that law, and to none but Him. But by

safety here is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by

lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himself.

And this is intended should be done, not by care applied to individuals, further than their protection from

injuries when they shall complain; but by a general providence, contained in public instruction, both of

doctrine and example; and in the making and executing of good laws to which individual persons may apply

And because, if the essential rights of sovereignty (specified before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away,

the Commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition and calamity of a war

with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life; it is the office of the sovereign to

maintain those rights entire, and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer to another or to lay from

himself any of them. For he that deserteth the means deserteth the ends; and he deserteth the means that,

being the sovereign, acknowledgeth himself subject to the civil laws, and renounceth the power of supreme

judicature; or of making war or peace by his own authority; or of judging of the necessities of the

Commonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers when and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge

necessary; or of making officers and ministers both of war and peace; or of appointing teachers, and

examining what doctrines are conformable or contrary to the defence, peace, and good of the people.

Secondly, it is against his duty to let the people be ignorant or misinformed of the grounds and reasons of

those his essential rights, because thereby men are easy to be seduced and drawn to resist him when the

And the grounds of these rights have the rather need drafter need to be diligently and truly taught, because

they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law that shall forbid

rebellion (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty) is not, as a civil law, any obligation

but by virtue only of the law of nature that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which natural obligation, if men

know not, they cannot know the right of any law the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it

but for an act of hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour, by acts of

As I have heard some say that justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by

force or art acquire to himself, not only in the condition of war, but also in a Commonwealth, is his own,

which I have already shown to be false: so there be also that maintain that there are no grounds, nor principles

of reason, to sustain those essential rights which make sovereignty absolute. For if there were, they would

have been found out in some place or other; whereas we see there has not hitherto been any Commonwealth

where those rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the savage people

of America should deny there were any grounds or principles of reason so to build a house as to last as long

as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time and industry produce every day new

knowledge. And as the art of well building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men

that had long studied the nature of materials, and the diverse effects of figure and proportion, long after

mankind began, though poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute Commonwealths,

imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by industrious

meditation, to make their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And such are those which

I have in this discourse set forth: which, whether they come not into the sight of those that have power to

make use of them, or be neglected by them or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little.

But supposing that these of mine are not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles from

authority of Scripture, as I shall make it appear when I shall come to speak of the kingdom of God,

But they say again that though the principles be right, yet common people are not of capacity enough to be

made to understand them. I should be glad that the rich and potent subjects of a kingdom, or those that are

accounted the most learned, were no less incapable than they. But all men know that the obstructions to this

kind of doctrine proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to

learn. Potent men digest hardly anything that setteth up a power to bridle their affections; and learned men,

anything that discovereth their errors, and thereby their authority: whereas the common people's minds,

unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are

like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole nations

be brought to acquiesce in the great mysteries of Christian religion, which are above reason; and millions of

men be made believe that the same body may be in innumerable places at one and the same time, which is

against reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching and preaching, protected by the law, to make that

received which is so consonant to reason that any unprejudicated man needs no more to learn it than to hear

it? I conclude therefore that in the instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and

fundamental laws of sovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a sovereign has his power entire, but what

proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the

Commonwealth; and consequently, it is his duty to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his duty, but

his benefit also, and security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from

And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any

form of government they see in their neighbour nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever present

prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire change. For the prosperity

of a people ruled by an aristocratical or democratical assembly cometh not from aristocracy, nor from

democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in a monarchy

because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state the

obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not only not flourish, but in short time

be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the Commonwealth shall

find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in the fable, which desiring to renew the

youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him, together with

strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change is like the breach of the first of God's

Commandments: for there God says, Non habebis Deos alienos: "Thou shalt not have the Gods of other

Secondly, they are to be taught that they ought not to be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their

fellow subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Commonwealth; nor

of any assembly, except the sovereign assembly, so as to defer to them any obedience or honour appropriate

to the sovereign only, whom, in their particular stations, they represent; nor to receive any influence from

them, but such as is conveyed by them from the sovereign authority. For that sovereign cannot be imagined to

love his people as he ought that is not jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of popular men to be

seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim marriage

with them in facie ecclesiae by preachers, and by publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed how great a fault it is to speak evil of the sovereign

representative, whether one man or an assembly of men; or to argue and dispute his power, or any way to use

his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people, and their obedience, in

which the safety of the Commonwealth consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the third Commandment by

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor, when it is taught, remember it, nor after one generation

past so much as know in whom the sovereign power is placed, without setting apart from their ordinary

labour some certain times in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; it is necessary

that some such times be determined wherein they may assemble together, and, after prayers and praises given

to God, the Sovereign of sovereigns, hear those their duties told them, and the positive laws, such as

generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh them laws.

To this end had the Jews every seventh day a Sabbath, in which the law was read and expounded; and in the

solemnity whereof they were put in mind that their king was God; that having created the world in six days,

He rested on the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that God was their king, which

redeemed them from their servile and painful labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoiced

in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawful recreation. So that the first table of the Commandments is

spent all in setting down the sum of God's absolute power; not only as God, but as King by pact, in peculiar,

of the Jews; and may therefore give light to those that have sovereign power conferred on them by the

And because the first instruction of children dependeth on the care of their parents, it is necessary that they

should be obedient to them whilst they are under their tuition; and not only so, but that also afterwards, as

gratitude requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of their education by external signs of honour. To which

end they are to be taught that originally the father of every man was also his sovereign lord, with power over

him of life and death; and that the fathers of families, when by instituting a Commonwealth they resigned that

absolute power, yet it was never intended they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. For

to relinquish such right was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power; nor would there be any

reason why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish and instruct them, if they were

afterwards to have no other benefit from them than from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth

Again, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, which, consisting in taking from no man what is

his, is as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours, by violence or fraud, of

anything which by the sovereign authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a

man are his own life and limbs; and in the next degree, in most men, those that concern conjugal affection;

and after them riches and means of living. Therefore the people are to be taught to abstain from violence to

one another's person by private revenges, from violation of conjugal honour, and from forcible rapine and

fraudulent surreption of one another's goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shown the evil

consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges or witnesses, whereby the distinction of

propriety is taken away, and justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh,

Lastly, they are to be taught that not only the unjust facts, but the designs and intentions to do them, though

by accident hindered, are injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of

the act. And this is the intention of the tenth Commandment, and the sum of the second table; which is

reduced all to this one commandment of mutual charity, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self"; as the

sum of the first table is reduced to "the love of God"; whom they had then newly received as their king.

As for the means and conduits by which the people may receive this instruction, we are to search by what

means so many opinions contrary to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles, have nevertheless

been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those which I have in the precedent the precedent chapter specified: as

that men shall judge of what is lawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their own consciences; that

is to say, by their own private judgements: that subjects sin in obeying the commands of the Commonwealth,

unless they themselves have first judged them to be lawful: that their propriety in their riches is such as to

exclude the dominion which the Commonwealth hath the same: that it is lawful for subjects to kill such as

they call tyrants: that the sovereign power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the

people by this means. They whom necessity or covetousness keepeth attent on their trades and labour; and

they, on the other side, whom superfluity or sloth carrieth after their sensual pleasures (which two sorts of

men take up the greatest part of mankind), being diverted from the deep meditation which the of truth, not

only in the matter of natural justice, but also of all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive the notions of

their duty chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of their neighbours or familiar acquaintance

as having the faculty of discoursing readily and plausibly seem wiser and better learned in cases of law and

conscience than themselves. And the divines, and such others as make show of learning, derive their

knowledge from the universities, and from the schools of law, or from the books which by men eminent in

those schools and universities have been published. It is therefore manifest that the instruction of the people

dependeth wholly on the right teaching of youth in the universities. But are not, may some man say, the

universities of England learned enough already to do that? Or is it, you will undertake to teach the

universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer: that till towards the latter end of Henry

the Eighth, the power of the Pope was always upheld against the power of the Commonwealth, principally by

the universities; and that the doctrines by so many preachers against the sovereign power of the king, and by

so many lawyers and others that had their education there, is a sufficient argument that, though the

universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a

contradiction of opinions, it is most certain that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and it is no

wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtle liquor wherewith they were first seasoned against the civil

authority. But to the latter question, it is not fit nor needful for me to say either aye or no: for any man that

The safety of the people requireth further, from him or them that have the sovereign power, that justice be

equally administered to all degrees of people; that is, that as well the rich and mighty, as poor and obscure

persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity,

when they do violence, dishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these does the like to

one of them: for in this consisteth equity; to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as

much subject as any of the meanest of his people. All breaches of the law are offences against the

Commonwealth: but there be some that are also against private persons. Those that concern the

Commonwealth only may without breach of equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done

against himself, according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man cannot in equity be

pardoned without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The inequality of subjects proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has no more place in

the presence of the sovereign; that is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and their

subjects in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of great persons is to be valued for their

beneficence, and the aids they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and

injuries they do are not extenuated, but aggravated, by the greatness of their persons, because they have least

need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great proceed in this manner. Impunity

maketh insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious

To equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the

equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man oweth to the Commonwealth for his defence.

It is not enough for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, if need be, for the

securing of his labour. They must either do as the Jews did after their return from captivity, in reedifying the

Temple, build with one hand and hold the sword in the other, or else they must hire others to fight for them.

For the impositions that are laid on the people by the sovereign power are nothing else but the wages due to

them that hold the public sword to defend private men in the exercise of several trades and callings. Seeing

then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and

rich, the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life is the same which a rich man oweth for the

defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own

persons, but for many more. Which considered, the equality of imposition consisteth rather in the equality of

that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there that

he which laboureth much and, sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little should be more charged than

he that, living idly, getteth little and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the

Commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are laid upon those things which men consume,

every man payeth equally for what he useth; nor is the Commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of

And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour, they

ought not to be left to the charity of private persons, but to be provided for, as far forth as the necessities of

nature require, by the laws of the Commonwealth. For as it is uncharitableness in any man to neglect the

impotent; so it is in the sovereign of a Commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain

But for such as have strong bodies the case is otherwise; they are to be forced to work; and to avoid the

excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such laws as may encourage all manner of arts; as

navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manufacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor

and yet strong people still increasing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently inhabited;

where nevertheless they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer

together, and not range a great deal of ground to snatch what they find, but to court each little plot with art

and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. And when all the world is overcharged with

inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is war, which provideth for every man, by victory or death.

To the care of the sovereign belongeth the making of good laws. But what is a good law? By a good law, I

mean not a just law: for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by

such power is warranted and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no

man can say is unjust. It is in the laws of a Commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the

gamesters all agree on is injustice to none of them. A good law is that which is needful, for the good of the

For the use of laws (which are but rules authorized) is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions, but to

direct and keep them in such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or

indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a law that is

not needful, having not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to be good when it is for

the benefit of the sovereign, though it be not necessary for the people, but it is not so. For the good of the

sovereign and people cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign that has weak subjects; and a weak people

whose sovereign wanteth power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws, but traps for

money which, where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not

The perspicuity consisteth not so much in the words of the law itself, as in a declaration of the causes and

motives for which it was made. That is it that shows us the meaning of the legislator; and the meaning of the

legislator known, the law is more easily understood by few than many words. For all words are subject to

ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the law is multiplication of ambiguity:

besides it seems to imply, by too much diligence, that whosoever can evade the words is without the compass

of the law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary processes. For when I consider how short were the laws

of ancient times, and how they grew by degrees still longer, methinks I see a contention between the penners

and pleaders of the law; the former seeking to circumscribe the latter, and the latter to evade their

circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got the victory. It belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator

(such as is in all Commonwealths the supreme representative, be it one man or an assembly) to make the

reason perspicuous why the law was made, and the body of the law itself as short, but in as proper and

It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign to make a right application of punishments and rewards. And

seeing the end of punishing is not revenge and discharge of choler, but correction either of the offender or of

others by his example, the severest punishments are to be inflicted for those crimes that are of most danger to

the public; such as are those which proceed from malice to the government established; those that spring from

contempt of justice; those that provoke indignation in the multitude; and those which, unpunished, seem

authorized, as when they are committed by sons, servants, or favourites of men in authority: for indignation

carrieth men, not only against the actors and authors of injustice, but against all power that is likely to protect

them; as in the case of Tarquin, when for the insolent act of one of his sons he was driven out of Rome, and

the monarchy itself dissolved. But crimes of infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great

provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the fact be a great crime or not, there is

place many times for lenity, without prejudice to the Commonwealth; and lenity, when there is such place for

it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of the leaders and teachers in a commotion; not the poor

seduced people, when they are punished, can profit the Commonwealth by their example. To be severe to

people is to punish ignorance which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was they

In like manner it belongeth to the office and duty of the sovereign to apply his rewards always so as there

may arise from them benefit to the Commonwealth: wherein consisteth their use and end; and is then done

when they that have well served the Commonwealth are, with as little expense of the common treasury as is

possible, so well recompensed as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as

they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with money or

preferment, from a popular ambitious subject to be quiet and desist from making ill impressions in the minds

of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past);

nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the damage of the public. It is a

contention with ambition, that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, which, having many heads, for every one

that was vanquished there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornness of one popular man is

overcome with reward, there arise many more by the example, that do the same mischief in hope of like

benefit: and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice increaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a

civil war may be deferred by such ways as that, yet the danger grows still the greater, and the public ruin

more assured. It is therefore against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to

reward those that aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, and not rather to oppose the

beginnings of such men with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Another business of the sovereign is to choose good counsellors; I mean such whose advice he is to take in

the government of the Commonwealth. For this word counsel (consilium, corrupted from considium) is of a

large signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit together, not only to deliberate what is

to be done hereafter, but also to judge of facts past, and of law for the present. I take it here in the first sense

only: and in this sense, there is no choice of counsel, neither in a democracy nor aristocracy; because the

persons counselling are members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors therefore is proper to

monarchy, in which the sovereign that endeavoureth not to make choice of those that in every kind are the

most able, dischargeth not his office as he ought to do. The most able counsellors are they that have least

hope of benefit by giving evil counsel, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace and

defence of the Commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from public troubles; but

the signs that guide to a just suspicion is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable or irremediable

grievances by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expenses, and may easily be

observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know who has most knowledge of the public affairs

is yet harder; and they that know them need them a great deal the less. For to know who knows the rules

almost of any art is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art, because no man can be assured of the

truth of another's rules but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any

art are much conversing in it and constant good effects of it. Good counsel comes not by lot, nor by

inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble in matter of

state, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortress; unless we shall think there needs no method in the

study of the politics, as there does in the study of geometry, but only to be lookers on; which is not so. For the

politics is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of Europe it hath been taken for a right of

certain persons to have place in the highest council of state by inheritance, it derived from the conquests of

the ancient Germans; wherein many absolute lords, joining together to conquer other nations, would not enter

into the confederacy without such privileges as might be marks of difference, in time following, between

their posterity and the posterity of their subjects; which privileges being inconsistent with the sovereign

power, by the favour of the sovereign they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their right, they

must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour than adhereth naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the counsellors in any affair, the benefit of their counsel is greater when they give

every one his advice, and the reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly by way of orations; and

when they have premeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time to

survey the consequences of action, and are less subject to be carried away to contradiction through envy,

The best counsel, in those things that concern not other nations, but only the ease and benefit the subjects

may enjoy, by laws that look only inward, is to be taken from the general informations and complaints of the

people of each province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they

demand nothing in derogation of the essential rights of sovereignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For

without those essential rights, as I have often before said, the Commonwealth cannot at all subsist.

A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by

his army, and consequently cannot perform that office with good success. He must therefore be industrious,

valiant, affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency and of loving his

soldiers. This is popularity, and breeds in the soldiers both desire and courage to recommend themselves to

his favour; and protects the severity of the general, in punishing, when need is, the mutinous or negligent

soldiers. But this love of soldiers, if caution be not given of the commander's fidelity, is a dangerous thing to

sovereign power; especially when it is in the hands of an assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the

safety of the people, both that they be good conductors and faithful subjects, to whom the sovereign commits

But when the sovereign himself is popular; that is, reverenced and beloved of his people, there is no danger at

all from the popularity of a subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust as to side with their captain,

though they love him, against their sovereign, when they love not only his person, but also his cause. And

therefore those who by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful sovereign, before they

could settle themselves in his place, have been always put to the trouble of contriving their titles to save the

people from the shame of receiving them. To have a known right to sovereign power is so popular a quality

as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see him

able absolutely to govern his own family: nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their armies.

For the greatest and most active part of mankind has never hitherto been well contented with the present.

Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that law which is commonly

called the law of nations, I need not say anything in this place, because the law of nations and the law of

nature is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same right in procuring the safety of his people, that

any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law that dictateth to men

that have no civil government what they ought to do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the

same to Commonwealths; that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies; there

being no court of natural justice, but in the conscience only, where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws,

such of them as oblige all mankind, in respect of God, as he is the Author of nature, are natural; and in

respect of the same God, as he is King of kings, are laws. But of the kingdom of God, as King of kings, and

THAT the condition of mere nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs that neither are

sovereigns nor subjects, is anarchy and the condition of war: that the precepts, by which men are guided to

avoid that condition, are the laws of nature: that a Commonwealth without sovereign power is but a word

without substance and cannot stand: that subjects owe to sovereigns simple obedience in all things wherein

their obedience is not repugnant to the laws of God, I have sufficiently proved in that which I have already

written. There wants only, for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what are those laws of God. For

without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded anything by the civil power, whether it be contrary to

the law of God or not: and so, either by too much civil obedience offends the Divine Majesty, or, through fear

of offending God, transgresses the commandments of the Commonwealth. To avoid both these rocks, it is

necessary to know what are the laws divine. And seeing the knowledge of all law dependeth on the

knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say something in that which followeth of the KINGDOM OF

"God is King, let the earth rejoice," [Psalms, 97. 1] saith the psalmist. And again, "God is King though the

nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the cherubim, though the earth be moved." [Ibid., 99. 1] Whether men

will or not, they must be subject always to the divine power. By denying the existence or providence of God,

men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke. But to call this power of God, which extendeth itself not

only to man, but also to beasts, and plants, and bodies inanimate, by the name of kingdom, is but a

metaphorical use of the word. For he only is properly said to reign that governs his subjects by his word and

by promise of rewards to those that obey it, by threatening them with punishment that obey it not. Subjects

therefore in the kingdom of God are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures irrational; because they understand

no precepts as his: nor atheists, nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind;

because they acknowledge no word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatenings. They

therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and propounded

rewards and punishments to mankind, are God's subjects; all the rest are to be understood as enemies.

To rule by words requires that such words be manifestly made known; for else they are no laws: for to the

nature of laws belongeth a sufficient and clear promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of ignorance;

which in the laws of men is but of one only kind, and that is, proclamation or promulgation by the voice of

man. But God declareth his laws three ways; by the dictates of natural reason, by revelation, and by the voice

of some man to whom, by the operation of miracles, he procureth credit with the rest. From hence there

ariseth a triple word of God, rational, sensible, and prophetic; to which correspondeth a triple hearing: right

reason, sense supernatural, and faith. As for sense supernatural, which consisteth in revelation or inspiration,

there have not been any universal laws so given, because God speaketh not in that manner but to particular

From the difference between the other two kinds of God's word, rational and prophetic, there may be

attributed to God a twofold kingdom, natural and prophetic: natural, wherein He governeth as many of

mankind as acknowledge His providence, by the natural dictates of right reason; and prophetic, wherein

having chosen out one peculiar nation, the Jews, for His subjects, He governed them, and none but them, not

only by natural reason, but by positive laws, which He gave them by the mouths of His holy prophets. Of the

The right of nature whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived,

not from His creating them, as if He required obedience as of gratitude for His benefits, but from His

irresistible power. I have formerly shown how the sovereign right ariseth from pact: to show how the same

right may arise from nature requires no more but to show in what case it is never taken away. Seeing all men

by nature had right to all things, they had right every one to reign over all the rest. But because this right

could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that right, to set up men, with

sovereign authority, by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of

power irresistible, there had been no reason why he should not by that power have ruled and defended both

himself and them, according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose power is irresistible, the

dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power

that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God

Almighty; not as Creator and gracious, but as omnipotent. And though punishment be due for sin only,

because by that word is understood affliction for sin; yet the right of afflicting is not always derived from

This question: why evil men often prosper; and good men suffer adversity, has been much disputed by the

ancient, and is the same with this of ours: by what right God dispenseth the prosperities and adversities of this

life; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers and, which

is more, of the saints, concerning the Divine Providence. "How good," saith David, "is the God of Israel to

those that are upright in heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had wellnigh slipped; for I

was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly in such prosperity." [Psalms, 73. 13] And Job, how

earnestly does he expostulate with God for the many afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his

righteousness? This question in the case of Job is decided by God Himself, not by arguments derived from

Job's sin, but His own power. For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his affliction to his

sin, and he defended himself by the conscience of his innocence, God Himself taketh up the matter, and

having justified the affliction by arguments drawn from His power, such as this, "Where wast thou when I

laid the foundations of the earth," [Job, 38. 4] and the like, both approved Job's innocence and reproved the

erroneous doctrine of his friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour concerning the

man that was born blind, in these words, "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of

God might be made manifest in him." And though it be said, "that death entered into the world by sin," (by

which is meant that if Adam had never sinned, he had never died, that is, never suffered any separation of his

soul from his body), it follows not thence that God could not justly have afflicted him, though he had not

Having spoken of the right of God's sovereignty as grounded only on nature, we are to consider next what are

the divine laws, or dictates of natural reason; which laws concern either the natural duties of one man to

another, or the honour naturally due to our Divine Sovereign. The first are the same laws of nature, of which I

have spoken already in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters of this treatise; namely, equity, justice, mercy,

humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It remaineth therefore that we consider what precepts are dictated

to men by their natural reason only, without other word of God, touching the honour and worship of the

Honour consisteth in the inward thought and opinion of the power and goodness of another: and therefore to

honour God is to think as highly of His power and goodness as is possible. And of that opinion, the external

signs appearing in the words and actions of men are called worship; which is one part of that which the Latins

understand by the word cultus: for cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestows

on anything with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things whereof we make benefit are either

subject to us, and the profit they yield followeth the labour we bestow upon them as a natural effect; or they

are not subject to us, but answer our labour according to their own wills. In the first sense the labour

bestowed on the earth is called culture; and the education of children, a culture of their minds. In the second

sense, where men's wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by force, but by complaisance, it signifieth as

much as courting, that is, winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their power,

and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly worship: in

which sense publicola is understood for a worshipper of the people; and cultus Dei, for the worship of God.

From internal honour, consisting in the opinion of power and goodness, arise three passions; love, which hath

reference to goodness; and hope, and fear, that relate to power: and three parts of external worship; praise,

magnifying, and blessing: the subject of praise being goodness; the subject of magnifying and blessing being

power, and the effect thereof felicity. Praise and magnifying are signified both by words and actions: by

words, when we say a man is good or great; by actions, when we thank him for his bounty, and obey his

There be some signs of honour, both in attributes and actions, that be naturally so; as amongst attributes,

good, just, liberal, and the like; and amongst actions, prayers, thanks, and obedience. Others are so by

institution, or custom of men; and in some times and places are honourable; in others, dishonourable; in

others, indifferent: such as are the gestures in salutation, prayer, and thanksgiving, in different times and

And of arbitrary worship, there be two differences: for sometimes it is commanded, sometimes voluntary

worship: commanded, when it is such as he requireth who is worshipped: free, when it is such as the

worshipper thinks fit. When it is commanded, not the words or gesture, but the obedience is the worship. But

when free, the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words or actions by which

we intend honour seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are no worship, because no signs of

honour; and no signs of honour, because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is

Again there is a public an private worship. Public is the worship that a Commonwealth performeth, as one

person. Private is that which a private person exhibiteth. Public, in respect of the whole Commonwealth, is

free; but in respect of particular men it is not so. Private is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude it is

never without some restraint, either from the laws or from the opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature

The end of worship amongst men is power. For where a man seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him

powerful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his power greater. But God has no ends: the worship

we do him proceeds from our duty and is directed according to our capacity by those rules of honour that

reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in

That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of nature, I will begin with His attributes.

Where, first, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to Him existence: for no man can have the will to honour

Secondly, that those philosophers who said the world, or the soul of the world, was God spake unworthily of

Him, and denied His existence: for by God is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world is God

Thirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternal, seeing that which is eternal has no cause, is to deny

Fourthly, that they who, attributing, as they think, ease to God, take from Him the care of mankind, take from

Him his honour: for it takes away men's love and fear of Him, which is the root of honour.

Fifthly, in those things that signify greatness and power, to say He is finite is not to honour Him: for it is not

a sign of the will to honour God to attribute to Him less than we can; and finite is less than we can, because to

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an idea of Him in our mind; for whatsoever we conceive is

Nor to attribute to Him parts or totality; which are the attributes only of things finite:

Nor to say He is in this or that place; for whatsoever is in place is bounded and finite:

Nor that He is moved or resteth; for both these attributes ascribe to Him place:

Nor that there be more gods than one, because it implies them all finite; for there cannot be more than one

Nor to ascribe to Him (unless metaphorically, meaning not the passion, but the effect) passions that partake of

grief; as repentance, anger, mercy: or of want; as appetite, hope, desire; or of any passive faculty: for passion

And therefore when we ascribe to God a will, it is not to be understood, as that of man, for a rational appetite;

Likewise when we attribute to Him sight, and other acts of sense; as also knowledge and understanding;

which in us is nothing else but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press the organical parts of

man's body: for there is no such thing in God, and, being things that depend on natural causes, cannot be

He that will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason must either use such negative

attributes as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the like; or

indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator; and in such sense as if He meant not to declare what He is (for that

were to circumscribe Him within the limits of our fancy), but how much we admire Him, and how ready we

would be to obey Him; which is a sign of humility, and of a will to honour Him as much as we can: for there

is but one name to signify our conception of His nature, and that is I AM; and but one name of His relation to

Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept of reason that they be signs of the

intention to honour God; such as are, first, prayers: for not the carvers, when they made images, were thought

Secondly, thanksgiving; which differeth from prayer in divine worship no otherwise than that prayers

precede, and thanks succeed, the benefit, the end both of the one and the other being to acknowledge God for

Thirdly, gifts; that is to say, sacrifices and oblations, if they be of the best, are signs of honour, for they are

Fourthly, not to swear by any but God is naturally a sign of honour, for it is a confession that God only

knoweth the heart and that no man's wit or strength can protect a man against God's vengeance on the

Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship to speak considerately of God, for it argues a fear of Him, and fear is a

confession of His power. Hence followeth, that the name of God is not to be used rashly and to no purpose;

for that is as much as in vain: and it is to no purpose unless it be by way of oath, and by order of the

Commonwealth, to make judgements certain; or between Commonwealths, to avoid war. And that disputing

of God's nature is contrary to His honour, for it is supposed that in this natural kingdom of God, there is no

other way to know anything but by natural reason; that is, from the principles of natural science; which are so

far from teaching us anything of God's nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the

smallest creature living. And therefore, when men out of the principles of natural reason dispute of the

attributes of God, they but dishonour Him: for in the attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider

the signification of philosophical truth, but the signification of pious intention to do Him the greatest honour

we are able. From the want of which consideration have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the

nature of God that tend not to His honour, but to the honour of our own wits and learning; and are nothing

Sixthly, in prayers, thanksgiving, offerings and sacrifices, it is a dictate of natural reason that they be every

one in his kind the best and most significant of honour. As, for example, that prayers and thanksgiving be

made in words and phrases not sudden, nor light, nor plebeian, but beautiful and well composed; for else we

do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the heathens did absurdly to worship images for gods,

but their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voice and instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts

they offered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their actions in worshipping, were full of submission,

and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour

Seventhly, reason directeth not only to worship God in secret, but also, and especially, in public, and in the

sight of men: for without that, that which in honour is most acceptable, the procuring others to honour Him is

Lastly, obedience to His laws (that is, in this case to the laws of nature) is the greatest worship of all. For as

obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light by His commandments is the greatest

of all contumelies. And these are the laws of that divine worship which natural reason dictateth to private

But seeing a Commonwealth is but one person, it ought also to exhibit to God but one worship; which then it

doth when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men, publicly. And this is public worship, the property

whereof is to be uniform: for those actions that are done differently by different men cannot said to be a

public worship. And therefore, where many sorts of worship be allowed, proceeding from the different

religions of private men, it cannot be said there is any public worship, nor that the Commonwealth is of any

And because words (and consequently the attributes of God) have their signification by agreement and

constitution of men, those attributes are to be held significative of honour that men intend shall so be; and

whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but reason, may be done by the

will of the Commonwealth by laws civil. And because a Commonwealth hath no will, nor makes no laws but

those that are made by the will of him or them that have the sovereign power, it followeth that those attributes

which the sovereign ordaineth in the worship of God for signs of honour ought to be taken and used for such

But because not all actions are signs by constitution, but some are naturally signs of honour, others of

contumely, these latter, which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence,

cannot be made by human power a part of divine worship; nor the former, such as are decent, modest, humble

behaviour, ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an infinite number of actions and gestures of an

indifferent nature, such of them as the Commonwealth shall ordain to be publicly and universally in use, as

signs of honour and part of God's worship, are to be taken and used for such by the subjects. And that which

is said in the Scripture, "It is better to obey God than man," hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and

Having thus briefly spoken of the natural kingdom of God, and His natural laws, I will add only to this

chapter a short declaration of His natural punishments. There is no action of man in this life that is not the

beginning of so long a chain of consequences as no human providence is high enough to give a man a

prospect to the end. And in this chain there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such

manner as he that will do anything for his pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the pains annexed to it;

and these pains are the natural punishments of those actions which are the beginning of more harm than good.

And hereby it comes to pass that intemperance is naturally punished with diseases; rashness, with

mischances; injustice, with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with oppression; negligent

government of princes, with rebellion; and rebellion, with slaughter. For seeing punishments are consequent

to the breach of laws, natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of nature,

And thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and right of sovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects,

derived from the principles of natural reason. And now, considering how different this doctrine is from the

practice of the greatest part of the world, especially of these western parts that have received their moral

learning from Rome and Athens, and how much depth of moral philosophy is required in them that have the

administration of the sovereign power, I am at the point of believing this my labour as useless as the

Commonwealth of Plato: for he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of state, and change of

governments by civil war, ever to be taken away till sovereigns be philosophers. But when I consider again

that the science of natural justice is the only science necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers,

and that they need not be charged with the sciences mathematical, as by Plato they are, further than by good

laws to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato nor any other philosopher hitherto hath put

into order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the theorems of moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby

both how to govern and how to obey, I recover some hope that one time or other this writing of mine may fall

into the hands of a sovereign who will consider it himself (for it is short, and I think clear) without the help of

any interested or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public

I HAVE derived the rights of sovereign power, and the duty of subjects, hitherto from the principles of nature

only; such as experience has found true, or consent concerning the use of words has made so; that is to say,

from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions, of such words as are essential to all

political reasoning, universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the nature and rights of a

Christian Commonwealth, whereof there dependeth much upon supernatural revelations of the will of God,

the ground of my discourse must be not only the natural word of God, but also the prophetical.

Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses and experience, nor that which is the undoubted word of

God, our natural reason. For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming

again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but

employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God's word

above reason; that is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated or confuted; yet there is

nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskillful interpretation, or erroneous

Therefore, when anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our

understanding to the words; and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic of such mysteries as

are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion

as with wholesome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole have the virtue to cure, but chewed, are for the

But by the captivity of our understanding is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion

of any other man, but of the will to obedience where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding,

reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but always, and necessarily such, as the things we see,

hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. We then

captivate our understanding and reason when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak as, by lawful

authority, we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which, in sum, is trust and faith reposed in him

that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken.

When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately or by mediation of another man, to whom He had

formerly spoken by Himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately may be understood by

those well enough to whom He hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another is hard, if

not impossible, to know. For if a man pretend to me that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and

immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce to oblige me to

believe it. It is true that if he be my sovereign, he may oblige me to obedience, so as not by act or word to

declare I believe him not; but not to think any otherwise than my reason persuades me. But if one that hath

not such authority over me shall pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either belief or obedience.

For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture is not to say God hath spoken to him

immediately, but by mediation of the prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as He

speaks to all other Christian men. To say He hath spoken to him in a dream is no more than to say he

dreamed that God spake to him; which is not of force to win belief from any man that knows dreams are for

the most part natural, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from selfconceit, and

foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a man's own goodliness, or virtue, by which he thinks he hath merited

the favour of extraordinary revelation. To say he hath seen a vision, or heard a voice, is to say that he

dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream

for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration is

to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no

natural and sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and

inspiration, yet He obliges no man to believe He hath so done to him that pretends it; who, being a man, may

How then can he to whom God hath never revealed His will immediately (saving by the way of natural

reason) know when he is to obey or not to obey His word, delivered by him that says he is a prophet? Of four

hundred prophets, of whom the King of Israel, asked counsel concerning the war he made against Ramoth

Gilead, only Micaiah was a true one. [I Kings, 22] The prophet that was sent to prophesy against the altar set

up by Jeroboam, [Ibid., 13] though a true prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence appears to be

a prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by another old prophet that persuaded him, as from the mouth of

God, to eat and drink with him. If one prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of

God by other way than that of reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture that there be two marks

by which together, not asunder, a true prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is the

not teaching any other religion than that which is already established. Asunder, I say, neither of these is

sufficient. "If a prophet rise amongst you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle,

and the miracle come to pass; if he say, Let us follow strange gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not

hearken to him, etc. But that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to

you to revolt from the Lord your God." [Deuteronomy, 13. 15] In which words two things are to be

observed; first, that God will not have miracles alone serve for arguments to approve the prophet's calling;

but (as it is in the third verse) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to Himself. For the works

of the Egyptian sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great miracles. Secondly, that how

great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the king or him that governeth by the king's

authority, he that doth such miracle is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make trial of their

allegiance. For these words, revolt from the Lord your God, are in this place equivalent to revolt from your

king. For they had made God their king by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only;

for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared God's commandments to the people. In like

manner, after our Saviour Christ had made his Disciples acknowledge him for the Messiah (that is to say, for

God's anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected for their king, but refused when he came), he

omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. "There shall arise," saith he, "false Christs, and false

prophets, and shall do great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very

elect." [Matthew, 24. 24] By which it appears that false prophets may have the power of miracles; yet are we

not to take their doctrine for God's word. St. Paul says further to the Galatians that "if himself or an angel

from heaven preach another Gospel to them than he had preached, let him be accursed." [Galatians, 1. 8] That

Gospel was that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the king received, in consequence

to these words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech is addressed to those who by his preaching had already

And as miracles, without preaching that doctrine which God hath established; so preaching the true doctrine,

without the doing of miracles, is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a man that teacheth

not false doctrine should pretend to be a prophet without showing any miracle, he is never the more to be

regarded for his pretence, as is evident by Deuteronomy, 18. 21, 22: "If thou say in thy heart, How shall we

know that the word" (of the prophet) "is not that which the Lord hath spoken? When the prophet shall have

spoken in the name of the Lord, that which shall not come to pass, that is the word which the Lord hath not

spoken, but the prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart, fear him not." But a man may here

again ask: When the prophet hath foretold a thing, how shall we know whether it will come to pass or not?

For he may foretell it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time, longer than the time of man's life; or

indefinitely, that it will come to pass one time or other: in which case this mark of a prophet is unuseful; and

therefore the miracles that oblige us to believe a prophet ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not

long deferred event. So that it is manifest that the teaching of the religion which God hath established, and the

showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true

prophet, that is to say, immediate revelation, to be acknowledged; of them being singly sufficient to oblige

Seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations

or inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, farther than it is conformable to

the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour supply the place and sufficiently recompense the

want of all other prophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and careful ratiocination, all

rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm, or

supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it out of which I am to take the

principles of my discourse concerning the rights of those that are the supreme governors on earth of Christian

Commonwealths, and of the duty of Christian subjects towards their sovereigns. And to that end, I shall

speak, in the next chapter, of the books, writers, scope and authority of the Bible.

BY THE Books of Holy Scripture are understood those which ought to be the canon, that is to say, the rules

of Christian life. And because all rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are laws, the

question of the Scripture is the question of what is law throughout all Christendom, both natural and civil. For

though it be not determined in Scripture what laws every Christian king shall constitute in his own

dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved that

sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators; those books only are canonical, that is, law, in

every nation, which are established for such by the sovereign authority. It is true that God is the Sovereign of

all sovereigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly

potentate command to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of when, and what God

hath said; which, to subjects that have no supernatural revelation, cannot be known but by that natural reason

which guided them for the obtaining of peace and justice to obey the authority of their several

Commonwealths; that is to say, of their lawful sovereigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge

no other books of the Old Testament to be Holy Scripture but those which have been commanded to be

acknowledged for such by the authority of the Church of England. What books these are is sufficiently

known without a catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by St. Jerome, who

holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and the second of

Maccabees (though he had seen the first in Hebrew), and the third and fourth of Esdras, for Apocrypha. Of

the canonical, Josephus, a learned Jew, that wrote in the time of the Emperor Domitian, reckoneth

twentytwo, making the number agree with the Hebrew alphabet. St. Jerome does the same, though they

reckon them in different manner. For Josephus numbers five books of Moses, thirteen of prophets that writ

the history of their own times (which how it agrees with the prophets writings contained in the Bible we shall

see hereafter), and four of Hymns and moral precepts. But St. Jerome reckons five Books of Moses, eight of

prophets, and nine of other Holy Writ which he calls of Hagiographa. The Septuagint, who were seventy

learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to translate the Jewish law out of the Hebrew

into the Greek, have left us no other for Holy Scripture in the Greek tongue but the same that are received in

As for the books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for canon by all Christian churches,

Who were the original writers of the several books of Holy Scripture has not been made evident by any

sufficient testimony of other history, which is the only proof of matter of fact; nor can be by any arguments of

natural reason: for reason serves only to convince the truth, not of fact, but of consequence. The light

therefore that must guide us in this question must be that which is held out unto us from the books

themselves: and this light, though it show us not the writer of every book, yet it is not unuseful to give us

And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were written by Moses, because they are

called the five Books of Moses; no more than these titles, the Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, the Book

of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove that they were written by Joshua, by

the Judges, by Ruth, and by the Kings. For in titles of books, the subject is marked as often as the writer. The

History of Livy denotes the writer; but the History of Scanderberg is denominated from the subject. We read

in the last chapter of Deuteronomy concerning the sepulchre of Moses, "that no man knoweth of his sepulchre

to this day," [Deuteronomy, 34. 6] that is, to the day wherein those words were written. It is therefore

manifest that those words were written after his interment. For it were a strange interpretation to say Moses

spake of his own sepulchre (though by prophecy), that it was not found to that day wherein he was yet living.

But it may perhaps be alleged that the last chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other

man, but the rest not. Let us therefore consider that which we find in the Book of Genesis, "And Abraham

passed through the land to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanite was then in the

land"; [Genesis, 12. 6] which must needs be the words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the

land; and consequently, not of Moses, who died before he came into it. Likewise Numbers, 21. 14, the writer

citeth another more ancient book, entitled, The Book of the Wars of the Lord, wherein were registered the

acts of Moses, at the Red Sea, and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident that the five

Books of Moses were written after his time, though how long after it be not so manifest.

But though Moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form we have them; yet he wrote all that

which he is there said to have written: as for example, the volume of the law, which is contained, as it

seemeth, in the 11th of Deuteronomy, and the following chapters to the 27th, which was also commanded to

be written on stones, in their entry into the land of Canaan. And this did Moses himself write, and deliver to

the priests and elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the feast of

tabernacles. [Deuteronomy, 21. 9, 10] And this is that law which God commanded that their kings (when they

should have established that form of government) should take a copy of from the priests and Levites; and

which Moses commanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the Ark; [Ibid., 31. 26] and the same

which, having been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, [II KIngs, 22. 8] and sent to King Josias,

who, causing it to be read to the people, renewed the covenant between God and them. [Ibid., 23. 13]

That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua may be gathered out of many places of

the book itself. Joshua had set up twelve stones in the midst of Jordan, for a monument of their passage; of

which the writer saith thus, "They are there unto this day";[Joshua, 4. 9] for unto this day is a phrase that

signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord that He had

rolled off from the people the reproach of Egypt, the writer saith, "The place is called Gilgal unto this

day";[Ibid., 5. 9] which to have said in the time of Joshua had been improper. So also the name of the valley

of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the camp, the writer saith, "remaineth unto this day"; [Ibid., 7.

26] which must needs be therefore long after the time of Joshua. Arguments of this kind there be many other;

The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Judges, 1. 21, 26, 4. 24, 10. 4, 15. 19, 18. 6, and Ruth,

1. 1, but especially Judges, 18. 30. where it said that Jonathan "and his sons were priests to the tribe of Dan,

That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are the like arguments, I Samuel, 5. 5, 7.

13, 15, 27. 6, and 30. 25, where, after David had adjudged equal part of the spoils to them that guarded the

ammunition, with them that fought, the writer saith, "He made it a statute and an ordinance to Israel to this

day." Again, when David (displeased that the Lord had slain Uzzah for putting out his hand to sustain the

Ark) called the place Perezuzzah, the writer saith it is called so "to this day":[II Samuel, 6. 8] the time

therefore of the writing of that book must be long after the time of the fact; that is, long after the time of

As for the two Books of the Kings, and the two Books of the Chronicles, besides the places which mention

such monuments, as the writer saith remained till his own days; such as are I Kings, 9. 13, 9. 21, 10. 12, 12.

19; II Kings, 2. 22, 10. 27, 14. 7, 16. 6, 17. 23, 17. 34, 17. 41, and I Chronicles, 4. 41, 5. 26. It is argument

sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon that the history of them is continued till that time.

For the facts registered are always more ancient than the register; and much more ancient than such books as

make mention of and quote the register; as these books do in diverse places, referring the reader to the

chronicles of the Kings of Judah, to the chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the books of the prophet Samuel,

of the prophet Nathan, of the prophet Ahijah; to the vision of Jehdo, to the books of the prophet Serveiah, and

The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity; because their

return, the reedification of the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the covenant, and ordination

The history of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity; and therefore the writer must have been of the

The Book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written: and though it appear sufficiently that

he was no feigned person; [Ezekiel, 14. 14 and James, 5. 11] yet the book itself seemeth not to be a history,

but a treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed: why wicked men have often prospered in

this world, and good men have been afflicted; and it is the more probable, because from the beginning to the

third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is (as St. Jerome testifies)

in prose; and from thence to the sixth verse of the last chapter in hexameter verses; and the rest of that chapter

again in prose. So that the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added, as a preface in the beginning and an

epilogue in the end. But verse is no usual style of such as either are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of

such as come to comfort them, as his friends; but in philosophy, especially moral philosophy, in ancient time

The Psalms were written the most part by David, for the use of the choir. To these are added some songs of

Moses and other holy men; and some of them after the return from the Captivity, as the 137th and the 126th,

whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return of the

The Proverbs, being a collection of wise and godly sayings, partly of Solomon, partly of Agur the son of

Jakeh, and partly of the mother of King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by

Solomon, rather than by Agur, or the mother of Lemuel; and that, though the sentences be theirs, yet the

collection or compiling them into this one book was the work of some other godly man that lived after them

The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not Solomon's, except it be the titles or

inscriptions. For The Words of the Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem, and The Song of Songs,

which is Solomon's, seem to have been made for distinction's sake, then, when the books of Scripture were

gathered into one body of the law; to the end that not the doctrine only, but the authors also might be extant.

Of the Prophets, the most ancient are Zephaniah, Jonas, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micaiah, who lived in the

time of Amaziah and Azariah, otherwise Ozias, Kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonah is not properly a

destroyed"; but a history or narration of his frowardness and disputing God's commandments; so that there is

small probability he should be the author, seeing he is the subject of it. But the Book of Amos is his

When Joel and Malachi prophesied is not evident by their writings. But considering the inscriptions or titles

of their books, it is manifest enough that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament was set forth, in the form

we have it, after the return of the Jews from their Captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolemaeus

Philadelphus, that caused it to be translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of Judea for

that purpose. And if the books of Apocrypha (which are recommended to us by the Church, though not for

canonical, yet for profitable books for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the Scripture was set

forth in the form we have it in by Esdras, as may appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book,

chapter 14, verses 21, 22, etc., where, speaking to God, he saith thus, "Thy law is burnt; therefore no man

knoweth the things which thou hast done, or the works that are to begin. But if I have found grace before

thee, send down the holy spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the

beginning, which were written in thy law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the

latter days, may live." And verse 45: "And it came to pass, when the forty days were fulfilled, that the

Highest spake, saying, The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may

read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them only to such as be wise among the people."

And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the books of the Old Testament.

The writers of the New Testament lived all in less than an age after Christ's ascension, and had all of them

seen our Saviour, or been his Disciples, except St. Paul and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever was

written by them is as ancient as the time of the Apostles. But the time wherein the books of the New

Testament were received and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing is not altogether so ancient.

For, as the books of the Old Testament are derived to us from no higher time than that of Esdras, who by the

direction of God's spirit retrieved them when they were lost: those of the New Testament, of which the copies

were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private man's hand, cannot be derived from a higher time

than that wherein the governors of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us as the

writings of those Apostles and disciples under whose names they go. The first enumeration of all the books,

both of the Old and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to be collected by Clement

the First (after St. Peter), Bishop of Rome. But because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the

Council of Laodicea is the first we know that recommended the Bible to the then Christian churches for the

writings of the prophets and Apostles: and this Council was held in the 364th year after Christ. At which

time, though ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the Church as no more to esteem emperors,

though Christian, for the shepherds of the people, but for sheep; and emperors not Christian, for wolves; and

endeavoured to pass their doctrine, not for counsel and information, as preachers; but for laws, as absolute

governors; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian doctrine to

be pious; yet I am persuaded they did not therefore falsify the Scriptures, though the copies of the books of

the New Testament were in the hands only of the ecclesiastics; because if they had had an intention so to do,

they would surely have made them more favorable to their power over Christian princes and civil sovereignty

than they are. I see not therefore any reason to doubt but that the Old and New Testament, as we have them

now, are the true registers of those things which were done and said by the prophets and Apostles. And so

perhaps are some of those books which are called Apocrypha, if left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of

doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by

Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews that were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy

interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works of

Philo and Josephus, both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the writer but the authority

of the Church that maketh a book canonical. And although these books were written by diverse men, yet it is

manifest the writers were all endued with one and the same spirit, in that they conspire to one and the same

end, which is the setting forth of the rights of the kingdom of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the

book of Genesis deriveth the genealogy of God's people from the creation of the world to the going into

Egypt: the other four Books of Moses contain the election of God for their King, and the laws which he

prescribed for their government: the Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe

the acts of God's people till the time they cast off God's yoke, and called for a king, after the manner of their

neighbour nations: the rest of the history of the Old Testament derives the succession of the line of David to

the Captivity, of which line was to spring the restorer of the kingdom of God, even our blessed Saviour, God

the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of the prophets, after whom the Evangelists wrote his life

and actions, and his claim to the kingdom, whilst he lived on earth: and lastly, the Acts and Epistles of the

Apostles declare the coming of God, the Holy Ghost, and the authority He left with them and their

successors, for the direction of the Jews and for the invitation of the Gentiles. In sum, the histories and the

prophecies of the Old Testament and the gospels and epistles of the New Testament have had one and the

same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God: 1. in Moses and the priests; 2. in the man Christ; and 3.

in the Apostles and the successors to apostolical power. For these three at several times did represent the

person of God: Moses, and his successors the high priests, and kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ

Himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of Pentecost

It is a question much disputed between the diverse sects of Christian religion, from whence the Scriptures

derive their authority; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, how we know them to

be the word of God, or, why we believe them to be so; and the difficulty of resolving it ariseth chiefly from

the improperness of the words wherein the question itself is couched. For it is believed on all hands that the

first and original author of them is God; and consequently the question disputed is not that. Again, it is

manifest that none can know they are God's word (though all true Christians believe it) but those to whom

God Himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our

knowledge of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our belief; because some are moved to believe

for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendered no one general answer for them all. The question

As far as they differ not from the laws of nature, there is no doubt but they are the law of God, and carry their

authority with them, legible to all men that have the use of natural reason: but this is no other authority than

that of all other moral doctrine consonant to reason; the dictates whereof are laws, not made, but eternal.

If they be made law by God Himself, they are of the nature of written law, which are laws to them only to

whom God hath so sufficiently published them as no man can excuse himself by saying he knew not they

He therefore to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed that they are His, nor that those that published

them were sent by Him, is not obliged to obey them by any authority but his whose commands have already

the force of laws; that is to say, by any other authority than that of the Commonwealth, residing in the

sovereign, who only has the legislative power. Again, if it be not the legislative authority of the

Commonwealth that giveth them the force of laws, it must be some other authority derived from God, either

private or public: if private, it obliges only him to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveal it. For

if every man should be obliged to take for God's law what particular men, on pretence of private inspiration

or revelation, should obtrude upon him (in such a number of men that out of pride and ignorance take their

own dreams, and extravagant fancies, and madness for testimonies of God's spirit; or, out of ambition,

pretend to such divine testimonies, falsely and contrary to their own consciences), it were impossible that any

divine law should be acknowledged. If public, it is the authority of the Commonwealth or of the Church. But

the Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a Commonwealth of Christians; called a

Commonwealth because it consisteth of men united in one person, their sovereign; and a Church, because it

consisteth in Christian men, united in one Christian sovereign. But if the Church be not one person, then it

hath no authority at all; it can neither command nor do any action at all; nor is capable of having any power

or right to anything; nor has any will, reason, nor voice; for all these qualities are personal. Now if the whole

number of Christians be not contained in one Commonwealth, they are not one person; nor is there a

universal Church that hath any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made laws by the

universal Church: or if it be one Commonwealth, then all Christian monarches and states are private persons,

and subject to be judged, deposed, and punished by a universal sovereign of all Christendom. So that the

question of the authority of the Scriptures is reduced to this: whether Christian kings, and the sovereign

assemblies in Christian Commonwealths, be absolute in their own territories, immediately under God; or

subject to one Vicar of Christ, constituted over the universal Church; to be judged condemned, deposed, and

Which question cannot be resolved without a more particular consideration of the kingdom of God; from

whence also, we are to judge of the authority of interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a lawful

power over any writing, to make it law, hath the power also to approve or disapprove the interpretation of the

SEEING the foundation of all true ratiocination is the constant signification of words; which, in the doctrine

following, dependeth not (as in natural science) on the will of the writer, nor (as in common conversation) on

vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture; it is necessary, before I proceed any further, to

determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of such words as by their ambiguity may render what I am to infer

upon them obscure or disputable. I will begin with the words body and spirit, which in the language of the

The word body, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which filleth or occupieth some certain room

or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the universe. For

the universe, being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also body; nor anything

properly a body that is not also part of that aggregate of all bodies, the universe. The same also, because

bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living creatures, is called

substance, that is to say, subject to various accidents: as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still; and

to seem to our senses sometimes hot, sometimes cold; sometimes of one colour, smell, taste, or sound,

sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming, produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies on

the organs of our sense, we attribute to alterations of the bodies that operate, and call them accidents of those

bodies. And according to this acceptation of the word, substance and body signify the same thing; and

therefore substance incorporeal are words which, when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a

But in the sense of common people, not all the universe is called body, but only such parts thereof as they can

discern, by the sense of feeling, to resist their force; or, by the sense of their eyes, to hinder them from a

farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, air and aerial substances use not to be taken for

bodies, but, as often as men are sensible of their effects, are called wind, or breath, or (because the same are

called in the Latin spiritus) spirits; as when they call that aerial substance which in the body of any living

creature gives it life and motion, vital and animal spirits. But for those idols of the brain which represent

bodies to us where they are not, as in a lookingglass, in a dream, or to a distempered brain waking, they are

(as the Apostle saith generally of all idols) nothing; nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to be; and in

the brain itself, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the objects or from the disorderly

agitation of the organs of our sense. And men that are otherwise employed than to search into their causes

know not of themselves what to call them; and may therefore easily be persuaded, by those whose knowledge

they much reverence, some to call them bodies, and think them made of air compacted by a power

supernatural, because the sight judges them corporeal; and some to call them spirits, because the sense of

touch discerneth nothing, in the place where they appear, to resist their fingers: so that the proper

signification of spirit in common speech is either a subtle, fluid, and invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol

or phantasm of the imagination. But for metaphorical significations there be many: for sometimes it is taken

for disposition or inclination of the mind, as when for the disposition to control the sayings of other men, we

say, a spirit of contradiction; for a disposition to uncleanness, an unclean spirit; for perverseness, a froward

spirit; for sullenness, a dumb spirit; and for inclination to godliness and God's service, the Spirit of God:

sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when great wisdom is

Other signification of spirit I find nowhere any; and where none of these can satisfy the sense of that word in

Scripture, the place falleth not under human understanding; and our faith therein consisteth, not in our

opinion, but in our submission; as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit, or where by the Spirit of God

is meant God Himself. For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of

what He is, but only that He is; and therefore the attributes we give Him are not to tell one another what He

is, nor to signify our opinion of His nature, but our desire to honour Him with such names as we conceive

"The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." [Genesis, 1. 2] Here if by the Spirit of God be meant

God Himself, then is motion attributed to God, and consequently place, which are intelligible only of bodies,

and not of substances incorporeal; and so the place is above our understanding that can conceive nothing

moved that changes not place or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension is body. But the

meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, where when the earth was covered with waters,

as in the beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth the like words, "I

will bring my Spirit upon the earth, and the waters shall be diminished":[Ibid., 8. 1] in which place by Spirit

is understood a wind (that is an air or spirit moved), which might be called, as in the former place, the Spirit

Pharaoh calleth the wisdom of Joseph the Spirit of God. For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise

and discreet man, and to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, "Can we find such a man as this is, in

whom is the Spirit of God?" [Genesis, 41. 38] And Exodus, 28. 3, "Thou shalt speak," saith God, "to all that

are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate him."

Where extraordinary understanding, though but in making garments, as being the gift of God, is called the

Spirit of God. The same is found again, Exod. 31. 36, and 35. 31 And Isaiah, 11. 2, 3, where the prophet,

speaking of the Messiah, saith, "The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and

understanding, the spirit of counsel, and fortitude, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord." Where manifestly is

In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary zeal and courage in the defence of God's people is called the Spirit of

God; as when it excited Othniel, Gideon, Jephtha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude, Judges, 3. 10,

6. 34, 11. 29, 13. 25, 14. 6, 19. And of Saul, upon the news of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the

men of Jabesh Gilead, it is said that "The Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his anger" (or, as it is in the

Latin, his fury) "was kindled greatly." [I Samuel, 11. 6] Where it is not probable was meant a ghost, but an

extraordinary zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like manner by the Spirit of God that came

upon Saul, when he was amongst the prophets that praised God in songs and music, [Ibid., 19. 20] is to be

understood, not a ghost, but an unexpected and sudden zeal to join with them in their devotion.

The false prophet Zedekiah saith to Micaiah, "Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to

thee?" [I Kings, 22. 24] Which cannot be understood of a ghost; for Micaiah declared before the kings of

Israel and Judah the event of the battle as from a vision and not as from a spirit speaking in him.

In the same manner it appeareth, in the books of the Prophets, that though they spake by the Spirit of God,

that is to say, by a special grace of prediction; yet their knowledge of the future was not by a ghost within

them, but by some supernatural dream or vision. It is said, "God made man of the dust of the earth, and

breathed into his nostrils (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." [Genesis, 2.

7] There the breath of life inspired by God signifies no more but that God gave him life; and "as long as the

spirit of God is in my nostrils" [Job, 27. 3] is no more than to say, "as long as I live." So in Ezekiel, 1. 20,

"the spirit of life was in the wheels," is equivalent to, "the wheels were alive." And "the spirit entered into

me, and me, and set me on my feet," [Ezekiel, 2. 30] that is, "I recovered my vital strength"; not that any

In the eleventh chapter of Numbers, verse 17, "I will take," saith God, "of the spirit which is upon thee, and

will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burden of the people with thee"; that is, upon the seventy elders:

whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophesy in the camp; of whom some complained, and Joshua

desired Moses to forbid them, which Moses would not do. Whereby it appears that Joshua knew not they had

received authority so to do, and prophesied according to the mind of Moses, that is to say, by a spirit or

In the like sense we read that "Joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon

him":[Deuteronomy, 34. 9] that is, because he was ordained by Moses to prosecute the work he had himself

begun (namely, the bringing of God's people into the promised land) but, prevented by death, could not

In the like sense it is said, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his":[Romans, 8. 9] not

meaning thereby the ghost of Christ, but a submission to his doctrine. As also, "Hereby you shall know the

Spirit of God: every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God"; [I John, 4. 2] by

which is meant the spirit of unfeigned Christianity, submission to that main article of Christian faith, that

Likewise these words, "And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost"[Luke, 4. 1] (that is, as it is expressed, Matthew, 4.

1, and Mark, 1. 12, "of the Holy Spirit") may be understood for zeal to do the work for which he was sent by

God the Father: but to interpret it of a ghost is to say that God Himself (for so our Saviour was) was filled

with God; which is very improper and insignificant. How we came to translate spirits by the word ghosts,

which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven nor earth, but the imaginary inhabitants of man's brain, I examine

not: but this I say, the word spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly a real substance or,

metaphorically, some extraordinary ability or affection of the mind or of the body.

The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea[Matthew, 14. 26 and Mark, 6. 49] supposed him to

be a spirit, meaning thereby an aerial body, and not a phantasm: for it is said they all saw him; which cannot

be understood of the delusions of the brain (which are not common to many at once. as visible bodies are; but

singular, because of the differences of fancies), but of bodies only. In like manner, where he was taken for a

spirit, by the same Apostles: [Luke, 24. 3, 7] so also when St. Peter was delivered out of prison, it would not

be believed; but when the maid said he was at the door, they said it was his angel; [Acts, 12. 15] by which

must be meant a corporeal substance, or we must say the disciples themselves did follow the common

opinion of both Jews and Gentiles that some such apparitions were not imaginary, but real; and such as

needed not the fancy of man for their existence: these the Jews called spirits and angels, good or bad; as the

Greeks called the same by the name of demons. And some such apparitions may be real and substantial; that

is to say, subtle bodies, which God can form by the same power by which He formed all things, and make use

of as ministers and messengers (that is to say, angels), to declare His will, and execute the same when He

pleaseth in extraordinary and supernatural manner. But when He hath so formed them they are substances,

endued with dimensions, and take up room, and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to

bodies; and therefore are not ghosts not ghosts incorporeal, that is to say, ghosts that are in no place; that is to

say, that are nowhere; that is to say, that, seeming to be somewhat, are nothing. But if corporeal be taken in

the most vulgar manner, for such substances as are perceptible by our external senses; then is substance

incorporeal a thing not imaginary, but real; namely, a thin substance invisible, but that hath the same

By the name of angel is signified, generally, a messenger; and most often, a messenger of God: and by a

messenger of God is signified anything that makes known His extraordinary presence; that is to say, the

Concerning the creation of angels, there is nothing delivered in the Scriptures. That they are spirits is often

repeated: but by the name of spirit is signified both in Scripture and vulgarly, both amongst Jews and

Gentiles, sometimes thin bodies; as the air, the wind, the spirits vital and animal of living creatures; and

sometimes the images that rise in the fancy in dreams and visions; which are not real substances, nor last any

longer than the dream or vision they appear in; which apparitions, though no real substances, but accidents of

the brain; yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signify His will, they are not improperly termed

And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain for things really subsistent without them,

and not dependent on the fancy; and out of them framed their opinions of demons, good and evil; which

because they seemed to subsist really, they called substances; and because they could not feel them with their

hands, incorporeal: so also the Jews upon the same ground, without anything in the Old Testament that

constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion (except the sect of the Sadducees) that those

apparitions, which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancy of men, for His own service, and

therefore called them His angels, were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of

God; whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the angels of God, and those they

thought would hurt them, they called evil angels, or evil spirits; such as was the spirit of Python, and the

spirits of madmen, of lunatics and epileptics: for they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases,

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find that in most of

them, there can nothing else be understood by the word angel, but some image raised, supernaturally, in the

fancy, to signify the presence of God in the execution of some supernatural work; and therefore in the rest,

For we read that the same apparition is called not only an angel, but God, where that which is called the angel

of the Lord, saith to Hagar, "I will multiply thy seed exceedingly"; [Genesis, 16. 7, 10] that is, speaketh in the

person of God. Neither was this apparition a fancy figured, but a voice. By which it is manifest that angel

signifieth there nothing but God Himself, that caused Hagar supernaturally to apprehend a voice from

heaven; or rather, nothing else but a voice supernatural, testifying God's special presence there. Why

therefore may not the angels that appeared to Lot, and are called men; [Ibid., 19. 10] and to whom, though

they were two, Lot speaketh as but to one, [Ibid., 19. 18] and that one as God (for the words are, "Lot said

unto them, Oh not so my Lord"), be understood of images of men, supernaturally formed in the fancy; as well

as before by angel was understood a fancied voice? When the angel called to Abraham out of heaven, to stay

his hand from slaying Isaac, [Genesis, 22. 11] there was no apparition, but a voice; which nevertheless was

called properly enough a messenger or angel of God, because it declared God's will supernaturally, and saves

the labour of supposing any permanent ghosts. The angels which Jacob saw on the ladder of heaven[Ibid., 28.

12] were a vision of his sleep; therefore only fancy and a dream; yet being supernatural, and signs of God's

special presence, those apparitions are not improperly called angels. The same is to be understood where

Jacob saith thus, "The angel of the Lord appeared to me in my sleep." [, 31. 11] For an apparition made to a

man in his sleep is that which all men call a dream, whether such dream be natural or supernatural: and that

which there Jacob calleth an angel was God Himself; for the same angel saith, "I am the God of Bethel."

Also the angel that went before the army of Israel to the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is the Lord

Himself; [Exodus, 14. 19 and He appeared not in the form of a beautiful man, but in form, by day, of a "pillar

of cloud," and, by night, in form of a "pillar of fire";[Ibid., 13. 21] and yet this pillar was all the apparition

and angel promised to Moses for the army's guide: for this cloudy pillar is said to have descended and stood

There you see motion and speech, which are commonly attributed to angels, attributed to a cloud, because the

cloud served as a sign of God's presence; and was no less an angel than if it had had the form of a man or

child of never so great beauty; or wings, as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common

people. For it is not the shape, but their use, that makes them angels. But their use is to be significations of

God's presence in supernatural operations; as when Moses had desired God to go along with the camp, as He

had done always before the making of the golden calf, God did not answer, "I will go," nor "I will send an

To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of angel is found would be too long.

Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I say there is no text in that part of the Old Testament which the

Church of England holdeth for canonical from which we can conclude there is, or hath been created, any

permanent thing (understood by the name of spirit or angel) that hath not quantity, and that may not be by the

understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as one part may be in one place, and the next

part in the next place to it; and, in sum, which is not (taking body for that which is somewhat or somewhere)

corporeal; but in every place the sense will bear the interpretation of angel for messenger; as John Baptist is

called an angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the same analogy) the dove and

the fiery tongues, in that they were signs of God's special presence, might also be called angels. Though we

find in Daniel two names of angels, Gabriel and Michael; yet it is clear out of the text itself that by Michael is

meant Christ, not as an angel, but as a prince: [Daniel, 12. 1] and that Gabriel (as the like apparitions made to

other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernatural phantasm, by which it seemed to Daniel in his

dream that two saints being in talk, one of them said to the other, "Gabriel, let us make this man understand

his vision": for God needeth not to distinguish his celestial servants by names, which are useful only to the

short memories of mortals. Nor in the New Testament is there any place out of which it can be proved that

angels (except when they are put for such men as God hath made the messengers and ministers of His word

or works) are things permanent, and withal incorporeal. That they are permanent may be gathered from the

words of our Saviour himself where he saith it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, "Go ye cursed into

everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels":[Matthew, 25. 41] which place is manifest for the

permanence of evil angels (unless we might think the name of Devil and his angels may be understood of the

Church's adversaries and their ministers); but then it is repugnant to their immateriality, because everlasting

fire is no punishment to impatible substances, such as are all things incorporeal. Angels therefore are not

thence proved to be incorporeal. In like manner where St. Paul says, "Know ye not that we shall judge the

angels?" [I Corinthians, 6. 3] And II Peter, 2. 4, "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them

down into hell"; and "And the angels that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath

reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgement of the last day";[Jude, 1. 6] though it prove

the permanence of angelical nature, it confirmeth also their materiality. And, "In the resurrection men do

neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven":[Matthew, 22. 30] but in the

resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeal; so therefore also are the angels.

There be diverse other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion. To men that understand the

signification of these words, substance and incorporeal (as incorporeal is taken not for subtle body, but for

not body), they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an angel or spirit is in that sense an incorporeal

substance is to say, in effect, there is no angel nor spirit at all. Considering therefore the signification of the

word angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary

way of nature, I was inclined to this opinion, that angels were nothing but supernatural apparitions of the

fancy, raised by the special and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make His presence and

commandments known to mankind, and chiefly to His own people. But the many places of the New

Testament, and our Saviour's own words, and in such texts wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the

Scripture, have extorted from my feeble reason an acknowledgement and belief that there be also angels

substantial and permanent. But to believe they be in no place, that is to say, nowhere, that is to say, nothing,

as they, though indirectly, say that will have them incorporeal, cannot by Scripture be evinced.

On the signification of the word spirit dependeth that of the word inspiration; which must either be taken

properly, and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtle air or wind in such manner as

a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if spirits be not corporeal, but have their existence only in the

fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a phantasm; which is improper to say, and impossible; for

phantasms are not, but only seem to be, somewhat. That word therefore is used in the Scripture

metaphorically only: as where it is said that God inspired into man the breath of life, [Genesis, 2. 7] no more

is meant than that God gave unto him vital motion. For we are not to think that God made first a living

breath, and then blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath were real or seeming; but only as it

is "that he gave him life, and breath";[Acts, 17. 25] that is, made him a living creature. And where it is said

"all Scripture is given by inspiration from God," [II Timothy, 3. 16] speaking there of the Scripture of the Old

Testament, it is an easy metaphor to signify that God inclined the spirit or mind of those writers to write that

which should be useful in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living.

But where St. Peter saith that "Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but the holy men of God

spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit," [II Peter, 1. 21] by the Holy Spirit is meant the voice of God in

a dream or vision supernatural, which is not inspiration: nor when our Saviour, breathing on His Disciples,

said, "Receive the Holy Spirit, was that breath the Spirit, but a sign of the spiritual graces he gave unto them.

And though it be said of many, and of our Saviour Himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit; yet that

fullness is not to be understood for infusion of the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as

are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained supernaturally or by study and

industry; for in all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God says, "I will pour out my Spirit

upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your

young men shall see visions," [Joel, 2. 28] we are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were

like water, subject to effusion or infusion; but as if God had promised to give them prophetical dreams and

visions. For the proper use of the word infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those

graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried hither and thither, and to be poured into men as into barrels.

In the same manner, to take inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that good spirits entered into men to

make them prophesy, or evil spirits into those that became phrenetic, lunatic, or epileptic, is not to take the

word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us

unknown. As also the wind that is there said to fill the house wherein the Apostles were assembled on the day

of Pentecost[Acts, 2. 2] is not to be understood for the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity itself; but for an

external sign of God's special working on their hearts to effect in them the internal graces and holy virtues He

THE kingdom of God in the writings of divines, and specially in sermons and treatises of devotion, is taken

most commonly for eternal felicity, after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call the kingdom of

glory; and sometimes for the earnest of that felicity, sanctification, which they term the kingdom of grace; but

never for the monarchy, that is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects acquired by their own

To the contrary, I find the kingdom of God to signify in most places of Scripture a kingdom properly so

named, constituted by the votes of the people of Israel in peculiar manner, wherein they chose God for their

king by covenant made with Him, upon God's promising them the possession of the land of Canaan; and but

seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for dominion over sin (and only in the New Testament), because

such a dominion as that every subject shall have in the kingdom of God, and without prejudice to the

From the very creation, God not only reigned over all men naturally by His might, but also had peculiar

subjects, whom He commanded by a voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner He reigned

over Adam and gave him commandment to abstain from the tree of cognizance of good and evil; which when

he obeyed not, but tasting thereof took upon him to be as God, judging between good and evil, not by his

Creator's commandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternal life,

wherein God had at first created him: and afterwards God punished his posterity for their vices, all but eight

persons, with a universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of God.

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and to make a covenant with him in these words, "I will

establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting

covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee,

the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession." [Genesis, 17. 7, 8]

In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity to obey, as God, the Lord that spake to him;

and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. And for a

memorial and a token of this covenant, he ordaineth the sacrament of circumcision. [Ibid., 16. 11] This is it

which is called the Old Covenant, or Testament, and containeth a contract between God and Abraham, by

which Abraham obligeth himself and his posterity in a peculiar manner to be subject to God's positive law;

for to the law moral he was obliged before, as by an oath of allegiance. And though the name of King be not

yet given to God; nor of kingdom to Abraham and his seed, yet the thing is the same; namely, an institution

by pact of God's peculiar sovereignty over the seed of Abraham, which in the renewing of the same covenant

by Moses at Mount Sinai is expressly called a peculiar kingdom of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham,

not of Moses, St. Paul saith that he is the father of the faithful; [Romans, 4. 11] that is, of those that are loyal

and do not violate their allegiance sworn to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the New Covenant

This covenant at the foot of Mount Sinai was renewed by Moses where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak

to the people in this manner, "If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a

peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and ye shall be unto me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy

nation." [Exodus, 19. 5] For a "peculiar people," the vulgar Latin hath, peculium de cunctis populis: the

English translation made in the beginning of the reign of King James hath, a "peculiar treasure unto me above

all nations"; and the Geneva French, "the most precious jewel of all nations." But the truest translation is the

first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself where he saith, [Titus, 2. 14] alluding to that place, that our

blessed Saviour "gave Himself for us, that He might purify us to Himself, a peculiar (that is, an

extraordinary) people": for the word is in the Greek periousios, which is opposed commonly to the word

epiousios: and as this signifieth ordinary, quotidian, or, as in the Lord's Prayer, of daily use; so the other

signifieth that which is overplus, and stored up, and enjoyed in a special manner; which the Latins call

peculium: and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which followeth

immediately, in that He addeth, "For all the earth is mine," as if He should say, "All the nations of the world

are mine; but it is not so that you are mine, but in a special manner: for they are all mine, by reason of my

power; but you shall be mine by your own consent and covenant," which is an addition to his ordinary title to

The same is again confirmed in express words in the same text, "Ye shall be to me a sacerdotal kingdom, and

an holy nation." The vulgar Latin hath it, regnum sacerdotale, to which agreeth the translation of that place,

sacerdotium regale, a regal priesthood; [I Peter, 2. 9] as also the institution itself, by which no man might

enter into the sanctum sanctorum, that is to say, no man might enquire God's will immediately of God

Himself, but only the high priest. The English translation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, "a

kingdom of priests"; which is either meant of the succession of one high priest after another, or else it

accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise of the high priesthood. For there was never any but the

high priest only that was to inform the people of God's will; nor any convocation of priests ever allowed to

Again, the title of a holy nation confirms the same: for holy signifies that which is God's by special, not by

general, right. All the earth, as is said in the text, is God's; but all the earth is not called holy, but that only

which is set apart for his especial service, as was the nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by

this one place that by the kingdom of God is properly meant a Commonwealth, instituted (by the consent of

those which were to be subject thereto) for their civil government and the regulating of their behaviour, not

only towards God their king, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards other nations both

in peace and war; which properly was a kingdom wherein God was king, and the high priest was to be, after

But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first when the elders of Israel, grieved with the

corruption of the sons of Samuel, demanded a king, Samuel, displeased therewith, prayed unto the Lord; and

the Lord answering said unto him, "Hearken unto the voice of the people, for they have not rejected thee, but

they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them." [I Samuel, 8. 7] Out of which it is evident that God

Himself was then their king; and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which

Again, where Samuel saith to the people, "When ye saw that Nahash, king of the children of Ammon, came

against you, ye said unto me, Nay, but a king shall reign over us; when the Lord your God was your king":[I

Samuel, 12. 12] it is manifest that God was their king, and governed the civil state of their Commonwealth.

And after the Israelites had rejected God, the prophets did foretell His restitution; as, "Then the moon shall be

confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem";

[Isaiah, 24. 23] where he speaketh expressly of His reign in Zion and Jerusalem; that is, on earth. And, "And

the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion":[Micah, 4. 7] this Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the earth.

And, "As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arm, and with fury poured

out, I will rule over you";[Ezekiel, 20. 33] and, "I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you

into the bond of the covenant";[Ibid., 20. 37] that is, I will reign over you, and make you to stand to that

covenant which you made with me by Moses, and broke in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel,

And in the New the New Testament the angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour, "He shall be great, and be called

the Son of the most High, and the Lord shall give him the throne of his father David; and he shall reign over

the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end." [Luke, 1. 32, 33] This is also a

kingdom upon earth, for the claim whereof, as an enemy to Caesar, he was put to death; the title of his cross

was Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews; he was crowned in scorn with a crown of thorns; and for the

proclaiming of him, it is said of the Disciples "That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar,

saying there was another King, one Jesus." [Acts, 17. 7] The kingdom therefore of God is a real, not a

metaphorical kingdom; and so taken, not only in the Old Testament, but the New. When we say, "For thine is

the kingdom, the power, and glory," it is to be understood of God's kingdom, by force of our covenant, not by

the right of God's power; for such a kingdom God always hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our

prayer, "Thy kingdom come," unless it be meant of the restoration of that kingdom of God by Christ which

by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been proper to say, "The

kingdom of heaven is at hand"; or to pray, "Thy kingdom come," if it had still continued.

There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation that it were a wonder there is no greater notice

taken of it, but that it gives too much light to Christian kings to see their right of ecclesiastical government.

This they have observed, that instead of a sacerdotal kingdom, translate, a kingdom of priests: for they may as

well translate a royal priesthood, as it is in St. Peter, into a priesthood of kings. And whereas, for a peculiar

people, they put a precious jewel, or treasure, a man might as well call the special regiment or company of a

In short, the kingdom of God is a civil kingdom, which consisted first, in the obligation of the people of Israel

to those laws which Moses should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the high priest,

for the time being, should deliver to them from before the cherubim in the sanctum sanctorum; and which

kingdom having been cast off in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ; and

the restoration whereof we daily pray for when we say in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy kingdom come"; and the

right whereof we acknowledge when we add, "For thine is the kingdom, the power, and glory, for ever and

ever, Amen"; and the proclaiming whereof was the preaching of the Apostles; and to which men are prepared

by the teachers of the Gospel; to embrace which Gospel (that is to say, to promise obedience to God's

government) is to be in the kingdom of grace, because God hath gratis given to such the power to be the

subjects (that is, children) of God hereafter when Christ shall come in majesty to judge the world, and

actually to govern his own people, which is called the kingdom of glory. If the kingdom of God (called also

the kingdom of heaven, from the gloriousness and admirable height of that throne) were not a kingdom which

God by His lieutenants or vicars, who deliver His commandments to the people, did exercise on earth, there

would not have been so much contention and war about who it is by whom God speaketh to us; neither would

many priests have troubled themselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it them.

Out of this literal interpretation of the kingdom of God ariseth also the true interpretation of the word holy.

For it is a word which in God's kingdom answereth to that which men in their kingdoms use to call public, or

The king of any country is the public person, or representative of all his own subjects. And God the king of

Israel was the Holy One of Israel. The nation which is subject to one earthly sovereign is the nation of that

sovereign, that is, of the public person. So the Jews, who were God's nation, were called a holy nation.

[Exodus, 19. 6] For by holy is always understood either God Himself or that which is God's in propriety; as

by public is always meant either the person or the Commonwealth itself, or something that is so the

Therefore the Sabbath (God's day) is a holy day; the Temple (God's house), a holy house; sacrifices, tithes,

and offerings (God's tribute), holy duties; priests, prophets, and anointed kings, under Christ (God's

ministers), holy men; the celestial ministering spirits (God's messengers), holy angels; and the like: and

wheresoever the word holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety gotten by consent.

In saying "Hallowed be thy name," we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandment of

having no other Gods but Him. Mankind is God's nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a holy nation,.

And the word profane is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with common; and consequently their

contraries, holy and proper, in the kingdom of God must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also

are called holy that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted and

given themselves to God. In the proper sense, that which is made holy by God's appropriating or separating it

to his own use is said to be sanctified by God, as the seventh day in the fourth Commandment; and as the

elect in the New Testament were said to be sanctified when they were endued with the spirit of godliness.

And that which is made holy by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used only in his public

service, is called also sacred, and said to be consecrated, as temples, and other houses of public prayer, and

their utensils, priests, and ministers, victims, offerings, and the external matter of sacraments.

Of holiness there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the service of God, there may be some

set apart again for a nearer and more especial service. The whole nation of the Israelites were a people holy to

God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a holy tribe; and amongst the Levites the priests were

yet more holy; and amongst the priests the high priest was the most holy. So the land of Judea was the Holy

Land, but the Holy City wherein God was to be worshipped was more holy; and again, the Temple more holy

A sacrament is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and a consecration of it to God's service,

for a sign either of our admission into the kingdom of God, to be of the number of his peculiar people, or for

a commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament the sign of admission was circumcision; in the New

Testament, baptism. The commemoration of it in the Old Testament was the eating (at a certain time, which

was anniversary) of the Paschal Lamb, by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were

delivered out of their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the Lord's Supper, by

which we are put in mind of our deliverance from the bondage of sin by our blessed Saviour's death upon the

cross. The sacraments of admission are but once to be used, because there needs but one admission; but

because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance and of our allegiance, the sacraments of

commemoration have need to be reiterated. And these are the principal sacraments and, as it were, the solemn

oaths we make of our allegiance. There be also other consecrations that may be called sacraments, as the

word implieth only consecration to God's service; but as it implies an oath or promise of allegiance to God,

there were no other in the Old Testament but circumcision and the Passover; nor are there any other in the

WHEN there is mention of the word of God, or of man, it doth not signify a part of speech, such as

grammarians call a noun or a verb, or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it

significative; but a perfect speech or discourse, whereby the speaker affirmeth, denieth, commandeth,

promiseth, threateneth, wisheth, or interrogateth. In which sense it is not vocabulum that signifies a word, but

Again, if we say the word of God, or of man, it may be understood sometimes of the speaker: as the words

that God hath spoken, or that a man hath spoken; in which sense, when we say the Gospel of St. Matthew, we

understand St. Matthew to be the writer of it: and sometimes of the subject; in which sense, when we read in

the Bible, "The words of the days of the kings of Israel, or Judah," it is meant the acts that were done in those

days were the subject of those words; and in the Greek, which, in the Scripture, retaineth many Hebraisms, by

the word of God is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning God and His

government; that is to say, the doctrine of religion: insomuch as it is all one to say logos theou, and theologia;

which is that doctrine which we usually call divinity, as is manifest by the places following: "The Paul and

Barnabas waxed bold, and said, it was necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken to you,

but seeing you put it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles."

[Acts, 13. 46] That which is here called the word of God was the doctrine of Christian religion; as it appears

evidently by that which goes before. And where it is said to the Apostles by an angel, "Go stand and speak in

the Temple, all the words of this life";[Ibid., 5. 20] by the words of this life is meant the doctrine of the

Gospel, as is evident by what they did in the Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same chapter.

"Daily in the Temple, and in every house, they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Jesus":[Ibid., 15. 7 in

which place it is manifest that Jesus Christ was the subject of this "word of life"; or, which is all one, the

subject of the "words of this life eternal" that our Saviour offered them. So the word of God is called the

word of the Gospel, because it containeth the doctrine of the kingdom of Christ; and the same word is called

the word of faith; [Romans, 10. 8, 9] that is, as is there expressed, the doctrine of Christ come and raised from

the dead. Also, "When any one heareth the word of the kingdom";[Matthew, 13. 19] that is the doctrine of the

kingdom taught by Christ. Again, the same word is said "to grow and to be multiplied";[Acts, 12. 24] which

to understand of the evangelical doctrine is easy, but of the voice or speech of God, hard and strange. In the

same sense the doctrine of devils I Timothy, 4. 1] signifieth not the words of any devil, but the doctrine of

heathen men concerning demons, and those phantasms which they worshipped as gods.

Considering these two significations of the word of God, as it is taken in Scripture, it is manifest in this latter

sense (where it is taken for the doctrine of Christian religion) that the whole Scripture is the word of God: but

in the former sense, not so. For example, though these words, "I am the Lord thy God," etc., to the end of the

Ten Commandments, were spoken by God to Moses; yet the preface, "God spake these words and said," is to

be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy history. The word of God, as it is taken for that which

He hath spoken, is understood sometimes properly, sometimes metaphorically. Properly, as the words He

hath spoken to His prophets: metaphorically, for His wisdom, power, and eternal decree, in making the

world; in which sense, those fiats, "Let their be light, Let there be a firmament, Let us make man," etc.

[Genesis, 1] are the word of God. And in the same sense it is said, "All things were made by it, and without it

was nothing made that was made":[John, 1. 3] and "He upholdeth all things by the word of His

power";[Hebrews, 1. 3] that is, by the power of His word; that is, by His power: and "The worlds were

framed by the word of God";[Ibid., 11. 3] and many other places to the same sense: as also amongst the

Latins, the name of fate, which signifieth properly the word spoken, is taken in the same sense.

Secondly, for the effect of His word; that is to say, for the thing itself, which by His word is affirmed,

commanded, threatened, or promised; as where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison, "till his word was

come";[Psalms, 105. 19] that is, till that was come to pass which he had foretold to Pharoah's butler

concerning his being restored to his office: [Genesis, 11. 13] for there, by his word was come, is meant the

thing itself was come to pass. So also, Elijah saith to God, "I have done all these thy words," [I Kings, 18. 36]

instead of "I have done all these things at thy word," or commandment. And, "Where is the word of the

Lord"[Jeremiah, 17. 15] is put for "Where is the evil He threatened." And, "There shall none of my words be

prolonged any more";[Ezekiel, 12. 28] by words are understood those things which God promised to His

people. And in the New Testament, "heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass

away";[Matthew, 24. 35] that is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold that shall not come to pass.

And in this sense it is that St. John the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John only, calleth our Saviour Himself as

in the flesh the Word of God, "And the Word was made flesh";[John, 1. 14] that is to say, the word, or

promise, that Christ should come into the world, "who in the beginning was with God": that is to say, it was

in the purpose of God the Father to send God the Son into the world to enlighten men in the way of eternal

life; but it was not till then put in execution, and actually incarnate; so that our Saviour is there called the

Word, not because he was the promise, but the thing promised. They that taking occasion from this place do

commonly call him the Verb of God do but render the text more obscure. They might as well term him the

Noun of God: for as by noun, so also by verb, men understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound,

that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeal or spiritual; and

therefore it cannot be said to be either God or man; whereas our Saviour is both. And this Word which St.

John in his Gospel saith was with God is, in his first Epistle, called the "Word of life";[Ibid., 1. 1] and "the

Eternal Life, which was with the Father": [Ibid., 1. 2] so that he can be in no other sense called the Word than

in that wherein He is called Eternal Life; that is, he that hath procured us eternal life by his coming in the

flesh. So also the Apostle, speaking of Christ clothed in a garment dipped in blood, saith his name is "the

Word of God," [Apocalypse, 19. 13] which is to be understood as if he had said his name had been "He that

was come according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to His word and promises

delivered by the prophets." So that there is nothing here of the incarnation of a word, but of the incarnation of

God the Son, therefore called the Word, because his incarnation was the performance of the promise; in like

There are also places of the Scripture where by the Word of God is signified such words as are consonant to

reason and equity, though spoken sometimes neither by prophet nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was

an idolater, yet his words to the good King Josiah, in which he advised him by messengers not to oppose him

in his march against Carchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God; and that Josiah, not

hearkening to them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read II Chronicles, 35. 21, 22, 23. It is true that as the

same history is related in the first Book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah, spake these words to Josiah

from the mouth of the Lord. But we are to give credit to the canonical Scripture whatsoever be written in the

The Word of God is then also to be taken for the dictates of reason and equity, when the same is said in the

Scriptures to be written in man's heart; as Psalms, 37. 31; Jeremiah, 31. 33; Deuteronomy, 30. 11, 14, and

The name of prophet signifieth in Scripture sometimes prolocutor; that is, he that speaketh from God to man,

or from man to God: and sometimes predictor, or a foreteller of things to come: and sometimes one that

speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most frequently used in the sense speaking from God to

the people. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were prophets. And in this sense the high

priest was a prophet, for he only went into the sanctum sanctorum to enquire of God, and was to declare his

answer to the people. And therefore when Caiaphas said it was expedient that one man should die for the

people, St. John saith that "He spake not this of himself, but being high priest that year, he prophesied that

one man should die for the nation." [John, 11. 51] Also they that in Christian congregations taught the people

are said to prophesy. [I Corinthians, 14. 3] In the like sense it is that God saith to Moses concerning Aaron,

"He shall be thy spokesman to the people; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of

God":[Exodus, 4. 16] that which here is spokesman is, Exodus, 7. 1, interpreted prophet: "See," saith God, "I

have made thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet." In the sense of speaking from

man to God, Abraham is called a prophet where God in a dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, "Now

therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a prophet, and shall pray for thee";[Genesis, 20. 7] whereby may

be also gathered that the name of prophet may be given not unproperly to them that in Christian churches

have a calling to say public prayers for the congregation. In the same sense, the prophets that came down

from the high place, or hill of god, with a psaltery, and a tabret, and a pipe, and a harp, Saul amongst them,

are said to prophesy, in that they praised God in that manner publicly. [I Samuel, 10. 5, 6, 10] In the like

sense is Miriam called a prophetess. [Exodus, 15. 20] So is it also to be taken where St. Paul saith, "Every

man that prayeth or prophesieth with his head covered," etc., and every woman that prayeth or prophesieth

with her head uncovered":[I Corinthians, 11. 4, 5] for prophecy in that place signifieth no more but praising

God in psalms and holy songs, which women might do in the church, though it were not lawful for them to

speak to the congregation. And in this signification it is that the poets of the heathen, that composed hymns

and other sorts of poems in the honor of their gods, were called vates, prophets, as is well enough known by

all that are versed in the books of the Gentiles, and as is evident where St. Paul saith of the Cretans that a

prophet of their own said they were liars; [Titus, 1. 12] not that St. Paul held their poets for poets for

prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word prophet was commonly used to signify them that celebrated the

When by prophecy is meant prediction, or foretelling of future contingents, not only they were prophets who

were God's spokesmen, and foretold those things to others which God had foretold to them; but also all those

impostors that pretend by the help familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of events past, from false

causes, to foretell the like events in time to come: of which (as I have declared already in the twelfth Chapter

of this discourse) there be many kinds who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men a greater

reputation of prophecy by one casual event that may be but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by

never so many failings. Prophecy is not an art, nor, when it is taken for prediction, a constant vocation, but an

extraordinary and temporary employment from God, most often of good men, but sometimes also of the

wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a phantasm

of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a prophetess; for neither had she any science

whereby she could raise such a phantasm, nor does it appear that God commanded the raising of it, but only

guided that imposture to be a means of Saul's terror and discouragement, and by consequent, of the

discomfiture by which he fell. And for incoherent speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one sort of

prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intoxicated with a spirit or vapor from the cave of the Pythian

Oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spake like madmen; of whose loose words a sense might

be made to fit any event, in such sort as all bodies are said to be made of materia prima. In the Scripture I find

it also so taken in these words, "And the evil spirit came upon Saul, and he prophesied in the midst of the

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word prophet; yet is that the most frequent in

which it is taken for him to whom God speaketh immediately that which the prophet is to say from Him to

some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh to

such a prophet. Can it, may some say, be properly said that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be

properly said He hath a tongue or other organs as a man? The Prophet David argueth thus, "Shall He that

made the eye, not see? or He that made the ear, not hear?" [Psalms, 94. 9] But this may be spoken, not, as

usually, to signify God's nature, but to signify our intention to honour Him. For to see and hear are

honourable attributes, and may be given to God to declare as far as capacity can conceive His almighty

power. But if it were to be taken in the strict and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all other

parts of man's body that he had also the same use of them which we have; which would be many of them so

uncomely as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to Him. Therefore we are to

interpret God's speaking to men immediately for that way, whatsoever it be, by which God makes them

understand His will: and the ways whereby He doth this are many, and to be sought only in the Holy

Scripture; where though many times it be said that God spake to this and that person, without declaring in

what manner, yet there be again many places that deliver also the signs by which they were to acknowledge

His presence and commandment; and by these may be understood how He spake to many of the rest.

In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah is not expressed; nor how he spake to

Abraham, till such time as he came out of his own country to Sichem in the land of Canaan, and then God is

said to have appeared to him. [Genesis, 12. 7] So there is one way whereby God made His presence manifest;

that is, by an apparition, or vision. And again, the word of the Lord came to Abraham in a vision";[Ibid., 15.

1] that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of God's presence, appeared as God's messenger to speak to him. Again,

the Lord appeared to Abraham by an apparition of three angels; [Ibid., 18. 1] and to Abimelech in a dream;

[Ibid., 18. 1] to Lot by an apparition of two angels; [Ibid., 19. 1] and to Hagar by the apparition of one angel;

[Ibid., 21. 17] and to Abraham again by the apparition of a voice from heaven; [Ibid., 22. 11] and to Isaac in

the night[Ibid., 26. 24] (that is, in his sleep, or by dream); and to Jacob in a dream; [Ibid., 28. 12] that is to

say (as are the words of the text), "Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder," etc. And in a vision of angels; [Ibid.,

32. 1] and to Moses in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush; [Exodus, 3. 2] and after the

time of Moses, where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament is expressed, He

spake always by a vision, or by a dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of

the prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the

Only to Moses He spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai, and in the Tabernacle; and to the

high priest in the Tabernacle, and in the sanctum sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the high

priests, were prophets of a more eminent place and degree in God's favour; and God Himself in express

words declareth that to other prophets He spake in dreams and visions, but to His servant Moses in such

manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these: "If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord

will make Myself known to him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so,

who is faithful in all my house; with him I will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches;

and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold." [Numbers, 12. 6, 7, 8] And, "The Lord spake to Moses face to

face, as a man speaketh to his friend." [Exodus, 33. 11] And yet this speaking of God to Moses was by

mediation of an angel, or angels, as appears expressly, Acts 7. 35 and 53, and Galatians, 3. 19, and was

therefore a vision, though a more clear vision than was given to other prophets. And conformable hereunto,

where God saith, "If there arise amongst you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams," [Deuteronomy, 13. 1] the

latter word is but the interpretation of the former. And, "Your sons and your daughters shall prophesy; your

old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions":[Joel, 2. 28] where again, the word

prophesy is expounded by dream and vision. And in the same manner it was that God spake to Solomon,

promising him wisdom, riches, and honour; for the text saith, "And Solomon awoke, and behold it was a

dream":[I Kings, 3. 15] so that generally the prophets extraordinary in the Old Testament took notice of the

word of God no otherwise than from their dreams or visions that is to say, from the imaginations which they

had in their sleep or in an ecstasy: which imaginations in every true prophet were supernatural, but in false

The same prophets were nevertheless said to speak by the spirit; as where the prophet, speaking of the Jews,

saith, "They made their hearts hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord

of Hosts hath sent in His Spirit by the former prophets." [Zechariah, 7. 12] By which it is manifest that

speaking by the spirit or inspiration was not a particular manner of God's speaking, different from vision,

when they that were said to speak by the Spirit were extraordinary prophets, such as for every new message

were to have a particular commission or, which is all one, a new dream or vision.

Of prophets that were so by a perpetual calling in the Old Testament, some were supreme and some

subordinate: supreme were first Moses, and after him the high priests, every one for his time, as long the

priesthood was royal; and after the people of the Jews had rejected God, that He should no more reign over

them, those kings which submitted themselves to God's government were also his chief prophets; and the

high priest's office became ministerial. And when God was to be consulted, they put on the holy vestments,

and enquired of the Lord as the king commanded them, and were deprived of their office when the king

thought fit. For King Saul commanded the burnt offering to be brought; [I Samuel, 13. 9] and he commands

the priest to bring the Ark near him; [Ibid.,14. 18] and, again, to let it alone, because he saw an advantage

upon his enemies. [Ibid., 14. 19] And in the same chapter Saul asketh counsel of God. In like manner King

David, after his being anointed, though before he had possession of the kingdom, is said to "enquire of the

Lord" whether he should fight against the Philistines at Keilah; [Ibid., 23. 2] and David commandeth the

priest to bring him the ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in Keilah or not. [Ibid., 23. 9] And King

Solomon took the priesthood from Abiathar, [I Kings, 2. 27] and gave it to Zadok. [Ibid., 2. 35] Therefore

Moses, and the high priests, and the pious kings, who enquired of God on all extraordinary occasions how

they were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have, were all sovereign prophets. But in what

manner God spake unto them is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to God in Mount Sinai it was

a dream, or vision, such as other prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses

and other prophets. [Numbers, 12. 6, 7, 8] To say God spake or appeared as He is in His own nature is to

deny His infiniteness, invisibility, incomprehensibility. To say he spake by inspiration, or infusion of the

Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equal with Christ, in whom only the

Godhead, as St. Paul speaketh, dwelleth bodily. [Colossians, 2. 9] And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy

Spirit, as it signifieth the graces or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernatural. For

God disposeth men to piety, justice, mercy, truth, faith, and all manner of virtue, both moral and intellectual,

And as these ways cannot be applied to God, in His speaking to Moses at Mount Sinai; so also they cannot be

applied to Him in His speaking to the high priests from the mercyseat. Therefore in what manner God spake

to those sovereign prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it was to enquire of Him, is not intelligible. In

the time of the New Testament there was no sovereign prophet but our Saviour, who was both God that

To subordinate prophets of perpetual calling, I find not any place that proveth God spake to them

supernaturally, but only in such manner as naturally He inclineth men to piety, to belief, to righteousness, and

to other virtues all other Christian men. Which way, though it consist in constitution, instruction, education,

and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian virtues, yet it is truly attributed to the operation of

the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, which we in our language call the Holy Ghost: for there is no good

inclination that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not always supernatural. When

therefore a prophet is said to speak in the spirit, or by the Spirit of God, we are to understand no more but that

he speaks according to God's will, declared by the supreme prophet. For the most common acceptation of the

In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself that prophesied in the camp of the Israelites. In

what manner God spake to them is declared in the eleventh Chapter of Numbers, verse 25: "The Lord came

down in a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy

elders. And it came to pass, when the spirit rested upon them, they prophesied, and did not cease." By which

it is manifest, first, that their prophesying to the people was subservient and subordinate to the prophesying of

Moses; for that God took of the spirit of Moses put upon them; so that they prophesied as Moses would have

them: otherwise they had not been suffered to prophesy at all. For there was a complaint made against them

to Moses; [Numbers, 11. 27] and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but

said to Joshua "Be not jealous in my behalf." Secondly, that the Spirit of God in that place signifieth nothing

but the mind and disposition to obey and assist Moses in the administration of the government. For if it were

meant they had the substantial Spirit of God; that is, the divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in

no less manner than Christ himself, in whom only the Spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant therefore of the

gift and grace of God, that guided them to cooperate with Moses, from whom their spirit was derived. And

it appeareth that they were such as Moses himself should appoint for elders and officers of the people: [Ibid.,

11. 16] for the words are, "Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be elders and officers of the

people": where, thou knowest is the same with thou appointest, or hast appointed to be such. For we are told

before that Moses, following the counsel of Jethro his fatherinlaw, did appoint judges and officers over the

people such as feared God; [Exodus, 18] and of these were those seventy whom God, by putting upon them

Moses' spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the administration of the kingdom: and in this sense the spirit of God is

said presently upon the anointing of David to have come upon David, and left Saul; [I Samuel, 16. 13, 14]

God giving His graces to him He chose to govern His people, and taking them away from him He rejected.

So that by the spirit is meant inclination to God's service, and not any supernatural revelation.

God spake also many times by the event of lots, which were ordered by such as He had put in authority over

His people. So we read that God manifested by the lots which Saul caused to be drawn the fault that Jonathan

had committed in eating a honeycomb, contrary to the oath taken by the people. [I Samuel, 14. 43] And God

divided the land of Canaan amongst the Israelites by the "lots that Joshua did cast before the Lord in Shiloh."

[Joshua, 18. 10] In the same manner it seemeth to be that God discovered the crime of Achan. [ Ibid., 7. 16,

etc.] And these are the ways whereby God declared His will in the Old Testament.

All which ways He used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by a vision of an angel; to Joseph,

in a dream; again to Paul, in the way to Damascus in a vision of our Saviour; and to Peter in the vision of a

sheet let down from heaven with diverse sorts of flesh of clean and unclean beasts; and in prison, by vision of

an angel; and to all the Apostles and writers of the New Testament, by the graces of His Spirit; and to the

Apostles again, at the choosing of Matthias in the place of Judas Iscariot, by lot.

Seeing then all prophecy supposeth vision or dream (which two, when they be natural, are the same), or some

especial gift of God so rarely observed in mankind as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well such

gifts as the most extraordinary dreams and visions may proceed from God, not only by His supernatural and

immediate, but also by his natural operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of reason and

judgement to discern between natural and supernatural gifts, and between natural and supernatural visions or

dreams. And consequently men had need to be very circumspect, and wary, in obeying the voice of man that,

pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us to obey God in that way which he in God's name telleth us to

be the way to happiness. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity pretends to govern

them; that is to say, rule and reign over them; which is a thing that all men naturally desire, and is therefore

worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture; and consequently ought be examined and tried by every

man before he yield them obedience, unless he have yielded it them already in the institution of a

Commonwealth; as when the prophet is the civil sovereign, or by the civil sovereign authorized. And if this

examination of prophets and spirits were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose to

set out the marks by which every man might be able to distinguish between those whom they ought, and

those whom they ought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out to know a prophet by,

[Deuteronomy, 13. 1, etc.] and to know a spirit by; [I John, 4. 1, etc.] and seeing there is so much

prophesying in the Old Testament, and so much preaching in the New Testament against prophets, and so

much greater a number ordinarily of false prophets than of true; every one is to beware of obeying their

directions at their own peril. And first, that there were many more false than true prophets appears by this,

that when Ahab consulted four hundred prophets, they were all false impostors, but only one Micaiah. [I

Kings, 22] And a little before the time of the Captivity the prophets were generally liars. "The prophets,"

saith the Lord by Jeremiah, "prophesy lies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor

spake unto them: they prophesy to you a false vision, a thing of naught, and the deceit of their heart."

[Jeremiah, 14. 14] Insomuch as God commanded the people by the mouth of the prophet Jeremiah not to

obey them. "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the prophets that prophesy to you.

They make you vain: they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord." [Ibid., 23.

Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament such quarrels amongst the visionary prophets, one

contesting with another, and asking, "When departed the spirit from me, to go to thee?" as between Micaiah

and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the lie to one another, as in Jeremiah, 14. 14, and such

controversies in the new Testament this day amongst the spiritual prophets: every man then was, and now is,

bound to make use of his natural reason to apply to all prophecy those rules which God hath given us to

discern the true from the false. Of which rules, in the Old Testament, one was conformable doctrine to that

which Moses the sovereign prophet had taught them; and the other, the miraculous power of foretelling what

God would bring to pass, as I have already shown out of Deuteronomy, 13. 1, etc. And in the New Testament

there was but one only mark, and that was the preaching of this doctrine that Jesus is the Christ, that is, the

King of the Jews, promised in the Old Testament. Whosoever denied that article, he was a false prophet,

whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that taught it was a true prophet. For St. John, speaking

expressly of the means to examine spirits, whether they be of God or not, after he had told them that there

would arise false prophets, saith thus, "Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every spirit that confesseth that

Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God";[I John, 4. 2, etc.] that is, is approved and allowed as a prophet of

God: not that he is a godly man, or one of the elect for this that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus

to be the Christ, but for that he is a prophet avowed. For God sometimes speaketh by prophets whose persons

He hath not accepted; as He did by Baalam, and as He foretold Saul of his death by the Witch of Endor.

Again in the next verse, "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of

Christ. And this is the spirit of Antichrist." So that the rule is perfect rule is perfect on both sides: that he is a

true prophet which preacheth the Messiah already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that

denieth him come, and looketh for him in some future impostor that shall take upon him that honour falsely,

whom the Apostle there properly calleth Antichrist. Every man therefore ought to consider who is the

sovereign prophet; that is to say, who it is that is God's vicegerent on earth, and hath next under God the

authority of governing Christian men; and to observe for a rule that doctrine which in the name of God he

hath commanded to be taught, and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines which

pretended prophets, with miracle or without, shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that

rule, to do as they did that came to Moses and complained that there were some that prophesied in the camp

whose authority so to do they doubted of; and leave to the sovereign, as they did to Moses, to uphold or to

forbid them, as he should see cause; and if he disavow them, then no more to obey their voice, or if he

approve them, then to obey them as men to whom God hath given a part of the spirit of their sovereign. For

when Christian men take not their Christian sovereign for God's prophet, they must either take their own

dreams for the prophecy they mean to be governed by, and the tumour of their own hearts for the Spirit of

God; or they must suffer themselves to be lead by some strange prince, or by some of their fellow subjects

that can bewitch them by slander of the government into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their

calling than sometimes an extraordinary success and impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both

divine and human, reduce all order, government, and society to the first chaos of violence and civil war.

BY Miracles are signified the admirable works of God: and therefore they are also called wonders. And

because they are for the most part done for a signification of His commandment in such occasions as, without

them, men are apt to doubt (following their private natural reasoning) what He hath commanded, and what

not, they are commonly, in Holy Scripture, called signs, in the same sense as they are called by the Latins,

ostenta and portenta, from showing and foresignifying that which the Almighty is about to bring to pass.

To understand therefore what is a miracle, we must first understand what works they are which men wonder

at and call admirable. And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: the one is if it be

strange, that is to say, such as the like of it hath never or very rarely been produced; the other is if when it is

produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the immediate hand of God.

But when we see some possible natural cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if the like

have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a natural means thereof, we no more wonder,

Therefore, if a horse or cow should speak, it were a miracle, because both the thing is strange and the natural

cause difficult to imagine; so also were it to see a strange deviation of nature in the production of some new

shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other animal, engenders his like, though we know no more

how this is done than the other; yet because it is usual, it is no miracle. In like manner, if a man be

metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a miracle, because strange; but if a piece of wood be so

changed, because we see it often it is no miracle: and yet we know no more by what operation of God the one

The first rainbow that was seen in the world was a miracle, because the first, and consequently strange, and

served for a sign from God, placed in heaven to assure His people there should be no more a universal

destruction of the world by water. But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not miracles, neither to

them that know their natural causes, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many rare works

produced by the art of man; yet when we know they are done, because thereby we know also the means how

they are done, we count them not for miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but by

Furthermore, seeing admiration and wonder is consequent to the knowledge and experience wherewith men

are endued, some more, some less, it followeth that the same thing may be a miracle to one, and not to

another. And thence it is that ignorant and superstitious men make great wonders of those works which other

men, knowing to proceed from nature (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God), admire not

at all; as when eclipses of the sun and moon have been taken for supernatural works by the common people,

when nevertheless there were others could, from their natural causes, have foretold the very hour they should

arrive; or, as when a man, by confederacy and secret intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of

an ignorant, unwary man, thereby tells him what he has done in former time, it seems to him a miraculous

thing; but amongst wise and cautelous men, such miracles as those cannot easily be done.

Again, it belongeth to the nature of a miracle that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to God's

messengers, ministers, and prophets, that thereby men may know they are called, sent, and employed by God,

and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the creation of the world, and after

that the destruction of all living creatures in the universal deluge, were admirable works; yet because they

were not done to procure credit to any prophet or other minister of God, they use not to be called miracles.

For how admirable soever any work be, the admiration consisteth not in that could be done, because men

naturally believe the Almighty can do all things, but because He does it at the prayer or word of a man. But

the works of God in Egypt, by the hand of Moses, were properly miracles, because they were done with

intention to make the people of Israel believe that Moses came unto them, not out of any design of his own

interest, but as sent from God Therefore after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from the

Egyptian bondage, when he said, "They will not believe me, but will say the Lord hath not appeared unto

me," [Exodus, 4. 1] God gave him power to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent, and again to return

it into a rod; and by putting his hand into his bosom, to make it leprous, and again by pulling it out to make it

whole, to make the children of Israel believe that the God of their fathers had appeared unto him: [Ibid., 4. 5]

and if that were not enough, He gave him power to turn their waters into blood. And when he had done these

miracles before the people, it is said that "they believed him." [Ibid., 4. 31] Nevertheless, for fear of Pharaoh,

they durst not yet obey him. Therefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh and the Egyptians

tended all to make the Israelites believe in Moses, and properly miracles. In like manner if we consider all the

miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the prophets till the Captivity, and those of our

Saviour and his Apostles afterwards, we shall find their end was always to beget or confirm belief that they

came not of their own motion, but were sent by God. We may further observe in Scripture that the end of

miracles was to beget belief, not universally in all men, elect and reprobate, but in the elect only; that is to

say, in such as God had determined should become His subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt had

not for end the conversion of Pharaoh; for God had told Moses before that He would harden the heart of

Pharaoh, that he should not let the people go: and when he let them go at last, not the miracles persuaded him,

but the plagues forced him to it. So also of our Saviour it is written that He wrought not many miracles in His

own country, because of their unbelief; [Matthew, 13. 58] and instead of, "He wrought not many," it is, "He

could work none." [Mark, 6. 5] It was not because he wanted power; which, to say, were blasphemy against

God; nor that the end of miracles was not to convert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all the miracles

of Moses, of the prophets, of our Saviour and of his Apostles was to add men to the Church; but it was

because the end of their miracles was to add to the Church, not all men, but such as should be saved; that is to

say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore our Saviour was sent from His Father, He could not use His

power in the conversion of those whom His Father had rejected. They that, expounding this place of St.

Mark, say that this word, "He could not," is put for, "He would not," do it without example in the Greek

tongue (where would not is put sometimes for could not, in things inanimate that have no will; but could not,

for would not, never), and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians, as if Christ could do no

From that which I have here set down, of the nature and use of a miracle, we may define it thus: a miracle is a

work of God (besides His operation by the way of nature, ordained in the Creation) done for the making

manifest to His elect the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation.

And from this definition, we may infer: first, that in all miracles the work done is not the effect of any virtue

in the prophet, because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say, God hath done it, without

Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit can do a miracle. For it must either be by virtue of some

natural science or by incantation, that is, virtue of words. For if the enchanters do it by their own power

independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from God, which all men deny; and if they do it by

power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but natural, and consequently no

There be some texts of Scripture that seem to attribute the power of working wonders, equal to some of those

immediate miracles wrought by God Himself, to certain arts of magic and incantation. As, for example, when

we read that after the rod of Moses being cast on the ground became a serpent, "the magicians of Egypt did

the like by their enchantments";[Exodus, 7. 11] and that after Moses had turned the waters of the Egyptian

streams, rivers, ponds, and pools of water into blood, "the magicians of Egypt did likewise, with their

enchantments";[Ibid., 7. 22] and that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land, "the

magicians also did so with their enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt";[Ibid., 8. 7] will

not man be apt to attribute miracles to enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of words; and

think the same very well proved out of this and other such places? And yet there is no place of Scripture that

telleth us what an enchantment is. If therefore enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of strange

effects by spells and words, but imposture and delusion wrought by ordinary means; and so far from

supernatural, as the impostors need not the study so much of natural causes, but the ordinary ignorance,

stupidity, and superstition of mankind, to do them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of magic,

witchcraft, and enchantment must needs have another sense than at first sight they seem to bear.

For it is evident enough that words have no have now effect but on those that understand them, and then they

have no other but to signify the intentions or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce hope, fear, or

other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a rod seemeth a serpent, or the waters blood, or

any other miracle seemeth done by enchantment; if it be not to the edification of God's people, not the rod,

nor the water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon by the words, but the spectator.

So that all the miracle consisteth in this, that the enchanter has deceived a man; which is no miracle, but a

For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much

knowledge of natural causes, and of the nature and interests of men, as by innumerable and easy tricks to be

abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a science of the course of the

stars, might a man have gained that should have told the people, this hour, or day, the sun should be

darkened? A juggler, by the handling of his goblets and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised,

would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the Devil. A man that hath practised to speak by

drawing in of his breath (which kind of men in ancient time were called ventriloqui) and so make the

weakness of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech, but from

distance of place, is able to make very many men believe it is a voice from heaven, whatsoever he please to

tell them. And for a crafty man that hath enquired into the secrets and familiar confessions that one man

ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and

yet there be many that by such means as that obtain the reputation of being conjurers. But it is too long a

business to reckon up the several sorts of those men which the Greeks called thaumaturgi, that is to say,

workers of things wonderful; and yet these do all they do by their own single dexterity. But if we look upon

the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done that is impossible

to be believed. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will deceive

many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witness, will

In this aptitude of mankind to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can there can be no better nor

I think any other caution than that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses (as I have said before in the

precedent chapter), in the beginning of the thirteenth and end of the eighteenth of Deuteronomy; that we take

not any for prophets that teach any other religion than that which God's lieutenant, which at that time was

Moses, hath established; nor any, though he teach the same religion, whose prediction we do not see come to

pass. Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron and his successors in their times, and the sovereign governor of

God's people next under God Himself, that is to say, the head of the Church in all times, are to be consulted

what doctrine he hath established before we give credit to a pretended miracle or prophet. And when that is

done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must both see it done and use all means possible to consider

whether it be really done; and not only so, but whether it be such as no man can do the like by his natural

power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to God's

lieutenant, to whom in all doubtful cases we have submitted our private judgements. For example, if a man

pretend that after certain words spoken over a piece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a

god, or a man, or both, and nevertheless it looketh still as like bread as ever it did, there is no reason for any

man to think it really done, nor consequently to fear him till he enquire of God by his vicar or lieutenant

whether it be done or not. If he say not, then followeth that which Moses, saith "he hath spoken it

presumptuously; thou shalt not fear him." [Deuteronomy, 18. 22] If he say it is done, then he is not to

contradict it. So also if we see not, but only hear tell of a miracle, we are to consult the lawful Church; that is

to say, the lawful head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And this is chiefly the case

of men that in these days live under Christian sovereigns. For in these times I do not know one man that ever

saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm or at the word or prayer of a man, that a man endued but

with a mediocrity of reason would think supernatural: and the question is no more whether what we see done

be a miracle; whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work, and not the act of a tongue or pen; but

in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lie. In which question we are not every one to make our own

private reason or conscience, but the public reason, that is the reason of God's supreme lieutenant, judge; and

indeed we have made him judge already, if we have given him a sovereign power to do all that is necessary

for our peace and defence. A private man has always the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not

believe in his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what benefit

can accrue, by men's belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they

be miracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the

public; that is to say, to God's lieutenant. But who is this lieutenant of God, and head of the Church, shall be

THE maintenance of civil society depending on justice, and justice on the power of life and death, and other

less rewards and punishments residing in them that have the sovereignty of the Commonwealth; it is

impossible a Commonwealth should stand where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater

rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now seeing eternal life is a greater reward

than the life present, and eternal torment a greater punishment than the death of nature, it is a thing worthy to

be well considered of all men that desire, by obeying authority, to avoid the calamities of confusion and civil

war, what is meant in Holy Scripture by life eternal and torment eternal; and for what offences, and against

whom committed, men are to be eternally tormented; and for what actions they are to obtain eternal life.

And first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life as, had he not broken the commandment

of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden everlastingly. For there was the tree of life, whereof he was

so long allowed to eat as he should forbear to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, which was not

allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, "lest he should put

forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live forever." [Genesis, 3. 22] By which it seemeth to me

(with submission nevertheless both in this, and in all questions whereof the determination dependeth on the

Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Commonwealth whose subject I am) that

Adam, if he had not sinned, had had an eternal life on earth; and that mortality entered upon himself, and his

posterity, by his first sin. Not that actual death then entered, for Adam then could never have had children;

whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he died. But where it is said, "In the day that

thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," [Ibid., 2. 17] it must needs be meant of his mortality and certitude

of death. Seeing then eternal life was lost by Adam's forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancel that

forefeiture was to recover thereby that life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that

believe in him, and therefore recovered to all believers that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam.

And in this sense it is that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth: "As by the offence of one, judgement came

upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to

justification of life." [Romans, 5. 18, 19] Which is again more perspicuously delivered in these words, "For

since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in

Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that eternal life which Christ hath obtained for them, the texts

next before alleged seem to make it on earth. For if, as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise and

eternal life on earth, even so in Christ all shall be made alive; then all men shall be made to live on earth; for

else the comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the Psalmist, "Upon Zion God

commanded the blessing, even life for evermore"; [Psalms, 133. 3] for Zion is in Jerusalem upon earth: as

also that of St. John, "To him that overcometh I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the

Paradise of God." [Revelation, 2. 7] This was the tree of Adam's eternal life; but his life was to have been on

earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. John, where he saith, "I John saw the holy city, new

Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband": and again,

verse 10, to the same effect; as if he should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again

of Christ, should come down to God's people from heaven, and not they go up to it from earth. And this

differs nothing from that which the two men in white clothing (that is, the two angels) said to the Apostles

that were looking upon Christ ascending: "This same Jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so

come, as you have seen him go up into heaven." Which soundeth as if they had said he should come down to

govern them under his Father eternally here, and not take them up to govern them in heaven; and is

conformable to the restoration of the kingdom of God, instituted under Moses, which was a political

government of the Jews on earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour, "that in the resurrection they neither

marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven," is a description of an eternal life,

resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of marriage. For seeing Adam and Eve, if they had not

sinned, had lived on earth eternally in their individual persons, it is manifest they should not continually have

procreated their kind. For if immortals should have generated, as mankind doth now, the earth in a small time

would not have been able to afford them place to stand on. The Jews that asked our Saviour the question,

whose wife the woman that had married many brothers should be in the resurrection, knew not what were the

consequences of life eternal: and therefore our puts them in mind of this consequence of immortality; that

there shall be no generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is marriage or generation

among the angels. The comparison between that eternal life which Adam lost, and our Saviour by his victory

over death hath recovered, holdeth also in this, that as Adam lost eternal life by his sin, and yet lived after it

for a time, so the faithful Christian hath recovered eternal life by Christ's passion, though he die a natural

death, and remain dead for a time; namely, till the resurrection. For as death is reckoned from the

condemnation of Adam, not from the execution; so life is reckoned from the absolution, not from the

That the place wherein men are to live eternally, after the resurrection, is the heavens, meaning by heaven

those parts of the world which are the most remote from earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in

another higher heaven, called coelum empyreum (whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in

reason), is not easily to be drawn from any text that I can find. By the Kingdom of Heaven is meant the

kingdom of the King that dwelleth in heaven; and His kingdom was the people of Israel, whom He ruled by

the prophets, his lieutenants; first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the sovereign priests, till in the days of

Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortal man for their king after the manner of other nations. And

when our Saviour Christ by the preaching of his ministers shall have persuaded the Jews to return, and called

the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new king of heaven; because our King shall then be God,

whose throne is heaven, without any necessity evident in the Scripture that man shall ascend to his happiness

any higher than God's footstool the earth. On the contrary, we find written that "no man hath ascended into

heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man, that is in heaven." Where I observe, by the

way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the words of our Saviour, but of St.

John himself; for Christ was then not in heaven, but upon the earth. The like is said of David where St. Peter,

to prove the Ascension of Christ, using the words of the Psalmist, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor

suffer thine Holy One to see corruption," saith they were spoken, not of David, but of Christ, and to prove it,

addeth this reason, "For David is not ascended into heaven." But to this a man may easily answer and say

that, though their bodies were not to ascend till the general day of judgement, yet their souls were in heaven

as soon as they were departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our

Saviour, who, proving the resurrection out of the words of Moses, saith thus, "That the dead are raised, even

Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God

of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for they all live to him." [Luke, 20. 37, 38] But if

these words be to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they prove not at all that which our

Saviour intended to prove, which was the resurrection of the body, that is to say, the immortality of the man.

Therefore our Saviour meaneth that those patriarches were immortal, not by a property consequent to the

essence and nature of mankind, but by the will of God, that was pleased of His mere grace to bestow eternal

life upon the faithful. And though at that time the patriarchs and many other faithful men were dead, yet as it

is in the text, they "lived to God"; that is, they were written in the Book of Life with them that were absolved

of their sins, and ordained to life eternal at the resurrection. That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal,

and a living creature independent on the body; or that any mere man is immortal, otherwise than by the

resurrection in the last day, except Enos and Elias, is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole

fourteenth Chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himself, is a complaint of this

mortality of nature; and yet no contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection. "There is hope of a tree,"

saith he, "if it be cast down. Though the root thereof wax old, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet

when it scenteth the water it will bud, and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dieth, and wasteth away,

yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he?" [Job, 14. 7] And, verse 12, "man lieth down, riseth not, till

the heavens be no more." But when is it that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us that it is at the

general resurrection. For in his second Epistle, third Chapter, verse 7, he saith that "the heavens and the earth

that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of judgement, and perdition of ungodly men," and, verse

12, "looking for and hasting to the coming of God, wherein the heavens shall be on fire, and shall be

dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat. Nevertheless, we according to the promise look for

new heavens, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." Therefore where Job saith, "man riseth not

till the heavens be no more"; it is all one, as if he had said the immortal life (and soul and life in the Scripture

do usually signify the same thing) beginneth not in man till the resurrection and day of judgement; and hath

for cause, not his specifical nature and generation, but the promise. For St. Peter says not, "We look for new

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of diverse evident places of Scripture, in the thirtyfifth

Chapter of this book, that the kingdom of God is a civil Commonwealth, where God Himself is sovereign, by

virtue first of the Old, and since of the New, Covenant, wherein He reigneth by His vicar or lieutenant; the

same places do therefore also prove that after the coming again of our Saviour in his majesty and glory to

reign actually and eternally, the kingdom of God is to be on earth. But because this doctrine, though proved

out of places of Scripture not few nor obscure, will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it,

maintaining nothing in this or any other paradox of religion, but attending the end of that dispute of the

sword, concerning the authority (not yet amongst my countrymen decided), by which all sorts of doctrine are

to be approved or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech and writing, whatsoever be the opinions of

private men, must by all men, that mean to be protected by their laws, be obeyed. For the points of doctrine

concerning the kingdom of God have so great influence on the kingdom of man as not to be determined but

As the kingdom of God, and eternal life, so also God's enemies, and their torments after judgement, appear by

the Scripture to have their place on earth. The name of the place where all men remain till the resurrection,

that were either buried or swallowed up of the earth, is usually called in Scripture by words that signify under

ground; which the Latins read generally infernus and inferi, and the Greeks ades; that is to say, a place where

men cannot see; and containeth as well the grave as any other deeper place. But for the place of the damned

after the resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old nor New Testament, by any note of situation, but

only by the company: as that it shall be where such wicked men were, as God in former times in

extraordinary and miraculous manner had destroyed from off the face of the earth: as for example, that they

are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in the bottomless pit; because Corah, Dathan, and Abiram were swallowed up

alive into the earth. Not that the writers of the Scripture would have us believe there could be in the globe of

the earth, which is not only finite, but also, compared to the height of the stars, of no considerable magnitude,

a pit without a bottom; that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their demonology (that is to say

in their doctrine concerning demons), and after them the Romans, called Tartarus; of which Virgil says,

Bis patet in praeceps, tantum tenditque sub umbras, Quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus Olympum: for that

is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear: but that we should believe them there, indefinitely,

Again, because those mighty men of the earth that lived in the time of Noah, before the flood (which the

Greeks called heroes, and the Scripture giants, and both say were begotten by copulation of the children of

God with the children of men), were for their wicked life destroyed by the general deluge, the place of the

damned is therefore also sometimes marked out by the company of those deceased giants; as Proverbs, 21.

16, "The man that wandereth out of the way of understanding shall remain in the congregation of the giants,"

and Job, 26. 5, "Behold the giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them." Here the place of the

damned is under the water. And Isaiah, 14. 9, "Hell is troubled how to meet thee" (that is, the King of

Babylon) "and will displace the giants for thee": and here again the place of the damned, if the sense be

Thirdly, because the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for

their wickedness with fire and brimstone, and together with them the country about made a stinking

bituminous lake, the place of the damned is sometimes expressed by fire, and a fiery lake: as in the

Apocalypse, 21. 8, "But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and

sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone;

which is the second death." So that it is manifest that hell fire, which is here expressed by metaphor, from the

real fire of Sodom, signifieth not any certain kind or place of torment, but is to be taken indefinitely for

destruction, as it is in Revelation, 20, at the fourteenth verse, where it is said that "Death and hell were cast

into the lake of fire"; that is to say, were abolished and destroyed; as if after the day of judgement there shall

be no more dying, nor no more going into hell; that is, no more going to Hades (from which word perhaps

Fourthly, from the plague of darkness inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written, "They saw not one

another, neither rose any man from his place for three days; but all the children of Israel had light in their

dwellings";[Exodus, 10. 23] the place of the wicked after judgement is called utter darkness, or, as it is in the

original, darkness without. And so it is expressed where the king commandeth his servants, "to bind hand and

foot the man that had not on his wedding garment and to cast him into," eis to skotos to exoteron "external

darkness," [Matthew, 22. 13] or "darkness without": which, though translated "utter darkness," does not

signify how great, but where that darkness is to be; namely, without the habitation of God's elect.

Lastly, whereas there was a place near Jerusalem called the Valley of the Children of Hinnon in a part

whereof called Tophet the Jews had committed most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the idol

Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted His enemies with most grievous punishments; and wherein

Josiah had burnt the priests of Moloch upon their own altars, as appeareth at large in II Kings, Chapter 23; the

place served afterwards to receive the filth and garbage which was carried thither out of the city; and there

used to be fires made, from time to time, to purify the air and take away the stench of carrion. From this

abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call the place of the damned by the name of Gehenna, or Valley

of Hinnon. And this Gehenna is that word which is usually now translated hell; and from the fires from time

Seeing now there is none that so interprets the Scripture as that after the day of judgement the wicked are all

eternally to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again as to be ever after

underground or underwater; or that after the resurrection they shall no more see one another, nor stir from one

place to another; it followeth, methinks, very necessarily, that which is thus said concerning hell fire is

spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to be enquired after (for of all metaphors

there is some real ground, that may be expressed in proper words), both of the place of hell, and the nature of

And first for the tormenters, we have their nature and properties exactly and properly delivered by the names

of the enemy, or Satan; the Accuser, or Diabolus; the Destroyer, or Abaddon. Which significant names,

Satan, Devil, Abaddon, set not forth to us any individual person, as proper names use to do, but only an office

or quality; and are therefore appellatives; which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are in the

Latin and modern Bibles, because thereby they seem to be the proper names of demons; and men are more

easily seduced to believe the doctrine of devils, which at that time was the religion of the Gentiles, and

And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer is meant the enemy of them that shall be in the

kingdom of God; therefore if the kingdom of God after the resurrection be upon the earth (as in the former

chapter I have shown by Scripture it seems to be), the enemy and his kingdom must be on earth also. For so

also was it in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For God's kingdom was in Palestine; and the nations

round about were the kingdoms of the Enemy; and consequently by Satan is meant any earthly enemy of the

The torments of hell are expressed sometimes by "weeping, and gnashing of teeth," as Matthew, 8. 12;

sometimes, by "the worm of conscience," as Isaiah, 66. 24, and Mark, 9. 44, 46, 48; sometimes, by fire, as in

the place now quoted, "where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched," and many places besides:

sometimes, by "shame, and contempt," as, "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake;

some to everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt." [Daniel, 12. 2] All which places

design metaphorically a grief and discontent of mind from the sight of that eternal felicity in others which

they themselves through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others

is not sensible but by comparison with their own actual miseries, it followeth that they are to suffer such

bodily pains and calamities as are incident to those who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but have

also for enemy the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily pains is to be

reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death. For though the Scripture be clear for a universal

resurrection, yet we do not read that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternal life. For whereas St. Paul,

to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith that "the body is sown in corruption,

and is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in

power";[I Corinthians, 15. 42, 43] glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of the wicked: nor can the

name of second death be applied to those that can never die but once. And although in metaphorical speech a

calamitous life everlasting may be called an everlasting death, yet it cannot well be understood of a second

death. The fire prepared for the wicked is an everlasting fire: that is to say, the estate wherein no man can be

without torture, both of body and mind, after the resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense the fire

shall be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred that he who shall be cast

into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them so as be eternally burnt and

tortured, and yet never be destroyed nor die. And though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire and

torments, into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever, yet I find none that affirm there

shall be an eternal life therein of any individual person; but to the contrary, an everlasting death, which is the

second death: "For after death and the grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every

man be judged according to his works; death and the grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire. This is the

second death." [Revelation, 20. 13, 14] Whereby it is evident that there is to be a second death of every one

The joys of life eternal are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of salvation, or being saved. To be

saved is to be secured, either respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all evil, comprehending

want, sickness, and death itself. And because man was created in a condition immortal, not subject to

corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that

happiness by the sin of Adam; it followeth that to be saved from sin is to be saved from all the evil and

calamities that sin hath brought upon us. And therefore in the Holy Scripture, remission of sin, and salvation

from death and misery, is the same thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who, having cured a man

sick of the palsy, by saying, "Son be of good cheer thy sins be forgiven thee"; [Matthew, 9. 2] and knowing

that the scribes took for blasphemy that a man should pretend to forgive sins, asked them "whether it were

easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk";[Ibid., 9. 5] signifying thereby that it was all one,

as to the saving of the sick, to say, "Thy sins are forgiven," and "Arise and walk"; and that he used that form

of speech only to show he had power to forgive sins. And it is besides evident in reason that since death and

misery were the punishments of sin, the discharge of sin must also be a discharge of death and misery; that is

to say, salvation absolute, such as the faithful are to enjoy after the day of judgement, by the power and

Concerning particular salvations, such as are understood, "as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel," [I Samuel,

14. 39] that is, from their temporary enemies; and, "Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from violence";[II

Samuel, 22. 3] and, "God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the

Assyrians," [II Kings, 13. 5] and the like, I need say nothing; there being neither difficulty nor interest to

But concerning the general salvation, because it must be in the kingdom of heaven, there is great difficulty

concerning the place. On one side, by kingdom, which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetual

security against enemies and want, it seemeth that this salvation should be on earth. For by salvation is set

forth unto us a glorious reign of our king by conquest; not a safety by escape: and therefore there where we

look for salvation, we must look also for triumph; and before triumph, for victory; and before victory, for

battle; which cannot well be supposed shall be in heaven. But how good soever this reason may be, I will not

trust to it without very evident places of Scripture. The state of salvation is described at large, Isaiah, 33. 20,

"Look upon Zion, the city of our solemnities; thine eyes shall see Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle

that shall not be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the

"But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers and streams; wherein shall go no galley

"For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king, he will save us.

"Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail: then is the

"And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick; the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their

In which words we have the place from whence salvation is to proceed, "Jerusalem, a quiet habitation"; the

eternity of it, "a tabernacle that shall not be taken down," etc.; the Saviour of it, "the Lord, their judge, their

lawgiver, their king, he will save us"; the salvation, "the Lord shall be to them as a broad moat of swift

waters," etc.; the condition of their enemies, "their tacklings are loose, their masts weak, the lame shall take

the spoil of them"; the condition of the saved, "The inhabitant shall not say, I am sick"; and lastly, all this is

comprehended in forgiveness of sin, "the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity." By which

it is evident that salvation shall be on earth, then, when God shall reign, at the coming again of Christ, in

Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into God's

kingdom: as is also more expressly declared by the same prophet, "And they" (that is, the Gentiles who had

any Jew in bondage) "shall bring all your brethren for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses,

and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith

the Lord, as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord. And I will

also take of them for priests and for Levites, saith the Lord":[Isaiah, 66. 20, 21] whereby it is manifest that

the chief seat of God's kingdom, which is the place from whence the salvation of us that were Gentiles shall

proceed, shall be Jerusalem: and the same is also confirmed by our Saviour, in his discourse with the woman

of Samaria concerning the place of God's worship; to whom he saith that the Samaritans worshipped they

knew not what, but the Jews worshipped what they knew, "for salvation is of the Jews"[John, 4. 22] (ex

Judaeis, that is, begins at the Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom He will

save you, as we do, that know it shall be by one of the tribe of Judah; a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore

also the woman not impertinently answered him again, "We know the Messias shall come." So that which our

Saviour saith, "Salvation is from the Jews,: is the same that Paul says, "The gospel is the power of God to

salvation to every one that believeth: to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the righteousness of

God revealed from faith to faith";[Romans, 1. 16, 17] from the faith of the Jew to the faith of the Gentile. In

the like sense the prophet Joel, describing the day of judgement, that God would "shew wonders in heaven,

and in earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke. The sun should be turned to darkness, and the moon into

blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come." [Joel, 2. 30, 31] He addeth, "and it shall come to

pass, that whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. For in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem

shall be salvation." [Ibid., 2. 32] And Obadiah, verse 17, saith the same, "Upon Mount Zion shall be

deliverance; and there shall be holiness, and the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions," that is, the

possessions of the heathen, which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by the

mount of Esau, the land of the Philistines, the fields of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and the cities of the

South, and concludes with these words, "the kingdom shall be the Lord's." All these places are for salvation,

and the kingdom of God, after the day of judgement, upon earth. On the other side, I have not found any text

that can probably be drawn to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven; that is to say, into any coelum

empyreum, or other ethereal region, saving that it is called the kingdom of heaven: which name it may have

because God, that was king of the Jews, governed them by His commands sent to Moses by angels from

heaven; and after their revolt, sent His Son from heaven to reduce them to their obedience; and shall send him

thence again to rule both them and all other faithful men from the day of judgement, everlastingly: or from

that, that the throne of this our Great King is in heaven; whereas the earth is but His footstool. But that the

subjects of God should have any place as high as His throne, or higher than His footstool, it seemeth not

suitable to the dignity of a king, nor can I find any evident text for it in Holy Scripture.

From this that hath been said of the kingdom of God, and of salvation, it is not hard to interpret what is meant

by the world to come. There are three worlds mentioned in the Scripture; the old world, the present world,

and the world to come. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, "If God spared not the old world, but saved Noah the

eighth person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly," etc. [II Peter,

2. 5] So the first world was from Adam to the general flood. Of the present world, our Saviour speaks, "My

kingdom is not of this world." [John, 18. 36] For He came only to teach men the way of salvation, and to

renew the kingdom of His Father by His doctrine. Of the world to come, St. Peter speaks, "Nevertheless we

according to his promise look for new heavens, and a new earth." [II Peter, 3. 13] This is that world wherein

Christ coming down from heaven in the clouds, with great power and glory, shall send His angels, and shall

gather together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the earth, and thenceforth reign

Salvation of a sinner supposeth a precedent redemption; for he that is once guilty of sin is obnoxious to the

penalty of the same; and must pay, or some other for him, such ransom as he that is offended, and has him in

his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended is Almighty God, in whose power are all things,

such ransom is to be paid before salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require. By this

ransom is not intended a satisfaction for sin equivalent to the offence, which no sinner for himself, nor

righteous man can ever be able to make for another: the damage a man does to another he may make amends

for by restitution or recompense, but sin cannot be taken away by recompense; for that were to make the

liberty to sin a thing vendible. But sins may be pardoned to the repentant, either gratis or upon such penalty

as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted, in the Old Testament, was some sacrifice or

oblation. To forgive sin is not an act of injustice, though the punishment have been threatened. Even amongst

men, though the promise of good bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises of evil, bind them

not; much less shall they bind God, who is infinitely more merciful than men. Our Saviour Christ therefore to

redeem us did not in that sense satisfy for the sins of men, as that his death, of its own virtue, could make it

unjust in God to punish sinners with eternal death; but did make that sacrifice and oblation of Himself, at His

first coming, which God was pleased to require for the salvation at His second coming, of such as in the

meantime should repent and believe in Him. And though this act of our redemption be not always in

Scripture called a sacrifice and oblation, but sometimes a price; yet by price we are not to understand

anything by the value whereof He could claim to a pardon for us from his offended Father; but that price

THE WORD Church (ecclesia) signifieth in the books of Holy Scripture diverse things. Sometimes, though

not often, it is taken for God's house, that is to say, for a temple wherein Christians assemble to perform holy

duties publicly; as, "Let your women keep silence in the churches":[I Corinthians, 14. 34] but this is

metaphorically put for the congregation there assembled, and hath been since used for the edifice itself to

distinguish between the temples of Christians and idolaters. The Temple of Jerusalem was God's house, and

the house of prayer; and so is any edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ, Christ's house: and

therefore the Greek Fathers call it Kuriake, the Lord's house; and thence in our language it came to be called

Church, when not taken for a house, signifieth the same that ecclesia signified in the Grecian

Commonwealths; that is to say, a congregation, or an assembly of citizens, called forth to hear the magistrate

speak unto them; and which in the Commonwealth of Rome was called concio, as he that spake was called

ecclesiastes, and concionator. And when they were called forth by lawful authority, it was ecclesia legitima, a

lawful Church, ennomos Ekklesia. [Acts, 19. 39] But when they were excited by tumultuous and seditious

It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the congregation, though not actually

assembled; that is to say, for the whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as

where it is said that "Saul made havoc of the church":[Acts, 8. 3] and in this sense is Christ said to be Head of

the Church. And sometimes for a certain part of Christians; as, "Salute the Church that is in his house."

[Colossians, 4. 15] Sometimes also for the elect only; as, "A glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle, holy

and without blemish"; [Ephesians, 5. 27] which is meant of the Church triumphant, or Church to come.

Sometimes, for a congregation assembled of professors of professors of Christianity, whether their profession

be true or counterfeit, as it is understood where it is said, "Tell it to the Church, and if he neglect to hear the

And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one person; that is to say, that it can be said

to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to do any other action

whatsoever; for without authority from a lawful congregation, whatsoever act be done in a concourse of

people, it is the particular act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the performance of

it; and not the act of them all in gross, as of one body; much less the act of them that were absent, or that,

being present, were not willing it should be done. According to this sense, I define a Church to be: a company

of men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign; at whose command they ought to

assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. And because in all Commonwealths that

assembly which is without warrant from the civil sovereign is unlawful; that Church also which is assembled

in any Commonwealth that hath forbidden them to assemble is an unlawful assembly.

It followeth also that there is on earth no such universal Church as all Christians are bound to obey, because

there is no power on earth to which all other Commonwealths are subject. There are Christians in the

dominions of several princes and states, but every one of them is subject to that Commonwealth whereof he is

himself a member, and consequently cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. And therefore a

Church, such a one as is capable to command, to judge, absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same

thing with a civil Commonwealth consisting of Christian men; and is called a civil state, for that the subjects

of it are men; and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians. Temporal and spiritual government

are but two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign. It is

true that the bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only spiritual, but eternal; but in this life

they are gross and corruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life, neither of state nor religion,

but temporal; nor teaching of any doctrine lawful to any subject which the governor both of the state and of

the religion forbiddeth to be taught. And that governor must be one; or else there must needs follow faction

and civil war in the Commonwealth between the Church and State; between spiritualists and temporalists;

between the sword of justice and the shield of faith; and, which is more, in every Christian man's own breast

between the Christian and the man. The doctors of the Church are called pastors; so also are civil sovereigns:

but if pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may be one chief pastor, men will be taught

contrary doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be, false. Who that one chief pastor is, according to

the law of nature, hath been already shown; namely, that it is the civil sovereign: and to whom the Scripture

THE FATHER of the faithful, and first in the kingdom of God by covenant, was Abraham. For with him was

the covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself and his seed after him to acknowledge and obey the

commands of God; not only such as he could take notice of (as moral laws) by the light of nature; but also

such as God should in special manner deliver to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they

were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withal, by promise of the land of Canaan. Nor

was there any contract that could add to or strengthen the obligation by which both they and all men else

were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: and therefore the covenant which Abraham made with God was

to take for the commandment of God that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a dream or

In this contract of God with Abraham, we may observe three points of important consequence in the

government of God's people. First, that at the making of this covenant God spoke only to Abraham, and

therefore contracted not with any of his family or seed otherwise than as their wills (which make the essence

of all covenants) were before the contract involved in the will of Abraham, who was therefore supposed to

have had a lawful power to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. According whereunto God

saith, "All the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him, for I know him that he will command his children

and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord." [Genesis, 18. 18, 19] From whence

may be concluded this first point, that they to whom God hath not spoken immediately are to receive the

positive commandments of God from their sovereign, as the family and seed of Abraham did from Abraham

their father and lord and civil sovereign. And consequently in every Commonwealth, they who have no

supernatural revelation to the contrary ought to obey the laws of their own sovereign in the external acts and

profession of religion. As for the inward thought and belief of men, which human governors can take no

notice of (for God only knoweth the heart), they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the

unrevealed will and of the power of God, and consequently fall not under obligation.

From whence proceedeth another point; that it was not unlawful for Abraham, when any of his subjects

should pretend private vision or spirit, or other revelation from God, for the countenancing of any doctrine

which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them; and

consequently that it is lawful now for the sovereign to punish any man that shall oppose his private spirit

against the laws: for he hath the same place in the Commonwealth that Abraham had in his own family.

There ariseth also from the same a third point; that as none but Abraham in his family, so none but the

sovereign in a Christian Commonwealth, can take notice what is or what is not the word of God. For God

spoke only to Abraham, and it was he only that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to

his family: and therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a Commonwealth are the only

The same covenant was renewed with Isaac, and afterwards with Jacob, but afterwards no more till the

Israelites were freed from the Egyptians and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by

Moses (as I have said before, Chapter thirtyfive), in such manner as they became from that time forward the

peculiar kingdom of God, whose lieutenant was Moses for his own time: and the succession to that office was

settled upon Aaron and his heirs after him to be to God a sacerdotal kingdom forever.

By this constitution, a kingdom is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites

as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance, it appeareth not as yet

that the people were obliged to take him for God's lieutenant longer than they believed that God spoke unto

him. And therefore his authority, notwithstanding the covenant they made with God, depended yet merely

upon the opinion they had of his sanctity, and of the reality of his conferences with God, and the verity of his

miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take anything for the law of God

which he propounded to them in God's name. We are therefore to consider what other ground there was of

their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandment of God that could oblige them, because

God spoke not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses himself: and our Saviour saith of himself,

"If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true";[John, 5. 31] much less if Moses bear witness of himself,

especially in a claim of kingly power over God's people, ought his testimony to be received. His authority

therefore, as the authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of the people and their

promise to obey him. And so it was: for "the people when they saw the thunderings, and the lightnings, and

the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking, removed and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses,

Speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die." [Exodus, 20. 18, 19] Here

was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should

And notwithstanding the covenant constituteth a sacerdotal kingdom, that is to say, a kingdom hereditary to

Aaron; yet that is to be understood of the succession after Moses should be dead. For whosoever ordereth and

establisheth the policy as first founder of a Commonwealth, be it monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, must

needs have sovereign power over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that power all

his own time is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the text last before cited, because the people

promised obedience, not to Aaron, but to him. Secondly, "And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord,

thou and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come near the

Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people go up with him." [Exodus, 24. 1, 2] By which it is

plain that Moses, who was alone called up to God (and not Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy

elders, nor the people who were forbidden to come up), was alone he that represented to the Israelites the

person of God; that is to say, was their sole sovereign under God. And though afterwards it be said, "Then

went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, and they saw the God of

Israel, and there was under His feet as it were a paved work of sapphire stone," [Ibid., 24. 9] etc.; yet this was

not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the people the words which God had said

to him. He only went for the business of the people; the others, as the nobles of his retinue, were admitted for

honour to that special grace which was not allowed to the people; which was, as in the verse after appeareth,

to see God and live. "God laid not His hand upon them, they saw God, and did eat and drink" (that is, did

live), but did not carry any commandment from Him to the people. Again, it is everywhere said, "The Lord

spake unto Moses," as in all other occasions of government, so also in also in the ordering of the ceremonies

of religion, contained in the 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st chapters of Exodus, and throughout

Leviticus; to Aaron, seldom. The calf that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of the

authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriam's mutiny against Moses, was judged by God Himself for

Moses. [Numbers, 12] So also in the question between Moses and the people, who had the right of governing

the people, when Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly "gathered

themselves together against Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, ye take too much upon you,

seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up

yourselves above the congregation of the Lord?" [Ibid., 16. 3] God caused the earth to swallow Korah,

Dathan, and Abiram, with their wives and children, alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes

with fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes of the people, but

Moses alone had next under God the sovereignty over the Israelites: and that not only in causes of civil

policy, but also of religion: for Moses only spoke with God, and therefore only could tell the people what it

was that God required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach

the mountain where God talked with Moses. "Thou shalt set bounds," saith the Lord, "to the people round

about, and say, Take heed to yourselves that you go not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it;

whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death." [Exodus, 19. 12] And again, "Go down, charge

the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze." [Ibid., 19. 21] Out of which we may conclude that

whosoever in Christian Commonwealth holdeth the place of Moses is the sole messenger of God and

interpreter of His commandments. And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the

Scripture to proceed further than the bounds which are set by their several sovereigns. For the Scriptures,

since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai, the bounds whereof are the laws of them that represent

God's person on earth. To look upon them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to

fear Him, is allowed; but to interpret them, that is, to pry into what God saith to him whom He appointeth to

govern under Him, and make themselves judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to

There was no prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the spirit of God, but such as Moses had

approved and authorized. For there were in his time but seventy men that are said to prophesy by the spirit of

God, and these were all of Moses his election; concerning whom God said to Moses, "Gather to me seventy

of the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people." [Numbers, 11. 16] To these God

imparted His spirit; but it was not a different spirit from that of Moses; for it is said, "God came down in a

cloud, and took of the spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy elders." [Ibid., 11. 25] But as I

have shown before, Chapter thirtysix, by spirit is understood the mind; so that the sense of the place is no

other than this, that God endued them with a mind conformable and subordinate to that of Moses, that they

might prophesy, that is to say, speak to the people in God's name in such manner as to set forward (as

ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For they were

but ministers; and when two of them prophesied in the camp, it was thought a new and unlawful thing; and as

it is in the 27th and 28th verses of the same chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to

forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his spirit that they prophesied. By which it is manifest that

no subject ought to pretend to prophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him

Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the kingdom, as being a sacerdotal kingdom, descended by

virtue of the covenant to Aaron's son, Eleazar the high priest: and God declared him, next under Himself, for

sovereign, at the same time that He appointed Joshua for the general of their army. For thus God saith

expressly concerning Joshua: "He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him before

the Lord; at his word shall they go out, and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the children of

Israel with him." [Numbers, 27. 21] Therefore the supreme power of making war and peace was in the priest.

The supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high priest: for the Book of the Law was in their

keeping, and the priests and Levites only were the subordinate judges in causes civil, as appears in

Deuteronomy, 17. 8, 9, 10. And for the manner of God's worship, there was never doubt made but that the

high priest, till the time of Saul, had the supreme authority. Therefore the civil and ecclesiastical power were

both joined together in one and the same person, the high priest; and ought to be so, in whosoever governeth

After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is noted frequently in the Book of Judges,

"that there was in those days no king in Israel"; and sometimes with this addition, that "every man did that

which was right in his own eyes." By which is to be understood that where it is said, "there was no king," is

meant, "there was no sovereign power," in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and exercise of such

power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar, "there arose another generation that knew not the Lord, nor

the nor the works which He had done for Israel, but did evil in the sight of the Lord and served Baalim."

[Judges, 2. 10] And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, "to look for a sign," not only before they

would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their

submission. Whereas signs and miracles had for end to procure faith, not to keep men from violating it when

they have once given it, for to that men are obliged by the law of nature. But if we consider not the exercise,

but the right of governing, the sovereign power was still in the high priest. Therefore whatsoever obedience

was yielded to any of the judges (who were men chosen by God extraordinarily to save His rebellious

subjects out of the hands of the enemy), it cannot be drawn into argument against the right the high priest had

to the sovereign power in all matters both of policy and religion. And neither the judges nor Samuel himself

had an ordinary, but extraordinary, calling to the government, and were obeyed by the Israelites, not out of

duty, but out of reverence to their favour with God, appearing in their wisdom, courage, or felicity. Hitherto

therefore the right of regulating both the policy and the religion were inseparable.

To the judges succeeded kings: and whereas before all authority, both in religion and policy, was in the high

priest; so now it was all in the king. For the sovereignty over the people which was, before, not only by virtue

of the divine power, but also by a particular pact of the Israelites in God, and next under Him, in the high

priest, as His vicegerent on earth, was cast off by the people, with the consent of God Himself. For when they

said to Samuel, "make us a king to judge us, like all the nations," [I Samuel, 8. 5] they signified that they

would no more be governed by the commands that should be laid upon them by the priest, in the name of

God; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all other nations were commanded; and

consequently in deposing the high priest of royal authority, they deposed that peculiar government of God.

And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel, "Hearken unto the voice of the people, in all that they shall

say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee; but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them."

[Ibid., 8. 7] Having therefore rejected God, in whose right the priests governed, there was no authority left to

the priests but such as the king was pleased to allow them; which was more or less, according as the kings

were good or evil. And for the government of civil affairs, it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the king.

For in the same chapter they say they will be like all the nations; that their king shall be their judge, and go

before them, and fight their battles; [Ibid., 8. 20] that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in peace and

war. In which is continued also the ordering of religion: for there was no other word of God in that time by

which to regulate religion but the Law of Moses, which was their civil law. Besides, we read that Solomon

"thrust out Abiathar from being priest before the Lord":[I Kings, 2. 27] he had therefore authority over the

high priest, as over any other subject, which is a great mark of supremacy in religion. And we read also that

he dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the people; and that he himself in person made that excellent prayer,

used in the consecrations of all churches and houses of prayer; [] which is another great mark of supremacy in

religion. Again, we read that when there was question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple,

the same was not decided by the high priest, but Josiah sent both and others to enquire concerning it, of

Huldah, the prophetess; [II Kings, 22] which is another mark of the supremacy in religion. Lastly, we read

that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, officers of Israel among them westward, "in all

business of the Lord, and in the service of the king." [I Chronicles, 26. 30] Likewise, that he made other

Hebronites "rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh" (these were the rest of

Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan) "for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king." [Ibid., 26. 32]

Is not this full power, both temporal and spiritual, as they call it that would divide it? To conclude: from the

first institution of God's kingdom, to the Captivity, the supremacy of religion was in the same hand with that

of the civil sovereignty; and the priest's office, after the election of Saul, was not magisterial, but ministerial.

Notwithstanding the government both in policy and religion were joined, first in the high priests, and

afterwards in the kings, so far forth as concerned the right; yet it appeareth by the same holy history that the

people understood it not; but there being amongst them a great part, and probably the greatest part, that no

longer than they saw great miracles, or, which is equivalent to a miracle, great abilities, or great felicity in the

enterprises of their governors, gave sufficient credit either to the fame of Moses or to the colloquies between

God and the priests, they took occasion, as oft as their governors displeased them, by blaming sometimes the

policy, sometimes the religion, to change the government or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure; and

from thence proceeded from time to time the civil troubles, divisions, and calamities of the nation. As for

example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation, which had not seen the wonders of God,

but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the covenant of a sacerdotal

kingdom, regarded no more the commandment of the priest, nor any law of Moses, but did every man that

which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed in civil affairs such men as from time to time they thought able

to deliver them from the neighbour nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God, as they ought to

do, but with such men, or women, as they guessed to be prophets by their predictions of things to come; and

though they had an idol in their chapel, yet if they had a Levite for their chaplain, they made account they

And afterwards when they demanded a king, after the manner of the nations, yet it was not with a design to

depart from the worship of God their King; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they would

have a king to judge them in civil actions; but not that they would allow their king to change the religion

which they thought was recommended to them by Moses. So that they always kept in store a pretext, either of

justice or religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience whensoever they had hope to prevail. Samuel

was displeased with the people, for that they desired a king (for God was their King already, and Samuel had

but an authority under Him); yet did Samuel, when Saul observed not his counsel in destroying Agag as God

had commanded, anoint another king, namely, David, to take the succession from his heirs. Rehoboam was

no idolater; but when the people thought him an oppressor, that civil pretence carried from him ten tribes to

Jeroboam an idolater. And generally through the whole history of the kings, as well of Judah as of Israel,

there were prophets that always controlled the kings for transgressing the religion, and sometimes also for

errors of state; as Jehoshaphat was reproved by the prophet Jehu for aiding the King of Israel against the

Syrians; [II Chronicles, 19. 2] and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, for showing his treasures to the ambassadors of

Babylon. By all which it appeareth that though the power both of state and religion were in the kings, yet

none of them were uncontrolled in the use of it but such as were gracious for their own natural abilities or

felicities. So that from the practice of those times, there can no argument be drawn that the right of

supremacy in religion was not in the kings, unless we place it in the prophets, and conclude that because

Hezekiah, praying to the Lord before the cherubim, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards

by the prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme head of the Church; or because Josiah consulted Huldah

the prophetess, concerning the Book of the Law, that therefore neither he, nor the high priest, but Huldah the

prophetess had the supreme authority in matter of religion, which I think is not the opinion of any doctor.

During the Captivity the Jews had no Commonwealth at all; and after their return, though they renewed their

covenant with God, yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras nor to any other: and

presently after they became subjects to the to the Greeks, from whose customs and demonology, and from the

doctrine of the Cabalists, their religion became much corrupted: in such sort as nothing can be gathered from

their confusion, both in state and religion, concerning the supremacy in either. And therefore so far forth as

concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude that whosoever had the sovereignty of the Commonwealth

amongst the Jews, the same had also the supreme authority in matter of God's external worship, and

represented God's person; that is, the person of God the Father; though He were not called by the name of

Father till such time as He sent into the world His Son Jesus Christ to redeem mankind from their sins, and

bring them into his everlasting kingdom to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak in the chapter

WE FIND in Holy Scripture three parts of the office of the Messiah: the first of a redeemer, or saviour; the

second of a pastor, counsellor, or teacher, that is, of a prophet sent from God to convert such as God hath

elected to salvation; the third of a king, an eternal king, but under his Father, as Moses and the high priests

were in their several times. And to these three parts are correspondent three times. For, our redemption he

wrought at his first coming, by the sacrifice wherein he offered up himself for our sins upon the cross; our

conversion he wrought partly then in his own person, and partly worketh now by his ministers, and will

continue to work till his coming again. And after his coming again shall begin that his glorious reign over his

To the office of a redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the ransom of sin, which ransom is death, it

appertaineth that he was sacrificed, and thereby bore upon his own head and carried away from us our

iniquities, in such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one man, though without sin, can satisfy for

the offences of all men, in the rigour of justice, but in the mercy of God, that ordained such sacrifices for sin

as He was pleased in His mercy to accept. In the old law (as we may read, Leviticus, 16) the Lord required

that there should, every year once, be made an atonement for the sins of all Israel, both priests and others; for

the doing whereof Aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself and the priests a young bullock, and for the rest of

the people he was to receive from them two young goats, of which he was to sacrifice one; but as for the

other, which was the scapegoat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the

iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune man to cause the goat to be

led into the wilderness, and there to escape and carry away with him the iniquities of the people. As the

sacrifice of the one goat was a sufficient, because an acceptable, price for the ransom of all Israel; so the

death of the Messiah is a sufficient price for the sins of all mankind, because there was no more required. Our

Saviour Christ's sufferings seem to be here figured as clearly as in the oblation of Isaac, or in any other type

of him in the Old Testament. He was both the sacrificed goat and the scapegoat: "He was oppressed, and he

was afflicted; he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumb

before the shearer, so opened he not his mouth":[Isaiah, 53. 7] here is the sacrificed goat. "He hath borne our

griefs and carried our sorrows";[Ibid.Ibid., 53. 6] and so he is the scapegoat. "He was cut off from the land of

the living for the transgression of my people": [Ibid., 53. 8] there again he is the sacrificed goat. And again,

"he shall bear their sins":[, 53. 11] he is the scapegoat. Thus is the Lamb of God equivalent to both those

goats; sacrificed, in that he died; and escaping, in his resurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father,

For as much therefore as he that redeemeth hath no title to the thing redeemed, before the redemption and

ransom paid, and this ransom was the death of the redeemer, it is manifest that our Saviour, as man, was not

king of those that he redeemed, before he suffered death; that is, during that time he conversed bodily on the

earth. I say he was not then king in present, by virtue of the pact which the faithful make with him in baptism:

nevertheless, by the renewing of their pact with God in baptism, they were obliged to obey him for king,

under his Father, whensoever he should be pleased to take the kingdom upon him. According whereunto, our

Saviour himself expressly saith, "My kingdom is not of this world." [John, 18. 36] Now seeing the Scripture

maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day of judgement, which is

therefore also called the last day; and that which shall be after the day of judgement, when there shall be a

new heaven and a new earth; the kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the general resurrection. And that is it

which our Saviour saith, "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels; and then he

shall reward every man according to his works." [Matthew, 16. 27] To reward every man according to his

works is to execute the office of a king; and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his Father, with his

angels. When our Saviour saith, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all therefore whatsoever they

bid you do, that observe and do";[Ibid., 23. 2] he declareth plainly that he ascribeth kingly power, for that

time, not to himself, but to them. And so he doth also, where he saith, "Who made me a judge or divider over

you?" [Luke, 12. 14] And, "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." [John, 12. 47] And yet our

Saviour came into this world that he might be a king and a judge in the world to come: for he was the

Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the anointed priest and the sovereign prophet of God; that is to say, he was

to have all the power that was in Moses the prophet, in the high priests that succeeded Moses, and in the

kings that succeeded the priests. And St. John says expressly, "The Father judgeth no man, but hath

committed all judgement to the Son." [Ibid., 5. 22] And this is not repugnant to that other place, "I came not

to judge the world": for this is spoken of the world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is

said that at the second coming of Christ, "Ye that have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man

shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

If then Christ, whilst he was on earth, had no kingdom in this world, to what end was his first coming? It was

to restore unto God, by a new covenant, the kingdom which, being his by the old covenant, had been cut off

by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to do, he was to preach unto them that he was

the Messiah, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets, and to offer himself in sacrifice for the sins of

them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to

call to his obedience such as should believe in him amongst the Gentiles. So that there are two parts of our

Saviour's office during his abode upon the earth: one to proclaim himself the Christ; and another by teaching,

and by working of miracles, to persuade and prepare men to live so as to be worthy of the immortality

believers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in majesty to take possession of his Father's

kingdom. And therefore it is that the time of his preaching is often by himself called the regeneration, which

is not properly a kingdom, and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the magistrates that then were; for he

commanded to obey those that sat then in Moses' chair, and to pay tribute to Caesar; but only an earnest of

the kingdom of God that was to come to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples and to

believe in him; for which cause the godly are said to be already in the kingdom of grace, as naturalized in that

Hitherto therefore there is nothing done or taught by Christ that tendeth to the diminution of the civil right of

the Jews or of Caesar. For as touching the Commonwealth which then was amongst the Jews, both they that

bore rule amongst them and they that were governed did all expect the Messiah and kingdom of God; which

they could not have done if their laws had forbidden him, when he came, to manifest and declare himself.

Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by preaching and miracles go about to prove himself to be that Messiah,

he did therein nothing against their laws. The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world: he taught all

men to obey in the meantime them that sat in Moses' seat: he allowed them to give Caesar his tribute, and

refused to take upon himself to be a judge. How then could his words or actions be seditious, or tend to the

overthrow of their then civil government? But God having determined his sacrifice for the reduction of His

elect to their former covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby He would bring the same to effect, made

use of their malice and ingratitude. Nor was it contrary to the laws of Caesar. For though Pilate himself, to

gratify the Jews, delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced openly that he found no

fault in him; and put for title of his condemnation, not as the Jews required, "that he pretended to be king,"

but simply, "that he was King of the Jews"; and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it, saying,

As for the third part of his office, which was to be king, I have already shown that his kingdom was not to

begin till the resurrection. But then he shall be king, not only as God, in which sense he is king already, and

ever shall be, of all the earth, in virtue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own elect, by virtue of

the pact they make with him in their baptism. And therefore it is that our Saviour saith that his Apostles

should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, "When the Son of Man shall sit in the

throne of his glory":[Loc. cit.] whereby he signified that he should reign then in his human nature; and "The

Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man

according to his works." [Ibid., 16. 27] The same we may read, Mark, 13. 26, and 14. 62, and more expressly

for the time, Luke, 22. 29, 30, "I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed to me, that you

may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." By

which it is manifest that the kingdom of Christ appointed to him by his Father is not to be before the Son of

Man shall come in glory, and make his Apostles judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here

ask, seeing there is no marriage in the kingdom of heaven, whether men shall then eat and drink. What eating

therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded by our Saviour where he saith, "Labour not for the meat

which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of Man shall give

you." So that by eating at Christ's table is meant the eating of the tree of life; that is to say, the enjoying of

immortality, in the kingdom of the Son of Man. By which places, and many more, it is evident that our

Again, he is to be king then no otherwise than as subordinate or vicegerent of God the Father, as Moses was

in the wilderness, and as the high priests were before the reign of Saul, and as the kings were after it. For it is

one of the prophecies concerning Christ that he be like, in office, to Moses: "I will raise them up a prophet,"

saith the Lord, "from amongst their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words into his

mouth";[Deuteronomy, 18. 18] and this similitude with Moses is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour

himself, whilst he was conversant on earth. For as Moses chose twelve princes of the tribes to govern under

him; so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones and judge the twelve tribes

of Israel: and as Moses authorized seventy elders to receive the Spirit of God, and to prophesy to the people,

that is, as I have said before, to speak unto them in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy

disciples to preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as when a complaint was made to Moses

against those of the seventy that prophesied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it as being subservient

therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St. John complained to him of a certain man that cast

out devils in his name, justified him therein, saying, "Forbid him not, for he that is not against us is on our

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of sacraments, both of admission into the kingdom of

God and of commemoration of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. As the children of

Israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdom of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of

circumcision, which rite, having been omitted in the wilderness, was again restored as soon as they came into

the Land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, had a rite of baptizing, that is, of

washing with water all those that, being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel. This rite St. John the Baptist

used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the Christ, whom he preached to be already come

into the world; and our Saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken by all that believed in him. For

what cause the rite of baptism first proceeded is not expressed formally in the Scripture, but it may be

probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses concerning leprosy; wherein the leprous man was

commanded to be kept out of the camp of Israel for a certain time; after which time, being judged by the

priest to be clean, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn washing. And this may therefore be a type of

the washing in baptism, wherein such men as are cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith are received into the

Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another conjecture drawn from the ceremonies of the

Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens: and that is, when a man that was thought dead chanced to

recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would do to converse with a ghost, unless he

were received again into the number of men by washing, as children new born were washed from the

uncleanness of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth. This ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that

Judaea was under the dominion of Alexander and the Greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept

into the religion of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would countenance a heathen rite, it is

most likely it proceeded from the legal ceremony of washing after leprosy. And for the other sacrament, of

eating the Paschal Lamb, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; in which the

breaking of the bread and the pouring out of the wine do keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of

sin by Christ's Passion, as the eating of the Paschal Lamb kept in memory the deliverance of the Jews out of

the bondage of Egypt. Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and he but a lieutenant to

God, it followeth that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to be like that of Moses, was no more but

subordinate to the authority of his Father. The same is more expressly signified by that that he teacheth us to

pray, "Our Father, let thy kingdom come"; and, "For thine is the kingdom, the power, and the glory"; and by

that it is said that "He shall come in the glory of his Father"; and by that which St. Paul saith, "then cometh

the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father";[I Corinthians, 15. 24] and by

Our Saviour therefore, both in teaching and reigning, representeth, as Moses did, the person God; which God

from that time forward, but not before, is called the Father; and, being still one and the same substance, is one

person as represented by Moses, and another person as represented by His Son the Christ. For person being a

relative to a representer, it is consequent to plurality of representers that there be a plurality of persons,

FOR the understanding of power ecclesiastical, what and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from

the ascension of our Saviour into two parts; one before the conversion of kings and men endued with

sovereign civil power; the other after their conversion. For it was long after the ascension before any king or

civil sovereign embraced and publicly allowed the teaching of Christian religion.

And for the time between, it is manifest that the power ecclesiastical was in the Apostles; and after them in

such as were by them ordained to preach the gospel, and to convert men to Christianity; and to direct them

that were converted in the way of salvation; and after these the power was delivered again to others by these

ordained, and this was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by which was signified the

giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they ordained ministers of God, to advance His

kingdom. So that imposition of hands was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach Christ and

teach his doctrine; and the giving of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands was an

imitation of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his minister Joshua, as we read,

Deuteronomy, 34. 9, "And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom; for Moses had laid his

hands upon him." Our Saviour therefore between his resurrection and ascension gave his spirit to the

Apostles; first, by breathing on them, and saying, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit";[John, 20. 22] and after his

ascension by sending down upon them a "mighty wind, and cloven tongues of fire";[Acts, 2. 2, 3] and not by

imposition of hands; as neither did God lay His hands on Moses: and his Apostles afterward transmitted the

same spirit by imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that it is manifest hereby in whom the power

ecclesiastical continually remained in those first times where there was not any Christian Commonwealth;

namely, in them that received the same from the Apostles, by successive laying on of hands.

Here we have the person of God born now the third time. For Moses and the high priests were God's

representative in the Old Testament; and our Saviour himself, as man, during his abode on earth: so the Holy

Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles and their successors, in the office of preaching and teaching, that had

received the Holy Spirit, have represented him ever since. But a person (as I have shown before, Chapter

thirteen) is he that is represented, as of as he is represented; and therefore God, who has been represented

(that is, personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three persons; though neither the word Person

nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible. St. John indeed saith, "There be three that bear witness in heaven,

the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one":[Luke, 5. 11] but this disagreeth not, but

accordeth fitly with three persons in the proper signification of persons; which is that which is represented by

another. For so God the Father, as represented by Moses, is one person; and as represented by His Son,

another person; and as represented by the Apostles, and by the doctors that taught by authority from them

derived, is a third person; and yet every person here is the person of one and the same God. But a man may

here ask what it was whereof these three bore witness. St. John therefore tells us that they bear witness that

"God hath given us eternal life in His Son." Again, if it should be asked wherein that testimony appeareth, the

answer is easy; for He hath testified the same by the miracles He wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by His

Son himself; and lastly by His Apostles that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times represented

the person of God, and either prophesied or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the Apostles, it was the

character of the apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles, to bear witness of his resurrection, as

appeareth expressly where St. Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot,

useth these words, "Of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and

out amongst us, beginning at the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one

be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection":[Acts, 1. 21, 22] which words interpret the "bearing of

witness" mentioned by St. John. There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of witnesses in earth.

For he saith, "there are three that bear witness in earth; the Spirit, and the water, and the blood; and these

three agree in one": [Ibid., 1. 8] that is to say, the graces of God's Spirit, and the two sacraments, baptism and

the Lord's Supper, which all agree in one testimony to assure the consciences of believers of eternal life; of

which testimony he saith, "He that believeth on the Son of Man hath the witness in himself." [Ibid., 1. 10] In

this Trinity on earth, the unity is not of the thing; for the spirit, the water, and the blood are not the same

substance, though they give the same testimony: but in the Trinity of heaven, the persons are the persons of

one and the same God, though represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the doctrine

of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this: that God, who is

always one and the same, was the person represented by Moses; the person represented by his Son incarnate;

and the person represented by the Apostles. As represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they

spoke is God; as represented by His Son, that was God and man, the Son is that God; as represented by

Moses and the high priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: from

whence we may gather the reason those names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in the signification of the

godhead, are never used in the Old Testament: for they are persons, that is, they have their names from

representing; which could not be till diverse men had represented God's person in ruling or in directing under

Thus we see how the power ecclesiastical was left by our Saviour to the Apostles; and how they were (to the

end they might the better exercise that power) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called

sometimes in the New Testament paracletus, which signifieth an assister, or one called to for help, though it

be commonly translated a comforter. Let us now consider the power itself, what it was, and over whom.

Cardinal Bellarmine, in his third general controversy, hath handled a great many questions concerning the

ecclesiastical power of the Pope of Rome, and begins with this, whether it ought to be monarchical,

aristocratical, or democratical. All which sorts of power are sovereign and coercive. If now it should appear

that there is no coercive power left them by our Saviour, but only a power to proclaim the kingdom of Christ,

and to persuade men to submit themselves there unto; and, by precepts and good counsel, to teach them that

have submitted what they are to do, that they may be received into the kingdom of God when it comes; and

that the Apostles, and other ministers of the Gospel, are our schoolmasters, and not our commanders, and

their precepts not laws, but wholesome counsels; then were all that dispute in vain.

I have shown already, in the last chapter, that the kingdom of Christ is not of this world: therefore neither can

his ministers, unless they be kings, require obedience in his name. For if the Supreme King have not his regal

power in this world; by what authority can obedience be required to his officers? "As my Father sent me," so

saith our Saviour, "I send you." [John, 20. 21] But our Saviour was sent to persuade the Jews to return to, and

to invite the Gentiles to receive, the kingdom of his Father, and not to reign in majesty, no not as his Father's

The time between the ascension and the general resurrection is called, not a reigning, but a regeneration; that

is, a preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ at the day of judgement, as appeareth

by the words of our Saviour, "You that have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit

in the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve thrones";[Matthew, 19. 28] and of St. Paul, "Having

your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace";[Ephesians, 6. 15] and is compared by our Saviour

to fishing; that is, to winning men to obedience, not by coercion and punishing, but by persuasion. And

therefore he said not to his Apostles he would make them so many Nimrods, hunters of men; but fishers of

men. It is compared also to leaven, to sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of mustardseed;

by all which compulsion is excluded; and consequently there can in that time be no actual reigning. The work

of Christ's ministers is evangelization; that is, a proclamation of Christ, and a preparation for his second

coming; as the evangelization of John the Baptist was a preparation to his first coming.

Again, the office of Christ's ministers in this world is to make men believe and have faith in Christ: but faith

hath no relation to, nor dependence at all upon, compulsion or commandment; but only upon certainty, or

probability of arguments drawn from reason, or from something men believe already. Therefore the ministers

of Christ in this world have no power by that title to punish any man for not believing or for contradicting

what they say: they have, I say, no power by that title of Christ's ministers to punish such; but if they have

sovereign civil power, by politic institution, then they may indeed lawfully punish any contradiction to their

laws whatsoever: and St. Paul, of himself and other the then preachers of the Gospel, saith in express words,

"We have no dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy."[II Corinthians, 1. 24]

Another argument, that the ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of commanding, may be

drawn from the lawful authority which Christ hath left to all princes, as well Christians as infidels. St. Paul

saith, "Children, obey your parents in all things; for this is well pleasing to the Lord." [Colossians, 3. 20]

And, "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eyeservice, as menpleasers,

but in singleness of heart, as fearing the Lord":[Ibid., 3. 22] this is spoken to them whose masters were

infidels; and yet they are bidden to obey them in all things. And again, concerning obedience to princes,

exhorting "to be subject to the higher powers," he saith, "that all power is ordained of God"; and "that we

ought to subject to them not only for" fear of incurring their "wrath, but also for conscience sake." [Romans,

13. 16] And St. Peter, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to

the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and

for the praise of them that do well; for so is the will of God." [I Peter, 2. 13, 14, 15] And again St. Paul, "Put

men in mind to be subject to principalities, and powers, and to obey magistrates." [Titus, 3. 1] These princes

and powers whereof St. Peter and St. Paul here speak were all infidels: much more therefore we are to obey

those Christians whom God hath ordained to have sovereign power over us. How then can we be obliged to

obey any minister of Christ if he should command us to do anything contrary to the command of the king or

other sovereign representant of the Commonwealth whereof we are members, and by whom we look to be

protected? It is therefore manifest that Christ hath not left to his ministers in this world, unless they be also

But what, may some object, if a king, or a senate, or other sovereign person forbid us to believe in Christ? To

this I answer that such forbidding is of no effect; because belief and unbelief never follow men's commands.

Faith is a gift of God which man can neither give nor take away by promise of rewards or menaces of torture.

And, if it be further asked, what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue we believe

not; must we obey such command? Profession with the tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any

other gesture whereby we signify our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding firmly in his heart the faith

of Christ, hath the same liberty which the prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was

converted in his heart to the God of Israel, for he saith, "Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt

offering nor sacrifice unto other gods, but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when

my master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow myself in

the house of Rimmon; when I bow myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this

thing." [II Kings, 5. 17, 18] This the Prophet approved, and bid him "Go in peace." Here Naaman believed in

his heart; but by bowing before the idol Rimmon, he denied the true God in effect as much as if he had done

it with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our Saviour's saying, "Whosoever denieth me before men, I

will deny him before my Father which is in heaven?" [Matthew, 10. 33] This we may say, that whatsoever a

subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own

mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign's; nor is it he that in this

case denieth Christ before men, but his governor, and the law of his country. If any man shall accuse this

doctrine as repugnant to true and unfeigned Christianity, I ask him, in case there should be a subject in any

Christian Commonwealth that should be inwardly in his heart of the Mahomedan religion, whether if his

sovereign command him to be present at the divine service of the Christian church, and that on pain of death,

he think that Mahomedan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey that

command of his lawful prince. If he say he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth all private men to

disobey their princes in maintenance of their religion, true or false: if he say he ought to be obedient, then he

alloweth to himself that which he denieth to another, contrary to the words of our Saviour, "Whatsoever you

would that men should do unto you, that do ye unto them";[Luke, 6. 31] and contrary to the law of nature

(which is the indubitable everlasting law of God), "Do not to another that which thou wouldest not he should

But what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the history of the Church, that they have

needlessly cast away their lives? For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been for

that cause put to death; whereof some have received a calling to preach and profess the profess the kingdom

of Christ openly; others have had no such calling, nor more has been required of them than their own faith.

The former sort, if they have been put to death for bearing witness to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from

the dead, were true martyrs; for a martyr is, to give the true definition of the word, a witness of the

resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those that those that conversed with him on earth,

and saw him after he was risen: for a witness must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not

good. And that none but such can properly be called martyrs of Christ is manifest out of the words of St.

Peter, "Wherefore of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and

out amongst us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day he was taken up from us, must one be

ordained to be a martyr" (that is, a witness) "with us of his resurrection":[Acts, 1. 21, 22] where we may

observe that he which is to be a witness of truth of the resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this

fundamental article of Christian religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some Disciple that conversed

with him, and saw him before and after his resurrection; and consequently must be one of his original

Disciples: whereas they which were not so can witness no more, but that their antecessors said it, and are

therefore but witnesses of other men's testimony, and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of Christ's witnesses.

He that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the history of our Saviour's life, and of

the Acts or Epistles of the Apostles, or which he believeth, upon the authority of a private man, will oppose

the laws and authority of the civil state, is very far from being a martyr of Christ, or a martyr of his martyrs. It

is one article only, which to die for meriteth so honourable a name, and that article is this, that Jesus is the

Christ; that is to say, he that hath redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternal life in

his glorious kingdom. To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition or profit of the clergy is not required;

nor is it the death of the witness, but the testimony itself that makes the martyr: for the word signifieth

nothing else but the man that beareth witness, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not.

Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamental article, but taketh it upon him of his private authority,

though he be a witness, and consequently a martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his Apostles,

Disciples, or their successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause, because being not called

thereto, it is not required at his hands; nor ought he to complain if he loseth the reward he expecteth from

those that never set him on work. None therefore can be a martyr, neither of the first nor second degree, that

have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none but such as are sent to the

conversion of infidels. For no man is a witness to him that already believeth, and therefore needs no witness;

but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his Apostles and his seventy Disciples with

authority to preach; he sent not all that believed. And he sent them to unbelievers; "I send you," saith he, "as

Lastly, the points of their commission, as they are expressly set down in the gospel, contain none of them any

We have first that the twelve Apostles were sent "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and commanded to

preach "that the kingdom of God was at hand." [Matthew, 10. 6, 7] Now preaching, in the original, is that act

which a crier, herald, or other officer useth to do publicly in proclaiming of a king. But a crier hath not right

to command any man. And the seventy Disciples are sent out as "Labourers, not as lords of the

harvest";[Luke, 10. 2] and are bidden to say, "The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you";[Ibid., 10. 9] and

by kingdom here is meant, not the kingdom of grace, but the kingdom of glory; for they are bidden to

denounce it to those cities which shall not receive them, as a threatening, that it shall be more tolerable in that

day for Sodom than for such a city. [Ibid., 10. 11] And our Saviour telleth his Disciples, that sought priority

of place, their office was to minister, even as the Son of Man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister.

[Matthew, 20. 28] Preachers therefore have not magisterial, but ministerial power: "Be not called masters,"

Another point of their commission is to "teach all nations"; as it is in Matthew, 28. 19, or as in St. Mark, 16.

15, "Go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Teaching, therefore, and preaching is the

same thing. For they that proclaim the coming of a king must withal make known by what right he cometh, if

they mean men shall submit themselves unto him: as St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when "three

Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have

suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ." [Acts, 17. 2, 3] But to teach out of the

Old Testament that Jesus was Christ, that is to say, king, and risen from the dead, is not to say that men are

bound, after they believe it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws and commands of their

sovereigns; but that they shall do wisely to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in patience and faith, with

Another point of their commission is to "baptize, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy

Ghost." What is baptism? Dipping into water. But what is it to dip a man into the water in the name of

anything? The meaning of these words of baptism is this. He that is baptized is dipped or washed as a sign of

becoming a new man and a loyal subject to that God whose person was represented in old time by Moses, and

the high priests, when He reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ, His Son, God and Man, that hath

redeemed us, and shall in his human nature represent his Father's person in his eternal kingdom after the

resurrection; and to acknowledge the doctrine of the Apostles, who, assisted by the Spirit of the Father and of

the Son, were left for guides to bring us into that kingdom, to be the only and assured way thereunto. This

being our promise in baptism; and the authority of earthly sovereigns being not to be put down till the day of

judgement; for that is expressly affirmed by St. Paul, where he saith, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ all

shall be made alive. But every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christ's at

his coming; then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when

he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power." [I Corinthians, 15. 22, 23, 24] It is manifest that

we do not in baptism constitute over us another authority by which our external actions are to be governed in

this life, but promise to take the doctrine of the Apostles for our direction in the way to life eternal.

The power of remission and retention of sins, called also the power of loosing and binding, and sometimes

the keys of the kingdom of heaven is a consequence of the authority to baptize or refuse to baptize. For

baptism is the sacrament of allegiance of them that are to be received into the kingdom of God; that is to say,

into eternal life; that is to say, to remission of sin: for as eternal life was lost by the committing, so it is

recovered by the remitting of men's sins. The end of baptism is remission of sins: therefore St. Peter, when

they that were converted by his sermon on the day of Pentecost asked what they were to do, advised them to

"repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus, for the remission of sins." [Acts, 2. 38] And therefore, seeing

to baptize is to declare the reception of men into God's kingdom, and to refuse to baptize is to declare their

exclusion, it followeth that the power to declare them cast out, or retained in it, was given to the same

Apostles, and their substitutes and successors. And therefore after our Saviour had breathed upon them,

saying, "Receive the Holy Ghost," [John, 20. 22] he addeth in the next verse, "Whosesoever sins ye remit,

they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained." By which words is not

granted an authority to forgive or retain sins, simply and absolutely, as God forgiveth or retaineth them, Who

knoweth the heart of man and truth of his penitence and conversion; but conditionally, to the penitent: and

this forgiveness, or absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned repentance, is thereby, without other

act or sentence of the absolved, made void, and hath no effect at all to salvation, but, on the contrary, to the

aggravation of his sin. Therefore the Apostles and their successors are to follow but the outward marks of

repentance; which appearing, they have no authority to deny absolution; and if they appear not, they have no

authority to absolve. The same also is to be observed in baptism: for to a converted Jew or Gentile, the

Apostles had not the power to deny baptism, nor to grant it to the unpenitent. But seeing no man is able to

discern the truth of another man's repentance, further than by external marks taken from his words and

actions, which are subject to hypocrisy, another question will arise: who is it that is constituted judge of those

marks? And this question is decided by our Saviour himself: "If thy brother," saith he, "shall trespass against

thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother.

But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it

unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican."

[Matthew, 18. 15, 16, 17] By which it is manifest that the judgement concerning the truth of repentance

belonged not to any one man, but to the Church, that is, to the assembly of the faithful, or to them that have

authority to be their representant. But besides the judgement, there is necessary also the pronouncing of

sentence: and this belonged always to the Apostle, or some pastor of the Church, as prolocutor; and of this

our Saviour speaketh in the eighteenth verse, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven;

and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." And conformable hereunto was the

practice of St. Paul where he saith, "For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have determined

already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed; in the name of our Lord Jesus

Christ, when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such

a one to Satan";[I Corinthians, 5. 3, 4, 5] that is to say, to cast him out of the Church, as a man whose sins are

not forgiven. Paul here pronounceth the sentence, but the assembly was first to hear the cause (for St. Paul

was absent), and by consequence to condemn him. But in the same chapter the judgement in such a case is

more expressly attributed to the assembly: "But now I have written unto you not to keep company, if any man

that is called a brother be a fornicator," etc., "with such a one no not to eat. For what have I to do to judge

them that are without? Do not ye judge them that are within?" [Ibid., 5. 11, 12] The sentence therefore by

which a man was put out of the Church was pronounced by the Apostle or pastor; but the judgement

concerning the merit of the cause was in the Church; that is to say, as the times were before the conversion of

kings, and men that had sovereign authority in the Commonwealth, the assembly of the Christians dwelling in

This part of the power of the keys by which men were thrust out from the kingdom of God is that which is

called excommunication and to excommunicate is, in the original, aposunagogon poiein, to cast out of the

synagogue; that is, out of the place of divine service; a word drawn from the custom of the Jews, to cast out

of their synagogues such as they thought in manners or doctrine contagious, as lepers were by the law of

Moses separated from the congregation of Israel till such time as they should be by the priest pronounced

The use and effect of excommunication, whilst it was not yet strengthened with the civil power, was no more

than that they who were not excommunicate were to avoid the company of them that were. It was not enough

to repute them as heathen, that never had been Christians; for with such they might eat and drink, which with

excommunicate persons they might not do, as appeareth by the words of St. Paul where he telleth them he

had formerly forbidden them to "company with fornicators";[I Corinthians, 5. 9, 10, etc.] but, because that

could not be without going out of the world, he restraineth it to such fornicators and otherwise vicious

persons as were of the brethren; "with such a one," he saith, they ought not to keep company, "no not to eat."

And this is no more than our Saviour saith, "Let him be to thee as a heathen, and as a publican." [Matthew,

18. 17] For publicans (which signifieth farmers and receivers of the revenue of the Commonwealth) were so

hated and detested by the Jews that were to pay it, as that publican and sinner were taken amongst them for

the same thing; insomuch as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of Zacchaeus a publican, though it

were to convert him, yet it was objected to him as a crime. And therefore, when our Saviour, to heathen,

As for keeping them out of their synagogues, or places of assembly, they had no power to do it but that of the

owner of the place, whether he were Christian or heathen. And because all places are by right in the dominion

of the Commonwealth, as well he that was excommunicated as he that never was baptized, might enter into

them by commission from the civil magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entered into their synagogues at

Damascus, to apprehend Christians, men and women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by commission

By which it appears that upon a Christian that should become an apostate, in a place where the civil power

did persecute or not assist the Church, the effect of excommunication had nothing in it, neither of damage in

this world nor of terror: not of terror, because of their unbelief; nor of damage, because they returned thereby

into the favour of the world; and in the world to come were to be in no worse estate than they which never

had believed. The damage redounded rather to the Church, by provocation of them they cast out to a freer

Excommunication therefore had its effect only upon those that believed that Jesus Christ was to come again

in glory to reign over and to judge both the quick and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into his

kingdom to those whose sins were retained; that is, to those that were excommunicated by the Church. And

thence it is that St. Paul calleth excommunication a delivery of the excommunicate person to Satan. For

without the kingdom of Christ, all other kingdoms after judgement are comprehended in the kingdom of

Satan. This is it that the faithful stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicate, that is to say, in an

estate wherein their sins were not forgiven. Whereby we may understand that excommunication in the time

that Christian religion was not authorized by the civil power was used only for a correction of manners, not of

errors in opinion: for it is a punishment whereof none could be sensible but such as believed and expected the

coming again of our Saviour to judge the world; and they who so believed needed no other opinion, but only

There lieth excommunication for injustice; as, if thy brother offend thee, tell it him privately, then with

witnesses; lastly, tell the Church, and then if he obey not, "Let him be to thee as an heathen man, and a

publican." [Matthew, 18. 15, 16, 17] And there lieth excommunication for a scandalous life, as "If any man

that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such

a one ye are not to eat." [I Corinthians, 5. 3, 4, 5] But to excommunicate a man that held this foundation, that

Jesus was the Christ, for difference of opinion in other points by which that foundation was not destroyed,

there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the Apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul a text

that seemeth to be to the contrary: "A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject."

[Ibid., 5. 11, 12] For a heretic is he that, being a member of the Church, teacheth nevertheless some private

opinion which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, St. Paul adviseth Titus after the first and second

admonition, to reject. But to reject in this place is not to excommunicate the man; but to give over

admonishing him, to let him alone, to set by disputing with him, as one that is to be convinced only by

himself. The same Apostle saith, "Foolish and unlearned questions avoid":[II Timothy, 2. 23] The word avoid

in this place, and reject in the former, is the same in the original, paraitou, but foolish questions may be set by

without excommunication. And again, "Avoid foolish questions,: [Titus, 3. 9] where the original periistaso

(set them by) is equivalent to the former word, reject. There is no other place that can so much as colourably

be drawn to countenance the casting out of the Church faithful men, such as believed the foundation, only for

a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good and pious conscience. But, on the

contrary, all such places as command avoiding such disputes are written for a lesson to pastors, such as

Timothy and Titus were, not to make new articles of faith by determining every small controversy, which

oblige men to a needless burden of conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the Church. Which

lesson the Apostles themselves observed well. St. Peter and St. Paul, though their controversy were great, as

we may read in Galatians, 2. 11, yet they did not cast one another out of the Church. Nevertheless, during the

Apostles' times, there were other pastors that observed it not; as Diotrephes who cast out of the Church such

as St. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took in preeminence: [3 John, 9, etc.]

so early it was that vainglory and ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.

That a man be liable to excommunication, there be many conditions requisite; as first, that he be a member of

some commonalty, that is to say, of some lawful assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church that hath

power to judge of the cause for which he is to be excommunicated. For where there is no community, there

can be no excommunication; nor where there is no power to judge, can there be any power to give sentence.

From hence it followeth that one Church cannot be excommunicated by another: for either they have equal

power to excommunicate each other, in which case excommunication is not discipline, nor an act of

authority, but schism, and dissolution of charity; or one is so subordinate to the other as that they both have

but one voice, and then they be but one Church; and the part excommunicated is no more a Church, but a

And because the sentence of excommunication importeth an advice not to keep company nor so much as to

eat with him that is excommunicate, if a sovereign prince or assembly be excommunicate, the sentence is of

no effect. For all subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of their own sovereign, when he

requireth it, by the law of nature; nor can they lawfully either expel him from any place of his own dominion,

whether profane or holy; nor go out of his dominion without his leave; much less, if he call them to that

honour, refuse to eat with him. And as to other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and the

same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the state

excommunicate: for the very institution, as it uniteth many men into one community, so it dissociateth one

community from another: so that excommunication is not needful for keeping kings and states asunder; nor

has any further effect than is in the nature of policy itself, unless it be to instigate princes to war upon one

Nor is the excommunication of a Christian subject that obeyeth the laws of his own sovereign, whether

Christian or heathen, of any effect. For if he believe that "Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God,"

[John, 5. 1] "and God dwelleth in him, and he in God." [, 4. 15] But he that hath the Spirit of God; he that

dwelleth in God; he in whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the excommunication of men. Therefore,

he that believeth Jesus to be the Christ is free from all the dangers threatened to persons excommunicate. He

that believeth it not is no Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to

excommunication: nor he also that is a professed Christian, till his hypocrisy appear in his manners; that is,

till his behaviour be contrary to the law of his sovereign, which is the rule of manners, and which Christ and

his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For the Church cannot judge of manners but by external

actions, which actions can never be unlawful but when they are against the law of the Commonwealth.

If a man's father, or mother, or master be excommunicate, yet are not the children forbidden to keep them

company, nor to eat with them; for that were, for the most part, to oblige them not to eat at all, for want of

means to get food; and to authorize them to disobey their parents and masters, contrary to the precept of the

In sum, the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the Apostles and

pastors of the Church have their commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by command and

coercion, but by teaching and direction of men in the way of salvation in the world to come. And as a master

in any science may abandon his scholar when he obstinately neglecteth the practice of his rules, but not

accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a teacher of Christian doctrine may

abandon his disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say they do him wrong,

because they are not obliged to obey him: for to a teacher that shall so complain may be applied the answer of

God to Samuel in the like place, "They have not rejected thee, but me." [I Samuel, 8. 7] Excommunication

therefore, when it wanteth the assistance of the civil power, as it doth when a Christian state or prince is

excommunicate by a foreign authority, is without effect, and consequently ought to be without terror. The

name of fulmen excommunicationis (that is, the thunderbolt of excommunication) proceeded from an

imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used it, that he was king of kings, as the heathen made Jupiter

king of the gods; and assigned him, in their poems and pictures, a thunderbolt wherewith to subdue and

punish the giants that should dare to deny his power: which imagination was grounded on two errors; one,

that the kingdom of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviour's own words, "My kingdom is not of this

world";[John, 18. 36] the other, that he is Christ's vicar, not only over his own subjects, but over all the

Christians of the world; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall be proved in its due

St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a synagogue of the Jews, "as his manner was, went in unto them,

and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging, that Christ must

needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead; and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ."

[Acts, 17. 2, 3] The Scriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament.

The men to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ, and risen again from the dead, were also Jews,

and did believe already that they were the word of God. Hereupon, as it is in the fourth verse some of them

believed, and, as it is in the fifth verse, some believed not. What was the reason, when they all believed the

Scripture, that they did not all believe alike, but that some approved, others disapproved, the interpretation of

St. Paul that cited them, and every one interpreted them to himself? It was this: St. Paul came to them without

any legal commission, and in the manner of one that would not command, but persuade; which he must needs

do, either by miracles, as Moses did to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his authority in God's

works; or by reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they might see the truth of his doctrine in

God's word. But whosoever persuadeth by reasoning from principles written maketh him to whom he

speaketh judge; both of the meaning of those principles and also of the force of his inferences upon them. If

these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the judge of what St. Paul alleged out of Scripture? If St.

Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said, "I find it so

in Scripture; that is to say, in your laws, of which I am interpreter, as sent by Christ." The interpreter

therefore of the Scripture, to whose interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be

none: every one might believe or not believe, according as the allegations seemed to himself to be agreeable

or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alleged. And generally in all cases of the world he that

pretendeth any proof maketh judge of his proof him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as to the case of

the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words to receive the determination of all hard questions

from the priests and judges of Israel for the time being. [Deuteronomy, 17] But this is to be understood of the

For the conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alleging the Scriptures, which they believed not. The

Apostles therefore laboured by reason to confute their idolatry; and that done, to persuade them to the faith of

Christ by their testimony of his life and resurrection. So that there could not yet be any controversy

concerning the authority to interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged, during his infidelity, to follow any

man's interpretation of any Scripture except his sovereign's interpretation of the laws of his country.

Let us now consider the conversion itself, and see what there was therein that could be cause of such an

obligation. Men were converted to no other thing than to the belief of that which the Apostles preached: and

the Apostles preached nothing but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say, the King that was to save them and

reign over them eternally in the world to come; and consequently that he was not dead, but risen again from

the dead, and gone up into heaven, and should come again one day to judge the world (which also should rise

again to be judged), and reward every man according to his works. None of them preached that himself, or

any other Apostle, was such an interpreter of the Scripture as all that became Christians ought to take their

interpretation for law. For to interpret the laws is part of the administration of a present kingdom, which the

Apostles had not. They prayed then, and all other pastors since, "Let thy kingdom come"; and exhorted their

converts to obey their then ethnic princes. The New Testament was not yet published in one body. Every of

the evangelists was interpreter of his own gospel, and every Apostle of his own epistle; and of the Old

Testament our Saviour himself saith to the Jews, "Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think to have eternal

life, and they are they that testify of me." [John, 5. 39] If he had not meant they should interpret them, he

would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ: he would either have interpreted

When a difficulty arose, the Apostles and elders of the Church assembled themselves together, and

determined what should be preached and taught, and how they should interpret the Scriptures to the people,

but took not from the people the liberty to read and interpret them to themselves. The Apostles sent diverse

letters to the Churches, and other writings for their instruction; which had been in vain if they had not

allowed them to interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as it was in the Apostles' time, it

must be till such time as there should be pastors that could authorize an interpreter whose interpretation

should generally be stood to: but that could not be till kings were pastors, or pastors kings.

There be two senses wherein a writing may be said to be canonical: for canon signifieth a rule; and a rule is a

precept by which a man is guided and directed in any action whatsoever. Such precepts, though given by a

teacher to his disciple, or a counsellor to his friend, without power to compel him to observe them, are

nevertheless canons, because they are rules. But when they are given by one whom he that receiveth them is

bound to obey, then are those canons not only rules, but laws: the question therefore here is of the power to

That part of the Scripture which was first law was the Ten Commandments, written in two tables of stone and

delivered by God Himself to Moses, and by Moses made known to the people. Before that time there was no

written law of God, who, as yet having not chosen any people to be His peculiar kingdom, had given no law

to men, but the law of nature, that is to say, the precepts of natural reason, written in every man's own heart.

Of these two tables, the first containeth the law of sovereignty: 1. That they should not obey nor honour the

gods of other nations, in these words, Non habebis deos alienos coram me; that is, "Thou shalt not have for

gods, the gods that other nations worship, but only me": whereby they were forbidden to obey or honour as

their king and governor any other God than Him that spake unto them by Moses, and afterwards by the high

priest. 2. That they "should not make any image to represent Him"; that is to say, they were not to choose to

themselves, neither in heaven nor in earth, any representative of their own fancying, but obey Moses and

Aaron, whom He had appointed to that office. 3. That "they should not take the name of God in vain"; that is,

they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron,

His lieutenants. 4. That "they should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour," and employ that

time in doing Him public honour. The second table containeth the duty of one man towards another, as "To

honour parents"; "Not to kill"; "Not to commit adultery"; "Not to steal"; "Not to corrupt judgement by false

witness"; and finally, "Not so much as to design in their heart the doing of any injury one to another." The

question now is who it was that gave to these written tables the obligatory force of laws. There is no doubt

but they were made laws by God Himself: but because a law obliges not, nor is law to any but to them that

acknowledge it to be the act of the sovereign, how could the people of Israel, that were forbidden to approach

the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses

propounded to them? Some of them were indeed the laws of nature, as all the second table, and therefore to

be acknowledged for God's laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to all people: but of those that were peculiar

to the Israelites, as those of the first table, the question remains, saving that they had obliged themselves,

presently after the propounding of them, to obey Moses, in these words, "Speak thou to us, and we will hear

thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die." [Exodus, 20. 19] It was therefore only Moses then, and after

him the high priest, whom, by Moses, God declared should administer this His peculiar kingdom, that had on

earth the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to be law in the commonwealth of Israel. But

Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding high priests were the civil sovereigns. Therefore hitherto the

The judicial law, that is to say, the laws that God prescribed to the magistrates of Israel for the rule of their

administration of justice, and of the sentences or judgements they should pronounce in pleas between man

and man; and the Levitical law, that is to say, the rule that God prescribed touching the rites and ceremonies

of the priests and Levites, were all delivered to them by Moses only; and therefore also became laws by

virtue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these laws were then written, or not written, but

dictated to the people by Moses, after his forty days being with God in the Mount, by word of mouth, is not

expressed in the text; but they were all positive laws, and equivalent to Holy Scripture, and made canonical

After the Israelites were come into the plains of Moab over against Jericho, and ready to enter into the Land

of Promise, Moses to the former laws added diverse others; which therefore are called Deuteronomy; that is,

Second Laws; and are, as it is written, "the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make

with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in Horeb." [Deuteronomy, 29. 1]

For having explained those former laws, in the beginning of the Book of Deuteronomy, he addeth others, that

begin at the twelfth Chapter and continue to the end of the twentysixth of the same book. This law they

were commanded to write upon great stones plastered over, at their passing over Jordan: [Ibid., 27] this law

also was written by Moses himself in a book, and delivered into the hands of the priests, and to the elders of

Israel, [Ibid., 31. 9] and commanded "to be put in the side of the Ark";[Ibid., 31. 26] for in the Ark itself was

nothing but the Ten Commandments. This was the law which Moses commanded the kings of Israel should

keep a copy of: [Ibid., 17. 18] and this is the law which, having been long time lost, was found again in the

Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received for the law of God. But both Moses at the writing

and Josiah at the recovery thereof had both of them the civil sovereignty. Hitherto therefore the power of

Besides this Book of the Law, there was no other book, from the time of Moses till after the Captivity,

received amongst the Jews for the law of God. For the prophets, except a few, lived in the time of the

Captivity itself; and the rest lived but a little before it, and were so far from having their prophecies generally

received for laws as that their persons were persecuted, partly by false prophets, and partly by the kings were

seduced by them. And this book itself, which was confirmed by Josiah for the law of God, and with it all the

history of the works of God, was lost in the Captivity, and sack of the city of Jerusalem, as appears by that of

II Esdras, 14. 21, "Thy law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things that are done of Thee, or the works

that shall begin." And before the Captivity, between the time when the law was lost (which is not mentioned

in the Scripture, but may probably be thought to be the time of Rehoboam when Shishak, King of Egypt, took

the spoil of the Temple[I Kings, 14. 26]) and the time of Josiah, when it was found again, they had no written

word of God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such as each of them

From hence we may infer that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which we have at this day, were not

canonical, nor a law unto the Jews, till the renovation of their covenant with God at their return from the

Captivity, and restoration of their Commonwealth under Esdras. But from that time forward they were

accounted the law of the Jews, and for such translated into Greek by seventy elders of Judaea, and put into

the library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the word of God. Now seeing Esdras was the high

priest, and the high priest was their civil sovereign, it is manifest that the Scriptures were never made laws,

By the writings of the Fathers that lived in the time before that Christian religion was received and authorized

by Constantine the Emperor, we may find that the books we now have of the New Testament were held by

the Christians of that time (except a few, in respect of whose paucity the rest were called the Catholic Church,

and others heretics) for the dictates of the Holy Ghost; and consequently for the canon, or rule of faith: such

was the reverence and opinion they had of their teachers; as generally the reverence that the disciples bear to

their first masters in all manner of doctrine they receive from them is not small. Therefore there is no doubt

but when St. Paul wrote to the churches he had converted; or any other Apostle or Disciple of Christ, to those

which had then embraced Christ; they received those their writings for the true Christian doctrine. But in that

time when not the power and authority of the teacher, but the faith of the hearer, caused them to receive it, it

was not the Apostles that made their own writings canonical, but every convert made them so to himself.

But the question here is not what any Christian made a law or canon to himself, which he might again reject

by the same right he received it, but what was so made a canon to them as without injustice they could not do

anything contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in this sense be canonical, that is to say, a law in

any place where the law of the Commonwealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a law. For a

law, as hath been already shown, is the commandment of that man, or assembly, to whom we have given

sovereign authority to make such rules for the direction of our actions as he shall think fit, and to punish us

when we do anything contrary to the same. When therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other rules,

which the sovereign ruler hath not prescribed, they are but counsel and advice; which, whether good or bad,

he that is counselled may without injustice refuse to observe; and when contrary to the laws already

established, without injustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say he cannot in this

case observe the same in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men, though he may without blame

believe his private teachers and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice, and that it were publicly

received for law. For internal faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human

jurisdiction; whereas the words and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our civil obedience, are

injustice both before God and man. Seeing then our Saviour hath denied his kingdom to be in this world,

seeing he hath said he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected us to other laws than

those of the Commonwealth; that is, the Jews to the law of Moses, which he saith he came not to destroy, but

to fulfil; [Matthew, 5] and other nations to the laws of their several sovereigns, and all men to the laws of

nature; the observing whereof, both he himself and his Apostles have in their teaching recommended to us as

a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the last day into his eternal kingdom, wherein shall be

protection and life everlasting. Seeing then our Saviour and his Apostles left not new laws to oblige us in this

world, but new doctrine to prepare us for the next, the books of the New Testament, which contain that

doctrine, until obedience to them was commanded by them that God had given power to on earth to be

legislators, were not obligatory canons, that is, laws, but only good and safe advice for the direction of

sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take and refuse at his own peril, without injustice.

Again, our Saviour Christ's commission to his Apostles and Disciples was to proclaim his kingdom, not

present, but to come; and to teach all nations, and to baptize them that should believe; and to enter into the

houses of them that should receive them; and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet

against them; but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to obedience by the

sword. In all which there is nothing of power, but of persuasion. He sent them out as sheep unto wolves, not

as kings to their subjects. They had not in commission to make laws; but to obey and teach obedience to laws

made; and consequently they could not make their writings obligatory canons, without the help of the

sovereign civil power. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only law where the lawful

civil power hath made it so. And there also the king, or sovereign, maketh it a law to himself; by which he

subjecteth himself, not to the doctor or Apostle that converted him, but to God Himself, and His Son Jesus

Christ, as immediately as did the Apostles themselves. That which may seem to give the New Testament, in

respect of those that have embraced Christian doctrine, the force of laws, in the times and places of

persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their synods. For we read the style of the council

of the Apostles, the elders, and the whole Church, in this manner, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to

us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things," [Acts, 15. 28] etc., which is a style that

signifieth a power to lay a burden on them that had received their doctrine. Now "to lay a burden on another"

seemeth the same as to oblige, and therefore the acts of that council were laws to the then Christians.

Nevertheless, they were no more laws than are these other precepts, "Repent"; "Be baptized"; "Keep the

Commandments"; "Believe the Gospel"; "Come unto me"; "Sell all that thou hast"; "Give it to the poor"; and

"Follow me"; which are not commands, but invitations and callings of men to Christianity, like that of Isaiah,

"Ho, every man that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, come, and buy wine and milk without money." [Isaiah,

55. 1] For first, the Apostles' power was no other than that of our Saviour, to invite men to embrace the

kingdom of God; which they themselves acknowledged for a kingdom, not present, but to come; and they

that have no kingdom can make no laws. And secondly, if their acts of council were laws, they could not

without sin be disobeyed. But we read not anywhere that they who received not the doctrine of Christ did

therein sin, but that they died in their sins; that is, that their sins against the laws to which they owed

obedience were not pardoned. And those laws were the laws of nature, and the civil laws of the state, whereto

every Christian man had by pact submitted himself. And therefore by the burden which the Apostles might

lay on such as they had converted are not to be understood laws, but conditions, proposed to those that sought

salvation; which they might accept or refuse at their own peril, without a new sin, though not without the

hazard of being condemned and excluded out of the kingdom of God for their sins past. And therefore of

infidels, St. John saith not, the wrath of God shall come upon them, but the wrath of God remaineth upon

them; [John, 3. 36] and not that they shall he condemned, but that they are condemned already. [Ibid., 3. 18]

Nor can it be conceived that the benefit of faith is remission of sins, unless we conceive withal that the

But to what end is it, may some man ask, that the Apostles and other pastors of the Church, after their time,

should meet together to agree upon what doctrine should be taught, both for faith and manners, if no man

were obliged to observe their decrees? To this may be answered that the Apostles and elders of that council

were obliged, even by their entrance into it, to teach the doctrine therein concluded, and decreed to be taught,

so far forth as no precedent law, to which they were obliged to yield obedience, was to the contrary; but not

that all other Christians should be obliged to observe what they taught. For though they might deliberate what

each of them should teach, yet they could not deliberate what others should do, unless their assembly had had

a legislative power, which none could have but civil sovereigns. For though God be the sovereign of all the

world, we are not bound to take for His law whatsoever is propounded by every man in His name; nor

anything contrary to the civil law, which God hath expressly commanded us to obey.

Seeing then the acts of council of the Apostles were then no laws, but counsels; much less are laws the acts of

any other doctors or councils since, if assembled without the authority of the civil sovereign. And

consequently, the books of the New Testament, though most perfect rules of Christian doctrine, could not be

The first council that made the Scriptures we now have canon is not extant: for that collection of the canons

of the Apostles, attributed to Clemens, the first bishop of Rome after St. Peter, is subject to question: for

though the canonical books be there reckoned up; yet these words, Sint vobis omnibus Clericis Laicis Libri

venerandi, etc., contain a distinction of clergy and laity that was not in use so near St. Peter's time. The first

council for settling the canonical Scripture that is extant is that of Laodicea, Can. 59, which forbids the

reading of other books than those in the churches; which is a mandate that is not addressed to every Christian,

but to those only that had authority to read anything publicly in the Church; that is, to ecclesiastics only.

Of ecclesiastical officers in the time of the Apostles, some were magisterial, some ministerial. Magisterial

were the offices of preaching of the gospel of the kingdom of God to infidels; of administering the

sacraments and divine service; and of teaching the rules of faith and manners to those that were converted.

Ministerial was the office of deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the administration of the secular

necessities of the Church, at such time as they lived upon a common stock of money, raised out of the

Amongst the officers Amongst the officer magisterial, the first and principal were the Apostles, whereof there

were at first but twelve; and these were chosen and constituted by our Saviour himself; and their office was

not only to preach, teach, and baptize, but also to be martyrs (witnesses of our Saviour's resurrection). This

testimony was the specifical and essential mark whereby the apostleship was distinguished from other

magistracy ecclesiastical; as being necessary for an Apostle either to have seen our Saviour after his

resurrection or to have conversed with him before, and seen his works, and other arguments of his divinity,

whereby they might be taken for sufficient witnesses. And therefore at the election of a new Apostle in the

place of Judas Iscariot, St. Peter saith, "Of these men that have companied with us, all the time that the Lord

Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day that he was taken up

from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection":[Acts, 1. 21, 22] where by this

word must is implied a necessary property of an Apostle, to have companied with the first and prime Apostles

The first Apostle of those which were not constituted by Christ in the time he was upon the earth was

Matthias, chosen in this manner: there were assembled together in Jerusalem about one hundred and twenty

Christians. [Acts, 1. 15] These appointed two, Joseph the Just and Matthias, [Ibid., 1. 23] and caused lots to

be drawn; "and the lot fell on Matthias, and he was numbered with the apostles." [Ibid., 1. 26] So that here we

see the ordination of this Apostle was the act of the congregation, and not of St. Peter, nor of the eleven,

After him there was never any other Apostle ordained, but Paul and Barnabas, which was done, as we read, in

this manner: "There were in the church that was at Antioch, certain prophets and teachers; as Barnabas, and

Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with Herod the

Tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministered unto the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas

and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them. And when they had fasted, and prayed, and laid their

By which it is manifest that though they were called by the Holy Ghost, their calling was declared unto them,

and their mission authorized by the particular church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the

apostleship is apparent by that, that they are both called Apostles: [Acts, 14. 14] and that it was by virtue of

this act of the church of Antioch that they were Apostles, St. Paul declareth plainly in that he useth the word,

which the Holy Ghost used at his calling, for he styleth himself, "An apostle separated unto the gospel of

God," [Romans, 1. 1] alluding to the words of the Holy Ghost, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul," etc. But

seeing the work of an Apostle was to be a witness of the resurrection of Christ, a man may here ask how St.

Paul, that conversed not with our Saviour before his Passion, could know he was risen. To which is easily

answered that our Saviour himself appeared to him in the way to Damascus, from heaven, after his ascension;

"and chose him for a vessel to bear his name before the Gentiles, and kings, and children of Israel"; and

consequently, having seen the Lord after his Passion, was a competent witness of his resurrection: and as for

Barnabas, he was a disciple before the Passion. It is therefore evident that Paul and Barnabas were Apostles,

and yet chosen and authorized, not by the first Apostles alone, but by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias was

Bishop, a word formed in our language out of the Greek episcopus, signifieth an overseer or superintendent

of any business, and particularly a pastor or shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not only amongst

the Jews that were originally shepherds, but also amongst the heathen, to signify the office of a king, or any

other ruler or guide of people, whether he ruled by laws or doctrine. And so the Apostles were the first

Christian bishops, instituted by Christ himself: in which sense the apostleship of Judas is called "his

bishoprick." [Acts, 1. 20] And afterwards, when there were constituted elders in the Christian churches, with

charge to guide Christ's flock by their doctrine and advice, these elders were also called bishops. Timothy

was an elder (which word elder, in the New Testament, is a name of office as well as of age); yet he was also

a bishop. And bishops were then content with the title of elders. Nay, St. John himself, the Apostle beloved of

our Lord, beginneth his Second Epistle with these words, "The elder to the elect lady." By which it is evident

that bishop, pastor, elder, doctor, that is to say, teacher, were but so many diverse names of the same office in

the time of the Apostles. For there was then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine and persuading.

The kingdom of God was yet to come, in a new world; so that there could be no authority to compel in any

church till the Commonwealth had embraced the Christian faith; and consequently no diversity of authority,

Besides these magisterial employments in the Church; namely, apostles, bishops, elders, pastors, and doctors,

whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews and infidels, and to direct and teach those that believed, we

read in the New Testament of no other. For by the names of evangelists and prophets is not signified any

office, but several gifts by which several men were profitable to the Church: as evangelists, by writing the life

and acts of our Saviour; such as were St. Matthew and St. John Apostles, and St. Mark and St. Luke

Disciples, and whosoever else wrote of that subject (as St. Thomas and St. Barnabas are said to have done,

though the Church have not received the books that have gone under their names); and as prophets, by the

gift of interpreting the Old Testament, and sometimes by declaring their special revelations to the Church.

For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of languages, nor the gift of casting out devils, nor of curing other

diseases, nor anything else did make an officer in the save only the due calling and election to the charge of

As the Apostles Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas were not made by our Saviour himself, but were elected by the

Church, that is, by the assembly of Christians; namely, Matthias by the church of Jerusalem, and Paul and

Barnabas by the church of Antioch; so were also the presbyters and pastors in other cities, elected by the

churches of those cities. For proof whereof, let us consider, first, how St. Paul proceeded in the ordination of

presbyters in the cities where he had converted men to the Christian faith, immediately after he and Barnabas

had received their apostleship. We read that "they ordained elders in every church";[Acts, 14. 23] which at

first sight may be taken for an argument that they themselves chose and gave them their authority: but if we

consider the original text, it will be manifest that they were authorized and chosen by the assembly of the

Christians of each city. For the words there are cheirotonesantes autois presbuterous kat ekklesian, that is,

"when they had ordained them elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation." Now it is well

enough known that in all those cities the manner of choosing magistrates and officers was by plurality of

suffrages; and, because the ordinary way of distinguishing the affirmative votes from the negatives was by

holding up of hands, to ordain an officer in any of the cities was no more but to bring the people together to

elect them by plurality of votes, whether it were by plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or

plurality of balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a vessel marked for the

affirmative or negative; for diverse cities had diverse customs in that point. It was therefore the assembly that

elected their own elders: the Apostles were only presidents of the assembly to call them together for such

election, and to pronounce them elected, and to give them the benediction, which now is called consecration.

And for this cause they that were presidents of the assemblies, as in the absence of the Apostles the elders

were, were called proestotes and in Latin antistites; which words signify the principal person of the assembly,

whose office was to number the votes, and to declare thereby who was chosen; and where the votes were

equal, to decide the matter in question by adding his own which is the office of a president in council. And,

because all the churches had their presbyters ordained in the same manner, where the word is constitute, as

ina katasteses kata polin presbuterous, "For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest constitute elders

in every city," [Titus, 1. 5] we are to understand the same thing; namely, that he should call the faithful

together, and ordain them presbyters by plurality of suffrages. It had been a strange thing if in a town where

men perhaps had never seen any magistrate otherwise chosen than by an assembly, those of the town,

becoming Christians, should so much as have thought on any other way of election of their teachers and

guides, that is to say, of their presbyters (otherwise called bishops), than this of plurality of suffrages,

intimated by St. Paul in the word cheirotonesantes. [Acts, 14. 23] Nor was there ever any choosing of

bishops, before the emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst

The same is also confirmed by the continual practice even to this day in the election of the bishops of Rome.

For if the bishop of any place had the right of choosing another to the succession of the pastoral office, in any

city, at such time as he went from thence to plant the same in another place; much more had he had the right

to appoint his successor in that place in which he last resided and died: and we find not that ever any bishop

of Rome appointed his successor. For they were a long time chosen by the people, as we may see by the

sedition raised about the election between Damasus and Ursinus; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith was so

great that Juventius the Praefect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to go out of the city; and

that there were above a hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the church itself. And though they

afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the cardinals; yet never any

was appointed to the succession by his predecessor. If therefore they pretended no right to appoint their own

successors, I think I may reasonably conclude they had no right to appoint the successors of other bishops

without receiving some new power; which none could take from the Church to bestow on them, but such as

had a lawful authority, not only to teach, but to command the Church, which none could do but the civil

The word minister in the original, diakonos, signifieth one that voluntarily doth the business of another man,

and differeth from a servant only in this, that servants are obliged by their condition to what is commanded

them; whereas ministers are obliged only by their undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they

have undertaken: so that both they that teach the word of God and they that administer the secular affairs of

the Church are both ministers, but they are ministers of different persons. For the pastors of the Church,

called "the ministers of the word," [Acts, 6. 4] are ministers of Christ, whose word it is: but the ministry of a

deacon, which is called "serving of tables," [Ibid., 6. 2] is a service done to the church or congregation: so

that neither any one man nor the whole Church could ever of their pastor say he was their minister; but of a

deacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables or distribute maintenance to the Christians

when they lived in each city on a common stock, or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of

the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or other worldly business of the Church, the whole congregation might

For their employment as deacons was to serve the congregation, though upon occasion they omitted not to

preach the Gospel, and maintain the doctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts, as St. Stephen did;

and both to preach and baptize, as Philip did: for that Philip, which preached the Gospel at Samaria, [Acts, 8.

5] and baptized the eunuch, [Ibid., 8. 38] was Philip the Deacon, not Philip the Apostle. For it is manifest that

when Philip preached in Samaria, the Apostles were at Jerusalem, [Ibid., 8. 1] and "when they heard that

Samaria had received the word of God, sent Peter and John to them";[Ibid., 8. 14] by imposition of whose

hands they that were baptized received (which before by the baptism of Philip they had not received) the

Holy Ghost. [Ibid., 8. 15] For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost that their baptism should

be administered or confirmed by a minister of the word, not by a minister of the Church. And therefore to

confirm the baptism of those that Philip the Deacon had baptized, the Apostles sent out of their own number

from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter and John, who conferred on them that before were but baptized, those

graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all true believers; which what

they were may be understood by that which St. Mark saith, "These signs follow them that believe in my

name; they shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they

drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." [Mark,

16. 17] This to do was it that Philip could not give, but the Apostles could and, as appears by this place,

effectually did to every man that truly believed, and was by a minister of Christ himself baptized: which

power either Christ's ministers in this age cannot confer, or else there are very few true believers, or Christ

That the first deacons were chosen, not by the Apostles, but by a congregation of the disciples; that is, of

Christian men of all sorts, is manifest out of Acts, 6, where we read that the Twelve, after the number of

disciples was multiplied, called them together, and having told them that it was not fit that the Apostles

should leave the word of God, and serve tables, said unto them, "Brethren look you out among you seven

men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business."

[Acts, 6. 3] Here it is manifest that though the Apostles declared them elected, yet the congregation chose

them; which also is more expressly said where it is written that "the saying pleased the whole multitude, and

Under the Old Testament, the tribe of Levi were only capable of the priesthood and other inferior offices of

the Church. The land was divided amongst the other tribes, Levi excepted, which by the subdivision of the

tribe of Joseph into Ephraim and Manasseh were still twelve. To the tribe of Levi were assigned certain cities

for their habitation, with the suburbs for their cattle; but for their portion they were to have the tenth of the

fruits of the land of their brethren. Again, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together

with part of the oblations and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron, "Thou shalt have no inheritance in their

land, neither shalt thou have any part amongst them; I am thy part and thine inheritance amongst the children

of Israel." [Numbers, 18. 20] For God being then King, and having constituted the tribe of Levi to be His

public ministers, He allowed them for their maintenance the public revenue, that is to say, the part that God

had reserved to Himself; which were tithes and offerings: and that is it which is meant where God saith, "I am

thine inheritance." And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of clergy, from

Kleros, which signifieth lot or inheritance; not that they were heirs of the kingdom of God, more than other;

but that God's inheritance was their maintenance. Now seeing in this time God Himself was their King, and

Moses, Aaron, and the succeeding high priests were His lieutenants; it is manifest that the right of tithes and

After their rejection of God in the demanding of a king, they enjoyed still the same revenue; but the right

thereof was derived from that, that the kings did never take it from them: for the public revenue was at the

disposing of him that was the public person; and that, till the Captivity, was the king. And again, after the

return from the Captivity, they paid their tithes as before to the priest. Hitherto therefore Church livings were

Of the maintenance of our Saviour and his Apostles, we read only they had a purse (which was carried by

Judas Iscariot); and that of the Apostles such as were fishermen did sometimes use their trade; and that when

our Saviour sent the twelve Apostles to preach, he forbade them to carry gold, and silver, and brass in their

purses, "for that the workman is worthy of his hire":[Matthew, 10. 9, 10] by which it is probable their

ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment; for their employment was "freely to give,

because they had freely received";[ Ibid., 10. 8] and their maintenance was the free gift of those that believed

the good tiding they carried about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour. To which we may add that

which was contributed out of gratitude by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned

"certain women which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went

seven devils; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward; and Susanna, and many others, which

After our Saviour's ascension, the Christians of every city lived in common upon the money which was made

of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the Apostles, of good will, not of duty;

[Acts, 4. 34, 35] for "whilst the land remained." saith St. Peter to Ananias, "was it not thine? And after it was

sold, was it not in thy power?" [Ibid., 5. 4] Which showeth he needed not have saved his land, nor his money

by lying, as not being bound to contribute anything at all unless he had pleased. And as in the time of the

Apostles, so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we shall find that the maintenance of

the bishops and pastors of the Christian Church was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that had

embraced their doctrine. There was yet no mention of tithes: but such was in the time of Constantine and his

sons the affection of Christians to their pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith, describing the sedition of

Damasus and Ursinus about the bishopric, that it was worth their contention, in that the bishops of those

times by the liberality of their flock, and especially of matrons, lived splendidly, were carried in coaches, and

But here may some ask whether the pastor were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution, as upon

alms, "For who," saith St. Paul, "goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of

the milk of the flock?" [I Corinthians, 9. 7] And again, "Do ye not know that they which minister about holy

things live of the things of the Temple; and they which wait at the altar partake with the altar";[Ibid., 9. 13]

that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the altar for their maintenance? And then he concludeth,

"Even so hath the Lord appointed that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel." From which

place may be inferred, indeed, that the pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not

that the pastors were to determine either the quantity or the kind of their own allowance, and be, as it were,

their own carvers. Their allowance must needs therefore be determined either by the gratitude and liberality

of every particular man of their flock or by the whole congregation. By the whole congregation it could not

be, because their acts were then no laws: therefore the maintenance of pastors before emperors and civil

sovereigns had made laws to settle it was nothing but benevolence. They that served at the altar lived on what

was offered. So may the pastors also take what is offered them by their flock, but not exact what is not

offered. In what court should they sue for it who had no tribunals? Or if they had arbitrators amongst

themselves, who should execute their judgements when they had no power to arm their officers? It remaineth

therefore that there could be no certain maintenance assigned to any pastors of the Church, but by the whole

congregation; and then only when their decrees should have the force, not only of canons, but also of laws;

which laws could not be made but by emperors, kings, or other civil sovereigns. The right of tithes in Moses'

Law could not be applied to then ministers of the Gospel, because Moses and the high priests were the civil

sovereigns of the people under God, whose kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the kingdom of

Hitherto hath been shown what the pastors of the Church are; what are the points of their commission, as that

they were to preach, to teach, to baptize, to be presidents in their several congregations; what is ecclesiastical

censure, viz., excommunication, that is to say, in those places where Christianity was forbidden by the civil

laws, a putting of themselves out of the company of the excommunicate, and where Christianity was by the

civil law commanded, a putting the excommunicate out of the congregations of Christians; who elected the

pastors and of the Church, that it the congregation; who consecrated and blessed them, that it was the pastor;

what was their due revenue, that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and the

voluntary contributions of devout and grateful Christians. We are to consider now what office in the Church

those persons have who, being civil sovereigns, have embraced also the Christian faith.

And first, we are to remember that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace, and to be taught the

subjects, is in all Commonwealths inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved, Chapter eighteen) to the

sovereign power civil, whether it be in one man or in one assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest

capacity that men's actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good or evil which from those

actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion that their

obedience to the sovereign power will be more hurtful to them than their disobedience will disobey the laws,

and thereby overthrow the Commonwealth, and introduce confusion and civil war; for the avoiding whereof,

all civil government was ordained. And therefore in all Commonwealths of the heathen, the sovereigns have

had the name of pastors of the people, because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people, but

by their permission and authority. This right of the heathen kings cannot be thought taken from them by their

conversion to the faith of Christ, who never ordained that kings, for believing in him, should be deposed, that

is, subjected to any but himself, or, which is all one, be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation

of peace amongst their subjects and for their defence against foreign enemies. And therefore Christian kings

are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors they please, to teach the

Again, let the right of choosing them be, as before the conversion of kings, in the Church, for so it was in the

time of the Apostles themselves (as hath been shown already in this chapter); even so also the right will be in

the civil sovereign, Christian. For in that he is a Christian, he allows the teaching; and in that he is the

sovereign (which is as much as to say, the Church by representation), the teachers he elects are elected by the

Church. And when an assembly of Christians choose their pastor in a Christian Commonwealth, it is the

sovereign that electeth him, because it is done by his authority; in the same manner as when a town choose

their mayor, it is the act of him that hath the sovereign power: for every act done is the act of him without

whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of history concerning the

election of pastors by the people or by the clergy, they are no arguments against the right of any civil

Seeing then in every Christian Commonwealth the civil sovereign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the

whole flock of his subjects is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority that all other pastors are

made, and have power to teach and perform all other pastoral offices, it followeth also that it is from the civil

sovereign that all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and other functions pertaining to that

office, and that they are but his ministers; in the same manner as magistrates of towns, judges in courts of

justice, and commanders of armies are all but ministers of him that is the magistrate of the whole

Commonwealth, judge of all causes, and commander of the whole militia, which is always the civil

sovereign. And the reason hereof is not because they that teach, but because they that are to learn, are his

subjects. For let it be supposed that a Christian king commit the authority of ordaining pastors in his

dominions to another king (as diverse Christian kings allow that power to the Pope), he doth not thereby

constitute a pastor over himself, nor a sovereign pastor over his people; for that were to deprive himself of the

civil power; which, depending on the opinion men have of their duty to him, and the fear they have of

punishment in another world, would depend also on the skill and loyalty of doctors who are no less subject,

not only to ambition, but also to ignorance, than any other sort of men. So that where a stranger hath

authority to appoint teachers, it is given him by the sovereign in whose dominions he teacheth. Christian

doctors are our schoolmasters to Christianity; but kings are fathers of families, and may receive

schoolmasters for their subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command;

especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends

them: nor can they be obliged to retain them longer than it is for the public good, the care of which they stand

so long charged withal as they retain any other essential right of the sovereignty.

If a man therefore should ask a pastor, in the execution of his office, as the chief priests and elders of the

people asked our Saviour, "By what authority doest thou these things, and who gave thee this authority?":

[Matthew, 21. 23] he can make no other just answer but that he doth it by the authority of the

Commonwealth, given him by the king or assembly that representeth it. All pastors, except the supreme,

execute their charges in the right, that is, by the authority of the civil sovereign, that is, jure civili. But the

king, and every other sovereign, executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God,

that is to say, in God's right, or jure divino. And therefore none but kings can put into their titles, a mark of

their submission to God only, Dei gratia Rex, etc. Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their mandates,

"By the favour of the King's Majesty, Bishop of such a diocese"; or as civil ministers, "In His Majesty's

name." For in saying, Divina providentia, which is the same with Dei gratia, though disguised, they deny to

have received their authority from the civil state, and slyly slip off the collar of their civil subjection, contrary

But if every Christian sovereign be the supreme pastor of his own subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the

authority, not only to preach, which perhaps no man will deny, but also to baptize, and to administer

sacrament of administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper and to consecrate both temples and pastors to

God's service; which most men deny, partly because they use not to do it, and partly because the

administration of sacraments, and consecration of persons and places to holy uses, requireth the imposition of

such men's hands as by the like imposition successively from the time of the Apostles have been ordained to

the like ministry. For proof therefore that Christian kings have power to baptize and to consecrate, I am to

render a reason both why they use not to do it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of imposition of

There is no doubt but any king, in case he were skilful in the sciences, might by the same right of his office

read lectures of them himself by which he authorizeth others to read them in the universities. Nevertheless,

because the care of the sum of the business of the Commonwealth taketh up his whole time, it were not

convenient for him to apply himself in person to that particular. A king may also, if he please, sit in

judgement to hear and determine all manner of causes, as well as give others authority to do it in his name;

but that the charge that lieth upon him of command and government constrain him to be continually at the

helm, and to commit the ministerial offices to others under him. In the like manner our Saviour, who surely

had power to baptize, baptized none himself, but sent his Apostles and Disciples to baptize. [John, 4. 2] So

also St. Paul, by the necessity of preaching in diverse and far distant places, baptized few: amongst all the

Corinthians he baptized only Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas; [I Corinthians, 1. 14, 16] and the reason was

because his principal charge was to preach. [Ibid., 1. 17] Whereby it is manifest that the greater charge, such

as is the government of the Church, is a dispensation for the less. The reason therefore why Christian kings

use not to baptize is evident, and the same for which at this day there are few baptized by bishops, and by the

And as concerning imposition of hands, whether it be needful for the authorizing of a king to baptize and

Imposition of hands was a most ancient public ceremony amongst the Jews, by which was designed, and

made certain, the person or other thing intended in a man's prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration,

condemnation, or other speech. So Jacob, in blessing the children of Joseph, "Laid his right hand on Ephraim

the younger, and his left hand on Manasseh the firstborn";[Genesis, 48. 14] and this he did wittingly (though

they were so presented to him by Joseph as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms across) to design

to whom he whom he intended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrificing of the burnt offering, Aaron is

commanded "to lay his hands on the head of the bullock";[Exodus, 29. 10] and "to lay his hand on the head of

the ram." [Ibid., 29. 15] The same is also said again, Leviticus, 1. 4, and 8. 14. Likewise Moses when he

ordained Joshua to be captain of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him to God's service, "laid his hands upon

him, and gave him his charge," [Numbers, 27. 23] designing and rendering certain who it was they were to

obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites God commanded that "the children of Israel should put

their hands the Levites." [Ibid., 8. 10] And in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed the Lord, God

commanded that "all that heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the congregation should

stone him." [Leviticus, 24. 14] And why should they only that heard him lay their hands upon him, and not

rather a priest, Levite, or other minister of justice, but that none else were able to design and demonstrate to

the eyes of the congregation who it was that had blasphemed and ought to die? And to design a man, or any

other thing, by the hand to the eye is less subject to mistake than when it is done to the ear by a name.

And so much was this ceremony observed that in blessing the whole congregation at once, which cannot be

done by laying on of hands, yet Aaron "did lift up his hand towards the people when he blessed them."

[Leviticus, 9. 22] And we read also of the like ceremony of consecration of temples amongst the heathen, as

that the priest laid his hands on some post of the temple, all the while he was uttering the words of

consecration. So natural it is to design any individual thing rather by the hand, to assure the eyes, than by

This ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviour's time. For Jairus, whose daughter was sick, besought

our Saviour not to heal her, but "to lay his hands upon her, that she might be healed." [Mark, 5. 23] And "they

brought unto him little children, that he should put his hands on them, and pray." [Matthew, 19. 13]

According to this ancient rite, the Apostles and presbyters and the presbytery itself laid hands on them whom

they ordained pastors, and withal prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and that not only

once, but sometimes oftener, when a new occasion was presented: but the end was still the same, namely a

punctual and religious designation of the person ordained either to the pastoral charge in general or to a

particular mission. So "The Apostles prayed, and laid their hands"[Acts, 6. 6] on the seven deacons; which

was done, not to give them the Holy Ghost (for they were full of the Holy Ghost before they were chosen, as

appeareth immediately before[Ibid., 6. 3]), but to design them to that office. And after Philip the Deacon had

converted certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down "and laid their hands on them, and they

received the Holy Ghost." [Ibid., 8. 17] And not only an Apostle, but a presbyter had this power: for St. Paul

adviseth Timothy, "Lay hands suddenly on no man";[I Timothy, 5. 22] that is, design no man rashly to the

office of a pastor. The whole presbytery laid their hands on Timothy, as we read, I Timothy, 4. 14, but this is

to be understood as that some did it by the appointment of the presbytery, and most likely their proestos, or

prolocutor, which it may be was St. Paul himself. For in his second Epistle to Timothy, verse 6, he saith to

him, "Stir up the gift of God which is in thee, by the laying on of my hands":[Acts, 9. 17, 18] where note, by

the way, that by the Holy Ghost is not meant the third person in the Trinity, but the gifts necessary to the

pastoral office. We read also that St. Paul had imposition of hands twice; once from Ananias at Damascus at

the time of his baptism; and again at Antioch, when he was first sent out to preach. [Ibid., 13. 3] The use then

of this ceremony considered in the ordination of pastors was to design the person to whom they gave such

power. But if there had been then any Christian that had had the power of teaching before, the baptizing of

him, that is, the making him a Christian, had given him no new power, but had only caused him to preach

true doctrine, that is, to use his power aright; and therefore the imposition of hands had been unnecessary;

baptism itself had been sufficient. But every sovereign, before Christianity, had the power of teaching and

ordaining teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them no new right, but only directed them in the way of

teaching truth; and consequently they needed no imposition of hands (besides that which is done in baptism)

to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastoral function, as namely, to baptize and consecrate. And in

the Old Testament, though the priest only had right to consecrate, during the time that the sovereignty was in

the high priest, yet it was not so when the sovereignty was in the king: for we read that Solomon blessed the

people, consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that public prayer, [I Kings, 8] which is the pattern now for

consecration of all Christian churches and chapels: whereby it appears he had not only the right of

From this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in Christian sovereigns, it is evident they have all

manner of power over their subjects that can be given to man for the government of men's external actions,

both in policy and religion, and may make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of

their own subjects, both as they are the Commonwealth and as they are the Church: for both State and Church

If they please, therefore, they may, as many Christian kings now do, commit the government of their subjects

in matters of religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point subordinate to them, and exerciseth that

charge in another's dominion jure civili, in the right of the civil sovereign; not jure divino, in God's right; and

may therefore be discharged of that office when the sovereign for the good of his subjects shall think it

necessary. They may also, if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an

assembly of pastors, and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most

convenient; and what titles of honor, as of bishops, archbishops, priests, or presbyters, they will; and make

such laws for their maintenance, either by tithes or otherwise, as they please, so they do it out of a sincere

conscience, of which God only is the judge. It is the civil sovereign that is to appoint judges and interpreters

of the canonical scriptures; for it is he that maketh them laws. It is he also that giveth strength to

excommunications; which but for such laws and punishments as may humble obstinate libertines, and reduce

them to union with the rest of the Church, would be contemned. In sum, he hath the supreme power in all

causes, as well ecclesiastical as civil, as far as concerneth actions and words, for those only are known and

may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no judge at all, but God, that knoweth the

heart. And these rights are incident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies: for they that are the

representants of a Christian people are representants of the Church: for a Church and a Commonwealth of

Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this book, seem clear enough for the asserting of the

supreme ecclesiastical power to Christian sovereigns, yet because the Pope of Rome's challenge to that power

universally hath been maintained chiefly, and I think as strongly as is possible, by Cardinal Bellarmine in his

controversy DeSummo Pontifice, I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to examine the grounds and

Of five books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three questions: one, which is simply the

best government, monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, and concludeth for neither, but for a government

mixed of all three; another, which of these is the best government of the Church, and concludeth for the

mixed, but which should most participate of monarchy; the third, whether in this mixed monarchy, St. Peter

had the place of monarch. Concerning his first conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (Chapter

eighteen) that all governments, which men are bound to obey, are simple and absolute. In monarchy there is

but one man supreme, and all other men that have any kind of power in the state have it by his commission,

during his pleasure, and execute it in his name; and in aristocracy and democracy, but one supreme assembly,

with the same power that in monarchy belongeth to the monarch, which is not a mixed, but an absolute

sovereignty. And of the three sorts, which is the best is not to be disputed where any one of them is already

established; but the present ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best, because it is

against both the law of nature and the divine positive law to do anything tending to the subversion thereof.

Besides, it maketh nothing to the power of any pastor (unless he have the civil sovereignty) what kind of

government is the best, because their calling is not to govern men by commandment, but to teach them and

persuade them by arguments, and leave it to them to consider whether they shall embrace or reject the

doctrine taught. For monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy do mark out unto us three sorts of sovereigns, not

of pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of masters of families, not three sorts of schoolmasters for their

And therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of government of the Church, is nothing to the

question of the Pope's power without his own dominions: for in all other Commonwealths his power, if he

have any at all, is that of the schoolmaster only, and not of the master of the family.

For the third conclusion, which is that St. Peter was monarch of the Church, he bringeth for his chief

argument the place of St. Matthew, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church," etc. "And I

will give thee the keys of heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and

whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." [Matthew, 16. 18, 19] Which place, well

considered, proveth no more but that the Church of Christ hath for foundation one only article; namely, that

which Peter, in the name of all the Apostles professing, gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here

cited. Which that we may clearly understand, we are to consider, that our Saviour preached by himself, by

John Baptist, and by his Apostles, nothing but this article of faith, "that he was the Christ"; all other articles

requiring faith no otherwise than as founded on that. John began first, preaching only this, "The kingdom of

God is at hand." [Ibid., 3. 2] Then our Saviour himself preached the same: [Matthew, 4. 17] and to his twelve

Apostles, when he gave them their commission, there is no mention of preaching any other article but that.

[Ibid., 10. 7] This was the fundamental article, that is the foundation of the Church's faith. Afterwards the

Apostles being returned to him, he asketh them all, not Peter only, who men said he was; and they answered

that some said he was John the Baptist, some Elias, and others Jeremias, or one of the Prophets; [Ibid., 16.

13] then he asked them all again, not Peter only, "Whom say ye that I am?" [Ibid., 16. 15] Therefore St. Peter

answered for them all, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God"; which I said is the foundation of the faith

of the whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying, "upon this stone I will build my

Church": by which it is manifest that by the foundationstone of the Church was meant the fundamental

article of the Church's faith. But why then, will some object, doth our Saviour interpose these words, "Thou

art Peter"? If the original of this text had been rigidly the reason would easily have appeared. We are

therefore to consider that the Apostle Simon was surnamed Stone (which is the signification of the Syriac

word cephas, and of the Greek word petrus). Our Saviour therefore after the confession of that fundamental

article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in English) thus, "Thou art Stone, and upon this Stone I will

build my Church": which is as much as to say, "This article, that I am the Christ, is the foundation of all the

faith I require in those that are to be members my Church." Neither is this allusion to a name an unusual thing

in common speech: but it had been a strange and obscure speech, if our Saviour, intending to build his

Church on the person of St. Peter, had said, "Thou art a stone, and upon this stone I will build my Church,"

when it was so obvious, without ambiguity, to have said, "I will build my Church on thee"; and yet there had

And for the following words, "I will give thee the keys of heaven," etc., it is no more than what our Saviour

gave also to all the rest of his Disciples, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven. And

whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." [Matthew, 18. 18] But howsoever this be

interpreted, there is no doubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors; such as are all

Christian civil sovereigns in their own dominions. Insomuch as if St. Peter, or our Saviour himself, had

converted any of them to believe him and to acknowledge his kingdom; yet because his kingdom is not of

this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him; or else he must have

deprived him of the sovereignty to which the right of teaching is inseparably annexed. And thus much in

refutation of his first book, wherein he would prove St. Peter to have been the monarch universal of the

The second book hath two conclusions: one, that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and there died; the other, that

the Popes of Rome are his successors; both which have been disputed by others. But supposing them true; yet

if by Bishop of Rome be understood either the monarch of the Church, or the supreme pastor of it, not

Silvester, but Constantine (who was the first Christian emperor) was that bishop; and as Constantine, so all

other Christian emperors were of right supreme bishops of the Roman Empire. I say, of the Roman Empire,

not of all Christendom, for other Christian sovereigns had the same right in their several territories, as to an

office essentially adherent to their sovereignty: which shall serve for answer to his second book.

In the third book he handleth the question whether the Pope be Antichrist. For my part, I see no argument that

proves he is so, in that sense the Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from the quality of

Antichrist to contradict the authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised, in the dominions of any

It is evident that the prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected, a Messiah, that is, a

Christ, that should reestablish amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in the

time of Samuel when they required a king after the manner of other nations. This expectation of theirs made

them obnoxious to the imposture of all such as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the kingdom,

and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by hypocritical life, or by orations and doctrine

plausible. Our Saviour therefore, and his Apostles, forewarned men of false prophets and of false Christs.

False Christs are such as pretend to be the Christ, but are not, and are called properly Antichrists, in such

sense as when there happeneth a schism in the Church by the election of two Popes, the one the one calleth

the other Antipapa, or the false Pope. And therefore Antichrist in the proper signification hath two essential

marks: one, that he denieth Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth himself to be Christ. The first

mark is set down by St. John in his first Epistle, 4. 3, "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is

come in the flesh is not of God; and this is the spirit of Antichrist." The other mark is expressed in the words

of our Saviour, "Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ";[Matthew, 24. 5] and again, "If any man

shall say unto you, Lo, here is Christ, there is Christ, believe it not." And therefore Antichrist must be a false

Christ; that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be Christ. And out of these two marks, to

deny Jesus to be the Christ and to affirm himself to be the Christ, it followeth that he must also be an

adversary of Jesus the true Christ, which is another usual signification of the word Antichrist. But of these

many Antichrists, there is one special one, o Antichristos, the Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely, as one

certain person; not indefinitely an Antichrist. Now seeing the Pope of Rome neither pretendeth himself, nor

denieth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called Antichrist; by which word is not meant one

that falsely pretendeth to be his lieutenant, or vicar general, but to be He. There is also some mark of the time

of this special Antichrist, as when that abominable destroyer, spoken of by Daniel, [Daniel, 9. 27] shall stand

in the holy place, [Matthew, 24. 15] and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever

shall be again, insomuch as if it were to last long, no flesh could be saved; but for the elect's sake those days

shall be shortened," [Ibid., 24. 22] (made fewer). But that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed

immediately by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a concussion of the heavens, and the

glorious coming again of our Saviour in the clouds. [Ibid., 24. 29] And therefore the Antichrist is not yet

come; whereas many Popes are both come and gone. It is true, the Pope, in taking upon him to give laws to

all Christian kings and nations, usurpeth a kingdom in this world, which Christ took not on him: but he doth it

In the fourth book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme judge in all questions of faith and manners, which is

as much as to be the absolute monarch of all Christians in the world, he bringeth three propositions: the first,

that his judgements are infallible; the second, that he can make very laws, and punish those that observe them

not; the third, that our Saviour conferred all jurisdiction ecclesiastical on the Pope of Rome.

For the infallibility of his judgements, he allegeth the Scriptures: the first, that of Luke, 22. 31, "Simon,

Simon, Satan hath desired you that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not;

and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." This, according to Bellarmine's exposition, is that

Christ gave here to Simon Peter two privileges: one, that neither his faith should fail, nor the faith of any of

his successors; the other, that neither he nor any of his successors should ever define any point concerning

faith or manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope: which is a strange and very much

strained interpretation. But he that with attention readeth that chapter shall find there is no place in the whole

Scripture that maketh more against the Pope's authority than this very place. The priests and scribes, seeking

to kill our Saviour at the Passover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing

the Passover being come, our Saviour celebrated the same with his Apostles, which he said, till the kingdom

of God was come he would do no more, and withal told them that one of them was to betray him. Hereupon

they questioned which of them it should be; and withal, seeing the next Passover their master would celebrate

should be when he was king, entered into a contention who should then be the greatest man. Our Saviour

therefore told them that the kings of the nations had dominion over their subjects, and are called by a name in

Hebrew that signifies bountiful; "but I cannot be so to you; you must endeavour to serve one another; I ordain

you a kingdom, but it is such as my Father hath ordained me; a kingdom that I am now to purchase with my

blood, and not to possess till my second coming; then ye shall eat and drink at my table, and sit on thrones,

judging the twelve tribes of Israel." And then addressing himself to St. Peter, he saith, "Simon, Simon, Satan

seeks, by suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but I have prayed for thee, that

thy faith shall not fail; thou therefore note this: being converted, and understanding my kingdom as of another

world, confirm the same faith in thy brethren." To which St. Peter answered (as one that no more expected

any authority in this world), "Lord, I am ready to go with thee, not only to prison, but to death." Whereby it is

manifest, St. Peter had not only no jurisdiction given him in this world, but a charge to teach all the other

Apostles that they also should have none. And for the infallibility of St. Peter's sentence definitive in matter

of faith, there is no more to be attributed to it out of this text than that Peter should continue in the belief of

this point, namely, that Christ should come again and possess the kingdom at the day of judgement; which

was not given by this text to all his successors; for we see they claim it in the world that now is.

The second place is that of Matthew 16. 18, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and

the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." By which, as I have already shown in this chapter, is proved no

more than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that

speech; namely this, that Jesus is Christ the Son of God. The third text is John, 21. 16, 17, "Feed my sheep";

which contains no more but a commission of teaching. And if we grant the rest of the Apostles to be

contained in that name of sheep, then it is the supreme power of teaching: but it was only for the time that

there were no Christian sovereigns already possessed of that supremacy. But I have already proved that

Christian sovereigns are in their own dominions the supreme pastors, and instituted thereto by virtue of their

being baptized, though without other imposition of hands. For such imposition, being a ceremony of

designing the person, is needless when he is already designed to the power of teaching what doctrine he will,

by his institution to an absolute power over his subjects. For as I have proved before, sovereigns are supreme

teachers, in general, by their office, and therefore oblige themselves, by their baptism, to teach the doctrine of

Christ: and when they suffer others to teach their people, they do it at the peril of their own souls; for it is at

the hands of the heads of families that God will require the account of the instruction of His children and

servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that God saith, "I know him that he will command his

children, and his household after him, that they keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and

The fourth place is that of Exodus, 28. 30, "Thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgement, the Urim and the

Thummim": which he saith is interpreted by the Septuagint, delosin kai aletheian, that is, evidence and truth:

and thence concludeth, God hath given evidence and truth, which is almost infallibility, to the high priest. But

be it evidence and truth itself that was given; or be it but admonition to the priest to endeavour to inform

himself clearly, and give judgement uprightly; yet in that it was given to the high priest, it was given to the

civil sovereign (for such next under God was the high priest in the Commonwealth of Israel), and is an

argument for evidence and truth, that is, for the ecclesiastical supremacy of civil sovereigns over their own

subjects, against the pretended power of the Pope. These are all the texts he bringeth for the infallibility of the

For the infallibility of his judgement concerning manners, he bringeth one text, which is that of John, 16. 13,

"When the Spirit of truth is come, he will lead you into all truth": where, saith he, by all truth is meant, at

least, all truth necessary to salvation. But with this mitigation, he attributeth no more infallibility to the Pope

than to any man that professeth Christianity, and is not to be damned: for if any man err in any point, wherein

not to err is necessary to salvation, it is impossible he should be saved; for that only is necessary to salvation

without which to be saved is impossible. What points these are I shall declare out of the Scripture in the

chapter following. In this place I say no more but that though it were granted the Pope could not possibly

teach any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him to any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince,

unless we shall also say a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions the best workman,

Besides the text, he argueth from reason, thus. If the Pope could err in necessaries, then Christ hath not

sufficiently provided for the Church's salvation, because he hath commanded her to follow the Pope's

directions. But this reason is invalid, unless he show when and where Christ commanded that, or took at all

any notice of a Pope. Nay, granting whatsoever was given to St. Peter was given to the Pope, yet seeing there

is in the Scripture no command to any man to obeyeth him when his commands are contrary to those of his

Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himself, that he is the civil of all the

Christians in the world; and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in point of

manners. For the civil sovereignty, and supreme judicature in controversies of manners, are the same thing:

and the makers of civil laws are not only declarers, but also makers of the justice and injustice of actions;

there being nothing in men's manners that makes them righteous or unrighteous, but their conformity with the

law of the sovereign. And therefore when the Pope challengeth supremacy in controversies of manners, he

teacheth men to disobey the civil sovereign; which is an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of

To prove the Pope has power to make laws, he allegeth many places; as first, Deuteronomy, 17. 12, "The man

that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest, that standeth to minister there before the

Lord thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel." For

answer whereunto we are to remember that the high priest, next and immediately under God, was the civil

sovereign; and all judges were to be constituted by him. The words alleged sound therefore thus, "The man

that will presume to disobey the civil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers, in the execution of

their places, that man shall die," etc., which is clearly for the civil sovereignty, against the universal power of

Secondly, he allegeth that of Matthew, 16, "Whatsoever ye shall bind," etc., and interpreteth it for such

binding as is attributed to the Scribes and Pharisees, "They bind heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, and

lay them on men's shoulders"; [Matthew, 23. 4] by which is meant, he says, making of laws; and concludes

thence that the Pope can make laws. But this also maketh only for the legislative power of civil sovereigns:

for the Scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses' chair, but Moses next under God was sovereign of the people of

Israel: and therefore our Saviour commanded them to do all that they should say, but not all that they should

The third place is John, 21. 16, "Feed my sheep"; which is not a power to make laws, but a command to

teach. Making laws belongs to the lord of the family, who by his own discretion chooseth his chaplain, as

The fourth place, John, 20. 21, is against him. The words are, "As my Father sent me, so send I you." But our

Saviour was sent to redeem by his death such as should believe; and by his own and his Apostles' preaching

to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdom; which he himself saith is not of this world, and hath

taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter, though he refused to tell his Apostles when it should come;

[Acts, 1. 6, 7] and in which, when it comes, the twelve Apostles shall sit on twelve thrones (every one

perhaps as high as that of St. Peter), to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Seeing then God the Father sent not

our Saviour to make laws in this present world, we may conclude from the text that neither did our Saviour

send St. Peter to make laws here, but to persuade men to expect his second coming with a steadfast faith; and

in the meantime, if subjects, to obey their princes; and if princes, both to believe it themselves and to do their

best to make their subjects do the same, which is the office of a bishop. Therefore this place maketh most

strongly for the joining of the ecclesiastical supremacy to the civil sovereignty, contrary to that which

The fifth is Acts, 15. 28, "It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden

than these necessary things, that ye abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things

strangled, and from fornication." Here he notes the word "laying of burdens" for the legislative power. But

who is there that, reading this text, can say this style of the Apostles may not as properly be used in giving

counsel as in making laws? The style of a law is, "we command": but, "we think good," is the ordinary style

of them that but give advice; and they lay a burden that give advice, though it be conditional, that is, if they to

whom they give it will attain their ends: and such is the burden of abstaining from things strangled, and from

blood, not absolute, but in case they will not err. I have shown before (Chapter twentyfive) that law is

distinguished from counsel in this, that the reason of a law is taken from the design and benefit of him that

prescribeth it; but the reason of a counsel, from the design and benefit of him to whom the counsel is given.

But here, the Apostles aim only at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely, their salvation; not at their

own benefit; for having done their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed or not.

The sixth place is that of Romans, 13, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power

but of God"; which is meant, he saith, not only of secular, but also of ecclesiastical princes. To which I

answer, first, that there are no ecclesiastical princes but those that are also civil sovereigns, and their

principalities exceed not the compass of their civil sovereignty; without those bounds, though they may be

received for doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for princes. For if the Apostle had meant we should be

subject both to our own princes and also to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine which Christ himself hath

told us is impossible, namely, to serve two masters. And though the Apostle say in another place, "I write

these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpness, according to the power which the Lord

hath given me";[II Corinthians, 13. 10] it is not that he challenged a power either to put to death, imprison,

banish, whip, or fine any of them, which are punishments; but only to excommunicate, which, without the

civil power, is no more but a leaving of their company, and having no more to do with them than with a

heathen man or a publican; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the excommunicant than to

The seventh place is I Corinthians, 4. 21, "Shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love, and the spirit of

lenity?" But here again, it is not the power of a magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a rod; but

only the power of excommunication, which is not in its own nature a punishment, but only a denouncing of

punishment, that Christ shall inflict, when he shall be in possession of his kingdom, at the day of judgement.

Nor then also shall it be properly a punishment, as upon a subject that hath broken the law; but a revenge, as

upon an enemy, or revolter, that denyeth the right of our saviour to the kingdom: and therefore this proveth

The eighth place is Timothy, 3. 2, "A bishop must be the husband but of one wife, vigilant, sober," etc.,

which he saith was a law. I thought that none could make a law in the Church but the monarch of the Church,

St. Peter. But suppose this precept made by the authority of St. Peter; yet I see no reason why to call it a law,

rather than an advice, seeing Timothy was not a subject, but a disciple of St. Paul; nor the flock under the

charge of Timothy, his subjects in the kingdom, but his scholars in the school of Christ. If all the precepts he

giveth Timothy be laws, why is not this also a law, "Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for health's

sake"? And why are not also the precepts of good physicians so many laws, but that it is not the imperative

manner of speaking, but an absolute subjection to a person, that maketh his precepts laws? In like manner, the

ninth place, I Timothy, 5. 19, "Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses,"

The tenth place is Luke, 10. 16, "He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me."

And there is no doubt but he that despiseth the counsel of those that are sent by Christ despiseth the counsel

of Christ himself. But who are those now that are sent by Christ but such as are ordained pastors by lawful

authority? And who are lawfully ordained that are not ordained by the sovereign pastor? And who is ordained

by the sovereign pastor in a Christian Commonwealth that is not ordained by the authority of the sovereign

thereof? Out of this place therefore it followeth that he which heareth his sovereign, being a Christian,

heareth Christ; and he that despiseth the doctrine which his king, being a Christian, authorizeth despiseth the

doctrine of Christ, which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the contrary. But all this is

nothing to a law. Nay more, a Christian king, a pastor and teacher of his subjects makes not thereby his

doctrines laws. He cannot oblige men to believe, though as a civil sovereign he may make laws suitable to his

doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do,

and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are commanded, they are laws; and the external

actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the sovereign, and not

of the subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his own at all, because God

The eleventh is every place where the Apostle, for counsel, putteth some word by which men use to signify

command, or calleth the following of his counsel by the name of obedience. And therefore they are alleged

out of I Corinthians, 11. 2, "I commend you for keeping my precepts as I delivered them to you." The Greek

is, "I commend you for keeping those things I delivered to you, as I delivered them": which is far from

signifying that they were laws, or anything else, but good counsel. And that of I Thessalonians, 4. 2, "You

know what commandments we gave you": where the Greek word is paraggelias edokamen, equivalent to

paredokamen, "what we delivered to you," as in the place next before alleged, which does not prove the

traditions of the Apostles to be any more than counsels; though as is said in the eighth verse, "he that

despiseth them, despiseth not man, but God": for our Saviour himself came not to judge, that is, to be king in

this world; but to sacrifice himself for sinners, and leave doctors in his Church, to lead, not to drive men to

Christ, who never accepteth forced actions (which is all the law produceth), but the inward conversion of the

And that of II Thessalonians, 3. 14, "If any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no

company with him, that he may be ashamed": where from the word obey, he would infer that this epistle was

a law to the Thessalonians. The epistles of the emperors were indeed laws. If therefore the Epistle of St. Paul

were also a law, they were to obey two masters. But the word obey, as it is in the Greek upakouei, signifieth

hearkening to, or putting in practice, not only that which is commanded by him that has right to punish, but

also that which is delivered in a way of counsel for our good; and therefore St. Paul does not bid kill him that

disobeys; nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him, which legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that

he may be ashamed: whereby it is evident it was not the empire of an Apostle, but his reputation amongst the

The last place is that of Hebrews, 13. 17, "Obey your leaders, and submit yourselves to them, for they watch

for your souls, as they that must give account": and here also is intended by obedience, a following of their

counsel: for the reason of our obedience is not drawn from the will and command of our pastors, but from our

own benefit, as being the salvation of our souls they watch for, and not for the exaltation of their own power

and authority. If it were meant here that all they teach were laws, then not only the Pope, but every pastor in

his parish should have legislative power. Again, they that are bound to obey their pastors have no power to

examine their commands. What then shall we say to St. John, who bids us "not to believe every spirit, but to

try the spirits whether they are of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the world?" [I John, 4.

1] It is therefore manifest that we may dispute the doctrine of our pastors, but no man can dispute a law. The

commands of civil sovereigns are on all sides granted to be laws: if any else can make a law besides himself,

all Commonwealth, and consequently all peace and justice, must cease; which is contrary to all laws, both

divine and human. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these or any other places of Scripture to prove the

The last point he would prove is this, that our Saviour Christ has committed ecclesiastical jurisdiction

immediately to none but the Pope. Wherein he handleth not the question of supremacy between the Pope and

Christian kings, but between the Pope and other bishops. And first, he says it is agreed that the jurisdiction of

bishops is at least in the general de jure divino, that is, in the right of God; for which he alleges St. Paul,

Ephesians, 4. 11, where he says that Christ, after his ascension into heaven, "gave gifts to men, some

Apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers"; and thence infers they

have indeed their jurisdiction in God's right, but will not grant they have it immediately from God, but

derived through the Pope. But if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction de jure divino, and yet not

immediately; what lawful jurisdiction, though but civil, is there in a Christian Commonwealth that is not also

de jure divino? For Christian kings have their civil power from God immediately; and the magistrates under

Him exercise their several charges in virtue of His commission; wherein that which they do is no less de jure

divino mediato than that which the bishops do in virtue of the Pope's ordination. All lawful power is of God,

immediately in the supreme governor, and mediately in those that have authority under him: so that either he

must grant every constable in the state to hold his office in the right of God, or he must not hold that any

But this whole dispute, whether Christ left the jurisdiction to the Pope only, or to other bishops also, if

considered out of those places where the Pope has the civil sovereignty, is a contention de lana caprina: for

none of them, where they are not sovereigns, has any jurisdiction at all. For jurisdiction is the power of

hearing and determining causes between man and man, and can belong to none but him that hath the power to

prescribe the rules of right and wrong; that is, to make laws; and with the sword of justice to compel men to

obey his decisions, pronounced either by himself or by the judges he ordaineth thereunto, which none can

Therefore when he allegeth, out of the sixth chapter of Luke, that our Saviour called his disciples together,

and chose twelve of them, which he named Apostles, he proveth that he elected them (all, except Matthias,

Paul, and Barnabas), and gave them power and command to preach, but not to judge of causes between man

and man: for that is a power which he refused to take upon himself, saying, "Who made me a judge, or a

divider, amongst you?" and in another place, "My kingdom is not of this world." But he that hath not the

power to hear and determine causes between man and man cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all. And

yet this hinders not but that our Saviour gave them power to preach and baptize in all parts of the world,

supposing they were not by their own lawful sovereign forbidden: for to our own sovereigns Christ himself

and his Apostles have in sundry places expressly commanded us in all things to be obedient.

The arguments by which he would prove that bishops receive their jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the

Pope in the dominions of other princes hath no jurisdiction himself) are all in vain. Yet because they prove,

on the contrary, that all bishops receive jurisdiction, when they have it, from their civil sovereigns, I will not

The first is from Numbers, 11, where Moses, not being able alone to undergo the whole burden of

administering the affairs of the people of Israel, God commanded him to choose seventy elders, and took part

of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those seventy elders: by which is understood, not that God weakened the

spirit of Moses, for that had not eased him at all, but that they had all of them their authority from him;

wherein he doth truly and ingenuously interpret that place. But seeing Moses had the entire sovereignty in the

Commonwealth of the Jews, it is manifest that it is thereby signified that they had their authority from the

civil sovereign: and therefore that place proveth that bishops in every Christian Commonwealth have their

authority from the civil sovereign; and from the Pope in his own territories only, and not in the territories of

The second argument is from the nature of monarchy, wherein all authority is in one man, and in others by

derivation from him. But the government of the Church, he says, is monarchical. This also makes for

Christian monarchs. For they are really monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own Church (for the

Church is the same thing with a Christian people); whereas the power of the Pope, though he were St. Peter,

is neither monarchy, nor hath anything of archical nor cratical, but only of didactical; for God accepteth not a

The third is from that the See of St. Peter is called by St. Cyprian, the head, the source, the root, the sun, from

whence the authority of bishops is derived. But by the law of nature, which is a better principle of right and

wrong than the word of any doctor that is but a man, the civil sovereign in every Commonwealth is the head,

the source, the root, and the sun, from which all jurisdiction is derived. And therefore the jurisdiction of

The fourth is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions: for if God, saith he, had given it them

immediately, He had given as well equality of jurisdiction, as of order: but we see some are bishops but of

one town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces; which differences were not

determined by the command of God: their jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of man: and one has a

greater, another a less, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church. Which argument, if he had proved before that

the Pope had had a universal jurisdiction over all Christians, had been for his purpose. But seeing that hath

not been proved, and that it is notoriously known the large jurisdiction of the Pope was given him by those

that had it, that is, by the emperors of Rome (for the Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely,

of being bishop of the capital city of the Empire, and seat of the emperor, claimed to be equal to him), it

followeth that all other bishops have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place wherein they exercise

the same: and as for that cause they have not their authority de jure divino; so neither hath the Pope his de

His fifth argument is this: "If bishops have their jurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take

it from them, for he can do nothing contrary to God's ordination"; and this consequence is good and well

proved. "But," saith he, "the Pope can do this, and has done it." This also is granted, so he do it in his own

dominions, or in the dominions of any other prince that hath given him that power; but not universally, in

right of the popedom: for that power belongeth to every Christian sovereign, within the bounds of his own

empire, and is inseparable from the sovereignty. Before the people of Israel had, by the commandment of

God to Samuel, set over themselves a king, after the manner of other nations, the high priest had the civil

government; and none but he could make nor depose an inferior priest. But that power was afterwards in the

king, as may be proved by this same argument of Bellarmine; for if the priest, be he the high priest or any

other, had his jurisdiction immediately from God, then the king could not take it from him; for he could do

nothing contrary to God's ordinance. But it is certain that King Solomon deprived Abiathar the high priest of

his office, [I Kings, 2. 26, 27] and placed Zadok in his room. [Ibid., 2. 35] Kings therefore may in the like

manner ordain and deprive bishops, as they shall think fit, for the well governing of their subjects.

His sixth argument is this: if bishops have their jurisdiction de jure divino, that is, immediately from God,

they that maintain it should bring some word of God to prove it: but they can bring none. The argument is

good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an argument no less good to prove the Pope himself

Lastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two Popes, Innocent and Leo; and I doubt not but he might

have alleged, with as good reason, the testimonies of all the Popes almost since St. Peter: for, considering the

love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold

the same opinion. Nevertheless, they should therein but do as Innocent and Leo did, bear witness of

In the fifth book he hath four conclusions. The first is that the Pope is not lord of all the world; the second,

that the Pope is not lord of all the Christian world; the third, that the Pope, without his own territory, has not

any temporal jurisdiction directly. These three conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is that the Pope has,

in the dominions of other princes, the supreme temporal power indirectly: which is denied; unless he mean by

indirectly that he has gotten it by indirect means, then is that also granted. But I understand that when he saith

he hath it indirectly, he means that such temporal jurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is

but a consequence of his pastoral authority, the which he could not exercise, unless he have the other with it:

and therefore to the pastoral power, which he calls spiritual, the supreme power civil is necessarily annexed;

and that thereby he hath a right to change kingdoms, giving them to one, and taking them from another, when

Before I come to consider the arguments by which he would prove this doctrine, it will not be amiss to lay

open the consequences of it, that princes and states that have the civil sovereignty in their several

Commonwealths may bethink themselves whether it be convenient for them, and conducing to the good of

their subjects of whom they are to give an account at the day of judgement, to admit the same.

When it is said the Pope hath not, in the territories of other states, the supreme civil power directly, we are to

understand he doth not challenge it, as other civil sovereigns do, from the original submission thereto of those

that are to be governed. For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently in this treatise demonstrated, that

the right of all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to be governed;

whether they that choose him do it for it for their common defence against an enemy, as when they agree

amongst themselves to appoint a man or an assembly of men to protect them, or whether they do it to save

their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the supreme civil

power over other states directly, denieth no more but that his right cometh to him by that way; he ceaseth not

for all that to claim it another way; and that is, without the consent of them that are to be governed, by a right

given him by God, which he calleth indirectly, in his assumption to the papacy. But by what way soever he

pretend, the power is the same; and he may, if it be granted to be his right, depose princes and states, as often

as it is for the salvation of souls, that is, as often as he will: for he claimeth also the sole power to judge

whether it be to the salvation of men's souls, or not. And this is the doctrine, not only that Bellarmine here,

and many other doctors teach in their sermons and books, but also that some councils have decreed, and the

Popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put in practice. For the fourth council of

Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the Third (in the third Chapter, De Haereticis), hath this canon: "If a king,

at the Pope's admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heretics, and being excommunicate for the same, make

not satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of their obedience." And the practice hereof hath been

seen on diverse occasions: as in the deposing of Childeric, King of France; in the translation of the Roman

Empire to Charlemagne; in the oppression of John, King of England; in transferring the kingdom of Navarre;

and of late years, in the league against Henry the Third of France, and in many more occurrences. I think

there be few princes that consider not this as unjust and inconvenient; but I wish they would all resolve to be

kings or subjects. Men cannot serve two masters. They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the

reins of government wholly in their own hands, or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope, that

such men as are willing to be obedient may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal

and spiritual power is but words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing

with another indirect power, as with a direct one. But to come now to his arguments.

The first is this, "The civil power is subject to the spiritual: therefore he that hath the supreme power spiritual

hath right to command temporal princes, and dispose of their temporals in order to the spiritual." As for the

distinction of temporal and spiritual, let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly that the temporal

or civil power is subject to the spiritual. There be but two ways that those words can be made sense. For when

we say one power is subject to another power, the meaning either is that he which hath the one is subject to

him that hath the other; or that the one power is to the other as the means to the end. For we cannot

understand that one power hath power over another power; or that one power can have right or command

over another: for subjection, command, right, and power are accidents, not of powers, but of persons. One

power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a saddler to the art of a rider. If then it be granted that the

civil government be ordained as a means to bring us to a spiritual felicity, yet it does not follow that if a king

have the civil power, and the Pope the spiritual, that therefore the king is bound to obey the Pope, more than

every saddler is bound to obey every rider. Therefore as from subordination of an art cannot be inferred the

subjection of the professor; so from the subordination of a government cannot be inferred the subjection of

the governor. When therefore he saith the civil power is subject to the spiritual, his meaning is that the civil

sovereign is subject to the spiritual sovereign. And the argument stands thus: the civil sovereign is subject to

the spiritual; therefore the spiritual prince may command temporal princes, (where the conclusion is the same

with the antecedent he should have proved). But to prove it, he allegeth first, this reason, "Kings and popes,

clergy and laity, make but one Commonwealth; that is to say, but one Church: and in all bodies the members

depend one upon another: but things spiritual depend not of things temporal: therefore temporal depend on

spiritual, and therefore are subject to them." In which argumentation there be two gross errors: one is that all

Christian kings, popes, clergy, and all other Christian men make but one Commonwealth: for it is evident that

France is one Commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, etc. And these consist of Christians, and

therefore also are several bodies of Christians; that is to say, several churches: and their several sovereigns

represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural

man; which no general or universal Church is, till it have a representant, which it hath not on earth: for if it

had, there is no doubt but that all Christendom were one Commonwealth, whose sovereign were that

representant, both in things spiritual and temporal: and the Pope, to make himself this representant, wanteth

three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to command, and to judge, and to punish, otherwise than, by

excommunication, to run from those that will not learn of him: for though the Pope were Christ's only vicar,

yet he cannot exercise his government till our Saviour's second coming: and then also it is not the Pope, but

The other error in this his first argument is that he says the members of every Commonwealth, as of a natural

body, depend one of another. It is true they cohere together, but they depend only on the sovereign, which is

the soul of the Commonwealth; which failing, the Commonwealth is dissolved into a civil war, no one man

so much as cohering to another, for want of a common dependence on a known sovereign; just as the

members of the natural body dissolve into earth for want of a soul to hold them together. Therefore there is

nothing in this similitude from whence to infer a dependence of the laity on the clergy, or of the temporal

officers on the spiritual, but of both on the civil sovereign; which ought indeed to direct his civil commands

to the salvation of souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God Himself. And thus you see the laboured

fallacy of the first argument, to deceive such men as distinguish not between the subordination of actions in

the way to the end; and the subjection of persons one to another in the administration of the means. For to

every end, the means are determined by nature, or by God Himself supernaturally: but the power to make

men use the means is in every nation resigned, by the law of nature, which forbiddeth men to violate their

His second argument is this: "Every Commonwealth, because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in

itself, may command any other Commonwealth not subject to it, and force it to change the administration of

the government; nay depose the prince, and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend itself

against the injuries he goes about to do them: much more may a spiritual Commonwealth command a

temporal one to change the administration of their government, and may depose princes, and institute others,

That a Commonwealth, to defend itself against injuries, may lawfully do all that he hath here said is very

true; and hath already in that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also true

that there is now in this world a spiritual Commonwealth, distinct from a civil Commonwealth, then might

the prince thereof, upon injury done him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to

come, repair and secure himself by war; which is, in sum, deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of

hostility. But by the same reason, it would be no less lawful for a civil sovereign, upon the like injuries done,

or feared, to make war upon the spiritual sovereign; which I believe is more than Cardinal Bellarmine would

But spiritual Commonwealth there is none in this world: for it is the same thing with the kingdom of Christ;

which he himself saith is not of this world, but shall be in the next world, at the resurrection, when they that

have lived justly, and believed that he was the Christ, shall, though they died natural bodies, rise spiritual

bodies; and then it is that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries, and make a spiritual

Commonwealth. In the meantime, seeing there are no men on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be

no spiritual Commonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unless we call preachers, that have

commission to teach and prepare men for their reception into the kingdom of Christ at the resurrection, a

The third argument is this: "It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate an infidel or heretical king, in case he

endeavour to draw them to his heresy, or infidelity. But to judge whether a king draw his subjects to heresy,

or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope right to determine whether the prince be to be deposed,

To this I answer that both these assertions false. For Christians, or men of what religion soever, if they

tolerate not their king, whatsoever law he maketh, though it be concerning religion, do violate their faith,

contrary to the divine law, both natural and positive: nor is there any judge of heresy amongst subjects but

their own civil sovereign. For heresy is nothing else but a private opinion, obstinately maintained, contrary to

the opinion which the public person (that is to say, the representant of the Commonwealth) hath commanded

to be taught. By which it is manifest that an opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy; nor the

sovereign princes that authorize them, heretics. For heretics are none but private men that stubbornly defend

But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate infidel or heretical kings, he allegeth a place in Deuteronomy

where God forbiddeth the Jews, when they shall set a king over themselves, to choose a stranger:

[Deuteronomy, 17] and from thence inferreth that it is unlawful for a Christian to choose a king that is not a

Christian. And it is true that he that is a Christian, that is, he that hath already obliged himself to receive our

Saviour, when he shall come, for his king, shall tempt God too much in choosing for king in this world one

that he knoweth will endeavour, both by terror and persuasion, to make him violate his faith. But, it is, saith

he, the same danger to choose one that is not a Christian for king, and not to depose him when he is chosen.

To this I say, the question is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the justice of deposing him. To choose

him may in some cases be unjust; but to depose him, when he is chosen, is in no case just. For it is always

violation of faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal law of God. Nor do we read

that any such doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the Apostles; nor in the time of the Roman

Emperors, till the popes had the civil sovereignty of Rome. But to this he hath replied that the Christians of

old deposed not Nero, nor Dioclesian, nor Julian, nor Valens, an Arian, for this cause only, that they wanted

temporal forces. Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, who for calling for might have had twelve legions of

immortal, invulnerable angels to assist him, want forces to depose Caesar, or at least Pilate, that unjustly,

without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to be crucified? Or ff the Apostles wanted temporal

forces to depose Nero, was it therefore necessary for them in their epistles to the new made Christians to

teach them, as they did, to obey the powers constituted over them, whereof Nero in that time was one, and

that they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience sake? Shall we say they did not

only obey, but also teach what they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of strength,

but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their heathen princes, or princes (for I cannot call any

one whose doctrine is the public doctrine, a heretic) that authorize the teaching of an error. And whereas for

the temporal power of the Pope, he allegeth further that St. Paul appointed judges under the heathen princes

of those times, such as were not ordained by those princes; [I Corinthians, 6] it is not true. For St. Paul does

but advise them to take some of their brethren to compound their differences, as arbitrators, rather than to go

to law one with another before the heathen judges; which is a wholesome precept, and full of charity, fit to be

practised also in the best Christian Commonwealths. And for the danger that may arise to religion, by the

subjects tolerating of a heathen, or an erring prince, it is a point of which a subject is no competent judge; or

if he be, the Pope's temporal subjects may judge also of the Pope's doctrine. For every Christian prince, as I

have formerly proved, is no less supreme pastor of his own subjects than the Pope of his.

The fourth argument is taken from the baptism of kings; wherein, that they may be made Christians, they

submit their sceptres to Christ, and promise to keep and defend the Christian faith. This is true; for Christian

kings are no more but Christ's subjects: but they may, for all that, be the Pope's fellows; for they are supreme

pastors of their own subjects; and the Pope is no more but king and pastor, even in Rome itself.

The fifth argument is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, "Feed my sheep"; by which was given all

power necessary for a pastor; as the power to chase away wolves, such as are heretics; the power to shut up

rams, if they be mad, or push at the other sheep with their horns, such as are evil, though Christian, kings; and

power to give the flock convenient food: from whence he inferreth that St. Peter had these three powers given

him by Christ. To which I answer that the last of these powers is no more than the power, or rather command,

to teach. For the first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, heretics, the place he quoteth is, "Beware of

false prophets which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves." [Matthew, 7. 15]

But neither are heretics false prophets, or at all prophets: nor (admitting heretics for the wolves there meant)

were the Apostles commanded to kill them, or if they were kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and

avoid them. Nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the Apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews that followed

him into the mountain, men for the most part not yet converted, that he gave this counsel, to beware of false

prophets: which therefore, if it confer a power of chasing away kings, was given not only to private men, but

to men that were not at all Christians. And as to the power of separating and shutting up of furious rams, by

which he meaneth Christian kings that refuse to submit themselves to the Roman pastor, our Saviour refused

to take upon him that power in this world himself, but advised to let the corn and tares grow up together till

the day of judgement: much less did he give it to St. Peter, or can St. Peter give it to the Popes. St. Peter, and

all other pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians that disobey the Church, that is, that disobey the

Christian sovereign, as heathen men and as publicans. Seeing then men challenge to the Pope no authority

over heathen princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are to be esteemed as heathen.

But from the power to teach only, he inferreth also a coercive power in the Pope over kings. The pastor, saith

he, must give his flock convenient food: therefore food: therefore the pope may and ought to compel kings to

do their duty. Out of which it followeth that the Pope, as pastor of Christian men, is king of kings: which all

Christian kings ought indeed either to confess, or else they ought to take upon themselves the supreme

His sixth and last argument is from examples. To which I answer, first, that examples prove nothing;

secondly, that the examples he allegeth make not so much as a probability of right. The fact of Jehoiada in

killing Athaliah[II Kings, 11] was either by the authority of King Joash, or it was a horrible crime in the high

priest, which ever after the election of King Saul was a mere subject. The fact of St. Ambrose in

excommunicating Theodosius the Emperor, if it were true he did so, was a capital crime. And for the Popes,

Gregory I, Gregory II, Zachary, and Leo III, their judgements are void, as given in their own cause; and the

acts done by them conformably to this doctrine are the greatest crimes, especially that of Zachary, that are

incident to human nature. And thus much of power ecclesiastical; wherein I had been more brief, forbearing

to examine these arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his as a private man, and not as the champion of

THE most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war in Christian Commonwealths hath a long time proceeded

from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once both God and man then when their

commandments are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough that when a man receiveth two contrary

commands, and knows that one of them is God's, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the

command even of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly), or the command of his

father. The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men, when they are commanded in the name of God,

know not in diverse cases whether the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth do but abuse

God's name for some private ends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews many false

prophets that sought reputation with the people by feigned dreams and visions; so there have been in all

times, in the Church of Christ, false teachers that seek reputation with the people by fantastical and false

doctrines; and by such reputation, as is the nature of ambition, to govern them for their private benefit.

But this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on earth, to those that can distinguish between

what is necessary and what is not necessary for their reception into the kingdom of God, is of no moment. For

if the command of the civil sovereign be such as that it may be obeyed without the forfeiture of life eternal,

not to obey it is unjust; and the precept of the apostle takes place: "Servants, obey your masters in all things";

and "Children, obey your parents in all things"; and the precept of our Saviour, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit

in Moses' chair; all therefore they shall say, that observe, and do." But if the command be such as cannot be

obeyed, without being damned to eternal death, then it were madness to obey it, and the counsel of our

Saviour takes place, "Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul." [Matthew, 10. 28] All men

therefore that would avoid both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted for disobedience to their

earthly sovereign, and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, have need be

taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not, necessary to eternal salvation.

All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues, faith in Christ, and obedience to laws. The latter

of these, if it were perfect, were enough to us. But because we are all guilty of disobedience to God's law, not

only originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not

only obedience for the rest of our time, but also a remission of sins for the time past; which remission is the

reward of our faith in Christ. That nothing else is necessarily required to salvation is manifest from this, that

the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but to sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the

law; nor to them, in case they repent, and believe all the articles of Christian faith necessary to salvation.

The obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our actions the will for the deed, is a serious

endeavour to obey Him; and is called also by all such names as signify that endeavour. And therefore

obedience is sometimes called by the names of charity and love, because they imply a will to obey; and our

Saviour himself maketh our love to God, and to one another, a fulfilling of the whole law; and sometimes by

the name of righteousness, for righteousness is but the will to give to every one his own, that is to say, the

will to obey the laws; and sometimes by the name of repentance, because to repent implieth a turning away

from sin, which is the same with the return of the will to obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly

desireth to fulfil the commandments of God, or repenteth him truly of his transgressions, or that loveth God

with all his heart, and his neighbour as himself, hath all the obedience necessary to his reception into the

kingdom of God: for if God should require perfect innocence, there could no flesh be saved.

But what commandments are those that God hath given us? Are all those laws which were given to the Jews

by the hand of Moses the commandments of God? If they be, why are not Christians taught to obey them? If

they be not, what others are so, besides the law of nature? For our Christ hath not given us new laws, but

counsel to observe those we are subject to; that is to say, the laws of nature, and the laws of our several

sovereigns: nor did he make any new law to the Jews in his Sermon on the Mount, but only expounded the

laws of Moses, to which they were subject before. The laws of God therefore are none but the laws of nature,

whereof the principal is that we should not violate our faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil

sovereigns, which we constituted over us by mutual pact one with another. And this law of God, that

commandeth obedience to the law civil, commandeth by consequence obedience to all the precepts of the

Bible; which, as I have proved in the precedent chapter, is there only law where the civil sovereign hath made

it so; and in other places but counsel, which a man at his own peril may without injustice refuse to obey.

Knowing now what is the obedience necessary to salvation, and to whom it is due, we are to consider next,

concerning faith, whom and why we believe, and what are the articles or points necessarily to be believed by

them that shall be saved. And first, for the person whom we believe, because it is impossible to believe any

person before we know what he saith, it is necessary he be one that we have heard speak. The person

therefore whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the prophets believed was God Himself, that spake unto

them supernaturally; and the person whom the Apostles and Disciples that conversed with Christ believed,

was our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God the Father nor our Saviour ever spake, it cannot

be said that the person whom they believed was God. They believed the Apostles, and after them the pastors

and doctors of the Church that recommended to their faith the history of the Old and New Testament: so that

the faith of Christians ever since our Saviour's time hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their

pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the Old and New Testament to be received for the

rule of faith; which none could do but Christian sovereigns, who are therefore the supreme pastors, and the

only persons whom Christians now hear speak from God; except such as God speaketh to in these days

supernaturally. But because there be many false prophets gone out into the world, other men are to examine

such spirits, as St. John adviseth us, "whether they be of God, or not." [I John, 4. 1] And, therefore, seeing the

examination of doctrines belongeth to the supreme pastor, the person which all they that have no special

revelation are to believe is, in every Commonwealth, the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civil sovereign.

The causes why men believe any Christian doctrine are various: for faith is the gift of God, and He worketh it

in each several man by such ways as it seemeth good unto Himself. The most ordinary immediate cause of

our belief, concerning any point of Christian faith, is that we believe the Bible to be the word of God. But

why we believe the Bible to be the word of God is much disputed, as all questions must needs be that are not

well stated. For they make not the question to be, why we believe it, but how we know it; as if believing and

knowing were all one. And thence while one side ground their knowledge upon the infallibility of the Church,

and the other side on the testimony of the private spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how

shall a man know the infallibility of the Church but by knowing first the infallibility of the Scripture? Or how

shall a man know his own private spirit to be other than a belief grounded upon the authority and arguments

of his teachers or upon a presumption of his own gifts? Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture from which

can be inferred the infallibility of the Church; much less, of any particular Church; and least of all, the

It is manifest, therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only believe the Scripture to be the word of

God; and that the means of making them believe, which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according

to the way of nature, that is to say, from their teachers. It is the doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian faith

in general, "Faith cometh by hearing," [Romans, 10. 17] that is, by hearing our lawful pastors. He saith also,

"How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?

And how shall they preach, except they be sent?" [Ibid., 10. 14, 15] Whereby it is evident that the ordinary

cause of believing that the Scriptures are the word of God is the same with the cause of the believing of all

other articles of our faith, namely, the hearing of those that are by the law allowed and appointed to teach us,

as our parents in their houses, and our pastors in the churches: which also is made more manifest by

experience. For what other cause can there be assigned why in Christian Commonwealths all men either

believe or at least profess the Scripture to be the word of God, and in other Commonwealths scarce any, but

that in Christian Commonwealths they are taught it from their infancy, and in other places they are taught

But if teaching be the cause of faith, why do not all believe? It is certain therefore that faith is the gift of God,

and He giveth it to whom He will. Nevertheless, because to them to whom He giveth it, He giveth it by the

means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is hearing. In a school, where many are taught, and some

profit, others profit not, the cause of learning in them that profit is the master; yet it cannot be thence inferred

that learning is not the gift of God. All good things proceed from God; yet cannot all that have them say they

are inspired; for that implies a gift supernatural, and the immediate hand of God; which he that pretends to,

But whether men know, or believe, or grant the Scriptures to be the word of God, if out of such places of

them as are without obscurity I shall show what articles of faith are necessary, and only necessary, for

The unum necessarium, only article of faith, which the Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation is this,

that Jesus is the Christ. By the name of Christ is understood the King which God had before promised by the

prophets of the Old Testament to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews and over such of other nations

as should believe in him) under Himself eternally; and to give them that eternal life which was lost by the sin

of Adam. Which, when I have proved out of Scripture, I will further show when, and in what sense, some

For proof that the belief of this article, Jesus is the Christ, is all the faith required to salvation, my first

argument shall be from the scope of the evangelists; which was, by the description of the life of our Saviour,

to establish that one article, Jesus is the Christ. The sum of St. Matthew's Gospel is this, that Jesus was of the

stock of David, born of a virgin, which are the marks of the true Christ; that the Magi came to worship him as

King of the Jews; that Herod for the same cause sought to kill him; that John the Baptist proclaimed him; that

he preached by himself and his Apostles that he was that King; that he taught the law, not as a scribe, but as a

man of authority; that he cured diseases by his word only, and did many other miracles, which were foretold

the Christ should do; that he was saluted King when he entered into Jerusalem; that he forewarned them to

beware of all others that should pretend to be Christ; that he was taken, accused, and put to death for saying

he was King; that the cause of his condemnation, written on the cross, was JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE

KING OF THE JEWS. All which tend to no other end than this, that men should believe that Jesus is the

Christ. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew's Gospel. But the scope of all the evangelists, as may

appear by reading them, was the same. Therefore the scope of the whole Gospel was the establishing of that

only article. And St. John expressly makes it his conclusion, "These things are written, that you may know

My second argument is taken from the subject of the sermons of the Apostles, both whilst our Saviour lived

on earth, and after his ascension. The Apostles in our Saviour's time were sent to preach the kingdom of God:

[Luke, 9. 2] for neither there, nor Matthew, 10. 7, giveth he any commission to them other than this, "As ye

go, preach, saying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand"; that is, that Jesus is the Messiah, the Christ, the King

which was to come. That their preaching also after his ascension was the same is manifest out of the Acts, 17.

6, "They drew," saith St. Luke, "Jason and certain brethren unto the rulers of the city, crying, These that have

turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom Jason hath received. And these all do contrary to

the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another king, one Jesus." And out of the second and third verses of

the same chapter, where it is said that St. Paul, "as his manner was, went in unto them; and three Sabbath

days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures; opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered, and

The third argument is from those places of Scripture by which all the faith required to salvation is declared to

be easy. For if an inward assent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning Christian faith now taught,

whereof the greatest part are disputed, were necessary to salvation, there would be nothing in the world so

hard as to be a Christian. The thief upon the cross, though repenting, could not have been saved for saying,

"Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom"; by which he testified no beliefs of any other

article, but this, that Jesus was the King. Nor could it be said, as it is, Matthew, 11. 30, that "Christ's yoke is

easy, and his burden light": nor that "little children believe in him," as it is, Matthew, 18. 6. Nor could St.

Paul have said (I Cor., 1. 21), "It pleased God by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe":[I

Corinthians, 1. 21] nor could St. Paul himself have been saved, much less have been so great a doctor of the

Church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of transubstantiation, nor purgatory, nor many other articles

The fourth argument is taken from places express, and such as receive no controversy of interpretation; as

first, John, 5. 39, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they that

testify of me." Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures only of the Old Testament; for the Jews at that

time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not written. But the Old Testament

hath nothing of Christ but the marks by which men might know him when he came; as that he should descend

from David; be born at Bethlehem, and of a virgin; do great miracles, and the like. Therefore to believe that

this Jesus was, he was sufficient to eternal life: but more than sufficient is not necessary; and consequently no

other article is required. Again, "Whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall not die eternally." [John, 11. 26]

Therefore to believe in Christ is faith sufficient to eternal life; and consequently no more faith than that is

necessary. But to believe in Jesus, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as appeareth in the verses

immediately following. For when our Saviour had said to Martha, "Believest thou this?" [Ibid.] she

answereth, "Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world."

[Ibid., 11. 27] Therefore this article alone is faith sufficient to life eternal, and more than sufficient is not

necessary. Thirdly, John, 20. 31, "These things are written that ye might believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the

Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name." There, to believe that Jesus is the Christ

is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life; and therefore no other article is necessary. Fourthly, I John, 4. 2,

"Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God." And I John, 5. 1, "Whosoever

believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." And verse 5, "Who is he that overcometh the world, but he

that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?" Fifthly, Acts, 8. 36, 37, "See," saith the eunuch, "here is water,

what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou believest with all thy heart thou mayst. And he

answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Therefore this article believed, Jesus is the

Christ, is sufficient to baptism, that is to say, to our reception into the kingdom of God, and, by consequence,

only necessary. And generally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man, "Thy faith hath saved thee,"

the cause he saith it is some confession which directly, or by consequence, implieth a belief that Jesus is the

The last argument is from the places where this article is made the foundation of faith: for he that holdeth the

foundation shall be saved. Which places are first, Matthew, 24. 23, "If any man shall say unto you, Lo, here is

Christ, or there, believe it not, for there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great

signs, and wonders," etc. Here, we see, this article, Jesus is the Christ, must be held, though he that shall

teach the contrary should do great miracles. The second place is Galatians, 1. 8, "Though we, or an angel

from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that we have preached unto you, let him be accursed."

But the gospel which Paul and the other Apostles preached was only this article, that Jesus is the Christ:

therefore for the belief of this article, we are to reject the authority of an angel from heaven; much more of

any mortal man, if he teach the contrary. This is therefore the fundamental article of Christian faith. A third

place is I John, 4. 1, "Beloved, believe not every spirit. Hereby ye shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit

that confesseth that is come in the flesh is of God." By which it is evident that this article is the measure and

rule by which to estimate and examine all other articles, and is therefore only fundamental. A fourth is

Matthew, 16. 18, where, after St. Peter had professed this article, saying to our Saviour, "Thou art Christ the

Son of the living God," our Saviour answered, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church":

from whence I infer that this article is that on which all other doctrines of the Church are built, as on their

foundation. A fifth is I Corinthians, 3. 11, 12, etc., "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid,

Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay,

stubble; every man's work shall be made manifest; for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by

fire, and the fire shall try every man's work, what sort it is. If any man's work abide which he hath built

thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burnt, he shall suffer loss; but he himself

shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Which words, being partly plain and easy to understand, and partly

allegorical and difficult, out of that which is plain may be inferred that pastors that teach this foundation, that

Jesus is the Christ, though they draw from it false consequences (which all men are sometimes subject to),

they may nevertheless be saved; much more that they may be saved, who, being no pastors, but hearers,

believe that which is by their lawful pastors taught them. Therefore the belief of this article is sufficient; and

by consequence, there is no other article of faith necessarily required to salvation.

Now for the part which is allegorical, as that "the fire shall try every man's work," and that they "shall be

saved, but so as by fire," or "through fire" (for the original is dia puros), it maketh nothing against this

conclusion which I have drawn from the other words that are plain. Nevertheless, because upon this place

there hath been an argument taken to prove the fire of purgatory, I will also here offer you my conjecture

concerning the meaning of this trial of doctrines and saving of men as by fire. The Apostle here seemeth to

allude to the words of the Prophet Zechariah, who, speaking of the restoration of the kingdom of God, saith

thus, "Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; and I will bring the third

part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried; they shall call

on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them." [Zechariah, 13. 8, 9] The day of judgement is the day of the

restoration of the kingdom of God; and at that day it is that St. Peter tells us shall be the conflagration of the

world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God will save shall pass through that fire

unhurt, and be therein (as silver and gold are refined by the fire from their dross) tried, and refined from their

idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the true God. [II Peter, 3] Alluding whereto, St. Paul here saith

that "the day" (that is, the day of judgement, the great day of our Saviour's coming to restore the kingdom of

God in Israel) shall try every man's doctrine, by judging which are gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay,

stubble; and then they that have built false consequences on the true foundation shall see their doctrines

condemned; nevertheless they themselves shall be saved, and pass unhurt through this universal fire, and live

eternally, to call upon the name of the true and only God. In which sense there is nothing that accordeth not

But a man may here ask whether it be not as necessary to salvation to believe that God is Omnipotent Creator

of the world; that Jesus Christ is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day; as

to believe that Jesus is the Christ. To which I answer, they are; and so are many more articles; but they are

such as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more or less difficulty. For who is there

that does not see that they who believe Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for

God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, do therein also believe that God is the Omnipotent Creator of all

things? Or how can a man believe that Jesus is the king that shall reign eternally, unless he believe him also

risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the office of a king. In sum, he that holdeth this

foundation, Jesus is the Christ, holdeth expressly all that he seeth rightly deduced from it, and implicitly all

that is consequent thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence. And therefore it

holdeth still good that the belief of this one article is sufficient faith to obtain remission of sins to the

penitent, and consequently to bring them into the kingdom of heaven. Now that I have shown that all the

obedience required to salvation consisteth in the will to obey the law of God, that is to say, in repentance; and

all the faith required to the same is comprehended in the belief of this article, Jesus is the Christ; I will further

allege those places of the Gospel that prove that all that is necessary to salvation is contained in both these

joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, next after the ascension of our

Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the Apostles, saying, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" [Acts, 2. 37]

To whom St. Peter answered, "Repent, and be baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye

shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." [Ibid., 2. 38] Therefore repentance and baptism, that is, believing

that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is necessary to salvation. Again, our Saviour being asked by a certain ruler,

"What shall I do to inherit eternal life?" [Luke, 18. 18] answered, "Thou knowest the commandments, Do not

commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Honour thy father and thy

mother":[Ibid., 18. 20] which when he said he had observed, our Saviour added, "Sell all thou hast, give it to

the poor, and come and follow me": which was as much as to say, rely on me that am the king. Therefore to

fulfil the law, and to believe that Jesus is the king, is all that is required to bring a man to eternal life. Thirdly,

St. Paul saith, "The just shall live by faith";[Romans, 1. 17] not every one, but the just; therefore faith and

justice (that is, the will to be just, or repentance) are all that is necessary to life eternal. And our Saviour

preached, saying, "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe the Evangel,"

[Mark, 1. 15] that is, the good news that the Christ was come. Therefore to repent, and to believe that Jesus is

Seeing then it is necessary that faith and obedience (implied in the word repentance) do both concur to our

salvation, the question by which of the two we are justified is impertinently disputed. Nevertheless, it will not

be impertinent to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto, and in what sense it is

said that we are to be justified by the one and by the other. And first, if by righteousness be understood the

justice of the works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed

the law of God. And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to be understood of the will,

which God doth always accept for the work itself, as well in good as in evil men. And in this sense only it is

that a man is called just, or unjust; and that his justice justifies him, that is, gives him the title, in God's

acceptation of just, and renders him capable of living by his faith, which before he was not. So that justice

justifies in that sense in which to justify is the same as that to denominate a man just; and not in the

signification of discharging the law, whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust.

But a man is then also said to be justified when his plea, though in itself insufficient, is accepted; as when we

plead our will, our endeavour to fulfil the law, and repent us of our failings, and God accepteth it for the

performance itself. And because God accepteth not the will for the deed, but only in the faithful, it is

therefore, faith that makes good our plea; and in this sense it is that faith only justifies: so that faith and

obedience are both necessary to salvation, yet in several senses each of them is said to justify.

Having thus shown what is necessary to salvation, it is not hard to reconcile our obedience to God with our

obedience to the civil sovereign, who is either Christian or infidel. If he be a Christian, he alloweth the belief

of this article, that Jesus is the Christ; and of all the articles that are contained in, or are by evident

consequence deduced from it: which is all the faith necessary to salvation. And because he is a sovereign, he

requireth obedience to all his own, that is, to all the civil laws; in which also are contained all the laws of

nature, that is, all the laws of God: for besides the laws of nature, and the laws of the Church, which are part

of the civil law (for the Church that can make laws is the Commonwealth), there be no other laws divine.

Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian sovereign is not thereby hindered neither from believing nor from

obeying God. But suppose that a Christian king should from this foundation, Jesus is the Christ, draw some

false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of hay or stubble, and command the teaching of

the same; yet seeing St. Paul says he shall be saved; much more shall he be saved that teacheth them by his

command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but only believes his lawful teacher. And in case a subject

be forbidden by the civil sovereign to profess some of those his opinions, upon what just ground can he

disobey? Christian kings may err in deducing a consequence, but who shall judge? Shall a private man judge,

when the question is of his own obedience? Or shall any man judge but he that is appointed thereto by the

Church, that is, by the civil sovereign that representeth it? Or if the Pope or an Apostle judge, may he not err

in deducing of a consequence? Did not one of the two, St. Peter or St. Paul, err in a superstructure, when St.

Paul withstood St. Peter to his face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of God and the

And when the civil sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him sinneth against the

laws of God (for such are the laws of nature), and rejecteth the counsel of the Apostles that admonisheth all

Christians to obey their princes, and all children and servants to obey their parents and masters in all things.

And for their faith, it is internal and invisible; they have the license that Naaman had, and need not put

themselves into danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of

their lawful sovereign, much less make war upon him. For he that is not glad of any just occasion of

martyrdom has not the faith he professeth, but pretends it only, to set some colour upon his own contumacy.

But what infidel king is so unreasonable as, knowing he has a subject that waiteth for the second coming of

Christ, after the present world shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey Him (which is the intent of believing

that Jesus is the Christ), and in the meantime thinketh himself bound to obey the laws of that infidel king,

which all Christians are obliged in conscience to do, to put to death or to persecute such a subject?

And thus much shall suffice, concerning the kingdom of God and policy ecclesiastical. Wherein I pretend not

to advance any position of my own, but only to show what are the consequences that seem to me deducible

from the principles of Christian politics (which are the Holy Scriptures), in confirmation of the power of civil

sovereigns and the duty of their subjects. And in the allegation of Scripture, I have endeavoured to avoid such

texts as are of obscure or controverted interpretation, and to allege none but in such sense as is most plain and

agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible, which was written for the reestablishment of the

For it is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be

interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive no thing

from them clearly; but rather, by casting atoms of Scripture as dust before men's eyes, make everything more

obscure than it is, an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage.

Besides these sovereign powers, divine and human, of which I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in

Scripture of another power, namely, that of "the rulers of the darkness of this world," [Ephesians, 6. 12] "the

kingdom of Satan," [Matthew, 12. 26] and "the principality of Beelzebub over demons," [Ibid., 9. 34] that is

to say, over phantasms that appear in the air: for which cause Satan is also called "the prince of the power of

the air";[Ephesians, 2. 2] and, because he ruleth in the darkness of this world, "the prince of this

world":[John, 16. 11] and in consequence hereunto, they who are under his dominion, in opposition to the

faithful, who are the "children of the light," are called the "children of darkness." For seeing Beelzebub is

prince of phantasms, inhabitants of his dominion of air and darkness, the children of darkness, and these

demons, phantasms, or spirits of illusion, signify allegorically the same thing. This considered, the kingdom

of darkness, as it is set forth in these and other places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a confederacy of

deceivers that, to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour, by dark and erroneous

doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature and of the gospel; and so to disprepare them for the

As men that are utterly deprived from their nativity of the light of the bodily eye have no idea at all of any

such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light than he hath at some time or other

perceived by his outward senses: so also is it of the light of the gospel, and of the light of the understanding,

that no man can conceive there is any greater degree of it than that which he hath already attained unto. And

from hence it comes to pass that men have no other means to acknowledge their own darkness but only by

reasoning from the unforeseen mischances that befall them in their ways. The darkest part of the kingdom of

Satan is that which is without the Church of God; that is to say, amongst them that believe not in Jesus Christ.

But we cannot say that therefore the Church enjoyeth, as the land of Goshen, all the light which to the

performance of the work enjoined us by God is necessary. Whence comes it that in Christendom there has

been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such jostling of one another out of their places, both by foreign

and civil war; such stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of

other men; and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark, felicity, if it be not night amongst us, or

The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown the tares of spiritual errors; and that,

first, by abusing and putting out the light of the Scriptures: for we err, not knowing the Scriptures. Secondly,

by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is to say, their fabulous doctrine concerning

demons, which are but idols, or phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own, distinct from

human fancy; such as are dead men's ghosts, and fairies, and other matter of old wives' tales. Thirdly, by

mixing with the Scripture diverse relics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy of the

Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Fourthly, by mingling with both these, false or uncertain traditions, and

feigned or uncertain history. And so we come to err, by giving heed to seducing spirits, and the demonology

of such as speak lies in hypocrisy, or, as it is in the original, "of those that play the part of liars," [I Timothy,

4. 1, 2] with a seared conscience, that is, contrary to their own knowledge. Concerning the first of these,

which is the seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this chapter.

The greatest and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent or

subservient, is the wresting of it to prove that the kingdom of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the

present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that, being dead, are to rise again at the last day:

whereas the kingdom of God was first instituted by the ministry of Moses, over the Jews only; who were

therefore called his peculiar people; and ceased afterward, in the election of Saul, when they refused to be

governed by God any more, and demanded a king after the manner of the nations; which God Himself

consented unto, as I have more at large proved before, in the thirtyfifth Chapter. After that time, there was

no other kingdom of God in the world, by any pact or otherwise, than He ever was, is, and shall be king of all

men and of all creatures, as governing according to His will, by His infinite power. Nevertheless, He

promised by His prophets to restore this His government to them again, when the time He hath in His secret

counsel appointed for it shall be fully come, and when they shall turn unto Him by repentance and

amendment of life. And not only so, but He invited also the Gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happiness of

His reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance. And He promised also to send His Son into

the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine to receive him at

his second coming: which second coming not yet being, the kingdom of God is not yet come, and we are not

now under any other kings by pact but our civil sovereigns; saving only that Christian men are already in the

kingdom of grace, inasmuch as they have already the promise of being received at his coming again.

Consequent to this error, that the present Church is Christ's kingdom, there ought to be some one man, or

assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour, now in heaven, speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his

person to all Christians; or diverse men, or diverse assemblies that do the same to diverse parts of

Christendom. This power regal under Christ being challenged universally by the Pope, and in particular

Commonwealths by assemblies of the pastors of the place (when the Scripture gives it to none but to civil

sovereigns), comes to be so passionately disputed that it putteth out the light of nature, and causeth so great a

darkness in men's understanding that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience.

Consequent to this claim of the Pope to vicar general of Christ in the present Church (supposed to be that

kingdom of his to which we are addressed in the gospel) is the doctrine that it is necessary for a Christian

king to receive his crown by a bishop; as if it were from that ceremony that he derives the clause of Dei gratia

in his title; and that then only is he made king by the favour of God when he is crowned by the authority of

God's universal vicegerent on earth; and that every bishop, whosoever be his sovereign, taketh at his

consecration an oath of absolute obedience to the Pope. Consequent to the same is the doctrine of the fourth

Council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the Third (Chapter 3, De Haereticis), "That if a king, at the

pope's admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heresies, and being excommunicate for the same, do not give

satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience." Whereby heresies are

understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained. And by this means, as

often as there is any repugnancy between the political designs of the Pope and other Christian princes, as

there is very often, there ariseth such a mist amongst their subjects, that they know not a stranger that

thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawful prince, from him whom they had themselves placed there;

and, in this darkness of mind, are made to fight one against another, without discerning their enemies from

From the same opinion, that the present Church is the kingdom of God, it proceeds that pastors, deacons, and

all other ministers of the Church take the name to themselves of the clergy; giving to other Christians the

name of laity, that is, simply people. For clergy signifies those whose maintenance is that revenue which

God, having reserved to Himself during His reign over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi (who were

to be His public ministers, and had no portion of land set them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their

inheritance. The Pope therefore (pretending the present Church to be, as the realms of Israel, the kingdom of

God), challenging to himself and his subordinate ministers the like revenue as the inheritance of God, the

name of clergy was suitable to that claim. And thence it is that tithes and other tributes paid to the Levites as

God's right, amongst the Israelites, have a long time been demanded and taken of Christians by ecclesiastics,

jure divino, that is, in God's right. By which means, the people everywhere were obliged to a double tribute;

one to the state, another to the clergy; whereof that to the clergy, being the tenth of their revenue, is double to

that which a king of Athens (and esteemed a tyrant) exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all public

charges: for he demanded no more but the twentieth part, and yet abundantly maintained therewith the

Commonwealth. And in the kingdom of the Jews, during the sacerdotal reign of God, the tithes and offerings

From the same mistaking of the present Church for the kingdom of God came in the distinction between the

civil and the canon laws: the civil law being the acts of sovereigns in their own dominions, and the canon law

being the acts of the Pope in the same dominions. Which canons, though they were but canons, that is, rules

propounded, and but voluntarily received by Christian princes, till the translation of the Empire to

Charlemagne; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope increased, became rules commanded, and the

emperors themselves, to avoid greater mischiefs, which the people blinded might be led into, were forced to

From hence it is that in all dominions where the Pope's ecclesiastical power is entirely received, Jews, Turks,

and Gentiles are in the Roman Church tolerated in their religion as far forth as in the exercise and profession

thereof they offend not against the civil power: whereas in a Christian, though a stranger, not to be of the

Roman religion is capital, because the Pope pretendeth that all Christians are his subjects. For otherwise it

were as much against the law of nations to persecute a Christian stranger for professing the religion of his

own country, as an infidel; or rather more, inasmuch as they that are not against Christ are with him.

From the same it is that in every Christian state there are certain men that are exempt, by ecclesiastical

liberty, from the tributes and from the tribunals of the civil state; for so are the secular clergy, besides monks

and friars, which in many places bear so great a proportion to the common people as, if need were, there

might be raised out of them alone an army sufficient for any war the Church militant should employ them in

A second general abuse of Scripture is the turning of consecration into conjuration, or enchantment. To

consecrate is, in Scripture, to offer, give, or dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a man or any

other thing to God, by separating of it from common use; that is to say, to sanctify, or make it God's, and to

be used only by those whom God hath appointed to be His public ministers (as I have already proved at large

in the thirtyfifth Chapter), and thereby to change, not the thing consecrated, but only the use of it, from

being profane and common, to be holy, and peculiar to God's service. But when by such words the nature or

quality of the thing itself is pretended to be changed, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary work

of God, or a vain and impious conjuration. But seeing, for the frequency of pretending the change of nature in

their consecrations, it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a conjuration or

incantation, whereby they would have men to believe an alteration of nature that is not, contrary to the

testimony of man's sight and of all the rest of his senses. As for example, when the priest, instead of

consecrating bread and wine to God's peculiar service in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper (which is but a

separation of it from the common use to signify, that is, to put men in mind of, their redemption by the

Passion of Christ, whose body was broken and blood shed upon the cross for our transgressions), pretends

that by saying of the words of our Saviour, "This is my body," and "This is my blood," the nature of bread is

no more there, but his very body; notwithstanding there appeareth not to the sight or other sense of the

receiver anything that appeared not before the consecration. The Egyptian conjurers, that are said to have

turned their rods to serpents, and the water into blood, are thought but to have deluded the senses of the

spectators by a false show of things, yet are esteemed enchanters. But what should we have thought of them if

there had appeared in their rods nothing like a serpent, and in the water enchanted nothing like blood, nor like

anything else but water, but that they had faced down the king, that they were serpents that looked like rods,

and that it was blood that seemed water? That had been both enchantment and lying. And yet in this daily act

of the priest, they do the very same, by turning the holy words into the manner of a charm, which produceth

nothing new to the sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned the bread into a man; nay, more, into a

God; and require men to worship it as if it were our Saviour himself present, God and Man, and thereby to

commit most gross idolatry. For if it be enough to excuse it of idolatry to say it is no more bread, but God;

why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in case they had the faces to say the leeks and onions

they worshipped were not very leeks and onions, but a divinity under their species or likeness? The words,

"This is my body," are equivalent to these, "This signifies, or represents, my body"; and it is an ordinary

figure of speech: but to take it literally is an abuse; nor, though so taken, can it extend any further than to the

bread which Christ himself with his own hands consecrated. For he never said that of what bread soever any

priest whatsoever should say, "This is my body," or "This is Christ's body," the same should presently be

transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome ever establish this transubstantiation, till the time of Innocent

the Third; which was not above five hundred years ago, when the power of Popes was at the highest, and the

darkness of the time grown so great, as men discerned not the bread that was given them to eat, especially

when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the cross, as if they would have men believe it were

transubstantiated, not only into the body of Christ, but also into the wood of his cross, and that they did eat

The like incantation, instead of consecration, is used also in the sacrament of baptism: where the abuse of

God's name in each several person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the cross at each name, maketh

up the charm. As first, when they make the holy water, the priest saith, "I conjure thee, thou creature of water,

in the name of God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ His only Son our Lord, and in virtue

of the Holy Ghost, that thou become conjured water, to drive away all the powers of the enemy, and to

eradicate, and supplant the enemy," etc. And the same in the benediction of the salt to be mingled with it,

"That thou become conjured salt, that all phantasms and knavery of the Devil's fraud may fly and depart from

the place wherein thou art sprinkled; and every unclean spirit be conjured by him that shall come to judge the

quick and the dead." The same in the benediction of the oil, "That all the power of the enemy, all the host of

the Devil, all assaults and phantasms of Satan, may be driven away by this creature of oil." And for the infant

that is to be baptized, he is subject to many charms: first, at the church door the priest blows thrice in the

child's face, and says, "Go out of him, unclean spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost the Comforter." As if

all children, till blown on by the priest, were demoniacs. Again, before his entrance into the church, he saith

as before, "I conjure thee, etc., to go out, and depart from this servant of God"; and again the same exorcism

is repeated once more before he be baptized. These and some other incantations are those that are used

instead of benedictions and consecrations in administration of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's

Supper; wherein everything that serveth to those holy uses, except the unhallowed spittle of the priest, hath

Nor are the other rites, as of marriage, of extreme unction, of visitation of the sick, of consecrating churches,

and churchyards, and the like, exempt from charms; inasmuch as there is in them the use of enchanted oil and

water, with the abuse of the cross, and of the holy word of David, asperges me Domine hyssopo, as things of

Another general error is from the misinterpretation of the words eternal life, everlasting death, and the second

death. For though we read plainly in Holy Scripture that God created Adam in an estate of living for ever,

which was conditional, that is to say, if he disobeyed not His commandment; which was not essential to

human nature, but consequent to the virtue of the tree of life, whereof he had liberty to eat, as long as he had

not sinned; and that he was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest he should eat thereof, and live for

ever; and that Christ's Passion is a discharge of sin to all that believe on Him, and by consequence, a

restitution of eternal life to all the faithful, and to them only: yet the doctrine is now and hath been a long

time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal.

So that the flaming sword at the entrance of Paradise, though it hinder a man from coming to the tree of life,

hinders him not from the immortality which God took from him for his sin, nor makes him to need the

sacrificing of Christ for the recovering of the same; and consequently, not only the faithful and righteous, but

also the wicked and the heathen, shall enjoy eternal life, without any death at all, much less a second and

everlasting death. To salve this, it is said that by second and everlasting death is meant a second and

All which doctrine is founded only on some of the obscurer places of the New Testament; which

nevertheless, the whole scope of the Scripture considered, are clear enough in a different sense, and

unnecessary to the Christian faith. For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth nothing of him but

his carcass; cannot God, that raised inanimated dust and clay into a living creature by His word, as easily

raise a dead carcass to life again, and continue him alive for ever, or make him die again by another word?

The soul, in Scripture, signifieth always either the life or the living creature; and the body and soul jointly,

the body alive. In the fifth day of the Creation, God said, Let the waters produce reptile animae viventis, the

creeping thing that hath in it a living soul; the English translate it, "that hath life." And again, God created

whales, et omnem animam viventem; which in the English is, "every living creature." And likewise of man,

God made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, et factus est homo in

animam viventem, that is, "and man was made a living creature." And after Noah came out of the ark, God

saith, He will no more smite omnem animam viventem, that is, "every living creature." And, "Eat not the

blood, for the blood is the soul"; that is, the life. From which places, if by soul were meant a substance

incorporeal, with an existence separated from the body, it might as well be inferred of any other living

creature, as of man. But that the souls of the faithful are not of their own nature, but by God's special grace, to

remain in their bodies from the resurrection to all eternity, I have already, I think, sufficiently proved out of

the Scriptures, in the thirtyeighth Chapter. And for the places of the New Testament where it is said that any

man shall be cast body and soul into hell fire, it is no more than body and life; that is to say, they shall be cast

This window it is that gives entrance to the dark doctrine, first, of eternal torments, and afterwards of

purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad, especially in places consecrated, solitary, or dark, of the

ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of exorcism and conjuration of phantasms, as also of

invocation of men dead; and to the doctrine of indulgences; that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for ever,

from the fire of purgatory, wherein these incorporeal substances are pretended by burning to be cleansed and

made fit for heaven. For men being generally possessed, before the time of our Saviour, by contagion of the

demonology of the Greeks, of an opinion that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies;

and therefore that when the body was dead, the soul of every man, whether godly or wicked, must subsist

somewhere by virtue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein any supernatural gift of God's; the

doctors of the Church doubted a long time what was the place which they were to abide in, till they should be

reunited to their bodies in the resurrection, supposing for a while, they lay under the altars: but afterward the

Church of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place of purgatory, which by some other

Let us now consider what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these three general errors I have here

touched. As for those which Cardinal Bellarmine hath alleged for the present kingdom of God administered

by the Pope (than which there are none that make a better show of proof), I have already answered them; and

made it evident that the kingdom of God, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of Saul: after which time

the priest of his own authority never deposed any king. That which the high priest did to Athaliah was not

done in his own right, but in the right of the young King Joash, her son: But Solomon in his own right

deposed the high priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place. The most difficult place to answer, of all

those that can be brought to prove the kingdom of God by Christ is already in this world, is alleged, not by

Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome, but by Beza, that will have it to begin from the resurrection

of Christ. But whether he intend thereby to entitle the presbytery to the supreme power ecclesiastical in the

Commonwealth of Geneva, and consequently to every presbytery in every other Commonwealth, or to

princes and other civil sovereigns, I do not know. For the presbytery hath challenged the power to

excommunicate their own kings, and to be the supreme moderators in religion, in the places where they have

that form of Church government, no less than the Pope challengeth it universally.

The words are, "Verily I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of

death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power." [Mark, 9. 1] Which words, if taken

grammatically, make it certain that either some of those men that stood by Christ at that time are yet alive, or

else that the kingdom of God must be now in this present world. And then there is another place more

difficult: for when the Apostles after our Saviour's resurrection, and immediately before his ascension, asked

our Saviour, saying, "Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" he answered them, "It is not

for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father hath put in His own power; but ye shall receive

power by the coming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and ye shall be my witnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all

Judaea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth":[Acts, 1. 6] which is as much as to say, My

kingdom is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come; for it shall come as a thief in the night;

but I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by him you shall have power to bear witness to all the world, by your

preaching of my resurrection, and the works I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, that they may

believe in me, and expect eternal life, at my coming again. How does this agree with the coming of Christ's

kingdom at the resurrection? And that which St. Paul says, "That they turned from idols, to serve the living

and true God, and to wait for His Son from heaven";[I Thessalonians, 1. 9, 10] where "to wait for His Son

from heaven" is to wait for his coming to be king in power; which were not necessary if his kingdom had

been then present. Again, if the kingdom of God began, as Beza on that place would have it, at the

resurrection; what reason is there for Christians ever since the resurrection to say in their prayers, "Let thy

kingdom come"? It is therefore manifest that the words of St. Mark are not so to be interpreted. There be

some of them that stand here, saith our Saviour, that shall not taste of death till they have seen the kingdom of

God come in power. If then this kingdom were to come at the resurrection of Christ, why is it said, some of

But they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them interpret first the like words of our Saviour

to St. Peter concerning St. John, "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?" [John, 21. 22] upon

which was grounded a report that he should not die. Nevertheless the truth of that report was neither

confirmed, as well grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a saying not understood.

The same difficulty is also in the place of St. Mark. And if it be lawful to conjecture at their meaning, by that

which immediately follows, both here and in St. Luke, where the same is again repeated, it is not improbable

to say they have relation to the Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following,

where it is said that "After six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John" (not all, but some of

his Disciples), "and leadeth them up into an high mountain apart by themselves, and was transfigured before

them. And his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no fuller on earth can white them.

And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses, and they were talking with Jesus," etc. So that they saw

Christ in glory and majesty, as he is to come; insomuch as "they were sore afraid." And thus the promise of

our Saviour was accomplished by way of vision. For it was a vision, as may probably be inferred out of St.

Luke, that reciteth the same story, and saith that Peter and they that were with him were heavy with sleep:

[Luke, 9. 28] but most certainly out of Matthew 17. 9 where the same is again related; for our Saviour

charged them, saying, "Tell no man the vision until the Son of Man be risen from the dead." Howsoever it be,

yet there can from thence be taken no argument to prove that the kingdom of God taketh beginning till the

As for some other texts to prove the Pope's power over civil sovereigns (besides those of Bellarmine), as that

the two swords that Christ and his Apostles had amongst them were the spiritual and the temporal sword,

which they say St. Peter had given him by Christ; and that of the two luminaries, the greater signifies the

Pope, and the lesser the king; one might as well infer out of the first verse of the Bible that by heaven is

meant the Pope, and by earth the king: which is not arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting over

princes that came in fashion after the time the popes were grown so secure of their greatness as to contemn all

Christian kings; and treading on the necks of emperors, to mock both them and the Scripture, in the words of

the ninetyfirst Psalm, "Thou shalt tread upon the lion and the adder; the young lion and the dragon thou

As for the rites of consecration, though they depend for the most part upon the discretion and judgement of

the governors of the Church, and not upon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction as

the nature of the action itself requireth; as that the ceremonies, words, gestures be both decent and significant,

or at least conformable to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels

belonging to them, he anointed them with the oil which God had commanded to be made for that purpose:

[Exodus, 40] and they were holy. There was nothing exorcized, to drive away phantasms. The same Moses

(the civil sovereign of Israel), when he consecrated Aaron (the high priest) and his sons, did wash them with

water (not exorcized water), put their garments upon them, and anointed them with oil; and they were

sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in the priest's office, which was a simple and decent cleansing and

adorning them before he presented them to God, to be His servants. When King Solomon (the civil sovereign

of Israel) consecrated the temple he had built, he stood before all the congregation of Israel; and having

blessed them, he gave thanks to God for putting into the heart of his father to build it, and for giving to

himself the grace to accomplish the same; and then prayed unto Him, first, to accept that house, though it

were not suitable to His infinite greatness, and to hear the prayers of His servants that should pray therein, or

(if they were absent) towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of peace offering, and the house was

dedicated. [II Kings, 8] Here was no procession; the King stood still in his first place; no exorcized water; no

Asperges me, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another occasion; but a decent and

rational speech, and such as in making to God a present of his newbuilt house was most conformable to the

We read not that St. John did exorcize the water of Jordan; nor Philip the water of the river wherein he

baptized the eunuch; nor that any pastor in the time of the Apostles did take his spittle and put it to the nose

of the person to be baptized, and say, in odorem suavitatis, that is, "for a sweet savour unto the Lord";

wherein neither the ceremony of spittle, for the uncleanness; nor the application of that Scripture, for the

To prove that the soul, separated from the body, liveth eternally, not only the souls of the elect, by especial

grace, and restoration of the eternal life which Adam lost by sin, and our Saviour restored by the sacrifice of

himself to the faithful; but also the souls of reprobates, as a property naturally consequent to the essence of

mankind, without other grace of God but that which is universally given to all mankind; there are diverse

places which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn: but such as when I compare them with that

which I have before (Chapter thirtyeight) alleged out of the fourteenth of Job seem to me much more subject

And first there are the words of Solomon, "Then shall the dust return to dust, as it was, and the spirit shall

return to God that gave it." [Ecclesiastes, 12. 7] Which may bear well enough (if there be no other text

directly against it) this interpretation, that God only knows, but man not, what becomes of a man's spirit when

he expireth; and the same Solomon, in the same book, delivereth the same sentence in the sense I have given

it. His words are, "All go to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knoweth that

the spirit of man goeth upward, and that the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth?" [Ibid., 3. 20, 21]

That is, none knows but God; nor is it an unusual phrase to say of things we understand not, "God knows

what," and "God knows where." That of Genesis, 5. 24, "Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God

took him"; which is expounded, Hebrews, 11. 5, "He was translated, that he should not die; and was not

found, because God had translated him. For before his translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased

God," making as much for the immortality of the body as of the soul, proveth that this his translation was

peculiar to them that please God; not common to them with the wicked; and depending on grace, not on

nature. But on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give, besides the literal sense of the words of

Solomon, "That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one

dieth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preeminence above a beast, for

all is vanity." [Ibid., 3. 19] By the literal sense, here is no natural immortality of the soul; nor yet any

repugnancy with the life eternal, which the elect shall enjoy by grace. And, "Better is he that hath not yet

been than both they";[Ibid., 4. 3] that is, than they that live or have lived; which, if the soul of all them that

have lived were immortal, were a hard saying; for then to have an immortal soul were worse than to have no

soul at all. And again, "The living know they shall die, but the dead know not anything";[Ibid., 9. 5] that is,

Another place which seems to make for a natural immortality of the soul is that where our Saviour saith that

Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude to rise

again, not of a life then actual; and in the same sense that God said to Adam that on the day he should eat of

the forbidden fruit, he should certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence; but not by

execution, till almost a thousand years after. So Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when

Christ spoke; but are not actually till the resurrection. And the history of Dives and Lazarus make nothing

But there be other places of the New Testament where an immortality seemeth to be directly attributed to the

to the wicked. For it is evident that they shall all rise to judgement. And it is said besides, in many places, that

they shall go into "everlasting fire, everlasting torments, everlasting punishments; and that the worm of

conscience never dieth"; and all this is comprehended in the word everlasting death, which is ordinarily

interpreted "everlasting life in torments": and yet I can find nowhere that any man shall live in torments

everlastingly. Also, it seemeth hard to say that God, who is the Father of mercies, that doth in heaven and

earth all that He will; that hath the hearts of all men in His disposing; that worketh in men both to do and to

will; and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good nor repentance of evil, should punish

men's transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture that men can imagine, and

more. We are therefore to consider what the meaning is of everlasting fire, and other the like phrases of

I have shown already that the kingdom of God by Christ beginneth at the day of judgement: that in that day,

the faithful shall rise again, with glorious and spiritual bodies and be his subjects in that his kingdom, which

shall be eternal: that they shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, nor eat and drink, as they did in their

natural bodies; but live for ever in their individual persons, without the specifical eternity of generation: and

that the reprobates also shall rise again, to receive punishments for their sins: as also that those of the elect,

which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day, shall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made

spiritual and immortal. But that the bodies of the reprobate, who make the kingdom of Satan, shall also be

glorious or spiritual bodies, or that they shall be as the angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor

engendering; or that their life shall be eternal in their individual persons, as the life of every faithful man is,

or as the life of Adam had been if he had not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it; save only these

From whence may be inferred that, as the elect after the resurrection shall be restored to the estate wherein

Adam was before he had sinned; so the reprobate shall be in the estate that Adam and his posterity were in

after the sin committed; saving that God promised a redeemer to Adam, and such of his seed as should trust

in him and repent, but not to them that should die in their sins, as do the reprobate.

These things considered, the texts that mention "eternal fire," "eternal torments," or "the worm that never

dieth," contradict not the doctrine of a second and everlasting death, in the proper and natural sense of the

word death. The fire or torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna, Tophet, or in what place soever, may

continue forever; and there may never want wicked men to be tormented in them, though not every nor any

one eternally. For the wicked, being left in the estate they were in after Adam's sin, may at the resurrection

live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, and have gross and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now

have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the resurrection, as they did before: for there is no

place of Scripture to the contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection, understandeth it only of the

resurrection to life eternal, and not the resurrection to punishment. [I Corinthians, 15] And of the first, he

saith that the body is "sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, raised in honour; sown

in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body." There is no such thing can be said

of the bodies of them that rise to punishment. So also our Saviour, when he speaketh of the nature of man

after the resurrection, meaneth the resurrection to life eternal, not to punishment. The text is Luke, 20, verses

34, 35, 36, a fertile text: "The children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that shall be

counted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in

marriage: neither can they die any more; for they are equal to the angels, and are the children of God, being

the children of the resurrection." The children of this world, that are in the estate which Adam left them in,

shall marry and be given in marriage; that is, corrupt and generate successively; which is an immortality of

the kind, but not of the persons of men: they are not worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the

next world, an absolute resurrection from the dead; but only a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the

end only to receive condign punishment for their contumacy. The elect are the only children of the

resurrection; that is to say, the sole heirs of eternal life: they only can die no more. It is they that are equal to

the angels, and that are the children of God, and not the reprobate. To the reprobate there remaineth after the

resurrection a second and eternal death, between which resurrection and their second and eternal death is but

a time of punishment and torment, and to last by succession of sinners thereunto as long as the kind of man

Upon this doctrine of the natural eternity of separated souls is founded, as I said, the doctrine of purgatory.

For supposing eternal life by grace only, there is no life but the life of the body; and no immortality till the

resurrection. The texts for purgatory alleged by Bellarmine out of the canonical Scripture of the Old

Testament are, first, the fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned II Samuel, 1. 12, and again, II

Samuel, 3. 35, for the death of Abner. This fasting of David, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for

them at God's hands, after their death: because after he had fasted to procure the recovery of his own child, as

soon as he knew it was dead, he called for meat. Seeing then the soul hath an existence separate from the

body, and nothing can be obtained by men's fasting for the souls that are already either in heaven or hell, it

followeth that there be some souls of dead men that are neither in heaven nor in hell; and therefore they must

be in some third place, which must be purgatory. And thus with hard straining, he has wrested those places to

the proof of a purgatory: whereas it is manifest that the ceremonies of mourning and fasting, when they are

used for the death of men whose life was not profitable to the mourners, they are used for honour's sake to

their persons; and when it is done for the death of them by whose life the mourners had benefit, it proceeds

from their particular damage: and so David honoured Saul and Abner with his fasting; and, in the death of his

own child, recomforted himself by receiving his ordinary food. In the other places which he allegeth out of

the Old Testament, there is not so much as any show or colour of proof. He brings in every text wherein there

is the word anger, or fire, or burning, or purging, or cleansing, in case any of the fathers have but in a sermon

rhetorically applied it to the doctrine of purgatory, already believed. The first verse of Psalm 37, "O Lord,

rebuke me not in thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure": what were this to purgatory, if Augustine

had not applied the wrath to the fire of hell, and the displeasure to that of purgatory? And what is it to

purgatory, that of Psalm, 66. 12 "We went through fire and water, and thou broughtest us to a moist place";

and other the like texts, with which the doctors of those times intended to adorn or extend their sermons or

But he allegeth other places of the New Testament that are not so easy to be answered. And first that of

Matthew, 12. 32, "Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but

whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him neither in this world, nor in the

world to come"; where he will have purgatory to be the world to come, wherein some sins may be forgiven

which in this world were not forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest there are but three worlds; one from

the creation to the flood, which was destroyed by water, and is called in Scripture "the old world"; another

from the flood to the day of judgement, which is "the present world, and shall be destroyed by fire; and the

third, which shall be from the day of judgement forward, everlasting, which is called "the world to come";

and in which it agreed by all there shall be no purgatory: and therefore the world to come, and purgatory, are

inconsistent. But what then can be the meaning of those our Saviour's words? I confess they are very hardly

to be reconciled with all the doctrines now unanimously received: nor is it any shame to confess the

profoundness of the Scripture to be too great to be sounded by the shortness of human understanding.

Nevertheless, I may propound such things to the consideration of more learned divines, as the text itself

suggesteth. And first, seeing to speak against the Holy Ghost, as being the third person of the Trinity, is to

speak against the Church, in which the Holy Ghost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made between the

easiness of our Saviour in bearing with offences done to him while he himself taught the world, that is, when

he was on earth, and the severity of the pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority,

which was from the Holy Ghost. As if he should say, you that deny my power; nay, you that shall crucify me,

shall be pardoned by me, as often as you turn unto me by repentance: but if you deny the power of them that

teach you hereafter, by virtue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive you, but

persecute you in this world, and leave you without absolution (though you turn to me, unless you turn also to

them), to the punishments, as much as lies in them, of the world to come. And so the words may be taken as a

prophecy or prediction concerning the times, as they have long been in the Christian Church: or if this be not

the meaning (for I am not peremptory in such difficult places), perhaps there may be place left after the

resurrection for the repentance of some sinners. And there is also another place that seemeth to agree

therewith. For considering the words of St. Paul, "What shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the

dead rise not at all? Why also are they baptized for the dead?" [I Corinthians, 15. 29] a man may probably

infer, as some have done, that in St. Paul's time there was a custom, by receiving baptism for the dead, (as

men that now believe are sureties and undertakers for the faith of infants that are not capable of believing) to

undertake for the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey and receive our Saviour

for their king at his coming again; and then the forgiveness of sins in the world to come has no need of a

purgatory. But in both these interpretations, there is so much of paradox that I trust not to them, but propound

them to those that are thoroughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer place that

contradicts them. Only of thus much, I see evident Scripture to persuade me that there is neither the word nor

the thing of purgatory, neither in this nor any other text; nor anything that can prove a necessity of a place for

the soul without the body; neither for the soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the souls

of them which the Roman Church pretend to be tormented now in purgatory. For God, that could give a life

to a piece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate and rotten

Another place is that of I Corinthians, 3, where it is said that they which build stubble, hay, etc., on the true

foundation, their work shall perish; but "they themselves shall be saved; but as through fire": this fire he will

have to be the fire of purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion to those of Zechariah, 13. 9,

where he saith, "I will bring the third part through the fire, and refine them as silver is refined, and will try

them as gold is tried": which is spoken of the coming of the Messiah in power and glory; that is, at the day of

judgement, and conflagration of the present world; wherein the elect shall not be consumed, but be refined;

that is, depose their erroneous doctrines and traditions, and have them, as it were, singed off; and shall

afterwards call upon the name of the true God. In like manner, the Apostle saith of them that, holding this

foundation, Jesus is the Christ, shall build thereon some other doctrines that be erroneous, that they shall not

be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but shall pass through it to salvation; but so as to see and

relinquish their former errors. The builders are the pastors; the foundation, that Jesus is the Christ; the stubble

and hay, false consequences drawn from it through ignorance or frailty; the gold, silver, and precious stones

are their true doctrines; and their refining or purging, the relinquishing of their errors. In all which there is no

A third place is that of I Corinthians, 15. 29, before mentioned, concerning baptism for the dead: out of which

he concludeth, first, that prayers for the dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a fire of

purgatory: but neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations of the word baptism, he approveth this in

the first place, that by baptism is meant, metaphorically, a baptism of penance; and that men are in this sense

baptized when they fast, and pray, and give alms; and so baptism for the dead, and prayer for the dead, is the

same thing. But this is a metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture nor in any other use

of language; and which is also discordant to the harmony and scope of the Scripture. The word baptism is

used for being dipped in one's own blood, as Christ was upon the cross, and as most of the Apostles were, for

giving testimony of him. [Mark, 10. 38, and Luke, 12. 50] But it is hard to say that prayer, fasting, and alms

have any similitude with dipping. The same is used also, Matthew, 3. 11 (which seemeth to make somewhat

for purgatory), for a purging with fire. But it is evident the fire and purging here mentioned is the same

whereof the Prophet Zechariah speaketh, "I will bring the third part through the fire, will refine them," etc.

[Zechariah, 13. 9] And St. Peter after him, "That the trial of your faith, which is much more precious than of

gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory at the

appearing of Jesus Christ";[I Epistle, 1. 7] and St. Paul, "The fire shall try every man's work of what sort it

is." [I Corinthians, 3. 13] But St. Peter and St. Paul speak of the fire that shall be at the second appearing of

Christ; and the Prophet Zechariah, of the day of judgement. And therefore this place of St. Matthew may be

interpreted of the same, and then there will be no necessity of the fire of purgatory.

Another interpretation of baptism for the dead is that which I have before mentioned, which he preferreth to

the second place of probability: and thence also he inferreth the utility of prayer for the dead. For if after the

resurrection such as have not heard of Christ, or not believed in him, may be received into Christ's kingdom,

it is not in vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them till they should be risen. But granting

that God, at the prayers of the faithful, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard Christ

preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the charity of men in that point cannot be

blamed; yet this concludeth nothing for purgatory, because to rise from death to life is one thing; to rise from

purgatory to life is another; as being a rising from life to life, from a life in torments to a life in joy.

A fourth place is that of Matthew, 5. 25: "Agree with thine adversary quickly, whilst thou art in the way with

him, lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou

be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the

uttermost farthing." In which allegory, the offender is the sinner; both the adversary and the judge is God; the

way is this life; the prison is the grave; the officer, death; from which the sinner shall not rise again to life

eternal, but to a second death, till he have paid the utmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his Passion,

which is a full ransom for all manner of sin, as well lesser sins as greater crimes, both being made by the

The fifth place is that of Matthew, 5. 22: "Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be guilty

in judgement. And whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be guilty in the council. But whosoever

shall say, Thou fool, shall be guilty to hell fire." From which words he inferreth three sorts of sins, and three

sorts of punishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be punished with hell fire; and

consequently, that after this life there is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory. Of which inference there is no

colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them. Shall there be a distinction after this life of

courts of justice, as there was amongst the Jews in our Saviour's time, to hear and determine diverse sorts of

crimes, as the judges and the council? Shall not all judicature appertain to Christ and his Apostles? To

understand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the words precedent and

subsequent. Our Saviour in this chapter interpreteth the Law of Moses, which the Jews thought was then

fulfilled when they had not transgressed the grammatical sense thereof, howsoever they had transgressed

against the sentence or meaning of the legislator. Therefore, whereas they thought the sixth Commandment

was not broken but by killing a man; nor the seventh, but when a man lay with a woman not his wife; our

Saviour tells them, the inward anger of a man against his brother, if it be without just cause, is homicide. You

have heard, saith he, the Law of Moses, "Thou shalt not kill," and that "Whosoever shall kill shall be

condemned before the judges," or before the session of the Seventy: but I say unto you, to be angry with one's

brother without cause, or to say unto him Raca, or Fool, is homicide, and shall be punished at the day of

judgement, and session of Christ and his Apostles, with hell fire. So that those words were not used to

distinguish between diverse crimes, and diverse courts of justice, and diverse punishments; but to tax the

distinction between sin and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying God, but

from the difference of their temporal courts of justice; and to show them that he that had the will to hurt his

brother, though the effect appear but in reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire by the judges and by

the session, which shall be the same, not different, courts at the day of judgement. This considered, what can

The sixth place is Luke, 16. 9: "Make ye friends of the unrighteous mammon, that when ye fail, they may

receive you into everlasting tabernacles." This he alleges to prove invocation of saints departed. But the sense

is plain, that we should make friends, with our riches, of the poor; and thereby obtain their prayers whilst they

The seventh is Luke, 23. 42: "Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom." Therefore, saith he,

there is remission of sins after this life. But the consequence is not good. Our Saviour then forgave him, and,

The eighth is Acts, 2. 24, where St. Peter saith of Christ, "that God had raised him up, and loosed the pains of

death, because it was not possible he should be holden of it": which he interprets to be a descent of Christ into

purgatory, to loose some souls there from their torments: whereas it is manifest that it was Christ that was

loosed. It was he that could not be holden of death or the grave, and not the souls in purgatory. But if that

which Beza says in his notes on this place be well observed, there is none that will not see that instead of

pains, it should be bands; and then there is no further cause to seek for purgatory in this text.

THE impression made on the organs of sight by lucid bodies, either in one direct line or in many lines,

reflected from opaque, or refracted in the passage through diaphanous bodies, produceth in living creatures,

in whom God hath placed such organs, an imagination of the object from whence the impression proceedeth;

which imagination is called sight, and seemeth not to be a mere imagination, but the body itself without us; in

the same manner as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears to him a light without, and before

him, which no man perceiveth but himself, because there is indeed no such thing without him, but only a

motion in the interior organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so. And the motion made

by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call imagination, and

memory, and, in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by sickness or violence, a dream, of

This nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to natural knowledge, much less

by those that consider not things so remote (as that knowledge is) from their present use, it was hard for men

to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense otherwise than of things really without us: which

some, because they vanish away, they know not whither nor how, will have to be absolutely incorporeal, that

is to say, immaterial, or forms without matter (colour and figure, without any coloured or figured body), and

that they can put on airy bodies, as a garment, to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and

others say, are bodies and living and living creatures, but made of air, or other more subtle and ethereal

matter, which is, then, when they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation

of them, demons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not inhabitants of their own brain, but of the air,

or of heaven, or hell; not phantasms, but ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say he saw his own

ghost in a lookingglass, or the ghosts of the stars in a river; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun, of the

quantity of about a foot, the demon or ghost of that great sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world: and

by that means have feared them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to do them good or

harm; and consequently, given occasion to the governors of the heathen Commonwealths to regulate this their

fear by establishing that demonology (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were

specially employed or reverenced) to the public peace, and to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto;

and to make some of them good demons, and others evil; the one as a spur to the observance, the other as

What kind of things they were to whom they attributed the name of demons appeareth partly in the genealogy

of their gods, written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the Grecians, and partly in other histories,

of which I have observed some few before, in the twelfth Chapter of this discourse.

The Grecians, by their colonies and conquests communicated their language and writings into Asia, Egypt,

and Italy; and therein, by necessary consequence, their demonology, or, as St. Paul calls it, their doctrines of

devils: and by that means the contagion was derived also to the Jews, both of Judaea and Alexandria, and

other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of demon they did not, as the Grecians, attribute to

spirits both good and evil; but to the evil only: and to the good demons they gave the name of the Spirit of

God, and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be prophets. In sum, all singularity, if good, they

attributed to the Spirit of God; and if evil, to some demon, but a kakodaimen, an evil demon, that is, a devil.

And therefore, they called demoniacs, that is, possessed by the devil, such as we call madmen or lunatics, or

such as had the fallingsickness; or that spoke anything which they, for want of understanding, thought

absurd. As also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he had an unclean spirit; of a

dumb man, that he had a dumb devil; and of John the Baptist, for the singularity of his fasting, that he had a

devil; [Matthew, 11. 18] and of our Saviour, because he said, he that keepeth his sayings should not see death

in aeternum, "Now we know thou hast a devil; Abraham is dead, and the prophets are dead." [John, 8. 52]

And again, because he said they went about to kill him, the people answered, "Thou hast a devil: who goeth

about to kill thee?" [John, 7. 20] Whereby it is manifest that the Jews had the same opinions concerning

phantasms; namely, that they were not phantasms, that is, idols of the brain, but things real, and independent

Which doctrine, if it be not true, why, may some say, did not our Saviour contradict it, and teach the

contrary? Nay, why does He use on diverse occasions such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I

answer that, first, where Christ saith, "A spirit hath not flesh and bone," [Luke, 24. 39] though he show that

there be spirits, yet he denies not that they are bodies. And where St. Paul says, "We shall rise spiritual

bodies," [I Corinthians, 15. 44] he acknowledgeth the nature of spirits, but that they are bodily spirits; which

is not difficult to understand. For air and many other things are bodies, though not flesh and bone, or any

other gross body to be discerned by the eye. But when our Saviour speaketh to the devil, and commandeth

him to go out of a man, if by the devil be meant a disease, as frenzy, or lunacy, or a corporeal spirit, is not the

speech improper? Can diseases hear? Or can there be a corporeal spirit in a body of flesh and bone, full

already of vital and animal spirits? Are there not therefore spirits, that neither have bodies, nor are mere

imaginations? To the first I answer that the addressing of our Saviour's command to the madness or lunacy he

cureth is no more improper than was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind and sea; for neither do these

hear: or than was the command of God to the light, to the firmament, to the sun, and stars, when He

commanded them to be; for they could not hear before they had a being. But those speeches are not improper,

because they signify the power of God's word: no more therefore is it improper to command madness or

lunacy, under the appellation of devils by which they were then commonly understood, to depart out of a

man's body. To the second, concerning their being incorporeal, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture

from whence it can be gathered that any man was ever possessed with any other corporeal spirit but that of

Our Saviour, immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the form of a dove, is said by St.

Matthew to have been "led up by the Spirit into the wilderness";[Matthew, 4. 1] and the same is recited,

Luke, 4. 1, in these words, "Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was led in the Spirit into the wilderness":

whereby it is evident that by Spirit there is meant the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for a possession;

for Christ and the Holy Ghost are but one and the same substance, which is no possession of one substance,

or body, by another. And whereas in the verses following he is said "to have been taken up by the devil into

the holy city, and set upon a pinnacle of the temple," shall we conclude thence that he was possessed of the

devil, or carried thither by violence? And again, "carried thence by the devil into an exceeding high

mountain, who showed him thence all the kingdoms of the world": wherein we are not to believe he was

either possessed or forced by the devil; nor that any mountain is high enough, according to the literal sense to

show him one whole hemisphere. What then can be the meaning of this place, other than that he went of

himself into the wilderness; and that this carrying of him up and down, from the wilderness to the city, and

from thence into a mountain, was a vision? Conformable whereunto is also the phrase of St. Luke, that he

was led into the wilderness, not by, but in the Spirit: whereas, concerning his being taken up into the

mountain, and unto the pinnacle of the temple, he speaketh as St. Matthew doth, which suiteth with the nature

Again, where St. Luke says of Judas Iscariot that "Satan entered into him, and thereupon that he went and

communed with the chief priests, and captains, how he might betray Christ unto them";[Luke, 22. 3, 4] it may

be answered that by the entering of Satan (that is, the enemy) into him is meant the hostile and traitorous

intention of selling his Lord and Master. For as by the Holy Ghost is frequently in Scripture understood the

graces and good inclinations given by the Holy Ghost; so by the entering of Satan may be understood the

wicked cogitations and designs of the adversaries of Christ and his Disciples. For as it is hard to say that the

devil was entered into Judas, before he had any such hostile design; so it is impertinent to say he was first

Christ's enemy in his heart, and that the devil entered into him afterwards. Therefore the entering of Satan,

But if there be no immaterial spirit, nor any possession of men's bodies by any spirit corporeal, it may again

be asked why our Saviour his Apostles did not teach the people so, and in such clear words as they might no

more doubt thereof. But such questions as these are more curious than necessary for a Christian man's

salvation. Men may as well ask why Christ, that could have given to all men faith, piety, and all manner of

moral virtues, gave it to some only, and not to all: and why he left the search of natural causes and sciences to

the natural reason and industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally; and many other

such questions, of which nevertheless there may be alleged probable and pious reasons. For as God, when He

brought the Israelites into the Land of Promise, did not secure them therein by subduing all the nations round

about them, but left many of them, as thorns in their sides, to awaken from time to time their piety and

industry: so our Saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly kingdom, did not destroy all the difficulties of

natural questions, but left them to exercise our industry and reason; the scope of his preaching being only to

show us this plain and direct way to salvation, namely, the belief of this article, that he was the Christ, the

Son of the living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himself for our sins, and, at his coming again,

gloriously to reign over his elect, and to save them from their enemies eternally: to which the opinion of

possession by spirits or phantasms is no impediment in the way, though it be to some an occasion of going

out of the way, and to follow their own inventions. If we require of the Scripture an account of all questions

which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of God's commands, we may as well complain of

Moses for not having set down the time of the creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth

and sea, and of men and beasts. To conclude, I find in Scripture that there be angels and spirits, good and

evil; but not that they are incorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream or vision,

which the Latins call spectra, and took for demons. And I find that there are spirits corporeal, though subtle

and invisible; but not that any man's body was possessed or inhabited by them, and that the bodies of the

Nevertheless, the contrary doctrine, namely, that there be incorporeal spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the

Church that the use of exorcism (that is to say, of ejection of devils by conjuration) is thereupon built; and,

though rarely and faintly practised, is not yet totally given over. That there were many demoniacs in the

primitive Church, and few madmen, and other such singular diseases; whereas in these times we hear of, and

see many madmen, and few demoniacs, proceeds not from the change of nature, but of names. But how it

comes to pass that whereas heretofore the Apostles, and after them for a time the pastors of the Church, did

cure those singular diseases, which now they are not seen to do; as likewise, why it is not in the power of

every true believer now to do all that the faithful did then, that is to say, as we read "in Christ's name to cast

out devils, to speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison without harm taking, and to

cure the sick by the laying on of their hands," [Mark, 16. 17] and all this without other words but "in the

name of Jesus," is another question. And it is probable that those extraordinary gifts were given to the Church

for no longer a time than men trusted wholly to Christ, and looked for their felicity only in his kingdom to

come; and consequently, that when they sought authority and riches, and trusted to their own subtlety for a

kingdom of this world, these supernatural gifts of God were again taken from them.

Another relic of Gentilism is the worship of images, neither instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in

the New Testament; nor yet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them, after they had given their

names to Christ. Before our Saviour preached, it was the general religion of the Gentiles to worship for gods

those appearances that remain in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the organs of their

senses, which are commonly called ideas, idols, phantasms, conceits, as being representations of those

external bodies which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more than there is in the things that

seem to stand before us in a dream. And this is the reason why St. Paul says, "We know that an idol is

nothing": not that he thought that an image of metal, stone, or wood was nothing; but that the thing which

they honored or feared in the image, and held for a god, was a mere figment, without place, habitation,

motion, or existence, but in the motions of the brain. And the worship of these with divine honour is that

which is in the Scripture called idolatry, and rebellion against God. For God being King of the Jews, and His

lieutenant being first Moses, and afterward the high priest, if the people had been permitted to worship and

pray to images (which are representations of their own fancies), they had had no further dependence on the

true God, of whom there can be no similitude; nor on His prime ministers, Moses and the high priests; but

every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion of the Commonwealth,

and their own destruction for want of union. And therefore the first law of God was: they should not take for

gods, alienos deos, that is, the gods of other nations, but that only true God, who vouchsafed to commune

with Moses, and by him to give them laws and directions for their peace, and for their salvation from their

enemies. And the second was that they should not make to themselves any image to worship, of their own

invention. For it is the same deposing of a king to submit to another king, whether he be set up by a

The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of images to worship them, or to set them up

at all in the places where God is worshipped, are, first, two examples; one of the cherubim over the Ark of

God; the other of the brazen serpent: secondly, some texts whereby we are commanded to worship certain

creatures for their relation to God; as to worship His footstool: and lastly, some other texts, by which is

authorized a religious honouring of holy things. But before I examine the force of those places, to prove that

which is pretended, I must first explain what is to be understood by worshipping, and what by images and

I have already shown, in the twentieth Chapter of this discourse, that to honour is to value highly the power

of any person, and that such value is measured by our comparing him with others. But because there is

nothing to be compared with God in power, we honour Him not, but dishonour Him, by any value less than

infinite. And thus honour is properly of its own nature secret, and internal in the heart. But the inward

thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and actions, are the signs of our honouring, and these

go by the name of worship; in Latin, cultus. Therefore, to pray to, to swear by, to obey, to be diligent and

officious in serving; in sum, all words and actions that betoken fear to offend, or desire to please, is worship,

whether those words and actions be sincere or feigned: and because they appear as signs of honouring are

The worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings and men in authority, is civil worship:

but the worship we exhibit to that which we think to be God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or

other actions be, is divine worship. To fall prostrate before a king, in him that thinks him but a man, is but

civil worship: and he that but putteth off his hat in the church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the house of

God, worshippeth with divine worship. They that seek the distinction of divine and civil worship, not in the

intention of the worshipper, but in the words douleia and latreia, deceive themselves. For whereas there be

two sorts of servants: that sort which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters, as slaves

taken in war, and their issue, whose bodies are not in their own power (their lives depending on the will of

their masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience), and that are bought and sold as

beasts, were called Douloi, that is properly, slaves, and their service, Douleia; the other, which is of those that

serve for hire, or in hope of benefit from their masters voluntarily, are called Thetes, that is, domestic

servants; to whose service the masters have no further right than is contained in the covenants made betwixt

them. These two kinds of servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them

by another: and the word Latris is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether

as a slave or a voluntary servant. So that latreia signifieth generally all service; but douleia the service of

bondmen only, and the condition of slavery: and both are used in Scripture, to signify our service of God,

promiscuously. Douleia, because we are God's slaves; latreia, because we serve Him: and in all kinds of

service is contained, not only obedience, but also worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words as signify

An image, in the most strict signification of the word, is the resemblance of something visible: in which sense

the fantastical forms, apparitions, or seemings of visible bodies to the sight, are only images; such as are the

show of a man or other thing in the water, by reflection or refraction; or of the sun or stars by direct vision in

the air; which are nothing real in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to be; nor are their

magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object, but changeable, by the variation of the organs of

sight, or by glasses; and are present oftentimes in our imagination, and in our dreams, when the object is

absent; or changed into other colours, and shapes, as things that depend only upon the fancy. And these are

the images which are originally and most properly called ideas and idols, and derived from the language of

the Grecians, with whom the word eido signifieth to see. They are also called phantasms, which is in the

same language, apparitions. And from these images it is that one of the faculties of man's nature is called the

imagination. And from hence it is manifest that there neither is, nor can be, any image made of a thing

It is also evident that there can be no image of a thing infinite: for all the images and phantasms that are made

by the impression of things visible are figured. But figure is quantity every way determined, and therefore

there can be no image of God, nor of the soul of man, nor of spirits; but only of bodies visible, that is, bodies

And whereas a man can fancy shapes he never saw, making up a figure out of the parts of diverse creatures,

as the poets make their centaurs, chimeras, and other monsters never seen: so can he also give matter to those

shapes, and make them in wood, clay, or metal. And these are also called images, not for the resemblance of

any corporeal thing, but for the resemblance of some fantastical inhabitants of the brain of the maker. But in

these idols, as they are originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or molten in matter,

there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the material body made by art may be said to be the

But in a larger use of the word image is contained also any representation of one thing by another. So an

earthly sovereign may be called the image of God, and an inferior magistrate the image of an earthly

sovereign. And many times in the idolatry of the Gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their

material idol to the idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the image of it. For a stone unhewn has been set

up for Neptune, and diverse other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their gods. And at

this day we see many images of the Virgin Mary, and other saints, unlike one another, and without

correspondence to any one man's fancy; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for,

which was no more but by the names only to represent the persons mentioned in the history; to which every

man applieth a mental image of his own making, or none at all. And thus an image, in the largest sense, is

either the resemblance or the representation of some thing visible; or both together, as it happeneth for the

But the name of idol is extended yet further in Scripture, to signify also the sun, or a star, or any other

Having shown what is worship, and what an image, I will now put them together, and examine what that

idolatry is which is forbidden in the second Commandment, and other places of the Scripture.

To worship an image is voluntarily to do those external acts which are signs of honouring either the matter of

the image (which is wood, stone, metal, or some other visible creature), or the phantasm of the brain for the

resemblance or representation whereof the matter was formed and figured, or both together as one animate

To be uncovered, before a man of power and authority, or before the throne of a prince, or in such other

places as he ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to worship that man or prince with civil worship; as

being a sign, not of honouring the stool or place, but the person, and is not idolatry. But if he that doth it

should suppose the soul of the prince to be in the stool, or should present a petition to the stool, it were divine

To pray to a king for such things as he is able to do for us, though we prostrate ourselves before him, is but

civil worship, because we acknowledge no other power in him but human: but voluntarily to pray unto him

for fair weather, or for anything which God only can do for us, is divine worship, and idolatry. On the other

side, if a king compel a man to it by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment, it is not idolatry;

for the worship which the sovereign commandeth to be done unto himself by the terror of his laws is not a

sign that he that obeyeth him does inwardly honour him as a god, but that he is desirous to save himself from

death, or from a miserable life: and that which is not a sign of internal honour is no worship, and therefore no

idolatry. Neither can it be said that he that does it scandalizeth or layeth any stumbling block before his

brother: because how wise or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from

thence argue that he approveth it, but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of his

To worship God in some peculiar place, or turning a man's face towards an image or determinate place, is not

to worship or honour the place or image, but to acknowledge it holy; that is to say, to acknowledge the image

or the place to be set apart from common use, for that is the meaning of the word holy; which implies no new

quality in the place or image, but only a new relation by appropriation to God, and therefore is not idolatry;

no more than it was idolatry to worship God before the brazen serpent; or for the Jews, when they were out of

their own country, to turn their faces, when they prayed, toward the temple of Jerusalem; or for Moses to put

off his shoes when he was before the flaming bush, the ground appertaining to Mount Sinai, which place God

had chosen to appear in, and to give His laws to the people of Israel, and was therefore holy ground, not by

inherent sanctity, but by separation to God's use; or for Christians to worship in the churches which are once

solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose by the authority of the king or other true representant of the

Church. But to worship God as inanimating or inhabiting such image or place; that is to say, an infinite

substance in a finite place, is idolatry: for such finite gods are but idols of the brain, nothing real, and are

commonly called in the Scripture by the names of vanity, and lies, and nothing. Also to worship God, not as

inanimating, or present in the place or image, but to the end to be put in mind of Him, or of some works of

His, in case the place or image be dedicated or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of them

that are our sovereign pastors, is idolatry. For the Commandment is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any

graven image." God commanded Moses to set up the brazen serpent; he did not make it to himself; it was not

therefore against the Commandment. But the making of the golden calf by Aaron and the people, as being

done without authority from God, was idolatry; not only because they held it for God, but also because they

made it for a religious use, without warrant either from God their Sovereign, or from Moses that was His

The Gentiles worshipped, for gods, Jupiter and others that, living, were men perhaps that had done great and

glorious acts; and, for the children of God, diverse men and women, supposing them gotten between an

immortal deity and a mortal man. This was idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no

authority from God, neither in His eternal law of reason, nor in His positive and revealed will. But though our

Saviour was a man, whom we also believe to be God immortal and the Son of God, yet this is no idolatry,

because we build not that belief upon our own fancy or judgement, but upon the word of God revealed in the

Scriptures. And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, "This is my body," signify that he

himself, and the seeming bread in his hand, and not only so, but that all the seeming morsels of bread that

have ever since been, and any time hereafter shall be, consecrated by priests, be so many Christ's bodies, and

yet all of them but one body, then is that no idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that text

do not signify that (for there is no other that can be alleged for it), then, because it is a worship of human

institution, it is idolatry. For it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the bread into Christ's body, for

the Gentiles also held God to be omnipotent, and might upon that ground no less excuse their idolatry, by

pretending, as well as others, a transubstantiation of their wood and stone into God Almighty.

Whereas there be, that pretend divine inspiration to be a supernatural entering of the Holy Ghost into a man,

and not an acquisition of God's graces by doctrine and study, I think they are in a very dangerous dilemma.

For if they worship not the men whom they believe to be so inspired, they fall into impiety, as not adoring

God's supernatural presence. And again, if they worship them they commit idolatry, for the Apostles would

never permit themselves to be so worshipped. Therefore the safest way is to believe that by the descending of

the dove upon the Apostles, and by Christ's breathing on them when he gave them the Holy Ghost, and by the

giving of it by imposition of hands, are understood the signs which God hath been pleased to use, or ordain to

be used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach His kingdom, and in their conversation,

Besides the idolatrous worship of images, there is also a scandalous worship of them, which is also a sin, but

not idolatry. For idolatry is to worship by signs of an internal and real honour; but scandalous worship is but

seeming worship, and may sometimes be joined with an inward and hearty detestation, both of the image and

of the fantastical demon or idol to which it is dedicated; and proceed only from the fear of death or other

grievous punishment; and is nevertheless a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are

looked at by others as lights to guide them by; because following their ways, they cannot but stumble and fall

in the way of religion: whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to

If therefore a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any other, of whose knowledge there is a

great opinion, do external honour to an idol for fear; unless he make his fear and unwillingness to it as

evident as the worship, he scandalizeth his brother by seeming to approve idolatry. For his brother arguing

from the action of his teacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to be lawful in

itself. And this scandal is sin, and a scandal given. But if one being no pastor, nor of eminent reputation for

knowledge in Christian doctrine, do the same, and another follow him, this is no scandal given (for he had no

cause to follow such example), but is a pretence of scandal which he taketh of himself for an excuse before

men. For an unlearned man that is in the power of an idolatrous king or state, if commanded on pain of death

to worship before an idol, he detesteth the idol in his heart: he doth well; though if he had the fortitude to

suffer death, rather than worship it, he should do better. But if a pastor, who as Christ's messenger has

undertaken to teach Christ's doctrine to all nations, should do the same, it were not only a sinful scandal, in

respect of other Christian men's consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge.

The sum of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the worship of images, is this, that he that worshippeth

in an image, or any creature, either the matter thereof, or any fancy of his own which he thinketh to dwell in

it; or both together; or believeth that such things hear his prayers, or see his devotions, without ears or eyes,

committeth idolatry. And he that counterfeiteth such worship for fear of punishment, if he be a man whose

example hath power amongst his brethren, committeth a sin. But he that worshippeth the Creator of the world

before such an image, or in such a place as he hath not made or chosen of himself, but taken from the

commandment of God's word, as the Jews did in worshipping God before the cherubim, and before the

brazen serpent for a time, and in or towards the temple of Jerusalem, which was also but for a time,

Now for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things at this day practised in the Church of

Rome, I say they are not allowed by the word of God, nor brought into the Church of Rome from the doctrine

there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles, and afterwards countenanced, and

As for the proofs alleged out of Scripture; namely, those examples of images appointed by God to be set up;

they were not set up for the people or any man to worship, but that they should worship God Himself before

them; as before the cherubim over the Ark, and the brazen serpent. For we read not that the priest or any other

did worship the cherubim. But contrarily we read that Hezekiah broke in pieces the brazen serpent which

Moses had set up, [II Kings, 18. 4] because the people burnt incense to it. Besides, those examples are not put

for our imitation, that we also should set up images, under pretence of worshipping God before them; because

the words of the second Commandment, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image," etc., distinguish

between the images that God commanded to be set up, and those which we set up to ourselves. And therefore

from the cherubim or brazen serpent, to the images of man's devising; and from the worship commanded by

God, to the willworship of men, the argument is not good. This also is to be considered, that as Hezekiah

broke in pieces the brazen serpent, because the Jews did worship it, to the end they should do so no more; so

also Christian sovereigns ought to break down the images which their subjects have been accustomed to

worship, that there be no more occasion of such idolatry. For at this day the ignorant people, where images

are worshipped, do really believe there is a divine power in the images; and are told by their pastors that some

of them have spoken, and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them; which they apprehend as

done by the saint, which they think either is the image itself, or in it. The Israelites, when they worshipped the

calf, did think they worshipped the God that brought them out of Egypt, and yet it was idolatry, because they

thought the calf either was that God, or had Him in his belly. And though some man may think it impossible

for people to be so stupid as to think the image to be God, or a saint, or to worship it in that notion, yet it is

manifest in Scripture to the contrary; where, when the golden calf was made, the people said, "These are thy

gods, O Israel";[Exodus, 32] and where the images of Laban are called his gods. [Genesis, 31. 30] And we

see daily by experience in all sorts of people that such men as study nothing but their food and ease are

content to believe any absurdity, rather than to trouble themselves to examine it, holding their faith as it were

But they infer from some other places that it is lawful to paint angels, and also God Himself: as from God's

walking in the garden; from Jacob's seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other visions and dreams.

But visions and dreams, whether natural or supernatural, are but phantasms: and he that painteth an image of

any of them, maketh not an image of God, but of his own phantasm, which is making of an idol. I say not,

that to draw a picture after a fancy is a sin; but when it is drawn, to hold it for a representation of God is

against the second Commandment and can be of no use but to worship. And the same may be said of the

images of angels, and of men dead; unless as monuments of friends, or of men worthy remembrance: for such

use of an image is not worship of the image, but a civil honouring of the person; not that is, but that was: but

when it is done to the image which we make of a saint, for no other reason but that we think he heareth our

prayers, and is pleased with the honour we do him, when dead and without sense, we attribute to him more

Seeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the Law of Moses nor in the Gospel, for the religious

worship of images or other representations of God which men set up to themselves, or for the worship of the

image of any creature in heaven, or earth, or under the earth; and whereas Christian kings, who are living

representants of God, are not to be worshipped by their subjects by any act that signifieth a greater esteem of

his power than the nature of mortal man is capable of; it cannot be imagined that the religious worship now in

use was brought into the Church by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It resteth therefore that it was left in it

by not destroying the images themselves in the conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.

The cause whereof was the immoderate esteem and prices set upon the workmanship of them, which made

the owners, though converted from worshipping them as they had done religiously for demons, to retain them

still in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honor of Christ, of the Virgin Mary, and of the Apostles,

and other the pastors of the primitive Church; as being easy, by giving them new names, to make that an

image of the Virgin Mary and of her Son our Saviour, which before perhaps was called the image of Venus

and Cupid; and so of a Jupiter to make a Barnabas, and of Mercury, a Paul, and the like. And as worldly

ambition, creeping by degrees into the pastors, drew them to an endeavour of pleasing the newmade

Christians; and also to a liking of this kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease, as

well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the images of Christ and his Apostles grew

more and more idolatrous; save that somewhat after the time of Constantine diverse emperors, and bishops,

and general councils observed and opposed the unlawfulness thereof, but too late or too weakly.

The canonizing of saints is another relic of Gentilism: it is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new

invention of the Roman Church, but a custom as ancient as the Commonwealth of Rome itself. The first that

ever was canonized at Rome was Romulus, and that upon the narration of Julius Proculus, that swore before

the Senate he spoke with him after his death, and was assured by him he dwelt in heaven, and was there

called Quirinus, and would be propitious to the state of their new city: and thereupon the Senate gave public

testimony of his sanctity. Julius Caesar, and other emperors after him, had the like testimony; that is, were

canonized for saints: for by such testimony is canonization now defined, and is the same with the apotheosis

It is also from the Roman heathen that the popes have received the name and power of Pontifex Maximus.

This was the name of him that in the ancient Commonwealth of Rome had the supreme authority under the

Senate and people of regulating all ceremonies and doctrines concerning their religion: and when Augustus

Caesar changed the state into a monarchy, he took to himself no more but this office, and that of tribune of

the people (that is to say, the supreme power both in state and religion); and the succeeding emperors enjoyed

the same. But when the Emperor Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and authorized Christian

religion, it was consonant to his profession to cause religion to be regulated, under his authority, by the

bishop of Rome: though it do not appear they had so soon the name of Pontifex; but rather that the

succeeding bishops took it of themselves, to countenance the power they exercised over the bishops of the

Roman provinces. For it is not any privilege of St. Peter, but the privilege of the city of Rome, which the

emperors were always willing to uphold, that gave them such authority over other bishops; as may be

evidently seen by that, that the bishop of Constantinople, when the Emperor made that city the seat of the

Empire, pretended to be equal to the bishop of Rome; though at last, not without contention, the Pope carried

it, and became the Pontifex Maximus; but in right only of the Emperor, and not without the bounds of the

Empire, nor anywhere after the Emperor had lost his power in Rome, though it were the Pope himself that

took his power from him. From whence we may by the way observe that there is no place for the superiority

of the Pope over other bishops, except in the territories whereof he is himself the civil sovereign; and where

the emperor, having sovereign power civil, hath expressly chosen the Pope for the chief pastor under himself

The carrying about of images in procession is another relic of the religion of the Greeks and Romans, for they

also carried their idols from place to place, in a kind of chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use,

which the Latins called thensa, and vehiculum Deorum; and the image was placed in a frame, or shrine,

which they called ferculum. And that which they called pompa is the same that now is named procession;

according whereunto, amongst the divine honours which were given to Julius Caesar by the Senate, this was

one, that in the pomp, or procession, at the Circaean games, he should have thensam et ferculum, a sacred

chariot and a shrine; which was as much as to be carried up and down as a god, just as at this day the popes

To these processions also belonged the bearing of burning torches and candles before the images of the gods,

both amongst the Greeks and Romans. For afterwards the emperors of Rome received the same honor; as we

read of Caligula, that at his reception to the Empire he was carried from Misenum to Rome in the midst of a

throng of people, the ways beset with altars, and beasts for sacrifice, and burning torches; and of Caracalla,

that was received into Alexandria with incense, and with casting of flowers, and dadouchiais, that is, with

torches; for dadochoi were they that amongst the Greeks carried torches lighted in the processions of their

gods. And in process of time the devout but ignorant people did many times honour their bishops with the

like pomp of wax candles, and the images of our Saviour and the saints, constantly, in the church itself. And

thus came in the use of wax candles and was also established by some of the ancient councils.

The heathens had also their aqua lustralis, that is to say, holy water. The Church of Rome imitates them also

in their holy days. They had their bacchanalia, and we have our wakes, answering to them; they their

saturnalia, and we our carnivals and Shrove Tuesday's liberty of servants; they their procession of Priapus, we

our fetching in, erection, and dancing about Maypoles; and dancing is one kind of worship. They had their

procession called Ambarvalia, and we our procession about the fields in the Rogation week. Nor do I think

that these are all the ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the first conversion of the Gentiles,

but they are all that I can for the present call to mind. And if a man would well observe that which is

delivered in the histories, concerning the religious rites of the Greeks and Romans, I doubt not but he might

find many more of these old empty bottles of Gentilism which the doctors of the Roman Church, either by

negligence or ambition, have filled up again with the new wine of Christianity, that will not fail in time to

BY philosophy is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from the manner of the generation of

anything, to the properties; or from the properties, to some possible way of generation of the same; to the end

to be able to produce, as far as matter and human force permit, such effects as human life requireth. So the

geometrician, from the construction of figures, findeth out many properties thereof; and from the properties,

new ways of their construction, by reasoning; to the end to be able to measure land and water; and for infinite

other uses. So the astronomer, from the rising, setting, and moving of the sun and stars in diverse parts of the

heavens, findeth out the causes of day and night, and of the different seasons of the year, whereby he keepeth

By which definition it is evident that we are not to account as any part thereof that original knowledge called

experience, in which consisteth prudence, because it is not attained by reasoning, but found as well in brute

beasts as in man; and is but a memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every

little circumstance, altering the effect frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent: whereas nothing is

Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions; for he that reasoneth aright in words he

Nor to that which any man knows by supernatural revelation; because it is not acquired by reasoning:

Nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books; because it is not by reasoning from the

cause to the effect, nor from the effect to the cause; and is not knowledge, but faith.

The faculty of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech, it was not possible but that there should have

been some general truths found out by reasoning, as ancient almost as language itself. The savages of

America are not without some good moral sentences; also they have a little arithmetic, to add and divide in

numbers not too great; but they are not therefore philosophers. For as there were plants of corn and wine in

small quantity dispersed in the fields and woods, before men knew their virtue, or made use of them for their

nourishment, or planted them apart in fields and vineyards; in which time they fed on acorns and drank water:

so also there have been diverse true, general, and profitable speculations from the beginning, as being the

natural plants of human reason. But they were at first but few in number; men lived upon gross experience;

there was no method; that is to say, no sowing nor planting of knowledge by itself, apart from the weeds and

common plants of error and conjecture. And the cause of it being the want of leisure from procuring the

necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of

great Commonwealths, it should be otherwise. Leisure is the mother of philosophy; and Commonwealth, the

mother of peace and leisure. Where first were great and flourishing cities, there was first the study of

philosophy. The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests of Chaldaea and Egypt are

counted the most ancient philosophers; and those countries were the most ancient of kingdoms. Philosophy

was not risen to the Grecians and other people of the West, whose Commonwealths, no greater perhaps than

Lucca or Geneva, had never peace but when their fears of one another were equal; nor the leisure to observe

anything but one another. At length, when war had united many of these Grecian lesser cities into fewer and

greater, then began seven men, of several parts of Greece, to get the reputation of being wise; some of them

for moral and politic sentences, and others for the learning of the Chaldaeans and Egyptians, which was

After the Athenians, by the overthrow of the Persian armies, had gotten the dominion of the sea; and thereby,

of all the islands and maritime cities of the archipelago, as well of Asia as Europe; and were grown wealthy;

they that had no employment, neither at home nor abroad, had little else to employ themselves in but either,

as St. Luke says, "in telling and hearing news," [Acts, 17. 21] or in discoursing of philosophy publicly to the

youth of the city. Every master took some place for that purpose: Plato, in certain public walks called

Academia, from one Academus; Aristotle in the walk of the temple of Pan, called Lycaeum; others in the

Stoa, or covered walk, wherein the merchants' goods were brought to land; others in other places, where they

spent the time of their leisure in teaching or in disputing of their opinions; and some in any place where they

could get the youth of the city together to hear them talk. And this was it which Carneades also did at Rome,

when he was ambassador, which caused Cato to advise the Senate to dispatch him quickly, for fear of

corrupting the manners of the young men that delighted to hear him speak, as they thought, fine things.

From this it was that the place where any of them taught and disputed was called schola, which in their

tongue signifieth leisure; and their disputations, diatribae, that is to say, passing of the time. Also the

philosophers themselves had the name of their sects, some of them, from these their schools: for they that

followed Plato's doctrine were called Academics; the followers of Aristotle, Peripatetics, from the walk he

taught in; and those that Zeno taught, Stoics, from the Stoa: as if we should denominate men from

Morefields, from Paul's Church, and from the Exchange, because they meet there often to prate and loiter.

Nevertheless, men were so much taken with this custom, that in time it spread itself over all Europe, and the

best part of Africa; so as there were schools, publicly erected and maintained, for lectures and disputations,

There were also schools, anciently, both before and after the time of our Saviour, amongst the Jews: but they

were schools of their law. For though they were called synagogues, that is to say, congregations of the

people; yet, inasmuch as the law was every Sabbath day read, expounded, and disputed in them, they differed

not in nature, but in name only, from public schools; and were not only in Jerusalem, but in every city of the

Gentiles where the Jews inhabited. There was such a school at Damascus, whereinto Paul entered, to

persecute. There were others at Antioch, Iconium and Thessalonica, whereinto he entered, to dispute. And

such was the synagogue of the Libertines, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians, and those of Asia; that is to

say, the school of Libertines, and of Jews, that were strangers in Jerusalem: and of this school they were that

But what has been the utility of those schools? What science is there at this day acquired by their readings

and disputings? That we have of geometry, which is the mother of all natural science, we are not indebted for

it to the schools. Plato, that was the best philosopher of the Greeks, forbade entrance into his school to all that

were not already in some measure geometricians. There were many that studied that science to the great

advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their schools; nor was there any sect of geometricians; nor

did they then pass under the name of philosophers. The natural philosophy of those schools was rather a

dream than science, and set forth in senseless and insignificant language, which cannot be avoided by those

that will teach philosophy without having first attained great knowledge in geometry. For nature worketh by

motion; the ways and degrees whereof cannot be known without the knowledge of the proportions and

properties of lines and figures. Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own passions. For the rule

of manners, without civil government, is the law of nature; and in it, the law civil, that determineth what is

honest and dishonest; what is just and unjust; and generally what is good and evil. Whereas they make the

rules of good and bad by their own liking and disliking; by which means, in so great diversity of taste, there

is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth, as far as he dares, whatsoever seemeth good in his own

eyes, to the subversion of Commonwealth. Their logic, which should be the method of reasoning, is nothing

else but captions of words, and inventions how to puzzle such as should go about to pose them. To conclude,

there is nothing so absurd that the old philosophers (as Cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some of

them maintained. And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than

that which now is called Aristotle's Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he

hath said in his Politics, nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethics.

The school of the Jews was originally a school of the law of Moses, who commanded that at the end of every

seventh year, at the Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they might hear and learn

it. [Deuteronomy, 31. 10] Therefore the reading of the law (which was in use after the Captivity) every

Sabbath day ought to have had no other end but the acquainting of the people with the Commandments which

they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the prophets. But it is manifest, by the many

reprehensions of them by our Saviour, that they corrupted the text of the law with their false commentaries,

and vain traditions; and so little understood the prophets that they did neither acknowledge Christ, nor the

works he did, of which the prophets prophesied. So that by their lectures and disputations in their

synagogues, they turned the doctrine of their law into a fantastical kind of philosophy, concerning the

incomprehensible nature of God and of spirits; which they compounded of the vain philosophy and theology

of the Grecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which

might most easily be wrested to their purpose; and from the fabulous traditions of their ancestors.

That which is now called a University is a joining together, and an incorporation under one government, of

many public schools in one and the same town or city, in which the principal schools were ordained for the

three professions; that is to say, of the Roman religion, of the Roman law, and of the art of medicine. And for

the study of philosophy it hath no otherwise place than as a handmaid to the Roman religion: and since the

authority of Aristotle is only current there, that study is not properly philosophy (the nature whereof

dependeth not on authors), but Aristotelity. And for geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all, as

being subservient to nothing but rigid truth. And if any man by the ingenuity of his own nature had attained

to any degree of perfection therein, he was commonly thought a magician, and his art diabolical.

Now to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to the Universities, and thence into the

Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from blindness of understanding; I shall first consider their principles.

There is a certain philosophia prima on which all other philosophy ought to depend; and consisteth

principally in right limiting of the significations of such appellations, or names, as are of all others the most

universal; which limitations serve to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning, and are commonly

called definitions; such as are the definitions of body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject, substance,

accident, power, act, finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and diverse others, necessary to

the explaining of a man's conceptions concerning the nature and generation of bodies. The explication (that

is, the settling of the meaning) of which, and the like terms, is commonly in the Schools called metaphysics;

as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle, which hath that for title. But it is in another sense; for there it

signifieth as much as "books written or placed after his natural philosophy": but the Schools take them for

books of supernatural philosophy: for the word metaphysics will bear both these senses. And indeed that

which is there written is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood, and so repugnant to

natural reason, that whosoever thinketh there is anything to be understood by it must needs think it

From these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture to make School divinity, we are told there be

in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call abstract essences, and substantial forms;

for the interpreting of which jargon, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place.

Also I ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of discourse for applying myself to those that are. The

world (I mean not the earth only, that denominates the lovers of it "worldly men," but the universe, that is, the

whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude,

namely, length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body is likewise body, and hath the like dimensions;

and consequently every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body is no part of the universe: and

because the universe is all that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently nowhere. Nor does it follow

from hence that spirits are nothing: for they have dimensions and are therefore really bodies; though that

name in common speech be given to such bodies only as are visible or palpable; that is, that have some

degree of opacity: but for spirits, they call them incorporeal, which is a name of more honour, and may

therefore with more piety be attributed to God Himself; in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth

best His nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour Him.

To know now upon what grounds they say there be essences abstract, or substantial forms, we are to consider

what those words do properly signify. The use of words is to register to ourselves, and make manifest to

others, the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Of which words, some are the names of the things

conceived; as the names of all sorts of bodies that work upon the senses and leave an impression in the

imagination: others are the names of the imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those ideas or mental

images we have of all things we see or remember: and others again are names of names, or of different sorts

of speech; as universal, plural, singular, are the names of names; and definition, affirmation, negation, true,

false, syllogism, interrogation, promise, covenant, are the names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to

show the consequence or repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, "a man is a body," he

intendeth that the name of body is necessarily consequent to the name of man, as being but serval name of the

same thing, man; which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word is. And as we use

the verb is; so the Latins use their verb est, and the Greeks their esti through all its declinations. Whether all

other nations of the world have in their several languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but

I am sure they have not need of it: for the placing of two names in order may serve to signify their

consequence, if it were the custom (for custom is it that gives words their force), as well as the words is, or

And if it were so, that there were a language without any verb answerable to est, or is, or be; yet the men that

used it would be not a jot the less capable of inferring, concluding, and of all kind of reasoning, than were the

Greeks and Latins. But what then would become of these terms, of entity, essence, essential, essentiality, that

are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applied as most commonly they are? They are

therefore no names of things; but signs, by which we make known that we conceive the consequence of one

name or attribute to another: as when we say, "a man is a living body," we mean not that the man is one

thing, the living body another, and the is, or being, a third; but that the man and the living body is the same

thing, because the consequence, "If he be a man, he is a living body," is a true consequence, signified by that

word is. Therefore, to be a body, to walk, to be speaking, to live, to see, and the like infinitives; also

corporeity, walking, speaking, life, sight, and the like, that signify just the same, are the names of nothing; as

But to what purpose, may some man say, is such subtlety in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing

but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no

longer suffer themselves to be abused by them that by this doctrine of "separated essences," built on the vain

philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names; as men

fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground that,

when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul, that is his life, can walk separated from his body, and is

seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground, they say that the figure, and colour, and taste of a

piece of bread has a being, there, where they say there is no bread: and upon the same ground they say that

faith, and wisdom, and other virtues are sometimes poured into a man, sometimes blown into him, from

heaven; if the virtuous and their virtues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen

the dependence of subjects on the sovereign power of their country. For who will endeavour to obey the laws,

if he expect obedience to be poured or blown into him? Or who will not obey a priest, that can make God,

rather than his sovereign; nay, than God Himself? Or who that is in fear of ghosts will not bear great respect

to those that can make the holy water that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the

errors which are brought into the Church from the entities and essences of Aristotle: which it may be he knew

to be false philosophy, but wrote it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of, their religion; and fearing

Being once fallen into this error of "separated essences," they are thereby necessarily involved in many other

absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them

some place. But because they hold them incorporeal, without all dimension of quantity, and all men know

that place is dimension, and not to be filled but by that which is corporeal, they are driven to uphold their

credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed anywhere circumscriptive, but definitive: which terms being

mere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latin, that the vanity of them may be concealed.

For the circumscription of a thing is nothing else but the determination or defining of its place; and so both

the terms of the distinction are the same. And in particular, of the essence of a man, which, they say, is his

soul, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part, how small soever, of his

body; and yet no more soul in the whole body than in any one of those parts. Can any man think that God is

served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to those that will believe the existence

And when they come to give account how an incorporeal substance can be capable of pain, and be tormented

in the fire of hell or purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can

Again, whereas motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are not capable of place, they are

troubled to make it seem possible how a soul can go hence, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory;

and how the ghosts of men (and I may add, of their clothes which they appear in) can walk by night in

churches, churchyards, and other places of sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unless they

will say, they walk definitive, not circumscriptive, or spiritually, not temporally: for such egregious

For the meaning of eternity, they will not have it to be an endless succession of time; for then they should not

be able to render a reason how God's will and preordaining of things to come should not be before His

prescience of the same, as the efficient cause before the effect, or agent before the action; nor of many other

their bold opinions concerning the incomprehensible nature of God. But they will teach us that eternity is the

standing still of the present time, a nuncstans, as the Schools call it; which neither they nor any else

understand, no more than they would a hicstans for an infinite greatness of place.

And whereas men divide a body in their thought, by numbering parts of it, and in numbering those parts,

number also the parts of the place it filled; it cannot be but in making many parts, we make also many places

of those parts; whereby there cannot be conceived in the mind of any man more or fewer parts than there are

places for: yet they will have us believe that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one and the

same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same time in one place; as if it were an

acknowledgement of the Divine Power to say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. And

these are but a small part of the incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing philosophically, instead

of admiring and adoring of the divine and incomprehensible Nature; whose attributes cannot signify what He

is, but ought to signify our desire to honour Him with the best appellations we can think on. But they that

venture to reason of His nature, from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first

attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end and without number; in the same manner as

when a man ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used

to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his

cloak, lets fall his hat; and, with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity.

Then for physics, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and secondary causes of natural events, they

render none at all but empty words. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards

toward the earth, and others go naturally from it, the Schools will tell you, out of Aristotle, that the bodies

that sink downwards are heavy; and that this heaviness is it that causes them to descend. But if you ask what

they mean by heaviness, they will define it to be an endeavour to go to the center of the earth: so that the

cause why things sink downward is an endeavour to be below; which is as much as to say that bodies

descend, or ascend, because they do. Or they will tell you the center of the earth is the place of rest and

conservation for heavy things, and therefore they endeavour to be there: as if stones and metals had a desire,

or could discern the place they would be at, as man does; or loved rest, as man does not; or that a piece of

If we would know why the same body seems greater, without adding to it, one time than another; they say,

when it seems less, it is condensed; when greater, rarefied. What is that condensed and rarefied? Condensed

is when there is in the very same matter less quantity than before; and rarefied, when more. As if there could

be matter that had not some determined quantity; when quantity is nothing else but the determination of

matter; that is to say, of body, by which we say one body is greater or lesser than another by thus, or thus

much. Or as if a body were made without any quantity at all, and that afterwards more or less were put into it,

For the cause of the soul of man, they say, creatur infundendo and creando infunditur: that is, "It is created by

For the cause of sense, an ubiquity of species; that is, of the shows or apparitions of objects; which when they

be apparitions to the eye is sight; when to the ear, hearing; to the palate, taste; to the nostril, smelling; and to

For cause of the will to do any particular action, which is called volitio, they assign the faculty, that is to say,

the capacity in general, that men have to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called

voluntas; making the power the cause of the act: as if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of

And in many occasions they put for cause of natural events, their own ignorance, but disguised in other

words: as when they say, fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no

cause: and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities; that is, qualities not known to them, and

therefore also, as they think, to no man else: and to sympathy, antipathy, antiperistasis, specifical qualities,

and other like terms, which signify neither the agent that produceth them, nor the operation by which they are

If such metaphysics and physics as this be not vain philosophy, there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to

And for their moral and civil philosophy, it hath the same or greater absurdities. If a man do an action of

injustice, that is to say, an action contrary to the law, God, they say, is the prime cause of the law and also the

prime cause of that and all other actions; but no cause at all of the injustice; which is the inconformity of the

action to the law. This is vain philosophy. A man might as well say that one man maketh both a straight line

and a crooked, and another maketh their incongruity. And such is the philosophy of all men that resolve of

their conclusions before they know their premises, pretending to comprehend that which is incomprehensible;

and of attributes of honour to make attributes of nature; as this distinction was made to maintain the doctrine

Aristotle and other heathen philosophers define good and evil by the appetite of men; and well enough, as

long as we consider them governed every one by his own law: for in the condition of men that have no other

law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good and evil actions. But in a Commonwealth

this measure is false: not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state, is

the measure. And yet is this doctrine still practised, and men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own

and of other men's actions, and of the actions of the Commonwealth itself, by their own passions; and no man

calleth good or evil but that which is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the public laws; except

only monks and friars, that are bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superior to which every

subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of

It is also vain and false philosophy to say the work of marriage is repugnant to chastity or continence, and by

consequence to make them moral vices; as they do that pretend chastity and continence for the ground of

denying marriage to the clergy. For they confess it is no more but a constitution of the Church that requireth

in those holy orders, that continually attend the altar and administration of the Eucharist, a continual

abstinence from women, under the name of continual chastity, continence, and purity. Therefore they call the

lawful use of wives want of chastity and continence; and so make marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure

and unclean as to render a man unfit for the altar. If the law were made because the use of wives is

incontinence, and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice: if because it is a thing too impure and

unclean for a man consecrated to God, much more should other natural, necessary, and daily works, which all

But the secret foundation of this prohibition of marriage of priests is not likely to have been laid so slightly as

upon such errors in moral philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life to the estate of matrimony;

which proceeded from the wisdom of St. Paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was for those that

in those times of persecution were preachers of the gospel, and forced to fly from one country to another, to

be clogged with the care of wife and children; but upon the design of the popes and priests of after times, to

make themselves, (the clergy, that is to say,) sole heirs of the kingdom of God in this world, to which it was

necessary to take from them the use of marriage, because our Saviour saith that at the coming of his kingdom

the children of God "shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels in heaven"; that

is to say, spiritual. Seeing then they had taken on them the name of spiritual, to have allowed themselves,

From Aristotle's civil philosophy, they have learned to call all manner of Commonwealths but the popular

(such as was at that time the state of Athens), tyranny. All kings they called tyrants; and the aristocracy of the

thirty governors set up there by the Lacedaemonians that subdued them, the thirty tyrants: as also to call the

condition of the people under the democracy, liberty. A tyrant originally signified no more, simply, but a

monarch. But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name

began to signify, not only the thing it did before, but with it the hatred which the popular states bore towards

it: as also the name of king became odious after the deposing of the kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to

all men to conceive some great fault to be signified in any attribute that is given in despite, and to a great

enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the democracy,

or aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their anger in; but call readily the one

anarchy, and the other oligarchy, or the tyranny of a few. And that which offendeth the people is no other

thing but that they are governed, not as every one of them would himself, but as the public representant, be it

one man or an assembly of men, thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government: for which they give evil

names to their superiors, never knowing (till perhaps a little after a civil war) that without such arbitrary

government, such war must be perpetual; and that it is men and arms, not words and promises, that make the

And therefore this is another error of Aristotle's politics, that in a wellordered Commonwealth, not men

should govern, but the laws. What man that has his natural senses, though he can neither write nor read, does

not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? Or that

believes the law can hurt him; that is, words and paper, without hands and swords of men? And this is of the

number of pernicious errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like not their governors, to adhere to those

that call them tyrants, and to think it lawful to raise war against them: and yet they are many times cherished

There is another error in their civil philosophy (which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any

other of the heathen), to extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts

and consciences of men, by examination and inquisition of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of

their speech and actions. By which men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or

constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment. It is true that the civil magistrate, intending to

employ a minister in the charge of teaching, may enquire of him if he be content to preach such and such

doctrines; and, in case of refusal, may deny him the employment: but to force him to accuse himself of

opinions, when his actions are not by law forbidden, is against the law of nature; and especially in them who

teach that a man shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an

article of the Christian faith. For who is there (that knowing there is so great danger in an error) whom the

natural care of himself compelleth not to hazard his soul upon his own judgement, rather than that of any

For a private man, without the authority of the Commonwealth; that is to say, without permission from the

representant thereof, to interpret the law by his own spirit, is another error in the politics: but not drawn from

Aristotle, nor from any other of the heathen philosophers. For none of them deny but that in the power of

making laws is comprehended also the power of explaining them when there is need. And are not the

Scriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority of the Commonwealth and,

Of the same kind it is also when any but the sovereign restraineth in any man that power which the

Commonwealth hath not restrained; as they do that impropriate the preaching of the gospel to one certain

order of men, where the laws have left it free. If the state give me leave to preach or teach; that is, if it forbid

me not, no man can forbid me. If I find myself amongst the idolaters of America, shall I that am a Christian,

though not in orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ, till I have received orders from Rome? Or when I

have preached, shall not I answer their doubts and expound the Scriptures to them; that is, shall I not teach?

But for this may some say, as also for administering to them the sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed

for a sufficient mission; which is true. But this is true also, that for whatsoever a dispensation is due for the

necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation when there is no law that forbids it. Therefore to deny

these functions to those to whom the civil sovereign hath not denied them is a taking away of a lawful liberty,

More examples of vain philosophy, brought into religion by the doctors of School divinity, might be

produced; but other men may if they please observe them of themselves. I shall only add this, that the

writings of School divines are nothing else, for the most part, but insignificant trains of strange and barbarous

words, or words otherwise used than in the common use of the Latin tongue; such as would pose Cicero, and

Varro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome. Which, if any man would see proved, let him (as I have said

once before) see whether he can translate any School divine into any of the modern tongues, as French,

English, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in most of these be made intelligible is not

intelligible in the Latin. Which insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false philosophy, yet it

hath a quality, not only to hide the truth, but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further

Lastly, for the errors brought in from false or uncertain history, what is all the legend of fictitious miracles in

the lives of the saints; and all the histories of apparitions and ghosts alleged by the doctors of the Roman

Church, to make good their doctrines of hell and purgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines which

have no warrant, neither in reason nor Scripture; as also all those traditions which they call the unwritten

word of God; but old wives' fables? Whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the writings of the

ancient Fathers, yet those Fathers were men that might too easily believe false reports. And the producing of

their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they believed hath no other force with them that, according

to the counsel of St. John, [I John, 4. 1] examine spirits than in all things that concern the power of the

Roman Church (the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it), to discredit their testimony

in respect of too rash belief of reports; which the most sincere men without great knowledge of natural

causes, such as the Fathers were, are commonly the most subject to: for naturally, the best men are the least

suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Gregory the Pope and St. Bernard have somewhat of apparitions of ghosts

that said they were in purgatory; and so has our Bede: but nowhere, I believe, but by report from others. But

if they, or any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby confirm the more

With the introduction of false, we may join also the suppression of true philosophy by such men as neither by

lawful authority nor sufficient study are competent judges of the truth. Our own navigations make manifest,

and all men learned in human sciences now acknowledge, there are antipodes: and every day it appeareth

more and more that years and days are determined by motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men that have in

their writings but supposed such doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for and against it, have been

punished for it by authority ecclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are

contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true. Let therefore the truth be first examined by

competent judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they be contrary to the

religion established? Let them be silenced by the laws of those to whom the teachers of them are subject; that

is, by the laws civil: for disobedience may lawfully be punished in them that against the laws teach even true

philosophy. Is it because they tend to disorder in government, as countenancing rebellion or sedition? Then

let them be silenced, and the teachers punished, by virtue of his power to whom the care of the public quiet is

committed; which is the authority civil. For whatsoever power ecclesiastics take upon themselves (in any

place where they are subject to the state) in their own right, though they call it God's right, is but usurpation.

CICERO maketh honourable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge amongst the Romans, for a custom

he had in criminal causes, when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, to ask the accusers, cui

bono; that is to say, what profit, honour, or other contentment the accused obtained or expected by the fact.

For amongst presumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the author as doth the benefit of the

action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine who they may be that have possessed the people so

long in this part of Christendom with these doctrines contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind. And

first, to this error that the present Church, now militant on earth, is the kingdom of God (that is, the kingdom

of glory, or the land of promise; not the kingdom of grace, which is but a promise of the land), are annexed

these worldly benefits: first, that the pastors and teachers of the Church are entitled thereby, as God's public

ministers, to a right of governing the Church; and consequently, because the Church and Commonwealth are

the same persons, to be rectors and governors of the Commonwealth. By this title it is that the Pope prevailed

with the subjects of all Christian princes to believe that to disobey him was to disobey Christ himself; and in

all differences between him and other princes (charmed with the word power spiritual) to abandon their

lawful sovereigns; which is in effect a universal monarchy over all Christendom. For though they were first

invested in the right of being supreme teachers of Christian doctrine, by and under Christian emperors within

the limits of the Roman Empire (as is acknowledged by themselves), by the title of Pontifex Maximus, who

was an officer subject to the civil state; yet after the Empire was divided and dissolved, it was not hard to

obtrude upon the people already subject to them, another title, namely, the right of St. Peter; not only to save

entire their pretended power, but also to extend the same over the same Christian provinces, though no more

united in the Empire of Rome. This benefit of a universal monarchy, considering the desire of men to bear

rule, is a sufficient presumption that the Popes that pretended to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the

authors of the doctrine by which it was obtained; namely, that the Church now on earth is the kingdom of

Christ. For that granted, it must be understood that Christ hath some lieutenant amongst us by whom we are

After that certain Churches had renounced this universal power of the Pope, one would expect, in reason, that

the civil sovereigns in all those Churches should have recovered so much of it as (before they had

unadvisedly let it go) was their own right and in their own hands. And in England it was so in effect; saving

that they by whom the kings administered the government of religion, by maintaining their employment to be

in God's right, seemed to usurp, if not a supremacy, yet an independency on the civil power: and they but

seemed to usurp it, inasmuch as they acknowledged a right in the king to deprive them of the exercise of their

But in those places where the presbytery took that office, though many other doctrines of the Church of Rome

were forbidden to be taught; yet this doctrine, that the kingdom of Christ is already come, and that it began at

the resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But cui bono? What profit did they expect from it? The

same which the popes expected: to have a sovereign power over the people. For what is it for men to

excommunicate their lawful king, but to keep him from all places of God's public service in his own

kingdom; and with force to resist him when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it,

without authority from the civil sovereign, to excommunicate any person, but to take from him his lawful

liberty, that is, to usurp an unlawful power over their brethren? The authors therefore of this darkness in

To this head, I refer also all those doctrines that serve them to keep the possession of this spiritual

sovereignty after it is gotten. As first, that the Pope, in his public capacity, cannot err. For who is there that,

Secondly, that all other bishops, in what Commonwealth soever, have not their right, neither immediately

from God, nor mediately from their civil sovereigns, but from the Pope, is a doctrine by which there comes to

be in every Christian Commonwealth many potent men (for so are Bishops) that have their dependence on the

Pope, owe obedience to him, though he be a foreign prince; by which means he is able, as he hath done many

times, to raise a civil war against the state that submits not itself to be governed according to his pleasure and

Thirdly, the exemption of these and of all other priests, and of all monks and friars, from the power of the

civil laws. For by this means, there is a great part of every Commonwealth that enjoy the benefit of the laws

and are protected by the power of the civil state, which nevertheless pay no part of the public expense; nor are

liable to the penalties, as other subjects, due to their crimes; and, consequently, stand not in fear of any man,

Fourthly, the giving to their priests (which is no more in the New Testament but presbyters, that is, elders) the

name of sacerdotes, that is, sacrificers, which was the title of the civil sovereign, and his public ministers,

amongst the Jews, whilst God was their king. Also, the making the Lord's Supper a sacrifice serveth to make

the people believe the Pope hath the same power over all Christians that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews;

that is to say, all power, both civil and ecclesiastical, as the high priest then had.

Fifthly, the teaching that matrimony is a sacrament giveth to the clergy the judging of the lawfulness of

marriages; and thereby, of what children are legitimate; and consequently, of the right of succession to

Sixthly, the denial of marriage to priests serveth to assure this power of the Pope over kings. For if a king be

a priest, he cannot marry and transmit his kingdom to his posterity; if he be not a priest, then the Pope

Seventhly, from auricular confession they obtain, for the assurance of their power, better intelligence of the

designs of princes and great persons in the civil state than these can have of the designs of the state

Eighthly, by the canonization of saints, and declaring who are martyrs, they assure their power in that they

induce simple men into an obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns, even to death,

if by the Pope's excommunication they be declared heretics or enemies to the Church; that is, as they interpret

Ninthly, they assure the same, by the power they ascribe to every priest of making Christ; and by the power

Tenthly, by the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by external works, and of indulgences, the clergy is

Eleventhly, by their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other things appertaining thereto, they keep,

Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and

obscure language of the Schoolmen, taught in the universities (which have been all erected and regulated by

the Pope's authority), serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the ignis

To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth

manifestly to the setting up of an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people; or for the

sustaining of the same when it is set up; or to the worldly riches, honour, and authority of those that sustain it.

And therefore by the aforesaid rule of cui bono, we may justly pronounce for the authors of all this spiritual

darkness, the Pope, and Roman clergy, and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the minds of men this

erroneous doctrine, that the Church now on earth is that kingdom of God mentioned in the Old and New

But the emperors, and other Christian sovereigns, under whose government these errors and the like

encroachments of ecclesiastics upon their office at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions and of

the tranquillity of their subjects, though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the sequel, and of

insight into the designs of their teachers, may nevertheless be esteemed accessaries to their own and the

public damage. For without their authority there could at first no seditious doctrine have been publicly

preached. I say they might have hindered the same in the beginning: but when the people were once

possessed by those spiritual men, there was no human remedy to be applied that any man could invent. And

for the remedies that God should provide, who never faileth in His good time to destroy all the machinations

of men against the truth, we are to attend His good pleasure that suffereth many times the prosperity of His

enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height as the violence thereof openeth the eyes,

which the wariness of their predecessors had before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let go

all, as Peter's net was broken by the struggling of too great a multitude of fishes; whereas the impatience of

those that strive to resist such encroachment, before their subjects' eyes were opened, did but increase the

power they resisted. I do not therefore blame the Emperor Frederick for holding the stirrup to our countryman

Pope Adrian; for such was the disposition of his subjects then, as if he had not done it, he was not likely to

have succeeded in the empire. But I blame those that, in the beginning, when their power was entire, by

suffering such doctrines to be forged in the universities of their own dominions, have held the stirrup to all

the succeeding popes, whilst they mounted into the thrones of all Christian sovereigns, to ride and tire both

But as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out; the way is the same, but the order is

inverted. The web begins at the first elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and other

virtues of the Apostles, whom the people, converted, obeyed out of reverence, not by obligation. Their

consciences were free, and their words and actions subject to none but the civil power. Afterwards the

presbyters, as the flocks of Christ increased, assembling to consider what they should teach, and thereby

obliging themselves to teach nothing against the decrees of their assemblies, made it to be thought the people

were thereby obliged to follow their doctrine, and, when they refused, refused to keep them company (that

was then called excommunication), not as being infidels, but as being disobedient: and this was the first knot

upon their liberty. And the number of presbyters increasing, the presbyters of the chief city or province got

themselves an authority over the parochial presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of bishops:

and this was a second knot on Christian liberty. Lastly, the bishop of Rome, in regard of the Imperial City,

took upon him an authority (partly by the wills of the emperors themselves, and by the title of Pontifex

Maximus, and at last when the emperors were grown weak, by the privileges of St. Peter) over all other

bishops of the Empire: which was the third and last knot, and the whole synthesis and construction of the

And therefore the analysis or resolution is by the same way, but beginneth with the knot that was last tied; as

we may see in the dissolution of the preterpolitical Church government in England. First, the power of the

popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth; and the bishops, who before exercised their functions in

right of the Pope, did afterwards exercise the same in right of the Queen and her successors; though by

retaining the phrase of jure divino they were thought to demand it by immediate right from God: and so was

untied the first knot. After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting down of Episcopacy:

and so was the second knot dissolved. And almost at the same time, the power was taken also from the

Presbyterians: and so we are reduced to the independency of the primitive Christians to follow Paul, or

Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: which if it be without contention, and without measuring the

doctrine of Christ by our affection to the person of his minister (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in

the Corinthians), is perhaps the best: first, because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men,

but of the word itself, working faith in every one, not always according to the purpose of them that plant and

water, but of God Himself, that giveth the increase. And secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who

teach there is such danger in every little error, to require of a man endued with reason of his own to follow

the reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men, which is little better than to venture his

salvation at cross and pile. Nor ought those teachers to be displeased with this loss of their ancient authority:

for there is none should know better than they that power is preserved by the same virtues by which it is

acquired; that is to say, by wisdom, humility, clearness of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation; and not by

suppression of the natural sciences, and of the morality of natural reason; nor by obscure language; nor by

arrogating to themselves more knowledge than they make appear; nor by pious frauds; nor by such other

faults as in the pastors of God's Church are not only faults, but also scandals, apt to make men stumble one

But after this doctrine, that the Church now militant is the kingdom of God spoken of in the Old and New

Testament, was received in the world, the ambition and canvassing for the offices that belong thereunto, and

especially for that great office of being Christ's lieutenant, and the pomp of them that obtained therein the

principal public charges, became by degrees so evident that they lost the inward reverence due to the pastoral

function: insomuch as the wisest men of them that had any power in the civil state needed nothing but the

authority of their princes to deny them any further obedience. For, from the time that the Bishop of Rome had

gotten to be acknowledged for bishop universal, by pretence of succession to St. Peter, their whole hierarchy,

or kingdom of darkness, may be compared not unfitly to the kingdom of fairies; that is, to the old wives'

fables in England concerning ghosts and spirits, and the feats they play in the night. And if a man consider

the original of this great ecclesiastical dominion, he will easily perceive that the papacy is no other than the

ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof: for so did the papacy start up

The language also which they use, both in the churches and in their public acts, being Latin, which is not

commonly used by any nation now in the world, what is it but the ghost of the old Roman language?

The fairies in what nation soever they converse have but one universal king, which some poets of ours call

King Oberon; but the Scripture calls Beelzebub, prince of demons. The ecclesiastics likewise, in whose

The ecclesiastics are spiritual men and ghostly fathers. The fairies are spirits and ghosts. Fairies and ghosts

inhabit darkness, solitudes, and graves. The ecclesiastics walk in obscurity of doctrine, in monasteries,

The ecclesiastics have their cathedral churches, which, in what town soever they be erected, by virtue of holy

water, and certain charms called exorcisms, have the power to make those towns, cities, that is to say, seats of

empire. The fairies also have their enchanted castles, and certain gigantic ghosts, that domineer over the

The fairies are not to be seized on, and brought to answer for the hurt they do. So also the ecclesiastics vanish

The ecclesiastics take from young men the use of reason, by certain charms compounded of metaphysics, and

miracles, and traditions, and abused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else but to execute what

they command them. The fairies likewise are said to take young children out of their cradles, and to change

them into natural fools, which common people do therefore call elves, and are apt to mischief.

In what shop or operatory the fairies make their enchantment, the old wives have not determined. But the

operatories of the clergy are well enough known to be the universities, that received their discipline from

When the fairies are displeased with anybody, they are said to send their elves to pinch them. The

ecclesiastics, when they are displeased with any civil state, make also their elves, that is, superstitious,

enchanted subjects, to pinch their princes, by preaching sedition; or one prince, enchanted with promises, to

The fairies marry not; but there be amongst them incubi that have copulation with flesh and blood. The

The ecclesiastics take the cream of the land, by donations of ignorant men that stand in awe of them, and by

tithes: so also it is in the fable of fairies, that they enter into the dairies, and feast upon the cream, which they

What kind of money is current in the kingdom of fairies is not recorded in the story. But the ecclesiastics in

their receipts accept of the same money that we do; though when they are to make any payment, it is in

To this and such like resemblances between the papacy and the kingdom of fairies may be added this, that as

the fairies have no existence but in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the traditions of old wives or

old poets: so the spiritual power of the Pope (without the bounds of his own civil dominion) consisteth only

in the fear that seduced people stand in of their excommunications, upon hearing of false miracles, false

It was not therefore a very difficult matter for Henry the Eighth by his exorcism; nor for Queen Elizabeth by

hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by missions

through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yield him little fruit, may not return; or rather, an

assembly of spirits worse than he enter and inhabit this cleanswept house, and make the end thereof worse

than the beginning? For it is not the Roman clergy only that pretends the kingdom of God to be of this world,

and thereby to have a power therein, distinct from that of the civil state. And this is all I had a design to say,

concerning the doctrine of the POLITICS. Which, when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the

FROM the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind, one to another, as also of one passion to

another, and from their reference to conversation, there has been an argument taken to infer an impossibility

that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civil duty. The severity of judgement, they

say, makes men censorious and unapt to pardon the errors and infirmities of other men: and on the other side,

celerity of fancy makes the thoughts less steady than is necessary to discern exactly between right and wrong.

Again, in all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary: for without it, the

resolutions of men are rash, and their sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerful eloquence, which

procureth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little. But these are contrary faculties; the former

being grounded upon principles of truth; the other upon opinions already received, true or false; and upon the

And amongst the passions, courage (by which I mean the contempt of wounds and violent death) inclineth

men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace: and timorousness

many times disposeth to the desertion of the public defence. Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the

And to consider the contrariety of men's opinions and manners in general, it is, they say, impossible to

entertain a constant civil amity with all those with whom the business of the world constrains us to converse:

which business consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority.

To which I answer that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities: for by education and

discipline, they may be, and are sometimes, reconciled. Judgement and fancy may have place in the same

man; but by turns; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes

fastened to their labour of making bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw: so also may

the judgement sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the fancy at another time wandering

about the world. So also reason and eloquence (though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet in the moral)

may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there is

much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy

between fearing the laws, and not fearing a public enemy; nor between abstaining from injury, and pardoning

it in others. There is therefore no such inconsistence of human nature with civil duties, as some think. I have

known clearness of judgement, and largeness of fancy; strength of reason, and graceful elocution; a courage

for the war, and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honoured

friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who, hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning

of the late civil war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand.

To the Laws of Nature declared in the fifteenth Chapter, I would have this added: that every man is bound by

nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of

peace. For he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to

destroy him by whose strength he is preserved: it is a manifest contradiction of himself. And though this law

may be drawn by consequence from some of those that are there already mentioned, yet the times require to

And because I find by diverse English books lately printed that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught

men in what point of time it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror; nor what is conquest; nor

how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his laws: therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I

say, the point of time wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror is that point wherein, having liberty to

submit to him, he consenteth, either by express words or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When it is

that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have shown before in the end of the twentyfirst Chapter; namely, that

for him that hath no obligation to his former sovereign but that of an ordinary subject, it is then when the

means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy; for it is then that he hath no longer

protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. Seeing therefore such

contribution is everywhere, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it be an assistance to the enemy, esteemed

lawful; a total submission, which is but an assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful. Besides, if

a man consider that they submit, assist the enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse,

assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their submission or composition an assistance, but rather

a detriment, to the enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a subject, hath taken upon him a new

obligation of a soldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power, as long as the old one keeps the

field and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his armies or garrisons: for in this case, he cannot

complain of want of protection and means to live as a soldier. But when that also fails, a soldier also may

seek his protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it, and may lawfully submit himself to his new

master. And so much for the time when he may do it lawfully, if he will. It therefore he do it, he is

undoubtedly bound to be a true subject: for a contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken.

By this also a man may understand when it is that men may be said to be conquered; and in what the nature of

conquest, and the right of a conqueror consisteth: for this submission is it implieth them all. Conquest is not

the victory itself; but the acquisition, by victory, of a right over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain

is overcome, but not conquered: he that is taken and put into prison or chains is not conquered, though

overcome; for he is still an enemy, and may save himself if he can: but he that upon promise of obedience

hath his life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered and a subject; and not before. The Romans used to

say that their general had pacified such a province, that is to say, in English, conquered it; and that the

country was pacified by victory when the people of it had promised imperata facere, that is, to do what the

Roman people commanded them: this was to be conquered. But this promise may be either express or tacit:

express, by promise; tacit, by other signs. As, for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an

express promise, because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable; yet if he live under their

protection openly, he is understood to submit himself to the government: but if he live there secretly, he is

liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy of the state. I say not, he does any injustice (for acts

of open hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise, if a man, when his

country is conquered, be out of it, he is not conquered, nor subject: but if at his return he submit to the

government, he is bound to obey it. So that conquest, to define it, is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty

by victory. Which right is acquired in the people's submission, by which they contract with the victor,

In the twentyninth Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the dissolutions of Commonwealths

their imperfect generation, consisting in the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power; for want

whereof, the civil sovereign is fain to handle the sword of justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for

him to hold: one reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, that they will all of them justify

the war by which their power was at first gotten, and whereon, as they think, their right dependeth, and not on

the possession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of England did depend on the goodness of the cause

of William the Conqueror, and upon their lineal and directest descent from him; by which means, there would

perhaps be no tie of the subjects' obedience to their sovereign at this day in all the world: wherein whilst they

needlessly think to justify themselves, they justify all the successful rebellions that ambition shall at any time

raise against them and their successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectual seeds of the death

of any state, that the conquerors require not only a submission of men's actions to them for the future, but also

an approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a Commonwealth in the world whose beginnings

And because the name of tyranny signifieth nothing more nor less than the name of sovereignty, be it in one

or many men, saving that they that use the former word are understood to be angry with them they call

tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny is a toleration of hatred to Commonwealth in

general, and another evil seed, not differing much from the former. For to the justification of the cause of a

conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered is for the most part necessary: but neither of them

necessary for the obligation of the conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say upon the review of the

In the thirtyfifth Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture that in the Commonwealth of the

Jews, God Himself was made the Sovereign, by pact with the people; who were therefore called His "peculiar

people," to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned, not by their consent, but by

His own power: and that in this kingdom Moses was God's lieutenant on earth; and that it was he that told

them what laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have omitted to set down who were the officers

appointed to do execution; especially in capital punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary

consideration as I find it since. We know that generally in all Commonwealths, the execution of corporeal

punishments was either put upon the guards, or other soldiers of the sovereign power, or given to those in

whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardness of heart concurred to make them sue for such an

office. But amongst the Israelites it was a positive law of God their Sovereign that he that was convicted of a

capital crime should be stoned to death by the people; and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and

after the witnesses, then the rest of the people. This was a law that designed who were to be the executioners;

but not that any one should throw a stone at him before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was

judge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded to execution, unless the fact were

committed in the presence of the congregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges; for then there needed no

other witnesses but the judges themselves. Nevertheless, this manner of proceeding, being not thoroughly

understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, in some cases, by a

right of zeal; as if the executions done upon offenders in the kingdom of God in old time proceeded not from

the sovereign command, but from the authority of private zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to

First, where the Levites fell upon the people that had made and worshipped the golden calf, and slew three

thousand of them, it was by the commandment of Moses from the mouth of God; as is manifest, Exodus, 32.

27. And when the son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God, they that heard it did not kill him, but

brought him before Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give sentence against him; as appears,

Leviticus, 24. 11, 12. Again, when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cozbi, [Numbers, 25. 6, 7] it was not by right

of private zeal: their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; there needed no witness; the law was

known, and he the heir apparent to the sovereignty; and, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act

depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this

presumption of a future ratification is sometimes necessary to the safety of a Commonwealth; as in a sudden

rebellion any man that can suppress it by his own power in the country where it begins, without express law

or commission, may lawfully do it, and provide to have it ratified, or pardoned, whilst it is in doing, or after it

is done. Also, it is expressly said, "Whosoever shall kill the murderer shall kill him upon the word of

witnesses":[Ibid., 35. 30] but witnesses suppose a formal judicature, and consequently condemn that pretence

of jus zelotarum. The Law of Moses concerning him that enticeth to idolatry, that is to say, in the kingdom of

God to a renouncing of his allegiance, forbids to conceal him, and commands the accuser to cause him to be

put to death, and to cast the first stone at him; [Deuteronomy, 13. 8] but not to kill him before he be

condemned. And the process against idolatry is exactly set down: for God there speaketh to the people as

Judge, and commandeth them, when a man is accused of idolatry, to enquire diligently of the fact, and

finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the witness throweth the first stone. [Ibid., 17. 4, 5, 6]

This is not private zeal, but public condemnation. In like manner when a father hath a rebellious son, the law

is that he shall bring him before the judges of the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. [Ibid.,

21. 1821] Lastly, by pretence of these laws it was that St. Stephen was stoned, and not by pretence of

private zeal: for before he was carried away to execution, he had pleaded his cause before the high priest.

There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by private zeal;

which, being oftentimes but a conjunction of ignorance and passion, is against both the justice and peace of a

In the thirtysixth Chapter I have said that it is not declared in what manner God spoke supernaturally to

Moses: not that He spoke not to him sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice, as to

other prophets; for the manner how He spoke unto him from the mercy seat is expressly set down in these

words, "From that time forward, when Moses entered into Tabernacle of the congregation to speak with God,

he heard a voice which spake unto him from over the mercy seat, which is over the Ark of the testimony;

from between the cherubims he spake unto him." [Numbers, 7. 89] But it is not declared in what consisted the

preeminence of the manner of God's speaking to Moses, above that of His speaking to other prophets, as to

Samuel and to Abraham, to whom He also spoke by a voice (that is, by vision), unless the difference consist

in the clearness of the vision. For "face to face," and "mouth to mouth," cannot be literally understood of the

And as to the whole doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of it are true and proper, and the ratiocination

solid. For I ground the civil right of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, upon the known

natural inclinations of mankind, and upon the articles of the law of nature; of which no man, that pretends but

reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the power ecclesiastical of the same

sovereigns, I ground it on such texts as are both evident in themselves and consonant to the scope of the

whole Scripture, and therefore am persuaded that he that shall read it with a purpose only to be informed,

shall be informed by it. But for those that by writing or public discourse, or by their eminent actions, have

already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not be so easily satisfied. For

in such cases, it is natural for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading and to lose their

attention in the search of objections to that they had read before: of which, in a time wherein the interests of

men are changed (seeing much of that doctrine which serveth to the establishing of a new government must

needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old), there cannot choose but be very

In that part which treateth of a Christian Commonwealth, there are some new doctrines which, it may be, in a

state where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a subject without leave to divulge, as

being a usurpation of the place of a teacher. But in this time that men call not only for peace, but also for

truth, to offer such doctrines as I think true, and that manifestly tend to peace and loyalty, to the consideration

of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more but to offer new wine, to be put into new casks, that both may

be preserved together. And I suppose that then, when novelty can breed no trouble nor disorder in a state,

men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of antiquity as to prefer ancient errors before new

There is nothing I distrust more than my elocution, which nevertheless I am confident (excepting the

mischances of the press) is not obscure. That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators,

and philosophers, contrary to the custom of late time, whether I have done well or ill in it, proceedeth from

my judgement, grounded on many reasons. For first, all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon reason or

upon Scripture; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any writer. Secondly, the matters in

question are not of fact, but of right, wherein there is no place for witnesses. There is scarce any of those old

writers that contradicteth not sometimes both himself and others; which makes their testimonies insufficient.

Fourthly, such opinions as are taken only upon credit of antiquity are not intrinsically the judgement of those

that cite them, but words that pass, like gaping, from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, it is many times with a

fraudulent design that men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other men's wit. Sixthly, I find not

that the ancients they cite took it for an ornament to do the like with those that wrote before them. Seventhly,

it is an argument of indigestion, when Greek and Latin sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to do,

unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of ancient time that either have written truth perspicuously,

or set us in a better way to find it out ourselves; yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if we will

reverence the age, the present is the oldest: if the antiquity of the writer, I am not sure that generally they to

whom such honour is given, were more ancient when they wrote than I am that am writing: but if it be well

considered, the praise of ancient authors proceeds not from the reverence of the dead, but from the

To conclude, there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in that I wrote before of the same subject in Latin,

as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the word of God or to good manners; or to the disturbance of the

public tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the

Universities, in case they also think so, whom the judgement of the same belongeth. For seeing the

Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing

such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and in their conversation) upon the

people, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the venom of heathen

politicians, and from the incantation of deceiving spirits. And by that means the most men, knowing their

duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons in their purposes against

the state, and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for their peace and defence; and the

governors themselves have the less cause to maintain at the common charge any greater army than is

necessary to make good the public liberty against the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies.

And thus I have brought to an end my discourse of civil and ecclesiastical government, occasioned by the

disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other design than to set

before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience; of which the condition of human

nature, and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an inviolable observation. And though in the

revolution of states there can be no very good constellation for truths of this nature to be born under (as

having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect

a new); yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine, or by any

that desires the continuance of public peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies

natural; wherein, if God give me health to finish it, I hope the novelty will as much please as in the doctrine

of this artificial body it useth to offend. For such truth as opposeth no man's profit nor pleasure is to all men