Thucydides ...............................................................................................................................................1

CHAPTER I. The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the Peloponnesian War

CHAPTER IV. From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War The Progress

CHAPTER V. Second Congress at Lacedaemon Preparations for War and Diplomatic Skirmishes

CHAPTER VI. Beginning of the Peloponnesian War First Invasion of Attica Funeral Oration of

CHAPTER VII. Second Year of the War The Plague of Athens Position and Policy of Pericles Fall

CHAPTER VIII. Third Year of the War Investment of Plataea Naval Victories of Phormio Thracian

CHAPTER X. Fifth Year of the War Trial and Execution of the Plataeans Corcyraean Revolution

CHAPTER XI. Sixth Year of the War Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece Ruin of

CHAPTER I. The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the Peloponnesian War

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians,

beginning at the moment that it broke out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of

relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations of both the

combatants were in every department in the last state of perfection; and he could see the rest of the Hellenic

race taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this

was the greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian

world I had almost said of mankind. For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more

immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences which

an inquiry carried as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion that there was

For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in ancient times no settled population; on the

contrary, migrations were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their homes under the

pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea,

cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, never planting

their land (for they could not tell when an invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come

they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place

as well as another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor

attained to any other form of greatness. The richest soils were always most subject to this change of masters;

such as the district now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, and the most

fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular

individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion.

Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction,

never changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion that the

migrations were the cause of there being no correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims

of war or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early

period, becoming naturalized, swelled the already large population of the city to such a height that Attica

became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out colonies to Ionia.

There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my conviction of the weakness of ancient

times. Before the Trojan war there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of the

universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary, before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such

appellation existed, but the country went by the names of the different tribes, in particular of the Pelasgian. It

was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that

one by one they gradually acquired from the connection the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed

before that name could fasten itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by Homer. Born long after the

Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them by that name, nor indeed any of them except the followers of

Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they are called Danaans, Argives, and

Achaeans. He does not even use the term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked

off from the rest of the world by one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that the several Hellenic

communities, comprising not only those who first acquired the name, city by city, as they came to understand

each other, but also those who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before the Trojan

war prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective

Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained increased familiarity with the sea. And the

first person known to us by tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master of what

is now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he sent the first colonies,

expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put down piracy in

For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and islands, as communication by sea became

more common, were tempted to turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives being

to serve their own cupidity and to support the needy. They would fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and

consisting of a mere collection of villages, and would plunder it; indeed, this came to be the main source of

their livelihood, no disgrace being yet attached to such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration

of this is furnished by the honour with which some of the inhabitants of the continent still regard a successful

marauder, and by the question we find the old poets everywhere representing the people as asking of

voyagers "Are they pirates?" as if those who are asked the question would have no idea of disclaiming the

imputation, or their interrogators of reproaching them for it. The same rapine prevailed also by land.

And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the

Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and that region of the continent; and the custom of carrying arms is still kept up

among these continentals, from the old piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their

habitations being unprotected and their communication with each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as

much a part of everyday life with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts of

Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time when the same mode of life was once equally common to

all. The Athenians were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode

of life; indeed, it is only lately that their rich old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of linen,

and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian

kindred and long prevailed among the old men there. On the contrary, a modest style of dressing, more in

conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, the rich doing their best to

assimilate their way of life to that of the common people. They also set the example of contending naked,

publicly stripping and anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, even in the

Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across their middles; and it is but a few years since

that the practice ceased. To this day among some of the barbarians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing

and wrestling are offered, belts are worn by the combatants. And there are many other points in which a

likeness might be shown between the life of the Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of today.

With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased facilities of navigation and a greater supply of

capital, we find the shores becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being occupied for the

purposes of commerce and defence against a neighbour. But the old towns, on account of the great prevalence

of piracy, were built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the continent, and still remain in their old

sites. For the pirates used to plunder one another, and indeed all coast populations, whether seafaring or not.

The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians and Phoenicians, by whom most of the

islands were colonized, as was proved by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in

this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and it was found that above half their inmates were

Carians: they were identified by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the method of interment,

which was the same as the Carians still follow. But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by

sea became easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus expelled the malefactors. The coast

population now began to apply themselves more closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life became

more settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the strength of their newly acquired riches. For

the love of gain would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the possession of capital

enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat later stage of

What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion, his superiority in strength, than

the oaths of Tyndareus, which bound the suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those

Peloponnesians who have been the recipients of the most credible tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving

among a needy population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such power that, stranger though he was, the

country was called after him; and this power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his

descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids. Atreus was his mother's brother; and to

the hands of his relation, who had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus, when he

set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government. As time went on and Eurystheus did

not return, Atreus complied with the wishes of the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by fear of the

Heraclids besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not neglected to court the favour of the

populace and assumed the sceptre of Mycenae and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the

power of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater than that of the descendants of Perseus. To all this

Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear

was quite as strong an element as love in the formation of the confederate expedition. The strength of his

navy is shown by the fact that his own was the largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians was furnished by

him; this at least is what Homer says, if his testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of the

Of many an isle, and of all Argos king. Now Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could not have

been master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be many), but through the possession of

And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier enterprises. Now Mycenae may have been a

small place, and many of the towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact observer

would therefore feel justified in rejecting the estimate given by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of

the armament. For I suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the temples and the foundations of

the public buildings were left, that as time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to

refuse to accept her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet they occupy twofifths of Peloponnese

and lead the whole, not to speak of their numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither built in a compact

form nor adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices, but composed of villages after the old fashion

of Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens were to suffer the same

misfortune, I suppose that any inference from the appearance presented to the eye would make her power to

have been twice as great as it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content ourselves with an

inspection of a town to the exclusion of a consideration of its power; but we may safely conclude that the

armament in question surpassed all before it, as it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept the

testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for the exaggeration which a poet would feel

himself licensed to employ, we can see that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting

of twelve hundred vessels; the Boeotian complement of each ship being a hundred and twenty men, that of

the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I conceive, he meant to convey the maximum and the minimum

complement: at any rate, he does not specify the amount of any others in his catalogue of the ships. That they

were all rowers as well as warriors we see from his account of the ships of Philoctetes, in which all the men at

the oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable that many supernumeraries sailed, if we except the kings and high

officers; especially as they had to cross the open sea with munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that had no

decks, but were equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we strike the average of the largest and

smallest ships, the number of those who sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the

whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of men as of money. Difficulty of

subsistence made the invaders reduce the numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country

during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival and a victory there

must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built there is no indication of

their whole force having been employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the

Chersonese and to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled the Trojans to keep the field

for ten years against them; the dispersion of the enemy making them always a match for the detachment left

behind. If they had brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in the war without scattering for

piracy and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the field, since they could hold their

own against them with the division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy

would have cost them less time and less trouble. But as want of money proved the weakness of earlier

expeditions, so from the same cause even the one in question, more famous than its predecessors, may be

pronounced on the evidence of what it effected to have been inferior to its renown and to the current opinion

Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing and settling, and thus could not attain to the

quiet which must precede growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and

factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities.

Sixty years after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, and

settled in the present Boeotia, the former Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of

whom joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of

Peloponnese; so that much had to be done and many years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a

durable tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and

most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest of Hellas.

But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became more an object, the revenues of the

states increasing, tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere the old form of government

being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself

more closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of naval

architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas where galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles,

a Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for the Samians. Dating from the end of this war, it is nearly three

hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again, the earliest seafight in history was between the

Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the same time.

Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial emporium; as formerly almost

all communication between the Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and the

Corinthian territory was the highway through which it travelled. She had consequently great money

resources, as is shown by the epithet "wealthy" bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled her,

when traffic by sea became more common, to procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a

mart for both branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which a large revenue affords.

Subsequently the Ionians attained to great naval strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians,

and of his son Cambyses, and while they were at war with the former commanded for a while the Ionian sea.

Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced

many of the islands, and among them Rhenea, which he consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time

also the Phocaeans, while they were founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians in a seafight. These

were the most powerful navies. And even these, although so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan

war, seem to have been principally composed of the old fiftyoars and longboats, and to have counted few

galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly the Persian war, and the death of Darius the successor

of Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any large number of galleys. For after

these there were no navies of any account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and others

may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally fiftyoars. It was quite at the end of this period

that the war with Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to persuade the

Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete

The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed were what I have described. All their

insignificance did not prevent their being an element of the greatest power to those who cultivated them, alike

in revenue and in dominion. They were the means by which the islands were reached and reduced, those of

the smallest area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was

acquired; we have the usual border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear

nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great state, no spontaneous

combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare

between rival neighbours. The nearest approach to a coalition took place in the old war between Chalcis and

Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to some extent take sides.

Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered in various localities. The power of

the Ionians was advancing with rapid strides, when it came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who,

after having dethroned Croesus and overrun everything between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had

reduced the cities of the coast; the islands being only left to be subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy.

Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for themselves, of looking solely to their

personal comfort and family aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and prevented

anything great proceeding from them; though they would each have their affairs with their immediate

neighbours. All this is only true of the mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very great power. Thus

for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find causes which make the states alike incapable of combination

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with

the exception of those in Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though after the

settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time,

still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it

has possessed the same form of government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the

late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states. Not many years after the

deposition of the tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years

afterwards, the barbarian returned with the armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great

danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of their

superior power; and the Athenians, having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes,

threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after repulsing the barbarian,

soon afterwards split into two sections, which included the Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well

as those who had aided him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens, at the head of the other

Lacedaemon, one the first naval, the other the first military power in Hellas. For a short time the league held

together, till the Lacedaemonians and Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each other with their allies, a

duel into which all the Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though some might at first remain neutral. So

that the whole period from the Median war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power in

war, either with its rival, or with its own revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant practice in

The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but merely to secure their subservience to

her interests by establishing oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived hers

of their ships, and imposed instead contributions in money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their

resources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their strength when the alliance flourished intact.

Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I grant that there will be a difficulty in believing

every particular detail. The way that most men deal with traditions, even traditions of their own country, is to

receive them all alike as they are delivered, without applying any critical test whatever. The general Athenian

public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogiton, not

knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and

Thessalus were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very

moment fixed on for the deed, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by their accomplices,

concluded that he had been warned, and did not attack him, yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their

lives for nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and slew him as he was

There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the Hellenes, even on matters of

contemporary history, which have not been obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the

Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have only one; and that there is a

company of Pitane, there being simply no such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of

truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand. On the whole, however, the conclusions I have

drawn from the proofs quoted may, I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be disturbed either

by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that

are attractive at truth's expense; the subjects they treat of being out of the reach of evidence, and time having

robbed most of them of historical value by enthroning them in the region of legend. Turning from these, we

can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon the clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as exact as

can be expected in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: despite the known disposition of the actors

in a struggle to overrate its importance, and when it is over to return to their admiration of earlier events, yet

an examination of the facts will show that it was much greater than the wars which preceded it.

With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered before the war began, others while it was

going on; some I heard myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them

word for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion

demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of

what they really said. And with reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it

from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I

saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most

severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labour from the want of coincidence

between accounts of the same occurrences by different eyewitnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect

memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the other. The absence of romance in my history

will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an

exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things

must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay

The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy decision in two actions by sea

and two by land. The Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it was, it was

short without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought upon Hellas. Never had so many cities been taken

and laid desolate, here by the barbarians, here by the parties contending (the old inhabitants being sometimes

removed to make room for others); never was there so much banishing and bloodshedding, now on the field

of battle, now in the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences handed down by tradition, but scantily

confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be incredible; there were earthquakes of unparalleled extent and

violence; eclipses of the sun occurred with a frequency unrecorded in previous history; there were great

droughts in sundry places and consequent famines, and that most calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the

plague. All this came upon them with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians and Peloponnesians by

the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke

the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no

one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The

real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of

Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still it is well to give the

grounds alleged by either side which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war.

THE city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the

Taulantians, an Illyrian people. The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of Eratocleides,

of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from

Corinth, the mother country. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians, and others of the Dorian race.

Now, as time went on, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but falling a prey to factions

arising, it is said, from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much enfeebled, and lost a

considerable amount of her power. The last act before the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people.

The exiled party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in the city by sea and land; and the

Epidamnians, finding themselves hard pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra beseeching their mother country

not to allow them to perish, but to make up matters between them and the exiles, and to rid them of the war

with the barbarians. The ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera as suppliants, and made the

above requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused to accept their supplication, and they were

When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra, they were in a strait what to do

next. So they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to the Corinthians

and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the

city and place themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered

over the colony in obedience to the commands of the oracle. They showed that their founder came from

Corinth, and revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them to perish, but to assist

them. This the Corinthians consented to do. Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the

Corcyraeans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their protection. Besides, they hated the

Corcyraeans for their contempt of the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours accorded to

the parent city by every other colony at public assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found

herself treated with contempt by a power which in point of wealth could stand comparison with any even of

the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great military strength, and which sometimes could not

repress a pride in the high naval position of an, island whose nautical renown dated from the days of its old

inhabitants, the Phaeacians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished on their fleet, which became

very efficient; indeed they began the war with a force of a hundred and twenty galleys.

All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to Epidamnus. Advertisement was made

for volunteer settlers, and a force of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched

by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being avoided from fear of Corcyraean

interruption. When the Corcyraeans heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in Epidamnus, and the

surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire. Instantly putting to sea with fiveandtwenty ships, which

were quickly followed by others, they insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back the banished

nobles (it must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had come to Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres

of their ancestors, had appealed to their kindred to restore them) and to dismiss the Corinthian garrison and

settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians turned a deaf ear. Upon this the Corcyraeans commenced operations

against them with a fleet of forty sail. They took with them the exiles, with a view to their restoration, and

also secured the services of the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they issued a proclamation to the effect

that any of the natives that chose, and the foreigners, might depart unharmed, with the alternative of being

treated as enemies. On their refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city, which stands on an

isthmus; and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the investment of Epidamnus, got together an

armament and proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to all who

chose to go. Any who were not prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of fifty Corinthian

drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving Corinth. Great numbers took advantage of this

proclamation, some being ready to start directly, others paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage

being disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were asked to lend them a convoy. Megara prepared to

accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with four; Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one,

Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans

for hulls as well; while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand heavy infantry.

When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth with envoys from Lacedaemon and

Sicyon, whom they persuaded to accompany them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she had

nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to make, they were willing to submit the

matter to the arbitration of such of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement, and

that the colony should remain with the city to whom the arbitrators might assign it. They were also willing to

refer the matter to the oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their protestations, war was appealed to, they should

be themselves compelled by this violence to seek friends in quarters where they had no desire to seek them,

and to make even old ties give way to the necessity of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth was that,

if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from Epidamnus, negotiation might be possible; but,

while the town was still being besieged, going before arbitrators was out of the question. The Corcyraeans

retorted that if Corinth would withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they were

ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being concluded till judgment could be given.

Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned and their allies had come in, the

Corinthians sent a herald before them to declare war and, getting under way with seventyfive ships and two

thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the

command of Aristeus, son of Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and Timanor, son of Timanthes; the troops

under that of Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium

in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, where the temple of

Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light boat to warn them not to sail against them.

Meanwhile they proceeded to man their ships, all of which had been equipped for action, the old vessels

being undergirded to make them seaworthy. On the return of the herald without any peaceful answer from the

Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail

(forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus), formed line, and went into action, and gained a decisive

victory, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day had seen Epidamnus compelled by its

besiegers to capitulate; the conditions being that the foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept as

After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, a headland of Corcyra, and slew all

their captives except the Corinthians, whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the Corinthians

and their allies repaired home, and left the Corcyraeans masters of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to

Leucas, a Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt Cyllene, the harbour of the Eleans,

because they had furnished ships and money to Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed the

battle they remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. At

last Corinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the summer, who

formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and the

rest of the friendly cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar station on Leukimme. Neither party

made any movement, but they remained confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter was at

Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the whole of the year after the engagement and

that succeeding it in building ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers being

drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of large bounties. The Corcyraeans,

alarmed at the news of their preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they had not enrolled

themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order

to enter into alliance and to endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also, hearing of their intentions,

sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of

ordering the war according to her wishes being thus impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival

"Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important service or support to their neighbours in

times past, for which they might claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to

solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy certain preliminary conditions. They should

show, first, that it is expedient or at least safe to grant their request; next, that they will retain a lasting sense

of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed if they

meet with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that with their petition for assistance they can also give you

a satisfactory answer on these points, and they have therefore dispatched us hither. It has so happened that

our policy as regards you with respect to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our interests,

to be at the present crisis inexpedient. We say inconsistent, because a power which has never in the whole of

her past history been willing to ally herself with any of her neighbours, is now found asking them to ally

themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, because in our present war with Corinth it has left us in a

position of entire isolation, and what once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in

alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their choosing, has now proved

to be folly and weakness. It is true that in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our

shores singlehanded. But they have now got together a still larger armament from Peloponnese and the rest

of Hellas; and we, seeing our utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the magnitude of the

danger which subjection to them implies, find it necessary to ask help from you and from every other power.

And we hope to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political isolation, a principle which

was not adopted with any sinister intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment.

"Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you will congratulate yourselves on this

request having been made to you. First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which, herself

inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because all that we most value is at stake in the

present contest, and your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of goodwill which will

ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest

naval power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune more rare in itself, or more

disheartening to your enemies, than that the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much

material and moral strength should present herself selfinvited, should deliver herself into your hands

without danger and without expense, and should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high character in the

eyes of the world, the gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a great accession of strength for

yourselves? You may search all history without finding many instances of a people gaining all these

advantages at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance being in a position to give

to the people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged

that it is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To this we answer that if any of you imagine

that that war is far off, he is grievously mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with

jealousy and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there the same, remember, that is your enemy, and is

even now trying to subdue us as a preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to prevent our becoming

united by a common enmity, and her having us both on her hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you

in one of two ways, either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own. Now it is our policy to

be beforehand with her that is, for Corcyra to make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we

ought to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she forms against us.

"If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance is not right, let her know that every colony

that is well treated honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice. For colonists are not

sent forth on the understanding that they are to be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to

be their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to

arbitration, they chose to prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair trial. And let their conduct

towards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their

direct requests; concessions to adversaries only end in selfreproach, and the more strictly they are avoided

"If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon,

the answer is that we are a neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that treaty is that it shall be

competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for

Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her allies, but also from the rest of Hellas, no

small number being furnished by your own subjects; while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left

open to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we might get from other quarters, and you are to be accused

of political immorality if you comply with our request. On the other hand, we shall have much greater cause

to complain of you, if you do not comply with it; if we, who are in peril and are no enemies of yours, meet

with a repulse at your hands, while Corinth, who is the aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no

hindrance from you, but is even allowed to draw material for war from your dependencies. This ought not to

be, but you should either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions, or you should lend us too what help you

"But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support. The advantages of this course, as we

premised in the beginning of our speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there be

a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is

also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish defection? And there is a wide difference

between declining the alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to

prevent, if possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing this, to secure the friendship of

the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon

this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one hand, whatever

your fears, your strength will be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you

derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also

remember that your decision is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not making the best

provision for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in

readiness for the breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a place

whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently

for the coast navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval

reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most

desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general and particular considerations, let

this show you the folly of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable naval powers in

Hellas Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth and that if you allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to

secure us for herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and Peloponnese. But

Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the Corinthians spoke as follows:

"These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine themselves to the question of their

reception into your alliance. They also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims of an

unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both these points before we proceed to the rest of

what we have to say, that you may have a more correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have good cause

to reject their petition. According to them, their old policy of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of

moderation. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not for good; indeed their conduct is such as to make them by

no means desirous of having allies present to witness it, or of having the shame of asking their concurrence.

Besides, their geographical situation makes them independent of others, and consequently the decision in

cases where they injure any lies not with judges appointed by mutual agreement, but with themselves,

because, while they seldom make voyages to their neighbours, they are constantly being visited by foreign

vessels which are compelled to put in to Corcyra. In short, the object that they propose to themselves, in their

specious policy of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of others, but to secure monopoly

of crime to themselves the licence of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can elude,

and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they were the honest men they pretend to be, the

less hold that others had upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have put their

"But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards us. The attitude of our colony towards

us has always been one of estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: 'We were not sent out to be

illtreated.' We rejoin that we did not found the colony to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to be

regarded with a proper respect. At any rate our other colonies honour us, and we are much beloved by our

colonists; and clearly, if the majority are satisfied with us, these can have no good reason for a dissatisfaction

in which they stand alone, and we are not acting improperly in making war against them, nor are we making

war against them without having received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would be

honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for us to trample on their moderation; but in

the pride and licence of wealth they have sinned again and again against us, and never more deeply than

when Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to claim in its distress upon our coming to

"As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a

challenge coming from the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit due only to him

who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In

their case, it was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length understood that we should not

tamely suffer it, that they thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own

misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them not in alliance but in crime, and to

receive them in spite of their being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they should

have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a

time when you will be admitting to a share in your protection those who never admitted you to a share in

their power, and will be incurring an equal amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had no

hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they asked you to share your fortunes with

"So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the violence and rapacity of our

opponents, have both been proved. But that you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It

may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be competent for any state, whose name was

not down on the list, to join whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those whose object

in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those whose need of support does not arise from the fact of

defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to receive them war instead of

peace; which will be the case with you, if you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary

and remain our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict

on them. And yet you have the best possible right to be neutral, or, failing this, you should on the contrary

join us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do

not lay down the principle that defection is to be patronized. Did we on the defection of the Samians record

our vote against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question

whether they should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has a right to punish its own

allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of

your dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less heavily on us than

"This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But we have also advice to offer and claims

on your gratitude, which, since there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and since our

friendship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture.

When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion,

Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian question, when

we were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina and to

punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises when, if ever, men are wont in their efforts against their enemies

to forget everything for the sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if thus far

he has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he has thus far been a friend; indeed they

allow their real interests to suffer from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle.

"Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they are from their elders, and let them

determine to do unto us as we have done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say,

but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the straightest path generally speaking the

wisest; but the coming of the war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade you to do

wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be carried away by it into gaining the instant and

declared enmity of Corinth. It were, rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which

your conduct to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely shown has a greater power of removing old

grievances than the facts of the case may warrant. And do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval

alliance. Abstinence from all injustice to other firstrate powers is a greater tower of strength than anything

that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now

our turn to benefit by the principle that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right to punish

her own allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and protest against your rewarding us for

benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that

this is that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes is most a foe. And for

these Corcyraeans neither receive them into alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and

you will act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best consult your own interests."

When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the first there was a manifest

disposition to listen to the representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an

alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive

alliance. It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join

Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's assistance

against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of

the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval power of such

magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by mutual

conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day have to wage with

Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting

passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of

the Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were commanded by

Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their

instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to

Corcyra and threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to

prevent it. These instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty.

Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed for Corcyra with a hundred and fifty

ships. Of these Elis furnished ten, Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twentyseven, Anactorium one, and

Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own admiral, the Corinthian being under the

command of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the

part of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of

Thesprotis, above which, at some distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean district. By this

city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It gets its name from the river Acheron, which flows

through Thesprotis and falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis flows, forming the boundary between

Thesprotis and Kestrine; and between these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the continent

the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When the Corcyraeans saw them coming,

they manned a hundred and ten ships, commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed

themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the ten Athenian ships being present. On Point Leukimme they posted

their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had come from Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were

the Corinthians on the mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their

assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies of theirs.

When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days' provisions and put out from

Chimerium by night, ready for action. Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and

coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed in order of battle. On the

Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed

in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean

formation. The Corinthian was as follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the

centre the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed of the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to

encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised on either

side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large number of

archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing. The seafight was an obstinate one, though

not remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each other,

the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of victory

lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships remaining

stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and pluck had more share in

the fight than science. Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the

Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy,

though their commanders could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right wing of the

Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and chased them in disorder to the continent with

twenty ships, sailed up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and plundered the stuff. So

in this quarter the Corinthians and their allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where

the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided success; the scanty forces of the

Corcyraeans being further weakened by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the

Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them more unequivocally. At first, it is true,

they refrained from charging any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians were

pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this

point, that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other.

After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in lashing fast and hauling after them the

hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as they

sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by them, by

mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing For the number of the ships on both sides, and the

distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult, after they had once joined, to distinguish between

the conquering and the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before it, any at least between

Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land,

they turned to the wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to

Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a

desert harbour of Thesprotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who on

their part advanced to meet them with all their ships that were fit for service and remaining to them,

accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in their territory. It was by

this time getting late, and the paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to

back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent out afterwards to

reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans

and the inability of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships were thus seen by the Corinthians first.

They suspected that they were from Athens, and that those which they saw were not all, but that there were

more behind; they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not sighted them, as they

were advancing from a point which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the Corinthians were

backing water, when some caught sight of them, and cried out that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this

they also retired; for it was now getting dark, and the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities.

Thus they parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans were in their camp at

Leukimme, when these twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and

Andocides, son of Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp, not long

after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans feared that they might be hostile vessels; but

The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by all the Corcyraean ships that were

seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The

Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the open sea, but beyond this made no further

movement, having no intention of assuming the offensive. For they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from

Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous difficulties, such as the necessity of guarding the prisoners

whom they had on board and the want of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were

thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be effected; they feared that the Athenians might

consider that the treaty was dissolved by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure.

Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send them without a herald's wand to the

Athenians, as an experiment. Having done so, they spoke as follows: "You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war

and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you placing yourselves in our path in arms

against us. Now if your intentions are to prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that we may wish,

and if you are for breaking the treaty, first take us that are here and treat us as enemies." Such was what they

said, and all the Corcyraean armament that were within hearing immediately called out to take them and kill

them. But the Athenians answered as follows: "Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we

breaking the treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help them. So if you want to sail

anywhere else, we place no obstacle in your way; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her

Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced preparations for their voyage home,

and set up a trophy in Sybota, on the continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that had

been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose in the night and scattered them in all

directions, and set up their trophy in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The reasons each side had for claiming

the victory were these. The Corinthians had been victorious in the seafight until night; and having thus been

enabled to carry off most wrecks and dead, they were in possession of no fewer than a thousand prisoners of

war, and had sunk close upon seventy vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and after

the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side; they had besides seen the

Corinthians retire before them, backing water on sight of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival of the

Athenians refuse to sail out against them from Sybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory.

The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The

place was taken by treachery, being common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing

Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold;

two hundred and fifty they retained in captivity, and treated with great attention, in the hope that they might

bring over their country to Corinth on their return; most of them being, as it happened, men of very high

position in Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the war with Corinth, and the

Athenian vessels left the island. This was the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians,

Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and

contributed their share to the war. Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her

hostility. The Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies

of Athens, were ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian

magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was

feared that they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw the rest of the

allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them. These precautions against the Potidaeans were taken by

the Athenians immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but

Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy.

He had been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who

were in league against him. In his alarm he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the Athenians in a war

with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of

Potidaea. He also made overtures to the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to

persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these places on the border could be made his allies,

it would be easier to carry on the war with their cooperation. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate the

revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They were just then sending off thirty ships and a

thousand heavy infantry for his country under the command of Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, with four

colleagues. They instructed the captains to take hostages of the Potidaeans, to raze the wall, and to be on their

Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of persuading them to take no new steps in

their matters; they also went to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need. Failing

after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory from the Athenians; being unable, for all they

could say, to prevent the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also sailing against them; and

receiving from the Lacedaemonian government a promise to invade Attica, if the Athenians should attack

Potidaea, the Potidaeans, thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the Chalcidians and

Bottiaeans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their towns on the

seaboard and, settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place: meanwhile to those who

followed his advice he gave a part of his territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while

the war against the Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished their towns, removed inland and

prepared for war. The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidaea and

the rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite impossible with their present force to carry on

war with Perdiccas and with the confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original destination,

and, having established themselves there, carried on war in cooperation with Philip, and the brothers of

Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt and the Athenian ships on the coast of Macedonia,

alarmed for the safety of the place and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth, and

mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen hundred heavy infantry in all, and four

hundred light troops. Aristeus, son of Adimantus, who was always a steady friend to the Potidaeans, took

command of the expedition, and it was principally for love of him that most of the men from Corinth

The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the cities. On being informed that Aristeus

and his reinforcements were on their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens and

forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command of Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues.

They arrived in Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that had been first sent out, just

become masters of Therme and besieging Pydna. Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and

besieged Pydna for a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced alliance with Perdiccas,

hastened by the calls of Potidaea and by the arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from Macedonia,

going to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the latter place, they pursued by land

their march to Potidaea with three thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a number of their

allies, and six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed

seventy ships along the coast. Advancing by short marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus, where

Meanwhile the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were encamped on the side looking towards

Olynthus on the isthmus, in expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside the city.

The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry; while the command of the cavalry was given to

Perdiccas, who had at once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that of the Potidaeans, having

deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the

attack of the Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies outside the isthmus, and the two hundred

cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing against

him; and thus to place the enemy between two fires. While Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues

dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of the allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made

from that quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched against Potidaea. After they

had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon

afterwards engaged. The wing of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and other picked troops round him, routed the

wing opposed to it, and followed for a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the army of the

Potidaeans and of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians, and took refuge within the

fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus perceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a loss

which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to Olynthus or to Potidaea, he at last determined to draw his

men into as small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidaea. Not without difficulty,

through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his

men safe, though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans from Olynthus, which is about

seven miles off and in sight of Potidaea, when the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little

way to render assistance; and the Macedonian horse formed against them to prevent it. But on victory

speedily declaring for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall; and

the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry present on either side. After the battle

the Athenians set up a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidaeans under truce. The Potidaeans and

their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and

The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised against it, and manned by the Athenians.

That on the side of Pallene had no works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong enough at

once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over to Pallene and raise works there; they were afraid that

the Potidaeans and their allies might take advantage of their division to attack them. Meanwhile the

Athenians at home learning that there were no works at Pallene, some time afterwards sent off sixteen

hundred heavy infantry of their own citizens under the command of Phormio, son of Asopius. Arrived at

Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at Aphytis, and led his army against Potidaea by short marches, ravaging

the country as he advanced. No one venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works against the wall on the

side of Pallene. So at length Potidaea was strongly invested on either side, and from the sea by the ships

cooperating in the blockade. Aristeus, seeing its investment complete, and having no hope of its salvation,

except in the event of some movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other improbable contingency,

advised all except five hundred to watch for a wind and sail out of the place, in order that their provisions

might last the longer. He was willing to be himself one of those who remained. Unable to persuade them, and

desirous of acting on the next alternative, and of having things outside in the best posture possible, he eluded

the guardships of the Athenians and sailed out. Remaining among the Chalcidians, he continued to carry on

the war; in particular he laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them; he also

communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to contrive some method by which help might be brought.

Meanwhile, after the completion of the investment of Potidaea, Phormio next employed his sixteen hundred

men in ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by him.

THE Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of complaint against each other: the

complaint of Corinth was that her colony of Potidaea, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within it,

were being besieged; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians that they had incited a town of hers, a

member of her alliance and a contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly fighting

against her on the side of the Potidaeans. For all this, war had not yet broken out: there was still truce for a

But the siege of Potidaea put an end to her inaction; she had men inside it: besides, she feared for the place.

Immediately summoning the allies to Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach of the

treaty and aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With her, the Aeginetans, formally unrepresented from

fear of Athens, in secret proved not the least urgent of the advocates for war, asserting that they had not the

independence guaranteed to them by the treaty. After extending the summons to any of their allies and others

who might have complaints to make of Athenian aggression, the Lacedaemonians held their ordinary

assembly, and invited them to speak. There were many who came forward and made their several

accusations; among them the Megarians, in a long list of grievances, called special attention to the fact of

their exclusion from the ports of the Athenian empire and the market of Athens, in defiance of the treaty. Last

of all the Corinthians came forward, and having let those who preceded them inflame the Lacedaemonians,

"Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your constitution and social order, inclines you to receive

any reflections of ours on other powers with a certain scepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but hence

also the rather limited knowledge which you betray in dealing with foreign politics. Time after time was our

voice raised to warn you of the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and time after time, instead of taking

the trouble to ascertain the worth of our communications, you contented yourselves with suspecting the

speakers of being inspired by private interest. And so, instead of calling these allies together before the blow

fell, you have delayed to do so till we are smarting under it; allies among whom we have not the worst title to

speak, as having the greatest complaints to make, complaints of Athenian outrage and Lacedaemonian

neglect. Now if these assaults on the rights of Hellas had been made in the dark, you might be unacquainted

with the facts, and it would be our duty to enlighten you. As it is, long speeches are not needed where you see

servitude accomplished for some of us, meditated for others in particular for our allies and prolonged

preparations in the aggressor against the hour of war. Or what, pray, is the meaning of their reception of

Corcyra by fraud, and their holding it against us by force? what of the siege of Potidaea? places one of

which lies most conveniently for any action against the Thracian towns; while the other would have

"For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to fortify their city after the Median war,

and afterwards to erect the long walls you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not only

those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have as yet been your allies. For the true author of the

subjugation of a people is not so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it having the means

to prevent it; particularly if that power aspires to the glory of being the liberator of Hellas. We are at last

assembled. It has not been easy to assemble, nor even now are our objects defined. We ought not to be still

inquiring into the fact of our wrongs, but into the means of our defence. For the aggressors with matured

plans to oppose to our indecision have cast threats aside and betaken themselves to action. And we know

what are the paths by which Athenian aggression travels, and how insidious is its progress. A degree of

confidence she may feel from the idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your noticing her; but it is

nothing to the impulse which her advance will receive from the knowledge that you see, but do not care to

interfere. You, Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend yourselves not by doing

anything but by looking as if you would do something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming

twice its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet the world used to say that you were to be

depended upon; but in your case, we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves know, had time

to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese, without any force of yours worthy of the name advancing

to meet him. But this was a distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near neighbour, and yet Athens you

utterly disregard; against Athens you prefer to act on the defensive instead of on the offensive, and to make it

an affair of chances by deferring the struggle till she has grown far stronger than at first. And yet you know

that on the whole the rock on which the barbarian was wrecked was himself, and that if our present enemy

Athens has not again and again annihilated us, we owe it more to her blunders than to your protection;

Indeed, expectations from you have before now been the ruin of some, whose faith induced them to omit

"We hope that none of you will consider these words of remonstrance to be rather words of hostility; men

remonstrate with friends who are in error, accusations they reserve for enemies who have wronged them.

Besides, we consider that we have as good a right as any one to point out a neighbour's faults, particularly

when we contemplate the great contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as far as we

can see, you have little perception, having never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in

the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to

innovation, and their designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have a

genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you

never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and

in danger they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, to mistrust even

what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release. Further, there is

promptitude on their side against procrastination on yours; they are never at home, you are never from it: for

they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have

left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend

ungrudgingly in their country's cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed in her service. A

scheme unexecuted is with them a positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative failure. The deficiency

created by the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled to

call a thing hoped for a thing got, by the speed with which they act upon their resolutions. Thus they toil on in

trouble and danger all the days of their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in

getting: their only idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them laborious occupation is

less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet life. To describe their character in a word, one might truly say

that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others.

"Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still delay, and fail to see that peace stays

longest with those, who are not more careful to use their power justly than to show their determination not to

submit to injustice. On the contrary, your ideal of fair dealing is based on the principle that, if you do not

injure others, you need not risk your own fortunes in preventing others from injuring you. Now you could

scarcely have succeeded in such a policy even with a neighbour like yourselves; but in the present instance,

as we have just shown, your habits are oldfashioned as compared with theirs. It is the law as in art, so in

politics, that improvements ever prevail; and though fixed usages may be best for undisturbed communities,

constant necessities of action must be accompanied by the constant improvement of methods. Thus it happens

that the vast experience of Athens has carried her further than you on the path of innovation.

"Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, assist your allies and Potidaea in particular, as

you promised, by a speedy invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their bitterest

enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. Such a step would not be condemned

either by the Gods who received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The breach of a treaty cannot

be laid to the people whom desertion compels to seek new relations, but to the power that fails to assist its

confederate. But if you will only act, we will stand by you; it would be unnatural for us to change, and never

should we meet with such a congenial ally. For these reasons choose the right course, and endeavour not to

let Peloponnese under your supremacy degenerate from the prestige that it enjoyed under that of your

Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be Athenian envoys present at Lacedaemon on

other business. On hearing the speeches they thought themselves called upon to come before the

Lacedaemonians. Their intention was not to offer a defence on any of the charges which the cities brought

against them, but to show on a comprehensive view that it was not a matter to be hastily decided on, but one

that demanded further consideration. There was also a wish to call attention to the great power of Athens, and

to refresh the memory of the old and enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a notion that their words

might have the effect of inducing them to prefer tranquillity to war. So they came to the Lacedaemonians and

said that they too, if there was no objection, wished to speak to their assembly. They replied by inviting them

"The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but to attend to the matters on which our

state dispatched us. However, the vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to

come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of the cities (indeed you are not the judges before whom

either we or they can plead), but to prevent your taking the wrong course on matters of great importance by

yielding too readily to the persuasions of your allies. We also wish to show on a review of the whole

indictment that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that our country has claims to consideration. We

need not refer to remote antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice of tradition, but not to the experience of

our audience. But to the Median War and contemporary history we must refer, although we are rather tired of

continually bringing this subject forward. In our action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain

advantages: you had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the good that the glory

may do us. However, the story shall be told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to

show, if you are so ill advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely

to prove. We assert that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian singlehanded. That when

he came the second time, unable to cope with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people,

and joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging

them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels would have made any combination for selfdefence

impossible. The best proof of this was furnished by the invader himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his

power to be no longer what it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with the greater part of his army.

"Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her

cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz., the largest number of

ships, the ablest commander, and the most unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than

twothirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that

the battle took place in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of

your receiving him with honours such as had never been accorded to any foreign visitor. While for daring

patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us

already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our property (instead of

deserting the remainder of the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves

into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us. We assert,

therefore, that we conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the cities

which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and

your coming was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all events, you never appeared

till we had nothing left to lose. But we left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for

a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours.

But if we had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our adhesion to the Mede

before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships,

your naval inferiority would have made a seafight unnecessary, and his objects would have been peaceably

"Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our

counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire.

That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion

the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to

assume the command. And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present

height; fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest afterwards came in. And at last, when

almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the

friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to

give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for

making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest.

"You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is

agreeable to you. And if at the period of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter,

and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would have made yourselves just as galling to

the allies, and would have been forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves. It

follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did

accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest

motives, fear, honour, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been law that

the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and

so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry of justice a

consideration which no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining

anything by might. And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet

"We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the conduct of others who should be placed

in our position; but even our equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of approval.

Our abatement of our rights in the contract trials with our allies, and our causing them to be decided by

impartial laws at Athens, have gained us the character of being litigious. And none care to inquire why this

reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we

do; the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. But our subjects are so habituated to

associate with us as equals that any defeat whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it

proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives us, makes them forget to be

grateful for being allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more vexed at a part being taken, than if we

had from the first cast law aside and openly gratified our covetousness. If we had done so, not even would

they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Men's indignation, it seems, is more

excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like

being compelled by a superior. At all events they contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this

from the Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy

on the conquered. This at least is certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and in taking our place,

you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of today is at

all to tally with the sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not

only is your life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with those of others, but your

citizens abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognized by the rest of Hellas.

"Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great importance; and do not be persuaded by

the opinions and complaints of others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence of

accident in war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances,

chances from which neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common

mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But

we are not yet by any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly, while it is still

open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our

differences settled by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else we take the gods who heard the oaths to

witness, and if you begin hostilities, whatever line of action you choose, we will try not to be behindhand in

Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard the complaints of the allies

against the Athenians, and the observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by

themselves on the question before them. The opinions of the majority all led to the same conclusion; the

Athenians were open aggressors, and war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian

king, came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a moderate man, and made the

"I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the experience of many wars, and I see those

among you of the same age as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war from

inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety. This, the war on which you are now debating,

would be one of the greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a struggle with

Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the

different points. But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who have also an extraordinary

familiarity with the sea, and who are in the highest state of preparation in every other department; with wealth

private and public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and a population such as no one other Hellenic

place can equal, and lastly a number of tributary allies what can justify us in rashly beginning such a

struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is it in our ships? There we are inferior;

while if we are to practise and become a match for them, time must intervene. Is it in our money? There we

have a far greater deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury, nor are we ready to contribute it from our

private funds. Confidence might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy infantry and population, which

will enable us to invade and devastate their lands. But the Athenians have plenty of other land in their empire,

and can import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an insurrection of their allies, these will

have to be supported with a fleet, most of them being islanders. What then is to be our war? For unless we

can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we shall meet with little

but disaster. Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it be the opinion that we

began the quarrel. For let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the

devastation of their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children; so improbable is it

that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war.

"Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure your allies, and to refrain from

unmasking their intrigues; but I do bid you not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with them

in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of submission, and to employ the interval in

perfecting our own preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of allies, Hellenic or barbarian it

matters not, so long as they are an accession to our strength naval or pecuniary I say Hellenic or barbarian,

because the odium of such an accession to all who like us are the objects of the designs of the Athenians is

taken away by the law of selfpreservation and secondly the development of our home resources. If they

listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after the lapse of two or three years our position will

have become materially strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think proper. Perhaps by that time

the sight of our preparations, backed by language equally significant, will have disposed them to submission,

while their land is still untouched, and while their counsels may be directed to the retention of advantages as

yet undestroyed. For the only light in which you can view their land is that of a hostage in your hands, a

hostage the more valuable the better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare as long as possible, and not make

them desperate, and so increase the difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared, hurried

away by the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it waste, have a care that we do not bring deep

disgrace and deep perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of communities or individuals, it is

possible to adjust; but war undertaken by a coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there is no means

"And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to pause before they attack a single city. The

Athenians have allies as numerous as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so much of

arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And this is more than ever true in a struggle between a

continental and a maritime power. First, then, let us provide money, and not allow ourselves to be carried

away by the talk of our allies before we have done so: as we shall have the largest share of responsibility for

the consequences be they good or bad, we have also a right to a tranquil inquiry respecting them.

"And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that are most assailed by their criticism,

need not make you blush. If we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its

commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been ours.

The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we alone

do not become insolent in success and give way less than others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the

pleasure of hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed, are we any

the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our

sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because selfcontrol contains honour as a chief constituent,

and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws,

and with too severe a selfcontrol to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless

matters such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to

assail them with equal success in practice but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are not

dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we

always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to

rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe

that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is

reared in the severest school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to us, and by whose

maintenance we have always profited, must not be given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a

day's brief space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many cities, and in which honour is

deeply involved but we must decide calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the

Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidaea, send on the matter of the alleged wrongs of the allies,

particularly as they are prepared with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who offers arbitration as

against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit preparation for war. This decision will be the best

Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas, one of the ephors for that year, and

"The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They said a good deal in praise of

themselves, but nowhere denied that they are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved

well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double punishment for having ceased to be

good and for having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise,

disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off till tomorrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer

today. Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up

to the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter, as it is anything but in word that we are

harmed, but render instant and powerful help. And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to deliberate under

injustice; long deliberation is rather fitting for those who have injustice in contemplation. Vote therefore,

Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of

Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors."

With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. He said that

he could not determine which was the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation not by

voting); the fact being that he wished to make them declare their opinion openly and thus to increase their

ardour for war. Accordingly he said: "All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion that the treaty has been

broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and go there," pointing out a certain place; "all who are of

the opposite opinion, there." They accordingly stood up and divided; and those who held that the treaty had

been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning the allies, they told them that their opinion was that

Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke all the allies and put it to the vote; in

order that they might make war, if they decided to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their

point, the delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later, when they had dispatched the

objects of their mission. This decision of the assembly, judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in

the fourteenth year of the thirty years' truce, which was entered into after the affair of Euboea.

The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the war must be declared, not so much

because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power

CHAPTER IV. From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War The Progress

THE way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under which her power grew was this.

After the Medes had returned from Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of them

who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, the

commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, departed home with the allies from Peloponnese. But the Athenians

and the allies from Ionia and Hellespont, who had now revolted from the King, remained and laid siege to

Sestos, which was still held by the Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters of the place on its

evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they sailed away from Hellespont to their respective cities.

Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the departure of the barbarian from their country, at once proceeded to

carry over their children and wives, and such property as they had left, from the places where they had

deposited them, and prepared to rebuild their city and their walls. For only isolated portions of the

circumference had been left standing, and most of the houses were in ruins; though a few remained, in which

Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedaemonians sent an embassy to Athens. They would have

themselves preferred to see neither her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though here they acted

principally at the instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at the strength of her newly acquired navy and

the valour which she had displayed in the war with the Medes. They begged her not only to abstain from

building walls for herself, but also to join them in throwing down the walls that still held together of the

ultraPeloponnesian cities. The real meaning of their advice, the suspicion that it contained against the

Athenians, was not proclaimed; it was urged that so the barbarian, in the event of a third invasion, would not

have any strong place, such as he now had in Thebes, for his base of operations; and that Peloponnese would

suffice for all as a base both for retreat and offence. After the Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, they were,

on the advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed by the Athenians, with the answer that ambassadors

should be sent to Sparta to discuss the question. Themistocles told the Athenians to send him off with all

speed to Lacedaemon, but not to dispatch his colleagues as soon as they had selected them, but to wait until

they had raised their wall to the height from which defence was possible. Meanwhile the whole population in

the city was to labour at the wall, the Athenians, their wives, and their children, sparing no edifice, private or

public, which might be of any use to the work, but throwing all down. After giving these instructions, and

adding that he would be responsible for all other matters there, he departed. Arrived at Lacedaemon he did

not seek an audience with the authorities, but tried to gain time and made excuses. When any of the

government asked him why he did not appear in the assembly, he would say that he was waiting for his

colleagues, who had been detained in Athens by some engagement; however, that he expected their speedy

arrival, and wondered that they were not yet there. At first the Lacedaemonians trusted the words of

Themistocles, through their friendship for him; but when others arrived, all distinctly declaring that the work

was going on and already attaining some elevation, they did not know how to disbelieve it. Aware of this, he

told them that rumours are deceptive, and should not be trusted; they should send some reputable persons

from Sparta to inspect, whose report might be trusted. They dispatched them accordingly. Concerning these

Themistocles secretly sent word to the Athenians to detain them as far as possible without putting them under

open constraint, and not to let them go until they had themselves returned. For his colleagues had now joined

him, Abronichus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, son of Lysimachus, with the news that the wall was

sufficiently advanced; and he feared that when the Lacedaemonians heard the facts, they might refuse to let

them go. So the Athenians detained the envoys according to his message, and Themistocles had an audience

with the Lacedaemonians, and at last openly told them that Athens was now fortified sufficiently to protect its

inhabitants; that any embassy which the Lacedaemonians or their allies might wish to send to them should in

future proceed on the assumption that the people to whom they were going was able to distinguish both its

own and the general interests. That when the Athenians thought fit to abandon their city and to embark in

their ships, they ventured on that perilous step without consulting them; and that on the other hand, wherever

they had deliberated with the Lacedaemonians, they had proved themselves to be in judgment second to none.

That they now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage

of both the citizens of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for without equal military strength it was

impossible to contribute equal or fair counsel to the common interest. It followed, he observed, either that all

the members of the confederacy should be without walls, or that the present step should be considered a right

The Lacedaemonians did not betray any open signs of anger against the Athenians at what they heard. The

embassy, it seems, was prompted not by a desire to obstruct, but to guide the counsels of their government:

besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very friendly towards Athens on account of the patriotism which she

had displayed in the struggle with the Mede. Still the defeat of their wishes could not but cause them secret

In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To this day the building shows signs of the haste

of its execution; the foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought or fitted, but

placed just in the order in which they were brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from

tombs, and sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the bounds of the city were extended at every

point of the circumference; and so they laid hands on everything without exception in their haste.

Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the walls of Piraeus, which had been begun before, in his year of

office as archon; being influenced alike by the fineness of a locality that has three natural harbours, and by

the great start which the Athenians would gain in the acquisition of power by becoming a naval people. For

he first ventured to tell them to stick to the sea and forthwith began to lay the foundations of the empire. It

was by his advice, too, that they built the walls of that thickness which can still be discerned round Piraeus,

the stones being brought up by two wagons meeting each other. Between the walls thus formed there was

neither rubble nor mortar, but great stones hewn square and fitted together, cramped to each other on the

outside with iron and lead. About half the height that he intended was finished. His idea was by their size and

thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he thought that they might be adequately defended by a small

garrison of invalids, and the rest be freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet claimed most of his attention.

He saw, as I think, that the approach by sea was easier for the king's army than that by land: he also thought

Piraeus more valuable than the upper city; indeed, he was always advising the Athenians, if a day should

come when they were hard pressed by land, to go down into Piraeus, and defy the world with their fleet.

Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, and commenced their other buildings immediately after

Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon as commanderinchief of the

Hellenes, with twenty ships from Peloponnese. With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a number

of the other allies. They made an expedition against Cyprus and subdued most of the island, and afterwards

against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Medes, and compelled it to surrender. This event took

place while the Spartans were still supreme. But the violence of Pausanias had already begun to be

disagreeable to the Hellenes, particularly to the Ionians and the newly liberated populations. These resorted to

the Athenians and requested them as their kinsmen to become their leaders, and to stop any attempt at

violence on the part of Pausanias. The Athenians accepted their overtures, and determined to put down any

attempt of the kind and to settle everything else as their interests might seem to demand. In the meantime the

Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias for an investigation of the reports which had reached them. Manifold and

grave accusations had been brought against him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta; and, to all appearance, there

had been in him more of the mimicry of a despot than of the attitude of a general. As it happened, his recall

came just at the time when the hatred which he had inspired had induced the allies to desert him, the soldiers

from Peloponnese excepted, and to range themselves by the side of the Athenians. On his arrival at

Lacedaemon, he was censured for his private acts of oppression, but was acquitted on the heaviest counts and

pronounced not guilty; it must be known that the charge of Medism formed one of the principal, and to all

appearance one of the best founded, articles against him. The Lacedaemonians did not, however, restore him

to his command, but sent out Dorkis and certain others with a small force; who found the allies no longer

inclined to concede to them the supremacy. Perceiving this they departed, and the Lacedaemonians did not

send out any to succeed them. They feared for those who went out a deterioration similar to that observable in

Pausanias; besides, they desired to be rid of the Median War, and were satisfied of the competency of the

Athenians for the position, and of their friendship at the time towards themselves.

The Athenians, having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary act of the allies through their hatred

of Pausanias, fixed which cities were to contribute money against the barbarian, which ships; their professed

object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging the King's country. Now was the time that the office

of "Treasurers for Hellas" was first instituted by the Athenians. These officers received the tribute, as the

money contributed was called. The tribute was first fixed at four hundred and sixty talents. The common

treasury was at Delos, and the congresses were held in the temple. Their supremacy commenced with

independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a common congress. It was marked by the following

undertakings in war and in administration during the interval between the Median and the present war,

against the barbarian, against their own rebel allies, and against the Peloponnesian powers which would come

in contact with them on various occasions. My excuse for relating these events, and for venturing on this

digression, is that this passage of history has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined

themselves either to Hellenic history before the Median War, or the Median War itself. Hellanicus, it is true,

did touch on these events in his Athenian history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate in his dates.

Besides, the history of these events contains an explanation of the growth of the Athenian empire.

First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the Medes, and made slaves of the

inhabitants, being under the command of Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros, the island in

the Aegean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonized it themselves. This was followed by a war

against Carystus, in which the rest of Euboea remained neutral, and which was ended by surrender on

conditions. After this Naxos left the confederacy, and a war ensued, and she had to return after a siege; this

was the first instance of the engagement being broken by the subjugation of an allied city, a precedent which

was followed by that of the rest in the order which circumstances prescribed. Of all the causes of defection,

that connected with arrears of tribute and vessels, and with failure of service, was the chief; for the Athenians

were very severe and exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the screw of necessity to men

who were not used to and in fact not disposed for any continuous labour. In some other respects the

Athenians were not the old popular rulers they had been at first; and if they had more than their fair share of

service, it was correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the confederacy. For this the

allies had themselves to blame; the wish to get off service making most of them arrange to pay their share of

the expense in money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to leave their homes. Thus while Athens was

increasing her navy with the funds which they contributed, a revolt always found them without resources or

Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river Eurymedon, between the Athenians with their

allies, and the Medes, when the Athenians won both battles on the same day under the conduct of Cimon, son

of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the whole Phoenician fleet, consisting of two hundred vessels. Some

time afterwards occurred the defection of the Thasians, caused by disagreements about the marts on the

opposite coast of Thrace, and about the mine in their possession. Sailing with a fleet to Thasos, the Athenians

defeated them at sea and effected a landing on the island. About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers

of their own citizens and the allies to settle the place then called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, now

Amphipolis. They succeeded in gaining possession of Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians, but on advancing into

the interior of Thrace were cut off in Drabescus, a town of the Edonians, by the assembled Thracians, who

regarded the settlement of the place Ennea Hodoi as an act of hostility. Meanwhile the Thasians being

defeated in the field and suffering siege, appealed to Lacedaemon, and desired her to assist them by an

invasion of Attica. Without informing Athens, she promised and intended to do so, but was prevented by the

occurrence of the earthquake, accompanied by the secession of the Helots and the Thuriats and Aethaeans of

the Perioeci to Ithome. Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians that were enslaved in

the famous war; and so all of them came to be called Messenians. So the Lacedaemonians being engaged in a

war with the rebels in Ithome, the Thasians in the third year of the siege obtained terms from the Athenians

by razing their walls, delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the moneys demanded at once, and

tribute in future; giving up their possessions on the continent together with the mine.

The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, finding the war against the rebels in Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid

of their allies, and especially of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon. The

reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in siege operations; a long siege had taught the

Lacedaemonians their own deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by assault. The first

open quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians arose out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians,

when assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and revolutionary character of the

Athenians, and further looking upon them as of alien extraction, began to fear that, if they remained, they

might be tempted by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some political changes. They accordingly dismissed

them alone of the allies, without declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that they had now no need of

them. But the Athenians, aware that their dismissal did not proceed from the more honourable reason of the

two, but from suspicions which had been conceived, went away deeply offended, and conscious of having

done nothing to merit such treatment from the Lacedaemonians; and the instant that they returned home they

broke off the alliance which had been made against the Mede, and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy

Argos; each of the contracting parties taking the same oaths and making the same alliance with the

Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten years' resistance, surrendered to

Lacedaemon; the conditions being that they should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and should

never set foot in it again: any one who might hereafter be found there was to be the slave of his captor. It

must be known that the Lacedaemonians had an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that they should let go

the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they went forth with their children and their wives, and being received by

Athens from the hatred that she now felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at Naupactus, which she had

lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The Athenians received another addition to their confederacy in the

Megarians; who left the Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on them by

Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegae, and built the Megarians their long walls from the city to

Nisaea, in which they placed an Athenian garrison. This was the principal cause of the Corinthians

Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the Libyans on the Egyptian border, having his

headquarters at Marea, the town above Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King

Artaxerxes and, placing himself at its head, invited the Athenians to his assistance. Abandoning a Cyprian

expedition upon which they happened to be engaged with two hundred ships of their own and their allies,

they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the sea into the Nile, and making themselves masters of the river and

twothirds of Memphis, addressed themselves to the attack of the remaining third, which is called White

Castle. Within it were Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and Egyptians who had not joined the

Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon Haliae, were engaged by a force of

Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the Corinthians were victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged the

Peloponnesian fleet off Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were victorious. Subsequently war broke out between

Aegina and Athens, and there was a great battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians and Aeginetans,

each being aided by their allies; in which victory remained with the Athenians, who took seventy of the

enemy's ships, and landed in the country and commenced a siege under the command of Leocrates, son of

Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous of aiding the Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three

hundred heavy infantry, who had before been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians. Meanwhile the

Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights of Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the

belief that, with a large force absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens would be unable to help the Megarians

without raising the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians, instead of moving the army of Aegina, raised a force

of the old and young men that had been left in the city, and marched into the Megarid under the command of

Myronides. After a drawn battle with the Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, each with the impression that

they had gained the victory. The Athenians, however, if anything, had rather the advantage, and on the

departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy. Urged by the taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians

made their preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up their trophy as victors. Sallying

out from Megara, the Athenians cut off the party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and

defeated the rest. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a considerable division, pressed by the pursuers and

mistaking the road, dashed into a field on some private property, with a deep trench all round it, and no way

out. Being acquainted with the place, the Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry and, placing the

light troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth here suffered a severe blow. The bulk of

About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the sea, that towards Phalerum and that

towards Piraeus. Meanwhile the Phocians made an expedition against Doris, the old home of the

Lacedaemonians, containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and Erineum. They had taken one of these

towns, when the Lacedaemonians under Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, commanding for King Pleistoanax,

son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, came to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy infantry of

their own, and ten thousand of their allies. After compelling the Phocians to restore the town on conditions,

they began their retreat. The route by sea, across the Crissaean Gulf, exposed them to the risk of being

stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across Geraneia seemed scarcely safe, the Athenians holding Megara and

Pegae. For the pass was a difficult one, and was always guarded by the Athenians; and, in the present

instance, the Lacedaemonians had information that they meant to dispute their passage. So they resolved to

remain in Boeotia, and to consider which would be the safest line of march. They had also another reason for

this resolve. Secret encouragement had been given them by a party in Athens, who hoped to put an end to the

reign of democracy and the building of the Long Walls. Meanwhile the Athenians marched against them with

their whole levy and a thousand Argives and the respective contingents of the rest of their allies. Altogether

they were fourteen thousand strong. The march was prompted by the notion that the Lacedaemonians were at

a loss how to effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt to overthrow the democracy. Some

cavalry also joined the Athenians from their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the Lacedaemonians

The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on both sides, victory declared for the

Lacedaemonians and their allies. After entering the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, the

Lacedaemonians returned home across Geraneia and the isthmus. Sixtytwo days after the battle the

Athenians marched into Boeotia under the command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in battle at

Oenophyta, and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled the walls of the Tanagraeans, took a

hundred of the richest men of the Opuntian Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls. This was

followed by the surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on conditions; they pulled down their walls, gave up

their ships, and agreed to pay tribute in future. The Athenians sailed round Peloponnese under Tolmides, son

of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of Lacedaemon, took Chalcis, a town of the Corinthians, and in a descent upon

Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still there, and encountered all the vicissitudes of

war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian to Lacedaemon with

money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that

the matter made no progress, and that the money was only being wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the

remainder of the money, and sent Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army to Egypt.

Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a battle, and drove the Hellenes out of

Memphis, and at length shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six

months. At last, draining the canal of its waters, which he diverted into another channel, he left their ships

high and dry and joined most of the island to the mainland, and then marched over on foot and captured it.

Thus the enterprise of the Hellenes came to ruin after six years of war. Of all that large host a few travelling

through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them perished. And thus Egypt returned to its subjection

to the King, except Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture from the extent of

the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike of the Egyptians. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole

author of the Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. Meanwhile a relieving squadron of fifty

vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest of the confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the

Mendesian mouth of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on the land side by the

troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician navy, most of the ships were destroyed; the few remaining being

saved by retreat. Such was the end of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.

Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being an exile from Thessaly, persuaded the

Athenians to restore him. Taking with them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians marched to

Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the country, though only in the immediate vicinity of the

camp; beyond which they could not go for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they failed to take the city or to

attain any of the other objects of their expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected

anything. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked in the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae,

it must be remembered, was now theirs), and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles,

son of Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the Sicyonians who engaged them, they immediately

took with them the Achaeans and, sailing across, marched against and laid siege to Oeniadae in Acarnania.

Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. Released

from Hellenic war, the Athenians made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and

their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these were detached to Egypt at the instance of

Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were compelled

to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with

the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by land and sea, and, being victorious on both elements departed

home, and with them the returned squadron from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians marched out on a

sacred war, and, becoming masters of the temple at Delphi, it in the hands of the Delphians. Immediately

after their retreat, the Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple, and placed it in the hands of the

Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in Boeotia being in the hands of the

Boeotian exiles, the Athenians marched against the abovementioned hostile places with a thousand

Athenian heavy infantry and the allied contingents, under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They

took Chaeronea, and made slaves of the inhabitants, and, leaving a garrison, commenced their return. On their

road they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, with some Locrians and

Euboean exiles, and others who were of the same way of thinking, were defeated in battle, and some killed,

others taken captive. The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia by a treaty providing for the recovery of the men;

and the exiled Boeotians returned, and with all the rest regained their independence.

This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from Athens. Pericles had already crossed over

with an army of Athenians to the island, when news was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the

Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that the Athenian garrison had been cut off by the

Megarians, with the exception of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced the

Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the town before they revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his

army back in all haste from Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians marched into Attica as far as Eleusis and

Thrius, ravaging the country under the conduct of King Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and without

advancing further returned home. The Athenians then crossed over again to Euboea under the command of

Pericles, and subdued the whole of the island: all but Histiaea was settled by convention; the Histiaeans they

Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty

years, giving up the posts which they occupied in Peloponnese Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia. In the

sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war,

the Milesians came to Athens with loud complaints against the Samians. In this they were joined by certain

private persons from Samos itself, who wished to revolutionize the government. Accordingly the Athenians

sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy; took hostages from the Samians, fifty boys and as

many men, lodged them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island returned home. But some of the

Samians had not remained in the island, but had fled to the continent. Making an agreement with the most

powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis, they

got together a force of seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover of night crossed over to Samos. Their

first step was to rise on the commons, most of whom they secured; their next to steal their hostages from

Lemnos; after which they revolted, gave up the Athenian garrison left with them and its commanders to

Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared for an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them.

As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty ships against Samos. Sixteen of these went to

Caria to look out for the Phoenician fleet, and to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders for reinforcements,

and so never engaged; but fortyfour ships under the command of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle,

off the island of Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which twenty were transports, as they were sailing

from Miletus. Victory remained with the Athenians. Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, and

twentyfive Chian and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and having the superiority by land invested the

city with three walls; it was also invested from the sea. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships from the

blockading squadron, and departed in haste for Caunus and Caria, intelligence having been brought in of the

approach of the Phoenician fleet to the aid of the Samians; indeed Stesagoras and others had left the island

with five ships to bring them. But in the meantime the Samians made a sudden sally, and fell on the camp,

which they found unfortified. Destroying the lookout vessels, and engaging and defeating such as were

being launched to meet them, they remained masters of their own seas for fourteen days, and carried in and

carried out what they pleased. But on the arrival of Pericles, they were once more shut up. Fresh

reinforcements afterwards arrived forty ships from Athens with Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio; twenty

with Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty vessels from Chios and Lesbos. After a brief attempt at fighting, the

Samians, unable to hold out, were reduced after a nine months' siege and surrendered on conditions; they

razed their walls, gave hostages, delivered up their ships, and arranged to pay the expenses of the war by

CHAPTER V. Second Congress at Lacedaemon Preparations for War and Diplomatic Skirmishes

AFTER this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has been already related, the affairs of

Corcyra and Potidaea, and the events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions of the

Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the fifty years' interval between the retreat of

Xerxes and the beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in placing their

empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians,

though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during most of the period,

being of old slow to go to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being

hampered by wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own

confederacy became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but

that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if

they could, by commencing the present war. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds

on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of

the God whether it would be well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the

answer that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be theirs, and the promise that he

himself would be with them, whether invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies again,

and to take their vote on the propriety of making war. After the ambassadors from the confederates had

arrived and a congress had been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the

Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the Corinthians. They had before on their

own account canvassed the cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it might come

too late to save Potidaea; they were present also on this occasion, and came forward the last, and made the

"Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having failed in their duty: they have not only

voted for war themselves, but have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for supremacy has

its duties. Besides equitably administering private interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the

common welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by all in other ways. For ourselves, all

who have already had dealings with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The

states more inland and out of the highway of communication should understand that, if they omit to support

the coast powers, the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the reception in

exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had

nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast will one day be

followed by the extension of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own interests are deeply

involved in this discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men

remain quiet, while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war when they are injured, returning to

an understanding on a favourable opportunity: in fact, they are neither intoxicated by their success in war, nor

disposed to take an injury for the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for the sake of

such delights is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of repose to which you cling;

while to conceive extravagant pretensions from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by

which you are elated. For if many illconceived plans have succeeded through the still greater fatuity of an

opponent, many more, apparently well laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with

which we form our schemes is never completely justified in their execution; speculation is carried on in

"To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is under the pressure of injury, with adequate

grounds of complaint; and after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have many

reasons to expect success first, superiority in numbers and in military experience, and secondly our general

and unvarying obedience in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall be raised by

us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these

enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more

mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than

in money. A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will be

the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an equality in

science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have

by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be removed by our

practice. The money required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could

be more monstrous than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing for their own

servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance and selfpreservation the treasure which by such refusal

"We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving

them of their revenues, which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified positions in their

country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon

definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such cases the

party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper

about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory

between rival neighbours, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens that is a match for our

whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as individual

nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided

and in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have no other end than

slavery pure and simple; a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without

disgrace see so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so

used, or that we put up with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for

ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a

tyrant state, though in individual states we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know how

this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For

we do not suppose that you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so

many instances a feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous

"There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further than may be of service to the present. For

the future we must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it is

hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you

should have a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want should

be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and

promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part from interest.

You will be the first to break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated

already, but rather to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but

"Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will amply justify you in going to war; and

this step we recommend in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest you have taken refuge

in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances a feeling which from the

numbers that it has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.