Euthydemus.........................................................................................................................................................1

Plato.........................................................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................1

EUTHYDEMUS ......................................................................................................................................7

The Euthydemus, though apt to be regarded by us only as an elaborate jest, has also a very serious purpose. It

may fairly claim to be the oldest treatise on logic; for that science originates in the misunderstandings which

necessarily accompany the first efforts of speculation. Several of the fallacies which are satirized in it

reappear in the Sophistici Elenchi of Aristotle and are retained at the end of our manuals of logic. But if the

order of history were followed, they should be placed not at the end but at the beginning of them; for they

belong to the age in which the human mind was first making the attempt to distinguish thought from sense,

and to separate the universal from the particular or individual. How to put together words or ideas, how to

escape ambiguities in the meaning of terms or in the structure of propositions, how to resist the fixed

impression of an 'eternal being' or 'perpetual flux,' how to distinguish between words and thingsthese were

problems not easy of solution in the infancy of philosophy. They presented the same kind of difficulty to the

half educated man which spelling or arithmetic do to the mind of a child. It was long before the new world

of ideas which had been sought after with such passionate yearning was set in order and made ready for use.

To us the fallacies which arise in the preSocratic philosophy are trivial and obsolete because we are no

longer liable to fall into the errors which are expressed by them. The intellectual world has become better

The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues of Plato. The nature of definition is explained

not by rules but by examples in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, Theaetetus,

Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman; a

scheme of categories is found in the Philebus; the true doctrine of contradiction is taught, and the fallacy of

arguing in a circle is exposed in the Republic; the nature of synthesis and analysis is graphically described in

the Phaedrus; the nature of words is analysed in the Cratylus; the form of the syllogism is indicated in the

genealogical trees of the Sophist and Statesman; a true doctrine of predication and an analysis of the sentence

are given in the Sophist; the different meanings of one and being are worked out in the Parmenides. Here we

have most of the important elements of logic, not yet systematized or reduced to an art or science, but

scattered up and down as they would naturally occur in ordinary discourse. They are of little or no use or

significance to us; but because we have grown out of the need of them we should not therefore despise them.

They are still interesting and instructive for the light which they shed on the history of the human mind.

There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new ones are constantly springing up. But

they are not of the kind to which ancient logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not

the analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the use of the Aristotelian logic any longer

natural to us. We no longer put arguments into the form of syllogisms like the schoolmen; the simple use of

language has been, happily, restored to us. Neither do we discuss the nature of the proposition, nor extract

hidden truths from the copula, nor dispute any longer about nominalism and realism. We do not confuse the

form with the matter of knowledge, or invent laws of thought, or imagine that any single science furnishes a

principle of reasoning to all the rest. Neither do we require categories or heads of argument to be invented for

our use. Those who have no knowledge of logic, like some of our great physical philosophers, seem to be

quite as good reasoners as those who have. Most of the ancient puzzles have been settled on the basis of

usage and common sense; there is no need to reopen them. No science should raise problems or invent forms

of thought which add nothing to knowledge and are of no use in assisting the acquisition of it. This seems to

be the natural limit of logic and metaphysics; if they give us a more comprehensive or a more definite view of

the different spheres of knowledge they are to be studied; if not, not. The better part of ancient logic appears

hardly in our own day to have a separate existence; it is absorbed in two other sciences: (1) rhetoric, if indeed

this ancient art be not also fading away into literary criticism; (2) the science of language, under which all

questions relating to words and propositions and the combinations of them may properly be included.

To continue dead or imaginary sciences, which make no signs of progress and have no definite sphere, tends

to interfere with the prosecution of living ones. The study of them is apt to blind the judgment and to render

men incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of appreciating the nature of truth. Nor should we

allow the living science to become confused with the dead by an ambiguity of language. The term logic has

two different meanings, an ancient and a modern one, and we vainly try to bridge the gulf between them.

Many perplexities are avoided by keeping them apart. There might certainly be a new science of logic; it

would not however be built up out of the fragments of the old, but would be distinct from themrelative to

the state of knowledge which exists at the present time, and based chiefly on the methods of Modern

Inductive philosophy. Such a science might have two legitimate fields: first, the refutation and explanation of

false philosophies still hovering in the air as they appear from the point of view of later experience or are

comprehended in the history of the human mind, as in a larger horizon: secondly, it might furnish new forms

of thought more adequate to the expression of all the diversities and oppositions of knowledge which have

grown up in these latter days; it might also suggest new methods of enquiry derived from the comparison of

the sciences. Few will deny that the introduction of the words 'subject' and 'object' and the Hegelian

reconciliation of opposites have been 'most gracious aids' to psychology, or that the methods of Bacon and

Mill have shed a light far and wide on the realms of knowledge. These two great studies, the one destructive

and corrective of error, the other conservative and constructive of truth, might be a first and second part of

logic. Ancient logic would be the propaedeutic or gate of approach to logical science,nothing more. But to

pursue such speculations further, though not irrelevant, might lead us too far away from the argument of the

The Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he approaches most nearly to the comic poet.

The mirth is broader, the irony more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two Sophists, although

veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his writings. Even Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last

pacified, and becomes a friendly and interested auditor of the great discourse. But in the Euthydemus the

Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself taken part, and in which the two

brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who had settled

at Thurii, but were driven out, and in former days had been known at Athens as professors of rhetoric and of

the art of fighting in armour. To this they have now added a new accomplishmentthe art of Eristic, or

fighting with words, which they are likewise willing to teach 'for a consideration.' But they can also teach

virtue in a very short time and in the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the lookout for teachers

of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of the great Alcibiades, and is desirous that he

should have the benefit of their instructions. He is ready to fall down and worship them; although the

A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is

watched by the eager eyes of his lover Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; and such a

performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and the Muses. It is agreed that the

brothers shall question Cleinias. 'Cleinias,' says Euthydemus, 'who learn, the wise or the unwise?' 'The wise,'

is the reply; given with blushing and hesitation. 'And yet when you learned you did not know and were not

wise.' Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball: 'Who are they who learn dictation of the grammarmaster; the

wise or the foolish boys?' 'The wise.' 'Then, after all, the wise learn.' 'And do they learn,' said Euthydemus,

'what they know or what they do not know?' 'The latter.' 'And dictation is a dictation of letters?' 'Yes.' 'And

you know letters?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn what you know.' 'But,' retorts Dionysodorus, 'is not learning

acquiring knowledge?' 'Yes.' 'And you acquire that which you have not got already?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn

Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these repeated overthrows. He therefore

explains to him the nature of the process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are not serious;

there are jests at the mysteries which precede the enthronement, and he is being initiated into the mysteries of

the sophistical ritual. This is all a sort of horseplay, which is now ended. The exhortation to virtue will

follow, and Socrates himself (if the wise men will not laugh at him) is desirous of showing the way in which

such an exhortation should be carried on, according to his own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias.

All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as wealth, health, beauty, birth, power,

honour; not forgetting the virtues and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is omitted.

What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already:in

every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the possession of

goods is not enough; there must also be a right use of them which can only be given by knowledge: in

themselves they are neither good nor evil knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and

folly the only evil. The conclusion is that we must get 'wisdom.' But can wisdom be taught? 'Yes,' says

Cleinias. The ingenuousness of the youth delights Socrates, who is at once relieved from the necessity of

discussing one of his great puzzles. 'Since wisdom is the only good, he must become a philosopher, or lover

After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction, the two brothers recommence their

'You want Cleinias to be wise?' 'Yes.' 'And he is not wise yet?' 'No.' 'Then you want him to be what he is not,

and not to be what he is?not to bethat is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all be!'

Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement, thinking that he will teach the two

Sophists a lesson of good manners. But he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as a

storm seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and Ctesippus then says that he is not reviling

the two Sophists, he is only contradicting them. 'But,' says Dionysodorus, 'there is no such thing as

contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how

Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would like to be informed by the great master

of the art, 'What is the meaning of this paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? Then

what are they professing to teach?' The two Sophists complain that Socrates is ready to answer what they said

a year ago, but is 'nonplussed' at what they are saying now. 'What does the word "nonplussed" mean?'

Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning.

Ctesippus again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews the conversation with

Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus in

He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a philosopher. And philosophy is the possession

of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable and may be used. What knowledge is

there which has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is required in any particular art; nor again the art of

the composer of speeches, who knows how to write them, but cannot speak them, although he too must be

admitted to be a kind of enchanter of wild animals. Neither is the knowledge which we are seeking the

knowledge of the general. For the general makes over his prey to the statesman, as the huntsman does to the

cook, or the taker of quails to the keeper of quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The two

enquirers, Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a wilderness, vainly searching after the

art of life and happiness. At last they fix upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But the

kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good nor evil: and if we say further that it makes us

wise, in what does it make us wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, but only in itself: or

say again that it makes us good, there is no answer to the question, 'good in what?' At length in despair

Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot know and not know, he cannot know

some things and not know others, and therefore he knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men

know all things. 'Do they know shoemaking, etc?' 'Yes.' The sceptical Ctesippus would like to have some

evidence of this extraordinary statement: he will believe if Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth

Dionysodorus has, and if Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of information about Euthydemus. Even

Socrates is incredulous, and indulges in a little raillery at the expense of the brothers. But he restrains himself,

remembering that if the men who are to be his teachers think him stupid they will take no pains with him.

Another fallacy is produced which turns on the absoluteness of the verb 'to know.' And here Dionysodorus is

caught 'napping,' and is induced by Socrates to confess that 'he does not know the good to be unjust.' Socrates

appeals to his brother Euthydemus; at the same time he acknowledges that he cannot, like Heracles, fight

against a Hydra, and even Heracles, on the approach of a second monster, called upon his nephew Iolaus to

help. Dionysodorus rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of Heracles than of Socrates. For a nephew is

a nephew, and a brother is a brother, and a father is a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of men only,

but of dogs and seamonsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the consequences which follow: 'Much good has

'But,' says Euthydemus, unabashed, 'nobody wants much good.' Medicine is a good, arms are a good, money

is a good, and yet there may be too much of them in wrong places. 'No,' says Ctesippus, 'there cannot be too

much gold.' And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a

stater in either eye?' Ctesippus, imitating the new wisdom, replies, 'And do not the Scythians reckon those to

be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the inside of them?' 'Do you see,' retorts

Euthydemus, 'what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?' 'What has the quality of

vision.' 'And you see our garments?' 'Yes.' 'Then our garments have the quality of vision.' A similar play of

words follows, which is successfully retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, who is rebuked by

'But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute

beauty?' Socrates replies that they are not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. 'And

are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?' After a few more amphiboliae, in which Socrates,

like Ctesippus, in selfdefence borrows the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are

invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and laughing, and a panegyrical oration

First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus to public opinion; for most persons would

rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he remarks upon

their impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as well as those of other people. Thirdly, he notes their

liberality, which makes them give away their secret to all the world: they should be more reserved, and let no

one be present at this exhibition who does not pay them a handsome fee; or better still they might practise on

one another only. He concludes with a respectful request that they will receive him and Cleinias among their

Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise severely this wisdom,not sparing

Socrates himself for countenancing such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this

censorious critic. 'Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.' Socrates understands that he is an

amphibious animal, half philosopher, half politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of

themselves and a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. They are a class who are

very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for

they imagine themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both of politics and of

philosophy. They do not understand the principles of combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of

two good things which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them taken separately.

Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is growing up. The description of

Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to him the reflection that the professors of education are strange

beings. Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions are few, and recommends that

'he and his house' should continue to serve philosophy, and not mind about its professors.

There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying out, and the new has not yet come into

full life. Great philosophies like the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of the human

mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms which have rooted themselves in

languageas troublesome elements of thought which cannot be either used or explained away. The same

absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached to the words which are the signs of

them. The philosophy which in the first and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of reflection,

It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirises in the Euthydemus. The fallacies which are noted by him

appear trifling to us now, but they were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier Greek

philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to perplex human thought. Besides he is

caricaturing them; they probably received more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously maintained

them. They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to wonder how any one could ever have been

deceived by them; but we must remember also that there was a time when the human mind was only with

To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a mental state in which not individuals

only, but whole schools during more than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the

conception of rest, and therefore the very word 'this' (Theaet.) from language; in which the ideas of space,

time, matter, motion, were proved to be contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative

change was a puzzle, and even differences of degree, when applied to abstract notions, were not understood;

in which there was no analysis of grammar, and mere puns or plays of words received serious attention; in

which contradiction itself was denied, and, on the one hand, every predicate was affirmed to be true of every

subject, and on the other, it was held that no predicate was true of any subject, and that nothing was, or was

known, or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried on with religious earnestness and more than

scholastic subtlety, in which the catchwords of philosophy are completely detached from their context.

(Compare Theaet.) To such disputes the humour, whether of Plato in the ancient, or of Pope and Swift in the

modern world, is the natural enemy. Nor must we forget that in modern times also there is no fallacy so gross,

no trick of language so transparent, no abstraction so barren and unmeaning, no form of thought so

contradictory to experience, which has not been found to satisfy the minds of philosophical enquirers at a

certain stage, or when regarded from a certain point of view only. The peculiarity of the fallacies of our own

age is that we live within them, and are therefore generally unconscious of them.

Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book 'De Sophisticis Elenchis,' which Plato, with

equal command of their true nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we are only struck

with the broad humour of this 'reductio ad absurdum:' gradually we perceive that some important questions

begin to emerge. Here, as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put words in the

place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny predication, and thus make knowledge impossible, to

whom ideas and objects of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual oscillation and transition.

Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which

allows the same words to be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of meaning: (2) The

necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena. Plato is aware that his own doctrine of ideas, as well

as the Eleatic Being and Not being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies. The sophism advanced

in the Meno, 'that you cannot enquire either into what you know or do not know,' is lightly touched upon at

the commencement of the Dialogue; the thesis of Protagoras, that everything is true to him to whom it seems

to be true, is satirized. In contrast with these fallacies is maintained the Socratic doctrine that happiness is

gained by knowledge. The grammatical puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes probably contain

allusions to tricks of language which may have been practised by the disciples of Prodicus or Antisthenes.

They would have had more point, if we were acquainted with the writings against which Plato's humour is

directed. Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning; but we have lost the clue to some of them, and

cannot determine whether, as in the Cratylus, Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun with his

The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects with the exhibition of the Sophists: (1)

In their perfect relevancy to the subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly

irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages the youth, instead of 'knocking him

down,' after the manner of the two Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusionfor while

Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they are not able to arrive at any certain

result about the art which is to teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the Republic;

as the conception of the kingly art is more fully developed in the Politicus, and the caricature of rhetoric in

The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is Socrates once more in the character of an old

man; and his equal in years, Crito, the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the Laches, his fellow

demesman (Apol.), to whom the scene is narrated, and who once or twice interrupts with a remark after the

manner of the interlocutor in the Phaedo, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes a playful

allusion to his moneygetting habits. There is the youth Cleinias, the grandson of Alcibiades, who may be

compared with Lysis, Charmides, Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths Socrates

draws his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in a kindly and sympathetic relation. Crito will

not believe that Socrates has not improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias (compare Phaedrus).

The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as long dead, (Greek), and who died at the age of

fortyfour, in the year 404 B.C., suggests not only that the intended scene of the Euthydemus could not have

been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue could not have been composed before 390 at the

soonest. Ctesippus, who is the lover of Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the Lysis, and seems

there too to deserve the character which is here given him, of a somewhat uproarious young man. But the

chief study of all is the picture of the two brothers, who are unapproachable in their effrontery, equally

careless of what they say to others and of what is said to them, and never at a loss. They are 'Arcades ambo et

cantare pares et respondere parati.' Some superior degree of wit or subtlety is attributed to Euthydemus, who

The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as inconsistent with the general scheme. Such

a criticism is like similar criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the variety which

the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to

write a play upon a play, just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same time he takes

the opportunity of assailing another class of persons who are as alien from the spirit of philosophy as

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been apt to have a bad

name both in ancient and modern times. The persons whom Plato ridicules in the epilogue to the Euthydemus

are of this class. They occupy a borderground between philosophy and politics; they keep out of the dangers

of politics, and at the same time use philosophy as a means of serving their own interests. Plato quaintly

describes them as making two good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by perverting the objects of

both. Men like Antiphon or Lysias would be types of the class. Out of a regard to the respectabilities of life,

they are disposed to censure the interest which Socrates takes in the exhibition of the two brothers. They do

not understand, any more than Crito, that he is pursuing his vocation of detecting the follies of mankind,

Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues. The concluding remark of Crito, that he has

a difficulty in educating his two sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give up philosophy

because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the

The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are: (1) the similarity in plan and style to the

Protagoras, Charmides, and Lysis;the relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of humorous

antagonism, not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of embittered hatred; and the places and persons have a

considerable family likeness; (2) the Euthydemus belongs to the Socratic period in which Socrates is

represented as willing to learn, but unable to teach; and in the spirit of Xenophon's Memorabilia, philosophy

is defined as 'the knowledge which will make us happy;' (3) we seem to have passed the stage arrived at in

the Protagoras, for Socrates is no longer discussing whether virtue can be taughtfrom this question he is

relieved by the ingenuous declaration of the youth Cleinias; and (4) not yet to have reached the point at which

he asserts 'that there are no teachers.' Such grounds are precarious, as arguments from style and plan are apt

to be (Greek). But no arguments equally strong can be urged in favour of assigning to the Euthydemus any

CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was

such a crowd around you that I could not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, and

I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who was he?

CRITO: The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the righthand side. In the middle was

Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own

Critobulus, but he is much forwarder and very goodlooking: the other is thin and looks younger than he is.

SOCRATES: He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand there was his brother

CRITO: Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new importation of Sophists, as I should

SOCRATES: As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part of the world, and have migrated

from Chios to Thurii; they were driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in these

regions. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful consummate! I never knew

what the true pancratiast was before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian

brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes, besides being perfect in the use of their

bodies, are invincible in every sort of warfare; for they are capital at fighting in armour, and will teach the art

to any one who pays them; and also they are most skilful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and

teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts. And this was only

the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have

mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares even to

stand up against them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true

or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can

SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the consolation of knowing that they

began this art of disputation which I covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, they

had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I

have done Connus the son of Metrobius, the harpplayer, who is still my musicmaster; for when the boys

who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him grandpapa's master. Now I should not

like the strangers to experience similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to receive

me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to accompany me to them, as I persuaded

them to go with me to Connus, and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your sons

as a bait; they will want to have them as pupils, and for the sake of them willing to receive us.

CRITO: I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that you would give me a description of

SOCRATES: In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I did not attendI paid great attention

to them, and I remember and will endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone in

the dressingroom of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to depart; when I was getting up I

recognized the familiar divine sign: so I sat down again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus

and Dionysodorus came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to be their disciples, and they

walked about in the covered court; they had not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered,

who, as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom was

Ctesippus the Paeanian, a wellbred youth, but also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the

entrance as I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you describe; and

Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first stopped and talked with one another, now and

then glancing at us, for I particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the youth,

and the other by me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long

time; and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not

in a small but in a large way of wisdom, for they know all about war,all that a good general ought to know

about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of fighting in armour: and they know about law

too, and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured.

They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they looked at one another, and both of them

laughed; and then Euthydemus said: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; to us

Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, what must the principal one be; tell me,

The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal occupation; and we believe that we can impart it

My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was saying just now, that your chief

accomplishment was the art of fighting in armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you

professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the other knowledge, O forgive me: I

address you as I would superior beings, and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are

you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so vast, that a feeling of incredulity

Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom.

And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?

That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to exhibit, but also to teach any one

But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want to learn. I shall be the first; and there is

the youth Cleinias, and Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers of Cleinias, who

were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting at some distance from Cleinias; and when

Euthydemus leaned forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between us;

and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because he was interested, he jumped up and

stood opposite to us: and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him

that they were all eager to learn: to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and

bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said: O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request

you to do myself and the company the favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble in giving the whole

exhibition; but tell me one thing,can you make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he

ought to learn of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is a thing

which cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him, who

is of the latter temper of mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he will best

And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now living are the most likely to

Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the exhibition, and only try to persuade

the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will

confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is I and all of us are extremely anxious that

he should become truly good. His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old

Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and we are naturally afraid that some one

may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is

most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, and converse with him in our

These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in a manly and at the same time

encouraging tone, replied: There can be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer

He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with

What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and

therefore, like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses.

Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or

The youth, overpowered by the question blushed, and in his perplexity looked at me for help; and I, knowing

that he was disconcerted, said: Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my

Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch my ear, his face beaming with

While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I had no time to warn him of the

predicament in which he was placed, and he answered that those who learned were the wise.

Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not?

And they are the teachers of those who learnthe grammarmaster and the lyremaster used to teach you

And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?

You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning?

At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus at the bidding of their director,

laughed and cheered. Then, before the youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly took him

in hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammarmaster dictated anything to you, were they the wise

Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your last answer to Euthydemus was

Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their wisdom, gave vent to another peal of

laughter, while the rest of us were silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere

with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another similar question, which might be

compared to the double turn of an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what

Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of the same sort.

Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn what they do not know; and he

Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns?

The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the argument, like a ball which he caught,

and had another throw at the youth. Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not

And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?

Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?

Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that he was in deep water, and

therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You

must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not

understand what the two strangers are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the

Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever been initiated, is,

as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you,

and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical

ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms. The two foreign

gentlemen, perceiving that you did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two

meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously

have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether

something done or spoken by the light of this newlyacquired knowledge; the latter is generally called

'knowing' rather than 'learning,' but the word 'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to

you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not

know. There was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they

know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the

gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever

was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and

oversetting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one

when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid

on his back. And you must regard all that has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in

what is to follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I

will show them how); for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that

they wanted to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think that we have

had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the

study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what

sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at

me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore

ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to

you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am

afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who does not

Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy?that is the next question. Shall

we not be happy if we have many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the

And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily

Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's own land, are goods?

And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, justice, courage: do you not verily

and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as

Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdomamong the goods or not?

Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.

Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.

On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and I escaped making a

Why, because we have already spoken of goodfortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward good fortune, which has a place in the list

He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is goodfortune; even a child may

The simpleminded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said to him: Do you not know, Cleinias,

Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?

And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the riskin company with a wise

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illnessa wise physician,

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever err, and therefore he must act

We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no

need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our

making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?

And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited

And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of

food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?

Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the

better for the possession of them? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools

And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them,

Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there

Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer

That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the nonuse; for the one is an evil,

Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the

And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at firstwealth and health and beauty, is not knowledge that

which directs us to the right use of them, and regulates our practice about them?

Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only

And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom?

Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom?

Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes

would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?

And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who

Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to

be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or

are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their

opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under

the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing?

What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result that other things are indifferent, and that

Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been

shown, is gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good fortune

in the use of them, is given by knowledge,the inference is that everybody ought by all means to try and

And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than money, from a father or a guardian

or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen or strangerthe eager desire and prayer to them that they would

impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is any one to be blamed for doing any

honourable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you

Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for this is a

point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me

Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from

a long and tiresome investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that

wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge

I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said: That is an example,

clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that one of

you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: or at least take up the enquiry where I left

off, and proceed to show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of

knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was saying at first, the

improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.

Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to see how they would approach the

question, and where they would start in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom

and virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed towards him,

perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for

the man, Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully persuasive regarded as an

Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you

I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when we asked them to converse with

the youth, and that this made them jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in

Taking advantage of my consternation he added: You wish him no longer to be what he is, which can only

mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be,

When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and said: Stranger of Thuriiif

politeness would allow me I should say, A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and

Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?

And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the

And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is

Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would be doing something; and you have

already acknowledged that no one can do what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says

what is false; but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is.

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain way and manner, and not as they really

Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are?

Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give you a piece of advice, you had better

take care that they do not speak evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil.

And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm?

To be sure they do, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid and cold dialectician.

Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving you friendly advice, and, if I could,

would persuade you not like a boor to say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all

I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I

think that we must allow the strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them about

words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to destroy men in such a way as to make good

and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether they

have learned from some one else this new sort of death and destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad

man and turn him into a good oneif they know this (and they do know thisat any rate they said just now

that this was the secret of their newlydiscovered art)let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and

make him wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with them, then

fiat experimentum in corpore senis; I will be the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old

person to Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill me, boil me, if he will

Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the strangers; they may skin me alive, if they

please (and I am pretty well skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that of

Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry

with him, when really I am not angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking

improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O illustrious Dionysodorus; for they

Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is

You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one contradicting any one else.

Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man could affirm a negative; for no

And what does that signify? said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all the same for that.

But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? Then

Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?

But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothingis

Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I have often

heard, and have been amazed to hear, this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples

of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as

destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no

such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position?

Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a

Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?

Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?

O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom; I am

afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if

there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man

And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought,

then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you

And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you bring up now what I said at

firstand if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up toobut are nonplussed

Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise men: and indeed I know not what to

make of this word 'nonplussed,' which you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean

Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise man who comes to us in the

character of a great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not to answerand now you will not

You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words

have a sense;what do you say, wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all your

wisdom will be nonplussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that there is no

error,and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however,

Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very likely to advance: even

your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another

Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you

Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe Ctesippus, and said to him: To you,

Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleiniasthat you do not understand the ways of these

philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus, they take different

forms and deceive us by their enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show

themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and

entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in which I

pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the

hope that I may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply serious and

interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, I said, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we

And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute truthA knowledge which will

And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was

But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better off, even if without trouble and

digging all the gold which there is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold,

the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? Do you not remember? I

Nor would any other knowledge, whether of moneymaking, or of medicine, or of any other art which knows

only how to make a thing, and not to use it when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right?

And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without giving them the knowledge of

the way to use the immortality, neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of

Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?

And our desire is not to be skilful lyremakers, or artists of that sort far otherwise; for with them the art

which makes is one, and the art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are

divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another. Am I not

And clearly we do not want the art of the flutemaker; this is only another of the same sort?

But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches would that be the art which would

I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which

they make, just as the makers of lyres do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of themselves

unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the others make for them; and this proves

Yes, I said; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art of making speeches is not one which

will make a man happy. And yet I did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be

discovered in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, always appear to me to be

very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the

great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of

charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of their's acts upon dicasts

and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and pacifying of them. Do you agree with me?

I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which the possession is most likely to make a

Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; and when the prey is taken the

huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but they hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and

astronomers and calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make their diagrams, but

only find out that which was previously contained in them)they, I say, not being able to use but only to

catch their prey, hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, if they have any sense in

Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands over his new acquisition to the

statesman, for he does not know how to use them himself; or as the quailtaker transfers the quails to the

keeper of them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us blessed, and which is able to use that which

it makes or takes, the art of the general is not the one, and some other must be found.

CRITO: Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs neither Euthydemus nor any one else

SOCRATES: All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not spoken either by Euthydemus or

Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I

CRITO: Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I should be disposed to think. But did

you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?

SOCRATES: Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were like children after larks,

always on the point of catching the art, which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the

whole story? At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and caused happiness, and

then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning,

SOCRATES: I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the political.

SOCRATES: To this royal or political art all the arts, including the art of the general, seemed to render up

the supremacy, that being the only one which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the

very art which we were seekingthe art which is the source of good government, and which may be

described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and

SOCRATES: You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what followed; for we resumed the enquiry,

and a question of this sort was asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for us?

SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine were supposed to have supreme

authority over the subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would sayit

SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the

subject artswhat does that do? Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?

SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? Perhaps you may not be

SOCRATES: No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is the art which we were

SOCRATES: And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge of some kind is the only

SOCRATES: All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for example, wealth, freedom,

tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and

impart knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, and make us happy.

CRITO: Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to your report of the conversation.

SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the arts,carpentering, and cobbling,

SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? For it is not the source of any

works which are neither good nor evil, and gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can it

be, and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other

SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that they will make others good,

and that these others will make others again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we

have put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old song over again; and we are just as

far as ever, if not farther, from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.

SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I lifted up my voice, and

earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the

argument; they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in sober earnest

what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following effect: Would you rather, Socrates,

said he, that I should show you this knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you

Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge; at my time of life that will be

That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?

Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; and therefore you are and are not at

A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you explain how I possess that knowledge

for which we were seeking? Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore,

since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I

know all things, then I must have the knowledge for which we are seekingMay I assume this to be your

Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I am only in the same case with you and

our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not

O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And do all other men know all things or

Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and not know others, and be at the same time knowing

O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest; hardly have I got you to that point. And

do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leathercutting?

By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give me some proof which would enable

Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell how many teeth you have.

Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this one thing, and then we shall know that you are

speak the truth; if you tell us the number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe

the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they refused, and they would only say in

answer to each of his questions, that they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to throw off all

restraint; no question in fact was too bad for him; he would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and

they, like wild boars, came rushing on his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was

carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance.

And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he got to such a height of skill as

Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be wise men.

Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be self convicted of this, for if I am really a

wise man, which I never knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all

Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid; when I do not know what you are

Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood and answered by me in another, will

That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I imagine.

You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning, because you will be prating, and are an

Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when he wanted to catch me in his

springes of words. And I remembered that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then

he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil,

I reflected that I had better let him have his way, as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So

I said: You are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never made a profession of the

art, and therefore do as you say; ask your questions once more, and I will answer.

Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with something, or with nothing.

The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you, he said, with what you know, but whether

Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope that you will forgive me. And now

And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?

You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know with this?

You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things with this, and some things with

Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if

And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that you know all things.

I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words 'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and

And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the

addition of 'when you know them' or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once

known all things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when you were growing up, and

before you were born, and before the heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know

them; and I swear that you shall always continue to know all things, if I am of the mind to make you.

But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, if you are really speaking the truth, and

yet I a little doubt your power to make good your words unless you have the help of your brother

Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although in the main I cannot doubt that I

really do know all things, when I am told so by men of your prodigious wisdomhow can I say that I know

such things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or not?

Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are

You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will be proved not to know, and then

I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not your omniscient brother appear to

Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent Euthydemus from proving to me that I

No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and a fortiori I must run away from two. I am no

Heracles; and even Heracles could not fight against the Hydra, who was a sheSophist, and had the wit to

shoot up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a second monster of a

seacrab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a seavoyage, bearing down

upon him from the left, opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing troublesome he called

Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably succoured him; but if my Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles (the

And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether

I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will insist on askingthat I pretty well

Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles; and his

father was not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of

Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his father, and mine was Sophroniscus.

I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid that you may prove me to be one.

And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold?

For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a father, then Sophroniscus, being other

Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my

I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other

Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father?

They are not 'in pari materia,' Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had better take care, for it is monstrous to

If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract the same admissions from you,

Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers.

Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus

Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him.

I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he

begat such wise sons? much good has this father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom

Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it good or evil for a man who is sick to

Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your charming puzzles.

That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit medicine to be good for a man to drink,

when wanted, must it not be good for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a

Ctesippus said: Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks is as big as the statue of Delphi.

And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?

Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one

And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you and your companion fight in

armour, I thought that you would have known better...Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus

And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much as possible in himself, and may

he not be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have gold in their own skulls to be the

happiest and bravest of men (that is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and

father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them,

And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? said

And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. (Note: the ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible

and able to see,' (Greek), 'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the

speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English. Compare Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):

'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known is here affirmed to know.

'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a stone you are.

'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the speaker are the subject of speech.

'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is when there is an equal linguistic

propriety in several interpretations; the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the

ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves unambiguous, as in "knowing letters."

"Knowing" and "letters" are perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the

letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the modes in which propositions and

Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you

do seem to me to have been caught napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak and

Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise and outcry if they are touched: so

that here your wisdom is strangely mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when

speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was present).

But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are silent.

Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?

Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that you will be 'nonplussed' at that

Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus,

has got into a dilemma; all is over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten

times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked up this answer from them; for

there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and

Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was rightly served for

having opened my mouth at all: I said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have

And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is

But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?

Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their skill, on which my heart was set.

Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the nonexistent.

What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?

And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for surely the other is not the same; I

should imagine that even a child will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you

must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you and your brother seem to me to be good

workmen in your own department, and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.

What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?

Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do his business, and if he were to

Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?

And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?

Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.

Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have in your own power, and which you

are able to use as you would desire, for example, an ox or a sheepwould you not think that which you

could sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own, and that which you could not

Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the questions, which I was impatient to

You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which

Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me,

Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a net, who

gives a desperate twist that he may get away, I said: No, Dionysodorus, I have not.

What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian at all if you have no ancestral gods

Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you please; in the way of religion I have altars

That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether colonists or citizens of Athens; an ancestral

Apollo there is, who is the father of Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an

Athene guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us.

No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, and Athene.

And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these

And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as

Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, can you sell them or give them away

At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came to the rescue.

Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more of them; the pair are invincible.

Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and their words, and what with laughing

and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only

had cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with delight until the columns of the

Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I

made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom; I was their devoted

servant, and fell to praising and admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to

acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, to admire in your words,

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of

any opinionwhether of the many, or of the grave and reverend seigniorsyou regard only those who are

like yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you, and who would approve of such

arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of

employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further express my approval

of your kind and publicspirited denial of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any

other; the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, not excepting your own, which

graciously follows the example of others; and thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to

me to be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably contrived by you, that in

a very short time it can be imparted to any one. I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time.

Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same time I would advise you not to have

any more public entertainments; there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an

opportunity of acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if the discussion were confined to your two

selves; but if there must be an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee;you

should be careful of this;and if you are wise, you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but

you and themselves. For only what is rare is valuable; and 'water,' which, as Pindar says, is the 'best of all

things,' is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among

Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed between us we went away. I hope that

you will come to them with me, since they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them money;

no age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat one thing which they said, for your especial

benefit,that the learning of their art did not at all interfere with the business of moneymaking.

CRITO: Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear that I am not likeminded with

Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments

than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think

that you may as well hear what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensionshe was a

professor of legal oratory who came away from you while I was walking up and down. 'Crito,' said he to

me, 'are you giving no attention to these wise men?' 'No, indeed,' I said to him; 'I could not get within hearing

of themthere was such a crowd.' 'You would have heard something worth hearing if you had.' 'What was

that?' I said. 'You would have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing.' 'And what did you

think of them?' I said. 'What did I think of them?' he said:'theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody

might hear from men who were playing the fool, and making much ado about nothing.' That was the

expression which he used. 'Surely,' I said, 'philosophy is a charming thing.' 'Charming!' he said; 'what

simplicity! philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had been present you would have been ashamed of

your friendhis conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they

say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the most eminent

professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean

and ridiculous.' Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from others, appears to

me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess

SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? First of all let me

know;What manner of man was he who came up to you and censured philosophy; was he an orator who

himself practises in the courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which they do battle?

CRITO: He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever been into court; but they say that he

SOCRATES: Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, whom I was on the point of

mentioningone of those whom Prodicus describes as on the borderground between philosophers and

statesmenthey think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the wisest;

nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in their way; and they are of the opinion that if they can

prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that

they are themselves really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friends,

when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom is very

natural; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political wisdom; there is

reason in what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of both, and so they keep out of the way of

CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something specious in that notion of theirs.

SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot be made to understand the nature

of intermediates. For all persons or things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate

in both of themif one of these two things is good and the other evil, are better than the one and worse than

the other; but if they are in a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they fall

short of either of their component elements in the attainment of their ends. Only in the case when the two

component elements which do not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either. Now, if

philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different ends, and they participate in both, and are

in a mean between them, then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; or, if the one be good

and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than the other; only on the supposition that they are

both evil could there be any truth in what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their two pursuits

are either wholly or partly evil; but the truth is, that these philosopher politicians who aim at both fall short

of both in the attainment of their respective ends, and are really third, although they would like to stand first.

There is no need, however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs which may be forgiven; for every man

ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all like wisdom: at the

CRITO: I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty about my two sons. What am I to

do with them? There is no hurry about the younger one, who is only a child; but the other, Critobulus, is

getting on, and needs some one who will improve him. I cannot help thinking, when I hear you talk, that there

is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties about our children:in the first place, about marrying a wife of

good family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for them and yet taking no care

about their education. But then again, when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am

amazed. To me, if I am to confess the truth, they all seem to be such outrageous beings: so that I do not know

SOCRATES: Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good

for nothing, and the good are few and beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and

SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?

SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your

SOCRATES: Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are

good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek

to turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I believe that she is, then follow her